The illustrious Hugo Grotius Of the law of warre and peace with annotations, III parts, and memorials of the author's life and death.

About this Item

Title
The illustrious Hugo Grotius Of the law of warre and peace with annotations, III parts, and memorials of the author's life and death.
Author
Grotius, Hugo, 1583-1645.
Publication
London :: Printed by T. Warren, for William Lee ...,
1655.
Rights/Permissions

To the extent possible under law, the Text Creation Partnership has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights to this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above, according to the terms of the CC0 1.0 Public Domain Dedication (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). This waiver does not extend to any page images or other supplementary files associated with this work, which may be protected by copyright or other license restrictions. Please go to http://www.textcreationpartnership.org/ for more information.

Subject terms
Grotius, Hugo, 1583-1645.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A42234.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The illustrious Hugo Grotius Of the law of warre and peace with annotations, III parts, and memorials of the author's life and death." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A42234.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 2, 2024.

Pages

III. War is lawfull in defense of life; onely against an assail•…•…nt: and in present certain danger.

THe first cause of just war is Injury not yet done, but offer'd either against Bo∣dy or Goods. If the Body be assaulted by present force, with perill of life, not

Page 178

otherwise avoidable * 1.1, in this case war is lawfull, even with the slaying of him that brings the danger; as we have said afore, when by this instance, as mo•…•… approved, we shewed that some private war may be just. Tis to be noted, this right of defense, by it self and primarily, springs from hence, that nature com∣mends every one unto himself, not from the injustice or sin of the other, from whom the danger is * 1.2. Wherefore although he be without fault, as one that war∣reth faithfully, or thinketh me other than I am, or is beside himself, or affrighted, as to some hath happened, hereby is not taken away the right of self-defense: it sufficeth, that I am not bound to suffer what he offereth, no more than if ano∣ther mans beast did threaten me with the danger. Whether also innocent persons, who being interposed hinder my defense or flight, without which death cannot be escaped, may be slain, is question'd. Some, even Divines, there are, that think it lawfull. And surely, if we respect na∣ture * 1.3 alone, with her the respect of socie∣ty is much less, than the care of proper safety. But the law of Charity, especially the Evangelicall, which equals another to our selves, plainly permits it not. That saying of Thomas, if it be rightly * 1.4 taken, is true: In a true defense a man is not slain on purpose: not that it is not lawfull sometimes, if there be no other

Page 179

meanes of safety, to do that on purpose whence the death of the assailant wil fol∣low, but that in this case that death is not chosen as a thing primarily intended, as in judiciall punishment, but as the only thing remaining at that time; when he that is assaulted, even at that time, ought to desire rather to do somewhat whereby the other may be terrified or weakened, than destroyed. Present * 1.5 dan∣ger is here requir'd, and as it were in a point. I confess, if the assailant draw his sword, and so that it appears he doth it with a mind to kill, it is lawfull to pre∣vent him: For in morals, as in naturals, a point is not found without some lati∣tude. Nevertheless are they deceived and do deceive, who admit of any fear what∣soever, as a just occasion of such preven∣ting. For it is well observed by † 1.6 Cicero, Very many injuries proceed from fear, when he that thinks to hurt another feareth, unless he do it, himself shall re∣ceive hurt. Clearchus in Xenophon: Ma∣ny have I known, drawn either by calum∣ny or supicion, whilst they fear others, and had rather prevent than suffer, to have done much evill to those, that attempted not, nor so much as thovght any such thing against them. Cato in his Oration for the Rhodians: What, saith he, shall we first execute, that which we say they desig∣ned? Cicero * 1.7 again: Who ever made this

Page 180

Statute, or to whom * 1.8 may it be granted without extreme hazard of all, that one might lawfully kill him first, of whom he saith we was afraid, left himself should afterward be killed? Pertinent is that of * 1.9 Thucydides: The future is yet uncertain: nor ought any one therefore to make a quarrell present and certain. The same Au∣thor, where he declareth the hurt of Se∣dition among the Grecian Cities, sets down this for one fault: He was praised, that first did, what another was about to commit † 1.10. To such agrees that saying of Vibius Crispus cited by Quintilian, * 1.11 Who permitted thee to be so fearfull? And Li∣via in Dio * 1.12 saith, They escape not in∣famy, that by way of prevention do the evill which they fear. Now, if any one offer not present force, but be found to have conspired or lyen in wait, if to pre∣pare poyson, if to plot a false accusation, to suborn witnesses, to corrupt judgment, such a one, I say, cannot be justly slain: if either the danger may be otherwise a∣voided; or it be not certain enough, it cannot be otherwise avoided. For, for the most part, the delay of time interpo∣sed affords many remedies, and many ac∣cidents for our rescue; according to the Proverb, † 1.13 Between the cup and the lip. Yet there are not wanting both Divines and Lawyers that extend their indulgence farther. But the other also, which is the better and safer way, wanteth not the con∣sent of Authors.

Notes

Do you have questions about this content? Need to report a problem? Please contact us.