The court of the gentiles, or, A discourse touching the original of human literature, both philologie and philosophie, from the Scriptures and Jewish church. Part 2, Of philosophie in order to a demonstration of 1. The perfection of Gods word and church light, 2. The imperfection of natures light and mischief of vain philosophie, 3. The right use of human learning and especially sound philosophie / by Theoph. Gale ...

CHAP. I. Of Socratick Philosophie, its Original, &c.

Socrates brought in Moral Philosophie, and why: His Metaphysicks from the Scriptures, viz. That Ʋirtue and Knowledge of God comes by Divine infusion: His Daemon, &c. Socrates's Philosophie how far Contemplative: All true Philosophie Active: His Moralitie, par∣ticularly his endeavours to strip men of vain conceits touching their own knowledge, & to reduce them to the Knowledge of themselves. The Forme of Socrates's Philosophie was partly Rhetorical by Ironie, partly Dialectical, by Introduction, and Interrogation, according to the Jewish mode of Disputing, Mark. 8.11. Luk. 11.53. Socrates's Death, and Character: the many Sects, that sprang from his Schole, and their differences about the chiefest Good, &c.

§. 1. HAving discoursed at large of the Italick Philosophie founded by Pythagoras, and its ••raduction from the Divine Oracles: We now return to the Ionick, and its Advances under Socrates, and by his Scholars, Plato, &c. We have afore in the Storie of Thales, shewn how he, who was the Foun∣der of the Ionick Sect, traduced the Choicest parts of his Phi∣losophie from the Jewish Church. We are now to demonstrate, what emprovment the Ionick Philosophie received from the said Jew∣ish Philosophie, and Sacred Oracles. The Ionick Schole (as we be∣fore

hinted) was Transplanted from Ionia in Asia,* 1.1 unto Athens by A∣naxagoras. as Vossius will have it; or by his Successor Archelaus, as Ludovicus Vives. Socrates was Scholar to both: First to Anaxagoras, and after his departure from Athens to Archelaus, who was called the Physiologist, or Naturalist, because he (as all his Predecessors of the Ionick Schole) wholly addicted himself to Natural Philoso∣phie.

* 1.2§. 2. But Socrates, being disgusted at the vain Ph••losophizings of these proud daring Naturalists, considers how he might reduce Philo∣sophie to a more Practical usage. For observing what small advantage Contemplative Philosophie brought to Human Life, he reduced her to a more Active Science; and so pared off in every Science what he conceived lesse useful,,* 1.3 valuing Speculation no farther, than it con∣duced to Action. Thus Cicero Acad. Quaest. 1.

Socrates (saies he) seems to me, as it is manifest to all, to be the First, that called off Philosophie from occult things, and such as were involved, in Na∣ture, in which all the foregoing Philosophers were Versed, and to reduce her to common Life, that so men might enquire about Virtue, and Vice, and altogether of things Good, and Evil. As for Celestial bodies, he judged them altogether above the knowledge of Nature, or if they might be never so well known, yet did they no way con∣duce to our well living.

Thus Cicero. We find the like account in August. Civit. Dei lib. 8. cap. 3. Of Socrates's Philosophie.

Socra∣tes (saies he) therefore was the first, who is mentioned to have turn∣ed the whole of Philosophie, for the correcting, and composing of manners: whereas before him all employed their chiefest endeavours in Physicks, i. e. in natural Enquiries.

Thus we see, that Socrates was the first, who rejecting Astronomical, and Physick Contemplations, brought in Moral Philosophie into the Scholes: whence he is said to call down Philosophie from Heaven to Earth.

* 1.4§. 3. August. also (de Civ. l. 8. c. 3.) enquires into the reasons, which might enduce Socrates to reject the Speculative Disquisitions, which were then most in vogue, and to turne his Philosophizing whol∣ly to Moralitie. And he concludes that 'tis not clear, whether it pro∣ceeded

from an irksome sense he had of the obscuritie, and uncertain∣tie, which attended such Natural Philosophizings: or (as some more favourably judge) whether it were, that he judged men not fit to meddle with such sublime Mysteries, before they had gotten minds

purified, and clarified from terrene affections, &c.

So Lactant. lib. 3.

I grant (saies he) that Socrates was a little more discreet than the rest, who fancyed, they could comprehend the Nature of things by their Ingenie, wherein I conceive them to be not only foolish, but impious, in that they dare thurst in their curious eyes into the secrets of that Celestial Providence: yea I count them much more wicked, who seek to prophane the secrets of the World, and this Heavenly Temple, by their impious disputes, than he that would endeavour to enter into the Temple of Vesta, or Ceres, &c.

