The court of the gentiles. Part IV, Of reformed philosophie. Book III, Of divine predetermination, wherein the nature of divine predetermination is fully explicated and demonstrated, both in the general, as also more particularly, as to the substrate mater [sic] or entitative act of sin.
Gale, Theophilus, 1628-1678.

PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie.

BOOK III. Of Divine Predetermination: Wherein the Nature of Divine Predetermination is fully explicated and demonstrated, both in the general, as also more particularly, as to the substrate matter or entitative act of Sin.

CHAP. I. The Explication of the Terms.

(1) The Origine of the controversie about Predetermination to the en∣titative act of Sin; with the method we procede in. (2) The Na∣ture of Sin, its Origine and material constitution; al acts in their Page  2 generic nature indifferent: Al Morality determined by the Moral Law: Sin as to its formal reason a privation: Of actions modally and intrinsecally evil. (3) The Libertie of the Wil: The new∣coined distinction of Libertie, largely and strictly taken, with its abuse: A true Idea of Libertie. (4) Moral Libertie or Free-wil to good: Necessitie, Impossibilitie, Possibilitie what. (5) The Wil of God, its Distribution into Significative and Decretive. (6) Di∣vine Concurse, its Immediation, Efficacitie, and Predetermination: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, with the Nature of Predeter∣mination explicated.

§. 1. THE Doctrine of Divine Concurse, and Creatural De∣pendence* has in al Ages of the Church, but more specially since the rise of Pelagianisme, received vigorous assaults from many learned and potent Adversaries: and indeed no wonder, sithat corrupt Nature pro∣pagated from Adam has, in imitation of its first parent, been ever aspiring after an equality to the Deitie; and that not only in being the last End of its Acting, but also the first Principe of its Dependence. This vain attemt has appeared more visibly in some daring and proud spirits, such as Nebuchadnezar, Dan. 4. 30. Is not this great Babylon that I have built, &c? But in others the Design and opposition against the Concurse of God has been more refined, under a pretext of vindicating the Divine Majesty from the blasphemous imputation of being the Author of sin. And because al pious Souls have so great a veneration for the Blessed Deitie, as to abhor the very shadow of such Blasphemie, therefore the Adversaries of Divine Concurse have in al Ages pitcht on this as the most puissant argument to oppose the same, that it brings the most holy and blessed God under the black im∣putation of encouraging, yea impelling men to Sin. And albeit those that assert Gods efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin, do most vehemently detest in their own souls, and solemnly protest against the least thought or opinion that makes God the Author of sin, yet nevertheless this direful piece of blasphemie is stil charged on them. Moreover, there being in this Doctrine of Efficacious Concurse (as in al other great Mysteries of Faith) some intricate difficulties, which the wise God has left us under, to trie our faith and submission to divine Revelation; hence also many learned, and some pious Page  3 men have been at a great loss in their Inquiries, how to reconcile the Libertie of the human Wil with the Efficace of Divine Con∣curse, so as to free the blessed God from the imputation of im∣pelling men to Sin. These and such like considerations made me the more prolixe in the philosophic metaphysic contempla∣tion of the Divine Concurse, its Nature, Origine, and manner of working, particularly as to the entitative act of what is sinful; together with the creatures Dependence thereon: which I have more fully discussed, Court of the Gentiles, Chap. 7, 9, 11. with design and endeavours, if it might be, to give the blessed God and his sinful Creature both their dues, and remove those ex∣tremes which men are apt to fal into.

But these my sincere desires and endeavours have not had that* success which was desired; which brings me under a fresh obligati∣on to vindicate mine own Hypothesis, touching the efficacious con∣curse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of what is sinful. I must confess, the province before us is difficult on many accounts, but principally, because whiles we endeavour to defend the Con∣curse and Providence of God about the entitative act of sin, it is suggested by some, and believed by others, that we make the holy God the Author of sin, which is the dregs of blasphemie, and that which every serious spirit abhors more than Hel. Yet we need no way to dout, but that, with divine assistance, we may firmly assert and demonstrate the efficacitie of Divine concurse to the material entitative act of that which is sinful, and yet fully vindicate the Divine Majestie from that blasphemous Imputati∣on of being the Author of sin. And for our more distinct and demonstrative procedure herein, we propose this method or form as most apt for the subject mater before us. (1) To examine and explicate the Terms formally implied in, or virtually rela∣ting to, the subject in controversie. (2) To shew wherein the opposite parties agree, and wherein they differ both among them∣selves and each from other; together with the original and prin∣cipal motives, grounds, and causes of such Differences. (3) To give a Scriptural Explication and Demonstration of our own Hy∣pothesis, touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful; with an answer to those false glosses and comments, which our Adversaries the Jesuites, Ar∣minians, and some new Methodists give to those Scriptures for the evading the force of them. (4) To draw up a brief Histo∣rie Page  4 or Narrative of this controversie, and its state in al periods of the Christian Churches to this day. (5) To give the De∣monstration of our Hypothesis from Reasons grounded on Scrip∣ture, with the Vindication of those Reasons from the unground∣ed invalid answers given to them by our opponents, Strangius, and others. (6) To solve and answer the Objections urged by those that oppose our Hypothesis, particularly Strangius, Bara∣nius, Le Blanc, with others. (7) And finally, to lay down the proper Sentiments and Hypotheses of the Orthodoxe about this subject, in opposition to those false Opinions which their Ad∣versaries charge upon them: as also to produce the proper opi∣nions of the adverse party, and the dangerous consequences that naturally and necessarily flow from them.

§. 2. Our first and indeed principal task, in order to a clear* and demonstrative procedure in this controversie, wil be, to ex∣plicate the termes, and disabuse them from those ambiguities, confusions, and false impositions, in which at present they are involved. And here indeed I cannot but break forth into a doleful Lamentation over the bleeding state of the Churches of Christ, by reason of those vexatious controversies which rend and tear out their very bowels, and al from the sophistic abuse or Ambiguitie of termes. And I no way dout but to make it most manifest, when opportunitie is offered, that most of the controversies of this Age are somented and maintained from the obscuritie and abuse of termes misapplyed by subtile wits, for the establishment of their own Hypotheses. This is most evi∣dent in our present case, which makes it a duty absolutely ne∣cessary, before we enter on our province, to clear up the way by a distinct and particular explication of those termes that re∣late thereunto.

The first Terme we are to consider is Sin: wherein we are to* examine its Origne, Causes, Constitution, both material and formal, and Kinds; particularly the nature of Acts substantially or intrin∣secally sinful: al which we shal discusse with that Brevitie and Per∣spicuitie the mater wil admit. 1. As for the Origine of Sin, it* came first into the world from the Defectibilitie of our first Parents their Free-wil, and has been ever since maintained and fomented by the Vitiositie of human nature depraved by Adams sin, as we have copiosely demonstrated, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 2. and Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 3.

Page  52. Sin, as to its material constitution, has for its substrate mater* or subject some natural good: For al sin being, as to its formal nature, but a moral privation or relation, it necessarily requires some natural good as its substrate mater or subject. The wise Creator and Gubernator of althings has by his Law so constituted al moral Beings, both Virtues and Vices, as that they cannot sub∣sist but in something natural: albeit sin be, according to its for∣mal reason, a mere privation, yet it requires some positive, real natural Being for its subject, according to the nature of al other privations. Thus Augustin: That which is evil by reason of vice,*is good by nature. Again he saith, That sin is not nature, but the vice of nature. And that trite Maxime communly received by al the Ancients, That al evil is founded in some good, i. e. natu∣ral, sufficiently demonstrates this our assertion. Thus Au∣gustin, Enchirid. 97. Although therefore things sinful, as sinful are not good; yet not only that good things, but also that sinful be, is good: i. e. things sinful are good, not morally, but naturally, as means utile and conducible to the promoting of Divine glorie: for albeit they oppose the bonitie of the creature, yet materially considered they oppose not the bonitie of the Creator; who can extract the greatest good out of the greatest evils. Doth it not then be∣long to the infinite bonitie of God, to permit sins to be? Yea, doth not the ingresse of sin into the world belong to the perfection thereof? is not then the substrate mater thereof some natural good? This is wel demonstrated by Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 11. sect. 3. p. 252.

Sin as sin has a material cause, which is always some good. So Augustin saith, That there can be no evil but in good, because if there were pure evil it would destroy itself: and the reason is, because sin, as to its formal cause, is not purely posi∣tive,* or a pure negation, but a privation of debite perfection, therefore it requires a subject unto which such a perfection is due; which subject must be some good, &c.
Yea, Strangius himself, our principal Adversary in this Controversie, grants in this particular as much as we demand, pag. 629. That it is absurd to say, any sin or defect can exist of itself, sithat there can be no sepa∣rate evil; but al evil is [seated] in good. Yea, he ingenuously con∣fesseth, pag. 245. That hatred of God, [which is an action intrinse∣cally evil] as it is an Act and Being, so it is from God, namely as it is hatred. For, adds he, So hatred truly, as it is abstracted from this or that object is a physic action, to which the metaphysic bonitie of Ens Page  6or Being agrees, and it is morally indifferent; but as it is determined to God, hence is its 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Obliquitie. This concession of Strangius, if wel considered, would not only overthrow his own Antithesis against our Hypothesis, but also put a period to this Controversie, as in what follows we shal demonstrate, Chap. 6. §. 1.

3. But the principal thing to be examined in the explication of sin is its formal Constitution or Reason, which we shal endeavour to manifest in the following Propositions. (1) Al human acts con∣sidered*in their generic physic Entitie or natural Being, abstracted from their moral constitution, are neither good nor evil, but morally indiffe∣rent. Al moral Beings or Acts are scated, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in proper nature, as Cyril; neither can they existe without that proper nature whereunto they are appendent. There is no virtue or vice which has not something of nature for its subject and seat: it's true, there may be nature where there is no moralitie, yet there cannot be moralitie where there is not some nature to sustain the same. Now al human nature, as also al natural Acts considered in their generic natural Idea, albeit capable of virtue or vice, yet are in themselves morally indifferent. Al thoughts, words and actions considered physically and abstractly, without regard to their mo∣ral determination by the Wil and Law of God, are neither good nor evil. For Moralitie is a mode not physically or intrinsecally inherent in human acts, but appendent to them from the deter∣mination of the Divine Law: The very acts of loving and hating God, considered in their generic, physic and entitative nature, as abstracted from the moral relation they have to their object, are morally neither good nor evil; because moral Bonitie and Vitio∣sitie are differences of human acts merely accidental or modal, as Suarez and other Scholemen generally grant. Thus much Stran∣gius frequently grants; as pag. 158. he saith, That moral Bonitie and Vitiositie are accidents of natural Actions. So pag. 875. The*action considered apart and physically is morally indifferent, neither may it be lesse subject to virtue than to vice. Hence,

(2) Al Moralitie and moral Acts, whether good or evil, receive their Constitution and Determination from the moral Divine Law. This Hypothesis is defended by Scotus, and other Scholemen, and that on the highest reasons: For the Divine Wil is the supreme mea∣sure and rule of al Justice and Sanctitie: Things are therefore just and good because God wils them; and whatever God wils is for that very reason, because God wils it, good and just. There∣fore Page  7 that Platonic notion defended by some learned men, That the reasons of good and evil are eternal, is of dangerous consequence, albeit it hath somewhat of Truth (as other errors have) mixed with it: we grant, that in things morally good, there is a natu∣ral condecence or congruitie to human nature, even antecedent to the Divine wil and constitution. As on supposition of mans be∣ing created, he immediately falls under a necessary and essential obligation of loving God, hating sin, &c. These are duties naturally congruous, yea morally necessary to human nature. Whence it is, that Divines usually determine, That Original Righteousness was natural to Adam, i. e. most condecent, congru∣ous, and morally necessary to his Nature. Yet all this hinders not, but that the formal Determination of al Morals arise from the free constitution of the Divine wil and Law. The Law of God is the great Expansum or firmament, which God has spread over the rational world, whereby al Mankind are moderated and regulated in al their moral Acts, and by which they shall be at last day judged: whence it necessarily follows, that al moral con∣stitution must procede hence, as we have more amply demon∣strated, Court Gentiles, P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. §. 1, 2. Thus also Voetius, Disput. Theolog. Par. 1. de jure & justit. Probl. 10. p. 351. proves, That the divine wil is the fountain and rule of al Goodness. So much also Strangius grants us, p. 89. namely, That, as whatever is true is therefore true, because conform to the first Truth; so whatever is good, is therefore good, because conform to the first Goodness: and as the Truth of God belongs to his Intellect, so Goodness to his Wil. The like Mr. Baxter, Catholick Theolog. Part 1. p. 100. Al crea∣ted Justice and Holiness is such, i. e. good (for goodness is their essence) because Gods efficient wil made them so. Hence,

(3) The formal reason or nature of Sin consists in its being a De∣ordination, or Transgression of the Divine Law. This Proposition is fully stated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophie, as we have copiosely proved, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 1. and Philos. General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. §. 1. so that it requires not further Explication or Demonstration. Hence,

(4) Sin as to its formal constitution and nature is not a positive*real Being, but privative. This Hypothesis has found general assent to it among al the Ancients both Pagan Philosophers and Christians, excepting some few, Marcion and Manes, with others. It's true, the Manichees held Sin to be a positive Being, and they Page  8 took up principes suited thereto, namely, That there were two first Beings or Causes, one of good, the other of evil: But the sober Philoso∣phers and Christians abhorred such sentiments. Simplicius on Epi∣ctetus, c. 34. p. 171. has an excellent Discourse to prove that sin is not in the nature of Beings, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a privation of Good, which we have largely explicated, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3 §. 4. §. 2. And this was generally asserted by the Greek and Latin Fa∣thers. Thus the spurious Dionysius assures us, that Sin must necessa∣rily be, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, without nature, without subsistence. So Greg. Nyssen. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Sin is an insubsistent Being, or privation. And it was a general con∣clusion in the Greek Scholes, that sin resulted, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from the absence of good, as darkness from the absence of light. Thus also among the Latins, Augustin asserted, that Sin was not Nature, but the evil of Nature. Again: the Amission of Good has taken up the name of Sin. And Strangius, who is our principal adversary in this controversie, yet l. 1. c. 13. p. 97, &c. he strongly demon∣strates this Hypothesis, That the formal reason of sin consists in Pri∣vation. This I conceive deserves a particular remarque, because some late Authors, and those not of inferior note, make great use of this Antithesis, namely, That Sin is as to its formal nature positive, as their chief engine to oppose our general Hypothesis, touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful. They tel us, that Sin, as to its forme, is not a mere priva∣tion, but a moral Relation, which has so much Realitie as a relati∣on. But to obviate al mistakes and verbal contests, we grant, [1] That Sin may be termed a moral privative relation, or rather, relative privation, as it is a transgression of, and so must have re∣lation to, the Moral Law. [2] That Sin is not a mere nothing, but has some kind of logic positivitie or notional entitie, so far as to render it capable of being the terme of a Proposition, as we have more fully shewen, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. §. 2. But, [3] We may not yield, that Sin is a moral positive Relation, much less a positive act or real Being, such as is the term of a natural production: For such a perswasion wil necessarily force men to grant, that God is the Author of Sin, or to hold with the Manichees, that there are two first Causes, one of good and the other of evil.

4. Touching the kinds of sinful Actions, that which princi∣pally concerns our present controversie is the distinction of sinful Page  9 Actions, into such as are modally only, or such as are intrinsecally evil.

(1) By actions modally evil they generally understand such as are* substantially good, yet have some modal accidental vitiositie or sin∣fulness appendent to them. Such are al the sincerely pious acts of good men in this imperfect state; which have an evangelic per∣fection and goodness in them, yet mixed with much corruption and imperfection. For such is the profunde mysterious wisdom of God, that he permits a mixture of sin even with the best good works on this side Heaven, thereby to render the methods of his Grace the more illustrious: so that the same Act, which is in evangelic estimation sincerely good, is also modally sinful and im∣perfect. Thus Strangius, l. 2. c. 9. p. 205. Sithat al transgression of the Law is sin, men sin both by doing what is forbidden, as also by doing what is commanded, if not in that manner as commanded: Again, both by not doing what is commanded, as also by abstaining from what is for∣bidden, if they abstain not in a regular manner. Thus oft it comes to pass, that the action may be good according to the substance of the work, and yet evil as to the mode of acting. As for example; to give Almes to the poor is a work substantially good, yet if it procede not from Faith and Charitie, and respect to the glorie of God, it is evil as to the mode of acting. Thus Strangius. But I adde, that the best works of Un∣believers are substantially evil, in that they have nothing of sincere good in them; but ful of hatred of God; and the best works of pious souls in this imperfect state are modally evil, because they have a tincture of vitiositie appendent to them.

(2) By Actions intrinsecally evil, they generally understand* such as being referred to and determined by such or such an ob∣ject, carrie in them an intrinsec vitiositie and malignitie; so that whiles under such a reference and determination they can never become good. And the commun instance is in hatred of God, and Blasphemie. Not that those acts are in their physic material entitie or substance sinful, but only in their moral constitution and formal determination or reference to their object. Thus much is also acknowledged by Strangius, l. 1. c. 13. p. 89. When, according to the commun sentence, it is said, that some also are in themselves or intrinsecally evil, the acts are not understood as ab∣stracted from their Object, but as they refer to their object, in regard of which they have their vitiositie.—It seems to me, that the vitio∣sitie, which is in the hatred of God, doth not belong to the material, Page  10 but formal of Sin. Which is an ingenuous confession, and wil be of much use to us in what follows. At present we shall only remarque; that this notion of Acts intrinsecally evil, if duely ex∣amined, wil be of no use to our Opponents, albeit they seem to lay the most stress on it. For [1] They grant, as Strangius here, that the vitiositie, which is in the hatred of God [and so in all other acts intrinsecally evil] doth not belong to the material but formal of sin: so that Gods concurse to the material or substrate mater of sin doth not suppose his concurse to the formal obliquitie of sin. [2] In acts sincerely but imperfectly good, and modally evil, the substrate mater or material act, which is both good and evil, is one and the same: now our Adversaries grant Predeter∣mination to the material act as good: how then can they denie predetermination to the same material entitative act which is evil, though not as such? But of this more hereafter, c. 5.

§. 3. The next terme to be discussed by us is the Natural*Freedom, or Libertie of the Wil; which is indeed the hinge on which our whole controversie turns, as our more intelligent Op∣ponents confess. A reverend Divine, Cathol. Theologie, Part 3. p. 80. saith, I do readily confess, that, as the sum of al the contro∣versie is, Whether man hath truely any free-wil; &c. I do readily concur with him in this, That the sum of al the controvesie must be resolved into this notion of free-wil; and therefore if we cannot make good our ground here, we must necessarily fal under the efforts of our Antagonists. And I must confess this conception has been deeply engraven on my thoughts, for twenty five years or more, that the whole of the Pelagian and Arminian contro∣versie centers in this point, touching the Libertie of the Wil: and he that endeavours to remove those maladies, but over∣looks those Pelagian infusions that lie hid in the heart of Free∣will, doth act but like the unskilful Physician, who, to remove an Hectick Feaver, endeavoured to cure the Itch. What made Du∣randus drive Gods immediate Concurse to human acts, but this perswasion, that it destroyeth the Libertie of the wil, and so makes God the Author of sin? And what makes the Jesuites de∣nie Predetermination, but the like groundless perswasion? So also Baronius, in his Metaphysics, Sect. 8. Disp. 3. §. 79. p. 147. Here it was that the Pelagians of old took Sanctuarie, and un∣der the shadow of this terme Free-wil conceled al their venimous Infusions: here, by their sophistic logic and ambiguous cloudy Page  11 distinctions, they fortified themselves against the Defenders of Efficacious Grace. Thus Jansenius, August. de Natur. Laps. Tom. 2. l. 4. c. 24. proves largely out of Augustine, that the principal fraud and cheat of the Pelagians lay in their philosophic hallucination about natural free-wil, which they placed in Indifference, but Au∣gustine in a rational spontaneitie. Herein they are followed by the Jesuites and Arminians, who indeed differ not scarcely one hairs breadth from the Pelagians and Semi-pelagians. Yea Baronius, (whom Rutherford rangeth among the Arminians) with confi∣dence maintains Bellarmines definition of Libertie, as justifiable and orthodoxe, Metaphys. Sect. 12. p. 285.

But other of our Antagonists, Strangius, Le Blanc, &c. per∣ceiving* that our Reformed Divines have generally placed Natural Libertie in a Rational Spontaneity, and so presumed, that volun∣tary necessitie is very wel consistent therewith, hence they have found out an artificial distinction for the reconciling the Calvinists with the Jesuites, Pelagians and Arminians: They distinguish Libertie, into that which is largely, or strictly taken: and they confess, (1) That Libertie taken largely, as it is a perfection of the Soul, so it has one and the same notion with Rational Spontaneitie; and such is the Libertie of glorified Souls. This Libertie they make essential to the wil; of which see Strangius, l. 3. c. 14. p. 686. also p. 691, 702, 703. But, adde they, (2) There is also a libertie strictly so termed, which consists in the Indifference of the wil to this or that object, also to act or not to act: and this Libertie is most proper to this our imperfect state, as Stran∣gius, p. 188. 687. 689. 711. So likewise Le Blanc, p. 435. and others. There were some first lines of this distinction drawn by Camero, who makes libertie strictly so termed to be about the means, not the end; yet his Notions about Libertie are tolerable, in that he makes Divine Predetermination consistent with hu∣man Libertie. But the first creator of this distinction touching a two-fold Libertie, among those who owned the Synod of Dort, was Strangius, who asserts a two-fold Libertie, one considered in its own Nature, which is essential to the wil, and the other as limited to lapsed man, which includes Indifference, &c. as in places above cited.

What these new Methodists mean by this new-coined di∣stinction of Libertie, unless it be a gratification to the Pelagians, I cannot conjecture: Certain I am, that I never could find it Page  12 among the ancient Philosophers, Primitive Fathers, Scholastic Theologues, or any other but these new Methodists or their Secta∣tors. Do any of the Greek Philosophers make mention of any li∣bertie, but what is essential to the wil and al human acts? Can we find among the Greek Theologues any notices of this two-fold Libertie? Yea do not the very Jesuites herein concur with us, that Liberty is essential to al moral acts, both in the future, as wel as the present state of the Soul? Is not Libertie constituted by them and the Arminians as the foundation of al Moralitie? Doth not Amyraldus, de Libero Arbitrio, as wel as we, make Libertie properly taken essential to the wil and al its Acts? Of what use then can this distinction of a two-fold Libertie be? Wil it satisfie the Pelagians, Jesuites or Arminians? No; because they al make Libertie strictly taken essential to al Moral Acts. Or, wil it any way relieve the Calvinists in their conflicts both with Jesuites and Arminians, to say the wil is sometimes free and sometimes not? If it be supposed, that Indifference be essen∣tial to libertie in this imperfect state, wil it not then be replied by Pelagians and Arminians, that the wil is not, according to these new Methodists, free in Conversion, because not indiffe∣rent? It were not difficult to demonstrate, how invalid this new∣coined distinction of Libertie is, and unapt to reach those ends for which it was designed by the authors thereof.

As for the true Idea and notion of Natural Libertie, we have,* with what studie and diligence we could, inquired into and dis∣cussed the same, Court of the Gentiles, P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. §. 11, 12. & B. 4. c. 1. § 29—32. also Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. S. 4. §. 2. the sum whereof may be drawn forth in these following Propositions. (1) Natural Libertie, as it denotes a power, has one and the same Idea or Nature with the Wil. This is copiosely demonstrated, in the forementioned pla∣ces. Hence, (2) Al acts of the Wil have libertie in the strictest no∣tion essentially appendent to them. (3) The Dominion which a free Agent has over his own Act is not absolute, but limited and conditio∣nate. (4) The necessitie which ariseth from the concurse of God the first cause, no way diminisheth, but establisheth the Natural Liber∣tie of the Wil. For nothing offers violence to the Wil, or is in∣juriose to its Libertie, so long as the act it puts forth is volun∣tary: so long as the wil doth voluntarily elect and embrace what it is predetermined unto, the act is in its own power and free: Page  13 for as Aristotle, Eth. l. 5. c. 12. wel observes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, nothing happens to such an one, but what he wils. (5) Actual Indifference to varietie of Objects or Acts, is no way essen∣tial to natural Libertie, but only an Accident resulting from its im∣perfection. (6) The formal, native and genuine Idea or notion of natural Libertie, both as to state and exercice, includes no more than a rational spontaneitie. This last proposition, which is the princi∣pal, Strangiusf owns; and Le Blanc de Libr. Arbit. Thes. 19. p. 405. confesseth this to be the general opinion of our Reformed Divines, even of Amyraldus, Placeus, and other new Methodists. That this also is asserted by our Judicious Davenant, see his De∣terminations, Quaest. 22. That the Divine Decree takes not away Libertie. These Propositions about natural Libertie, we have in the forecited places more amply demonstrated, because the whole Pelagian and Arminian controversie, and particularly this about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin depends thereon: and he that shal undertake this Province of resolving our present Que∣stion, without a clear Explication and Demonstration of the Wils natural Libertie, doth nothing to purpose.

§. 4. Next to the natural Libertie of the Wil, we are to con∣sider*Moral Libertie or Free-wil, as also what is possible or impos∣sible to corrupt Nature. By Moral Libertie or Free-wil is gene∣rally understood the moral potence or spiritual abilitie of the Soul to do good. This moral and spiritual Libertie, our Adversaries the Pelagians, Arminians and new Methodists confound with natural Libertie, and from our denying the later in corrupt Na∣ture, they falsely charge us with denying the former: therefore to remove this confusion of the termes, and those false imputa∣tions which are charged on those that defend efficacious concurse, the following Propositions wil be of use unto us.

1. Natural Libertie is essential to the Wil and al its acts, but moral Libertie or free-wil to good only accidental and separable. The Wil is not a Wil if it be not naturally free in al its acts; what∣ever act is voluntary, is for that very reason free; Voluntary and free being in Scriptural estimation, as also by the determi∣nation of the best Philosophers, termes synonymous and equipol∣lent, as we have demonstrated, Philos. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. §. 1. But now as for Moral Libertie and free-wil to good, that is only accidental to the human Soul; it may come and go, be present and absent without the natural destruction of the Page  14 Soul, or violation to natural Libertie. It's true, that Moral Li∣bertie, consisting in virtuose Habits, Inclinations and Exercices, is the Perfection of Man, yet so as the Essence of the Soul is not diminished or destroyed by the loss thereof.

2. Our first Parents in their innocent state were invested not only with natural but also with moral Libertie or free-wil to good. This is granted on both sides, and therefore needs not further demon∣stration.

3. Since the fal corrupt Nature in its unregenerate state lies un∣der a total, universal and naturally moral Impotence as to al Moral and spiritual good. I cal this Impotence total and universal, as it overspreads the whole soul, and has stript it of al seeds of, or inclinations to, any spiritual or truely moral good. I terme it also natural, or naturally moral, in that, albeit the subject be moral, yet the Impotence being communicated together with corrupt Nature, connatural or congenite and proper thereto, as corrupt, and as to al natural power inseparable therefrom, it is become a moral Nature. I am not ignorant, that some new Methodists, together with the Arminians, stiffely contend, that this Impo∣tence is not natural but only moral; but either they intend under the ambiguitie of the termes to concele some Pelagian Infusions of natural seeds of virtue and Free-wil to Moral good, or else they must wrest the termes Moral and Natural from their native sense, and what is intended by those that defend a natural impo∣tence. For al know, that by moral Impotence is generally un∣derstood an Impotence contracted by frequent Acts of and Custom in Sin; and so on the contrary by natural Impotence is under∣stood such as is traduced together with, and through the mise∣rable contagion of sin inseparably appendent to corrupt nature. Of this see more Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 5. §. 1. Hence,

4. Sin in corrupt Nature becomes necessary, and the observation of Divine Precepts impossible. This Proposition has ever been in al Ages of the Church, the great bal of contention between the Patrons of Free-wil, and the Defensors of Free-grace. The Pe∣lagians of old as the Arminians of late have made this their main Refuge for the defense of their Diana of Free-wil. If Sin, say they, be necessary, and so inevitable, then it ceaseth to be sin: if it be voluntary, then it may be avoided. But these Pelagian Armes Augustin and his Sectators have stoutly refelled, by shewing, Page  15 (1) That the Law was not originally impossible to mans Na∣ture, but only is become so accidentally by reason of Sin, and the impotence of corrupt Nature. (2) That this Impotence is not less voluntary than necessary, yea the more necessary it is, the more voluntary: The necessitie of this Impotence is seated in and ariseth from the Wil, and therefore most voluntary. Thence Augustin termes it dura Necessitas, an hard Necessitie, because the more necessary this impotence is the more voluntary, and the more voluntary it is the more necessary. Plato, Phileb. p. 22. gives it the character, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of a miserable necessitie; which he opposeth to that blessed necessitie of adhering to the chiefest good, of which see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 7. (3) That albeit the avoiding of sin and the observation of Divine commands be legally impossible to corrupt nature, yet both are Evangelicly possible through the habitual and actual assistances of the Spirit of Grace. See more of the impossibilitie which is in corrupt nature for the obser∣vation of Divine precepts in Jansenius, Aug. Tom. 3. l. 3. c. 15, &c. Philosoph. General. Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. sect. 5. §. 1. Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 8.

5. Notwithstanding the necessary impotence of corrupt nature as to what is morally and spiritually good, yet it stil retains a physic or natu∣ral facultie and remote passive power capable of receiving spiritual good. No one denies, but that the Soul, as a rational and volun∣tary subject, is remotely, passively, and naturally capacitated for the reception of gratiose infusions; al the Controversie is about a proxime or next, active, and moral power, which we denie to remain in corrupt nature.

