The court of the gentiles, or, A discourse touching the original of human literature, both philologie and philosophie, from the Scriptures and Jewish church. Part 2, Of philosophie in order to a demonstration of 1. The perfection of Gods word and church light, 2. The imperfection of natures light and mischief of vain philosophie, 3. The right use of human learning and especially sound philosophie / by Theoph. Gale ...

CHAP. VIII. Of Plato's Logick, and it's derivation from the Jews.

Plato's forme of Logick consisting in Dialogues: their use in the Ele∣atick Schole, but their original use amongst the Jews. Scripture Logick in Dialogizing, as in Job, the Prophets, Mark 8.11. Luke 22.68. Rom. 11.1. Luke 11.53, 54. Logick an Organ, or key to all Sciences. Plato's Logick precepts. 1. A Logicia•• must be grave, and moderate, not contentious. Conten∣tious Disputes the cause of Scepticisme. 2. The Matter of Di∣sputes must be weighty. 3. To lay down good principles. 4. To proceed Methodically from particulars to generals, &c. 5. To illustrate by examples. 6. To distinguish duelie 'twixt Truth, and falshood. 7. To State will the affirmative. 8. Not to ex∣pect more exactnesse, than matters will bear. 9. To keep the Judgment free. 10. To make Reason, not Authoritie the mea∣sure of Truth. 11. Modestie, and Candor in Disputes. 12. In refuting Errors to reduce to absurditie. 13. To shew the rise of Error. Alcinous of Plato's Logick.

§. 1.* 1.1 PHilosophie may be considered in it's Essential constitutive par∣ticulars; or else in its introductorie universal Organ· The Introductorie universal organ, or key to all Philosophie is Logick;

which Plato makes much use of in all his Philosophizings, though not according to the mode, as now it is in use in our Scholes. For Plato imitating his master Socrates; and those of the Eleatick Schole, Par∣menides, and Zeno (who are supposed to be the first Inventors of Lo∣gick) affect a natural, plain, and familiar mode of Disputing by Di∣alogues, or Interrogations, and Responsions, much like the Scriptural, and Jewish way of Disputation. That the Mode, or Forme of Di∣sputing in Plato's Academie, was not by way of Syllogisme (which A∣ristotle brought in) but by Interrogations, and Answers, is apparent to any vers'd in Plato's Philosophie, which is wrapt up in Dialogues beginning with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or such like Interrogations. This is farther evident from the Origination of the name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (which Plato useth for the most part, if not altogether, to expresse Logick by) Dialectick, which is apparently derived from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the primarie notation whereof is to Conferre, or Dispute by Dialogues, or Colloquies. Thus Alexander 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Dialectick makes discourses consisting of Interrogations, and Responses: for from these it wholly derived it's name. So Laertius l. 3. saies, That a Dialogue is an Oration composed of Interrogation, and Responsion, concerning matters relating to Philosophie, or Republick Affairs.

* 1.2As for the Original of this Dialogizing Mode, 'tis not certainly de∣termined whence Plato had it. Some say he himself was the Author of it; others derive it from Zeno the Eleatick, others from others. So Lud. Vives on August. Civit. Dei lib. 8. cap. 7.

There are some, who refer this kind of Dialectick oration to Plato, as the Inventor thereof; as Favorinus: others to Alexamenus Teius, as Aristotle: there are not wanting some, who refer it to Zeno the Eleatick. Truly it is evident, that Plato polished, and adorned this mode of Dialo∣gizing (or arguing by Dialogues) which he fils with all kind of neat∣nesses, and learning, wherein if the artificial formules of Diale∣ctick (or Logick) are not delivered, yet all the precepts of this Art are really expressed, as also the method, how to use them. Plato gives us Demonstration in his Timaeus: the specimens of Sophistrie are delivered in his Eutydemus; whence Aristotle translated not a few of his Sophistick Elenches, or Fallacies: Plato's Socratick In∣duction is of all most potent, &c.