Put the genuine account seems this; that Socrates having enquired into all kinds of Philosophie then in vogue, he found little of certaintie, and lesse of usefulnes therein; whereupon he made it his designe to reduce spe∣culation to practice, &c. The like inducement drew Padre Paul that Venetian Reformer to quit speculative Philosophie, and turne to Mora∣litie, as it's well observed by the Author of his Life (English, pag. 69.)

About that time (saies he) Father Paul changed the qualitie of his studies (excepting Ecclesiastical, and Prophane Stories) to the studie of Moral Philosophie. Peradventure that which is written of So∣crates is no singular, or voluntarie Act, but is, as it were natural to all those understandings, which have any thing of transendent, who, after they have made a discoverie of what they can arrive to upon U∣niversalities, transport themselves totally to Moralitie; which studie (as to inferior things) is the only speculation of Humanitie. This a∣riseth either from a desire more intense to better it self, or from some incomprehensibilitie, or from a solid judgment of the vanitie of Sci∣ences, &c.

§. 4. Though Socrates addicted himself chiefly to Moralitie, yet was he not without skill in other parts of Philosophie, and Learning.* 1.5 Plato in his Epistles Attributes some parts of Natural Philosophie to Socrates. Xenephon his Scholar (as also Cicero) affirms,

that he was excellent in all kind of Learning, as well in Wisdom, Acutenes,* 1.6 Po∣litenes, and Subtiltie; as in ••loquence, Varietie, and Copiousnes: to whatsoever piece of Learning he addicted himself; he was with∣out exception Prince of all.

So much also is expressed in that an∣swer, which the Oracle made to him, who enquired who was the wisest m••n? 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Of all men Socrates is the wisest, said the Oracle. He made man the entire subject of his

Philosophie. For, according to the twofold 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or regard of man, 1. To Divine Contemplation, or, 2. To Human Conversation, he di∣vided his Philosophie into Metaphysick or Contemplative, and Mo∣ral or Active.* 1.7 1. As to his Metaphysicks, or Divine Contempla∣tions, he took it for granted, whilest man was subject to, and under the impression of corporeal Images, sensible Formes, and terrene Affe∣ctions, he was not rightly disposed for Divine Contemplation, which required a mind defecated, and separated from corporeal Phantasmes, and Passions. This some give as the reason, why in his Philosophick Institutes he so much addicted himself to moralitie; because he found his Scholars not capable of those more sublime Metaphysick Contem∣plations, therefore he endeavoured to prepare them for the same by Moral Institutes. This he made the chief subject of his last Philoso∣phick Lecture to his Scholars, after he had taken his Poyson, immedi∣ately before his Death, as we find it related at large by Plato in his Phaedo; where he gives us Socrates's Dying Philosophizings

touching the souls immortalitie, and separate state; and particularly, that none could rightly Philosophize of these Divine Mysteries, but such as had their souls stripped of, & abstracted from all Corporeal ima∣ges, impresses, and affections: for 'till the soul was loose from the prison of the bodie it could not be free for the Contemplation of God &c. Whence he defines Philosophie a mediation of death i. e. of the separation of the soul and bodie, in which state the soul being purged from those corporeal dregs, by which it was contaminated, whilest confined to the bodie, it is rendred capable of contempla∣ting God, and Divine things. For (saies he) it is great impietie to suppose that the Most Pure Divine Truth, and Being, will be touch∣ed by an impure mind. Thence he judged, that the Friends of God knew more of him, and his Divine Mysteries, than impure souls, who followed not God.

And Plato in his Cratylus brings him in affirm∣ing, that only Good men were Wise, and skilful in Divine Myste∣ries, &c. So August. de civit. Dei l. 8. c. 3. giving a reason, why So∣crates Philosophized so much on Moralitie, he saies,

Socrates would not, that minds clogged with terrene passions, should extend them∣selves to contemplate Divine things, which he conceived could not be comprehended but by a refined judgment: and therefore he thought men should be very intent on getting a reformed Life, that the minde being exonerated of its depressing Lusts, might by a natu∣ral

vigor, lift up it self to Eternals, and by that puritie of Intelligence contemplate the Nature of that Eternal, Incommutable Light, where the causes of all created Natures live in stabilitie, &c.