6. The Necessitie of consenting and Impossibilitie of resisting which*attends the wil on the supposition of Divine concurse efficaciously moving and applying the same to act, is only consequential, hypothetic, or condi∣tionate and voluntary, not simple, absolute, and coactive or violent. Here we are to inquire what a simple and absolute impossibilitie is, and how it is differenced from a conditionate and limited Impossibi∣litie. A thing is said to be simply and absolutely impossible, when it is in no regard possible: for if it be in any respect possible, it can∣not be said to be simply and absolutely impossible. Now nothing can be said to be in no regard possible, or simply and absolutely impossi∣ble, but what in its own nature implies a repugnance of existing: and surely nothing in its own nature implies a repugnance of ex∣isting, but what involves a contradiction: that which involves a Page  16 contradiction comes not within the compass of possible, because contradictions have no passive power of being verified; for the affirming of the one is the denying of the other; the truth of the one makes the other false: But whatever implies not a contradi∣ction or repugnance of existing, that may be; and therefore can∣not be simply and absolutely impossible, of which see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. § 4. Now that the Concurse of God predetermining the wil to the substrate mater of sinful acts cannot render the op∣posite act of obedience simply and absolutely impossible is evident; because (1) the opposite act of obedience implies no contradicti∣on or repugnance of existing: For God can and doth work it in some: albeit it be in a limited sense impossible to corrupt nature, yet it is possible to Grace, as before. (2) The wil predetermi∣ned to one act has an habitual indifference or radical flexibilitie to the opposite act; and therefore the impossibilitie is only con∣ditionate and limited. A reverend Divine supposeth, That Gods determinative concurse to the substrate mater of sin leaves it undenia∣ble, that the mater of al his Laws, in reference to al such actions, are a simple and most strictly natural impossibilitie. Which I conceive to be a great mistake, and that according to the confession of our principal Adversary, Strangius, who lib. 3. cap. 8. pag. 625. speaks thus: Therefore the Divine determination either by efficacious grace, or any other way [which includes concurse to the entitative act of sin] being granted, there is truly inferred a necessitie of the conse∣quence; because that act of the wil unto which it is determined by God must necessarily follow, but it is not a necessitie of the consequent, which in its own nature remains contingent; and therefore in a composite sense the wil, when it is determined by God to act, cannot but act. Whence some Scholemen say, That in free-wil there is a simultie of power to op∣posites,*but not a power of simultie, i. e. a power of embracing opposites at one and the same time: whereof the reason is this, because a power to one act is not opposed to the power unto the negation of the same act, or to a contrary act, but two contraries or contradictories cannot be toge∣ther in the same subject. Of which mater Alvarez discourseth lear∣nedly, de Auxil. l. 9. Disp. 94. & l. 12. Disp. 115. Note wel here, that Strangius in this point fals in with the Dominicans, and fully assents and consents to their mode of conciliating Divine determi∣nation with human libertie, which if the fore-mentioned reverend Brother and others would do, I should judge our Controversie ve∣ry near, if not fully at an end. The sum of al is this, That the de∣termination Page  17 or predetermination of Divine concurse to this or that act doth not make the negation of that act, or a contrary act a simple or most strictly natural impossibilitie, as some would per∣suade us, but only infers a necessitie of the consequence, the wil having stil, in sensu diviso, i. e. on supposition of the withdrawment of Divine concurse, an habitual indifference to act or not to act, though, in sensu composito, as predetermined by Divine concurse, it cannot but act. Or summarily thus: The wil has at that very time, when it is predetermined by God to this or that act, an ha∣bitual power or radical indifference to the negation of that act, or to the putting forth a contrary act: So that Divine predetermina∣tion excludes only a contrary act, not the radical power to that act. Thus also Davenant, Animadv. against Hoard, p. 240, 333, 341, 360, 402. proves strongly and accurately, That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibilitie to contrary events, though not with contrary events. Of which more hereafter.

§. 5. The next terme that fals under consideration is the Wil of*God, its different Ideas and various Acceptions in the Scri∣ptures, under which our Opponents concele themselves, and their misrepresentations of our sentiments. The ancient distinction of the Divine wil, (which they say Hugo de S. Victore first formed) was, into voluntatem signi & voluntatem beneplaciti, Gods significative wil and his beneplacite wil. (1) Gods significative wil they make to consiste of Precepts, Promisses, Prohibitions, Permissions, Counsels, and Admonitions. By Permissions here we must understand such as are moral, not natural, which as to sin properly belong to Gods beneplacite wil, as anon. This significative Wil of God some Di∣vines terme his Reveled wil, from Deut. 29. 29. others terme it his Legislative or Preceptive wil: others his Approbative wil, where∣by he declares what he approves and what he disapproves, of which see Davenant Animadv. against Hoard, pag. 222, 356, 391—399. Lastly learned Chamier, and Daillé out of him, terme this significative wil of God, his wil 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of complacence, or compla∣cential wil, whereby he declares, what is most agreable to him, and what not. Our judicious Davenant makes use also of this terme, as having one and the same Idea with the former notion of Gods Approbative wil. These several notions of Gods significative wil, albeit they may differ in some formalitie, yet they agree in substance and import, denoting Gods reveled wil touching mans dutie, and that which is most agreable to his holy wil and nature. Page  18 (2) As for Gods Beneplacite wil, commonly •…iled his wil 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of good pleasure, it is that whereby he decrees, effects, or permits al events and effects: whence it is distributed into effective and per∣missive. Gods effective beneplacite wil, is that whereby he decrees and produceth al natural and supernatural effects: Gods permis∣sive beneplacite wil, is that whereby according to his eternal Decree he efficaciously permits the existence of sin.

This distribution of the Divine wil is greatly opposed by the Pelagians, Arminians, and new Methodists. (1) The Jesuites, whom we may without breach of charitie terme Pelagians, do what they can to baffle this distinction: so Molina, the Head of that Faction, in Thom. Part. 1. Quaest. 19. Art. 12. tels us, That these signs of the Divine wil signifie properly and formally some nolition or vo∣lition in God; and therefore Gods significative wil cannot be con∣tradistinguisht to his beneplacite wil. The same is urged by the Arminians. But the Orthodox both among Papists and Prote∣stants replie, that Gods reveled significative wil is only equivocal∣ly, analogically, figuratively and improperly termed his wil, as the Edicts of Princes, and Laws of States. So Sanderson de Obligatione Conscientiae, Praelect. 4 sect. 20. tels us, That Gods beneplacite wil is that whereby God has from al Eternitie constituted with himself what he wil do: his significative wil is that whereby he has appointed unto us a Law, by signifying what he wil have done by us. Whereof the former is properly and univocally the wil of God, but this later improperly and analogically so called. The like Davenant, Animadvers. pag. 392. It's true, Divines grant, that this significative wil of God has some Decree or Act of the beneplacite wil answering thereto: for the wise God decreed, that this or that should be mans dutie; but they denie that this reveled wil of God touching mans dutie is the same with his decretive wil touching events. (2) Our Ad∣versaries pretend, that by this distinction of the significative and beneplacite wil we make two opposite wils in God, and such as clash each with other. This makes a reverend Brother to reject this distinction, as of no use in our present case. But Divines answer, that these wils are not opposite in God, but only disparate and di∣verse: the things decreed, and the things reveled and constituted by Gods significative wil may oppose each other, but the decre∣tive and reveled wil never oppose each other. The most holy and wise God really intends whatever he commands, or approves, with an intention that it shal be mans dutie, and rewarded if per∣formed, Page  19 but not alwayes with an intention that it shal be effect∣ed. (3) Our Opponents, and particularly the new Methodists, confound Gods Beneplacite Decretive Wil, with his Wil of Com∣placence and Approbation: and under this confusion endeavor to secure their opposition against Gods willing the Permission of Sin. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. None can be said to wil what he doth not approve. Thence others make Love of compla∣cence essential to al acts of the Divine Wil: and thence con∣clude, if God wil the permission of Sin, he must necessarily take complacence therein. But the replie hereto is not difficult: we say, that God takes complacence in al his own Acts, but not in al the objects they refer unto: but now love of complacence is not so termed from the act, but object about which it is conver∣sant; which must be some good either natural or moral. Whence it is evident, that God may wil the permission of Sin, and its existence as a consequent thereto, and yet not take complacence in or approve of sin. See more of Gods Wil and its various Di∣stributions, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. §. 3.

§. 6. The last terme that needs our Explication is Divine Con∣curse,* its Immediation, Efficacitie and Predetermination. Strangius, l. 1. c. 11. p. 59. distinguisheth Concurse from Influxe thus: (1) In∣fluxe is more large than concurse: for the causality of every effi∣cient is termed Influxe; and therefore the Influxe of God is seen in many things, in which his concurse is not, as when he acts without the concurrence of a second cause. Thence, (2) the terme Influxe is absolute, not denoting the respect of any other cause, but that of concurse is relative. I have no mind to quar∣rel about termes without just ground, and therefore can easily admit this distinction, though it make neither for nor against either party. But that which more immediately concerns our* present controversie is, 1. To give the true Idea and Notion of Immediate Concurse, as generally asserted and stated in the Scholes: which we shal endeavour to explicate both negatively and posi∣tively.

(1) Negatively, Immediate concurse to an Act consistes not in the preservation of the principe, or rendring of it apt and habile for any congenerous action. I know a learned and pious Divine, who seems in termes to grant immediate Concurse as to the sub∣strate mater of sinful actions, yet in the close placeth it only in this, That God as the first Mover, so far excite and actuate those Page  20 powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action, to which they have a natural designation; and whereunto they are not sinfully disinclined. But al this, as I conceive, no way reacheth the true notion of Immediate concurse, neither is it consistent with it self. For, [1] If God as the first mover excite and actu∣ate those powers, then are they necessarily by him drawn or ap∣plied to act, which is more than being apt and habile for any con∣generous action: certainly to excite and actuate a power is more than to render it apt and habile for an action. [2] If the Powers by Gods exciting of them are rendred only apt and habile for any congenerous action, then where is immediate concurse as to the Act? Did or would any terme this immediate concurse, so far to excite and actuate those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous Action? [3] What this Aptitude and Habilitie is, which the Powers receive by being thus excited and actuated by God, I cannot divine: Are not the powers of the soul as powers apt and habile for natural actions, such as the sub∣strate mater of sin is? What other Aptitude or Habilitie doth God give unto the natural faculties as to sinful acts, but merely the facultie of acting? Need sinners any other facultie, power, Apti∣tude or Habilitie to sin, but the rational faculties depraved? It's true, God applies those faculties to the entitative act of that which is sinful, but yet doth not adde any aptitude or habilitie to sin. [4] Doth not Durandus and his Sectators grant al this, and yet denie immediate concurse as to the entitative act of sin? The Hypothesis of Durandus doth no way exclude any kind of Aptitude or Habilitie, but rather include the same; it only ex∣cludes the immediate application of the power to its act; which also is excluded by this laxe notion of Immediate concurse. [5] Lastly, if they who oppose Gods concurse to the substrate mater of al sinful acts, do indeed and in truth assert and owne an immediate concurse to any one entitative act that is sinful, al those black and direful consequences, which they cast on the assertors of Predetermination, may with as much facilitie be re∣torted on them, as we shal demonstrate, chap. 5. §. 4. Hence,

(2) Affirmatively, Immediate concurse as to its formal Idea not only gives an Aptitude or Habilitie to act, but also immediately pro∣duceth the very act it self. That this notion of immediate con∣curse is universally received in the Scholes, is most evident. I shal desire the Reader to consult our Countrey-man Compton Page  21 Carleton, a learned and acute Jesuite, who had his first educa∣tion in Cambridge, and is more moderate than most of that facti∣on. He saith, Philosoph. Disput. 28. de Causa prima, Sect. 3. p. 319. God therefore concurs with al his Creatures immediately to al their actions, not only by the Immediation of Virtue, but also of Supposite, i. e. that action, whereby the creature operates, doth also flow imme∣diately from God himself, and not from any other substituted in his place. A clear explication of Immediate concurse, so far as it regards its Immediation. Whence Disput. 29. Sect. 2. he deter∣mines thus, touching Gods Immediate concurse to the act of Sin: We must say therefore, that God doth physically and immediately con∣cur to the act of sin, together with the create Wil. And he confirmes this Hypothesis by Arguments out of Aquinas, Suarez, Vasques, Anselme, Tanner, Zumel, Montesinus, Mulderus, Arriaga, and Oviedo. So that this notion of Immediate concurse seems to have been generally entertained by al parties, both Thomists, Scotists, and Jesuites, as that which is most rational and self-eviden∣cing.

2. But the principal point in controversie is touching the Effi∣cacitie* and Predetermination of Divine Concurse; wherein the Je∣suites and Arminians oppose the Dominicans and Calvinists. I must confess, when I first undertook the explication of Divine Concurse, specially as to the substrate mater of Sin, I studiosely avoided the terme Predetermination, (although it be frequently fathered on me) as is intimated Court Gentiles, P. 4. B. 2. c. 11. §. 7. partly to avoid needless countests about words, and partly because I would not professedly espouse the interest of any one Sect, but adhere to Scriptural termes; but since, upon a more accurate inquiry, finding the terme expressely laid down in Scripture, and that as to the very mater in controversie, touch∣ing Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin, I see no reason why we may not make use of it, notwithstanding the prejudices some endeavor to load it with. Therefore for the more ful ex∣plication of this terme I shal endeavor to shew, (1) What effi∣cacious concurse notes; and (2) How this efficacious concurse may be termed Predeterminative.

1. Divine Concurse is termed efficacious as it doth most po∣tently* and invincibly produce its effect. The Grecanic terme, whereby the efficacitie of Divine Concurse is expressed in the Scriptures, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, efficacitie, or energie, which notes the puissant Page  22 force of any operation. So Ephes. 1. 19. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,*acccording to the energie or efficacious working of the might of his power. Here is, (1) Power or force. (2) Might of power or most potent power; and (3) The efficacious working of this most potent power: Which note the puissant efficacitie of di∣vine concurse. Thence the Syriac renders it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, accord∣ing to the efficace. So Ephes. 3. 7. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,*according to the energie or efficace of his power. The like, Phil. 3. 21. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,*according to the efficacious working, whereby he is able even to subdue althings unto himself. So Col. 1. 29. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, according to his efficacious working, which worketh in me mightily. In al these Texts we have mighty power, yea omnipotence joined with the efficace of divine Concurse; which demonstrates its invincible manner of work∣ing, in the production of al its effects. So that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies Gods intime presence with al second Causes, and efficacious con∣curring with and actuating of them in al their operations. The like import may be applied to its conjugate 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which notes, to effect any thing in the most efficacious manner, so as to overcome al resistence made against the force of the Agent. So 1 Cor. 12. 6.*〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, who efficaciously worketh althings. The like v. 11. of which hereafter. This efficacious concurse, as it cooperates with the second cause is termed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉cooperation or concurse, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to cooperate. So Mark 16. 20. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Lord cooperating, or efficaciously concurring. So elsewhere, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as applied to God notes his actuose, efficacious, and pre∣determinative concurse in and with althings, is evident from the use of the word both in sacred and profane Authors. So with Phavorinus〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to work readily. It's rendred by the Syriac, sometimes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to work, as 1 Cor. 12. 6. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 where it notes not only an universal general concurse, but a particular, present, certain, efficacious force or effi∣cacitie of Divine Concurse, exerting it self in al individual acts and effects. Again, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is rendred by the Syriac, Rom. 7. 5.* and 2 Cor. 4. 12. by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to work, to act with diligence, to be efficacious, as Boderianus. And 1 Cor. 12. 11. it is rendred by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to act, to work, to perform, to effect, as Boderianus. Lastly, it is rendred by the Syriac, Ephes. 1. 11. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, who hath*efficaciously wrought althings. Which sufficiently demonstrates Page  23 the predetermination of Gods concurse, as to al second causes and acts. Hence,

2. This efficacious Concurse, as it determines and applies the* second cause to act, is both in sacred Scripture and by scholastic Theologues termed Determinative and Predeterminative. We find both these termes in Scripture applied to Divine Concurse. Thus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉a terme or limit; (1) primarily and properly signifies to termine, set bounds or limits to any cause, effect, or thing. So Acts 17. 26. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and*hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their ha∣bitation: i. e. God has determined or predetermined to every Man, Nation, and Kingdome their fixed termes of duration and life. So Arrian, Epictet. lib. 1. cap. 12. speaking of God, he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And Virgils Song is remarquable: Stat sua cui{que} dies, Every ones day stands fixed or determined: which Ser∣vius understands, of the fixed determined period of human life. So that we see that not only sacred Philosophie, but the very Pagans by their dim light, asserted a fixed period of Divine life, as deter∣mined by God; albeit some that professe themselves Christians denie the same. Then he addes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the bounds, or the position of termes: for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 properly signifies the position of termes or limits to any cause, action, effect, or thing. God by his eternal Decree has predetermined or set termes and limits to al se∣cond causes, their actions, effects, and events: there is nothing so contingent in nature, but it is predetermined by the Divine wil. We find the Verbe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 applied to times and places, as wel as to causes and acts: So Heb. 4. 7. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he determines or limits*a day. Thence in the Glossarie, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is a stated or deter∣mined day: and so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, I termine or limit as to place. Whence Hesychius makes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he determines, to be the same with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he gives terme or limit. Thence also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 with the LXX. answers to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉to termine, determine, or constitute termes to any place or thing, Num. 34. 6. Josh. 13. 27. & 15. 11. also to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉to be bounded or determined. Whence lastly 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies a definition, which is the terme or boundary of an essence, accord∣ing to Cicero, who renders it, the circumscription of a thing. (2) From this primary notion of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 follows a secondary, namely, to decree, destine to a certain end, predestine, predetermine. In which sense it signifies the same with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to predetermine: and so it is transferred to predestination, predetermination, or the decree and Page  24 purpose of the Divine wil, even about the substrate mater or enti∣tative act of sin; as Luke 22. 22. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as it was deter∣mined,* or predetermined, decreed. Our Lord speaks of his Cruci∣fixion, which was the greatest of sins and intrinsecally evil, and yet lo! as to the substrate mater or entitative act, predetermi∣ned and decreed by God. The same Acts. 2. 23. Him, being deli∣vered*by the determinate counsel, and foreknowledge of God: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by that defined, determined, or predetermined counsel: of which more Chap. 3. §. 2. Hence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉to decree, deliberate, deter∣mine is expounded by Theodotion, Job 22. 28. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 And Hesy∣chius makes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉he determines synonymous to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which when applied to the Divine wil note predefinition and predetermination.

As the simple 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so also the composite 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to prede∣stine* or predetermine is used six times in the N. T. (1) of things ap∣pertaining to salvation, 1 Cor. 2. 7. (2) of persons elect, Rom. 8. 29, 30. Eph. 1. 5, 11. (3) of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin, yea that which was intrinsecally evil. So Act. 4. 28. For to do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsel determined before, or pre∣determined to be done. For so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 may more properly be rendred. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 primarily signifies to predefine, predestine, predetermine, to set limits, bounds, termes to persons or things. Thence, as to this present text and point, when it is said here, that those who crucified Christ did what Gods hand and counsel predetermined to be done, it must be understood of the substrate mater or entitative act, which was predetermined by God, as in what follows, Chap. 3. §. 2. The Syriac version interprets 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉to seal, constitute, or make firm any thing, which is rendred by the LXX. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to order, dispose, constitute, institute. The Divine Wil and Decree gives order, constitution, limitation, deter∣mination, yea predetermination to althings: al persons and things, times and places, ends and means receive termes, limits, desti∣nation, and predetermination from the Divine Wil and Decree. Hence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the N. T. is made synonymous to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to foreknow, 1 Pet. 1. 20. to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to preordain, Act. 17. 26. to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to propose, or purpose, Rom. 1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to prepare, Rom. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evi∣dently see, what footsteps predetermination, and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin, has in the sacred Scriptures.

Page  25We now procede to examine this notion as used by scholastic* Theologues, and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversie. (1) Some distinguish between Gods predefinition and his predetermination: his predefinition they restrain to his Decrees, and his predetermination to his Concurse. Others distinguish the predetermination of God into extrinsec and intrin∣sec: by extrinsec predetermination they understand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree, whereby the creature is predetermined to act: by intrinsec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature, which continually moves and applies it to act. But I should rather distinguish predetermination, (as Creation and al other Acts of God ad extrà) into active and passive: [1] By active predetermination I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil, whereby al second causes, persons, acts, effects and things receive their termes, order, and limitation as to power and activitie. This is the same with predefinition, pre∣destination, and extrinsec predetermination. That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil, without any impression or actual influxe on the second cause has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Scholes, and that on invict reasons: for if God wil, that the second cause, (suppose it be the human wil) act, imme∣diately on the volition of God the action of the second cause wil follow, not from any previous impression on the second cause, but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathie with the first cause: as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facul∣tie of man moves. See Suarez, de Auxil. l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 3. [2] By passive predetermination I understand the concurse of God as applying the second cause to its act, and not really, but mentally or modally only distinct therefrom: For as active predetermination is the same with the Divine wil, so passive predetermination is the same with the second cause, its act and effect, as we have demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. §. 1.

(2) Predetermination is usually distinguished into physic or na∣tural,* and ethic or moral. This distinction dependes on that of causes into physic, and moral: a physic or natural cause is that which is truly efficient, and so doth really influence the act and effect, in a way of proper efficience or causalitie: whence an Ethic or moral cause is that which doth not immediately, directly, or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect, but only morally,Page  26 by proposing objects, motives, precepts, promisses, or the like moral means and influences, with excitements and persuasions. Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into physic and moral. [1] By physic predetermination we must under∣stand not corporal, or natural in a strict notion, which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes, but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act, and really, yea immediately influenceth both act and effect. Thus Sua∣rez, Metaphys. Disput. 17. sect. 2. num. 2. A physic cause [and so predetermination] in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause, acting by corporeous and material motion; but it's taken more universally, for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect: for as nature sometimes signifies any essence; so physic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper causalitie worketh the effect: to which when a moral cause is opposed, it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act, yet it doth so carrie itself, as that the effect may be imputed to it: such a cause is he that comforts, beseecheth, or hinders not when he may and ought. Hence [2] by moral predetermination, as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world, we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end, his stating mans dutie by moral precepts, inviting thereto by Evangelic promisses, dehorting from sin by penal com∣minations, and al other moral influences. Here we are to note, that albeit physic and moral predetermination be comprehended under physic and moral causalitie, yet the later is more compre∣hensive than the former: for physic predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior, but physic cau∣salitie to any efficient, as Strangius doth wel observe.

But to sum up the whole, both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuites and Arminians in this, That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to sin: for he neither counsels, encourageth, commandes, or invites any one to the least sin. The Question therefore must be understood of physic predetermination; which I shal describe according to the explication of Strangius, l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus:

By the physic predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God, whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act, and so antecedently to al operation of the creature; or in order of nature and reason be∣fore the creature workes, God really and efficaciously moves it to act in al its actions: i. e. he actes and causeth, that the crea∣ture Page  27 actes and causeth whatever it actes and causeth: so that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing: and this premotion being given it is impossible, in a composite sense, that the creature should not act and do that, unto which it is pre∣moved by the first cause.
And more particularly, though con∣cisely, as for Gods predetermination of the human wil, Strangius,*l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus: To predetermine the wil, as they teach, is to applie the wil to act, and to make it act. Which descripti∣on of predetermination I do readily close with, and so the Questi∣on before us wil be summarily this,

Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions, even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them? Affirm.

I am not ignorant, that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis, states the question otherwise, as if we held, That God doth by an efficacious influence universaelly move and determine men to al their actions; even those that are most wicked. But this Hypothesis, as proposed and intended, I know no sober mind but abhors: whoever said, that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such? were not this to make him the Au∣thor of sin, which every pious soul detestes? For to determine to wicked actions as such, implies also a determination to the wick∣ednesse of those actions: and this determination cannot be phy∣sic; because sin as sin has no physic cause or determination: there∣fore it must be moral: and surely whoever determines morally to the most wicked actions cannot but be the moral cause, and Au∣thor of them: and is not this an high piece of blasphemie? We are so far from asserting, that God determines men to the most wicked actions, as that we say, he determines men to no wicked action; no not the least: Yea we adde further, that in actions sincerely but imperfectly good, and in part sinful, albeit God predetermines men both naturally and morally to the goodnesse of the action, and naturally to the substrate mater or natural act, yet he predetermines not to the vitiositie of the act, or the act as sinful. So the sum and whole of our Hypothesis is this, That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions, even such as have sin appendent to them. This Hypothesis we no way doubt but to make good both by scriptural and rational demonstration.

Page  28
CHAP. II. The state of the Controversie.

(1) Ten general Propositions wherein the New Methodists and Pre∣determinants agree. (2) The New Methodists differences among themselves about Prescience, Futurition, Divine Concurse, and Gods permission of sin. (3) The differences of the Predeterminants from the New Methodists about absolute Decrees, the Futurition, Divine Permission, Prescience, Providence, Predefinition, and Predetermina∣tion of Sin.

THE prolixitie we have used in explicating and stating our Question wil render our subsequent work more facile and concise. For here that old Proverbe holds true, A good beginning is half the work. But before we enter on the Demonstration of our Hypothesis it wil be necessary to manifest, (1) Wherein we and those who maintain the Antithesis do agree. (2) Wherein our Oppo∣nents, who maintain the Antithesis, differ among themselves. (3) Wherein we differ from them. The explication of these Particulars wil not a little conduce to the more perfect state and determina∣tion of our Question.

§. 1. Wherein we and our Opponents, who maintain the Antithesis,*do agree. Some there are who conceive our differences greater than they are; others on the contrary make them lesse: our first work therefore wil be to shew, wherein we agree; which I shal en∣deavor to lay down in the following Propositions.

1. Prop. That God hath decreed althings that come to passe. Here∣in our Adversaries generally concord with us; albeit they differ from us, as also among themselves about the manner how God decrees the substrate mater of sin. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 3. p. 558.

But also we confesse and say, that God doth truly decree al∣things that happen, but not althings in one and the same man∣ner; but some things effectively, other things permissively: which is the commun opinion of Theologues, according to that famose Axiome of Augustin: There is nothing done, which the Omnipotent doth not wil, either by permitting that it be done, or by doing of it.
Yet the said Strangius, in what precedes, gives us a very dangerous position touching the Divine Decrees:
It is not needful, saith Page  29 he, that we appoint so many particular Decrees of God, touch∣ing his Concurse to be afforded, as there are actions of the crea∣ture and particular objects of them. Sithat that one general Decree or Institute of God may suffice, whereby he hath deter∣mined to concur with al the actions of the creature, as he hath given them a power to act, &c.
This general Decree, foisted in to salve his own Hypothesis, is most unworthy of the Divine Being, in that it overthrows the Prescience of God, imposeth imperfection on the Divine Wil, and opens an effectual dore to Pelagianisme.

2. Prop. That Election of some to Grace and Glorie is absolute, and no way dependent on the prevision of any act of man. This Proposi∣tion, although it be denied by the Pelagians, Socinians, and Armi∣nians, yet it is generally granted by our Adversaries, the New Methodists, Amyraldus, Strangius, Le Blanc, and others. For these, albeit they make Reprobation conditional and dependent on mans sin, yet they grant a particular absolute Election of some to Grace and Glorie: which to me seems very strange and incon∣sistent with their Hypothesis about Reprobation: For if the De∣crees of God be absolute as to Election, why should they not be* also estimed such as to Reprobation? Can the Divine wil be mo∣ved by any thing but itself? Are not conditional Decrees incon∣sistent therewith? Doth not God in the glass of his own Decrees foresee al acts and events of the human wil? Must they not then be al decreed absolutely by God? See hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 3.

3. Prop. That God hath a certain Science or Prescience of sin, as wel as of al other Events. This Proposition is universally granted by al the New Methodists, Amyraldus, Strangius, &c. as also by most Arminians, although it be utterly incompossible and inconsistent with the sentiments both of the one and t'other Partie. For al the wit of man, yea I wil with confidence adde of Devils, wil never be able to explicate and demonstrate a certain prescience in God of things future, but what is originated in and dependent on his own Decrees. I must solemnely professe, I can see no way left to evade the force of Socinus's argument against the certaintie of Gods prescience, if we resolve it not into the free determina∣tion of his own wil decreeing al future events: of which more in what follows, Chap. 5. §. 2.

4. Prop. That whatever God absolutely predefines or predestines from Eternitie, he predetermines in time. This Proposition the New-Methodists Page  30 seem generally to grant. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 547.

When we speak of absolute predefinition, we willingly grant, that the predefinition of God from eternitie, and the Predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other; so that whatever particular singular Act God hath ab∣solutely predefined should be done by us, to the same he doth determine our wil: For whatever God hath by his Decree so predefined, it is necessary that he effect the same, or cause that it be done; because the Decree of God, seeing it is absolute and efficacious, must necessarily have its effect; which it cannot have but by efficaciously applying the create wil to the predefi∣nite act: otherwise, if the wil should not act that which is pre∣defined, the Predefinition and Decree of God would be frustra∣ted, which is absurd.
A good concession, which wil be of use to us in what follows, Chap. 5. §. 3.

5. Prop. That God doth predetermine the human Wil to al acts and effects morally good, as also to some other commun acts and effects. This Proposition is generally rejected by the Armini∣ans, as also by Baronius, yet the New Methodists, who have chalked out a middle Way, generally entertain it. Thus Stran∣gius, l. 3. c. 5. p. 584.

We have shewen, that God doth not in al things predetermine the human Wil, namely not in acti∣ons intrinsecally evil, and to which Vitiositie is necessarily an∣nexed; albeit in things lawful, not only in works of Grace, but also in others that are commun, according to his own pleasure, he determines it, with the preservation of its own native li∣bertie, sithat he can never offer any violence to the wil, but only moves it sweetly according to its own nature.
See more on this argument in what follows, c. 3. §. 1. on Prov. 21. 1. This great concession of Strangius indeed cuts the nerves and sinews of al his arguments against our Hypothesis: For if God can and doth predetermine the wil to some acts, without any vio∣lence offered to its Libertie, why may he not also predeter∣mine it to al its acts, without prejudice to its Libertie? The force of this consequence is so strong, that it forceth Baro∣nius and the Arminians to denie al Predetermination. See Chap. 5. §. 4.

6. Prop. That God predetermins the Wil to the substrate mater of some sinful acts, even of such as are not intrinsecally evil. This Pro∣position is granted by Strangius, l. 4. c. 1. p. 766.

But although Page  31 in the actions of wicked men, when God doth use them as In∣struments for the execution of some peculiar works, it may per∣adventure be said, that God doth determine their wils, yet it seems more incommode to say, that God moves and predeter∣mines to al other acts, as to acts of hatred of God, blasphe∣mie, &c.
So that he yieldeth, that God may predetermine to the mater of some sinful acts: and indeed it cannot be rationally denied; sithat Acts imperfectly good are also in part sinful; and the substrate mater of the act as good and sinful is the same: wherefore if God predetermine the human wil to the substrate mater of the act as good, must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the act as sinful? When I say, that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act as sinful, As here must not, yea cannot be taken Reduplicatively, but only Specificatively, as it specifies one and the same Act, and distributes it into its opposite Adjuncts of Good and Evil: So that the meaning is no more than this, that God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is both good and evil: and if he predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the Act which is imperfectly good, (as our Adversaries grant) he must also necessarily predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act whereunto sin is annexed: because the substrate mater of the Act as good and evil is the same. When our Adversaries shal have given us a rational and distinct solution to this argu∣ment, I shal confess they have done much for the subversion of our Hypothesis. Of this Argument, see Chap. 5. §. 4, 5.

7. Prop. That there is no real positive Act or Entitie in nature, whereof God is not the efficient cause. This is generally granted by al those that denie sin to be a positive Being. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 3. p. 557.

