Pus-mantia the mag-astro-mancer, or, The magicall-astrologicall-diviner posed, and puzzled by John Gaule ...

CHAP. XVIII.

18. From the fatuity of Fate.

1. WHether the very word, tearm, or name of Fate and For∣tune, be not of Paganish origination; and withall, of superstitious derivation and acception? As Fate or fa∣tation, from praefation or fore speaking. And (I pray) whose speaking? not Gods, but the starres; nay, not the starres, but the constellated Oracles: For these were the first Faticanes, and their hills, or cells, the first Vaticanes that ere were heard of. Although I rejoyce not much in etimologizing, neither do account an argument from the Notation to be very strong, especially in names of humane imposi∣tion: Yet something may (not amisse) be affirmed or denyed, from the notation of the name (though it be not so exquisite, but allu∣sive only) keeping the principall letters, and comming neer to the nature of the thing. Let them therefore give me leave a little to play upon the word: and if they will undertake to doe otherwise; let others judge if they be not more ridiculous. Fatum à fando; vates, quasi fates, à fando, vel à 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Fatuus à fando. Fate, and Fatories, and Fatiloquists, and Fooles, all taken from talking they know not what; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, why any of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and not all rather of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉? in as much as fatidicall men, and Fooles, both fore-speak many things, but fore-see nothing, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, vel 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, vel 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, vel 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; of making furious and phantasticall both connexions and Predictions; vel quasi 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, supposing the hand or power of the Moon, or coelestiall bodyes, to be therein; vel 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sive 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, doubting whether the coelestialls doe signifie or presage any such thing, yea or no; vel 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; whether moneths, or dayes, or years, doe indeed distribute such things as they prognosticate; vel 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, whether there be any such part or lot indeed; vel 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, whether there be any such thing asFate in destiny remaining; vel quasi 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 thing not coherent, congruous, convenient, necessary. But why not of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, rather than of all the rest? save that there is nothing in

this their fatall Destinie, to be loved or desired. Sic 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quare non à 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, aeque ac à 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉? Take them one as well as another, and then they note all together, that Fate may as easily be occurred, and prevented, as that it must necessarily have its fact or finishing. And that it may as well be passed by, as passe upon. Sic 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, à 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, happening any way; vel a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because of every ones own fabricating or ma∣king; vel quasi 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; as a thing (at best) but in a mans vowes, wishes, or desires, rather than in any reality. Sic Fortuna quasi vortuna, à vertendo, of turning every way. Vel quasi forte una; peradventure something, peradventure something, peradventure nothing. But to cease from descanting upon names, the very nature of both these hath al∣waies caused the learnd to call them the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; the most vain and foolish things of themselves, that a man could either fear or confide in.

2. Whether Fate or Fortune ought once to be named among Christians? And how many eminent Saints of Gods Church have retracted, and repented that ever they have so done? And how ma∣many of them have, and do daily warn men to be wary, how they rake the heathenish termes out of their ashes, and translate them into the Church of Christ? Not that they are litigious about termes, or scrupulour of titles: But because the word of God hath not a word, nor a syllable, nor a sound, nor a signification of either of them; if it be rightly translated or understood. And because nei∣ther of them can be of any edification to the Church of God: but the use of them is a prophanation both of his Word and Church.

3. Whether there be any such thing as Fate in nature, or in the world? And whether they that determine for it, doe aptly distin∣guish it: or in the determination abstract and exempt it from the very hethenish originall and acceptation? And whether all their distinctions of Fate be able to discern it, for a solide and sober truth, in any part or respect? The Theologicall fate is abusive; for that's not paganish fate, but divine providence. The Naturall fate is su∣perfluous; for that need be called no more but natures common order. The Stoicall fate is superstitious, for that binds all things, persons, actors, (in heaven or earth) to an ineluctible necessitie. The Chaldaicall, Mathematicall, or Genathliacall fate is worse than all the rest, as adding to them all a sydereall or constellatio∣nall

fancy. But what kind of Fate call they that which they make to sit in the middle, and as it were hover in the balance, betwixt the desultory levity of an indifferent casualty; and the presultory temerity of an urging, and inevitable necessity?

4. Whether Fate or Fortune doe not mutually take away one another? For necessity and contingency have alwayes been held as contraries and inconsistents. Else to what end were all those di∣sputes betwixt the Stoicks and the Epicures? But why then doe so many Authors speak of both these so promiscuously? And why doe our Fataries, and Fortunaries so confound them: especially in their prognostications, or predictions?

5. Whether the Philosophers have been more serious than the Poets, about the series of Fate? As for the Poets, what child smiles not to read the pretty fictious of the three Fates, or fatall Si∣sters; Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos; yea, or of Nova, Decima, and Morta; and of their names, derivations, progenie, order, and offices? As for the Philosophers (Stoicks and Epicures,) It were long to tell, how featly they have tost both Fate and Fortune, too and fro in their sundry argumentations, assertions, definitions, de∣scriptions, opinions, &c. But (better than all their earnest) it is excellent sport which they make (in their Mythologies, Apologies, Hieroglyphicks, &c.) with Fortunes wheel and horn on the one hand: and Fates Distaffe and Spindle on the other.