Thus Lud. Vives: wherein he gives us a good account of Plato's Logick, and its original; which as it seems most probable, was by him, or by his Master Socrates deri∣ved

immediately from the Eleatick Schole, from Parmenides, and Zeno: for the same Lud. Vives (in August. Civit. Dei lib. 8. cap. 4.) tells us, that Plato diligently examined the Inventions of Parmenides, and Zeno the Eleaticks. And Aristotle in Sophista, as also Laer∣tius in Zeno acquaints us, that Logick was first found out by Zeno the Eleatick. So Vossius de Histor. Graec. lib. 4. cap. 2. agen, Vossius de Philosoph. Sect. lib. 2. cap. 11. §. 2, 3. And Hornius who succeeded him in his Professorship, agrees with him in his Opinion hereabout:

Plato primus Dialogos introduxit non quod ipse primus invenerit, (ante eum enim Zeno scripsit) sed quod expoliverit.

Hornius Histor. Philos. l. 7. c. 8.

Dialogues are said to have been first introduced by Plato, not as if he had been the first Inventor of them (for Zeno writ in that way before him) but because he very much po∣lished, and perfected that way of Arguing: to this purpose Hornius.

But whence ever Plato derived this Dialogizing mode of Logick, that it came originally from the Jewish Church, and Sacred Scriptures, we shall endeavour to demonstrate both by Artificial, and Inartificial arguments.

§. 2. First, Suppose we grant, that Plato,* 1.3 and Socrates received this forme of Dialogizing Logick from Parmenides, or Zeno the Elea∣tick; yet that these had their choicest notions from the Jews, we have afore, in our discourse of the Eleatick Philosophie, endeavoured to prove: and particularly that Zeno the Eleatick (who is supposed to be the Inventor of Dialectick Logick) was originally of Tarsis, or as o∣thers of Sidon, and so a Phenician, and borderer on the Jews, &c.

2. But to come to Plato's own confession: In his Thaeetetus, fol. 210. Plato brings in Socrates stiling this Art of disputing by Dialogues a playing the Midwife:

The true way of teaching (saith he) is by apt Interrogations, and Answers to bring forth the faetus, i. e. the sense of our minds into light: which is in regard of Discipline a commo∣dious 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, obstetrication, or doing the office of a Midwife. This art of playing the Midwife, or Dialectick Logick, Socrates (in the same place confesseth) that he received from God, his words are, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, This Midwife art I, and my Mother received from God. i. e. the true God of Israel (of whom he seems to have had some notices) by some Jewish Tradition, as we may presume.

* 1.43. That this Platonick mode of Disputing by dialogues, or inter∣rogations, and answers, exactly answers to (and therefore as we may justly presume was derived from) the Jewish mode of disputing, will be more than probable to such, as shall consider such disputes as are mentioned in Scripture. We find in the book of Job (one of the most ancient pieces of Scripture) several Disputes 'twixt Job, and his Friends carried on in a Dialectick mode, by questions, and answers. So in like manner, in the Prophets, God (condescending to the Jewish manner of reasoning) frequently argues, and debates matters with his people in a way of dialogue, or interrogation, &c. Yea this manner of disputing, or debating matters, continued amongst the Jews 'till our Saviour's time, as appears by his Disputes with the Jewish Doctors, Scribes, and Pharisees, as also their reasonings with him, which were for the most part, if not altogether, managed by questions, and answers; not by Syllogismes. So Mark 8.11. The Pharisees are said to dispute with Chri••: where Grotius on 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 observes,

that the most ancient mode of Disputation was by Interrogations.

Thus in like manner on Luke 22.68. Grotius renders 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, [if I shall propose any argu∣ments.] for addes he, the Hebrews, no lesse th••n the Grecians were wont to dispute by Interrogations. So agen, on Rom. 11.1. He with whom Paul disputes proposeth a question, to which Paul a••swers, &c. as Grotius. So on Luke 11.53, 54. Grotius observes, that the wo••d 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is taken from the Scholes, & signifies to pose by questions, &c. as before in Socrates's mode of Philosophizing.