There is no Entitie, and no action as it is an acti∣on or has any realitie, whereof God is not the cause, or which he hath not decreed either absolutely or respectively.
So l. 4. c. 11. p. 859.
The entitie of the Action is reduced unto God, as the first cause, on whose concurse and influxe it dependes. So a Reverend Divine, Cathol. Theol. Part 1. Sect. 17. p. 85. `It is certain, that as motus vel actio is quid naturale, it is of God as the first cause of Nature: and so when a sinner acteth, it is not without the first Universal Cause.
One would think that this concession, if well stated and prosecuted, would put an end to our controversie: For al that we demand is, that the real posi∣tive Page  40 act, whereunto sin is annexed, be from God as the first cause of Nature: But yet what our Opponents grant, as limited by them wil not answer our expectations. For some hold with Du∣randus, that the action is from God, but not immediately; others, that it is immediately from God, yet not by a predetermi∣native concurse. Hence,

8. Prop. That God concurs immediately to the substrate mater or entitative act whereunto sin is annexed. This Proposition is not granted by such as follow Durandus either in words or sense, yet by others it is. Thus Strangius, l. 1. c. 10. p. 54. But we must judge, that God doth immediately reach every action and effect of the creature, and that both by the Immediation of virtue and supposite or person. For as God himself, so his virtue is every where present and energetic. For the proof whereof he cites Isa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. ult. 1 Cor. 12. 6. Act. 17. 28. with other Scriptures. So Ch. 11. p. 61. he confesseth, that there is a common influxe of God unto al actions, which he cals 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the energie and efficace of God, whereby he doth subordinate second Causes to himself; so that what∣ever they are or do act, they essentially depend on him in both respects. Whereby he seems to evince, that Gods Influxe doth not only render the subject habile to act, but also immediately reach the very act, even that has sin annexed to it. The like he addes, l. 4. c. 1. p. 760.

It may truely be said, and men are wont so to speak, That God is the cause of vitiose actions, albeit he be not the cause of the actions as they are vitiose.
And more fully l. 4. c. 3. p. 783.
From what has been said, it may in some manner be understood, how in a sane sense God may be said to impel or incline to some sin, when yet he is void of al sin: spe∣cially if these things be observed. (1) That it be not under∣stood, that God moves or inclines men to sin in general. (2) Nei∣ther that it be said, that God moves to al sin, but only to such, in which he useth depraved wils as instruments to execute his good works. (3) Neither that it be understood, that God doth properly move to sin simply and formally taken, or sin as sin; but only to the material of sin, i. e. not to the sin of the Action, but to the Action as substrate to the sin, so that he be not the Author of the vitiositie, which he only permits, but of the substrate Act, and of his own direction and ordination, which he exerciseth about the vitiose Action, &c.
Yea in Actions intrinsecally sinful, he seems to grant, that the Act, as it is a Page  33 physic or natural Being, is from God. So l. 4. c. 12. p. 876.
That which is also true of Actions which are intrinsecally evil, such as the hatred of God, perjurie, &c. In which also we must distinguish the physic or natural Being from the Ethic or moral evil.
—That God concurs to the physic action, but not to the moral vice of the action we have above shewen. There are two observables in these concessions of Strangius, which, if he were candid and uniforme in granting us, would put a period to the controversie. [1] That in Actions intrinsecally evil there is a physic or natural entitie separable from the ethic or moral vi∣tiositie. [2] That the physic or natural entitie of al sinful Actions, even such as are intrinsecally sinful, is immediately from God, as the first cause of Nature. But I must confesse, I cannot find that Strangius is candid or uniforme in these his concessions, but elsewhere he seems to overthrow what he has here granted. For, [1] He sometimes asserts, that the natural act of hating God is so intrinsecally evil, as that the vitiositie cannot be sepa∣rated from it. Again, [2] albeit he seem frequently to grant an immediate concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts, yet when he comes to explain what he intends thereby, he doth too much verge unto, if not wholly espouse Durandus's mediate con∣curse, as to acts intrinsecally evil. Thus also Amyraldus, as it is wel noted by Le Blanc, Thes. Conciliat. Arbitrii, &c. Thes. 48. p. 436.

9. Prop. That Gods Providence is universally and efficaciously active in the directing and governing the Sins of men unto his own Glo∣rie. This most of the new Methodists grant, albeit some seem to denie it, at least in part. Our Proposition is granted by Stran∣gius, l. 3. c. 4. p. 469.

Neither doth it follow from our opinion, that any free act is substracted from the Providence of God, if man doth that which God permits, sithat whether it be good or evil that man doth, God must foreknow, and direct and order it to the end appointed by himself. So l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. `Fur∣thermore it must be observed, which we have oft mentioned, that God albeit he doth not wil sin as sin, yet he doth advisedly permit, direct, and ordain it in the best manner, to execute his righteous judgements, and illustrate his glorie. The like p. 764. Albeit we denie that God doth ever determine the wil to sin for∣mally taken, or to the actions unto which sin is necessarily an∣nexed, yet we acknowledge, that God doth so rule and order Page  34 the sinful wils of Men and Devils, that by permitting tenta∣tions, offering objects, subministrating occasions, denying Grace, which he owes to none, letting loose the reins to Satan, re∣moving impediments, or by operating in any other secret man∣ner, the event which he pre-appoints infallibly follows, and specially that that work be performed, for the effecting of which God useth their ministerie.
How much would this concession conduce to put a period to this controversie, were our Adver∣saries but ingenuous in their assent and consent to it? Doth he not say here as much as we, abating only the terme Predetermi∣nation? and yet elsewhere how doth he start off from what is here granted?

10. Prop. That God doth no way concur or predetermine the hu∣man wil to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin so as to be the cause or author of Sin. This Proposition we chearfully and with our whole Souls assent and consent unto; although it be the grand designe and unwearied endeavors of our Adversaries, both Pela∣gians, Jesuites, Arminians and new Methodists, to fasten the An∣tithesis on us, namely, That we make God to be the Author of sin. Which Imputation has been in al Ages of the Christian Church fastened on those that defended Efficacious Grace and Divine Concurse, as we shal shew in what follows, Chap. 4.

§. 2. Having laid down the general Propositions, wherein our* Opponents generally, though not without some variation, con∣cord with us, it follows, that we shew briefly wherein they differ among themselves. Indeed, so great is the difference of our Ad∣versaries, specially the New Methodists, Amyraldus, Baronius, Strangius, Le Blanc, and others among themselves in this point touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of sin, as that it is very difficult for us to forme commun principes or Hypotheses wherein they al agree. And albeit they generally agree in their opposing our Hypothesis, touching Gods imme∣diate predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of acti∣ons intrinsecally evil, yet they lay down their own Antithesis with so much caution, suspension, and hesitation of mind, as if they were afraid the contrary might prove true. Placeus, Tractat. de Liber. Arbit. p. 174. cunningly waves the determination of the Question, with this modest concelement of his mind: Truely we, according to the reverence we have towards the infinite Majestie of God, dare not define what the Dependence of the second cause on the Page  35 first is: It sufficeth us, that too much dependence cannot be asserted, provided that it doth not asperse God with any the least spot of our sins. Which we readily close with, renouncing al such dependence as brings the holy God under the imputation of sin. So Baronius, Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp. 3. §. 78. pag. 147. having given us the men∣tion of the Thomists previous predeterminative concurse, namely, that the human wil is in al its motions excited by God, and efficaciously, i. e. irresistibly moved, first to act, and then to act this rather than that, before he undertakes the refutation hereof he thus premonishes us: In the mean while we professe these two things: (1) That we do much against our wil recede from this opinion, and that because we con∣ceive so honourably of those great men, which are Patrones thereof. (2) That we are ready, if any thing may follow from this our Doctrine against any article of faith, to reject it. Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. Thes. 55. pag. 438. seems to wave the Controversie; yet Thes. 56. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius, That God cannot physically promove and predetermine free causes to acts intrinsecally evil, without being the Author of sin. But Thes. 57. he confesseth, That provided God be not made the Author of sin, the dependence of the second causes on the first in acting cannot be too much asserted, &c. And Thes. 58. he concludes, That the force and efficace of the Divine pro∣vidence even about sinful acts, is not to be restrained to a certain gene∣ral indifferent concurse; but that God doth many ways procure, pro∣move, direct, and moderate sinful events. So great is the hesitation of our Adversaries. Yea, how frequently do the very same per∣sons differ from themselves in their sentiments about this point? Doth not the same person sometimes seem to grant an universal concurse immediately influencing al natural acts, and yet else∣where denie the same to acts intrinsecally evil? And so in other points controverted by us. But the differences of our Opponents among themselves are more palpable and visible as to the follow∣ing Particulars.

1. They are greatly confused and at variance among themselves as*to Gods Prescience of sinful acts. Al the New Methodists gene∣rally grant Gods certain prescience of al sinful acts, but yet they are at a great difference, yea contradiction among themselves in the stating of it. (1) Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 594. tels us, That among al the modes which are wont to be explicated, that seems the most probable, which is taken from the presence of althings in Eternitie. Wherein he follows the Dominicans, and so must by consequence Page  36 resolve the futurition of sin into the wil of God permitting it, which overthrows his Hypothesis. Yet cap. 8. pag. 622. he re∣solves the certaintie of Gods foreknowing future events into the more Essence of God. And pag. 626. he resolves it into the actions themselves and their determinate causes. Lastly, cap. 10. pag. 646. he in down right termes confesseth, That the science of future sins is referred to the science of Vision. Which is al that we contend for, and that which necessarily resolves Gods prescience of sin, into the act of his wil permitting it. Some of our Opponents re∣solve Gods certain prescience of sin into the infinitude of his science. Thus Le Blanc De Concord. Libert. p 444. Thes. 39. As for the fourth opinion, which secketh the certitude of Divine prescience in the infinitie of the Divine Intellect, and in the determinate veritie of those things which are contingently future, it layeth down nothing but what is certain and indubitate. Yet Thes. 40. he confesseth, That this opinion doth not satisfie the Question, nor take away the principal difficultie. For that which is here most difficult to be understood is, how future contin∣gents do from Eternitie passe from mere possibles into the nature of fu∣tures, that so under that reason they may be perceived by God. Which knot he endeavors to untie, by telling us, that the same causes that give existence to things future give them also their futurition. But this is a very jejune and poor evasion, as we shal hereafter shew, Chap. 5. §. 1. (3) Others refer Gods certain prescience of sin to the Jesuites middle science, whereby God foresees, that if the wil of man come under such a connexion of causes, circumstances, and providential concurrences, the effect wil certainly follow, albeit in itself merely contingent. Thus Lud. Crocius, Dyodec. Dissert. Dissert. 7. where he largely but weakly defends this mid∣dle science: which Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. pag. 449. Thes. 26; &c. makes to be the opinion of Baronius and others. Le Blanc himself, pag. 444. Thes. 42. confesseth, That it wants not great dif∣ficultie, how a thing which is supposed to depend on a cause in itself inde∣terminate should be certainly knowen by the Divine Intellect: for the Divine Intellect although infinite cannot see what is not, nor yet change the nature of its object. Whence he concludes, Thes. 43. That se∣ing there is so much darknesse on al sides, our safest and most ingenuous course is to confesse our own ignorance herein. The like subterfuge Strangius makes use of, l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. &c. 6. p. 591. with this pretexte, That the mode of Divine prescience is not reveled in Scri∣pture. A poor refuge indeed! why then do they so daringly sift Page  37 and prie into the Divine prescience, and draw it down to the mo∣del of our corrupt reason? We easily grant, that the mode of Di∣vine prescience is incomprehensible by poor mortals, and there∣fore can content our selves with scriptural descriptions thereof: but this we assert, that it is impossible the Divine prescience, which is in itself most certain, should depend on the most incer∣tain ambulatory wil of man; and so much Scripture and Reason grounded thereon doth fully demonstrate.

2. Our Adversaries differ greatly among themselves about the*futurition of sin, and Gods predefinition thereof. Strangius, l. 3. c. 11. holds, That some free acts are absolutely future, and knowen of God as such, without any Decree predetermining the free causes to those acts: and yet he denies, that those free contingent futures can be knowen by God according to any Hypothesis, which doth not necessarily infer the determination of the create wil; and thence which doth not include an absolute Decree of their futurition. Whence it wil follow, that God can foreknow no contingent sinful act as absolutely future, but what he first decreed to be absolutely future; which yet Strangius admits not. Herein he is opposed by Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. pag. 455.

3. Our Opponents are also at variance among themselves* touching Gods concurse, its immediation, totalitie, prioritie, efficace, and predetermination as to sinful acts. (1) How many of them in∣cline to the sentiments of Durandus, denying al immediate con∣curse to sinful acts? And of those that grant immediate concurse in termes, how many yet denie it in realitie? Among those that grant immediate concurse both name and thing, do not many espouse such consequences as are inconsistent therewith, yea re∣pugnant thereto? (2) Our Adversaries also differ much about Gods total particular concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin. Some grant a total concurse to the physic entitative act in the general, but not in particular: others grant a total concurse to the entitative act in particular, abstracting the refe∣rence it has to its object: Thus Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 3. who grants, that God doth concur by a special concurse to the special effects as they are specifically distinguished not morally but physically; which is al that we contend for: Others, on the contrary, make Gods con∣curse to the substrate mater of sin only partial and general, assert∣ing with Molina, Part. 1. q. 14. a. 3. Disp. 6. That God is only a par∣tial cause of the entitative act of sin: So a Divine of name among us; yea he asserts, that God never totally permits sin. (3) Our Page  38 Opponents differ also among themselves touching the Priori∣tie of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin. Some grant Gods concurse hereto previous, though not predeterminative; so Strangius: but others make it to be only simultaneous; asserting, that God concurs with the wil of man in the same moment of nature and reason, to the same act. So Baronius, wherein he also follows Lud. Molina and the Arminians. (4) Lastly, the princi∣pal difference among our Adversaries is about the Efficacitie and Predetermination of Divine concurse as to the substrate mater of sin. Some make the concurse of God to be only general and in∣different, and so determinable by the second cause, as the influence of the Sun is by the mater it workes upon. Thus Baronius, Meta∣phys. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. §. 73, 74, 75. pag. 142, &c. where he makes Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts to be the same with that of the Sun concurring to the generation of a man or horse. Where∣in he follows the Remonstrants and Jesuites, more particularly Molina, Concord. Liber. Arbitr. cum Grat. donis, &c. Quaest. 14. Disput. 26. Thus a reverend Divine of name among our selves openly asserts, that Gods concurse is determinable by the creature. But Strangius, albeit he too far fals in with the sentiments of Ba∣ronius against predetermination; yet he rejects this Hypothesis of a general indifferent concurse as too grosse and Pelagian. So l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. We say not therefore, that God concurs only by a gene∣ral concurse, as the Sun concurs in the same manner to the generation of a man, and of an horse, and of a mouse; but we determine, that the influxe of God is special to special effects, as they are physically distin∣guished specie, and unto al kind of entitie, but not to the reason of mo∣ral iniquitie, which consistes in privation. Strangius here seems to oppose Baronius's Hypothesis touching a general indifferent con∣curse; but yet, I must confesse, upon a more accurate research I cannot find that he differs materially from Baronius herein: for although l. 1. c. 11. p. 61. he cals this concurse 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, efficace, yet he makes it be but commun, and no way determinative, and there∣fore only indifferent. The like l. 2. c. 19. p. 373. And I am very positive in this, that no man living can rationally exemt them∣selves from the imputation of the Jesuites indifferent concurse, and assert an efficacious special concurse, but what is determina∣tive as to the subject it workes on. And thence Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. part. 3. thes. 36. p. 434. confesseth, That Strangius's opi∣nion as to this point differs but little from that of Baronius. Lastly, Page  39Baronius denies al predetermination both as to good and evil actions; as Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. §. 78, &c. p. 146. Strangius allows predetermination to al acts moraly though but imperfectly good, and to many other acts of the wil, whensoever God pleaseth, or need requireth; yet he denies it to al acts of the creatures, specially to such as are in∣trinsecally evil, as lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 162. and elsewhere. Herein he is followed by some Divines of note among our selves, who I am very confident wil never be able to maintain their singular Hypothesis, but wil at last be driven to the opinion of Baronius, the Remonstrants, and Jesuites, or else fal under the lode of al those black consequences they clog our Hypothesis with; of which hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 4.

4. Our Adversaries differ much among themselves about Gods*permission of sin, its nature and efficace. (1) A Divine of repute among our selves assertetthat no act of sin, no not the active selling of Joseph, or crucifying of Christ was willed by God; but only the pas∣sive vendition and crucifixion or effect; yea he saith, That God doth not wil sin as a punishment in a proper sense: but others allow, that God wils the acts of sin as penal, or conducible to his own glorie, though not as sinful acts. Thus Strangius, l. 4. c. 2. p. 773. where having refuted that distinction (at first framed by Bellarmine, and of late reassumed by a Divine of great name among our selves) of active and passive vendition and crucifixion, he concludes thus: Therefore here was not an otiose or idle permission, but an efficax operation in the selling of Joseph, which is more orthodoxe and consistent with itself, than the former Hypothesis which seems to be contradictory to itself, as hereafter, Chap. 3. §. 2. (2) Some of our Opponents assert, Gods permission of sin to be altogether inefficacious, yea idle and unactive: but others allow it an effi∣cace, and energie for the limiting, directing, and ordering of sin∣ful acts to their proper ends; albeit not about the act itself; which I conceive no better than a modest contradiction: for how can Gods permission limit, direct, and order sinful acts, but by in∣fluencing the very act itself materially considered? See more of this, Chap. 5. §. 6.

5. Our Adversaries also differ greatly among themselves about*the Nature of sin, its formal Reason, &c. Some, and those of no smal repute among our selves, hold sin, as to its formal reason, to be a positive real Being: which indeed is most agreable to their Hypothesis touching acts intrinsecally evil, which they denie to be Page  40 as to their substrate mater or entitative act from God. I must confesse this opinion would carry somewhat of probabilitie with it, if we could with the Manichees hold two first Principes or Causes, one of good, the other of evil; but for us that assert but one first Cause of al create positive Beings, I cannot imagine how any can maintain this Hypothesis of the positivitie of sin, without ma∣king God the Author of sin, or making mans corrupt wil inde∣pendent, and so the first cause of a real positive act. Therefore Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 13. to avoid these black consequences strong∣ly argues, with the Orthodoxe, that the formal reason of sin consistes in privation. But withal we are here to note, that this Hypothe∣sis utterly overthrows his other Hypothesis touching acts intrin∣secally evil, which he denies to be from God as to their substrate mater; of which more hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 5.

There are other points of moment wherein our Antagonists differ among themselves, as wel as from us; namely, touching the natural or moral libertie of the wil, natural impossibilitie and possi∣bilitie, Gods decretive and approbative wil, of which before Chap. 1. And indeed we need no way wonder, that our Adversaries thus differ among themselves, sithat their Hypothesis is liable to so many inconsistences and contradictions: for how is it possible, that they should agree among themselves, when as their principal Hypothesis is so disagreeing from itself? But more of this when we come to the demonstrative part, Chap. 5.

§. 3. We procede now to shew, Wherein we differ from those of*the new method, Strangius, Baronius, Le Blanc, and others, about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin. Immediately on the breaking up of the Synod of Dort, wherein the Antitheses and sen∣timents of the Arminians were so strongly and fully refuted, there sprang up some Divines, who gave their assent and consent to the Canons of the said Synod, but yet contrived a new method, spe∣cially as to universal Grace, Reprobation, and Gods concurse to the sub∣strate mater of sin, in order to a coalition with the Arminian par∣tie, as we shal hereafter demonstrate. And the principal Agent, who undertook the new modelling this last head, was Strangius; which he has copiosely treated of, according to the new method, in his Book, De Voluntate & Actionibus Dei circa peccatum: whose sentiments we are to examine in what follows; but at present we shal only lay down in several Propositions wherein we differ from him, and those who follow his method in the stating Gods Concurse to the mater of sin. We assert,

Page  411. Prop. God has an absolute efficacious Decree about the substrate*mater or entitative act of al sin. This Proposition Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 547. grants to be true in althings but sin; specially the first sin, and such acts as are intrinsecally evil: which sufficiently proves our Proposition; for we say and are ready to demonstrate, that the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed, is not in itself or its natural entitie sinful, but naturally good. What there is of sin annexed to it ariseth from its moral estima∣tion and relation to the Law of God violated thereby: in which regard we peremptorily denie that it is from God. Yea Stran∣gius, lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 569. grants, That God is the cause of the act, though he doth not absolutely predestine or decree the same: and then to that objection of Alvarez, That the Divine preordination and eternal predefinition extendes itself to al those things unto which the cau∣salitie and efficience of God extendes, he replies, That God decrees althings either absolutely or respectively. But this is a very poor Pe∣lagian evasion: for respective or conditional Decrees are every way unbecoming the Divine perfections of God, as our Divines, parti∣cularly Davenant Animadvers: against Hoard, pag. 226. have pro∣ved against the Arminians. Lastly, Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 576. denies, That God decrees al sins, specially the first sin: which we shal in its place endeavor to prove, with the solution of his obje∣ctions against it. Hence,

2. Prop. The Decree of God gives futurition to the substrate mater*or material entitative act whereunto sin is annexed. The Antithesis hereto is defended by Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he affirmes, That it is not repugnant to the nature of God, or of the thing itself, that something be future, which God has not predefined. So c. 9. p. 628. he denies, that God hath decreed al futures, namely the fal of Adam, or the sin against the Holy Ghost. This Proposition is also violently impugned by Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. Hum. par. 1. thes. 55, &c. But specially I can no way approve of what Twisse doth in many places assert, That the Decree of God and his wil is the sole and only cause of the futurition of every event. And he instanceth in the fal of Adam and the Angels. His Arguments against the futuri∣tion of the substrate mater of sin from the Decree of God, we shal examine in what follows, Chap. 5. §. 1.

3. Prop. The permissive Decree of God about sin is not idle but effi∣cacious.* This Proposition is opposed by Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 556. Neither do we grant, what some affirme, that the permissive Decree of Page  42 God, whereby he permits al sin, is efficacious, albeit not effective. For so the fal of Adam and al other sins should procede from the efficace of the Divine Decree: which is an hard saying. Neither is that lesse hard, which some affirme, that God hath absolutely decreed, that men do not more good than what they do, and omit not more evil than what they omit. This Hypothesis is so far from being hard, as that I conceive Strangius's opposite persuasion is most dangerous and destructive of the Divine Decrees, as we shal shew in its place. Yea Strangius himself, in what follows, pag. 557. grants what Lombard, lib. 1. dist. 47. assertes, namely, that the wil of God is always efficacious, &c.

4. Prop. Gods Prescience of things future, and particularly of acts*whereto sin is annexed is founded on his Decrees. Thus Hilarie, de Trin. lib. 9. What God decreed to do, those things he knows in his wil. This sentence of Hilarie Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 576. ownes as orthodox, but yet denies, that the absolute Decree of God is the rea∣son of knowing althings. So Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. par. 1. thes. 3. I see no reason, why we should denie unto God the knowledge of those things which are freely future under a certain condition, albeit in that condition there be not included a decree of predetermining the free cause to this or that. But Scotus and his followers fully espouse our Hypothesis, asserting, That God certainly knows al future contin∣gents, because his Divine Essence, which is the reason of knowing, re∣presentes to the Divine Intellect the thing determinately future from the determination of his own wil. And then as to the prescience of sin, they hold, That albeit God doth not predefine sins as such, yet he predefines the permission of sins, in which he knows them to be future. Which is orthodox, and that which we shal demonstrate here∣after, Chap. 5. §. 2.

5. Prop. It belongs to the Perfection of Gods wil and providence to*predefine and predetermine al the free acts of the wil. This predefini∣tion and predetermination as to gratiose acts Strangius, lib. 2. c. 8. p. 188. and the rest of the new Methodists, excepting Baronius, grant; but they denie it as to the Fal of Adam and other acts in∣trinsecally evil. So Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 568. But if it be said, that God predefined and predetermined that Adam should at that very time eat, abstracting from the object which he did eat of, that can∣not be. Then he gives his reasons, why God could not predefine and predetermine Adam to the act of eating, abstracting it from the reference it has to its object. And then he addes: Moreover Page  43 we denie, that it belongs to the Perfection of God or of Divine Provi∣dence, that he absolutely predefine al free acts, and predetermin the Wil unto them. The Arguments he urgeth for this his Antithesis we shal endeavor to solve, and demonstrate our own hypothesis in its due place, Chap. 6. §. 1.

6. Prop. Gods predefinition of and predetermination to the substrate*mater of sinful Acts destroys not their Libertie. Strangius and his Sectators grant, That Predefinition and Predetermination destroyes not that Libertie which is essential to the Wil, but only that which consistes in Indifference. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 14. p. 681, 682, 683, 685, 686. and c. 16. p. 711. But how frivolous this opinion is, and how unapt to serve the designe for which it was coined, we have already intimated, c. 1. §. 3. and intend more fully to de∣monstrate, Chap. 6. §. 5.

7. Prop. Predefinition in the divine Decree and Predetermination*in time of those entitative Acts whereunto sin is annexed, do not make God the Author of Sin. This is the principal point in controversie, the Antithesis whereof is strongly urged, though weakly de∣fended by our Opponents. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. But I judge it no way consentaneous to the natural sanctitie of God, that he wil and decree sin to be, the vitiositie to exist, and that he predefine such acts, whereunto the vitiositie is necessarily annexed; specially the Fal of the evil Angels and our first Parents, from whence al sins sprang. So c. 5. p. 579. Whether it be said from the permission, or from the Decree of God permitting, or from the action of which God is the cause, that sin is necessarily inferred, truely the necessity of sinning is ascri∣bed to God as the Author; namely because he decreed and caused that from which sin necessarily follows. The like p. 587. Neither hath God predetermined the wil of Adam to the very act of eating the for∣bidden fruit, which yet as to its entitie is reduced to God as the first cause: neither was that act or its vitiositie necessarily inferred from the permission of God. That this Antithesis of Strangius and his Sectators is most false, and our Hypothesis most true, it remains on us to demonstrate, Chap. 5.

Thus we have given the true and ful state of our Controversie; which by reason of the subtile evasions and subterfuges of our Adversaries lies under so much obscuritie and confusion: and in∣deed it is to me a deplorable case, and that which argues mens diffidence of the merits of their cause, that they contend with so much passionate vehemence for their own Phaenomena, and yet Page  44 never explicate the termes, or state the Question in controversie. I have thereby given the Reader as wel as my self the more trouble in this part of our Province, that so what follows may be the more facile both for him and me.

CHAP. III. Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis.

Scriptural Demonstration, (1) That God is the first Cause of al na∣tural Actions and Things, Esa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Psal. 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. (2) That God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed. [1] Joseph's vendition, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. Gen. 50. 20. Acts 7. 9. [2] The Crucifixion of Christ, Mat. 26. 24. Luke 22. 22. John 19. 10, 11. Acts 2. 23. & 4. 28. Our Adversaries Eva∣sions taken off. (3) That God makes use of wicked Instruments to punish his People, Esa. 10. 5, 6. Jer. 16. 16. Psal. 105. 25. Job 1. 21. (4) God's immediate hand in the Act of Sin, 2 Sam. 12. 11. & 16. 22. 2▪ Sam. 16. 10, 11. & 24. 1. 1 Kings 11. 31, 37. & 12. 15, 24. 2 Kings 9. 3. & 10. 30. 1 Kings 22▪ 23. Rev. 17. 17. (5) Gods efficacious permission of Sin, 1 Sam. 2. 25. Job 12. 16, 17, 20. (6) Gods judicial hardening Sin∣ners, Psal. 81. 12. & 69. 22-27. Rom. 11. 10. Esa. 6. 10. & 29. 10. & 19. 11- 14. & 44. 18, 19. & 60. 2. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Thess. 2. 11. The nature of Judicial Induration in six Pro∣positions. (7) Gods ordering Sin for his glorie, Exod. 9. 14-16. Rom. 9. 17, 18. Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 9. 21, 22. 1 Pet. 2. 8.

HAving explicated the termes relating to and given the ge∣nuine state of our Hypothesis, namely, That God doth, by an efficacious power and influence, move and predetermine men to al their natural actions, even such as have sin appendent to them; we now procede to the Demonstration hereof. And because al de∣monstration must be grounded on some first principes, which give evidence, firmitude and force thereto; and there are no proper principes of Faith and Theologie, but what are originally Page  45 in the Scriptures, we are therefore to begin our Demonstration* with Scriptural Arguments, which we shal reduce to these seven heads. (1) Such Scriptures wherein it is universally affirmed, that God is the first Cause of al natural actions and things, and more par∣ticularly of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. (2) Such Scriptures as directly demonstrate, That God doth predefine, prede∣termine, and foreordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessa∣rily annexed. (3) Such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his People, in such a way wherein they could not but contract guilt. (4) Such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those acts whereunto sin is ap∣pendent. (5) Such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious permission of some to sin. (6) Such Scriptures as demonstrate Gods giving up some to judicial Occecation and Obduration. (7) Such as clearly evince Gods ordering and disposing the Sins of men for his own Glo∣rie.

§. 1. We shal begin our Scriptural Demonstration with such* Texts as universally affirme, That God is the first cause of al natu∣ral Actions and Things; and more particularly, of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. 1. The Scriptures that speak God to be the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things, are many and great: we shal mention some; as, Esa. 26. 12. Thou hast wrought al our*works in us, or for us. This Text is urged by Strangius, p. 54. to prove Gods immediate concurse to al actions of the creature, though it doth in a more peculiar manner regard the deliverance of the Church; wherein God predetermines and over-rules ma∣ny actions of wicked men, which have much sin annexed to them. Again, this universal prime Causalitie of God efficaciously influ∣encing al natural Acts and Effects is apparently expressed Rom.* 11. 36. For of him, and through him, and to him are althings. Of him, as he frames althings; By him, as he operates in and coope∣rates with althings; and for him, as the final cause of althings. Thus Gods 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, multiforme energie, as Cyril stiles it, reacheth al manner of Natural actions and effects: and if so, then surely such natural entitative Actions as have sin annexed to them. Is there any sin so intrinsecally evil, which has not some entitative act or subject as the substrate mater thereof? And if althings are of God, and by him, and for him, must not also the entitative act of sins intrinsecally evil be so? Strangius, p. 342. replies thus: Al that God workes must tend to his Glorie: But what Page  46 Glorie redounds to God from those Actions of hatred of God, blasphe∣mie? &c. A strange replie indeed for a Divine to make. (1) Was there not much Hatred of God, and Blasphemie in the cruci∣fying of Christ? And yet was there any action more conducing to the glorie of God than this? Yea, (2) Doth not Strangius himself, and those of his partie grant, that God directs, disposeth, and over-rules al sinful acts, even such as are intrinsecally evil, so as that they conduce to his glorie? And how can God direct, dispose, and over-rule them, unless he concur, yea predetermine the Wil to the entitative act? Again Strangius, p. 561. answers to this Text thus: None that is orthodoxe ever extended these words to sins; as if sins were of God, by God, and for him, &c. [1] Nei∣ther do we extend these words to sins formally considered: [2] But must we thence necessarily conclude, that the entita∣tive act, whereto sin is only accidentally appendent, is not from God, nor by him, nor for him? Yea, [3] May we not say with Divines, that sin formally considered, although it be not of God and by him as an Efficient, yet it is for him, i. e. conducing to his Glorie, as wisely ordered and over-ruled contrary to the intent of the sinner? Thus much Augustin once and again inculcates, as De Genes. ad liter. lib. Imperfecto, cap. 5. *For God is not the Author of our sins, yet he is the Ordinator of them, &c. And thus much indeed Strangius, p. 860. confesseth.

