Archelogia philosophica nova, or, New principles of philosophy containing philosophy in general, metaphysicks or ontology, dynamilogy or a discourse of power, religio philosophi or natural theology, physicks or natural philosophy / by Gideon Harvey ...

CHAP. XIX. Of Original Sinne.

• 1. How it is possible for two contrary Habits to inhere in one subject.
• 2. The absurdities, that follow this Assertion, viz. That the evil habit inheres in the soul per se.
• 3. In what manner the Habit of good is taken to inhere per se in the soul.
• 4. That God created every man theologically good. Several Objecti∣ons, relating to the same assertion, answered.
• 5. How the soul partaketh of the guilt of Original Sinne. The opi∣nion of the Synod of Rochel upon this matter.

I. NOw we may easily explain how two contrary habits can inhere in one and the same subject. No question it is impossible two contraries should inhere both per se in one sub∣ject; for the nature of contraries is to expell one another out of the same subject: Yet it is not repugnant but that two contra∣ry habits may inhere both in one subject, provided the one exist in it per se, and the other per accidens, or that they be not inhe∣rent in one partial subject, although they may in the total: for it is possible for a man to be afflicted with two contrary diseases in two parts of his body, yet both are sustained by one total sub∣ject. In like manner may the evil habit be principally and origi∣nally inherent in the body, and the good habit in the soul, yet both these are contained in one man.

II. Notwithstanding all this, there are some, who obstinately do affirm, that the evil habit inheres in the soul per se, but how do they prove it? Certainly upon these suppositions.

1. That the habits may be altered, and the substance remain the same.

2. That the first man acted through habits.

3. That the good habit being removed the evil habit succeed∣ed in its steed, and consequently that an Accident doth migrate è subjecto in subjectum. which is against their own maxims.

These suppositions being all false, as hath been proved at large, cannot be a firm foundation for any conclusion what∣ever they have built upon them. And therefore I conclude again,

1. That in the first man there was a natural disposition of act∣ing good, but no habit.

2. That there became two habits in man after his fall, the one of good, and the other of evil.

III. That the habit of good inheres in man per se (Quatenus actionis principium dicatur anima, inest ei habitus bonus per se, aut prout habitus sit accidens, secundum istud potest animae attributi in∣esse per accidens, quia ipse habitus est accidens; quae tamen mihi est in usitata locutio.) And the habit of evil per accidens (Non quate∣nus proficiscatur ab anima tanquam à mali principio, sed duntaxat quatenus sit animae instrumentum.) Here one may object, If an evil act proceed per se from the soul, than the evil habit is also inherent in her per se. As to this, the same I may argue from a good act, and thence infer the inherence of the good habit per se. But it is certain, that two contrary opposites (secundum idem ad idem) cannot exist together at the same instant in the same subject; so that the one habit must necessarily inesse per se, and the other per accidens. Before I go farther, let me tell you once for all, when I say that the good habit is per se in man, I do not imply, that it is ex se, but è Dei gratia, è voluntate & poten∣tia divina ordinata; to deny this is to rob God of his honour, and is no lesse than a blasphemy: wherefore it ought to be a great caution to all men, how they assert good habits per se, or good works per se, lest they offend.

IV. God creates every man theologically good, that is, God infuseth the soul theologically good into the body being good al∣so: for otherwise God would be supposed to joyn good to evil. How could the body be evil before the advent of the soul? If it were evil, it must be morally evil (for there is no doubt but it was and remaineth physically good) but that cannot be admitted, because there is no moral evil without a rational will. Good and evil is taken in a double sense:

1. Good or evil is that, which is agreeable or disagreeable with the Law of God.

2. Good or evil is, which is convenient and sutable, or in∣convenient

and unsutable to a being.

According to the first acception, The soul is infused good into a good body, because of the reason fore-mentioned. But accord∣ing to the last it is not.

Here may be demanded, Whether it agreeth with God's goodnesse, to infuse a good soul into an unsutable body.

I answer, That it doth not detract one title from God's good∣nesse: for he hath ordained, that man should multiply and increase, and therefore hath given man a power of increasing and multiply∣ing. The power, which man exerciseth to multiply, is through propagation of his body only, and uniting the soul to it. The body being then prepared for the souls reception, the soul at that instant is raised out of the body (è potentia materiae receptiva) not out of it, as è materiali principio eductivo, like unto material forms, but by the divine power, which is ever present where God hath ordained his benediction: so that God doth not with∣draw his power of creating a soul, when ever a body is pre∣pared for it, although that body is generated by the worst of men, because God hath ordained it; for God doth cre∣ate a soul, not because a wicked man hath disposed a body for the reception of it, but because of his ordained blessing to mans increase.

V. The soul being united to the body, immediately partaketh of the guilt of original sinne. What original sinne is, me thinks, is not distinctly expounded by our ordinary institutionists. They say, It is a natural disposition to evil, naturally descending from Adam to all men; it is that, which is called, The sinne dwelling in man, The Law of our members, The old man, The flesh, The body of sinne, &c.

First, I demand, What sinne is? I shall be answered, That it is a breach of God's Law. Ergo, A sinne is an act: for to break God's Law is to act against God's Law. A disposition, say they, is, whereby an agent can act. Ergo, A disposition to sinne is no sinne, because a disposition is no act, but whereby we can, or do act. So that original sinne is the first act of sinne, which the first man acted, who comprehending in him whole mankind, since all men were to descend from him, the sinne, which he acted, was also acted by whole mankind, and consequently the guilt of that sinne is imputed to every man. The habit of sinne being en∣tered

through one act, whereby we are render'd prone to evil, and commit actual sinne, or do act sinne, the same habit and disposi∣tion hath also ceased on all mankind. So that original is rather the first actual sinne, after which followed the habit of sinning; and with the original or first sinne of man, the habit of sinning is withall communicated to mans posterity. This very sense may be dtawn from their own words, although it was against their inten∣tions.

The Synod held at Rochel in the year 1607. in the moneth of March, rendreth her self in these words, as further appears by their Confession. We believe, that whole mankind, ever since Adam, is corrupted with such an infection, as original sinne is, to wit, an ori∣ginal defect. And in the 11^th Artie We believe, that this defect is a sinne, and is sufficient to damn whole mankind from the highest to the lowest, yea moreover the Infants in their Mothers womb. What can any body apprehend by this original defect, but an actual sin, or how could Infants be guilty of it?