6. Whether argue the more strongly; the Stoicks against For∣tune, or the Epicures against Fate? Me thinks the Stoicks (for all their gravity) doe but rayle, when they call her the Goddess of fools, an empty name, a versatile wind, a short Sunshine, a sudden tempest, a muddy torrent, a fools paradise, a labyrinth, &c. Re∣proaching her for blind, deaf, mad, brutish, instable, treacherous, envious, cruell &c. Querulously accusing her for playing with her own gifts; and sporting her self with humane mortality and mi∣sery; turning all things upside down, corrupting her own nature, or rushing upon her very self, repenting of her good, rejoycing at her evill, taking the stronger part; regarding not vertue, but power; answering those more, that dare, than that implore her; carrying on things against reason, prudence, counsell, vertue; most deceiving, where she is most trusted; fooling all she fosters; smiling and kil∣ling at once; tampering her hony with poyson; immoderate both in good and evill; strangling at last her own nurselings; exalting

and depressing; giviving and taking; dealing indiscriminatly; satis∣fying the greedy, more than the needy; giving unto many too much, to none enough; now a mother, now a stepdame; when most flourishing or flattering, most feeble; and making but the more un∣happy, for having been acquainted with her happiness. But (in my mind) the Epicures (for all their levity,) reason better. For though they might return the many invectives against Fortune upon Fate, yet they soberly argue thus; If there be necessitating and enforcing fatation upon things, must not such a thing be done by a man, whether he be instructed or exhorted to it or no? nay, shall he not doe it whether he will himself or no? Is not the destinating decree enough to bring all things about, although there were neither com∣mand, nor care to goe about it? Does it not robb all rationall creatures of mind, will, counsell, deliberation, to tye them up to inevitable necessitie? How then are their proper motions reserved, not only to rationalls, but to every moving creature? What natu∣rall series of causes can there be betwixt intellectualls, rationalls, spiritualls, animals, inanimates, and artificialls? Is it not ridiculous, to make an indissoluble series, or conjunction of causes, where (besides a deity) reason, and accident are ever and anon making an interrup∣tion? Who will say, that all things are concludedby, and included under Fate? Is there not much arbitrariness, whether one man will beget another, or no? and much more, whether one man will kill another, or no? How can there be so much as a naturall fate or ne∣cessity over men, when we see they are not all carryed one way: as things of one nature or kind (beasts, birds, fishes, flyes) are? but men (although of one nature) are carryed diversly, as their wits and affections lead them. Were people have sundry Lawes, and they duly executed; how are they led along by their conveni∣ent edicts, rather than by the fatall decree of the Starres? Are the lawes of men and fate repugnant? and are these more prevalent than they? If all things be necessarily bound under Fate; what can be subject to reason, will, nature, occasion, time, manners, pru∣dence, counsell, society, contingency, casualty? Must not mens sins and vices be necessary also, and inforced? Why should he be pu∣nished for offending, that is not able to resist an impelling force? Is he to be blamed, that is not of his own power? we may com∣mend vertue, but what praise of the vertuous, not so by labour and industry, but by fate and necessity? Doe not the Authors of Fate

goe, and come; speak, and keep silence; offer, and forbear; con∣sult, and deliberate; procure, and prevent; exhort, and dehort, praise, and dispraise; reward, and punish? and why should they doe all this, if they did believe their own doctrine of Destiny? Why should men study or labour, if their fate be sufficient to make them both wise and rich? How many things are not as the Fates will but as we will our selves? Have the Fates determined that a man shall have children, that will not marry, nor once touch a woman? that he shall be wise, that will not learn? that he shall be liberall, that will not give? that he shall be drowned, that will not come neer the warer? that he shall dye in a strange Country that will not travell? If Fate have appointed a wound, or a disease to the body, is there not a medicine and meat to cure it? but if it could intend any evill upon the soul or mind, yet is there not education, and disci∣pline to prevent it? Many things may be effected besides nature: may they not much more then besides Fate? If every man may fa∣bricate his own Fortune, why not also contrive his own Fate? If Fate had never had name, or nature, or power, would things have fallen out otherwise than they doe fall out? why then should Fate be inculcated, since (without Fate) there is Nature and Fortune, to which all things (necessary or casuall) may be aptly referred? In this old Philosophicall dispute, what easie Moderator would not give this censure? That either side hath said sufficient, to overthrow his Adversaries opinion; but neither of them enough to establish his own.

