Archelogia philosophica nova, or, New principles of philosophy containing philosophy in general, metaphysicks or ontology, dynamilogy or a discourse of power, religio philosophi or natural theology, physicks or natural philosophy / by Gideon Harvey ...

CHAP. V. Of the Formality of an Objective Being.

• 1. The Authors Definition of a (Ens Rationis) Being of the Mind, or an Objective Being. Wherein a Real Being differs and agrees with an Objective Being.
• 2. The Proof of the fore-given Definition. That whatever we think, when we do not think upon a Real Being, is an Objective Being. That whatever we think or can think, when we do not think upon a Real Be∣ing, is like to a Real Being.
• 3. Another Argument to prove the Formality of a mental being to con∣sist in likeness to a Real Being.
• 4. The Division of an Objective Being.

1. THat, which a man doth apprehend to be like to what he per∣ceives by his senses, is an (Ens Rationis) objective being, which is like to some one, or more real Beings. And this makes the other opposite dividing Member of a (Ens) Being in gene∣ral. An Ens Rationis or an objective being, is that, whose essence existing in the mind only, consisteth in a likeness to a real being. That an Objective being as to us, is as much a being, as a real being, it appeares hence, because a being, like to another being, is as much cognoscible in its existence, and other modes or Accidents, as a real being, to which it may be like. It is called objective, be∣cause its essence is immediately grounded upon the passive and a∣ctive Intellect, which gives it to be objective or representing: So that you may observe, that the sorce of the word objective, doth con∣firm the truth of my Definition, which is, that an objective being is, which represents a real being, or is like to a real being. Likeness doth not imply a single or immediate Idea in the active Intellect; for that is only proper to real beings, but a reflexe or double Idea, or the framing of another Idea, like to the single Idea of a Real be∣ing.

A being conceived to be like to a real being, is partly different from it, and partly the same with it. It is the same with it, or iden∣tificated in their superiour gender, which is a being. It is diffe∣rent,

in that it moves the passive understanding differently from a real being, that moving the understanding by its present motion through and from it self: whereas it self moveth the passive under∣standing through its intelligibility or internal cognoscibility, which it hath in the active Intellect. This Intelligibility is nothing else but the same Idea of a real being, conceived again in the absence of that real being, which made that first Idea by its own present moti∣on in the understanding: In a word, it is not else, but a Recorda∣tion of a real being; and a real being it self is nothing else, but a being apt to move the senses by its own single and present Mo∣tion.

II. I prove the fore-stated Definition of an Objective being to be adequate to its Essentials. If whatever we think or can think, be only like to a Real being, and that at such times, when we are not employed in understanding a Real being, is no real being; that Concept must be of an Ens Rationis, or Objective being: But what ever we think, or can think, is like to a real being, and that, at such times when we are not employed in understanding a real being, is no real being; Ergo, whatever we think, or can think to be like to a real being, and that at such times when we are not employed in understanding a real being, must be a Concept of an Ens Rationis, or Objective being. I confirm the Major Proposition, which cor∣taines an Argument a necessario. The Necessity flowes from a Max∣ime, which is that an Objective Being and real being are contradi∣ctorily opposite; and between Contradictories there is no Mean or Medium. But of this more hereafter.

I prove the Minor, which is, that all which we think, or can think is like to a real being, at such times when we are not employed in understanding a real being. Stop your ears, and shut your eyes, or compose your self to a Platonick Extasie, and try, whether you can think of one or more beings, which is, or are not like to a real being or beings; let that thought be of a being most impossible to exist really. I am certain, I could never. You will say, that you can think of an Atlas, or a man holding the world upon his back: I grant, that an Atlas is an Ens Rationis; but this Ens Rationis is like to a real being: Namely, the man is like to a man, the world like to a Globe? had we never seen a Globe, or a man, we could never have thought upon them joyntly: so is a Hirco-cervus, a Goat∣stagge, an objective being, representing a Goat and a Stagge. This