Thus August. Whereby we are informed, why Socrates was so sparing in communi∣cating his Divine Contemplations to his Scholars: though it seems to me very evident by what I find ascribed to him by Plato, that of all the Grecian Philosophers (Pythagoras not excepted) Scocrates had as (if not more) clear Notions as any touching God, his Nature, Vnitie,* 1.8 and other sacred Mysteries, which he could never have attained unto, but by some borrowed Tradition originally Jewish, or Scriptural. Particularly Socrates asserted. 1. The Spiritual, Infinite, Eternal Nature of God, and his Ʋnitie, which was the great Article, for which he suffered a kind of Martyrdome. 2. The cor••uption of Humane Na∣ture, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 &c. 3. A Native blindnes, in which all men were inveloped &c. 4. That Virtue was not teachable, and acqui∣table by Nature, or Art, but the product of Divine inspiration.* 1.9 Thus Plato in Meno. fol. 89. brings in Socrates thus discoursing 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 &c.

Having therefore often sought if there were any Praeceptors of Virtue, after all my endeavours I could find none:

so, fol. 99. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Virtue is neither teach∣able, neither gained by science. Then he brings in Socrates concluding more positively, thus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Virtue then is neither from Nature, nor Teachable; but it comes by a divine inspiration, without the concurrence of humane understanding in those to whom it is communica∣ted, &c. Thus Plato. Yea he adds (in the same fol. 99.) That God useth the most unskilful instruments, in communicating this Grace to men, &c. 5. When also Socrates asserted, That all true knowledge of God came by Divine Infusion. So Plato in his Alcibiad. fol. 124.* 1.10 brings in Socrates thus bespeaking Alcibiades,

We have need of a Common Council, by what means we may become best. Neither doe I affirm this only of thee, Alcibiades, that thou wantest Di∣scipline, but that I my self, mostly need it. Neither doe I at all dif∣fer from thee, this one thing being excepted; ••hat my Tutor, name∣ly God is better, and Wiser than thine, viz. Pericles.

So again Pla∣to Alcibiad. fol. 135. brings in Socrates thus Dialogizing with Alci∣biades. Socrates:

Dost thou know by wh•••• me••ns thou mayst avoid this inordinate motion of thy mind? Alcibiades: Yes: Soc. How?

Alcib. If thou wilt Socrates. Socrat. Thou speakest not rightly Al∣cibiades. Alcib. How then must I speak? Socrat. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, If God will, &c.

Again, Plato in his Theaet. fol. 151. brings in So∣crates alluring Theaetetus (a young man of an happie ingenie) to his Philosophie: in order whereto he affirms, that he was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 i. e. endowed with a Midwifes facultie to draw forth the conceptions of mens minds. But withall he adds that God alone was the Efficient, and he only a Midwife employed by God, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.11 God has compelled me to play the Midwife, but for∣bad me to generate. and fol. 210. he expresly saies, I and my Mother received this Midwifes facultie from God, &c. 6. Hence Socrates pretended to have a familiar Daemon alwaies attending, and inspiring of him. So Plato Theagnes. 128. brings in Socrates thus discoursing, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c.

There is by Divine Grace a Daemon, which has follo••ed me from my Childhood. This Daemon, is a voice, which signifies to me what I must doe, yet it does not compel me to do every thing: But if any of my friends communicate somewhat to me, and that voice d••hort me me from the same,* 1.12 it also suffers me not to doe it, &c.

So it's said of Socrates that when one of his Scholars offered him Money for in∣structing him, he refused it, saying, his Daemon would not permit it. And Plato in his Symposion, brings in Socrates discoursing at large of this Daemon, his Office, &c. And Serranus in Plato's Apologie for So∣crates tells us,

That Socrates called his Divine Inspiration 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Daemon, a Voice, and a Signe. And by the assistance of this tutelar Daemon Socrates affirmed, that he instituted his whole life even from his childhood. Wh••t this Daemon was, whe∣ther a good, or bad Angel (whereof the latter is most probable) it concerns us not to debate: only this is evident from the whole, that Socrates acknowledged a necessitie of a supernatural, Divine, assistance for instruction, and direction &c.

7. Socrates acknowledgeth a ne∣cessitie of some Divine Purgatorie, or purgation to expel all noxious humours from the soul: So Plato Charmides 154.

Socrates artificially feignes himself (saies he) a Physician; and testifies, that his Medi∣cament would be ineffectual unless there preceed some 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, pre∣paratorie Pill, or enchantment, by the words whereof the disease may be driven out. This he illustrates by an excellent similitude

drawn from Medicine, which teacheth that general purgatives are to precede particulars: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c.

So agen fol 157. he adds 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Socrates said, that the soul was to be purged by certain Epoda's, or preparatories, and these E∣poda's were Good, and Divine words.