Lastly, That the Ancients generally, before Aristotle, disputed by Interrogations is evident by what is observed by Aristotle in his So∣phistick Elenches, where he makes mention of a Fallacie amongst the Ancients called a Fallacie of many Interrogations. By all ••hich it ma∣nifestly appears, that the mode of disputing amongst the An••ients, particularly in Plato's Schole, was by Interrogations, and Responsions, conformable unto, and therefore, as we may justly presume▪ in deri∣vation from the Jews their mode of ••ialogizing. Thus was Logick a∣mongst the Ancients clothed in a more natural, familiar, simple dresse, suitable to things, without those cloudie Niceties, and dark crabbed Termes, which serve only to breed needlesse, and endlesse conten∣tions, as it has been well observed by Jackson on the Scripture, fol. 57.

as all the principal heads of the Grecian invention were derived for the most part from the Hebrews; although by successive artifici∣al

imitation, their varietie grows greater, and their resemblance of Divine Truth lesse, so likewise were Logical conceits first clothed like Natures Children, &c.

Thus much for the Forme of Plato's Logick, and it's cognation with that in use amongst the Jews.

§. 3. We shall proceed to make a more particular distinct inquisi∣tion into Plato's Logick, which he makes to be a key,* 1.5 or induction to all Philosophie: so in Repub. lib. 7. fol. 518. Plato calls his Dialectick 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an introductorie Art. So agen fol. 532. he calls it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the way to other Sciences: & fol. 533. he stiles it a method, wherein by certain steps we at last ascend to the highest principles. Whence Plato makes his Dialectick but a gradation to his Metaphysicks, and therefore he oft confounds them, and mixeth them together in his Discourses. So in his Pa••menides, and Sophista he mixeth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, his Me∣taphysicks, and Dialectick discourses together, as 'tis well observed by Lud. Vives ••n August. Civit. lib. 8. cap. 4^o. And herein Plato is fol∣lo••ed by his Scholar Aristotle, who calls his Logick also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an Organ, or Instrument for the discoverie of other Sciences; only with this difference, whereas Aristotle seems to make Logick an organ, but no part of Philosophie, Plato 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it to be both. So Ammonius on Aristotle's Categor. pag. 8 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Amongst the ancient Philosophers, some made Logick to be a part of Philosophie as the whole Chorus of the Stoa: o∣thers made it an Organ, as all those of the Paripatum: but Plato makes Logick both a part, and organ of Philosophie, &c.

The Anci∣ents were wont to distribute their Sciences into three parts, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Dogme, or Principle, the Method, the Praxis. The Method of all Sciences belongs to Logick, for so Ari∣stotle, as well as Plato defines Logick 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

a Method for the right disposing of every Probleme proposed:

only Aristotle calls this Method 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Syllogistick, whereas Plato makes it to be Dialectick. So then we may according to Plato's mind, define Logick, an organ, meanes, way, or method for the disquisition, and finding out of the Truth. This fully agrees with the definition Plato gives of a good Logician. Plat. Repub. 7 fol. 537.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

Thou callest a Logician him who penetrates the essence of things. For a Logician is a very accurate Inquisitor, or Inspector. This being the nature of Logick, and office of a Logician to make a serious Inquisition into the nature of things, in order to the disquisition of Truth, we shall endeavour to pick up such Methodical precepts, and Rules as lye scattered here and there in Plato's Philosophie, and seem to comprize the chief of his Logick,* 1.6 or Method for the finding out of Truth.

§. 4. First, as to the qualification of Logicians, and their regular procedure in Logical studies, and debates. Plato requireth, that a Lo∣gician be of a mature, and ripe judgment, moderate, and calme as to his passions, modest, candid, and ingenuous in all his disputes; not vain glorious, not contentious, but grave, and moderate in the whole of his deportment. Thus Plato de Repub. 7. (fol. 539. Edit. Stephan.)

