Archelogia philosophica nova, or, New principles of philosophy containing philosophy in general, metaphysicks or ontology, dynamilogy or a discourse of power, religio philosophi or natural theology, physicks or natural philosophy / by Gideon Harvey ...

CHAP. XXIV. Of the Theorems of Causes.

• 1. That a Cause and its Effects are co-existent.
• 2. That there are but three Causes of every Natural Being.
• 3. That there is but one Cause of every Being.
• 4. That all Beings are constituted by one or more Causes.
• 5. That all Causes are really univocal.
• 6. That all Natural Causes act necessarily.
• 7. That the Soul of a Beast acteth necessarily.
• 8. That all Matter hath a Form. That Matter is capable of many Forms.

I. A Cause and its Effect are existent at one and the same time. This Theorem is received among most Philosophers, who render it thus; Posita Causa, ponitur Effectus. The Cause being sta∣ted, that is, reduced into action, its Effect is also stated, or produ∣ced. The Reason depends upon their relation one to the other, to whose Relata it is proper to exist at one and the same time, accor∣ding to that trite Maxim, Relata mutuo sese ponunt & tollunt. Relati∣ons do constitute and abolish one another.

II. There are three Causes of every Natural Being, whereof one reduced to Action supposeth the others also to be reduced to action. The Proof of this is demonstrated by the same Axiom, by which the next forementioned was inferred:

III. There is but one Cause of all Beings. A Cause here is taken in a strict sense, for that, which produceth an effect essentially and

really distinct from it self: In this Acception is an efficient the only cause of all Beings. Matter and Form are no Causes, according to this Interpretation, but Principles; because they do not constitute an effect essentially different from themselves. A Cause sometime is taken in a strict sense, for that, which produceth an Effect differ∣ent from it self modally; and so there are two; to wit, Matter and Form. Lastly, A cause, as it signifieth in a middle signification, participating of each acception, comprehends a triplicity of causes; viz. An Efficient, Matter, and Form.

IV. All beings are constituted by one or more Causes. God is of himself, and not from any other, as from an efficient cause; and consisteth of one pure formal cause. By formal Cause, understand an immaterial being. Angels are constituted by two Causes; name∣ly, by an Efficient and a Form. All other Beings are constituted by more.

V. All Causes are univocal. This is to be understood of Effi∣cients only. Whatever Effect a Cause produceth, it is like to its Form, and is formal only: For it cannot generate matter, that being created. Wherefore it cannot produce any thing else, but what like to it self, and consequently produceth alwaies the same effect; whereas an equivocal cause should produce different effects. You may demand, why it hapneth, that many effects are different, as we observe in the Sun, which by its heat, doth produce Vegetables and Animals, which are different? I answer, that the Difference doth result from the diversity of the Matter, upon which it acteth, and not from the causality; that being ever one and the same. The diver∣sity of Effects is accidental to the Efficient, and therefore not to be allowed of in Sciences.

VI. All Natural Causes act Necessarily. Hence derives this Maxim; Natura nunquam errat: Nature doth never erre; because she acts necessarily. Against this Maxim may be objected, that Nature erreth in generating a Monster. This is no Errour of Na∣ture: It might rather be imputed an Errour, if, when it should pro∣duce a Monster, it doth not. That, which acts after the same man∣ner at all times, doth not erre; But Nature doth act in the same manner at all times; Ergo she doth never erre. I prove the Minor. If she acts differently at any time, it is in a Monster: But she doth not act differently in a Monster; as in the example forenamed, of a Dog without Legs, she doth through the Efficient cause educe a

form out of the matter, which she extendeth according to the extent of the subjected matter; the matter therefore being deficient in quantity, it is accidental to Nature, if thereby a being is not brought to the likeness of its Species.

The Soul of man may be considered, either, 1. As a Natural Cause; and so it acteth also necessarily, in giving a Being and Life to the Body: For as long as it abideth in the body, it cannot, but give Life to its Parts. 2. As it is above a Natural Cause, in that it hath a power of acting voluntarily without the Necessity or Im∣pulse of Nature.