8. Socrates seems to have some imperfect notices of Faith, and Prayer,* 1.13 according to the Scriptures notion thereof. So Plato Epinom. fol. 980. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. Trust on the Gods, and pray unto them, that meet apprehensions of the nature of the Gods may come into thy minde. 9. Lastly that Socrates had very clear apprehensions of the soul's immortalitie,* 1.14 and it's sepa∣rate state, will be evident to any, that views his dying discourse of this Theme, as related by Plato in his Phaedo. By all which laid together it's evident: that Socrates had very Metaphysical contemplations of Divine Mysteries, and that originally from the Jewish Church,

§. 5 Though Socrates was not without sublime,* 1.15 and deep contem∣plations of Divine things, yet the most of his Philosophical discourses in his Schole concerned Morals, and that for the reasons afore menti∣oned. So August. Civit. l. 8. c. 4.

In as much as the studie of wisdom consists in Contemplation, and Action, Socrates is said to excel most, in Active Philosophie, whereas Pythagoras, insisted more upon Contemplative, &c.

Not but that Socrates spent much time in Contemplation, as well as Pythagoras, for so Plato lib. 7. de Repub. brings in Adimantus thus speaking unto Socrates, Thou hast consumed thy whole life in nothing else but Speculation; &c. Only herein lay the difference: Socrates made all his Contemplations subservient unto Acti∣on, and valued not speculative sciences farther then they conduced to practice: for he made Man the whole subject of his philosophie. So Plato in his Apologie for Socrates, tells us, how much time he spent in Contemplative Inquisitions; but only so far, as they referred to Action: whereas Pythagoras, & so Plato in many of their inquiries made Truth the ultimate Object or End of their Contemplation, or Motion. Now it's well known, that the specifick differrence betwixt Contemplative, and Active Philosophie ariseth not so much from their different Acts, as Objects, and Effects; for Active Philosophie supposeth some Con∣templation of Truth, as well as Contemplative; only in the latter, Truth is the ultimate Object, and sole Effect; whereas the former considers Truth only as influential on Practice, according to that anci∣ent

determination, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Practick Philosophie is effective of Virtue, but Theoretick of Truth. Thus we see how Socrates's Philosophie may be termed Active, though not exclusive of Contemplation. Namely as it is not only speculative, and apprehensive of Truth, but also practick, and causative of Virtue: wherein he was followed by the Cynicks, and Stoicks,* 1.16 who acknowledged a Fraternitie, as being both descended from Socrates's schole, and herein agreed with him in making the chief end of Philosophie to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, To live according to Vir∣tue. So Plato, who according to vniversal consent, received his Mo∣rals from Socrates, follows his Master therein, telling us, that

Philo∣sophie is the way to true Felicitie, which has chiefly these two Offi∣ces, to Contemplate God, and to sever the minde from Corporeal Phantasmes. So agen Plato in his Euthydemus tells us, that Use in things holds the principal place, and the possession of any thing, & therefore of science it self, which without the use thereof, is vain: So that if there could be a science, which should give us Immortalitie, yet were it of no value, if we understood not how to use it: whence he con∣cludes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Wisdom therefore alwaies makes men to live happily.

Agen he saies, That he deserves very ill of Philosophie, who lives not Philosophically. i. e. according to the pre∣cepts of Philosophie. And elsewhere he give us this principally as the spirits of all his Philosophie, To Philosophize is to know, to love, and to imitate God. Yea Aristotle his scholar who abounds in speculation, does yet herein symbolize with him, and Socrates his Master: affirm∣ing that he alone is a true Philosopher, who lives Philosophically: So Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Many doe not these things, but flying to their reason they think to Philosophize, and so to be virtuous, doing like to sick men, who hear their Physitian diligently, but yet doe nothing of what he prescribeth. As therefore these playing thus the Physicians, will never cure the bodie, so the other, thus Philosophizing, will never cure the soul. But the Stoicks (as it has been already hinted) follow Socrates 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, foot by foot reducing all Philosphie to Moralitie. So Epictetus bid his Di∣sciples Not to tell the world they were Philosophers by words, but by deeds:

to act as Philosophers, As (saies he) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 &c. The sheep do not bring their grasse to the shepherd to shew how much they eate, but digesting their food within, they bring forth a good Fleece, and Milk. And so do you; don't teach men, how they ought to eate, but eate as you ought, &c. So Seneca Epist. 75. He is not blessed, who knowes these things, but who does them. Epist. 94. What else is Philosophie, but a law of Life? The like Seneca Epist. 90. Wis∣dom

sets deeper, neither does she teach the hands, but is the Mis∣tress of Minds: she is a Queen, and Governess, Arts serve, but wisdom governs the life,