Axiome doth also infer the same; Nihil est in Intellectus, quin prius fuerit in sensu; there is nothing in the understanding, but it pro∣ceeds from our senses. If then we know nothing, but that, which we receive from our sensation, and the Knowledge in the understand∣ing is nothing, but a Representation of what is recommended to it by the Senses, that which we alwaies think, or can think, must be like, or must represent a real being; because we perceive nothing, but what is really existent without the understanding. Here may be Objected, that then all real beings are objective beings; because all real beings cause a Representation or Likeness to themselves in the understanding. The Solution is easie. In a large sense all real beings are objective, if objective be taken largely, for that which moveth the understanding, as Smilec. also, Disp. 1. Q. 1. well observes, Non quaecun{que} existentia objectiva sufficit ad Ens Rationis; Nam etiam entia realia existunt objective in intellectu. It is not every objective existence doth suffice to constitute an objective being; for real be∣ings exist also objectively in the understanding. So that I say, that it is not every Likeness in the understanding specifieth an objective being, but only a mediate and reflexe Likeness, which is formed out of the immediate or direct Likeness or Idea of a real being, by abstracting another or mediate Likeness from that first likeness. The likeness of a real being is immediate, and therefore needs its own real presence to impress this likeness upon the understanding; whereas the likeness of an Objective being is formed mediately from the first real likeness (as I may call it) and is abstracted, when the real Object is absent, that is, at such a time (as I inserted above) when we are not employed in the understanding of a real likeness. I call it a reflexe likeness, because the understanding doth abstract it by a reflexe action upon it self.

Neither is that first or immediate likeness of a real being proper∣ly a likeness, but rather an Impression made by its presential acti∣on; whereas a likeness is properly that, which is abstracted from the Impression already made by a real being, and in the absence of it, that is, when we are not employed in the understanding of a real being. So that a proper likeness is between two beings, formally different from one another. I will illustrate this by an example: Frame a Likeness upon an Impression of a real being: as of a Dog; as long as that Impression lasteth, you cannot make a Likeness upon it; for we can exercise but one act of the understanding faculty at once;

For one formal power exerciseth but one formal act. It is then ne∣cessary that the Impression should be finished, by the cessation of the alteration of that real being upon the Sensories (which I call the absence of a real being, a parte rei, or the intermission of understan∣ding a real being a parte actus Intellectus.) The Impression being fi∣nisht by the absence of that real being, namely, of the Dog, the un∣derstanding by a reflexe and mediate Likeness upon that Impressi∣on, may by another action relate that likeness abstracted from that Impression to that same Dog again (which action is a distinct ope∣ration of the mind, formally differing from that first action of re∣ceiving an Impression) and so that Dog framed in the understand∣ing is like to the first Impression of that real Dog again. Where ob∣serve, that this Likeness is not the same Impression, which that Dog made upon the Sensories, but a being abstracted in the passive understanding, by the Active, of the same likeness to that same Im∣pression.

III. Another Argument to prove the formality of an Objective being to consist in a likeness to a real being, is this. As Beasts and Men are formally distinct in their Essence, so also they are formally distinct in their formal Operations. Hence I proceed thus. The per∣ceiving of a real being is proper to a Beast, the perceiving of an ob∣jective being is only proper unto men. Wherefore as them two ope∣rations are formally different, so are their Acts, which is the per∣ceiving of a real being, and of a formal being, and consequently, an Objective being doth differ from a real being. These Operati∣ons being supposed to be formally different, I say, that that which makes them formally different, is the Ratio formalis of each. That which argues or makes a being to be real, is its perception by the a∣nimal Senses. This is evident, because Beasts, who do perceive and discern real beings (for they discern Grass from water, their own Stable from another) which they cannot perceive, but by their senses: Ergo, the perception by animal sense is the Ratio formalis of a real being. That which makes an Objective being, is that, whereby a man is distinct from a Beast, which is a power of framing likenesses by a reflexion upon the Animal perception or Impression, and is an act whereby a man is formally distinct from a Beast: For a Beast cannot frame any Likeness: Ergo, The Formality of an Ob∣jective being doth consist in a Likeness to a Real being.