7. Hath not the constellatory Fatation introduced so many starry Gods into the world? Yea, made so many providentiall, and tutelary Gods and Goddesses (some Select, others Ascriptitious) to have a hand in the whole administration of the Universe? But particularly so many Geniall or Genitall Gods and Goddesses, and their sundry ordinations and offices at every mans geniture. As of Janus, Jupiter, Saturn, Genius, Mercury, Apollo, Mars, Vulcan, Neptune, Sol, Orcus, Liber Pater, Tellus, Ceres, Juno, Lucina, Fluona, Luna, Diana, Minerva, Venus, Vesta. Moreover, Vitum∣nus, Sentinus, Mens, Mena, Iterduca, Domiduca, Abaona, Ade∣ona, and Dea Fatua too, not of the least ordination and operation, either in the birth, or life, or death? And no marvell that they make so many Consent-Gods goe to the fate of a Man: when they will have so many to be busie about the fate of an herb. As Seia

fatally president of the sowing; Segetia or Segesta, at the com∣ming up of the Corn; Nodotus or Nodinus, at the knitting or knot∣ting; Volutina, at the involving of the leaves; Batellina or Da∣tellea, at the opening of the blade; Proserpina at the budding; Hostilina, at the equall shaping of the eare; Flora, at the flourish∣ing; Lasturtia, at the nourishing; Tutilina, in the keeping; Ma∣tuta, or Matura, at the ripening; Messia, at the mowing; and Runcina, not only at the weeding, but at the plucking up by the roots.

8. Whether Fate be one or many? If it be one simply, then what needs any reduction? if it many, why is it not reduced to one? And then in vain is that done by many, which may be done by one: and it is prophane, l to ascribe that to many, which ought to be a scribed to one. If it be one truly, then is it undivided in it self, and divided from all others: which how can that which is a series, or connexion of so many things be? especially having its inherence in movables or mutables. If it be but one accident, why should it imply all under a necessity? If it be but one by aggregation, col∣lection, connexion, so are things fortuitous as well as fatall. Be∣sides, such an unity is in the meanest degree of entity. Wherefore then should it order, and subordinate things of a more perfect de∣gree then it self? If it be many, or a multiplicity; then is it une∣quall, indeterminate, uncertain, and next to a nullity. If it be one, why then so they make it do diverse, according to divers conjucti∣ons and constellations? If it be many, how can they make any certain and particular pronouncing upon it?

9. Whether that they call Fate, be in the first, or among the se∣cond Causes? If in the first, that is as much as to make it equall unto God: If among the second, then is it inferiour unto man. For among second causes, and especially in involuntary actions, and all such as fall under humane counsell and deliberation; the in∣tellectuall mind, and rationall will, hath no superiour. And what more contrary to the order of nature and creatures, than that the lesse noble should be disposing, and governing those more noble than themselves?

10. Whether there be a fatall necessity upon all acts or events? If upon all acts, where's Liberty? if upon all events, where's con∣tingency? And whether upon these, both good and evill? and that whether naturall, civill, or spirituall? If upon naturall acts and

events, good, or evill; then what use of means either to preserve, or to prevent? If upon acts civill, and good; what merit? what praise? if upon acts civill, and evill; what laws, what punish∣ments? If upon events civill, and good; what thanks? if upon events civill, and evill; what hopes? If upon acts spirituall, and good; what free grace? if upon acts spirituall, and evill; what free will? If upon events spirituall, and good; what free bounty? If upon events spirituall, and evill; what free mercy?

11. How can there, or why should there be such a thing as Fate, imposing a necessity upon actions, and events? when as divine pro∣vidence it self doth it not: so as to exclude liberty, contingency, or casualty from things. But works with second causes according to their own motion, and manner. Permitting sometimes their exu∣berancy, sometimes their deficiency: preserving to them their sundry orders, offices, and degrees of efficiency. Suffering the remoter cau∣ses, or agents, to be impedited by the more proximate; that all ef∣fects might not be taken for naturall, and necessary; but that his own free disposing might appear. Although nature, and every na∣turall agent, be of it self, and ordinarily, determinated to one ef∣fect; and to the producing of it after the same way: yet he suf∣fers it to be impedited by one debility, and indisposition, or ano∣ther (either to come to pass otherwise, or else to be altogether pre∣vented) that so he might preserve a contingency in all naturall causes: to the intent nothing might be thought absolutely neces∣sitating, but his own will and pleasure above. Much more doth he confirm a freedom to the rationall will; not only that good may the more chearfully be done, and accepted; but the evill also that is done, or suffered; may not unjustly be imputed to pro∣vidence, because of a necessity imposed.

12. If fate be (as they define it) the Series, order, nexure, li∣gation, complication, constitution, disposition of second cau∣ses, &c. what feeble things are all those seconds put together without the first? what can their own motion work to, without his speciall concurrence? what if he work not with them? what if without them? what if against them? Leave them to themselves, and what knot in a rope of Sand? Can there be a perpetuall se∣ries, or indissoluble connexion betwixt causes so disparate, yea so adverse, as naturall, internall, necessary, and arbitrary, adven∣titious, accidentall? yet after this order is fate oftentimes finished.