Another Text that evidently and invincibly demonstrates Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to al natural as wel as su∣pernatural Actions and Effects is, Ephes. 1. 11. Who worketh al∣things*after the counsel of his own wil. We find three particulars in this Texte which greatly conduce to explicate and demon∣strate Gods efficacious Concurse to al Actions, and particularly to the substrate mater of sinful acts. (1) We may consider the object, althings, i. e. whatever is clothed with the Notion and Idea of real positive entitie: althings must be here taken distri∣butively into al singulars: there is no Being, that partakes of real entitie but is wrought by God. (2) Here is to be consi∣dered, the Act, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, who worketh energetically, or effica∣ciously: for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies to work with an invincible efficace; and thence it is oft joined with words denoting infinite power and activitie, as before, c. 1. §. 6. It notes here Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse, working in and with althings, ac∣cording to their natural propensions. Thence (3) follows the Page  47 original principe of this predeterminative efficacious operation, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, according to the counsel of his own wil. Which notes, that Gods efficacious predeterminative wil is the supreme and first cause of althings: there is no execu∣tive power in God distinct from his Wil: his Concurse in regard of its active attingence is no more than his simple volition: so that divine Predetermination is the same with divine Predefi∣nition, as we have largely demonstrated, Court Gent. P. 4. c. 7. §. 3. Whence also it follows, that Gods working althings according to the counsel of his wil, has one and the same Idea with his pre∣determining al actions and effects, even such as have sin appen∣dent to them. Strangius, p. 560. replies to the Argument drawen from this Text thus: From this place nothing more can be collected, than that God has decreed those things that he worketh: as it is cer∣tain, that God hath decreed nothing which he doth not execute—not that God worketh sins, &c. [1] This Text speaks more than what Strangius allows it to speake, namely, that God has not only decreed those things that he worketh, but also that he works by his Decree, or omnipotent Volition: for we owne no other executive power in God but his divine Wil, as Scotus, Bradwardine, and some of the greatest Scholastic Theologues de∣monstrate. [2] Who saith, that God worketh Sins? surely none but Marcion or Manes, or such as hold Sin to be a posi∣tive real Being. [3] But yet we do with the Orthodoxe af∣firme and prove from this Scripture, that God worketh that en∣titative natural Act, whereunto sin is appendent: for otherwise, how can he be said to worke althings? Is this good sense or Logic, to say, God workes althings, not only according to their generic or specific distribution, but also according to their di∣stribution into each singular, (for so the Syncategoreme Al is here taken) but yet he worketh not al singular entities, namely the substrate mater of Sin? Doth this amount to less than a down-right contradiction? He workes althings, but yet doth not worke althings? What Logic or wit of man can reconcile these Notions?

2. Unto our first Head we may also reduce such Scriptures, as in a more particular manner mention Gods efficacious predeter∣minative concurse to al human actions and effects, even such as are most contingent and dependent on the ambulatory wil of man. Thus Psal. 33. 15. He fashioneth their hearts alike: he con∣sidereth*Page  48 al their works, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, who fashioneth, formeth, frameth, as the Potter doth his clay: it notes not only, yea not so much the first Creation of the human Soul, as its actual figments, frames, ima∣ginations and thoughts: this is evident from the scope and contex∣ture of the words: for what is the Psalmists intent and under∣takement, but to demonstrate Gods infinite prescience, and its perfect comprehension of al the figments, frames, thoughts, in∣tentions, and affections of the heart, as vers. 13, 14? And how doth he prove this? Why, because he fashioneth their hearts alike, i. e. puts al the first thoughts, inclinations, intentions and move∣ments of the heart into what forme, frame, or fashion he plea∣seth. There is also a great Emphase and significance in that terme 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which we render alike, but may be as properly rendred together, as it is by the Latine simul; neither is it to be referred to the Verbe frameth, but to the object Hearts: and so it notes an universalitie distributive into al singulars, without the least ex∣ception of any. And then the sense wil be; who fashioneth, form∣eth, or frameth the hearts of al mankind in al their very first moti∣ons, conceptions, imaginations, resolutions, end, interests, con∣trivements, ebullitions, affections, prosecutions, and fruitions, or other actions whatsoever. Whence he addes, He considereth al their works: what works doth he mean? Surely not only the works and labors of mens hands, but also the workings, movements, and figments of their hearts: and how can God consider them, if he did not forme, frame and fashion them? Yea, there yet lies a deeper notion in the coherence of these parts; namely, that Gods forming, framing and fashioning the hearts of al men is the ground and cause of his considering their works: For how God can perfectly consider and know the works of mens hearts, unlesse he be the former, framer, and fashioner of them al, as to their real entitative acts, al the wit of man can never devise or make clear unto us. So that Gods Science of Vision, or Prescience as to the figments of mans heart ariseth from this, that God is the framer, former, and fashioner of mens hearts and al their natural move∣ments; which also implies his predefinition and predetermina∣tion of mans heart and al its first motions, inclinations, and affe∣ctions. So then to forme and sum up our Argument from this Text: Doth God indeed fashion, forme and frame the hearts of al men in al their natural motions, imaginations, and affections? And may we without apparent contradiction to the light of this Page  49 Text exclude the entitative acts of any sins, though never so intrinsecally evil? What is this but to exclude the far greatest part of human acts from being formed and framed by God? Or how can the omniscient God consider al the works of mens hearts, if he be not the former and fashioner of them al, as to their natural entitie? I must confesse the validitie of this argu∣ment from Gods prescience is to me so firme and great, as that should it be baffled, I see no way left, but to turne Socinian, and so to denie the certaintie of Gods prescience as to the contingent ima∣ginations of mans heart, which implies much Atheisme.

Another Text that proves Gods efficacious and predetermina∣tive Concurse as to al human acts is Prov. 21. 1. The Kings heart is*in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water; he turneth it whither∣soever he wil. (1) He mentions the Kings heart, as the measure of al other mens; because Kings generally have a greater Soverain∣tie and Dominion over their own hearts, than other men: if any mens hearts may plead the privilege of exemtion from Gods effi∣cacious predeterminative Concurse, surely Kings may, specially such as Solomon was, who obtained from God such an amplitude of Soul, and self-Dominion: yet he grants, that the Kings heart was not exemted therefrom. (2) By the Heart we must under∣stand, according to the Hebraic mode, the whole soul, and al its movements, imaginations, ratiocinations, contrivements, pur∣poses, and undertakements. (3) In the hand of the Lord: i. e. under his efficacious predeterminative influxe or concurse. The Hand being the instrument of our most potent operations, it's usually put in Scripture for the energetic, potent and predeter∣minative Concurse of God: So Hab. 3. 4. He [i. e. Christ whose* brightnesse was as the light] had hornes, [i. e. beams, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 notes] coming out of his hands [i. e. most potent wil, the spring of al his efficacious operations: whence it follows] and there was the hiding of his power, i. e. his most potent efficacious predeterminative con∣curse lay hid in the beams irradiated from his omnipotent hand or wil. So Act. 11. 21. And the hand of the Lord was with them,*i. e. the efficacious predeterminative power of Divine Grace; the hand being the instrument whereby man exertes and puts forth his power. So Solomon saying, That the hearts of Kings are in the hand of God, it must be understood of Gods puissant predetermina∣tive Concurse, whereby he applies the heart to its acts, conduceth and guideth it therein, and determineth it as he pleaseth. So it Page  50 follows, (4) As the rivers of waters, he turneth it whithersoever he wil. How easie is it by Aquaducts to turne waters this or that way as men please? And is it not infinitely more facile for the wise omnipontent God, to turne the hearts of men, and al their natu∣ral conceptions, products, and issues which way he listes? Al this may be evinced from Strangius's glosse on this Text, lib. 1. cap. 9. pag. 50. where having given us the mention of Gods preserving and directing the wils of men even in evil actions, he addes a third and more special mode of Divine influence, whereby God doth bend, impel, and incline human wils which way he please, not by proper compulsion, but by sweet inspiration and motion: For albeit God doth never take away that libertie which is essential to the wil, yet he doth at times, and when he please, efficaciously move and impel the wils of men: and what Solomon predicates of the Kings heart, Prov. 21. 1. that very same may, on a greater account, be affirmed of the heart of every man. So Augustin, de Grat. & Liber. Arbitr. cap. 20. If the Scripture be diligently inspected, it shews, that not only the good wils of men, but even the bad are so in the power of God, that where he wil and when he wil, he causeth them to be inclined, either to performe benefits, or to inflict punishments, by a most secret, yet just judgement. So again August. de Corrept. & Grat. cap. 6. God hath in his power the wils of men, more than they themselves; without dout having most om∣nipotent power to incline mens hearts where he pleaseth. What could be said more categorically and positively to evince Gods effica∣cious and predeterminative Concurse to al the natural products and issues of mans heart, even such as have intrinsecal evil, as they cal it, appendent to them? Yea, Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 182. grants,

That God doth sometimes efficaciously move and pre∣determine the wils of men not only to supernatural workes, but also to natural and civil, as oft as it seems good to him, to per∣forme certain ends which he has preordained.
So Prov. 16. 7. He maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him. And how so? Surely by over-ruling their hearts even in the sinful movements. Thus he bent and determined the revengeful mind of Esau to em∣brace his brother, Gen. 33. So he gained the hearts of the Egy∣ptians towards the Israelities, Exod. 11. 2, 3. & 12. 35, 36. Thus God determined the wil of Cyrus to bring back the Captivitie of the Jews, 2 Chron. 36. 22. Ezra 1. 1. Thus God bent the mind of Darius and Artaxerxes to grant the Jews libertie for the re∣building the Temple, Ezra 6. 1, &c. & 7. 2. Neh. 2. 4. So God Page  51 dealt with Jeremy's enemies, Jer. 15. 11. Al these predetermi∣nations even in civil and natural actions are allowed by Stran∣gius: whence we argue, That it is impossible, but that God should predetermine to the substrate mater of sinful actions: for al these actions being exerted by wicked men, had nothing of moral or supernatural good in them, albeit God made use of them for the succour of his people, yea they were ful of hatred against God.

To these Scriptures we may adde, Act. 17. 28. For in him we*live, and move, and have our being. Not only Being in general, and Life, which implies more than simple being, but also al our move∣ments or motions are from God as the prime Motor: which Paul demonstrates out of one of their own Poets: for we are also his off∣spring. As if he had said: Do not your own Poets tel you, that we are the off-spring of God? Is he not then the first Cause and Mo∣tor of al our motions? Doth not Aristotle, Phys. 8. also strongly demonstrate, That al our natural motions must arise from one first immobile Motor? And to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God? Must not then the substrate mater of al sinful motions, even such as are intrinsecally evil, be reduced unto God as the prime Motor?

I shal conclude this first Head of scriptural Arguments with Jam. 4. 15. For that ye ought to say, If the Lord wil, we shal live,*and do this or that. There were a number of Free-willers, who proudly conceited, that they had an absolute and plenary domi∣nion over their own wils and actions; whom James rebukes, and tels them, they ought to say, If the Lord wil, &c. So that he plainly resolves al the acts of mans wil into the wil of God, as the original Cause and Principe. But let us see how poorly Strangius shifts off the force of this Argument, lib. 2. cap. 10. pag. 227. he saith, Who ever understood these words, if God wil, i. e. if God prede∣termine my wil to do this or that? Then he addes his own glosse: But truly nothing more can be understood by that condition, IF GOD WIL, than this, if God shal permit, or wil permit, as it is elsewhere expli∣cated, Act. 16. 7. & 1 Cor. 16. 7. I must confesse I cannot but won∣der, that a person of so great reason, and under so many advan∣tages and assistances from Divine Revelation, should satisfie him∣self with so slender an evasion, which not only Reason and Scri∣pture, but even Pagan Philosophemes contradict. For (1) it is most evident, that James here, (as Luke, Act. 16. 7. and Paul, 1 Cor. 16. 7.) speakes not of a mere permissive wil, but of an effi∣cacious Page  52 influential concurse, arising from the wil of God, which is the alone principe and spring of Divine concurse: for al actions both natural, civil, and supernatural must be resolved into the wil of God, as their prime cause: so that If God wil here, is the same with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 elsewhere, if God concur, if he assiste, if he by his effi∣cacious predeterminative wil, without which we can do nothing, concur. And that this is the genuine mind of this Text is most evident by the use of this phrase among the Ancients both Jews and Pagans. Bensyra, that ancient Hebrew, Sent. moral. xi. thus speakes: Let man never say he wil do any thing, before he hath pre∣faced this, If the Lord wil, i. e. assiste or concur, not permit. So among Pagans, Hom. Iliad. B. vers. 28. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. The like Demosth. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, If God wil. But none speakes more fully to this point than Plato, Alcibiad. pag. 135. where Alcibiades demanding, How he ought to speak touching Di∣vine*efficacious concurse, Socrates replies, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, If God wil: and in his Laches: But I wil do this and come to thee to morrow, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, If God wil. Whence it's evident, that this for∣mule of speech was ordinary even among the Heathens, as wel as Jews and Christians, noting not only a permissive or Directory, but Decretory and predeterminative wil. So the same Phrase must be understood, Act. 18. 21. If God wil, and 1 Cor. 4. 19. If*the Lord wil. Is it possible that these Phrases should be understood of a mere permissive wil? Do not al mankind need an efficacious concurse and predeterminative wil to conduct them in al their affaires? Again, (2) Gods permissive wil is either natural or moral: it cannot be meant of Gods natural permissive wil, be∣cause that regardes only sin, which there is no mention of in these Textes, neither is it necessarily included. Neither can it be meant of Gods moral permissive wil, because that was already declared and manifest in the Laws of God: for al moral permission be∣longs to Gods Legislative wil declared in his word. It remains therefore that this phrase, If God wil, be understood of Gods effi∣cacious wil, whereby al natural motions and so the entitative acts of sin are predetermined.

§. 2. I now descend to the Second Head of Scriptural Demon∣strations,* namely, That God doth predefine, predetermine, and fore∣ordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed. I shal mention only two Actions, The Selling of Joseph, and the Cru∣cifixion of our Lord, whereof the former was but a Type of the Page  53 later. 1. I shal begin with the Selling of Joseph, mentioned Gen.* 45. 5, 7, 8. Joseph saith v. 5. Now therefore be not grieved, nor angry with your selves, that ye sold me hither: for God did send me be∣fore you to preservelife. Joseph here has a double aspect on his Bro∣thers sin; the one regards their hand in the sin, which he, out of a noble generous principe of fraternal Love, passeth by; the other regards the special hand of Divine Providence in this their Sin, which he admires and adores, in that it by an efficacious predeterminative Concurse brought so great a good out of so great an evil; which no finite power could do: men may make good use of what is in it self good, but who can bring so great good out of so great evil, but a God omniscient and omnipo∣tent? (1) Let us remarque their Sin in selling Joseph, and of what a black Idea it was. [1] It sprang from Hatred, yea a deliberate rooted hatred, as Gen. 37. 4. They hated him, and could not speak peaceably unto him. Their hatred was grounded on his fathers love to him. Yea, [2] There was much Envy and Indignation joined with their hatred, as v. 8. Shalt thou indeed reign over us? &c. whence v. 11. and his brethren envied him, &c. [3] There was in like manner bloudy Cruelty, yea intended Murther in this sin, as v. 20, 21, 22, 24. [4] There was also notorious Lying evident in this sin, v. 32, 33. [5] That this sin was of a very crimson bloudy guilt is evident by their own Convictions and Confessions, when God began to awaken their Consciences, as it is conjectured about fourteen years after, Gen. 42. 22. Behold his bloud is required! [6] By al which it is most evident, that this vendition or selling of Joseph was a sin intrinse∣cally evil. For certainly if a sin of such bloudy Aggravations de∣serve not the name of intrinsecally evil, I know not what sin doth. Hence, (2) We are to demonstrate, that God did predefine and predetermine Josephs Brethren to the entitative act or substrate mater of this Sin. And this Province we no way dout but to make good out of the Texte, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. compared with other Texts. [1] Joseph saith, v. 5. 7. God did send me before you to preserve life. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sent me forth, by his efficacious predeter∣minative hand, which conducted me hither. The LXX. render it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifies, to send forth with a mighty hand, as Captives into Libertie, Luke 4. 18. also, to send forth with com∣mands, autoritie and power, Mat. 10. 16. & 11. 10. as elsewhere: again, to send forth executioners, Mat. 2. 16. lastly, to direct the course of a Ship. In al these notions Gods efficacious predetermi∣native Page  54 concurse in sending Joseph into Egypt, is necessarily inclu∣ded. This also appears [2] by what is added v. 5. God did send me before you to preserve life. Note here, that God certainly and absolutely foresaw the Famine and Josephs being sold into Egypt, which he intended to turne for good, even for the preservation of Jacobs Familie and the Elect seed in him. Now how could God foresee this absolutely and infallibly, but in the predefini∣tion or fore ordainment of his own Wil? And Strangius grants this, that where there is Predefinition, there also follows Predetermi∣nation: Must we not then conclude, that this Vendition of Jo∣seph was both predefined and predetermined by God? Yea, [3] Joseph addes v. 8. So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God, &c. You see here Joseph makes a three-fold mention of Gods over-ruling hand in this their sin, and that for their as wel as his good: And he tels them plainly, that it was not they that sent him, but God. As if he had said, You indeed sent me to be a poor Vassal in Egypt; but did not God send me to be a Ru∣ler over Egypt? You sent me to destroy me, but why did God send me, but to preserve both you and me? You sent me out of Hatred and Malice; but did not God send me out of great Love and pitie both to me and you? And what could be spoken more emphatically to illustrate and demonstrate Gods efficaci∣ous predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin than this, It was not you that sent me hither, but God? Why doth he use this manner of speech? was it not they that sold him? Yes; but because they were but as mere passive Instruments or Mid∣wifes to bring forth that great predeterminative Decree, and to subserve Divine Providence in the ushering into Egypt Joseph their temporal Savior, and the Type of our Eternal Savior, therefore the entitative action is wholly taken off from them, (albeit the moral vitiositie of it is imputable to none but them) and ascribed unto God, as the principal Agent. This manner of speech is Hebraic, and must be understood, (1) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it was not you, i. e. not only you: you were but the Instruments of Divine Gu∣bernation and Predetermination. (2) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, emphatically, it was not you, i. e. if we consider the act of selling me in its na∣tural entitative Idea, as the substrate mater of Divine Providence, ye had the least hand in it, it was not you, but God that sent me hither. We find the like Hebraisme, 1 Sam. 8. 7. Not thee but me, i. e. principally and comparatively. So that it's most evident Page  55 that Joseph ascribeth the whole Act considered entitatively and naturally unto Gods efficacious predeterminative and principal concurse and conduct, whereof they were but the Instruments; albeit, if we consider the act morally, as to its obliquitie, so it* was wholly theirs, not Gods: it is not his brethrens sin morally considered, but the entitative act that he refers to God. [4] That this is the genuine mind of Josephs words is evident from other Scriptures. So Gen. 50. 20. But as for you, ye thought evil against me, but God meant it for good, &c. Here we have their moral evil separated from Gods natural and moral good in and by the Ven∣dition of Joseph. Their Act proceding from hatred, envy, and attended with Murder, was intrinsecally evil, and designed no∣thing but evil against Joseph: but the same Act considered phy∣sically and entitatively as proceding from the efficacious prede∣terminative conduct of God, was naturally good; and as it tend∣ed to the designed exaltation of Joseph, and rendered him a tem∣poral and typical Savior of Israel, so it was morally good. The aggravation of their Sin, and efficace of Gods predeterminative Concurse may be both greatly illustrated by an inspection into the native import of the Hebraic 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, used here to note their malitiose plotted evil, and Gods plotted predeterminative con∣curse in and about the same act. (1) He saith, Ye thought evil against me,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ye plotted, contrived evil against me. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 properly signifies to excogitate, deliberate, consult, compute, calcu∣late, contrive, reason. It is oft used to signifie plotted, inachinated evil, as Psal. 10. 2. The same word is used to note Gods deter∣minate counsel and wil about the entitative act of their Sin; but God meant it unto Good,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. from al Eternitie con∣trived and predetermined it for good. Their plotted contrived evil, was counter-plotted and contrived by God for good: Which notes that it was not a thing casual or accidental, but fore-ordained and predetermined by God, according to the de∣terminate counsel of his wil. The like may be deduced from Stephens words, Act. 7. 9. And the Patriarchs moved with envy,*sold Joseph into Egypt; but God was with him. Here we have their Moral evil aggravated from its original Spring, and Gods natu∣ral and moral good in the same Act. How was God with him? Not only in his passive Vendition, or passing into Egypt and con∣tinuance there, as some would perswade us; but also in the very Active Vendition, or act of selling him to the Ishmaelites, consi∣dered Page  56 naturally and entitatively: for God was with Joseph in causing the Ishmaelites to pass by at that very time, in determin∣ing his brethrens wils to take him out of the pit and sell him to the Ishmaelites, and inclining or determining these to accept the bargain. In sum, God was with Joseph by an efficacious predeter∣minative conduct, determining every circumstance of this Ven∣dition naturally considered.

I am not ignorant what Responses or Answers are framed by* the Jesuites, Arminians, and New Methodists against our Argu∣ment deduced from this Vendition of Joseph: Molina, (the Head of the Jesuites as to their Pelagian Dogmes) de Concord. q. 19. Disp. 2. tels us, that this Vendition of Joseph is ascribed to God, as merely permitting it. The like Ruiz, de Volunt. disp. 18. Sect. 2. and Lessius, de Efficac. Grat. Sect. 2. and others. Arminius, de Efficac. Provid. Disput. 11, 12. over and above this mere Per∣mission of the Jesuites, addes Gods oblation, direction, and deter∣mination of Arguments and Occasions, yea some kind of concurse in this Vendition of Joseph, &c. But al these frivolous subterfuges to avoid the force of this Text are incomparably wel blowen off by Rutherford, de Divina Provident. c. 16. p. 192, &c. I shal there∣fore only give the solution of such as have been coined since by the New Methodists, which indeed are much the same with those of the Jesuites and Arminians. A Divine of name among us, gives this replie to our Argument, That the Venditio activa, the active Vendition of Joseph was not willed by God, but only passiva, the passive, or effect and consequents; which are only mentioned in the Text. I must confess this answer gives me some amazement, but no difficultie to answer it. For, (1) What this Reverend Author means by his passive Vendition I cannot divine: I know that in the Aristotelean Scholes Action and Passion have been really distinguished and so distributed into two distinct Predica∣ments; but I think this imaginary distinction is now generally hiss'd out of the Scholes by al awakened Disputants; yea, how many of those, who are zelose Sectators of Aristotle in other points, have subscribed the banishment of this distinction? So that to distinguish active Vendition from passive, what is it but to distinguish one and the same Act from it self? But (2) grant there be such a distinction in Nature, yet is it not most apparent, that it can have no place here? Doth not Joseph ascribe the very active Vendition or action of Selling him, unto God? Is it not Page  57 said v. 8. So now, it was not you that sent me hither, but God? Can this, with any tolerable sense be applied to the passive Vendition, or the effects and consequents of the selling Joseph? Must it not necessarily be understood of the very same active Vendition, which, considered in its natural entitative act, they were the In∣struments of, but God the principal Agent and Conductor? (3) This Distinction of Active and Passive Vendition was not indeed forged by the Reverend Author before mentioned, but taken up from Bellarmine, who de Amiss. Grat. l. 12. c. 11. di∣stinguisheth the Action of selling Joseph and crucifying Christ from the Passion, and grants, that God willed and decreed the Passion, but not the Action, which inferred the Passion; and because the said Author has so great an estime for Strangius, whom he generally follows in this point, I shal give him the answer which Stran∣gius, l. 4. c. 11. p. 772. gives to this distinction of Bellarmine, thus:

However it be, in the Text there are two things to be observed, [1] That Joseph there cannot distinguish the Action from the Passion, as if the Passion were to be ascribed to God, not the Action: for it's plainly said and repeted in the Text, according to the Hebraic veritie, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. that God sent him. [2] Thence c. 50. 20. he doth plainly distinguish between the good work of God and their evil in the same mater, from the diversitie of the Intention: You designed evil against me, but God designed that for good
Then he addes:
Here the various operation and pro∣vident administration of God is seen, that he might bring to pass what he had presignified before by the dreams of Joseph, &c.
And p. 773. he subjoins:
There is no incommoditie if it be said, that God elected and also procured the Vendition of Joseph as a means to the end fore-ordained by him, and that may be un∣derstood not only of passive Vendition, but also of active, which truely can never be separated. For if God willed that Joseph be sold, he willed, that some one should sel him, and that no other should sel him but his brethren. For neither was that Ven∣dition a thing in it self evil, if it be considered apart from the vitiositie and defect of the second Causes. Then he concludes: The Permission of God here was not otiose, but an efficacious operation in the tradition of Joseph, subministration of occasi∣ons, out of the concurse which he made both by the direction of al circumstances, and moderation of the wil of his brethren, that their purpose of killing him being changed, they might Page  58 do no other than what God intended. And the same efficace and force of Divine providence shines brightly in working, dis∣posing, and directing al other things that relate to this Historie.
This Answer of Strangius to Bellarmine I have been the more pro∣lixe in reciting, (1) because the fore-mentioned Divine of so much repute among us makes great use of this distinction touch∣ing active and passive vendition or crucifixion, endeavoring thereby to solve al our Arguments from the vendition of Joseph and cruci∣fixion of Christ; whereas Strangius, one of his own partie, re∣jectes it as spurious and frivolous. (2) Because the concessions of Strangius in this his Answer to Bellarmine do indeed give a mortal wound to his own cause: For if the active vendition of Joseph was from Gods efficacious providence and wil decreeing the same, then actions intrinsecally evil are as to their entitative act or substrate mater naturally considered from God, albeit their moral vitiositie is to be ascribed to no one but the sinner.

2. I now passe on to demonstrate, That God doth predefine, or* foreordain and predetermine such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed, from the Crucifixion of Christ. And the Textes that confirme this part of our demonstration are so great and illustrious, that I cannot but greatly wonder how any Chri∣stian, that assentes to the veracitie and authoritie of Scripture, can evade the evidence thereof, or dissent from our Hypothesis. (1) I shal take the Scriptures as they lie in order, and begin with Mat.* 26. 24. The Son of man goeth, as it is written of him; but wo unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed. [1] Note here that Christs death was infallibly predicted or foretold: so much, as it is written of him, necessarily infers. Now how could the death of Christ be infallibly predicted, if it were not predefined and preor∣dained by God? Yea, if the death of Christ were not necessarily predefined and preordained by God, how could God infallibly foreknow the salvation of any one elect soul, which necessarily dependes on the death of Christ? So that it remains most cer∣tain, that the death of Christ was predefined and foreordained by God, and that in every the least circumstance thereof: the whole series of intentions and actions in Judas's betraying his Lord, and the Jews malitiose and bloudy crucifying of him was predefined and preordained by God. [2] Hence also it follows, that al the bloudy contrivements, barbarous and cruel executions, with al the particular circumstances in the betraying and crucifying of Page  59 Christ were predetermined by God. Thus much reason strongly evinceth, and Strangius with others grant, that eternal predefini∣tion or predestination, and predetermination in time are parallel and commensurate each to other: whatever is eternally prede∣fined or preordained by God is predetermined by him in time. Indeed if we wil take the true Idea of Divine Predetermination, what is it but the eternal act of the Divine wil, whereby God pre∣defined or preordained al persons, actions, and effects to existe in such or such a period of time? So that, to speake truth, prede∣finition and predetermination differ not really and originally as to their active principe; albeit we may, out of compliance with the Scholes, put this difference between them, by understanding Predefinition, Preordination, or Predestination of the eternal active Decree of God, and Predetermination of the execution of the De∣cree, or its passive Attingence in regard of the effect. But take predetermination in what sense you please, it must necessarily be applied to the Crucifixion of Christ and al the most minute cir∣cumstances thereof. And so much indeed is implied in those words, The Son of man goeth,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Where? or to what? Surely to die, and how? without al peradventure, as efficaciously conducted, moved, yea predetermined by the Divine wil. There was not the least step he took to the Crosse, the least intention, action, or circumstance in the whole complexe or systeme of Christs Crucifixion, as wel active as passive, but was predetermi∣ned by God. But [3] note also hence, that this Crucifixion of Christ, although it were predefined and predetermined by God, yet this Divine predefinition and predetermination did not at al diminish the guilt of those bloudy instruments, who had their hands embrued in that immaculate blood. This is particularly specified in those words: but wo unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed. Judas neither did nor could justly plead Divine preordination or predetermination, as an excuse for his treache∣rie. No, his own conscience told him, that he had voluntarily, yea malitiosely betrayed innocent bloud: neither could the Jews plead the same, in as much as their own malitiose and bloudy wils were as deeply engaged in this Crucifixion, as if there had been no predetermination, which doth no way diminish the li∣bertie of the wil. Hence, [4] it is most evident, that this Cru∣cifixion of our Lord was a sin intrinsecally evil. For was there not a world of enmitie and hatred of God in it? Did there not Page  60 much blasphemie attend their wicked deeds? Is not the shedding innocent bloud, yea the bloud of God, as it is stiled, Act. 20. 28. a sin intrinsecally evil? And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate, that the substrate mater of an act intrinsecally evil is predefined and predetermined by God?

(2) Another Texte that evidently demonstrates the Crucifixi∣on of Christ to be predefined and predetermined by God, is Luke 22.* 22. And truly the Son of man goeth, as it was determined; but wo unto that man by whom he is betrayed. This Text is the same, and refers to the same passage with that before of Matthew, yet with this difference; Matthew saith, As it is written of him; but Luke, As it was determined; which puts it out of al dout, that Christs crucifixion was determined or predetermined by God. And for the more ful explication and demonstration hereof, we are to re∣marque, that Luke being a Physician, was most intimely versed in the Greek Tongue: for a Physician in those days was of little re∣pute, if not wel acquainted with the Grecanic Monuments rela∣ting to medicine. And thence we find, even by the confession of some Atheistic spirits, that Lukes Greek both in this his Evangel, as also in the Acts of the Apostles, is most pure, elegant, and significant. And among other this notion here used gives us a specimen of his accurate skil in the Greek. For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here is a philosophic notion, of much use among the Grecians to signi∣fie that which is defined, determined, predetermined, predestinated, de∣creed, constituted, and ordained by an unalterable Decree, as we have more copiosely demonstrated from the genuine import of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, cap. 1. §. 6. Of determinative Concurse. And that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here may be properly rendred predetermined, is evident from the use of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Act. 4. 28. To do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsel*determined before to be done. Where it is in the Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, predetermined. And indeed Determination and Predetermination as to the Divine concurse admit not so much as any mental distin∣ction, according to the confession of some Adversaries. The Sy∣riac, Luk. 22. 22. renders it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it is defined.〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the O. T. signifies to expand, to make clear, to explicate more fully and clearly by the distribution of al parts, &c. Whence it is rendred by the LXX. Ezech. 37. 12 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to separate: and Num. 15. 34▪ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to decree: which sense agrees with the mind of our Lord, Luk. 22. 22. So that it is most evident, that this notion 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here considered in itself, and in al its synonymies, notes the Page  61 Crucifixion of Christ in al its circumstances both active and pas∣sive, to be determined, predetermined, and foreordained by God. Yea, we have for this a great concession of Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 13. pag. 665. But that the workes of Christ, specially his Passion and vo∣luntary death were absolutely predetermined by God is manifest from Scripture, Luk. 22. 22. Act. 2. 23. & 4. 28. Whence I argue, that if the death and crucifixion of Christ were absolutely prede∣termined by God, then the substrate mater of a sinful act, yea of an act intrinsecally evil was absolutely predetermined by God. How poor and evanid the evasions of Strangius and others are as to this Text we shal examine and lay open when we have explica∣ted the following Texts, which demonstrate the same.