That the miserable issue of vain contention may be avoided, be it provided that no one under 30 years of age shall taste of Dialectick Ratiocination; and then not without great caution, and circumspe∣ction. Thus Plato; who in what follows gives his reason of such his Institute: Because young men, when engaged in Dialetick disputes doe rather aime at Victorie, and vain glory, than the discoverie of Truth; and thence abusing this Art of Logick unto needlesse con∣tradictions 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, using it alwaies for con∣tradiction, they like young Puppies often overcome, and are oft o∣vercome again, so long 'till at last they come to believe nothing at all.

But (addes Plato) your grave person of mature judgment 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 &c.

would not willingly be partaker of this madnesse, be∣cause in his disputing he seeks rather Truth, than Victorie, or Glo∣rie, which is the proper effect of Childish Contentious Disputes. Agen he addes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Ancient Person is more moderate, or regular, and so adorneth his Province with gravitie, candor, and moderation, &c.

* 1.7Albeit Plato is thus severe against Contentious wrangling Logick, yet it cannot be denyed, but that there were, at least after his death, many vexatious questions, and contentious disputes in his Old Acade∣mie, which laid the foundation of that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or suspension of judgement

in the New Academie. For we must remember there was allowed by Plato in his Academie, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a peirastick, or probatio∣nal mode of disputing: the Laws whereof allowed, that in some dubious points it was free for any to dispute pro, or contra, for, or a∣gainst the position, and at last to leave it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, undefin'd,* 1.8 or undetermined. And that which gave an occasion to this Sceptick mode of disputing was this, that although Plato held some things certain, and infallibly true, which ought to be certainly assented to, as the Existence of God &c. yet he held also many other points, especially in Physicks, to be very dubious, and uncertain, wherein he presumed there might be a Libertie granted of disputing pro, or contra, without prejudice to Truth: whence sprang many contentious disputes, which at last determined in the New Academick 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 suspension, or disbe∣lief of every thing. So Serranus in his Preface to Plato: It is no way

to be doubted, but that the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and dubitations of the New A∣cademicks were the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and corruptions of the old opinion: for Plato in some Arguments disputes both waies, &c.

And indeed nothing is more natural than that from disputes, & contentions pro, and contra, if not well mannag'd, Assent to Truth should be much weaken'd. This contentious kind of Logick made the Stoicks, & Cynicks ('twixt whom there was a great 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or symbolization) reject ratio∣nal, & natural Philosophie, because it was man's 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and chief end, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to live virtuously, as Diog. Laertius.

§. 5. Secondly, Another Logick Precept laid down by Plato, is this;

That the matter of Logical discussions be weightie, and useful,* 1.9 not frivolous, or unnecessarie:

So in his Phaedrus fol. 277. Plato compares a Logician to a skilful Seedsman, who soweth such Dialectick artificial notions, and discourses, as will bring forth the best fruit for use and advantage. This is the more diligently to be heeded, be∣cause in Dialectick Debates nothing is more easie to be found, than an occasion of disputing about Chimera's, &c. This Rule follows on the foregoing, and therefore needs not farther illustration.

3. A Third Rule given by Plato,* 1.10 in order to a Logical disquisition of Truth is

that we be sure to lay down sound, and substantial Prin∣ciples, as the foundation of all following discourse, and conclusions.

Thus Plato in his Philebus, being about to dispute, he will have them first lay down by common consent some few foundation Principles: His own words are fol. 20. these, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Let us lay down a few confessed principles before us: and then

addes the reason 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Principles fairly granted are immoveable. So agen Plato in Cratylus fol. 436. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, every man ought about the first Principle of any undertaking to discourse much, and to consider much whether it be rightly laid or not. This is of great moment, because according to that measure of strength, or weaknes which is in the Principles, such will be the strength, or weaknes of the Conclusions. Whence that old max∣ime quoted by Aristotle, The Principle is half the whole. i. e. Lay a good Principle, and your work is half done. The first Principle gives light to all following Principles, but receives none from them.