A languishing man not only consumes away within himself; but the ayr, meats, drinks, poyson, act the fatall consummation. To an ordinated destiny of an unfortunate end; comes in inordinate∣ly fire, water, a fall, a gun, a sword, an unlucky hand, &c. and hath not this necessitating fate now the complement by accident? and is there not a casuall intervention (of more force to the fatall effect) than all the causall connexion? How many accidents fall out fatally, that can have no second cause ordinatly assigned to them; much less prospected in them (but must be referred meer∣ly to divine will and pleasure) unless you will have accidentall in∣struments (that interven inordinately) to be such?

13. The Physicall fate they will have to be a series of pure na∣turall causes, &c. (viz. betwixt the stars, the elements, the tem∣perament, the inclination, the manners, the action, and the issue or event) now where are all these causes knit together? in the efficient, the form, the matter, or the end? How are they worthy to be called causes, or so proved? How are they pure, naturall, and ne∣cessary causes; when some of them are voluntary, and contingent? what connexion of them is that, which carrys on prime, and se∣cond causes; naturall, and voluntary; necessary, and contingent, with one fatall force, or inevitable agitation? what series is that which (as hath been said) is so often interrupted? what copulation betwixt the first, and the last; when as (by their own confession) the stars are not the causes of all events; neither doe all those ef∣fects fall out necessarily, whereof they are the cause; How are they fatall then; or their complement of fate?

14. Whether in the series both of fate, and of fortune (although two contraries) Astrologers have not delivered the same order, and connexion of causes (as the stars, tempers, manners, actions, events) or else what difference doe they make between them? Nay wherefore doe the same Authors speak of fate, and fortune so promiscuously, and indiscriminately? (especially in their progno∣sticating, or predicting way) Is it not because they are not able to distinguish them? Or is it not because they are conscious of a fortuitousness of event, even in their strictest fatality?

15. Whether (in the series of fatall causes) the effect doth fol∣low the universall, indefinite, equivocall, and remote: or else the univocall, proximate specificall and particular cause? And which of these is that which doth determine, and distinguish the effect?

Does not a man generate a man; and a Beast, a Beast; what ever the position of the stars be? Those that have been borne in the same region, at the same moment, under the same position; have they all been the same? nay, how divers have they been (for all that) in their ingenies, their fortunes, and fates? And why so? but because they have taken their severall affections, and incli∣nations from their particular causes?

16. As for second causes, means, agents, instruments; seeing God Almighty makes use of them, to bring his own purposes to pass (not out of any defect, or necessity; but to make his own ef∣ficiency the more perceptible.) Yee seeing he oft-times renders the most noble, and convenient means ineffectuall; and uses the meanest, and unaptest of them, to the producing of very eminent effects; Why then should we be bound to lurke at that order, which God himself observes not? why should our faith be taught to respect, or rest upon the middle things; in a prejudice to that providence, which is the absolute beginning, and end of all?

17. Whether the second causes be not ordained as the reme∣dies, rather than as the means of fate, or fortune? providence it self that has determined such an accident, or event, has it not also ordained second means, to help, and relieve, in such a case? wher∣fore are the creatures, and their offices created to such ends: if they be not to be used to such ends, for which they were created? what ever the fate, or fortune be; is there not a naturall Law (imprest in every creature) to labour for the conservation of it self, both in its being, and well being? To what end hath God given men a mind, will, reason, affections, counsell, deliberation, science, art, obser∣vation, experiment, means, instruments, &c. but as well prudently, and diligently to discern, procure, fortify, prevent, remedy; as thankfully to accept, or humbly to submit? Hath not the Spirit of God secretly, and sweetly suggested to his dearest children (in their sudden, and extraordinary perils, and perplexities) even pre∣sent advices, and succours; besides the inward consolations, and confirmations of his grace? yea, is not this one cause why men are kept so ignorant of future accidents (and of their utmost issues, after that they are already happened) that men might not only prepare for them; but make use of such means, as God himself hath prepared against them? Otherwise, should they not tempt God, in a neglect of them?

18. Whether there be not in the whole course of nature, in the universall world, and especially throughout the whole Church of Christ, farre more effectuall causes, means, orders, connexions, rules, guides, guards, helpes of life, of health, peace, libertie, socie∣ty, &c. for counsell, actions, passions, accidents, events, than the coe∣lestiall bodies can possibly be? ought these then to be respected more than all they? or yet in comparison to them?