(3) I passe on to the Conference between Pilate and our Lord, Joh. 19. 10. Then saith Pilate unto him, Knowest thou not, that I*have power to crucifie thee, and have power to release thee? Pilate ha∣ving power of life and death committed to him by Tiberius Cesar, he threatens our Lord therewith: and what replie doth our Lord make? vers. 11. Jesus answered: Thou couldest have no power at al against me, except it were given thee from above: therefore he that hath delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin. We find several particulars here very remarquable for the demonstration of our Hypothesis. [1] Whereas Pilate boasted of his power to crucifie, or release our Lord, he tels him plainly, that he could have no power against him, except it were given him from above. The power that Pilate pretendes unto was legal Autoritie backed with an execu∣tive power committed to him: so much 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 notes: our Lord doth not denie his claim of legal Autoritie, as commissionated by Cesar; but yet confines and restrains the execution thereof to Gods predeterminative Concurse. As if our Lord had said: I grant thy power and autoritie of life and death as Cesars Commis∣sioner and Minister; yet know, thou couldest not execute this thy power on me, unlesse the providential concurrence of my Fa∣ther did efficaciously move and predetermine thee thereto. [2] Observe here the double negative, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which among the Grecians implies a more vehement negation. As if he had said: Alas! thou hast not the least umbrage or shadow of power to execute against me, but what is dispensed forth unto thee by the efficacious predeterminative hand or providential concurse of my Father; whose wise and omnipotent hand has put in every bit∣ter ingredient into the Cup I am to drink of. [3] Neither doth Page  62 al this excuse Judas, the Jews, or Pilate as to their guilt in cruci∣fying the Lord of Glorie: no, Gods predeterminative concurse is so far from excusing these Traitors, as that it aggravates their sin. So it follows: Therefore he that hath delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin. Therefore,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for this very reason, be∣cause my Father hath left that traiterous wretch Judas to be hur∣ried, by his own avaricious lust, into this horrid Treason of be∣traying me, and predetermined thine execution thereof, his guilt is the greater. [4] Lastly, hence also we may argue, that this sin of crucifying our Lord was intrinsecally evil. So much that last clause, hath the greater sin, implies. As if he had said: Oh! what a world of treason, murder, blasphemie, hatred of God and al manner of sin is involved in the wombe of this sin?

(4) We find the predefinition and predetermination of Christs crucifixion more expressely explicated and demonstrated, Act. 2.* 23. Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel, and foreknow∣ledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain. What could more plainly be said for the predefinition and predetermination of our Lords crucifixion, as to its substrate enti∣tative act, and yet for the aggravation of their sin in acting their parts in this bloudy Tragedie? Let us examine the particulars. [1] It's said, he was delivered by the determinate counsel,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 primarily notes counsel with a decree, or a decreed fixed counsel, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉the cast of an arrow, or the like. Whence the formal act of the wil is termed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is but a derivation from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. But Luke, to expresse Peters mind more significantly, addes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by that determinate, defined, firme, immutable, decretive, predeterminative counsel of God, as the word importes, according to our former explication of it, on Luk. 22. 22. whereto this Text seems to answer. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is by Glossaries made synonymous to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to ordain; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to preordain; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to constitute; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to establish; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to predetermine. Among the LXX. it answers to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to termine, determine, predetermine, as Num. 34. 6. Josh. 13. 27. and elsewhere. By which it is most evident, that it is here by Luke used to denote Gods efficacious, absolute, predeterminative counsel and purpose touching the crucifixi∣on of our Lord. [2] Then he addes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and foreknowlege of God. Note here, that Gods foreknowlege or Pre∣science of Christs crucifixion, and so by consequence of the sin an∣nexed thereto, follows the predetermination or determined counselPage  63 of his own wil: God therefore foreknew, because in his deter∣mined counsel he foreordained or decreed the Passion of our Lord. And yet [3] this necessary predefinition and predeter∣mination of Gods wil with his infallible prescience touching the crucifixion of Christ, did no way lessen their sin: for addes Peter, Him ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain. Al∣beit he was predefined and predetermined by God to go (as him∣self declares, Luk. 22. 22.) to the Crosse, yet they, by their wick∣ed bloudy hands, took him as voluntarily, yea with as much bloud∣thirsty greedinesse, as if there had been no predefinition and predetermination of the act by God. Lo! what a plain conci∣liation is here of efficacious predefinition and predeterminative concurse of the substrate mater of sin, with the voluntary and free election of the sinner as to his part in this bloudy Tragedie. [4] Note that phrase, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by wicked hands, i. e. sacrile∣gious, bloudy, God-murdering hands. Which certainly denotes their sin to be of the first magnitude, and intrinsecally evil. And that this Text fully demonstrates the predefinition of Christs Pas∣sion, Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 3. pag. 563. freely acknowlegeth. So lib. 4. cap. 2. pag. 768. he saith, That it is not to be douted, but that the whole humiliation and passion of Christ flowed from the decree and wil of God; and what God from Eternitie decreed, the same he executes and procures in time. But what his replie is to the force of our ar∣gument from this absolute Decree of God we shal examine anon.

(5) I come now to that other parallel Text, which fully de∣monstrates the predefinition and predetermination of Christs cru∣cifixion by God, Act. 4. 28. For to do whatsoever thine hand and thy*counsel determined before to be done. He speaks of the gathering together both of Jews and Gentiles for the crucifying the Son of God, as vers. 26, 27. he saith, They did nothing but what Gods hand and counsel predetermined to be done. [1] By the counsel of God we may here understand his Decretive counsel, or the counsel and purpose of his wil, whereby he predefined and predetermined the crucifixion of our Lord. Thus some terme Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse, quoad attingentiam activam, as to active attingence, which is nothing else but the very wil of God, accord∣ing to his eternal counsel predetermining and foreordaining al future events, as Scotus and others assure us. Thus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 must be understood, Act. 2. 23. as before. Whence [2] by the Hand of Page  64 God, we are to understand his most efficacious and potent execution of his decretive counsel, predetermining the whole substrate mater, or al entitative acts and circumstances in the crucifixion of our Lord, which they terme his predeterminative Concurse, quoad at∣tingentiam passivam, as to passive attingence. For mans hand being the instrument of operation, whereby he puts forth his power and force, it is thence applied to God, to denote his most potent exe∣cution of his Decrees in predetermining and applying al second causes to their act, as before §. 1. of this Chapter. We find a very good glosse hereon in Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 2. pag. 769.

In the other place, saith he, Act. 4. 28. there is mention made not only of the counsel of God, but also of the hand of God; that counsel may be referred to the Decree, and hand to the execution. To decree is presupposed the wise counsel of God, and to execute the power of the Divine right hand. And here truly what God hath decreed in his counsel, he also by his hand hath executed: For in this whole work the hand of God hath appeared, howbeit many wicked hands did concur. So the Hand of God here is opposed to wicked hands, Act. 2. 23. The hand, I say, of God ap∣peared in moderating, ordaining, governing, and directing al the machinations, endeavors, sayings and deeds of his enemies, that they should wil and perfect that very same thing which he wil∣led, though with a far different counsel and purpose, whatever their malice were.
Lo! what a ful testimonie is here? who would not think Strangius orthodox in this point, did he acquiesce here? But there lies a Snake in the grasse: he elsewhere starts off from what he here grants, as hereafter. Only this note, that he here, as elsewhere, strongly impugnes and opposeth that passive crucifixion which Bellarmine and a reverend Divine of repute a∣mong us only ascribe to God: for he expressely saith, That the very act of crucifixion was executed by the hand of God; yea al the machi∣nations, endeavors, sayings, and deeds of Christs enemies, moderated, ordained, governed, directed by the same Divine hand. What could be said more for the predefinition and predetermination of the substrate mater of an act intrinsecally evil? But I passe on to the act of Divine predetermination expressed in the Text before us by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 What the genuine import of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is, we have shewen, Chap. 1. §. 6. In the general it signifies to predefine, pre∣destine, predetermine: it's applied in the N. T. both to persons and things, and these both good and evil. It is here limited and con∣fined Page  65 to Gods predefining, predestining, and predetermining the substrate mater or entitative act of Christs crucifixion, which was a sin of the first magnitude, containing in its pregnant wombe blasphemie, hatred of God, murther, yea God-killing bloud∣guiltinesse. The Syriac turnes it by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to seal, constitute, and make firme any thing. And surely if the blessed God ever sealed, constituted, made firme, or predetermined any thing in the world, it was the crucifixion of his Son, on which the salvation of al his Elect dependes. Augustin renders 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here praedestinavit, he has predestined. So the old Latin renders it, 1 Cor. 2. 7. And Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 582. is herein (as in some other points) very ingenuous and free in confessing,
That Augustin doth use the words to predestine, predefine, determine, constitute, or∣dain, and dispose, indifferently, so as they may be extended to al∣things which God hath decreed.
So that it's clear by his own confession, that the crucifixion of Christ taken actively was pre∣destined, predefined, constituted, foreordained, and predetermined by God. Whence by a paritie of reason we demonstrate our Hypo∣thesis, that the substrate mater or entitative act of that, where∣unto intrinsecal sin is necessarily annexed, is predefined and prede∣termined by God. The inference and conclusion to me is so natu∣ral and evident, that I cannot see how the wit of man can evade it.

But let us examine what subterfuges and evasions our Oppo∣nents* frame to evade the force and evidence this second Head touching Christs Crucifixion gives to our Hypothesis.

1. Bellarmine and from him a reverend Divine of name among* our selves replie, That the passive crucifixion of Christ was from God, not the active: i. e. Christs Passion and the effects of it was from God, but not the actions of those that crucified him. (1) How poor and shiftlesse this shift is we have already demonstrated on the vendition of Joseph from Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. (2) But more parti∣cularly as to this Head, I cannot but wonder how any, who have not quite banished Reason and Religion from their minds, can sa∣tisfie themselves with such jejune notions and evasions: Did not the blessed God predefine and predetermine the very act of Christs crucifixion? how else could he certainly foreknow that he would be crucified? Or what certain prescience could he have of the salvation of any one elect soul, which wholly dependes on the death of Christ? Again, what fine-spun nonsense is this, God Page  66 predetermined the Passion of Christs crucifixion, but not the Acti∣on? as if God predetermined that Christ should be kissed and so betrayed by Judas, but not that Judas should kisse and betray Christ: again, that Christ should be mocked, blasphemed, scourged, &c. by the Souldiers and Jews, but that these should not mock, blaspheme, scourge, &c. Christ. Lastly, that the Spear should be thrust into the side of Christ, but yet not that any thrust it in. What Logic, Reason, or sense is this? Do not the very Aristoteleans grant us, That action and passion are not re∣ally, but only modally distinct? As the way from Athens to Thebes, and so back again from Thebes to Athens, is but one and the same way, diversified only from its relation to different termes; so the same fluxe as it procedes from the Agent is called Action, and as it termines on the patient, Passion. Is it possible then that God should predetermine or concur to the passion and not to the action of crucifixion? But enough of this, which is so strongly refuted by Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 11. pag. 772.

2. Another reverend Divine of estime among us for parts and* pietie evades thus: [Christs crucifixion]

was a thing which Gods hand and counsel had determined before to be done, Act. 4. 28. i. e. foreseeing wicked hands would be promt and ready for this tragic enterprise, his sovereign power and wise counsel concurred with his foreknowledge, so only, and not with lesse latitude, to define or determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie, than to let it procede to this execution. And to deliver him up (not by any formal resignation or surrender, as we wel know, but permitting him) thereunto. Though the same phrase of delivering him, hath elsewhere another notion of assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation for the sins of men, by dying; which was done by mutual agreement between both the parties, &c.
This replie of this learned pious Divine (so far as I can penetrate and understand it, which seems involved under much obscuritie) may be resolved into the following parts. (1) He makes Gods prescience or foreseeing the crucifixion of Christ by wicked hands, to procede or go before the concurrence and determination of Gods wise counsel or predefinition there∣of. Wherein he fals in with the Jesuites middle Science, making Gods prescience precedent to his predefinition or decree, and so dependent only on the mutable wil of men as to the act of sin; which he elsewhere seems to intimate: whereas the Scripture, Page  67 which he refers to, Act. 2. 23. makes the foreknowledge of Christs crucifixion subsequent to the predifinition of his deter∣minate Counsel or Decree. And certainly al the wit of man summed up in one cannot conceive or demonstrate, how God should have a certain prescience of Christs crucifixion, which de∣pendes wholly on the contingent uncertain wil of man, and not on the determinate counsel of his own wil. (2) He makes Gods determinate counsel or hand only to determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie, &c. As if the bounding and limiting of the malignitie, and not the substrate mater or act itself entitatively considered were from God. Whereas the Text saith categori∣cally, That the hand and counsel of God predefined and predetermined whatever those wicked hands of theirs executed. (3) He gives us a new Glosse or Paraphrase on that phrase delivering him, Act. 2. 23. as if it implied only an assigning or appointing him to be a propitia∣tion, &c. But how little this glosse wil accord with the sense of these Texts is evident. For that assigning and appointing him to be a propitiation was immanent and eternal in the Divine De∣crees, but the delivering him here is meant of his being delivered into the hands of those that crucified him, and that according to the determinate counsel of God.

3. We come now to the more plausible subterfuges of Stran∣gius,* whereby he endeavors to evade the evidence of those Texts, which mention Gods predetermining the crucifixion of our Lord. He answers, lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 573. thus:

The occision and cru∣cifixion of Christ, also the kind of death were from God: and as they were from God, they were good and greatly gloriose, and properly the means to procure our salvation: and God is deservedly judged the Cause and Author of them, Who by his determinate counsel and precognition delivered his Son to them, whom with wicked hands they killed on the crosse, Act. 2. 23. Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action: therefore their wickednesse and malice was not from God; neither was it willed or predefined by God, who cannot be said to be the Cause and Author of any sin. There∣fore speaking absolutely, the occision of Christ was not sin; (o∣therwise God should be the Author of sin:) as to kil a man is not sin. And truly if God had commanded men to kil Christ, and they out of conscience to that command had obeyed God, they had not sinned. But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is Page  68 intrinsecally evil, neither can that be any way wel done, or com∣manded by God.

Observe here (1) he grants that the crucifixion of Christ,* with al its natural circumstances entitatively considered were from God, as the God of nature, and so naturally good: yea, that they were morally good and greatly gloriose as means to procure our salvation; and therefore God is deservedly judged the cause and author of them, as Act. 2. 23. And (2) we denie with him, that the wickednesse and malice of those acts was from God. (3) He also grants, That the occision or killing of Christ considered absolutely was not sin. Whereunto we retort, That neither the hatred of Christ considered absolutely without relation to its ob∣ject is sin. But, (4) he concludes: But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is intrinsecally evil, &c. Whence we argue, That the crucifying of Christ was a sin intrinsecally evil, and yet as to its substrate mater and entitative acts from God. For did not the Jews prosecute Christ out of hatred and malice, yea malice blowen up to the sin against the Holy Ghost in some of them? And was not, in this good work of crucifixion, the good action of God, and the evil action of the Jews the same as to the sub∣strate mater or natural entitative act? This pincheth Strangius closely, and therefore he seems to make the natural entitative act of God distinct from the natural entitative act of the wicked Jews: For he saith, Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action; and therefore their wicked∣nesse and malice was not from God. Here we grant, [1] his conse∣quence or conclusion, That their malice was not from God. [2] We thus far also grant his Antecedent, That the good action of God, considered both naturally and morally, was distinguished from their evil action considered formally and morally: for the malice and vitiositie which formalised the action as theirs, is no way im∣putable to Gods act considered either naturally or morally. [3] But yet we stil avouch, and no way dout but to demonstrate in its place, that in the crucifixion of Christ the act of the wicked Jews considered materially, naturally, and entitatively was one and the same with Gods act: So much al these Texts clearly evince; so much also reason dictates: For if there were two acts, the one primarily, yea only from the wicked instruments, the other from God the prime Efficient, then how could they be said to be the instruments of Gods Efficience? Must we not then also suppose Page  69 two Crucifixions, one from God, and the other from the Jews? What a world of absurdities would follow this Hypothesis, That the action of God in the Crucifixion of Christ considered enti∣tatively, materially, and naturally, was really distinct from the action of the Instruments considered entitatively, materially, and naturally? But to conclude, we find an excellent solution to al these evasions and subterfuges in Augustin, Epist. 48. ad Vincen∣tium,* thus: When the Father delivered his Son, and Christ his own Bodie, and Judas his Lord, why in this Tradition is God just and man guilty, but because in one and the same thing which they did, the cause was not one and the same. A solution sufficient to satisfie any sober mind: Wherein note, (1) That the act of Tradi∣tion and so of crucifying Christ, was one and the same entita∣tively and physically considered both in regard of God and the sinner. (2) That the difference sprang from the Causes: God delivered his Son to Death, thereby to bring about the greatest good that Sinners could wisn for, their Salvation; but Judas and the malitiose Jews delivered the Lord of Glorie to death, with wicked hands, out of an avaricious humor, malice, &c. Hence, (3) The Action was most just and gloriose on Gods part, but most unjust and wicked on the Sinners part. This answer of Augustin is so great, that it might serve to answer al the objecti∣ons against our Hypothesis, were not men bent to cavil against the truth.

§. 3. I come now to a third Head of Scriptural Arguments, namely such, wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing or afflicting his people in such a way, wherein the In∣struments could not but contract guilt. I shal divide this Head in∣to two members; (1) Such Scriptures, wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing his sinful people. (2) Such as mention Gods afflicting his righteous People by sinful In∣struments.

1. We shal begin with such Scriptures wherein God is said to*make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his sinful people. So Esa. 10. 5, 6. O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, I will send him against an hypocritical Nation. The Assyrian is sent by God as his rod to punish his sinful people; and every stroke of this rod was* from God; his hand guiding, ordering, and actuating the rod in al its motions. And yet, how much sin was there committed on the Assyrians part in punishing Israel? How little did he in∣tend Page  70 to serve God herein? were not Pride and Ambition the main springs of his action? Thence it's added v. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so, &c. whence v. 12. God threatens to punish him for his sin. So that it's evident, this sending of the Assyrian by God, mentioned v. 6. cannot be meant of any legal permission or commission given him by God, but of the secret efficacious predeterminative concurse and Providence of God, ordering what should come to pass. So Jer. 16. 16. Be∣hold,*I wil send for many fishers, saith the Lord, and they shal fish them, and after wil I send for many hunters, and they shal hunt them from every mountain, &c. Note, (1) That these words con∣tain not a promisse but threat, begun v. 9. This is evident from v. 17. (2) By Fishers and Hunters in the general we must un∣derstand enemies to the Jews. To fish and to hunt, is to take and destroy. War has a great ressemblance with fishing and hunting, which is a kind of war against bestes; as war is a kind of fishing and hunting of men: whence Nimrod the first Warrier after the Floud, is stiled Gen. 10. 9. a mighty hunter, i. e. of men. Ay, but more particularly, (3) Who are these fishers? Why, as it is supposed, the Egyptians, who are called Fishers, Esa. 19. 8. (4) And who are the Hunters? The Babylonians, as it is gene∣rally said: But, (5) Who is it that sends for these Fishers and Hunters? It is God, I wil send, &c. (6) Why doth God send for them? To punish his sinful People, and that by those very Nations in whom they had so much confided, and to whom they had so much conformed, as is intimated v. 17. And what more just, than that Professors should be punished by such Instruments, as have been the ground of their confidence, and the exemplars of their sins? (7) How doth God send for these Fishers and Hunters? Surely, not by any legal Act or formal Commission given to them, but providentially, by exciting their minds, ap∣plying their wils, and drawing forth, yea determining the same to the substrate mater or material entitative act of afflicting the Jews, whereunto there was much malice, murder, and hatred of God and his People annexed. Yea, God did not only send Ne∣buchadnezar to afflict Israel, but also give him a reward for his service; as Jerem. 27. 6. And now have I given al these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezar the King of Babylon, my servant. God gives him the neighbor Nations as a reward for his service against Israel. The like Jer. 43. 10. Multitudes of Texts might be Page  71 added to shew, how God makes use of wicked Instruments in the punishment of his sinful people, and in a providential way efficaciously concurs to and predetermines al their actions ma∣terially and naturally considered, and yet is no way the Cause or Author of their sin.

2. To mention one or two Scriptures, which speak of Gods*using wicked Instruments in afflicting his innocent People. So Job 1. God makes use of the Sabeans, and Caldeans, yea of Satan him∣self, to afflict Job; and yet he saith, v. 21. The Lord taketh away. He saw by faith Gods hand moving, yea predetermining the hearts and hands of his adversaries to every act of theirs ma∣terially*considered, albeit not to the vitiositie. So Psal. 105. 25.*He turned their heart to hate his people, to deal subtilely with his ser∣vants. Here it's said expressely, that God turned, i. e. efficaci∣ously moved and predetermined the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his People Israel. God's turning their hearts doth expressely and formally denote his efficacious predeterminative concurse to the entitative material natural act of hatred, albeit not to the vitiositie and malignitie thereof. So much also the next clause importes, and to deal subtilely with his servants, i. e. al their subtile strategems, machinations, and politic contrivements for the ex∣tirpation of Israel, by putting to death their Males, oppressing them with hard labors, &c. al these were, as to their substrate mater and physic entitative acts from God, who turned their hearts thereto: And what could be more nakedly and evidently said to demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin?

Let us now see what our Opponents replie to these Scriptures and our Arguments drawen thence. Strangius, l. 4. c. 4. p. 791. evades the force of this last Text thus: What is said Psal. 105. 25. that God turned their hearts to hate his people, it must be un∣derstood, that God did it not by perverting the hearts of the Egyp∣tians, but by doing good to his people, whence the Egyptians took oc∣casion of hatred. (1) We say not that God perverted the hearts of the Egyptians; that's the commun odiose consequence which our Adversaries impose on us. But, (2) We avouch, that God did more than give occasion to the Egyptians of hating, by his doing good to his people. Is not this a strange Comment, God turned their heart to hate his people, i. e. gave occasion of hatred, by doing good unto his people? Doth not Gods turning the Page  70 heart in Scripture Phraseologie always import his effica•… pre∣determinative concurse in applying the wil to its act? 〈◊〉 it's said, Prov. 21. 1. God turneth the heart whithersoever he w•…, is it not meant of an efficacious concurse? Do not also the follow∣ing words, Psal. 105. 25. to deal subtilely with his servants, clearly implie an efficacious act of God upon their hearts, predetermining them to their act? Certainly such Comments are very poor eva∣sions to elude such clear Texts. As for the other Texts, Stran∣gius's general answer p. 774, 775. is, That God is the Cause of the act in those sins, but not of the pravitie of the Instruments, &c. And what do we say or desire more? But yet there lies a sting in this very concession of his: for he addes, p. 774. That God hath de∣creed nothing by his Wil of good pleasure, but what he approves as Good. i. e. God hath not absolutely decreed to permit sin, be∣cause he doth not approve of it. Wherein note, [1] How he doth, with the Pelagians and Arminians, confound Gods De∣cretive Wil, with his Approbative complacential Wil. [2] We de∣nie not but God approves of al his own Acts; but the Question is touching objects, Whether God approves of al objects which by his Decretive Wil he decrees to permit? This we peremptorily de∣nie, and no way dout but to make good our denial in its place.

§. 4. Another Head of Arguments, contains such Scriptures as*mention Gods own immediate hand in those Acts whereunto sin is ap∣pendent. We begin with 2 Sam. 12. 11. where God tels David by Nathan, that for his folie committed with Ʋriah's wife, and* murder, Behold, I wil raise up evil against thee out of thine own house, and I wil take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neigh∣bour, &c. This threat we find fulfilled, 2 Sam. 16. 22. And Ab∣salom*went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of al Israel. What could be more plainly and distinctly expressed to demon∣strate Gods immediate concurse to that entitative act of Absa∣lom's Sin? Here Strangius, l. 4. c. 4. p. 789. acknowledgeth, (1) That Absalom's Incest in violating his fathers bed is by God owned as his own Fact. But, (2) then he answers, that this was acknow∣ledged for the reason above-mentioned, namely, by reason of Gods effi∣cacious Gubernation, Moderation, and Direction, which he afforded, according to the modes already explicated, about the sinful Wils of Absalom and Achitophel, and their actions in this wickedness; which fact is related 2 Sam. 16. 20, &c. For this is usual, that the effect, Page  73 which ariseth from two causes, whereof the one is effective, and the other directive, be ascribed to both, but in a different respect, &c. This is the commun answer, which he and his Sectators give to such Scriptures, which speake Gods immediate hand in the enti∣tative acts of sin; let us therefore a little examine the force of this answer.

(1) Take notice, that he allows Gods Gubernation, Moderation and Direction of the Act whereto sin is annexed, but not the pro∣duction of the act. This is evident by the Conclusion, wherein he makes the Sinner to be the effective cause, but God the directive only. But I replie, how can God efficaciously Govern, Moderate, and Direct the Act, unless he be also the effective Cause thereof? Take his own instance, the sinful wils of Absalom and Achitophel, how is it possible, that God should efficaciously govern and direct those immanent acts of their sinful wils, but by influencing their wils, and efficaciously predetermining them to act? If God did, as he grants, efficaciously govern, moderate, and direct their sinful wils in those immanent acts of Lust, certainly he must necessa∣rily produce those acts. (2) Neither wil this answer at al solve the Difficultie: for suppose we grant, that God doth only effi∣caciously govern, moderate, and direct the sinful act, not pro∣duce the entitative mater thereof, yet this efficacious directive in∣fluence doth as much make God the Author of sin, as our effective predeterminative concurse. For Gods efficacious Moderation and Direction of the sinful act, denotes his efficacious Preservation of the act, which is as sinful as the effection or production of the Act. But more of this hereafter, Chap. 5, 6.

Another Scripture which speaks Gods immediate predetermi∣native* concurse in the entitative act of Sin, is 2 Sam. 16. 10. where David saith of Shimei, That the Lord said unto him, Curse David. And v. 11. Let him curse; for the Lord hath bidden him. Now the force of this argument dependes on the explication of this word or command of God to Shimei, which must be here ta∣ken either morally, for a divine precept and injunction, or phy∣sicly for an efficacious Concurse and influence. (1) That it cannot be here taken morally for a preceptive word, is most evi∣dent; because had God commanded Shimei to curse David, he had been the moral cause and so the Author of his sin. (2) There∣fore it remains, that it be here taken only physicly, for Gods efficacious Concurse secretly and powerfully inclining and apply∣ing Page  74Shimei's wil to the entitative act of this cursing. And in this sense the Word of God is frequently taken in Scripture, namely, for his efficacious predeterminative concurse, in the Creation, Conservation, and Gubernation of things.

Now what doth Strangius replie to this? Why, l. 4. c. 4. p. 786. he saith, That Shimei's Cursings being intrinsecally evil, we may not say, that God did move or impel him thereto in a proper manner of speech, neither that Shimei was the Instrument of God in these acti∣ons, as they were determined to such an object; but only as directed by God to his just judgements: and that most certain direction of God, with the administration of Circumstances and Occasions was as a Pre∣cept. In which Response note, (1) That he grants, that Shi∣mei his cursing was an action intrinsecally evil: which is a great concession, and wil clearly overthrow his own Hypothesis, and prove ours, That God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate ma∣ter of actions intrinsecally evil. For if Shimei's Cursing was an acti∣on intrinsecally evil, then surely such also was the Vendition of Joseph and the Crucifixion of our Lord, which were both as to their entitative acts predetermined by God. But (2) he denies, that Shimei was the Instrument of God in these actions, as determined to such an object. In the last clause of this Antithesis lies the spirit and force of al his objections against predetermination to the substrate mater of sin; which we intend more fully to examine Chap. 6. §. 1. at present, we say, [1] That Shimei was not the instrument of any moral but physic influence from God: the pre∣cept or bidding here specified was not moral but physic and real: God did not morally command Shimei to curse David, but phy∣sicly and naturally incline him to the entitative act of Cursing him; which was as a Precept: this Strangius grants in the close as to Gods direction. [2] Hence if we consider Shimei's cursing as physicly determined to such an object, it was not morally evil but good, and so from God: It's true, as it was morally deter∣mined by Shimei the moral Agent to its object David, so it was intrinsecally evil, but as it was physicly or naturally determined by God, for the punishment of David, so it was both naturally and morally good and from God. (3) He placeth the whole of Gods Influence to this act, in directing his Actions to his just judge∣ments, &c. To which I answer. [1] How could God direct these actions of Shimei; specially, the immanent acts of his wil, (which were the worst part of his malediction) but by an effi∣cacious Page  75 predeterminative influence on his wil and its acts? [2] He grants, that this Direction of God was most certain and efficacious: if so, then certainly predeterminative: and if the di∣rection be predeterminative, is not Gods concurse to the sinful act considered materially and entitatively, predeterminative? [3] If Gods directive concurse be predeterminative, as Stran∣gius must by his concessions grant, wil not those ugly consequen∣ces which he lodes our Hypothesis with, be al retorted on him? Did not Gods efficacious direction termine on Shimei's cursing as determined to such an object, namely David? And was he not the Instrument of this efficacious direction?

Baronius, Metaph. S. 8. Disp. 3. p. 158. answers this Text thus: To that malediction of Shimei it is answered, That God commanded Shimei to curse David, not by bending his wil, but by opening to him the way to this evil, and by shutting it to al other evils, i. e. by per∣mitting him to act this only, whenas he was ready for many other evils. A poor evasion indeed, and such as if admitted would make the whole Scripture but as a Nose of Waxe. (1) Doth not David say categoricly, that God bid, [i. e. not morally but physicly] Shimei to curse? And what can this implie, but the bending his wil to the substrate mater, or entitative Act? (2) Can it be imagined, that David could mean only a mere otiose and specu∣lative permission, and not an active concurrence to the act it self entitatively considered? (3) Doth not Baronius confess, that God opened to him the way to this evil? And if so, must he not then open Shimei's heart to the mater of it? Did not the main act of malediction arise from his wil? And if that were not open∣ed to the entitative act, would the way to this evil have been ever opened?