Seneca Epist. 117. The minde is wont to de∣light, rather then to heal it self, and to make Philosophie a Recreation, whereas it ought to be a Remedie. &c. To which we may adde that of Plutarch de placit. philos. l. 1. It behoves (saies he) a man (truly wise &) blessed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, To be not only Theoretick of Beings, but also practick of things wanting as to well-being. By all which we see what a general reception this active, and moral Philosophie, which Socrates first brought into the Scholes, found amongst all the following Sects, especially the Stoicks. That Socrates reduced the whole of his Philosophie to an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Ʋirtuous opera∣tion, is evident,* 1.17 by what is mentioned of him in Stobaus Serm. 1. fol. 29. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Some one asking Him (i. e. Socrates) what seem∣ed to him the best instruction? He answered Eupraxie, or Well-doing— For he said they were best, and most grateful to God in husbandrie, who transacted their husbandrie affaires well; In Physicks, who acted as good Physicians; In Politicks, who dispatched the Politick concerns well. But he, that does nothing well, said he, is neither profitable, nor (Theo∣philes) grateful to God. Thus Stobaeus, who also in what follows, serm. 1. fol. 29.) tells us out of Xenophon, lib. 2. de Secrat. that Socrates made this his practice wheresoever he came to do Good, &c. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Thus Socrates was in every affair, and according to every

respect useful, wherefore nothing was more beneficial than to have conversation with Socrates, and conference with him in every place, and matter: for he profited those, who conversed with him, no lesse in recreation, than in serious studies, and conferences:

Thus Stobaeus. So Plutarch acquaints us, that

Socrates taught not only in the Chair, but even in his recreations, in his eating, in the Field, in the Mar∣ket, finally, when he was in Prison; thus he made every place a Schole of Virtue, &c.

As for the severals of Socrates's Moral Philoso∣phie, we have no exact account thereof, because he left nothing in Writing; only we may look upon most of Plato's Moral Philosophi∣zings as extracts (though with some flourishes, and intermixtures of his own) of Socrates's Principles; for it is a received opinion amongst the Ancients, that Plato owes the original of his Moral Philosophie to Socrates, as Augustin. &c. But yet we shall give one or two parti∣culars of Socrates's Morals, &c.

* 1.181. He made it a great part of his design to strip men of their affect∣ed conceited opinions of their own wisdom. He seemed to have some kind of feeling sense, how apt men are to be their own flatterers, to a∣bound in the sense of their own parts and sufficiencies, and therefore he laies this as the first principle, and foundation of all Philosophie Know thy self: So Plato (Alcibiad. 24) brings in Socrates advising Alcibiades to the studie of himself thus: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

But believe me, and the Delphick Oracle, Know thy self. He tells us (fol. 134) that they who know not themselves, know nothing of their own goods, or ills, nor of any such thing, that belonged to them, yea that they knew nothing of other affaires; and therefore could never make good Politicians, or Governours of Families. He also affirms, that all sin proceeds from a conceited ignorance, which makes men presume they know, what indeed they are ignorant of. He shews how many have erred from the best Marke, because they trusted to their own opinion; whereas those, who are conscious of their ignorance, will commit themselves to the teaching of others. He saies this is the best Modestie, and Wisdom 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to know a man's self. He gives us the root of this Self-knowledge, namely the knowledge of God, &c. He also informs us touching its true Object, and Act: viz. that it is a reflex knowledge of the soul, its Habits, Acts, &c. And the more effectually to convince Alcibiades of his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and

proud arrogance, Socrates draws a parallel 'twixt him, & the Persi∣an Monarchs thereby to shew him how inconsiderable he was: so Plato Alcibiades, fol. 102.

2.* 1.19 Socrates gave many excellent precepts for the government of the Tongue as Stobaeus Serm. 3.44. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to be a lover of hearing, more than a lover of speaking. Agen 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

Seal thy words with silence, and thy silence with opportunitie, wherein he Pythagorized.

Lastly, albeit Socrates gave many excellent Moral Institutes, yet was he greatly defective both as to Principles, and Practice: as hereafter.

§. 6. As for Socrates's Mode, or Forme of Philosophizing,* 1.20 it was in the general suitable to his matter, natural, familiar, and plain, not artificial. He suited his Forme to his Matter, according to the me∣thod of Nature, not his Matter to his Forme, as the scholes now doe. For the matter of his Philosophie being chiefly Moral, he fitted his forme thereto. In particular, the Socratick Mode, or Forme of Philoso∣phizing was Twofold, 1. Rhetorical, or Suasive, 2. Dialectick, or Persuasive. 1. As to Socrates's Rhetorical mode of Philosophizing,* 1.21 it was by Ironie: and indeed his whole life was but a kind of Ironie, or dis∣simulation, whence he was called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 i. e. One that acts the part of a Fool, though most Wise. Cicero (de orat. 2.) tells us

That Socrates ex∣ceeded all men in this Ironical dissimulation, mixing a sweet Urbani∣tie, and pleasantnes with his discourses: so Stobaeus saies, that his Jests were instructive.