19. Who is able to bring into one series, or can reconcile to truth the old Philosophicall opinions, about the exercise, or execu∣tion of Fate, by second causes? As whether by Angels, Spirits, Geniusses, Demons, Devills, by the Soul of the world, by the Souls of men, by the totall subservience of Nature, by the mo∣tions and influences of the Starres, and caelestiall bodies, by sen∣sible agents, by artificiall instruments, yea, and by very accidents and casualties? Christians know, and acknowledge all these creatures to be the ministers, or instruments of providence. The Angells doing his will, are the more eminent ministers both of his mercies and judgements: administring not only in temporalls, and in spiritualls, but likewise to eternalls. And if it be so as Philosophie sayes, that they are the Intelligencies, that move the caelestiall orbes; then have they an ordination over the admini∣stration of the Starres. The Devills are not only permitted, but wisely and justly used in the execution of temptations, tryalls, judgements. (But how comes in Fate and Fortune? who can tell? unlesse they intrude among the Devills, and be indeed of their foysting in.) As for the heavenly bodyes, they are to be con∣fest, as of Gods ordination and employment in their order, light, motions, and prodigious appearances. But he makes speciall use of mens reason, understanding, wills, affections, memories, coun∣sells, deliberations, policies, vocations, societies, arts, artifices, Lawes, Customes, actions, and experiments, in the government of the world: and yet more especially their gifts, graces, duties, offices, services, in the governing of his Church. Last of all come in the whole hoste of creatures to act here as he hath ordained. Now what fatation, or fatall necessitation to man, among all these? Angels or Devills can but inject into the mind: they cannot com∣pell, no nor yet incline the will. That's only for the infinite power of God himself to doe, men (as to naturall, civill, and morall acts) are still actors in their own liberty. As for bodyes (Coelestiall

or terrestriall) they work directly but upon bodyes only: and the terrestriall are held, and found to be the more proximately, parti∣cularly, and sensibly disposing. Besides the friendship and hatred, the complyance and adversness of men; is not the service, or disser∣vice of the brute creature; the vertue or venome of an herb or minerall; yea, the defence or offence of a sword, a knife, a spear, a gun, a club, &c. are not all these more sensibly apprehended, to be more neerly advantagious or prejudiciall to health or sicknesse, riches or poverty, honour or disgrace, prosperity and adversity, life or death; than are all the joynt benevolences, or malevolencies of the fatall Starres? If therefore a fatidicall prognostication may be made from the Caelestiall: why not rather from the terrestriall motions?

20. Whether Fate be above the Starres, as their governour; or else under them as their minister? If above them, why make they the starres to be the causes of fate? For so they must needs be superiour to it. If under them, how then are the starres them∣selves subject to fate? for so they must needs be inferiour. How then should the starres dispose of others fate▪ that are not able to dispose of their own? Is it for creatures (terrestriall or caelesti∣all) to perform that to others, which they are not able to preserve to themselves? Ought not therefore such a disposition to be referred solely to him, that hath the ordination, and gubernation of all things (both in heaven and earth) simply, freely, eternally and immutably in himself?

21. How can the fatall series of causes be from the starres? when as the starres themselves are not causes, as in humane and ar∣bitrary actions. Not causes, where they may be signes; as of things already done, and past. Yea, God himself may signifie many things, whereof he is not the cause: as in evill, and sinfull actions. Nay, have not the fatidicall Vaticinators themselves made many fatall signes, which could never be causes, nor yet once come into any se∣ries, or necessary connexion? As in their aruspicies, and anguries; from the entrailes of beasts, flight, and noise of birds, &c. as also from lots, dreams, prodigies, casualties, yea and physiogno∣mies, &c.

22. How can the starres be the first in the fatall series of second causes? When as (of all creatures) the spirituall, intellectuall, or rationall are the supreme: and the corporeall, animate, or inani∣mate

their inferiours. Now the starres are both corporeall, and inanimate; Spirits, and souls; as they have more similitude to, so they participate more vertue of divine providence than all other creatures: For they are both the cognoscitive, and the operative in∣struments of providence, which the other are not. For these being but the executive only: may either be directed, or diverted by the iutellectuall, and ordinative. As acting of themselves with liber∣ty, deliberation, discretion observation of right rules, application of fit means, and intention to a due end. And therefore are the more eminent ministers of providence, than all things else, in hea∣ven or earth.

23. Whether any such cut as fatation, may be properly sayd to be in, or from the starres? For fatation imports a primordiall law or decree; not an influence only, or effect: what sacrilege is it then to ascribe that to the instrument, which is only peculiar to the prin∣cipall agent? Since it is for instruments (especially the inanimate) not to ordain, but execute only, (Yea, it is a question, whether there be any fatation even in fate it self?) it being accepted, and discerned, not for a seminall disposition, but for an ultimate execution: and that inherent in the moveable or mutable subject. Wherefore, seeing fatation is neither in the starres, nor in fate it self: whether can any thing be sayd to be fatall with respect to the starres? For the starres are but second causes. And with respect to all such, some things may be sayd to be naturall, some things arbitrary, some things indifferent, some things contingent, some things uncertain, some things casuall: but few or none fatall.