Again, Gods immediate predeterminative hand in those acts, whereunto sin is necessarily appendent, may be demonstrated from 2 Sam. 24. 1. And again the anger of the Lord was kindled*against Israel, and he moved David against them, to say, Go number Israel and Judah. Here it is expressely said, that God moved Da∣vid to number the people. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and he moved or excited, i. e. effi∣caciously determined and applied his wil to the substrate mater of this command to number the people. Hence Strangius, pag. 790. answers, (1) That the He here must be meant of Satan, who is said, 1 Chron. 21. 1. to stir up David to number the people. And he cites for this Comment Junius with others. But alas! what poor Page  76 subterfuges wil men flie unto to avoid the force and evidence of Divine light? Doth not Grammatic construction, as wel as the mind of the words utterly reject such a glosse? The Particle He here is not a distinct Pronoun, as our English Version reads it, but included in the Verbe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which is by the Copulative ו joined to the former part, and the anger of the Lord was kindled: so that if the passive, was kindled, belongs to the Lords anger, then also must what follows, and he moved. Neither is this sense aliene from other Scriptures: for 1 Sam. 26. 19. David saith, That God had*stirred up Saul against him, i. e. efficaciously moved him to the enti∣tative act of persecuting David. Thence (2) Strangius fearing the ruinous downfal of this refuge flies to another, thus: But if we follow the commun interpretation, it appears, that the same fact is ascribed to God and Satan; and therefore it must be on a different ac∣count: and here also the varietie in the end and mode makes the unspot∣ted Justice of God to shine forth, and the malice of Satan and pravitie of man to discover itself. For [1] the action of numbering the people was not in itself evil. [2] Divines distinguish between tentation of probation and seduction. [3] Here the sane things concur, which were before explicated of the same sense, whereby God is said to incline to evil, namely the permission and laxation of the reins to Satan, the ob∣lation of occasions and irritaments, impediments being removed, and the suspension of Divine Grace: which things concurring with the pra∣vitie of nature, sin necessarily follows.

(1) We grant, that the same fact is ascribed to God and Satan on different accounts: God put the thought entitatively conside∣red into Davids heart, but Satan stirred up his heart to the act of numbering the people; God in judgement gave over David to this sin, that it should be at this time when God was angry with Israel: There is a special providence of God even in the ebulli∣tions of lusts in the hearts of his own people. Thus also in the wicked; who put that thought of murder considered materially into the heart of Esau, When my father is dead I wil slay my brother Jacob? Was it not from God? Whence came that motion into the heart of Judas to betray Christ, with al the circumstances ma∣terially considered referring thereto? were they not from God? Thus here, God put the entitative thought of numbering the peo∣ple into the heart of David, albeit Satan stirred it up; and God was the Orderer, albeit Satan the Abettor and in some sense the Au∣thor of it: for God is only the prime physic cause of the natural Page  77 entitie, but Satan the moral cause or Author of the vitiositie: again, the concurse of God to the natural entitative act is imme∣diate, efficacious, and predeterminative, but Satans concurse only mediate, objective, and suasive, though with more or lesse degrees of moral efficacitie, as Eph. 2. 2. Again, (2) we grant, that the different ends and modes of operating make Gods unspotted Justice and mans pravitie to shine forth. (3) We are glad, that Strangius wil grant, the action of numbering the people not to be in itself evil. Whence, by a paritie of reason, we argue, That no action, though never so intrinsecally evil, is in itself, i. e. as considered in its physic entitative act, and according to its sub∣strate mater, sinful: for certainly if Davids numbering the peo∣ple, which was a sin attended with so much pride, vain-glorie, and confidence in an arme of flesh, with other aggravations, which so greatly provoked God, were not in itself evil, no other sin con∣sidered in its mere entitative and physic act is such. Yea, I as yet see no reason why this sin of David considered in its individual circumstances and moral relation to its object and principes, may not be estimed a sin intrinsecally evil, as wel as Shimei's cursing David. But (4) Strangius's summary conclusion, That Gods concurse to Davids sin was only an idle permission, laxation of the reins to Satan, and oblation of occasions, with suspension of Divine Grace, is very contradictory both to the letter and mind of the Text, which saith positively, that God moved, or excited, and stirred up the mind of David, not morally, but physicly, to the entitative act of num∣bering the people. Certainly, when the Scripture speakes so ca∣tegoricly and positively of Gods moving the wil to its act, to restrain such moving influences and causalitie, only to mere idle permission, or objective oblation of occasions, or negative suspensions of Divine Grace, what is this but to make the Scripture contradictory to it∣self, or affirmation and negation applicable to the same words? How easily might an Atheist hence take advantage to elude al Scripture!

But to passe on to other Texts, that clearly expresse Gods im∣mediate predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin∣ful acts. 1 Kings 11. 31. the Lord saith, I wil rend the kingdome*out of the hand of Solomon. So vers. 37. to Jeroboam, I wil take thee and thou shalt reigne, &c. Whence 1 Kings 12. 15. it's said, that the cause why Rehoboam hearkened not unto the people, was from the Lord, that he might performe his saying, &c. So vers. 24. Page  78 God saith expressely, The thing [i. e. the revolt of Israel] is from me. So of Jehu, God saith, 2 Kings 9. 3. I have anointed thee*King: and chap. 10. 30. Jehu is said to do unto the house of Ahab al that was in Gods heart. From these Texts it's most evident, that the holy God assumes to himself the production of such entita∣tive natural acts, which had sin necessarily appendent to them.

Now let us examine what response Strangius gives hereto: l. 4. c. 4. p. 793. rejecting the answer of Bellarmine, (which to me is as good as his, yea not really different) he answers, It is not un∣likely but that Jeroboam and Jehu, albeit in taking the Kingdome they sinned not as to the thing itself and substance of the act, because in∣structed by Gods-command, yet in manner of acting, as they were pro∣fane men, they variously sinned by mingling their own ambition and de∣praved affections with the worke of God. Thence he concludes, That whatever their sins were, yet the justice of God sufficiently shines forth in the whole of this Administration, because God used both the Kings and people in this worke only as instruments to execute his just judge∣ments, &c.

To give a brief replie hereto, it is very evident, that al that*Strangius hath given us in answer to these Texts, doth but more confirme us in the true sense we give of them. For (1) it is ma∣nifest, that Jeroboam and Jehu, with the Revolters their Adhe∣rents, sinned not only in the mode or manner, but in the very sub∣stance of their acts: For is not High treason against a lawful King an act sinful as to its substance? And were not Rehoboam and Ahab both lawful Kings? Was not Rehoboam Solomons Son, whom God made King? It's true, Jeroboam and Jehu had private prophetic Instructions and Unctions, but yet those gave them no real title before the people, but only secret intimations what God would in his providence bring to passe. David had a promise of the King∣dom and also Divine Unction; and yet he confesseth, that God gave him no actual title to the Kingdom in the eyes of men; but he stil ownes Saul as his Soverain King, and the Lords Anointed: and so ought Jeroboam and Jehu their lawful Soverains, til God had given them a legal title before men. (2) But suppose Jero∣boam and Jehu's sin were only in the manner, not in the substance of the act, yet certain it is, that the peoples sin, before God had declared his soverain wil to them, was high Treason, and so sub∣stantially evil. (3) Yea further, grant that they al sinned but in the mode, not in the substance of their acts, yet whether the act Page  79 be substantially or modally only sinful, it comes al to one in this case of Divine concurse and predetermination: For if God con∣cur to the substrate mater of acts modally sinful; why may he not as wel concur to the substrate mater of acts substantially sinful? Do not our Adversaries hereby, according to their Principes, make God the Author of modal sins? Or, is not the entitative act of modal and substantial sins the same as to kind, namely a real physic or natural good? and therefore if God concur to the one, why not also to the other? Assuredly, the most refined Wits wil never find out a sufficient disparitie between acts modally and substantially sinful, so as to allow God an efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of the one, but not of the other. (4) Stran∣gius grants in the close, That God used both these Kings and their mutinous Adherents as instruments in this worke, to execute his just judgements, &c. Did he so indeed? Did he not then also make use of their politic contrivements, ambitiose wils, and rebellious affections as instruments in this worke? And if so, did not God also move, excite, applie, yea predetermine their wils to the sub∣strate mater of their traitorous rebellious designes and exploits? Do not al these consequences hang together in an indissoluble chain of invict Reason? To close up these arguments with that of Calvin, Institut. lib. 1. cap. 18. §. 4. pag. 78.

But now how it may be from God, and governed by his secret providence, which men wickedly undertake, we have an illustrious document in the Election of King Jeroboam; in which the madnesse and te∣meritie of the people is severely condemned, because they per∣verted the order established by God, and perfidiosely departed from the familie of David: and yet we know, that God would have him anointed; whence in the words of Hosea, c. 8. 4. there appears a kind of repugnance; because God there complains, That that Kingdome was erected contrary to his wil and knowlege; and yet c. 13. 11. he declares, That he gave Jeroboam to be King in his wrath. How can these things agree? Thence he concludes, We see therefore that God, who nilled the perfidie or treacherie, yet, for another end, justly willed the defection.
And if God justly wil∣led the defection, he also justly moved and predetermined them to the substrate mater thereof; for predetermination answers adequately to God predefinition or absolute volition, as Stran∣gius grants.

We adde to the fore-cited Texts, 1 King. 22. 23. Now there∣fore*Page  80 behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of al these thy Prophets, and the Lord hath spoken evil concerning thee. (1) The Lord hath put, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, hath given forth, delivered, or put. LXX. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, hath given. It notes here an efficacious enthusiastic infusion, which of al kinds of predetermination is most prevalent and ir∣resistible. (2) Note also the sin, it is a lying spirit, which cer∣tainly denotes an act intrinsecally evil: For is it not a sin of the first magnitude to forge lying Prophecies, and impose them on men as the Oracles of God, thereby to delude their souls into Hel? Such was the case here: and yet, lo! it's said, that this ve∣ry sin was, as to its substrate mater or entitative act, from God: can any thing be spoken more nakedly and clearly to evince and demonstrate the truth of our Hypothesis?

What doth Strangius replie to this? His answer we find, lib. 4. cap. 4. pag. 788. We must note, that this oration from the Prophet Micaiah is parabolic, in which various things are spoken〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to our capacitie; and in a Parable althings are not to be cut open to the quick, but that only must be regarded, which belongs to the scope of the Parable—But in that God said, vers. 22. Go forth and do so, it must be understood of Divine permission: for we use the Imperative Mode not only in commanding, but also in permitting, or giving licence. And albeit there be mention made of a Divine precept, yet that is not otherwise to be taken, than for the efficacious direction of God, for the execution of his just judgement, that God delivered Ahab and his false Prophets left by God to be deceived by Satan: of which Tradition af∣terward.

In answer hereto, (1) what Strangius means by his parabolic Oration is not easie to divine. For we know, that al Parables consiste of two parts, the Proposition and Reddition or moral: and what is there to be found of these in this Text or Contexture? But this seems most like to Strangius's design, to bring this Text to a parabolic image, thereby to elude its argumentative force: for Divines grant, That parabolic or symbolic Theologie is not argu∣mentative, further than the scope and mind of the Symbol reach∣eth. That here is something spoken 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or according to human capacitie I easily grant, but this doth not at al invali∣date the argument, but rather confirme it. The wise God speakes according to the manner of men, inquiring, examining, and expect∣ing what the issue would be, thereby the more fully to demonstrate his efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater Page  81 of this sinful act. (2) As for the command of God, vers. 22. Go forth and do so, it can in no sober sense be understood of a mere permission. For al permission is either moral or Physic and natu∣ral: it cannot be meant of a moral permission, which Strangius seems to incline unto: for if God had given the lying spirit a li∣cence, or legal permission to deceive, how could he be vindicated from being the Author of the sin? Is not lying a sin intrinsecally evil? Should not the holy God then, according to this sense, be the Author of a sin intrinsecally evil? Neither can it be meant of a mere speculative physic permission, as to the substrate mater: for it's expressed in a terme of the most active import, the Lord hath put,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. This Divine precept therefore must denote an effi∣cacious real influence, such as predetermined those lying spirits to the substrate mater of their sin. Yea, (3) is there not so much included in the last clause of Strangius's replie, wherein he grants, This Divine precept to be taken for the efficacious direction of God, for the execution of his just judgement? Now what is Gods efficacious direction, but a part of his efficacious predeterminative concurse? And how could God efficaciously direct these lying spirits in Ahabs false Prophets, but by a predeterminative influence applying their minds and wils to the substrate mater of their false prophetic in∣spirations?

I shal conclude this Head with Rev. 17. 17. where speaking of* the ten Hornes, which gave their power to the Beste, he saith, God hath put into their hearts to fulfil his wil, and to agree and give their kingdome unto the Beste. That phrase 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is very emphatic, and notes not the infusion of any vitiositie, but the efficacious predetermining their wils to the substrate ma∣ter or entitative act, and permission of the vitiositie. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here exactly answers to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 1 Kings 22. 23. which the LXX. ren∣der 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and here signifies, to cause the mater effectually to be brought about, as the same word signifies, Mat. 12. 39. & 16. 4. & 24. 24. Mar. 13. 22. Act. 2. 19. & 14. 3. Rom. 15. 5. Rev. 3. 4. and elsewhere. Whence it follows: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to ful∣fil his wil.〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here signifies, powerfully to effect, or to performe with singular efficace, in which sense it is used also Mat. 7. 22. & 13. 58. or to effect with labor and industrie, as it's used, Act. 9. 39. & 19. 24. Heb. 8. 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies properly a decree, sentence, or confirmed purpose; so here. So that the mind of this Text seems this: The blessed God passed an absolute irreversible decree or Page  82 purpose, that the Adherents of Antichrist should give up their Power and Kingdome to him; and thence he, by an efficacious concurse, predetermined their wils to the substrate mater of those acts, whereunto sin was annexed, for the glorifying of his Justice, on Antichrist, and his power and mercie towards his afflicted Churches.

Now let us examine the subterfuges men shelter themselves under, to avoid the force of this Text. A reverend Divine of name among us replies thus:

(1) He that readeth Dr. Ham∣monds Exposition applying this to Alaricus sacking Rome, with the effects, wil see that the very subject is so dubious and dark, as not fit to found such a Doctrine on. (2) It was the effect of sin that God willed, and not the sin. (3) He is not said to put the sin into their hearts,—but only to do his pleasure, and agree to give up, &c. which he could most easily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, which with their own sins, would have that effect, which he willed: if a thief have a wil to rob, God may put it into his heart to go such or such a way, where a wicked man to be punished wil be in his way.
Thus that reverend Divine.

In answer hereto we say, That whatever mens Comments may be, yet certainly the subject is not so dark, but carries evidence enough with it, that it can be meant of no other than of the ten hornes, which give up their Kingdome to the Antichristian Beste. (2) Whereas he saith, It was the effect of their sin that God willed, and not the sin, this seems contradictory to the very letter as wel as to the mind of the words: for it's said, [1] God hath put it into their hearts, i. e. not only the effect, but the very material entita∣tive act. Then [2] to fulfil his wil, i. e. his decree, so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here must note. Now God decreed the very act, and not only the ef∣fect; and therefore his predetermining concurse must also reach the very act: according to that great theologic Axiome allowed by Strangius and others, That predetermination necessarily follows predefinition, or Gods absolute Decree. Yea [3] it's said, That God put into their hearts, not only to fulfil his wil, but also to agree and give their Kingdome to the Beste. To agree, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, unanimously to make one Edict or Decree, and that at a Council-table. Which clearly denotes a deliberate, firme, unanimous consent of giving up their power to the Beste. And doth not this clearly speak the act of their sin, as wel as the effect? And is not this act Page  83 as to its entitative mater, said to be put into their hearts by God? So much also the next Verbe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 importes, namely their delibe∣rate free donation of their power, wherein the formalitie of their sin lies: and yet this very act, as to its substrate mater, is said to be from God. Whence (3) whereas he saith, God is not said to put the sin into their hearts,—but only to do his pleasure and agree, &c. I easily grant, [1] That God did not put the sin formally considered into their heart; for God temtes no one to sin; but yet he put the material entitative act of the sin into their heart. For wherein lay the malignitie of their sin, but in this, that they una∣nimously and peremtorily agreed or decreed to give up their power to the Beste? And is not this very act, entitatively consi∣dered, said to be put into them by God? And was it not also Gods pleasure or stated Decree, that they should thus agree? &c. And [2] whereas he saith, God could make them do his pleasure most easily, by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, &c. is not this a very slender evasion? what the least mention is there of any such thing in the Text? Yea, is it not expressely said, That God put into their hearts to agree, &c? And did not the poi∣son of their sin lie in this maligne bloudy agreement? Albeit the holy God be sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation of any hand in this conspiracie, in that he decreed and produced on∣ly the entitative act, not the vitiositie. [3] His instance or similitude from the Thief that hath a wil to rob, &c. is extreme lame and nothing to the purpose; for it's evidently said in the Text, that God not only concurred to the externe acts and effects, but that he put it into their hearts to agree, &c. So that the very wil and consent, entitatively considered, was from God.

Let us now examine what Strangius replies to this, who lib. 4. cap. 10. pag. 855. acknowlegeth this Text Rev. 17. 17. to be meant of the ten hornes giving their power to the Beste; but yet so as that if we understand the words (1) of Gods putting it into their minds to agree, &c.

then the sense must be no other than, 2 Thes. 2. 11. Rom. 1. 28. and like places, which speak of Gods delivering men up to a reprobate mind, and sending the efficace of error, that they might serve Antichrist. And here the distinction must always concur, when in the same action sin and punishment concur, that not mens sins, but Gods judgements and punish∣ments must be ascribed to God. In this sense God is said to excite, impel, and incline to sin.
Before we passe on to Strangius's Page  84 second answer, let us a little examine this. [1] He grants, that God judicially may and doth concur to sin, yea excite, impel, and incline men to it. And doth not this fully overthrow his own Hypothesis and confirme ours? For if God in judgement impel, excite, and incline men to one sin, as a punishment of another, is he not then as much the Author of sin in this way, as in ours? [2] How doth God judicially punish one sin by another, but, to use his own words, by delivering such up to a reprobate mind and the efficace of error? And if so, then must not the substrate acts of such judicial dereliction be from God? Of this hereafter, §. 6.

But (2) I passe on to his second answer, whereon he seems to lay the most weight, though indeed most feeble:

But, saith he, because those words, Rev. 17. 17. are immediately subjoined to vers. 16. and are connected therewith by the rational Particle 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which points out the reason of that which next follows, namely, that those ten Kings having changed their opinion, should destroy the Whore and Antichrist, it seems to me more commodious, if in that vers. 17. there be a reason given of this famose change, that they who were before the friends and vas∣sals of Antichrist, should be afterwards enemies and adversaries to him, namely, because God hath put this into their heart. And the first words of vers. 17. sufficiently accord to this Expo∣sition—But what is subjoined, That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste, until the word of God should be consummate, I should think ought to be expounded negatively, &c.
Thus Strangius.

A strange comment indeed! let us a little inquire into it. (1) How infirm is his argument from the rational particle 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to make what follows, the fulfilling of Gods wil, to refer only to the destroying of Antichrist? whereas the particle 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 seems rather to refer to the whole verse, and more particularly to the last clause, until the Word of God shal be fulfilled; and so it notes, that God put it into their hearts to fulfil his Wil, [1] In agreeing to give their Kingdom to the Beste, and [2] When the words of God were fulfilled, i. e. Antichrists reign expired, then to hate the Whore, &c. And this makes the whole contexture of the words natural and evident. So that v. 17. is not only a reason of the change, mentioned v. 16. but also an account of the whole series of their actions both whiles friends to, and enemies against Anti∣christ. Page  85 (2) As for what is subjoined v. 17. That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste, I cannot but admire with what sha∣dow of reason Strangius can understand this negatively, as if they should not give their Kingdom to the Beste: certainly if such glosses should be admitted, we might easily find in Scripture sub∣terfuges for the worst Heresies and Immoralities? Why may not the most profane debauched wretch, when he is pressed with those Commands, Thou shalt not commit adulterie, Thou shalt not kill, &c. replie, that these Scriptures must not be taken negative∣ly but affirmatively, Thou shalt commit adulterie, &c? But Stran∣gius saw ful wel, that the affirmative sense of those words, That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste, would quite subvert his forced sense of the foregoing words, and therefore he saw no way left, but to secure himself by reducing this later affirmative clause to a negative, though contrary to the expresse letter and mind of the words. But (3) being after al his glosses sensible of the infir∣mitie and invaliditie of this response, he p. 856. flies again to his old refuge, telling us,

That if any shal think this exposition of the last member not sufficient, but that beyond it there must be also signified, that God did put it into their hearts to give their Kingdome to the Beste, I have no mind to contend about this mater, sithat the sense is sufficiently sane, which ever way the words be understood. In evil works God is not the cause of the moral evil, but of the substrate act and punishment, or Judge∣ment which is annected to the sin; but in good works, not only of the substrate act, but also of the moral Bonitie, &c.
Who of us denies this? would our Adversaries but stick here, how soon would our Controversie be ended? But here lies the sting, even in this plausible concession, Strangius with the rest would fain perswade us, that there are some acts of sin so intrinsecally evil, as that you cannot separate the physic natural act from its moral Vitiositie.

§. 5. We descend now to such Scriptures as mention Gods*efficacious Permission of sin. The former Heads regard only the substrate mater or entitative act of sin, but this sin in its formal nature. Our Adversaries, the Pelagians, Jesuites, Arminians and Semi-Arminians or New Methodists, al grant Gods permission of Sin, but only such as is otiose, speculative, negative and naked, with∣out any efficacious active Influence for the production of its en∣titative act, or direction of it to its proper ends: But the sacred Page  86 Scriptures ascribe to God a positive, efficacious, directive, and ordi∣native permission of sin, arising from his positive absolute voli∣tion to permit it. So it's said of Eli's Sons, 1 Sam. 2. 25. They*hearkened not to the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them. The conjunction 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here is Causal, and resolves their sin into the efficacious permissive Wil of God: The Soverain Lord had, by an absolute peremtorie decree, predetermined to leave the Sons of Eli to this sin of Disobedience both against their Fa∣ther and God, which should prove the cause of their temporal and eternal ruine; and thence it's said, they hearkened not, because the Lord would slay them: the wil of God was not properly the cause of their sin or slaughter, yet their sin was a consequent of Gods Wil efficaciously permitting it to be. I am not ignorant, that some of late have endeavored to give the causal particle 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a more soft, as they phrase it, Version; and among these some make it conclusive, and so render it ideo, idcirco, quapropter: others render it quamvis, as Turnovius; others otherwise: But certainly our English Version, which renders it causally, because, seems much more agreeable to the mind of the Words and al the ancient Versions: So the LXX. who render the words thus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because the Lord in willing willed to destroy them. In willing willed, i. e. according to the He∣braic Idiome, peremtorily, efficaciously, immutablely and absolutely willed. Thus also the ancient Syriac and Arabic Versions, with some later, Munster, Pagnine, Arias Montanus, Junius and Tre∣melius, Osiander, Piscator, Malvenda, with the Tigurine and Belgic Versions; yea Castalio not excepted, render 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉causally, because, according to our sense and interpretament.

Let us examine now what Strangius returns in answer to this Text, lib. 4. cap. 6. pag. 809, &c. He answers, (1) That the sons of Eli were, for their flagitiose impieties, destined and devoted by God to ruine. (2) That the punishment of death here mentioned, seems properly and directly to be understood of temporal, not eternal. (3) That however it be, as it is manifest, that sin precedes damna∣tion and the inflicting of punishment, so it's necessary that the presci∣ence of every sin be presupposed in the eternal purpose of God, of damn∣ing and inflicting punishment, whether temporal or eternal. (4) That the particle Quia Because, here used, doth not alwayes denote a proper cause, but a reason of consequence, which may be taken from the effect, and other arguments besides the cause, &c.

Page  87Strangius here raiseth a great deal of dust, to blind our eyes from beholding the Meridian light of this Text; but to answer briefly: (1) We say, that his first answer smells too rankly of Pelagianisme, in that it makes the sins of men the cause of the Divine Wil: The Sons of Eli were not for their flagitiose Impieties destined by God to ruine, as if their flagitiose Impieties were causa∣tive of and influential on Divine destination; but the Soverain God destined, by an absolute decree, to leave them to those fla∣gitiose sins, and for them to destroy them. What are the dan∣gerous consequents of such a conditional Reprobation, we intend more fully to shew hereafter, c. 5. §. 3. (2) That the Death here intended and inflicted was only temporal, is too crude a no∣tion for a Divine instructed in the knowledge of divine wrath: Yea, Strangius confesseth, that they merited eternal wrath; and how then could they be exemted from it, who had rejected the Merits of their Messias? (3) What he addes, touching the prescience of every sin to be presupposed in Gods eternal purpose of damning men, has a tincture also of rank Pelagianisme: for if the prescience or prevision of actual sins, yea of final Impeni∣tence, be that which moves the divine Wil to decree the Dam∣nation of men, then it wil, by a paritie of reason, necessarily follow, that the prescience or prevision of mens Faith and final Perseverance is that which moves the divine Wil to elect men: for if Reprobation be conditional, Election must be so also, as our Divines on Scripture-reason strongly demonstrate. Dave∣nant in his Animadvers. against Hoard, invictly proves, p. 226. and elsewhere, That Decrees purely conditional are very much un∣becoming the Divine Wil. But of this more in what follows, c. 5. §. 3. (4) As for the Particle Quia, Because, [1] We grant, that it doth not alwayes denote a proper Cause, but a reason of Conse∣quence, and that taken sometimes from the effect. But, [2] that it cannot denote a reason of Consequence taken from the Effect in this Text, is most evident; because Gods Wil to slay them was not the effect of their disobedience, but their disobedience was the consequent of Gods wil to slay them. [3] Take notice, that we do not say, that Gods wil was the cause of their disobe∣dience or ruine, but only that the later was the consequent of the former: God in his most soverain wise and efficacious pur∣pose decreed to leave the sons of Eli to such flagitiose sins, as should prove the cause of their ruine, both temporal and eternal: Page  88 and hereupon their sin and ruine followed, as Darknesse is the consequent of the Suns retirement into the inferior He∣misphere.

Again, Gods efficacious permissive wil about sin may be de∣monstrated from Job 12. 16. The deceiver and deceived are his.*〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, His or unto him is the deceiver and the deceived,* i. e. he doth in just judgement permit men to deceive and to be deceived, as Vatablus on this Text. Which Mercer thus more fully explicates:

I understand this not only of false Worship, but also of al errors that are committed every where; although more specially in Polities and Cities to be governed, where God stirs up some who draw others into error, that they might follow their fallacious counsel, and enter on a perniciose course for their own dammage.—God therefore impels and draws some into error: not that the Lord is the Author of Error or Sin, but that their sin and defection from God leads them there∣to, God not only merely permitting, but also ordaining, &c.
Whence it's added, v. 17. He leadeth counsellers away spoiled, and maketh the Judges fools; spoiled,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. of their wisdom and counsel, as it follows. So it's taken, Psal. 76. 6. The valiant are spoiled of their heart, i. e. deprived of their courage. And maketh the Judges fools, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, infatuat, or ad insaniam adigit, as Mercer. He infatuates them. Again, v. 20. He removeth away the speech of the trusty, and taketh away the understanding of the aged. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Judgement, Discretion, Counsel, Prudence, Sense: Hebr. the sa∣vor or experimental tast. So v. 24. He taketh away the heart of the chief of the People of the earth, and causeth them to wander in a Wil∣dernesse where there is no way. The like Deut. 28. 28. and Esa. 19. 11, 12, 13, 14.

Now let us see what answer Strangius, l. 4. c. 9. p. 836. gives hereto:

It must be observed, saith he, that Job in this Chapter doth in an illustrious manner discourse of Gods Providence so ordering things, that nothing comes to pass casually or fortui∣tously, nothing without his destinated counsel, that nothing is done but what he wils, either by permitting that it be done, or by doing of it, as August. Enchirid. c. 95. so that God doth effect and procure whatever things are good, and also wisely fore∣knowing the future event, doth permit sins, which he directs to good ends ordained by him.—Deservedly therefore Job among other things observes, that it is from Divine Providence, Page  89 that some erre, and draw others into error; and that both as to maters of Religion, and in other maters of this life; not that is he the Author of seduction and errors, but because God, for the contemt and abuse of his light, delivers them destitute there∣of into a mind void of judgement, and presenting objects and occasions, opens a way, wherein they wander, &c.

Though this Paraphrase be far short of the mind of the Text, yet there is enough in it to confirme our Hypothesis, and subvert his own Antithesis. For (1) he grants, That nothing happens ca∣sually, without Gods destinated counsel, according to that of Augustin, That nothing is done but what God wils, &c. Now certainly Gods destinated counsel or determined wil is most efficacious and irre∣sistible: so that if the permission of sin be from Gods destinated counsel, it must be also determined by his efficacious wil. (2) He grants, that God wisely foreknows al future events, even the sins of men: and how this can be without the efficacious predetermi∣nation of his own wil to permit the same, neither Strangius him∣self, nor any of his sectators, could ever yet make out. (3) He grants also, That God directs those aberrations and sins to good ends appointed by him. And how can God direct the immanent aberra∣tions of the mind, but by an efficacious predetermination of the substrate acts, and permission of the vitiositie? (4) He yet fur∣ther grants, That God delivers them unto a mind void of judgement: and what do we say more? Doth not this evidently denote an active efficacious permission of sin? But then (5) his last clause, presenting objects and occasions, &c. overthrows al his former con∣cessions: for the wise God doth not only present objects and oc∣casions, and thereby open a way to mens infatuation, but he also predetermines the mind to the entitative act, and efficaciously permits the vitiositie, without the least finger in the sin.

There are other Scriptures which demonstratively prove Gods efficacious permission of sin; as Esa. 63. 17. O Lord, why hast thou*made us erre from thy ways, and hardened our hearts from thy fear? Strangius, pag. 839. grants, that the Verbe in both Members be∣ing in Hiphil oft notes a double action, as when we say, That one makes another to do a thing; though he pretends, that sometimes it only notes a permission of the action. But it is certain, that it can∣not here denote a mere naked permission, but such as procedes from the efficacious wil of God. The like Jer. 20. 7. O Lord, thou hast deceived me and I was deceived. Whereto answers, Ezech. 14. 9. Page  90And if the Prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that Prophet. Which Texts speak certainly more than a mere idle speculative permission, namely such as re∣sultes from the active, efficacious, directive and ordinative wil of God, as Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 9. pag. 840—844. grants. What this permission of God is, and how far it extendes, see what fol∣lows, Chap. 5. §. 6.

§. 6. Let us now passe on to such Scriptures as mention Gods*tradition or giving up some to judicial excecation and induration or hardnesse of heart; which wil give a more evident demonstration of Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin. Not to insiste on Gods hardening Pharaohs heart, Exod. 4. 21. which has been already solidly and demonstratively explicated by a judicious Divine, in his Letter to a Friend, &c. pag. 28—30. I shal begin with Psal. 81. 12. So I*gave them up to their own hearts lusts, or to the hardnesse of their own hearts, as Kimhi. Hebr. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and I sent them away in the depraved cogitation of their heart. LXX. render it, Deut. 29. 19. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and Jer. 3. 17. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Whence it follows: and they walked in their own counsels. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in their own depraved imaginations. It's just with God to give up men to that spirit of hardnesse which they affect: his way of harden∣ing is mysterious and invisible: he delivers sinners up to the bent of their own lusts, and then lets them enjoy what they lust after: when men adde acquired hardnesse to natural, God justly inflicts on them judicial hardnesse. And oh! how righteous is it with God judicially to harden such as sinfully, yea voluntarily harden themselves! And then the heart which is an Adamant towards God and things spiritual, is as wax towards sin and Satans tenta∣tions. And what is the effect of this judicial hardnesse, but to seal up sinners from the darknesse of mind to the darknesse of Hel? Thus God, albeit he be not the Author of sin, yet is the Or∣derer of it, and the cause of the substrate act unto which sin is an∣nexed.

