Archelogia philosophica nova, or, New principles of philosophy containing philosophy in general, metaphysicks or ontology, dynamilogy or a discourse of power, religio philosophi or natural theology, physicks or natural philosophy / by Gideon Harvey ...

CHAP. XIII. Of Natural Faith.

• 1. That Faith is the sole means, through which we are to attain to our greatest good. What Faith is. The Definition confirmed by Ar∣guments deduced from reason.
• 2. The two-fold object of Faith. A proof from reason, that

• ... God is the Creator of man. That God and Nature are one.
• 3. An enquiry into the end of man's creation.
• 4. That man doth know the summe of God's Law through the light of Nature. A summary enumeration of the Law of God, as it is imprinted upon every man's heart.
• 5. Moral virtues compared with the moral Law. A comprehension of all moral virtues.

I Have just now finisht my Discourse upon the subject of this Tract; that, which fals next under our consideration, is the means, through which we are to attain to our greatest Good and happinesse. The sole means is Faith.

Faith is a certain knowledge of God and the Law, and an assu∣rance in, and of God's mercy and goodnesse. The genus proxi∣mum, and differentia proxima, are signals, that their Definitum, or thing defined is not an historical or temporary faith, or saith of miracles onely, but a justifying and glorifying faith, necessa∣rily comprehending in it self the three other kinds, as degrees, by which the soul doth gradually ascend to an exalting faith. Among other School-Divines it goeth under the name of an explicite Faith. Fides the same with the Definitum, deriveth its denomi∣nation from fidere, a word not in use among the later Latinists, whose signification the verb confidere hath since supplied, which is to rest contented and fully satisfied: Wherefore assurance im∣plying a certain practical knowledge freed from all doubts, and causing this rest and satisfaction, doth justly and properly deserve the place of the Genus in this Definition.

The certainty, which Faith doth bring with it, depends upon the certainty and necessity of its premises, which be∣ing necessary and certain infers a certain and necessary con∣clusion.

• If God is mercifull, he will save them, that beg mercy.
• But God is mercifull, and I do beg mercy.
• Therefore God will save me.

This Conclusion, as depending upon unchangeable and certain premises, holds forth, that Faith is an undoubted assurance of God's mercy, and that he will save a zealous believer. No won∣der then, if Faith doth create this quietnesse, rest, and satis∣faction.

Austin. de Civit. Dei, lib. 19. cap. 18. tels us no lesse: To the Acadamicks all things are uncertain: but the City of God doth quite detest such kind of doubting, like madnesse: having a most cer∣tain knowledge of them things, which it comprehendeth in it's mind and reason.

II. The object, about which Faith is conversant, is double: 1. God, and the Law. 2. God's infinite mercy and transcen∣dent goodnesse. This duplicity is necessary; because, first, we must know our present state: Secondly, how to get out of that state into a better. Our present state is made known unto us through knowing God and the Law. The way, whereby to change this state for a better, is through an assurance in God's mercy and goodnesse.

A natural man, after having made enquiry, what he is, and finding, that he is a man, a Rational living creature, above all other creatures in the world, and of a most excellent and admira∣ble essence, cannot but straight way admire and search from who, or whence, he had this noble being. Certainly although if he hath never heard of God, or attained to the knowledge of him, yet his reason will direct him to observe daily experience, which sheweth him, that every man descends from his parents, and they from their progenitours, or that man is continuated by pro∣pagation: By the same rule of experience he is also instru∣cted, that all things in the world are finite, and have a beginning and ending: If so, then there must be one first cause, from which all Beings derive their Essence: This cause is an universal cause, by reason that all things have received their being from it: If all things are derived from this universal cause, then certainly the race of man had its beginning also thence. Some of the ruder sort may object, that all things are by nature. In answer to this, I demand, what they mean by na∣ture? they will reply an universal cause, which acteth most uni∣formly and unchangeably. Secondly, I demand through what principle all things are continued? They say, through the same nature. Nature, say they, acteth most wisely and most provi∣dently, and hath so acted from all eternity. This is so farre from an objection against us, that it is an argument for us: For by these very words they expresse God, who is nature (Natura naturans) and the sole universal cause acting most uniformly, unchangeably

(secundum volunt atem ordinatam) most wisely, providently, from all eternity, and continuating all things from the beginning, un∣till the ending. Let an Atheist therefore answer never so per∣versly concerning the first cause of all beings, yet nolens volens he doth plainly confesse, that there is a God, although under another name of Nature.

III. Man knowing, that God hath created him, he cannot but wonder, for what end. For God (thinks he) acteth no∣thing in vain. He is sure, it is not for to eat, drink, and live; for were it so, God needed not to have conferred a reasoning or understanding faculty upon him, because he could have eaten, drunk and lived without an understanding. The end therefore, for which he was created, must be that, to what his understand∣ing makes him capable. His understanding is capable of know∣ing God, and his Laws, of praising, serving, obeying God, and li∣ving according to his Commandments.

As for his Commandments he will find them written in his heart.

IV. 1. He may easily gather, That there is but one true God, because he is Almighty, and can work all things: If then there were more Gods than one, it supposeth, that they are not almigh∣ties, but must work sociably one with the other; or if they are almighties, that, as many as are more than one, are in vain: for one is Almighty, and can do all things; if he can do all things, then there is nothing remaining for the others to do, who must then be in vain. But to imagine otherwise is absurd. Ergo, There is but one true God, and all the others are false gods.

2. God is a Spirit, and therefore will only be worshipped in Spirit. This was not unknown to the Heathens.

Si Deus est animus, nobis ut carmina dicunt, Hic tibi praecipue sit pura mento colendus.

If God a Spirit be, as most of Poets say, In purity of mind we must unto him pray.