24 Whether it be in the power and validity of the celestiall bo∣dyes to impose a fatall necessity, either upon humane actions, or yet upon naturall things? For if the starres be any such causes; then must they cause principally of themsel••es, intentionally, directly, immutably. Now how can they be principall causes; when provi∣dence is above them? how of themselves: when they work not upon humane actions but by accident? how intentionally; since they want a mind, or soul? how directly; when they operate upon humane actions but indirectly? how immutably, when their ordi∣nation or disposition may be impedited? Again, were they thus acting; then should there be no contingents, or accidents, no liber∣tie, or free actions, nor prevention of any events or issues; no par∣ticular causes should be defective; nor distance of place, nor in∣disposition

of the mean; no neglect of the means, no endeavour to the contrary, or opposition should be available: nay, not only the understanding▪ but the will should be tyed to corporall organs and matter; yea, and the starres should not only be of sufficient, but of infinite power.

25. How doe the celestiall bodyes work so fatally upon these inferiours: when as they here operate not upon a necessity, as to the producing of the effect. For albeit their impressions be naturall; yet are they not received, but according to the manner of the recei∣vers, which are fluxible, and not having themselves still after the same way. Because of the matter, that is in a potentiality to many, yea, and to contrary formes. The matter also is movable, and cor∣ruptable, and may easily defect of it self, may be intrinsecally in∣disposed, and extrinsecally impedited. And the starres themselves are but indefinite, and remote causes; to which the effect can never follow determinatly, and necessarily, unless the middle causes be ne∣cessary; and then they follow them, and not the other. But in the foresaid series the middle causes are most of them contingent: and from many contingent causes can come no effect of necessity, be∣cause any one of them, and all of them together, may be defective, and not attain unto their end.

26. Seeing the heavenly bodyes act not upon these inferiours, but by their light and motion; and so communicate nothing to the matter they work upon, but light, motion and heat: Now why may not all these flow from all the starres in generall? And why then should such, and such fatall inclinations be attributed to such, or such positions or conjunctions? And if there be any particular vertues of the light and motion of some stars, contrary to the ver∣tues of the light and motion of other starres; how is that demon∣strated? And how comes it to passe that they should be operative and effectuall one way, in their simple natures or qualities: and yet another way in their relative aspects and positions? Is an ima∣ginary relation, or respect of more validity, than a reall substance or propriety?

27. They seem to define fate more acurately, that make it to be the ••eries, or connext order of naturall causes. Now till they can di∣rectly and successively deduce those naturall causes, down from the starres, to those fatall events: what reason is there to credit their proposition, much lesse their prognostication? They likewise will

have fate (in the best sense they can take it) to digest and distribute all things, according to certain motions, successions, orders, forms, places, times. Now if their fate cannot be well understood, or discerned, without these same astrictions: why are they so con∣founded at the inexplicableness of the circumstances? Otherwise, why doe they not predict usually the very times and places, to∣gether with the fates themselves? Moreover, the first definers of fate, held it to be, not in the superiors, but in the inferiors them∣selves. Namely, a disposition inherent in the moveable thing: and that urging to an immoveable event. If indeed it be such; ought not every mans fate to be collected from himself, rather than from his Stars?

28. How should the things of fate, and fortune be foretold; when it is not yet (with one consent) told what things they are themselves? Some have gone so high, as to say that they are Dei∣ties or Gods: others are fallen so low, as to make them vanities, and nothing. Some confound these two together: some set them so opposite, as that they make them confound one another. Some admit many things of both (as they say) at the fore-gate: and exclude all again at the back door. Some place them in the be∣ginning in the middle, in the end of a business. Some make us to be in their power: Some them in our power. Some would have us believe both but inquire neither. But if they would no inquiry after their nature, and properties: why make they such inquiry into their operations, and effects?

29. Whether fate be mutable, or immutable? If mutable; how is it fate? Is there not then a contingency of fate: as well as a fate of contingencies? If immutable; what hope? what colour? what means? what remedy? Nay, if immoveable; how moves it (as they say) according to the nature, and order of all moveable things? That is to say, with naturall things, naturally; with ne∣cessary, necessarily; with voluntary, voluntarily; with contingent, contingently; with violent, violently; with remiss, remissely. And all this not as a prime, and free; but as a second and necessary cause. Why may we not as well say, with rationall things •…•…∣tionally; with brute, brutishly; with sensuall, sensually; with •…•…∣tuous, vertuously; with vitious, vitiously; with prosperous, p••o••∣perously; with adverse, adversely; with uncertain uncertainly, 〈◊〉〈◊〉. And then, what irrefragable law of fate is that, which is fain to con∣form

to, and comply with every ones manners, and manner of working?

30. Whether fate be absolute in decree, or conditionate? If ab∣solute; then can it not be otherwise, and what remedy? Nay then is it infinite omnipotent, eternall, and with superiority? If con∣ditionate (and that not from a liberall dispensation of its own, but a naturall ordination from another) what fatation is that then, that comes upon condition? that depends upon others actions, not its own determination? If it be absolute; then is it cruell, and unjust in many things: if it be conditionate; then is it variable and certain in nothing. Set aside the first act, which is the eternall decree; and the last act, which is death: these indeed may be said to be both absolute, and conditionate; but Christians are not taught to call these fate. But take it (as they doe) for the middle act, then can they make it to be neither absolute, nor condi∣tionate.