VII. The Soul of a Beast doth act necessarily, and by Instinct of Nature. This Conclusion may seem to contradict, what is set down in the precedent Paragraph; containing, that to act necessa∣rily, is to act alwaies in the same manner: whereas Beasts act in sundry manners, and produce various Effects: as, sometimes they feed, other times they run, or lie down; which are all various acts, and performed in various manners. These Acts are called sponta∣neous, which generally are received as differing from Natural and Voluntary, and constituting a Mean between Necessary and Con∣tingent, although improperly; for there is no Mean between Ne∣cessary and Contingent; because whatever is Necessary, cannot be Contingent, and whatever is Contingent, cannot be Necessary. These Acts must be either the one, or the other. They are not con∣tingent, for then a Beast, as a Beast, could not act necessarily. Since then it is more evident, that they act necessarily at most times, it is an invincible Argument, that they do not act contingently. This by the way; I return to the forementioned Objection, and to reconci∣liate them seeming Contradictions: I say, that, 1. Nature doth act alwaies in the same manner, through the same Principles, and upon the same Object. 2. Nature doth not act alwaies in the same manner, through different Principles, and upon different Ob∣jects: For example; Opium raises fury in a Turk, and layeth it in an European: These are different Effects, because the Objects are different. Coral is heavy and weighty from its Earth, and thence proveth obstructive in the body of man: Coral is also informated by a sublime spirit, through which it is aperitive and cordial. The dif∣ference of these effects proceeds from the difference of Principles. I apply this to the Acts of a Beast, which are different, because they proceed from different Principles: Nevertheless them Acts

are alwaies the same, as far as they proceed from the same Princi∣ples, although different from one another. But as for a voluntary Principle, that acteth effects different from it self, as it is one and the same Principle.

The Proprieties of voluntary are,

• 1. To act different Effects through one and the same Principle.
• 2. To have a power of suspending an Action.
• 3. To act with Election.

The Proprieties of Naturals are,

• 1. To act the same Acts through the same Principle.
• 2. To act alwaies, and withal necessarily, without having a power of suspending its Action.
• 3. To act through an Impulse of Nature. A Brute doth feed from an Instinct of Nature, and therefore cannot but obey it, at the same Instant of that Instinct, provided there be food for it to feed upon. Neither can it suspend that Action for a moment, but as soon as it is impelled, it moveth towards its food. This is evi∣dent in a Dog; if he be very hungry, and have a bone in his sight, he will move towards that bone, although you beat him never so much. A Brute moveth locally either to avoid pain, or to search for food. If a Beast move after it is filled, it moveth to avoid pain, (and in that it answereth to the Impression of Nature, whereby all natural beings move to avoid that, which is inconvenient to them, or disagreeing with them) which it feels in lying long, through the weight of his bones, one pressing the other, and therefore moves, to else himself, either by standing, going, or running. He goeth or runneth so long until he is pained by it; and then to ease him∣self, and to avoid that pain, he lieth down again.

VIII. All Matter hath a Form: because it would be nothing, if it had no Form: For from thence it is thought to receive unity; now without unity a being is no being.

All Matter hath but one essential Form; for had it two essenti∣al Forms, it would be two Beings, and consequently no Being; because whatever is not one, or is more then one, is no Be∣ing.

The Form giveth Unity, and Distinction to the Matter.

Matter is capable of many Forms successively, that is one af∣ter another: as for example; The Matter, which is in an Herb, is capable of receiving the form of Chyle, of Bloud, and of Flesh:

Or if burnt, of Ashes; if then melted, of Glass.

In like manner man receiveth first the form of a Plant, afterwards of an Animal or sensible Living Creature, lastly, of a Man.

A Form doth act without intermission: For should its Action cease at any time, at the same moment would the Form cease also with it.