* 1.114. Rule for Dialectick discourse is this, That there be a methodick procedure from certain plain Hypotheses, or evident concessions, to those things, which are more general, obscure, and of an higher con∣templation. Thus Plato Repub. 7. fol. 533. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, where Plato makes Logick to be nothing else than

a Method, whereby we proceed from some cer∣tain, and plain Hypotheses, by certain medium's or assents, to the high∣est, and first Principle, or Truth.

This Method which Plato commends, whereby we proceed from the particular to the general, from the effect, to the cause, and from the end to the beginning, is usually stiled in the Scholes Analytick method, whereof (as 'tis said) Plato was the first In∣ventor. Certainly such a procedure from effects to their causes, and from particulars to generals must be of great use for the discoverie of Truth. For there is nothing can be rightly known, 'till the first cau∣ses, whence it sprang, be made manifest. Particulars receive strength and certainty from generals, out of which they grow, and generals re∣ceive light, and evidence from particulars. In all parts of knowledge things most general are most firme, on which the certaintie of particulars depends. See les conferences par beaux Esprits. Tom. 1. Conf. 1. This also is commended by Ammonius in Arist. Categ. pag. 13. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He that will exactly understand the nature of the whole, must exactly consider its parts.

* 1.125. Rule. Plato prescribeth the use of Examples, and clear illustrati∣ons, as necessarie in Logick discourse for the evidencing of Truth. So in his Politicus fol. 277.

It is very hard (saies he) to demonstrate a∣ny thing, that is great, or transcendent without Examples:

for every

ones knowledge seems to be but dreaming: we are indeed ignorant of every thing. And Serranus on this place Comments thus,

Plato wils, that in our inquisitions into the natures of things more obscure, we place before our understanding 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the exemplars, and adumbrations of things more known, thereby to make our investigation more facile, and speedie. Therefore in search∣ing into the natures of great things we are to make use of the exam∣ples of the least things.

Neither was this Plato's advice only, but his practice also. For none of the Ancients (yea may not we say of the Moderns also?) may be compared with him as to the use of proper, and accurate examples, and instances for the illustration of Truth. Whence that Proverbial speech, Plato teacheth, Aristotle proveth:

§. 6. Rule for Logical disquisitions is this;* 1.13 'To distinguish well be∣twixt Truth, and Falshood. So Plato in his Gorgias, fol. 507 tels us, that we must be exceeding exact in severing Truth from Falshood; for the better performing whereof, he acquaints us (Repub. 7. fol. 537.) that a Logician must be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an accurate Inquisitor: and elsewhere he laies down this as requisite for one, that would exactly difference Truth from Falshood, that he have Sagacitie, good Disposition, and libertie of Judgment. Calvin tells us,

this is the best method for avoiding Er∣rour, to consider well the danger imminent on both sides.

And Be∣za in the life of Calvin gives him this Character:

That amongst o∣ther excellent graces these Two shined most brightly in him;

viz. 1. A singular vivacitie to discover where the difficultie of matters lay: and 2. A marvellous dexteritie to couch his responses without losing one word.

7. Rule, In order to the right distinguishing 'twixt Truth and Falshood, it's necessarie to state the affirmative well in some Theses,* 1.14 or Suppositions. So Plato tells us, 'tis but one and the same labour 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to establish the Truth, and revince the Errour: So agen, in his Sophist. Plato acquaints us,

that he who will understand 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Negative, must well understand 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Affirmative.

And the reason is evident: Because no Ne∣gative hath in it self the cause of it's Truth, but it is so by the Truth of the Affirmative; neither was there ever any proposition false, but be∣cause some other was true: nor can the falsitie of the one be known, but by the Truth of the other.

8. Rule.

In the Definition, or Description of things we may not expect more certainty, or exactnes than the matter affordeth,* 1.15 or re∣quireth.