2. As for Socrates's Dialectical Demonstra∣tive, and Persuasive Mode of Philosophizing, it was also Natural,* 1.22 and Familiar, not Artificial, as that in Aristotle's schole. In brief, Socra∣tes's natural Logick consisted in Induction; which Cicero [de Iuvent. 1.)

defines a Discourse, that gains assent to things doubtful, by the as∣sent which is yeelded to things not doubtful. Lud. Vives (in Aug. Civ. l. 8. c. 7.) acquaints us, that this Socratick Induction is of all most powerful; which none used more happily than Socrates; whence Quintilian commends it to his Orator; whence also Plato borrowed his Mode of Dialogizing, &c.

This kind of reasoning Socrates affected, because he would not himself use any arguments of persuasion, but ra∣ther work somewhat out of what was granted. This is discursive Induction Socrates formed into, and expressed by Interrogations, as it's evident to any, that shall consider his discourses in Plato. So Hornbeeck summa Controvers. pag. 56.

Alwaies (saies Hornbeck)

approved the Socratick mode of Disputing, wherein, by continued, & pressing interrogations, and answers, the truth at last is so certainly gathered, and concluded, that it easily gains an assent from all; which as elsewhere, so especially in Plato's Hippia he observes, &c.

Socrates made use of this kind of Argumentation by Interrogations, thereby to draw forth the conclusion he aimed to prove, even from the gradual concessions of his opponents: for he was wont to say he knew nothing himself, only like a barren Midwife he was endowed with a particular gift for the assisting others to bring forth their own concep∣tions. So Plato Theaet. fol. 210. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.23 This Midwifes Art, I, and my Mother received from God, &c. In these Dialogizing disputes Socrates attributed more to his opponents, detracting from himself, for he pretended still to know nothing, and therefore refused to take Money of his Scholars. Thence Aristotle, 2 Elench. Sophist. cap. 8. saies. That Socrates alwaies interrogated, but never replied, because he professed he knew nothing. This Natural and familiar mode of reasoning by questi∣ons and answers used in Socrates's Schole seems an exact imitation of, and derivation from the Jewish mode of Disputation. So Mark 8.11. 'Tis said the Pharisees came forth, & began to question with him, &c. 'tis so in the Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to dispute with him by questions: So Grotius on this place: The ancient manner of Disputing, saies he, was by Interrogations. But more expresly Luke 11.53. 'Tis said the Scribes, and Pharisees began to urge him vehemently, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. by In∣terrogations, unto which they required an extemporary answer, so it follows, and to provoke him to speak of many things, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. This

word (saies Grotius) was taken from the Scholes, where the Masters were wont to set the riper Scholars to pose the younger by Interro∣gations,

whence in the New Testament the words 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 usually signifie to dispute, i. e. by Dialogues, or questions, and answers, which was the mode of disputing in the Jewish Scholes, and thence traduced unto the Grecian, and continued amongst them till Aristotle reduced this natural Logick to an Artificial way of Syllogi∣zirg in Mode and Figure, of which more hereafter, in Plato's mode of Philosophizing. In these disputations of Socrates, he intends more the drawing forth, ••nd revincing the opinion of his Opponent, than the delivering and establishing of his own. For he conceived it not his concern, who affirmed he knew nothing, to assert any thing, as he

himself declareth in Plato's Theaetetus. And this his modest suspension, or conceling his own opinion, laid the Foundation of those differing Sects, which sprang from him; especially of the Academical 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or suspension: of which hereafter. Howbeit Socrates's modestie would not permit him to assert, and confirme his own 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Hy∣potheses, yet was he very bold, and Ironical in refuting the proud as∣sumings of such as pretended they knew all things. So August. de Civit. l. 8. c. 3.

It is apparent (saies he) that Socrates did in his very Moral questions, whereto he seems wholly to addict himself, either by his confessed ignorance, or dissembled knowledge, with an admirable pleasantnes, and most acute urbanitie agitate, and overturne the follie of unlearned persons, who thought they knew somewhat, &c.

All these Philosophick Contemplations of Socrates laid together, suf∣ficiently argue their original to be Divine, and Sacred. Yea Justin Martyr, and other of the Fathers, conceived, that he lived 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & that he did 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in part acknowledge Christ. So Justin Martyr Apol. ad Senat. & Anton. Hornius Hist. Eccles. l. 3. c. 13. 'Tis possible that Socrates's Daemon might be no other, than the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Spirit of God.

