Archelogia philosophica nova, or, New principles of philosophy containing philosophy in general, metaphysicks or ontology, dynamilogy or a discourse of power, religio philosophi or natural theology, physicks or natural philosophy / by Gideon Harvey ...

CHAP. VII. Of the Natural Matter and Form of the Elements.

• 1. That the Elements are constituted out of minima's. That they were at first created a maximum divisible into minima's.
• 2. That, supposing there were a materia prima Aristotelica, yet it is absurd to assert her to have a Potentia Essentialis, or Appetitus Formae.
• 3. That the Natural Form is not educed e Potentia materiae.
• 4. That the Actus of Local Motion is the Form of the Elements.
• 5. The manner of knowing the first constitution of the Elements. That there was a Chaos.
• 6. That there was conferred a distinct form upon every Element. Whe∣ther a Form is a Substance. 'Tis proved that it is not.

I. ANd now give me leave to apply what hath been stated in the preceding Chapter to the Elements, which as they are constituted out of Indivisibles, Points, or minima's, so they are dissolveable into the said Indivisibles. At their first Creation they were each created a Maximum. Their matter is nothing else but their concrete quantity, mole, or magnitude. Neither are we to

imagine, that God did create all the minima's of the world, before he united them to one Mass, but created the whole Mass at once, divi∣sible into indivisibilities, that so they being divided into indivisibi∣lities might become a fit matter for mixture; and therein he im∣posed an order and law upon the Elements of generation and disso∣lution: and without this Law, what Order is there imagina∣ble?

II. Supposing these points coagmented into one Mass, were created before the advent of a form (which is impossible secundum quid) and being without any determination, figure, motion, or any thing, that descends from a form, it would be nothing differing from Aristotles materia prima: Now then I demand what Potentia essemi∣alis, or Appetitus formae could there be rationally conceived to in∣here in her? Certainly no essential one, but obediential; neither an Appetite to a form, for she being blind, how could she perceive a form, to covet it? or being destitute of motion, how could she have an appetite? since Appetite is nothing else but a natural mo∣tion, or inclination.

III. Matter having brought quantity, place, habit, and duration along with her, let us further enquire what company the form hath attending it. A form, as we said before, is little else but a Mode of activity and quality: For quantity without her is nothing of her self; it is the same that doth constitute her, and addes distinction and action to her. That, which giveth activity and quality to Matter and Quantity is an actus of Local Motion. This actus of motion is not raised out of quantity or matter, for then it would remain quantity, neither is it educed out of the disposition of matter; for even so it could be nothing yet but matter disposed. Wherefore it is a strange saying to assert, that the form is educed out of the power of matter: Either this may be taken properly, and then it is equipollent, as if you said, the form is educed out of the matter, as she is potent, that is, as having a disposition or propension unto; and this is impos∣sible: or improperly, when the power of matter is taken for a be∣ing, which as yet is not, but may be; neither can the form in this sense be educed; for she then would be educed e nihilo, or e priva∣tione.

IV. That the actus continuus of local motion is the form of the Ele∣ments: I prove it. That, which is the first cause of all the effects acted by the Elements, must needs be their form: but such is the act of local

motion. Wherefore, &c. I shall omit the proving of the Minor here in general, since I have proved it below in particular.

V. The particular production of each part of the world holds forth the manner of the production of the whole, since they are all derived from one universal efficient, Nature Naturating. We observe then daily; as for instance, in the production of Man, Beasts, Fowls, Minerals; that these draw their first Original from a confusion of Principles of Elements, which is an assured note, or mark that the Elements of the universe were first cast into a confusion (quia pars totius naturam aemulatur.)

2. It is no less undoubtable, that as the activity and qualities of these fore-instanced formations were latent, and contained in their confused Elements, and gradually extracted, inacted, and exalt∣ed to their (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) perfection, through the vertue of an efficient, in like manner were the activity, and qualities, or forms of the ele∣ments latent in their Chaos, and afterwards gradually extracted, ex∣panded, divided and exalted into their fulness by the same Na∣ture.

3. It is hence apparent, that the Elements underwent several changes, but total, not partial ones, and therefore require a particu∣lar disquisition upon each.

VI. Let us imagine many millions upon millions of minima's of quantity, or matter divided into four equal parts, whereof each is set apart to be the matter and subject of every one of the four E∣lements. Each of these, 'tis necessary should be vivified and actua∣ted by a distinct form, for otherwise they could not in their dissolu∣tion from the Chaos, prove apt substances for the constitution of di∣stinct bodies. Or simply, a form is needful, or how, or by what pow∣er could they act? But the question will be, whether this form is not an incompleat Substance, as the Philosopher states. The question, me thinks, is rather, whether it is not a Bull to name a substance incompleat? For a substance is a substance because it is compleat, and its completion or perfection gives it a subsistence: so that were a form a substance it might subsist per se: Besides, would it not ac∣cording to Aristotle make an unum per Accidens, or could it be di∣rectly referred to a Predicament, were it united to another real sub∣stance? Neither is it sufficient to distinguish it from an Accident, because it doth constitute part of the compositum: for so doth every other accident or mode, as appears in Metaphysicks: Doth it not

inhere in Subjecto per modum accidentis, or can it exist out of it? And wherein is it then different from an Accident?

2. It is frustraneous for the form to be a substance, since that a being through its quantity only is capable of receiving quality, and activity or vertue of acting * 1.1.

A form then is a power of acting in a substance, but not a sub∣stance; it is essential to a being, but modally only distinguisht from it, not really; for an activity in a substance is nothing else, but an active substance.

The concomitants of this activity, or form are many, as alterative qualities, colour, figure, and all determination and distinction: In a word, it renders its subject hoc aliquid.

Although the form is not educed e potentia materiae, it hinders not from being educed e potestate actuali Agentis, vel efficientis, as Scali∣ger delivers.

Notes

• * 1.1

  That is, an actual vertue, or continua∣ted act.