So Plato (in Critias, fol. 107.)

When Painters (saith he) endeavour to Limne forth to us Divine things, we find our selves abundantly satisfied, if they expresse but some small image of those things.

So Arist. Ethick. lib. 1. cap. 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

It is the office of a learner to seek after so much exactnes in every kind, as the nature of the thing admits. For (addes he) you must not put an Orator to demonstrate by Logick, or a Mathe∣matician to persuade by Oratorie, &c. in Divinis, & maximis mini∣mum investigare maximum est, In great, and Divine matters to find out the least apex of Truth is of greatest moment:

as Plato.

It is a Ridiculous superstition (saith Cunaeus) to be alwaies sollicitous about definitions: for some things will not admit them.

* 1.169. Rule.

In the examination of things there must be used Liber∣tie of judgment, without partialitie or prejudice:

So Plato de Re∣pub. 6. fol. 494,

Truth is acquired by none 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but such as, give themselves up as slaves to be possessed thereby.

Hence that great saying; it becomes a searcher after Truth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to sacrifice to Truth, not to be enslaved to an opinion. Whence Aristotle gives this good Character of a true Philosopher,

That he must yeeld himself up a captive to Truth, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to the extirpation of his own Phaenomena. Li∣bertie (saith Cunaeus) is an inestimable treasure, which some make to be the Soul of a true ••udgment. Indifferencie of judgment (saith Mede) without prejudice is sufficient to discover much Truth with little diligence, and without much Learning. but the miserie is, the world loves to be deceived, rather than to be taught; addes another: and yet another, Cujus animo semel sedet pervicax opinio, definit res vere discernere, he, whose mind is prepossest with a pertina∣cious Opinion, ceaseth to be in a Capacitie for discerning of Truth.

* 1.1710. Whence it follows,

that the Authoritie of Persons is not so much to be valued, as the weight of their Reasons: So Plato Phaed. 91. brings in Socrates advising his friends Simia, and Cebes, not to give credit to him with the losse of Truth. But doe ye (saith So∣crates) give credit to me only thus far, as to be sure ye make very much account of Truth,* 1.18 but very little of Socrates. Agen, Plato tells us, that a man is soon deceived by Authoritie of others: there is but one good Authoritie, and that is of Reason.

11. Disputes must be managed with Modestie, Candor,* 1.19 and Mo∣deration. So Plato Protag. fol. 337. They must debate things with an amicable familiaritie: the opinions, and reasons of Adversaries must be related bona fide: neither 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, must they rail, &c. There must be modestie used, which Plato defines thus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a voluntarie yeelding to what is best.

12. For refuting Errors Plato gives this Rule (Hippias, fol. 362.* 1.20)

This is a commodious way of refelling Sophisters, to reduce them to absurd Consequences, whence the falsitie of their Antecedents will appear.

13. To which adde this. In confuting Errors, we must shew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the first rise, and spring of the Error.

§. 7. If any one expects, or desires a more artificial account of Plato's Dialectick, the best, that I have met with,* 1.21 is that of Alcinous (a great Platonick Philosopher) in his Institution to Plato's Doctrine, where hav∣ing (cap. 3.) distributed Philosophie (according to Plato's mind) into Con∣templative, Active, and Rational; and (cap. 4.) explicated the founda∣tion of Dialectick which has it's seat in Nature, he proceeds (cap. 5.) to discourse of the proper Elements of Dialectick, which he reduceth to these 5. heads; Definition, Division, Analysis, or Method, Induction,* 1.22 or Di∣judication, & Ratiocination.