31. Whether fate, and fatall events follow the body; or the mind? If the body; what difference betwixt the fate of a man, and of a beast? In events (good or evill) who is worthy? who is guilty? And how follow they the mind; seeing the stars (neces∣sarily and directly) make no impression there? Because it is supe∣riour, according to the order of nature: and not subject to matter, time, or place: but united to an intellectuall, and spiri∣tuall substance; and therefore cannot suffer from corporeall things, although celestiall. Nor can they so exceed their own sphear, and species; as to act directly upon it. And if not upon the intellective faculty, which acts necessarily: much less upon the elective power, which is free; and never acts but freely; nor is subject to fatality, or fatall necessity. For then should the election of the will be no more, but a meer naturall instinct; should be determi∣ned to one thing; should act but one way; should have the like motions in all upon the like representations; should not have any thing in its own power to discern, deliberate, choose, refuse, &c. but must be carryed on, either naturally, or violently, as the Stars doe incline or enforce?

32. Whether fate or fortune, be either in good, or evill acti∣ons? If fate be i•• good actions; are they not necessitated, and in∣forced? if fortune 〈◊〉〈◊〉 there; are they not fortuitous, and acciden∣tall? And so, what •…•…e of them? what reward? The like may

be affirmed of evill actions; and if likewise thus inferred; what shame? what punishment? In vitious actions, either fate offers violence to a mans will, or leaves to its own liberty. If the first, is not a mans will to be excused in evill? and if the last, is not every mans will the cause of his own fate? yea and of the hardest and heaviest fates? For they are such which follow sin, and wic∣kedness.

33. Wherefore should man (or his actions) be made the subject, yea the slave of fate; when as indeed man, as man, is superiour thereto? For fate being but a sydereall service of second causes, must be reduced to the providence of the first cause: and in that reduction, man himself hath place, or preferment, before all the stars of heaven. Because the divine providence receives to it self, or extends it self in a more speciall way, to intellectuall, or rationall: than it doth to all other creatures else. In as much as they excell all others, both in the perfection of nature, and in the dignity of end. In the perfection of nature; Because the rationall creature hath the dominion over his own actions, and operates voluntarily: whereas the other act not so much, as are acted. In the dignity of the end; because the intellectuall creature only, by his operation, reaches to the ultimate end of the universe, sc. to know, and love God. But the other creatures touch not that end, by an inspired intention, but only according to some participated similitude. Furthermore, God provides for the intellectuall nature principal∣ly, and as it were for selfs sake: and but for all other crtatures se∣condarily and in order to it. The rationall creature is Gods agent: the other are but his instrumens. Now God cares more for his agents than he doth for his instruments. Yea they are the instruments of this very agent: and he makes use of them either in his practice, or contemplation. God hath more regard to the free, and liberall: than to the necessitated, and servile acts of his creatures. The ra∣tionall creatures are the more noble in themselves, and of more neer accession to the divine similitude; and therefore tendred by God before and above all others. They are the more principall parts of the whole universe: to which the less principall are but subser∣ving; as intended for their sakes, and working for their ends. In∣tellectuall natures have more asfinity with the whole; as appre∣hending all things else besides themselves: whereas every other creature is but a part, and capable of no more but a bare partici∣pation

of its own particular entity. Now it is not for the in∣apprehending part, to have an ordaining power over the appre∣hensive whole. By the course of nature the rationall creature uses all other things for it self, as either for the perfection of its intellect, the explication of its science, the exercise of its vertue, or else the sustentation of its body, to which the intellectu∣all nature is united. And therefore it is not for them, to dispose, rule, govern, impell necessitate him him: but for him to observe, rule, govern, dispence moderate, and make use of them.

34. Whether any thing can be sayd to be fatall (with re∣spect to us) till it have taken effect? For a fatality before it be, is but a contingency to us: and to us a concingency, after it is, is a fatality. Why then should we be bound to believe the prognosticated things of Fate or Fortune before hand? yea, though they may have some naturall cause, remotely necessary, or of some indefinite probability: yet is not all this sufficient for our faith in particular; because, as concerning many such naturall causes, there is in us nevertheless (besides the supreme) a liberty, and power to prevent.

35. Suppose the Fates have destinated one man to be hangd, or kill'd by another; why should not that be prognosticated from another mans nativity, as well as his own: seeing he also comes necessarily into the series of second causes? Indeed some of the old genethliacks have boasted to foresee, or fore∣tell a mans fate, or fortune, from the nativity of his parents, Brethren, children, &c. But have not others of them held it for a foolish fancy, that the fate or fortune of one man should lye involved, not only in his own; but in the constellations of so many mens nativities?