You may Object, that you can apprehend a being existing in your

mind, to be a real being: Ergo, Whatever is thought, is not thought to be like to a real being, but somthing may be thought to be a real being. I Answer, That that, which you think to be a real being, you think it to be like to a real being, and because of that, you say it is a real being: For example, Suppose you think the Pope to be a real man, your thinking of him to be so, is nothing else, but your think∣ing him to be like to a man, and therefore you say he is a man.

Moreover, although an objective being consisteth in a likeness to a real being, the Conclusion thence is not, that that which is an objective being, is no real being, that is, that hath no real being for its foundation: for the definition doth imply it: neither are you to conclude, that an objective being is a contradictorily opposite to a real being: that is, that an objective being doth not respond to a real being, because a real being doth not exist in that manner of conjunction, as an objective being is somtime conceived, viz. a Dog-cat is an Ens Rationis: now the apprehending of these both to∣gether, that is, one a top the other, doth not make them formally and essentially distinct from each other, supposing them to be con∣ceived distinctly; for that is but accidental to them, and in effect, they are conceived distinctly in the same manner, as I have decla∣red in the Sixth Chapter. This then being granted to be acciden∣tal to an Objective being, we must necessarily suppose each of them singly (viz. the Dog and the Cat) existing at present only in the understanding, to be an objective being: What, will you call them beings real beings, which now, are existent only in your understand∣ing, and cannot move your cognoscible faculty really from without at the same time, when you know them from within? Further, supposing, that each Component of a compounded ens rationis, is an Ens Rationis (as formally it is, for how can a whole compounded ens rationis be said to be an whole Ens Rationis, unless its parts are like∣wise Entia Rationis? (Nihil est in effectu, quin prius suerit in causis) there is nothing contained in the effect, but what was before exist∣ent in its Causes, and such as the effect is, such must the Cause have been) it is impossible, that you can think or conceive any such com∣ponents, but which are respondable to a real being. Neither is it proper to call that being, which you have conceived in your mind, to be like to a real being, although that real being be before you, a real being, because now it is objective, and existent in the active Intellect, moving the passive Intellect actually: But in case you

leave that Objective being, and reflect your senses to that same be∣ing which is before, then that being, which doth now move your sen∣sual cognoscibility, is said to be a real being. But here you may say, that an objective being is formally different from a real being, wherefore an Objective being ought not so much as to have a pow∣er of existing really, which according to this Discourse it hath, and therefore the fore-stated Definition of an Objective is not to be al∣lowed. I Answer, That an Objective being is formally different from a real being, and is impossible ever to be formally a real be∣ing: For, in that I assert a being to be Objective, I assert that it is not real, neither can an Objective being quatenus objective, be real, quatenus real. Lastly, Is a Mule more or less an ens rationis, because it is generated from different Species, or constituted in unity by part•• of a different Species? Certainly no. So, neither is a (Hirco cervus) Goat-stagge more or less an Objective being, although consisting of Parts of different Species: and as a Mule is not termed an ens rea∣le, because it consists of different Species; So, neither is a Hirco-cervus an ens rationis, because it consisteth of different Species. But you reply, that a Hirco-cervus is impossible to exist really. Why? Because it doth consist of different Species. And what doth that hinder? That it may, is plain in a Mule. Wherefore I say again, that it is impossible for a man to think a single notion, which should be im∣possible to exist really. But more of this elsewhere.

An Objective being is twofold, Modal, and essential Obje∣ctive. A modal Objective being is, which is like to a modal real Being. An essential Objective Being is, which is like to an essen∣tial real Being. What a real Modal, and real Essential Being is, we shall deliver in the next Chapter.