The like Psal. 69. 22. Let their eyes be darkened that they see not,*and make their loins continually to shake. Let their eyes [i. e. their minds] be darkened. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, be made so obscure and dark, as that they may not see their way: let al true wisdome be taken from them, and make their loins continually to shake: i. e. take from them al force, vigor and abilitie of acting as they ought; let them Page  91 stagger and reel like to a drunken man. The shaking of the loins argues imbecillitie and want of force, which is chiefly seated in the loins. Thus he procedes, and then vers. 17. brings Divine wrath to a black conclusion: Adde iniquitie to their iniquitie, &c. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which implies, that God addes the punish∣ment of judicial hardnesse to the iniquitie of their voluntary ac∣quired hardnesse. We find this piece of judicial hardnesse cited by Paul, Rom. 11. 10. Let their eyes be darkened that they may not*see, and bow down their back alway. The Heb. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is here ren∣dred by Paul 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, bow down; the sense being the same; for the bowing down of the back argues the defect of strength in the loins.

To these Texts we may adde, Esa. 6. 10. Make the heart of this*people fat: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 make the heart fat, or grosse, i. e. stupid and senselesse: for the fat of animals has little sense. It alludes to the heart in the animate bodie overgrowen and oppressed with fat. These words are six times repeted in the N. T. Whence it follows: and shut their eyes.〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is rendred by some, dim them, or make them dim; by others, daub them, as with plaister, or other like mater: by others, close them: al which notes the effica∣citie of error and blindnesse, that follows on judicial hardnesse.

The like curse we find, Esa. 29. 10. For the Lord hath poured*out upon you the spirit of deep sleep, and hath closed your eyes. LXX. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The Heb. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is rendred by Aquila〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and by Theodotion〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which Act. 10. 11. notes a deep sleep or ecstasie: and the radix 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sig∣nifies to overwhelme with deep sleep; and it's rendred 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Dan. 10. 9. So that by the spirit of deep sleep, must be under∣stood such a stupor of spirit as leaves men without al sense. The allusion is to some soporiferous stupifying wine, or potion, or medicine, which, being given to a man, or sprinkled on him, casts him into a deep sleep. Hence the Prophet ushers in these words with a direful exclamation, vers. 9. Stay your selves and wonder—they are drunken, but not with wine, &c. i. e. the Lord hath made them drunken with a soporiferous stupifying potion. As for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 it is not derived from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to pricke, Act. 2. 27. but from the ancient word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The simple 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 being put for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which also remains among the Latins, as nuo, nutus, nutare. Thence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifies to nod, or shake the head, as they are wont to do who have drunk any stupifying potion. So that Page  92〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here is such a spirituose, stupifying potion as de∣prives men of their senses, makes them shake the head, stagger and reel as drunken men. Thence it follows: and hath closed your eyes. When God judicially pours out a spirit of deep sleep, how soon is the heart stupified and made senselesse! This Text is cited* and explicated by Paul, Rom. 11. 8. According as it is written, God hath given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, &c. The first part, God hath given them the spirit of slumber, notes the stupor of their minds, unto which they were judicially delivered up by God.

Thus also Esa. 19. 11—14. He begins vers. 11. Surely the Prin∣ces*of Zoan are fools, &c. Thence he procedes to give the reason of it vers. 14. The Lord hath mingled a perverse spirit in the midst thereof, &c. The Lord hath mingled, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, poured out, or given them to drinke. Gods judicial excecation and induration is here, as else∣where, compared to a cup of intoxicating liquor, which being very strong and heady distempers men, and makes them to reel and stagger: so much the following phrase importeth, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉a spirit of perversities. The Hebrew word, not elsewhere to be found in the O. T. is derived from a Verbe that signifies to pervert, turne away, or make crooked: it's here plural of a duplicate forme, and notes al manner of perversities both extensive and in∣tensive. They boasted of their wisdome, vers. 11. but God made them drunk with a spirit of error and perversities. The Chaldee and LXX. render it, with a spirit of error or seduction; the Latin, with a spirit of giddinesse. The sense is the same.

We may adde hereto, Esa. 44. 18. They have not knowen nor*understood; for he hath shut their eyes, that they cannot see, and their hearts, that they cannot understand. He hath shut, Heb. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉he has daubed; Shindler renders it, crustavit, aut obduxit parietem. God did as it were plaister their eyes with a spirit of slumber: whence it follows, vers. 19. and none considereth in his heart, &c. Those profane Idolaters did shut their eyes, that they might not see, and the righteous God comes and as it were daubes or plaisters them over, that they shal not see.

This judicial excecation is also lively expressed, Esa. 60. 2.*For behold darknesse shal cover the earth, and grosse darknesse the peo∣ple. The Prophet having exhorted the elect among the Jews, vers. 1. Arise and shine, for they light is come, &c. i. e. the Messias is come and shineth on thee with the gloriose beams of Evangelic Page  93 light; in this vers. 2. he gives us the dreadful curse of those that should wilfully shut their eyes against this light. For behold—thick darknesse. Heb. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which seems compounded of a word that signifies to drop or destil, and another that signifies a mist or fog: so that the compound notion here properly notes a mist or fog so thick, that it even drops again; such as the Egyptian mist was, that filled the earth with darknesse, Exod. 10. 22, 23. When men wilfully shut their eyes against Evangelic light, God judicially leaves them to wander up and down in the thick mist of their own darknesse, so that they stumble at noon day.

Thus God dealt with the Gentiles, even the wisest of them, for the abuse of natures light, as Rom. 1. 28. And even as they did*not like to retain God in their knowlege, God gave them over to a re∣probate mind, to do those things that are not convenient. They did not approve of or acknowlege God in their practic judgements or consciences, and therefore God did not approve of or owne their practic notions, but delivered them up to a reprobate, spuri∣ous, drossie, vain, adulterine, rejectaneous mind; so much 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 notes. A Divine of note among us saith to this Text, Here is nothing at al but a penal desertion and permission, &c. So that by this Tradition he understands only a negation of Grace, and mere permission of men to sin; but Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 7. pag. 813. is more ingenuous, and grants, that this Tradition importes something positive: though what that positive is he doth not, neither indeed can by his Hypothesis, explicate.

The like Tradition or delivering up to a reprobate mind we find foretold touching the Sons of Antichrist, 2 Thes. 2. 11. And*for this cause God shal send them strong delusion, that they should be∣lieve a lie. When secure Professors wil not receive the Truth in the love thereof, that they may be saved, it is just with God to send them strong delusions, that they should believe a lie; that they might al be damned, &c. as vers. 12. The fore-mentioned reve∣rend Divine answers to this Text thus: Here is nothing signified, but (1) That God wil permit Magicians and false Teachers to vent deceits. (2) And permit wicked men to believe them: which is men∣tioned as a permitted consequent, and not as an end intended by God. And the word sending is mentioned, because the permission was penal for their sin, &c. But this response is too slender and jejune for so great a Text: For (1) whereas that reverend Divine makes mention of Gods permitting Magicians, &c. this savors too much▪ Page  94 of a Grotian and Cassandrian spirit, which I presume, he has no kindnesse for, whereby al those prophetic predictions about An∣tichrist are fixed on Simon Magus, or some other false Teacher in the Primitive Churches: whereas it is most evident, that this sending them strong delusion is ascribed immediately to God, as a righteous Judge. (2) Neither is this only a mere permitted con∣sequent, as he phraseth it; but the terme sending importes active efficacious influence on Gods part that sends, not on the sin formal∣ly considered, but on the substrate mater, or act entitatively con∣sidered. But Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 10. pag. 853. is here also more candid, granting, Gods sending the efficace of error, to be the same with Gods pouring out a spirit of slumber, Esa. 19. 14. and Jerome thinkes, that Paul took his words from Esa. And pag. 855. Strangius addes,

That this sending strong delusions may be ascri∣bed to God, as a punishment of their former sin, in not recei∣ving the truth in the love thereof:
which sufficiently proves our Hypothesis, That the substrate mater of sin is from God, as here∣after.

But let us a little more fully examine the general solutions* which our Adversaries give to these Texts touching Gods active excecation and induration. 1. A Divine among our selves, whom I love and honor, thinkes, that those Texts in the O. T. which speak of Gods hardening men, &c. might, according to the He∣brew Idiome, have a softer sense; so (as I suppose he must mean) as a mere permission is intended thereby. But to answer hereto in the words of Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 9. pag. 839. The Hebraic forme is oft in Hiphil, which denotes a double action, to make a man to do a thing; yea sometimes this induration is expressed by Verbes in Piel, of an active import, as Exod. 4. 21. & 9. 12. & 10. 20, 27. & 11. 10. & 14. 4, 8. Deut. 2. 30. Josh. 11. 20. Whence Strangius concludes, That this phrase of Scripture oft occurring de∣notes much more than a mere naked permission. Though what this should be he is at a great losse.

2. Baronius, Metaphys. Sect. 8. Disp. 3. §. 99. pag. 159, 160. an∣swers,

That there are four actions of God in induration; (1) He punisheth former sins by permitting men to fal into greater. (2) He offers to them an occasion of repentance, &c. (3) He gives them not grace to improve the occasion; whence they are said to be blinded and hardened. (4) He offers to them occasions of greater sins, by such things as objectively move them to sin.
Page  95 But al this, which Baronius allows God in judicial execation and Induration, comes far short of what the forecited Scriptures mention. For besides the mere permission of Sin, privation of Grace, and offering occasions and objects, the Scripture menti∣ons a Tradition and delivering up to the very act of sin, yea, Gods immediate efficacious hand in the very act of sin, considered entitatively and materially.

3. But we come to Strangius, who, in his concessions goes beyond the former Divines, yet comes short of the genuine mind and spirit of those Texts, which speak of Gods judicial Exceca∣tion and Induration. (1) He grants, (contrary to the sentiment of a reverend Divine among us) that active excecation is ascribed unto God. So l. 4. c. 8. p. 819. Active excecation, saith he, is ascri∣bed to God, Satan, and the Sinner himself. Satan and the Sinner in that action do greatly sin, but God actes most justly. God can as justly punish Sinners with excecation of mind, as he punished Elymas the sorcerer with corporal excecation, Act. 13. 11. (2) Thence p. 822. he addes: Herein the whole difficultie lies, that in this action we rightly distinguish that which is sin, and the cause of sin, whereof God is not the cause, from the punishment, which God in just judge∣ment inflicts. So p. 829. In al vitiose action, the action substrate to the vice, or whatever there is of entitie and positive therein, must be reduced to God as the first cause, who doth concur therewith, as con∣sidered separate from the vice or defect annexed thereto; and there∣fore whatever entitative or positive is found in any obduration, in like manner it must be referred to God, albeit he hath no commerce with the vice of the action. This ingenuous concession of Strangius, did he not overthrow it by other positions, were sufficient to period our controversie: for what do, or need we desire more than what he here grants? If whatever be entitative or positive in obduration be from God, then surely the substrate mater or en∣titative act of that whereto sin is annexed, is from God. But here lies the point of our Controversie with Strangius, he holds that there be some acts so intrinsecally evil, as that you cannot separate the entitative act from the sinful reference it has to its object. But, (3) Strangius addes, p. 831. That in the same Indu∣tation the sin and punishment are conjunct, &c. This indeed is a great concession, that which overthrows Strangius's Antithesis; for, if in the same Act the sin and punishment be conjunct, then how can God concur to the act as a punishment, and not concur Page  96 to the substrate mater or entitative act which has sin annexed to it? This Knot the acutest of Strangius's Sectators wil never un∣tie. Again, (4) He addes, p. 831. That the very Permission of God is the act and effect of the wil of God.—For to wil to permit, and advisedly to permit is also to act. What is done by God negatively in regard of his transient act, is done also positively, in regard of his interne immanent act. Herein also he lays before us a pregnant Truth, which is directly contradictory to his own Hypothesis: for, [1] If Gods permissive Wil as to sin be not only negative but also positive, then it must be efficacious. Again, [2] If Gods permission of sin be positive and efficacious, then also his Decree of Reprobation to permit sin must be positive and abso∣lute, which directly impugneth Strangius's Opinion. (5) He addes, p. 832. That other actions also concur with Gods Permission, because he also rules, moderates and ordains what he permits, and concurs to the actions substrate to the sin it self. Is it so indeed? What then do we contend so vehemently for? what made Stran∣gius write such a voluminous discourse, and oppose Rutherford, Twisse, and other Calvinists with so much violence, when as here he grants whatever they contend for? But to speak the truth, there yet lies a Snake under the herbe; albeit Strangius seems to grant so liberally Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate act of sin, yet indeed, when he comes else-where to state this con∣curse, he makes it be only a remote concurse to the act consider∣ed in genere, in its generic nature, not to the individual particular act as so or so circumstantiated. And herein he is followed by* a Divine of Name among us: wherein lies the spirit of al their solutions and oppositions. But how inept and evanid this subter∣fuge is, wil be very evident, if we consider the nature of al phy∣sic or natural acts. Is not every natural or entitative act indivi∣dual or singular? Are not al natural Acts the effluxes of singu∣lar Supposites or persons? and if the subject be singular, must not the Action be also singular? To talk of a natural action in genere, or specie, what a wild conceit is this, that which al true Logic and Philosophie both new and old contradicts? It's true, human acts, as to their moral consideration, may be distinguished into generic, specific, or individual: but if we consider human acts in their natural entitative Being, so there neither is nor can be any such thing as actio in genere, action in general; but al are singular and individual. So that if God concur to the act of sin, it must Page  97 be to the act in its individual singular nature, not morally but physically and entitatively considered; of which more hereafter, Chap. 6. §. 1.

But to give a distinct and Theologic Idea of Gods Judicial* Excecation and Induration, with the Vindication of his Sacred Majestie from being the Author of Sin, the following Distincti∣ons and Determinations may be of use to us. (1) We are to distinguish Gods concurse in Judicial Induration or Hardnesse, from that of the Sinner. (2) Gods Concurse in Judicial Hard∣nesse may be considered either in regard of his Decree, or in re∣gard of his Providence and actual execution. (3) Induration may be distinguished into Moral and Natural: or into sinful and penal. These things being premissed, the true nature of Gods judicial excecation and Induration wil appear in the follow∣ing Propositions.

1. Prop. Gods Decree is not properly the cause of mans Hardnesse of heart or Damnation, but only of the Negation or withdrawment of preventing Grace, which God is no way bound to give. The De∣cree of Reprobation is not the proper efficient or formal cause of the Sinners Induration or Condemnation, but his own wilful obstinacie. This sufficiently clears the Sanctitie and Justice of God.

2. Prop. Yet supposing the Decree of Reprobation, the sinners In∣duration or Hardnesse follows infallibly, and in some sense necessarily; i. e. by a modal hypothetic necessitie, not brutish or coactive, such as should destroy Libertie. The holy God doth not infuse hardnesse, or by any compulsion hurrie men into it, but leaves them to the swinge of their own lusts, which violently hurrie them into such courses as necessarily harden. This also cleareth Gods Justice from the imputation of sin.

3. Prop. Gods Providence in Judicial excecation and Induration is very efficacious and illustrious. (1) God leaves men to the Blandishments, Allurements, and Ensnarements of an heart-be∣witching world, which insensibly harden. (2) He delivers up men to the power of Satan, the God of this world, whose sub∣jects and vassals they willingly become, 2 Cor. 4. 3, 4. and so are taken alive captive at his wil, 2 Tim. 2. 26. (3) God so disposeth and orders al his Providences, as that they do al accidentally, by reason of mens lusts, conspire to harden them: Mercies be∣come Page  100 Curses to them, Rom. 11. 9, 10, 11. Yea, (4) The very means of Grace, become the means of their hardening, their Food and Physic become Poyson to them, 2 Cor. 2. 16. Esa. 28. 12, 13, 14, 15. (5) Christ himself, the chief Corner-stone of sal∣vation becomes to them a stone of stumbling and offence, Esa. 8. 14. a stone of stumbling,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of smiting, such as lying in the way the foot may smite against, and thence stumble and receive hurt. It answers to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, scandal in the New Testament: Thence it follows, and for a rock of offence. Heb. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not a bare Stumbling-stone, or block, such as a man may make a shift to avoid or get over, or if he stumble, yet recover himself again; but he is a rock of offence, which notes, [1] The Offence to be inevitable and unavoidable, as the removing of a rock: [2] The ruine to be certain, as that of a Ship falling on a rock. Whence he addes: for a gin and for a snare, such as men should neither by power, wit, or craft escape. Whence it follows, v. 15. And many among them shal stumble and fal, and be broken, and be snared, and be taken. The like Rom. 9. 33. (6) God puts a period to the day of Grace, and leaves men to the plague of their own heart, Esa. 22. 14. Surely this iniquitie shal not be purged from you til you die. Hebr. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, If this iniquitie be purged. It is the concise forme of an Oath, frequently used in Scripture, as Chap. 5. 18. whereby God sweareth, that their iniquitie should not be purged. So Luke 19. 41, 42. Heb. 3. 7. (7) God doth positive∣ly, yea efficaciously concur to al that is positive, material, enti∣tative, and natural in judicial hardnesse, without the least hand in the obliquitie or vitiositie.

4. Prop. The suspension of restraining Grace in Judicial excecation is not properly a privation of any Grace due to the Creature, but a negation or withdrawment of undeserved and abused Grace. For the clearing whereof we are to consider, the difference between Man and God in this particular: No meer man may or ought to permit or deliver up another to sin or hardnesse, if it be in his power to hinder: (1) Because al men are under a Law and obligation of subjection to their Creator, whereby they are obliged to promove his Glorie, and prevent sin and rebellion against him the most they can. (2) Because al men are under a communion of Natures, and therefore bound to afford assistance each to other, so far as they may for their natural and moral Page  101 good. But now the soverain Creator of man is under no such obligation, and therefore may as he please dispose of his own grace, or suspend it, specially when abused by sinners.

5. Prop. God doth not deliver up men to judicial hardnesse simply as hardnesse, under that reduplication, but penally, as it conduceth to the vindication of his Justice. For the explication and demonstra∣tion of this Proposition we are to remember, that there is no∣thing in the world of itself, purely, and simply evil: for if there were any pure and chiefest evil in the world, then God, who is the chiefest good, could not wil it: but the greatest evil has something of good mixed with it; and this God wils. Thus in judicial hardnesse there is a penal vindictive good, which God wils for the illustration of his Justice.

6. Prop. In judicial hardnesse, that which is morally evil in regard of man and his transgression, is naturally good in regard of God and his Providence. For albeit God doth concur with the sinner, who is deficient as to his dutie, yet God is no way deficient. (1) Al moral evil of sin is only such to him whose it is, or to whom it doth belong, as the Author thereof, by virtue of some Law he offends against: But now this judicial hardnesse or sin doth not belong to God as the proper Owner or Author of it, but only to the sinner; neither doth the holy God offend against any Law. (2) The specific qualitie of an effect is not to be ascribed to the universal first cause, but to the second particular cause, from which it receives specification. (3) The sinner is only the moral cause of his own hardnesse; because he is the meritorious cause thereof, and also a voluntary, yea wilful Agent therein. Al his hardnesse is voluntarily contracted, albeit judicially inflicted by God: he suffers his heart voluntarily to be defloured by sinful ob∣jects: God threatens to suspend his Divine influence, and the ob∣stinate sinner cries, Content: Satan comes and blinds his eyes, and he hugges him for it. So that the whole deficience or moral causalitie is on the sinners part, not on Gods. The sinner wants Divine influence and is willing, yea glad to want it: therefore his depraved wil is the sole formal, vital, subjective and moral effi∣cient cause of his own hardnesse and sin.

§. 7. We come in the last place to such Scriptures as mention* Gods efficacious ordering, disposing, and directing the sins of men unto his own glorie, which evidently demonstrates his immediate con∣curse and predetermination to the substrate mater or entitative Page  102 act thereof. Thus Exod. 9. 14, 15, 16. God threatens Pharaoh,*vers. 14. to send al his plagues on his heart, i. e. in a way of judicial excecation and induration. And why? That thou mayst know there is none like me in al the earth: i. e. that I may magnifie my* vindictive Justice and Power on thee. Whence he addes, v. 15. For now I wil stretch out mine hand, that I may smite thee, and thy people with pestilence, and thou shalt be cut off from the earth. It runs in the Hebrew in the time past, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, I sent out mine hand, i. e. by the pestilence or murrain among the bestes, as v. 3, 6. and so it follows: and I had smitten thee, with the same pestilence; and thou hadst been cut off, deservedly; but for another cause (which is mentioned vers. 16.) I have spared thee. This seemeth the genuine meaning, namely, that God spared Pharaoh in this plague, thereby to magnifie his vindictive Justice and Power the more in his final ruine. God let him alone to run on in ful career in his way of sin, yea, concurred to the substrate mater of al his sins, and caused al his plagues to meet on his heart, in order to his final obduration, thereby to render his vindictive Justice more illustrious in his ruine. And so vers. 16. And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to shew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared thorowout al the earth. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in very deed, or verily: it notes a great asseveration, such as with God amounts almost to an oath. For this. The Apostle Paul, Rom. 9. 17. addes a Pronoun of intention, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for this very same, i. e. cause or purpose, as the Greeks expound it, for this cause have I raised thee up. The LXX. render it, thou hast been preser∣ved or kept alive; but Paul more emphaticly, Rom. 9. 17. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,*I have made thee stand up, or, have constituted, or set thee up, as on a Theatre before al the world, to be a vessel of wrath, and an exemple of Divine vengeance. The Syriac renders it thus: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, I have made thee to stand up; which emphaticly paints forth Gods absolute wil in his Reprobation. So in the Hebraic Verbe, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, I have made thee stand up, as a monument of vin∣dictive Justice. This making to stand up, notes the constitution and being of a thing, as elsewhere in Scripture: the righteous God gave being and constitution to Pharaoh for this very end, to magnifie the glorie of his vindictive Justice on him. So it fol∣lows: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for to shew, or that I may shew in thee, or shew thee. But the LXX. adde the Particle In: so Paul, Rom. 9. 17. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, That I may give a specimen, or demon∣stration Page  103 of my power in thee. Hebr. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, my power, or my force, my omnipotent severitie. Thence it follows: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for to declare, or tel my name. The righteous God suffered Pharaoh to run on with a vehement impetuositie in his sinful rebellion, that so the world might ring of Gods vindictive Justice in his ruine. From al this the Apostle strongly demonstrates our conclusion, Rom. 9. 18. Therefore God hath mercie on whom he wil, and whom he*wil he hardeneth. Observe here, (1) the Apostle ushers in this inference with the conclusive note, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, therefore. He layeth the premisses in Gods judicial procedings with Pharaoh for the manifestation of his vindictive punitive glorie in Pharaohs ruine: whence he infers this universal conclusion. Therefore God, &c. (2) He resolves Gods hardening men into his absolute wil or de∣cree of Reprobation, which he in this regard, makes parallel to his absolute decree of Election: for as God hath mercie on whom he wil, i. e. according to his absolute purpose or decree; so in like manner, he hardeneth whom he wil, i. e. according to his abso∣lute decree of Reprobation. And it is most certain, according to the Scripture, no man can maintain absolute Election, but he must also maintain absolute Reprobation: and if Reprobation be absolute, then also Gods concurse to the entitative act of that which is sinful must be efficacious and predeterminative, as here∣after, Chap. 5. §. 3.

There are other Texts that make expresse mention of Gods efficacious ordering and disposing of wicked men and their sins for his own glorie. So Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made althings*for himself; yea even the wicked for the day of evil. Note here (1) the end of Gods making althings, which is for himself, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. for the manifestation of his own glorie. (2) The manner of Gods making althings for himself, included in the Verbe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, hath made, which signifies [1] Gods active efficience, or his energetic, architectonic Decree, whereby althings are made. [2] Gods passive creation, or his efficience in time. [3] Gods conservation of althings in their beings and wel-beings. [4] Gods efficacious actuating and governing althings to their ends. Thus Psal. 46. 9. Eccles. 11. 5. Esa. 5. 12. The LXX. generally render it by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which Joh. 5. 17. our Lord useth to expresse Gods effica∣cious concurse and predeterminative influence. And Strangius, pag. 804. grants, that whether we understand 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here of Gods production in time, or of his eternal Decree to produce man, or Page  104 of his ordination and constitution of man to punishment, the dif∣ference is not material. I would therefore take it in the largest notion as comprehensive of al its significates before specified. (3) Whence follows the particular object, even the wicked, i. e. consi∣dered not only in their substance as men, but also in al their Modes, Adjuncts, Accidents, and Operations. There is not the most mi∣nute accident or action of a wicked man but God makes it, i. e. decrees, influenceth, and orders it for himself. Whence (4) the wicked are said to be made by God, for the day of evil, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. for the day of vindictive wrath, or punishment inflicted for the illustration of Divine Justice: which includes also their being left to sin; for the forest piece of Divine vengeance is mens be∣ing given up to their own hearts lusts.

Adde hereto Rom. 9. 21, 22. Hath not the potter power over the*clay, &c? Here Paul refutes the proud Pelagian blasphemies by an argument taken from Gods absolute Dominion and Soverain∣tie over his creature. As if he had said: Has not the Potter an absolute dominion over the clay, to forme it into what shape he please? and shal we not allow the great Creator of althings the same absolute dominion? Did he not make althings? and there∣fore may he not assume the Prerogative of ordering althings to the ends for which they were made? As he gives to every crea∣ture what shape he please, so cannot he appoint them to what end he please, and direct them infallibly to that end? Is it not an end sufficient for the being of any creature, to be the glorie of any At∣tribute? and therefore if God make a creature to be a vessel of wrath fitted to destruction, is there any injurie done to the crea∣ture? The Pythagoreans have an effate, That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the worse is made for the service of the better, which holds most true here of the vessels of wrath or wicked men, who are made for the better, i. e. their Makers glorie, as Prov. 16. 4. Thus Paul concludes, vers. 22. Vessels of wrath fitted to destruction,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, signifies primarily aptly to fit, frame, or set together: thence, to ordain, decree, or constitute. Whence among the LXX. it answers to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to found, as Psal. 8. 2. Out of the mouths of babes he hath founded or ordained praise: also to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to ordain, decree, establish, as Psal. 67. 10. & 73. 17. Thus it signifies here, namely Gods eternal ordination or absolute De∣cree of Reprobation founded on his absolute Soveraintie. Observe here the difference between the vessels of mercie, and the vessels of Page  105 wrath: of the former he speakes actively, vers. 23. That he might make known the riches of his glorie on the vessels of mercy, which he had prepared unto glorie; but of the later he speakes only passively, vers. 22. fitted to destruction. The reason of this difference seems this: The vessels of mercie are wholly from God, both as vessels, and as vessels of mercie; they receive from God both their natu∣ral good of being, and their moral good of grace, wel-being, and happi∣nesse: but now the vessels of wrath are such partly from God, and partly from themselves: That they are vessels, and vessels of wrath ordained to destruction, they are from God; but that they are vessels deserving wrath, this they are from themselves: their sins and punishment morally considered are from themselves; but consider them entitatively and penally, and so they are from God. I am not ignorant of the many false and Pelagian glosses which are affixed to this Text, without shadow of reason.

Another Text that evidently demonstrates Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse in ordering mens sins for his own glo∣rie is, 1 Pet. 2. 8. And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence,*even to them that stumble at the word, being disobedient, whereunto also they were appointed. This Text is taken partly from Esa. 8. 14. Here Christ the chief Corner-stone of the Church, is said to be a stone of stumbling and rock of offence to wilful unbelievers. The Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 are synonymous, and of the same import here; though 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 be in its general no∣tion more extensive: It notes originally any thing that may offend the foot, or other part, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to halt, or from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, distort∣ed: more particularly, it signifies (1) that tigillum, or crosse piece of wood in your traps for Mice, Foxes, or the like: (2) a sharp stake, whereby the foot is hurt: and so it is the same with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, inter∣preted by Hesychius〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is by him made to be the same with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an impediment: it was cal∣led also by the Greeks 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, denoting a military instrument, like a sharp stake, whereby they annoyed their enemies: in which sense the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is used in that Apocryphous book, Ju∣dith 5. 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. (4) A stone that of∣fends the foot: and so it answers with the LXX. to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Lev. 19. 14. in which regard it is made synonymous to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, both by Peter; and Rom. 14. 13. by Paul: and this they both de∣note here, 1 Pet. 2. 8. the great offence which sinners took at Christ, to their own ruine. Whence it's added: Whereunto also Page  106 they were appointed,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. What doth this note? why take Grotius's Note on this Text, who was no friend to Calvinists:

Unto this, saith he, Unbelievers were destined by God, that they might most grievously fal—For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which answers to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, oft signifies to ordain, destine, or decree, as Joh. 15. 16. So 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 1 Thes. 5. 9. The Syriac in this place ren∣ders it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they were designed; the Arabic 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they were con∣stituted, namely by the Divine Decree.
Thus Grotius, who here speakes like a Calvinist, though generally no friend to the sentiments of Calvin. The like 2 Pet. 2. 11. As natural brute bestes, made to be taken and destroyed. Is not absolute Reprobation here, and that by the concession of Grotius, no friend thereto, clearly and fully asserted? And if Reprobation be absolute, must not also Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin be efficacious and predeterminative? The immutable connexion between abso∣lute Reprobation and predetermination to the substrate mater of that which is sinful we intend to demonstrate hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 3.

But a reverend Divine of name among us answers to this Text thus: Resp. 1.

This [1 Pet. 2. 8. whereunto also they were appointed] hath respect to Luke 2. 34—And no more can be hence gathe∣red, but that God hath decreed, that as a punishing Judge, (1) he wil leave the rejecters of Christ to go on in their own sinful way; (2) and that their opposition to him shal be their ruine: So that [1] he doth not speak this of any but the rejecters of Christ, that deserved it. [2] He speaketh not at al as willing their sin, but only as one that penally denieth them further grace. [3] But the thing that he is said to ordain them to, is not sin, but ruine the consequent of their sin: The word [stumbling and falling] signifying their destruction.
Thus that reverend Divine.