§. 7. This fervor of Socrates mixed with an Ironical facetiousnes in overturning the proud conceited ignorance of some,* 1.24 who fancyed they knew all things, is supposed to give the occasion of his condemnation, and death. So August. de Civit. l. 8. c. 3.) in what follows saies, that from

these endeavours of Socrates to discover the follie of these ignorant Sophists, enmities being stirred up, he was by a calumnious crimination condemned, and punished with death, &c.

Plato in his Apologie for Socrates affirmes, that these odiums, and feudes befel Socrates by rea∣son of his disputations against these proud Sophists. The same Laertius:

There were three, that accused Socrates Anytus, Melitus, and Lycon the Orator, who was the Actor;

whereas Anytus defended the rout of Artificers, and the rest of the Athenians, whom Socrates often deri∣ded; and Melitus defended the Poets, when Socrates had condemned, and judged to be expelled the Citie. The main crime they accuse him of was his denying a multiplicitie of Gods &c. for which he was condemned by 281 suffrages. Immediately before his death, after he had taken the poyson, he makes a learned, and undaunted discourse a∣bout the immortalitie of the Soul, and its state in separation from the bo∣die &c. and when he felt the paines of Death growing upon him, he

takes his leave of his Scholars,* 1.25 enjoyning them to go, and Sacrifice a Cock to Esculapius the Daemon-god of Medicine, as a thankful acknow∣ledgement for so sweet, and noble a death: of which see Plato's Phaedo about the end; also his, and Xenophon's Apologies for Socrates, with Diogenes Laertius, where we find Socrates pleading, that his Enemies overwhelmed him not with Crimes, but envie only, &c. And the Athenians were so greatly affected with the injurie done to Socrates, that a little after they caused all their Scholes to be shut, and punished Melitus with death, Anytus with banishment, erecting a brazen Statue to Socrates, as Austin: and Ludov. Vives in Aug. Civit. l. 8. c. 2. gives him this great Character.

This is that Socrates of whom nothing can be sufficiently said for his Dignitie, who, as it's manifest, was the wisest of all the Gentiles, and came nearest of all to the Christian Wisdom: He was borne at Athens, Sophroniscus be∣ing his Father, &c. He was a Man temperate, chast, just, modest, pa∣tient of injuries; not greedie of riches, pleasures, no nor yet of glorie, for it's certain he writ nothing. He was the first, who whilst others professed to know all things, professed himself to know no∣thing.

Thus Lud. Vives. To which may be added that of Hornius, Socrates erat vir acutus, festivus, laborem tolerans, non tam praeceptis quàm exemplo docens: quem, & Lactantius caeteris non paulo cordatiorem fuisse concedit. Socrates was eminent for his Acumen, Eloquence, Dili∣gence, Instructing, as well by his Example as Precepts; and such as Lactantius also acknowledgeth to have far surpast others (Heathen Phi∣losophers) for Wisdom, Horn. Hist. Phil. lib. 3. cap. 13. Yet some say, Socrates was not exempted from that great Gentile uncleannes, which the wisest and best of those Gentile Philosophers were guiltie of, mentioned Rom. 1.21, 27. as elsewhere.

* 1.26§. 8. Though Socrates writ nothing himself, yet his Disputes were committed to Writing by his Scholars: amongst whom Xenophon was the first, and most punctual; for Plato useth a great libertie in interlining his own Sentiments with his Masters Dogmes. And albeit Socrates con∣fined himself to Morals, and in his Philosophizings thereon used a plain method, yet after his death, his Scholars fell into several Fa∣ctions, and Sects, which sprang from their differing Apprehensions a∣bout the chiefest Good, and the chiefest Evil. So Austin (Civit. l. 8. c. 3.)

Therefore Socrates by reason of his so great Fame, both living, and dead, left behind him many Sectator•• of his Philosophie, whose

Eristick studie was to be versed in the Controversies of Moral Que∣stions, wherein the chiefest Good consisted? which not evidently ap∣pearing in Socrates's Disputes, whil'st he started, and asserted, and destroyed every thing, every one formed such a chief Good, as seem∣ed most pleasing to him. Thus had these Socraticks differing per∣swasions about this last end; some placing the chiefest Good in Plea∣sures, as Aristippus; some in Virtue, as Antisthenes, &c.

Indeed all the Sects of the Ionick Philosophie, seem to owe their Original to Socrates's Schole, especially the Cyreniack, Cynick, Eleatick, Megarick, Academick, Platonick, Stoick.

1. Of Socrates's Scholars, Xenophon,* 1.27 and Aeschinus, the Socratick clave fast to their Master, without founding a new Sect.