What a vain thing is it for man to worship an Image? as if God could not perceive or know our worship without that Image; or as if we could not know God without an Image. If we can truly make an Image of God, then God is no Spirit, but an old man, as the Papists picture him.

3. A Lord's servant seldom speaks of him, without naming of him his Lordship, or his Honour, or tho Right Honourable, and so doth reverence and homage his very name; and no doubt, but a Lord would conceive himself much provoked, should his ser∣vant take his name in vain: much more ought man, who is the meanest servant of the Lord of Lords name his name with all re∣verence and humility; for God is most highly provoked in hear∣ing of his name taken in vain.

4. There is an ordinary manner of serving God, which ought to continue at all times in doing all things to his glory. God doth permit man to do that, which tends to his conservation; neverthelesse at those times we ought to praise God for giving us strength and means, whereby we are preserved. There is also an extraordinary manner of serving God, when we for bear from all temporal and corporeal actions, and abide wholly in spiritual exercises for a day, a week, or a moneth. Assuredly this is ac∣ceptable to God, and therefore we ought to repeat it often.

These are the duties which a man may gather are to be perfor∣med to God. But this is not all, there are other duties remaining respecting to ones self and others. Among others, some are parti∣cularly related to us, as our parents; some in a common and ge∣neral relation only, as our neighbours.

5. The Duty, which we owe to our parents, nature teacheth us, as to honour, love and obey them.

6. The Duty to our selves and others is, to do what we can to preservate our selves and our neighbours, not to injure or kill our selves or others: To do to others, as we would have other do to us. We must shun all envy, anger and hatred.

7. A man is not to defile himself or another. Modesty, unchast thoughts, carnal desires, wanton gestures are by the light of nature adjudged evil and sinfull.

8. We ought to render to every one what is his. We are not to wrong our neighbours in his goods, houses, cattel, or corn, &c. We must detest cheating, defrauding, or crafty over-reaching of our neighbours, whether by lies, false measures, else weights, or moneys, and usury, &c.

9. A false oath is unjust and injurious; the like are slanderings, lies and backbitings, the harbouring of bad thoughts of others without a manifest cause.

10. We are not so much as to have the least desire to what is not our own, if it be to the wrong of another, unlesse we desire withall to give full satisfaction and contentment to the owner, which is only possible in unfixt and untied matters.

V. I have briefly enumerated the contents of the Moral Law, according as it is engraffed upon all mens hearts. This Law is per∣fect and compleat, because there is no moral precept belonging to any moral virtue, but is contained herein, neither is there any vice, but is hereby checked and condemned: Wherefore I shall compare them together, to wit, moral Virtues with the mo∣ral Law.

A virtue is a habit of acting good: on the other side, vice is a habit of acting evil.

Virtue or vice may be termed moral or theologick according to the act, which it produceth, which is either moral good or evil, or theologick good or evil.

So holinesse is a habit of acting according to the Law of God. Sin is a habit of acting contrary to the Law of God, according it is written in all mens hearts.

That this Law is known to all men, it appears hence, because all men are checked by their conscience at one time or another for their sins.

There are four cardinal or principal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Temperance and Fortitude.

Prudence is a habit, through which a man is directed in exer∣cising particular virtues.

Its integrant parts are three. 1. The remembrance of things past. 2. The knowledge of things present. 3. The fore-sight of things to come. Thomas Aquinas counteth eight. 1. Me∣mory. 2. Knowledge. 3. Aptnesse to learn. 4. Cunning∣nesse. 5. Reason. 6. Fore-sight. 7. Circumspection. 8. Cau∣tion.

The subjected parts of Prudence are four. 1. Kingly pru∣dence, in governing his Subjects. 2. Politick prudence of the People, in obeying the Magistrate. 3. Oeconomical pru∣dence, in governing a family. 4. Military prudence, in ruling an Army.

The potential parts of prudence are three. 1. Inquiry for means. 2. Judgement concerning the means invented.

3. Command, that them things be effected, upon which judge∣ment is past.

Justice is a virtue of giving every one, what is his.

Its integral parts are three. 1. To live honestly. 2. To give every one what is his. 3. To wrong no man.

The subjected parts of Justice are two. 1. General Justice, through which a man deals justly with the Commonwealth. 2. Special or particular Justice, through which a man deals justly with every particular person. Special Justice is two-fold. 1. Com∣mutative Justice, through which a man is just in his trading with others. 2. Distributive Justice, which is either recompencing every one for his good deserts; or punishing every one for his crimes: in which there is observed a Geometrical proportion: and in commutative Justice an Arithmetical proportion

Right is that, which agreeth with the Law or Justice. It is ei∣ther natural, or positive: humane, or divine: Ecclesiastick, or civil: written, or not written.

A Law is a rule, command, or precept of Justice containing in it, what is just, and what ought to be done. There are three conditions required to the constitution of a Law. 1. Equity. 2. Authority. 3. Promulgation, or the publishing of it.

A Law is either external, or participated. The participated Law is divided in Natural, Humane, and Divine.

The Humane Law is either Civil or Canonical.

The Divine Law is divided into the old and new Law.

Temperance is a habit of moderating the senses, particularly the senses of feeling and tasting.

The integral parts are two. 1. Bashfulnesse. 2. Honesty.

The potential parts are four: Continence, Clemency, Humility and Modesty.

The subjected parts are Abstinence, Sobriety, Chastity, and Shamefac'dnesse.

Fortitude is a virtue in attempting terrible matters.

Its acts are two. 1. To uphold. 2. To go on.

The integral parts of Fortitude are Magnanimity, Magnificence, Patience and Perseverance.

A man must not only have a bare knowledge of God's Law, or of the moral Virtues, but also a practick knowledge, that is to know them in himself so as to practise them