In the Elements of Dialectick (saith Alci∣nous) this was principally Plato's sentiment; that Firstly the nature of every thing should be considered, and then it's Accidents. What the Nature of every thing is, he searcheth out either from Superiors, by Division, and Definition: or from Inferiors, by Analysis, or resolu∣tion. As for Accidents, which inhere in Essences, he seeks them out, either from the Contents by Induction, or from the Continents by Ra∣tiocination. So that Dialectick Reasons are deservedly comprehended under Division, Definition, Analysis, Dijudication, and Raciocination. Division it is either the Distribution of the Genus into it's Species,* 1.23 or the Section of the whole into it's parts, or the partition of the word into it's significates. Agen, Division is either of the Accidents into their Subjects, or of the Subjects into their Accidents. The Division of Genus into it's Species is useful for the finding out the Nature of e∣very thing, which belongs to Definition.* 1.24 Now Definition springs from Division thus. The Genus of the thing to be Defined must be taken, as Animal of Homo.

Hence this Genus must be divided by it's next difference, 'till we descend to the Species. And then by adding the

next difference to the Genus, the Definition of the Species is constituted, as Homo est Animal Rationale. Analysis has Three Species:* 1.25 the one whereby we ascend from Sensibles to first Intelligibles: another where∣by we proceed from Demonstrates, and Sub-demonstrates to first Propositions, which want a Medium: the Third whereby we passe from a Supposition to those Principles, which are taken for granted, without a Supposition. The First kind of Analysis is thus exemplified: as when we passe from the beautie of the Bodie to that of the Mind: from this, to that which appears in men's Morals, or conversations; and from this to that, which shines in Politick constitutions, and Ad∣ministrations: from which at last we arrive to that immense Ocean of the first Beautie. See the other Two Species of Analysis in Alci∣nous.

* 1.26§. 8. Thence Alcinous proceeds to Induction

which (saies he) is a rational procedure from Like to Like, or from Singulars to Vniversals. This is most advantageous to excite Notions implanted by Nature herself.* 1.27 As for that piece of Oration which we call Proposition, it has Two Species: the one is Affirmation, the other is Negation. In Affirmations, and Negations some are Universal, as All evil is base, &c. some are Particular, as Some pleasure is not good. Of Propositions some are Categorical, some Hypothetical, or conditionate. The Art of Ratiocination is used by Plato in Arguing,* 1.28 and Demonstrating. He Argues, and Confutes what is false by Interrogations: but he Demon∣strates by teaching what is true. Ratiocination is an Oration in which some Propositions being laid down a conclusion by force of those Pro∣positions is drawn. Of Ratiocinations some are Categorical, some are Hypothetical, some Mixt, which have a complexion of both. Plato useth Demonstrative Ratiocinations in those Dialogues, wherein he ex∣plicates his own opinion: but against Sophisters, and young men he makes use of probable arguments: and against those, who were properly contentious, he useth Eristick argumentation; as against Euthydemus, and Hippias. As for Categorical Ratiocination (which has Three Figures) Plato Interrogates in each Figure. As in the First Figure thus,* 1.29 (in Alcibiades) Just things are they not beautiful? and beautiful things, are they not good? therefore are not just things good? So in the ••econd, and Third Figure Plato Interrogates in his Parmenides, &c. Touching Hypothetical Ratiocinations,* 1.30 we find many delivered by Plato, though by Interrogations, especially, in his Par∣menides.

He also gives some hints of Mixt Ratiocination— If we look for some account of Sophismes,* 1.31 and Fallacies, we shall find it in Plato's Euthydemus. Also he has given us some adumbration of the Ten Categories in his Parmenides,* 1.32 as in like manner in his Dia∣logues. He has comprehended the universal Forme of Notation in his Cratylus.* 1.33 And truely this man was admirably perfect in defi••ing, and dividing: which declareth that he had the chiefest force, or spirit of Dialectick. In his Cratylus he queries, whether names signifie from Nature, or from Institution? And he determineth, that what is right in names comes from Institution, yet not casually, but so as such In∣stitution must be consentaneous to the nature of the thing it self. For the rectitude of names is nothing else but an Institution convenient to the Nature of the things. This also belongs to Logick to use names aright:

Thus Alcinous. Albeit we may allow this learned Platonist, that some vestigia of these several parts of Dialectick are to be found in Plato's writings, yet 'tis most certain, that Plato never in∣tended to deliver over to posteritie any such artificial mode, or forme of Logick. All that he designes is, to give us some general Canons for a more methodical Inquisition into the nature of things, and for regular Disputation, or Ratiocination. The first, that gave us an artificial Systeme of Logick separate from the Praexis, was Aristotle (as hereafter) Plato affected a more natural, familiar, and simple method of Ratiocina∣tion (as before) yea so far is he from delivering any exact artificial forme of Logick, as that he confounds his Dialectick with Metaphy∣sicks, and other contemplations (as else where) Yet as to the Praxis of Dialectick, Plato abounds with accurate Definitions, and Divisions: also he gives an excellent Idea of Analytick method, whereof he is said to be the first Inventor. And as to Dijudication, and Argumentati∣on, he seems very potent in the use of the Socratick Induction. And all this with much harmonie, simplicitie, and plainnesse, without that Arti∣fice which Aristotle introduced. Amongst our Moderne Writers, no one seems to have made a better emprovement of Plato's Dialectick Precepts, and Praxis, than Peter Ramus, who (notwithstanding the contumelies cast upon him by his bloudie Adversarie Carpenter) seems to have had a thorough insight into Plato's mind, and to have reduced his principles to the best method for the Disquisition of Truth. The Abstract of his Logick we intend to give, when we come to Treat of Aristotle's Logick.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Plato's mode, or Forme of Logick consist∣ing in Dia∣logues.
• * 1.2

  The original of this Dialogi∣zing mode, from the Elea∣tick Schole of Zeno.
• * 1.3

  Plato's Dia∣logizing Lo∣gick original∣ly from the Jews.
• * 1.4

  The Scripture mode of dispu∣ting by Dia∣logues.
• * 1.5

  Logick a Key, Organ, or Me∣thod for the disquisition of Truth.
• * 1.6

  Plato's Lo∣gick Precepts for the disqui∣sition of Truth. 1. A Logician must be of ripe age, Grave, Moderate, not vain glorious, or contentious.
• * 1.7

  How far the old Academie was guiltie of contentious Disputes, which gave rise to the new Academick 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.8

  See more of this Acade∣mick 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in what pre∣cedes of Pla∣to's Academie.
• * 1.9

  2. R. The mat∣ter of Logick debates must be momentous and useful.
• * 1.10

  3. Rule for the laying good foundation Principles.
• * 1.11

  4. R. A metho∣dical proce∣dure from par∣ticulars to ge∣nerals, from part to the whole.
• * 1.12

  5. R. The use of Examples.
• * 1.13

  6. R. To distin∣guish rightly 'twixt Truth, and Falshood.
• * 1.14

  7. R. To state well the Affir∣mative, and Truth.
• * 1.15

  8. R. We may not expect more exactnes than the mat∣ter will afford
• * 1.16

  9. R. Libertie of judgment.
• * 1.17

  10. R. Reason more to be va∣lued than Au∣thoritie.
• * 1.18

  Non inventio∣num acumen, sed rerū pon∣de••a am••mus.
• * 1.19

  11. R. Modestie, Candor, and Moderation to be used in Di∣sputes.
• * 1.20

  12. R. Of the manner of con∣futing Errors, See Hoonrb. Sum. Controv. p. 30, 31.54.56.13. R.
• * 1.21

  Plato's Dia∣lectick accord∣ing to Alcino∣us, cap. 5.
• * 1.22

  The Elements of Dialectick 5
• * 1.23

  Division.
• * 1.24

  Definition.
• * 1.25

  Analysis.
• * 1.26

  Induction of judgment.
• * 1.27

  Proposition Affirmative, or Negative, Universal, or Particular.
• * 1.28

  Ratiocination.
• * 1.29

  Ratiocination Categorick.
• * 1.30

  Hypothetick.
• * 1.31

  Mixt.
• * 1.32

  Categories.
• * 1.33

  Notation.