2. Aristippus the Cyrenian,* 1.28 another of Socrates's Scholars founded the Cyreniack Sect, whose main Principle was, that the chiefest Good lay in Pleasure, whence the whole Sect was called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as the E∣picureans after them.

3. Antisthenes another of Socrates's Scholars,* 1.29 founded the Cynick Sect. His chief Position was, that Virtue was the chiefest Good, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, wherein he was followed by Zeno his Scholar, who was the Founder of the Stoick Sect, which as to Morals held a great commu∣nion with the Cynicks, and they both with Socrates, &c.

4. Another of Socrates's Scholars was Euclid the Megarick,* 1.30 whose Followers were thence called Megaricks, and afterwards Eri∣sticks; and by some Dialecticks, because they exercised themselves chiefly in Dialectick Questions, which humor Euclid suckt in, not from Socrates, but Parmenides, and Zeno the Eleatick.

5. Phaedo of Elia, another of Socrates's Scholars,* 1.31 established the Eleatick Sect. He writ many of Socrates's Elegant Speeches.

6. But the most renowned of all Socrates's Scholars, was Plato,* 1.32 that famous Founder of the old Academie, whence the new Academicks descended; as the Platonists: as it follows.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Vossius de Philos. Sect. part. 2. cap. 5. paragr. 7. Lud. Viv. Aug. Civ. l. 8. c. 2.
• * 1.2

  Socrates the Author of Mo∣ral Philoso∣phie.
• * 1.3

  Galenus initio libri de Sectis Philos. S••crati inventionem Ethicae, et Lo∣gicae tribuit. Hornius Hist. Phil. l. 3. c. 13.
• * 1.4

  Why Socrates applyed him∣self wh••lly to Moralitie.
• * 1.5

  Socrates a•• U∣niversal Scho∣lar.
• * 1.6

  Socrates juni∣or adhuc in∣credibili cupi∣ditate naturalis Scientiae arsit, uti de se apud Platonem, lib. de anima testa∣rur: Senior factus cam Philosophiae partem, ut dubiam, incertam, inutilem, prorsus repudia••it. Hornius Hist. Phil. l. 3. c. 13.
• * 1.7

  Socrates's Me∣taphysicks.
• * 1.8

  Socrates hi•• Metaphysick Contemplati∣ons from Scri∣pture traditi∣ons.
• * 1.9

  4. That Virtue comes from God.
• * 1.10

  5. That all true know∣ledge of God is by Divine infusion.
• * 1.11

  Socrates's Dae∣mo••.
• * 1.12

  Socrates ute∣batur Daemone 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sive domestico, & familiari; ex cujus pr••scrip∣to omnia age∣bat: de quo integro libro de Deo So∣cratis Madau∣rensis agit. Hornius i Hist. Phil. l. 3. c. 13.
• * 1.13

  8. Of faith, and Prayer.
• * 1.14

  9. Of the Soul it's immorta∣litie, &c.
• * 1.15

  Socrates's Active Moral Philosophie how far con¦templative.
• * 1.16

  All Philoso∣phie ought to determine in Virtue and Action.
• * 1.17

  Socrates's Moralitie.
• * 1.18

  1 His Insti∣tutes against self conceited∣nes, and fla∣terie, with advice to studie our selves.
• * 1.19

  2. For the go∣vernment of the tongue.
• * 1.20

  Socrates's mode, or forme of Philosophi∣zing, Natural, and familiar.
• * 1.21

  1. His Rheto∣rick mode Iro∣nical.
• * 1.22

  2. His Dialect∣ick by Inducti∣on, which con∣sisted of Inter∣rogations.
• * 1.23

  These Diale∣ctical interro∣gations of Jewish origi∣nal.
• * 1.24

  The occasion and instru∣ments of his Death.
• * 1.25

  Tandem cum nonnullorum odia in se con∣citasset, accu∣satus quòd cor∣rumperet ja∣ventutem, et novas supersti∣tiones induce∣ret ad cicutae forbitionem condemnatus est Socrates. Quint. l. 4. c. 4. Apul. 10. miles. Horni∣us, Hist. Phil. l. 3. c. 13. Socrates's Character.
• * 1.26

  Of Socrates's Scholars, and their different persuasions a∣bout Morals, the chiefest Good, &c. whence they fell into di∣vers Sects.
• * 1.27

  Xenophon.
• * 1.28

  Aristippus Founder of the Cyreniack••
• * 1.29

  Antisthenes of the Cynicks, and Stoicks.
• * 1.30

  Euclid of the Megaricks.
• * 1.31

  Phaedo of the Eleaticks.
• * 1.32

  Plato of the Academicks.