36. Whether they that suffer the same fate, have the same starres coupling, or compacting thereunto? Et è contra. Sup∣pose them suffring (and suffring to death, the last line of Fate) for Christ, the Gospe••l religion, and conscience. Is this fatall destiny also from the starry order, and connexion? who ever heard that the starres made Martyrs, or necessitated unto mar∣tyrdome? How then hath it come to passe, that young, old, men, women, of severall ages, sexes, nations (and therefore not of the same constellations) have all agreed to undergoe the same event?

37. Whether that be true Fate, which they would mingle together with providence? and how can divine providence, and Pagan Fate agree? For Providence is the beginning, and con∣tinuation of all things: Fate is the end or utter confusion of them. Providence is in the ordering of casuals, as well as fa∣tals: Fate is opposing all things fortuitous; and therefore not disposing them. Providence is an act in God: their Fate is no more but an event upon the creature. Providence is a disposi∣tion impendent, or out of the thing: Fate is a disposition inhe∣rent, or in the thing. Providence comprehends all things (past, present, and to come) so does not Fate in her connexion of Causes. Providence is in and over all things, from the greatest to the least (good, evill, celestialls, terrestrialls, spiritualls, corporealls, universalls, singulars, naturalls, rationalls, vo∣luntaries, necessaries, contingents) so is not Fate. Providence is more speciall to one, than to another: but Fate is a necessity to all alike. Providence can work immediately, without, and against means: Fate can operate nothing but according to her series, or connexion. Providence can act with every creature, reserving to it its own motion (as with free agents freely; with contingents contingently, &c.) whereas Fate hath no way to work but fatally, that is necessarily, for∣cibly, inexorably, immutably, inevitably. The rules, order, successe of divine providence, are either written in his own book or in his own breast: and not in the Starres and Pla∣nets, as Fate is. The wisedome, justice, power, goodnesse of his providence; all this is written in his own book: the par∣ticular successes, issues, events thereof all these are written in his own breast Even wise Providence it self is not herein to be discerned or determined before-hand: what satuous thing is Fate then, that is so obvious and triviall, as for the Faticanes to foretell? Is not this difference enough between them, and never to be reconciled; Providence is a prudent counsellor, and will have the particular issues kept secret: Fate is a silly babbler, and will have them commonly foretold?

38. Whether (had it not been for the fictions of Fate and Fortune) there had ever been hatcht opinions and heresies, so prejudiciall to divine providence? and that even amongst Pa∣gans

themselves, that had experience sufficient to convince them of the truth, and power of it: and of the justice, yea and good∣nesse of it in great part. Had the divine providence ever been denyed: if Fate and fortune had not been held for Gods? Had God himself been implanted under Fate, or made subject to the decrees of it, or slandered for a sloathfull & careless spectator of humane things, and terrene: if they had not confined and limi∣ted God to content himself with the reiglement of the heavens; as if it had veen beneath his dignitie and majestie, to vouch∣safe to look down to small things, or once to take notice of of what was done here below: but to commit the care and rule of all sublunary and inferiour things, to the starres and celestiall bodyes; as his substitutes and their superiours? Had prophane and wicked men ever accused providence, and excused their impieties: had they not heard of fatall starres necessitating and inforcing both their wills and actions?

39. Was not the constitution of Fate and Fortune, first in∣vented in a derogation to God, and his divine providence: and that through a paganish and infidelious scandall at good things happening to bad men here; and evill things to good men, which had never been excogitated, or had soon vanished had they been thus Christianly instructed, viz. That the all provi∣dent Creator dispenses these middle things with an indifferent hand, as unto creatures. That the best men upon earth, are not worthy of the least of goods things: & may deserve to be invol∣ved in the utmost of evill things, that can here befall them. That the wise Disposer knows how to turn these outward good things to the evill, of evill men: and these outward evill things to the good of good men. That this present world is no time of full punishing, or rewarding: but these two precisely pertain to the world that is to come.

40. Admit that either Fate or fortune was so indeed as they presage; or much more than they can imagine: yet how is the best of them both sufficient to moderate all fond hopes and fears? Or what is able to doe that; but a lively faith (voyd of these heathenish superstitions) and assuredly believing, That there is an all-provident God, that only foresees all things necessarie: and to whom nothing is contingent or casuall.

That can, will, and doth work (for the best of his) both with second causes, and exteriour means; as also without them, yea and against them. That binds not the world, much lesse tyes his Church unto them. That hath written his childrens names in the book of life: and much more then (they may be assured) hath numbred the hairs of their heads, as concern∣ing all earthly accidents. That shines, and moves in the Sun and Moon, and starres: and makes their generall influxes more, or lesse effectuall, as he is pleased to adde, or abstract his speciall motion; or oppose his immediate administration, or interpose the office of his more excellent Ministers, Angells, and reasonable Souls.