And now let us a little examine this his Response to our Argu∣ment from this Text, which wil serve for a replie to most of his subterfuges. (1) In answer to his first particular, we assert, that more may be gathered from this Text, than what he allows, namely, That God hath decreed, that, as a punishing Judge, he wil leave the rejecters of Christ to go on in their own sinful way. For he himself grants, (which cannot be denied) That they were appointed to stumble on the rock of offence: And if so, then surely they were destined or appointed to the entitative act of sin: for stumbling doth not only implie their destruction, as he insinuates, but also Page  107 their sin. Whence, (2) there is something more also implied, than that their opposition to him shal be their ruine. For it's ex∣pressely said, That they were appointed, not only to their ruine, but also to their stumbling at the word, and being disobedient, which notes the Decree of Reprobation to be absolute and positive; yea predeterminative of the substrate mater of sin. (3) Whereas he saith, That he speakes not at al as willing their sin, but only as one that penally denieth them further grace, this seems also against the expresse mind of the Text, which saith, They were appointed, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. according to Grotius, they were ordained, destined, or de∣creed to stumble at the word, &c. This certainly denotes more than Gods penal denial of further grace. (4) Whereas he saith, That the thing that he is said to ordain them unto, is not sin, but ruine, the consequent of their sin, the word [stumbling and falling] signifying their destruction, it seems contradictory to the letter and mind of the words: for both 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifie, ac∣cording to our precedent explication of them, primarily their sin, and then their ruine or destruction, as the consequent of their sin. This also is evident from that parallel Text, Jude 4. For there are*certain men crept in unawares, who were of old ordained to this condem∣nation, ungodly men turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse, and denying the only Lord God. These ungodly men are said to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, designed, and as it were before written in the book of Gods predetermination, to be given up to this condemnation, of turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse, &c. So that it is evi∣dent, that God foreordained and decreed, not only their destru∣ction, but to leave them to those sins, which should cause the same.

But to sum up the whole of this Head, we grant, (1) That ab∣solute Reprobation is not the cause either of mens sins, or damna∣tion. It's true, elective Grace is the cause of faith and salvation, but the Decree of Reprobation is not the cause of sin or damna∣tion. (2) That Reprobation withdraws not any power from the person reprobated. Yet we denie, [1] That it is injust for God, by an absolute, efficacious Decree, to reprobate some, for the glorifying of his own Justice: For albeit the Decree of Reproba∣tion be not an act of justice, yet it is not injust for God to repro∣bate any. [2] We denie also, that there is any motive, cause, or condition of Reprobation, as it regards the act of the Divine wil. Whence also [3] we denie, that the act of Reprobation is Page  108 merely negative; but affirme, that it is positive and absolute; of which see Davenant Dissert. de Elect. & Reprobat. p. 113. Hence, [4] It necessarily follows, that when God predestines and pre∣ordains any unto Damnation, he predestines and preordains in like manner, by an efficacious act of his own soverain Wil, to leave men to their own sinful courses, and efficaciously to concur to the substrate mater of those sins. See more Chap. 5. §. 3.

CHAP. IV. An Historic Idea of Predeterminants and Anti∣predeterminants.

The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin; (1) Fathers, Augustin, Prosper, Fulgentius. (2) Such as succeeded in the Roman Church, Hugo de Sancto Victore, Aquinas, Scotus, Ariminensis, Holcot, Altissiodorensis: Brad∣wardine, his Conversion, Parts, both natural and acquired, zele for Efficacious Predeterminative Concurse, particularly as to the substrate mater of Sin: How God wils Sin: How the entitative act is from Gods predeterminative Concurse: How God spontaneously impels or necessitates men to the entitative act of Sin. The Domi∣nicans, and particularly Alvarez's sentiments conforme to our Hy∣pothesis. The concurrent perswasions of Jansenius and his Sectators: also of the Tridentine Catechisme. (3) The Sentiments of Re∣formed Divines, Wiclef, Calvin, Zuinglius, Beza, Chamier, Lud. Crocius, the Synod of Dort, and Church of England, Dave∣nant, Sam. Ward, &c. (4) Such as denie Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin, more ancient: Durandus, his proper Hy∣pothesis, and who may be accounted his Sectators; Lud. à dola his proper Sentiments and designe: Arminius, and his Adherents, the Remonstrants and Anabaptistes. The New Methodistes, Ca∣mero, Amyraldus, Placeus, Le Blanc, Baronius, Strangius. How these New Methodistes fel into these Sentiments, and who may be estimed such.

§. 1. HAving given a Scriptural Demonstration of our Hypo∣thesis,*touching the efficacious, predeterminative Concurse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful; we now procede to lay down the concurrent sentiments of Anti∣pelagians Page  109 in al Ages of the Church; and withal to shew who have in al Ages defended the Antithesis of our Adversaries. First, among the Patrons of our Hypothesis none deserves a more illu∣strious name and mention than Augustin, that great Propugnator* or Champion of efficacious Concurse. I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries, as Strangius by name, are so confident as to cite Augustin's testimonie in defense of their Antithesis; but this is too palpable an abuse to find place among the indiffe∣rent or impartial Sectators of Augustin; whose sentiments touch∣ing this subject are sufficiently evident in his Works. Thus, de Grat. & Lib. Arbitr. cap. 20. If the Scripture, saith he, be dili∣gently inspected, it wil appear, that not only the good wils of men, but also the bad, are so in Gods power, that he can incline them where and when he wil, to performe his benefices, or to inflict his punishments, by his most secret, yet most just judgement. Again, in the same book, he saith, That God workes in the hearts of men, to incline them which way he please, either to Good, out of his Mercie, or to evil ac∣cording to their deserts, by his Judgement, sometimes open, sometimes secret, but always just. So De Praedestinat. Sanct. c. 16. It is (saith he) in the power of wicked men to sin; but that by sinning ma∣litiosely they do this or that, is not in their power, but of God dividing the darkness, and ordering it; that so hence what they do against the wil of God, might not be fulfilled but by the wil of God. Again, De Gen. ad literam lib. imperfecto, c. 5. Some things, saith he, God makes and orders, other things he only orders; righteous men he makes and orders, but sinners, as sinners, he makes not, but only orders, i. e. In good actions he is both the cause of the good, and of the acti∣on, but in sinful acts he is not the cause of the sin, but only of the act ordering it for his glorie. Again, De Civitate Dei, l. 13. c. 22. he saith, That Sin as it is justly permitted by God, fals under the Eternal Law, that is, the Divine Wil or Decree. Moreover, Augustin frequently asserts, that God punisheth one sin by giving men up to another: So Contra Julian. l. 5. c. 3. & de Civitate Dei, l. 15. c. 6. & libro de Natura & Gratia, from cap. 20. to the end. To these Testimonies we may adde several Hypotheses of Au∣gustin, which demonstratively evince Gods Predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin. As, (1) He asserted, that Reprobation was the act of Gods absolute Wil, and so in it self positive and absolute (2) He held, That Excecation and Obdura∣tion is the consequent of Reprobation: of which see Jansenius, August. Page  110 de G•…t. Christ. l. 10. c. 3, 4. (3) He maintained, That al sins in lapsed Nature are necessary, because punishments, as Jansen. de Nat. Lap. c. 22. p. 264. Lastly, that Augustin held Gods Efficaci∣ous predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin, is evident from the false Imputations charged on him by the Pela∣gians, who imputed to him the same odiose and forged conse∣quences, which have been ever since imputed to the Assertors of Predeterminative Concurse. As, [1] They falsely charged on him, that he asserted a fatal Necessitie, and said, that God com∣pelled mon to sin. Whereas Augustin, l. 1. q. 2. ad Simpl. answers (in the same manner as we now adays) That God is said to harden some Sinners, in that he has not mercie on them, not that he impels them to sin, &c. [2] The Pelagians charged on Augustin, That he denied to sinners the Libertie of their Wil, &c. It's true, when he* discourseth of Moral Libertie, consisting in Adherence unto God, he denieth, that sinners have any such Libertie; but yet he fully asserts a Natural Libertie, that which is essential to the wil, to belong to al sinners, of which see Jansenius, August. Tom. 3. l. 7. c. 12. p. 330. To conclude, there is scarce any imputation falsely charged on those that assert predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin now a-days, but it was also imputed to Augustin by the Pelagians of old, and wiped off by him, as by us, which sufficiently demonstrates, that his Sentiments were as to this Hypothesis the same with ours. He that wil see more of Augustins mind about this mater, may consult Rutherford, de Pro∣videntia, cap. 30. Chamier, Panstrat. Tom. 2. Lib. 3. c. 8.

Next to Augustin follow his Sectators and Disciples, Prosper and*Fulgentius, whom our Adversaries would fain make to be of their persuasion, but without shadow of Truth or Reason. As for the sentiments of Prosper touching our Hypothesis, they are to be seen, ad capitula Gallorum, where, following Augustin, he makes God to wil sin as the punishment of sin. So Fulgentius, l. 1. ad Moni∣mum, c. 26. God, albeit he be not the Author of evil cogitations, yet he is the Ordinator of evil Wils: neither doth he cease to work good out of the evil work of every evil man: neither in the very injust works of the Wil, doth he relinquish the just order of his own works; because this he hath in that very order, that he doth justly desert the evil Wil—and in the very injust wil of the sinner, he fulfills his own Ju∣stice, &c. What could be said more evidently to demonstrate our Hypothesis? Is God the Ordinator of evil Wils? doth he not then Page  111 efficaciously, yea predeterminatively move and order them in their very evil acts? And doth he not cease to worke good out of their evil workes? Must he not then applie their wils to the entitative act of those evil workes? And what is this but to predetermine their wils to the substrate mater of those evil workes? Again, if God, in the very injust workes of the Wil doth not relinquish the just order of his workes, then surely he must of necessitie applie and predetermine the wil of the Sinner to the entitative act of the worke, thereby to maintain his own just order.

§. 2. We now passe on to such as succeded the Fathers, and* albeit they lived in the bosome of the Roman Church, yet they stil defended the Doctrine of Augustin and our Hypothesis, as to Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin. I shall begin with Anselme, Bishop of Canterburie, who flou∣rished* about the year 1095, an Italian by Nation, Monke by pro∣fession, of a most acute Ingenie, devotional Sanctitie, conjoined with great Prudence and Humilitie, according to the character given him by Baronius. This Anselme, de Concord. Praescientiae, Prae∣destinationis, Gratiae & Liberi Arbitrii, c. 1. thus speaketh: God worketh althings, which are wrought by a just or unjust Wil, i. e. both good and evil workes; In good workes truely he causeth both that they are, and that they are good; but in evil workes he causeth that they are, but not that they are evil. Herein he gives us the difference between Gods Concurse to good and evil acts, as also the demon∣stration of our Hypothesis; for if God causeth evil acts that they are, then certainly he efficaciously moves and applies the wil to the act, which is al that we mean by Predetermina∣tion.

Next follows Hugo de Sancto Victore, by Nation a Saxon, (and* so allied to us,) by profession a Monk, contemporary with Ber∣nard, who flourished about the year 1130. This Hugo, de Sacr. Fid. l. 1. c. 13. faith, *That God wils there should be evil, and yet he doth not wil evil: He wils there should be evil, because it's good there should be evil; but he wils not evil, because evil it self is not good. An excellent description of Gods predeterminative wil and concurse to the substrate mater of sin, so as to vindicate his Sacred Majestie from any hand in the moral vitiositie thereof: (1) God wils there should be evil, i. e. he doth, by an omnipotent efficacious decree, wil the existence of evil, in willing the sub∣strate mater thereof: and yet (2) He doth not wil evil, i. e. he Page  112 doth not with a wil of approbation or any way morally wil evil as to its moral vitiositie or formal reason. (3) It's good there should be evil, i. e. as it conduceth to the illustration of Gods glorie; and so God wils it. But (4) evil itself, [morally considered as evil] is not good, and therefore not willed by God as such. The same Hugo, de Sacramentis, par. 5. cap. 29. affirmes, That God by presi∣ding*over evil wils, doth, by an occult and invisible operation, temper and incline them to his own wil. What could more expressely be said for the asserting Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin? Doth God indeed preside over the evil wils of men, and so, by an occult and invisible operation, temper and incline them to his own wil? how is it possible then, but that he applie and determine them to the entitative act of their sinful workes? And whereas Hugo foresaw many would be then, as now also, scandalised at this doctrine, touching Gods ef∣ficacious concurse to the substrate mater of sin, he addes this as the reason of the offense: Not because that which is spoken is not wel spoken, but because that which is wel spoken is not wel understood. I wish our Adversaries would wel consider this prophetic reflexion of Hugo; of which more hereafter in Bradwardines sentiments.

We passe on to Thomas Aquinas, whom some of our Adversa∣ries* would fain conjure into their Campe, and make a Patrone of their Antithesis: but this is so great an imposition on the intel∣ligent world, that I cannot but admire at the confidence of those who make use of it. Yet this has been the attempt not only of some lesse conversant in Aquinas's Workes, but even of learned Strangius, who is oft more candid and ingenuous than others of his persuasion. Thus Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 14. from pag. 313. to 317. endeavors to demonstrate, That Thomas doth not admit that physic predetermination of God to al and singular actions of the wil: The like a reverend Divine of estime among our selves would fain per∣suade us, namely, That albeit the Dominicans are for such an uni∣versal predetermination, yet Aquinas is not, &c. But let us a little examine the reason of this subterfuge: (1) Was not Thomas A∣quinas himself a Dominican, of the Order of Dominic? And are not al the Dominicans sworne Thomists? Albeit they are in re∣gard of their Order Dominicans, yet are they not al in regard of their Doctrine Thomists? How comes it to passe then that they should contend so hotly for physic predetermination of the wil by God in al its natural actions, even such as are sinful, and yet Tho∣masPage  113 their Master against it? (2) Take the character of impartial Writers, and who ever denied this to be Aquinas's sentiment? See learned and acute Dr. Samuel Ward, Professor of Theologie at Cambridge, his Determinations, pag. 117, 118. where he proves Gods predeterminative Concurse to al actions of the wil out of Thomas. But because Dr. Ward seems to be our friend, we shal appele unto our Adversaries for the decision of this Controver∣sie, namely to Le Blanc and Baronius. Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. par. 3. thes. 10. pag. 430. assures us, That Thomas and his sectators the Dominicans, teach, for the explication of Divine Con∣curse—That God doth premove and applie the very second causes to their worke: for this the dependence of the second causes on God their first Mover doth require. For, according to their mind, God is there∣fore said to be the first Mover, because he doth antecedently move and applie al other causes to their operations, &c. What could be said more evidently to explicate Aquinas's mind herein? Thus also Baronius, who, in his Metaphysics, Sect. 8. Disp. 3. §. 78. pag. 146. imputes this celebrious Opinion of Gods previous predeterminative concurse to al actions unto Thomas Aquinas, as the principal Founder thereof. So §. 79. pag. 147. And §. 82. pag. 149. he urgeth, That from the opinion of Thomas it follows, that God is the Author of sin. The like §. 85. pag. 151. But (3) to let passe the testimo∣nies of others, if we may be allowed the privilege of believing our own senses, and the reflexions of our own reason thereon, it is to me most evident, that Aquinas has copiosely and nervosely defended our Hypothesis, and impugned the Antithesis of our Adversaries. Thus, 1. 2. Quaest. 79. Art. 2. The act of sin is both Ens and Act, and in both regards it is from God: for it's necessary that every Ens or Being be derived from the first Being, &c. And where∣as Strangius and a reverend Divine among our selves pretend, that this includes immediate concurse, but not predeterminative, it is most evident, that Aquinas owned no concurse but what was pre∣determinative: For what is predetermination of the wil, but the ap¦plication*of it to its act, as Strangius, pag. 244. grants? And is not this the proper notion whereby Aquinas describeth the Concurse of God to al acts of the wil? What more commun with him, than this grand Effate, That God applies al second causes to their act? Thus in his sums, par. 1. Quaest. 105. Art. 5. he layes down this conclusion, That God actes in every Agent finally, effectively, and for∣mally, yet so as they also act. And then in the explication hereof Page  114 he saith,

(3) That it is to be considered, that God doth not only move things to work, as by applying the formes and vir∣tues of things to their operations, (as also the Artificer applies the axe to cut, who yet sometimes gives not the forme to the axe) but also gives formes to creatures acting, and preserves them in being—and because the forme is in the thing,—and God is properly the cause of the universal Being in althings, which among althings is more intime, it follows, that God workes intimely in althings; and for this reason in sacred Scri∣pture, the operations of nature are ascribed unto God, as work∣ing in nature, according to that, Job 10. 11. With skin and with flesh hast thou clothed me, &c.
What could have been said more evidently to demonstrate our Hypothesis? He saith, (1) That God actes in every Agent, not only finally and effectively, but also for∣mally. (2) That God moves things to worke, by APPLYING (i. e. predetermining) the formes and virtues of things to their operations. Yea, (3) That God applies the second cause to act, as the Artificer ap∣plies the instrument to worke. Whereby he makes al second causes, the wil not excepted, but a kind of instrument of Gods principal efficience: For the wil, albeit it may be termed a principal cause of most of its acts, yet in regard of the Divine concurse, which it receives, and in virtue whereof it actes, it may safely be termed a vital Instrument. (4) That God acting most intimely in althings, the very operations of nature are ascribed unto him, which notes pre∣determination in the highest point. So also Aquinas, Quaest. Disp. q. 3. de Potentia, art. 7. speakes fully of this predeterminative appli∣cation of al second causes by God. And indeed how frequently is this Hypothesis demonstrated by him? So that I cannot but wonder, that any learned man should urge Aquinas's testimonie against us.

We descend now to Scotus, (the Head of a Sect opposite to the* Thomists, yet) who hath given evident and strong confirmation and demonstration to our Hypothesis. I am not ignorant, that a learned and pious Divine makes use also of Scotus's name to patronise his Antithesis: and I shal not denie, but that Scotus has in many points too much favored the Pelagian interest, which has inclined the Jesuites to follow him rather than Thomas; yet this I no way dout but to make good, that as to our Hypothesis, touch∣ing Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin, Scotus is fully of our persuasion. This wil appear evident, (1) if we Page  115 consider his notion of Divine Prescience of things future, which he makes to arise from the Divine Decree giving futurition to them, as Le Blanc, de Praescient. thes. 33. pag. 443. confesseth. And cer∣tainly such as hold Gods prescience of sins future to be from his own Decree efficaciously determining their futurition, cannot with any shadow of reason denie Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin. (2) Scotus and his sectators gene∣rally* hold, That God efficaciously concurs to al second causes and their acts, not by any influence or impression on the second cause, (which the Thomists assert) but by his absolute and efficacious Decree applying and determining the second cause to act. Which we judge to be the very truth, as it hath been demonstrated by us, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 3. So that the Thomists and Scotists differ not really as to the point of predetermination, but only as to its origine and principe; the Thomists making it to consiste in a physic intrinsec influxe impressed on the creature, and the Scotists placing the whole of it in the volition of God, without any force impressed on the second cause, as our Country-man Compt. Carleton, in his Philosophie, Disp. 30. Sect. 1. pag. 327. has incomparably wel sta∣ted it. But (3) Scotus, in 4. Sentent. Distinct. 49. Quaest. 6. §. 14. pag. 522. (edit. 1620.) has these very words: Est contra naturam ejus, [scil. voluntatis] determinari à causa inferiori, quia tunc ipsa non esset superior: non est autem contra naturam ejus determinari à causa superiori, quia cum hoc stat, quòd sit causa in suo ordine, It's against its nature, [namely the wils] to be determined by an inferior cause, because then it should not be superior; but it is not against its na∣ture to be determined by a superior cause, because it is consistent here∣with, that it be a cause in its own order. Wherein Scotus doth most acutely, though briefly, state the Controversie about Predetermi∣nation both negatively and positively. (1) Negatively, That the wil cannot be determined, or predetermined, by any inferior cause; be∣cause then it were not superior: for whatever cause predetermines another to act, is so far superior to it: it being impossible, yea a con∣tradiction, that the inferior should predetermine the superior. (2) Positively, That it is not against the nature of the wil to be pre∣determined by a superior cause, i. e. by God the first cause, who gave it being, and therefore may without violence to its libertie deter∣mine or predetermine it in its operation: and Scotus's reason is invincible; because to be predetermined by a superior cause, is very wel consistent with the wils being a cause in its own order: Yea, we Page  116 may raise this reason to a greater height, therefore the wil is a cause in its own order, i. e. a particular, proper, principal, or lesse principal cause, according to the nature of its causalitie and effect, because it is predetermined to act by God the superior first Cause: so that Gods predeterminative concurse to the actions of the wil, even such as have sin appendent to them, is, according to Scotus's sentiments, so far from infringing or diminishing the wils natural order and libertie in acting, as that it corroborates and confirmes the same. (4) Lastly, Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist. 37. q. 2. saith ex∣pressely,

That [albeit God determine the wil to the material act which is sinful, yet] the vitiositie of sin is not to be attributed to God, but to the create wil, because the create wil is under an essential obligation to give rectitude to the action; but God is not bound by any such obligation, &c.
Which is the same with the sentiments of Zuinglius and our reformed Divines, albeit op∣posed by the new Methodists, as wel as Arminians and Moli∣nists.

Having laid down the concurrent testimonies of the two prin∣cipal* Heads of the Scholes, Thomas and Scotus, we now passe on to their sectators, whereof we shal give the mention but of a few more illustrious. To begin with Gregorius Ariminensis, who was by profession a Dominican, and great defendent of Augustin's Doctrine; whom Bishop Ʋsher valued as the soundest of the Schole-men, and Dr. Barlow, as the acutest: His invict demon∣stration of our Hypothesis we find, in Sent. 2. Distinct. 34. Art. 3. where he demonstrates Gods▪ immediate efficience in producing the entitative act of sin thus:

(1) Every evil act when produced is conserved by God. Ergo. The antecedent he proves thus: be∣cause otherwise every evil act should not in its existence imme∣diately depend on God, but be independent; and so by stronger reason, the wil itself, which is more perfect than its act, should be independent. Again, if it be not repugnant to the Divine Bonitie to conserve the evil act, neither is it repugnant to it to produce the same. (2) The wil is of itself indifferent to any act, therefore it must be determined to every act by God. (3) If God be not the immediate cause of the act, which is evil, he is not the Maker of al Beings. (4) Al good that is not God, is from God as the Efficient thereof; but the act morally evil is yet naturally good.
Ergo. Hence he procedes to answer the Objections of his and our Adversaries thus:
(1) If God produce*Page  117 the same evil act, which man produceth, then he sins as man sins. Whereto he answers, by denying the consequence, and that on this reason; because man doth not therefore precisely sin, be∣cause he doth an evil act, as it is Ens or act; but therefore he sins, because he doth it evilly, i. e. against right reason; [or the Law of God] but now God produceth the same act according to right reason, and therefore wel. So the same man borne in fornication, is produced by God wel, but by the fornicator evil∣ly.
But (2) it is farther objected by his Adversaries then, as by ours now, thus: Thou wilt say, that those things that are, per* se, in themselves [or intrinsecally] evil, as the hatred of God, or the like, can never be wel done: therefore neither by God.
I responde, saith he, (as we) that there is or can be no entitie which may not be wel done, albeit not by every Agent: e. g. man envieth; but God, although he produce the same act of envie with man, yet he doth not envie. For al such acts, beyond the simple pro∣duction or motion of such or such a thing, do connote some∣thing on the part of the Author, who is so denominated, which agrees not to God: So to steal, besides the simple translation of the thing from place to place, connotes the thing stolne not to belong to him that translated it: but God translating the same thing, doth not translate what is not his own; and therefore is not said to be the thief, &c.
But here we are to note, that whereas Gregorius Ariminensis makes God to be a partial cause of sin, it is not to be understood, as if God were the partial cause of the entitative act, for so he makes God to be a total cause; but he cals God a partial cause of sin, as he produceth only the entitative act, not the vitiositie, whereof man only is the moral cause. Thus also Holcot, our Country-man, super Sentent. lib. 2. Dist. 1. q. 1.* makes God to be a partial cause of sin, yet not the Author of it: whereby he plainly means, as he explicates himself, that God is the physical cause of the substrate mater, or entitative act only, but man the moral cause of the vitiositie also. This I mention, because a reverend Divine of name among us from these expressi∣ons of Ariminensis and Holcot, would persuade us, that they make God the partial cause of the entitative act. We might adde to these the testimonies of Altissiodorensis, in Sent. 2. where he proves* by strong arguments, namely from the Passion of Christ, &c. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil; of which more in what follows touching Bradwardine.

Page  118I now come to Thomas Bradwardine, our pious, learned and pro∣found*Bradwardine, whom, might I be allowed my libertie, I should rather reckon among our first Reformers, than among the Sons of Antichrist; for indeed he was a zelose Patron of, and stout Champion for the fundamental points of the Reformed Reli∣gion, specially efficacious free Grace, which he with so much cou∣rage, strength of argument, and flaming zele defended against the Pelagians of those days. This Thomas Bradwardine, borne at Hart∣field in Sussex, flourished about the year 1350. He was a person of prodigiose natural ingenie, which he greatly polisht by al man∣ner of acquired Sciences, specially the Mathematics and schola∣stic Theologie. He was a great Affecter and Admirer of meta∣physic Contemplations, which in his first studies he greedily drank in, even to the neglect of the holy Scriptures, because they favored not of a metaphysic style, as he himself informes us, in his Book de Causa Dei. When, saith he, in the state of my unrege∣neracie, I came into the Scholes, and heard Lectures on Pauls Epistles of free Grace, &c. it did no way relish with me, quia non sapit stylum metaphysicum, because it savored not of a metaphysic style. It was with me, as it was with Augustin of old, nothing would please but scho∣lastic discourses for free wil, &c. But after his Conversion he was, as another Augustin, the greatest Champion for free efficacious Grace. Balaeus, de Script. Brit. cent. 5. cap. 87. tels us,

That John Baconthorp, that famose Divine and English-man, returning from Paris had a great contest with Bradwardine about the points of Gods Prescience and Predestination; to whom at last Bradwardine assents in al those points;
as the same Bacon∣thorp declares, in Sent. lib. 4. Dist. 1. q. 4. Afterwards he was cal∣led to be Confessor to King Edward III. and thence made Arch∣bishop of Canterbury, without any desire of his own thereto. He was indeed a good Mathematician, a great Philosopher, and ex∣cellent Divine, being communly stiled Doctor profundus, the pro∣found Doctor.

Neither was he lesse renowned for his Pietie and Zele in the* Cause of God, against the Pelagians, which he defended with great fervor, as wel as acumen of spirit; which also is greatly il∣lustrious in his defence of Gods efficacious Concurse and Providence about the substrate mater of sinful acts. This he frequently incul∣cates in his most excellent Book de Causa Dei, specially lib. 1. c. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34. He demonstrates (1) That al voluntary actions Page  [unnumbered] are governed by the Laws of Divine Providence, cap. 30, 31. p. 271, &c. (2) That althings which have any natural Entitie or Being, procede from Gods Providence actually and efficaciously dispo∣sing them, and not merely permitting. Which he demonstrates ma∣ny ways: as [1] Because there is no act simply evil and inordinate, by any inordination precedent to the divine wil. [2] Because other∣wise the whole Ʋniverse would not be disposed in the best manner. [3] Because the Scriptures both of Old and New Testments, ascribe to God in his Providence about Sin active Names. Thus cap. 32. p. 288. (3) That about whatever Gods Permission is, his actual Vo∣lition is also employed about the same. And he gives this demon∣strative reason hereof: For albeit those things that are evil as evil are not good, yet it is good that there should be not only good things, but also evil. For unless it were good that evils be, the Omnipotent good would not suffer them to be, as Cap. 33.

Hence, (4) He comes l. 34. to the state of the controversie,*How God wils sin, and how he wils it not. [1] He proves, p. 294, 295. That God must necessarily wil the existence of Sin, because he permits it: also God doth voluntarily provide for, yea act al the vo∣luntary acts of the wil both good and evil, with al their positive cir∣cumstances, which necessarily import sin. Again,

This Proposition, Sin is, is true; and therefore there must be some cause of its truth, which can be no other than the divine wil, from which al complexe beings as wel as incomplexe have their origina∣tion. Again, `Whatever is good must procede from the first good: but that Sin existe, is good, according to Augustin. So Hugo saith, That God wils that sins existe, because this is good. Moreover, he brings in Hugo speaking thus; (which deserves a great remarque) If it be said, God wils sin, this seems harsh and scandalous to the ear; and therefore some pious mind doth refute this, not because that which is spoken, is il spoken, but because that which is wel spoken is il understood.
[2] Thence Bradwardine pro∣cedes to refute Lombard, who asserts, That God wils sin as a pu∣nishment, not under this reason, as it is sin; [i. e. materially or en∣titatively considered] which Hypothesis of Lombard he refutes, by shewing,
That the punishment of sin is necessarily conjoined with the Sin: so that if God wils sin as a punishment, he must ne∣cessarily wil the existence of sin. Also whoever knows two things to be necessarily and inseparably conjoined, and wils that they should be so conjoined, and knowingly and rationally wils Page  [unnumbered] one; the same person wils also the other; specially if about both he employ an act of his wil: But now God knows and wils that those two, Sin and Punishment be conjoined together, and rationally wils the one, namely the punishment of sin, therefore also the sin. Again, he that wils an Antecedent, wils also the Consequent, at least in an universal, albeit not in a par∣ticular: for he that wils a whole, wils al the parts necessary thereto.
[3] Thence he procedes, p. 300. to shew, how God wils sin: God, saith he, doth no way wil Sin simply, but only in some limited respect:
For, to say that God wils something simply, is, according to the commun manner of speech, to say, that he loves it and approves of it as good. Yea, addes he, may it not be said, that in the whole Universe there is no such thing as Inordination, Deformitie, or Sin simply considered, but only Sin in some respect? Because in regard of the prime and su∣preme Cause, al Beings both positive and privative are sweetly disposed with the highest wisdome, beautie, and justice.
Whence [4] He gives us the difference between Gods Concurse to sinful acts, and to such as are good, p. 302. God, saith he, is not the Author of sin, as of that which is done wel:
For of this he is the Author so, as that he alone doth supernaturally create, and give to the wel-doer, Faith, Hope and Love, &c.
But it is not so as to sin. i. e. As to good, God produceth not only the natural act, but also the moral Bonitie, but as to Sin, he produceth only the natural entitative Act. [5] He thence p. 302. expli∣cates, how the Apostle Paul and the Fathers denied, that God wils Sin:
When, saith he, Augustin and the other holy men denie that God wils Sin, the cause of this negation seems this: Because the Apostle and Augustin, and other holy men placed Predestination, Prescience, and the like on Gods part, the Pe∣lagians and other Heretics would excuse Sinners from their sins, and retort the cause and blame on God, who so predestinated or foreknew: therefore these holy men would say, that God by his Predestination, Prescience or such like, doth not compel them against their wil to sin, but that they sin freely and by their own wil; and that God by predestinating, foreknowing, or willing sins, doth not sin, nor do unjustly, neither is he the first imputable, or culpable cause of sins; but the first, impu∣table, and culpable cause is the proper wil of the Sinner.
This indeed is the proper state of our controversie at this day. Then Page  121 he addes, pag. 303.
But if it yet be said, that it always hears il with many to say, That God doth any wise wil sin, it is certainly true, and that peradventure according to Hugo before cited, not because that which is said is not wel said, but*because that which is wel said, is not wel understood. I would to God therefore that they would take the Salt of Divine wisdome, and savor and understand the truth which is savo∣ry to a sane tast; and that they would know, that there is no evil in the world, which is not for some great good: why therefore should we substract from the World, and from God the Author of the World, this way of doing good, or of be∣nefaction, which is so admirable and great? Yea it seems more miraculose and great, to worke good out of evils than out of goods, or to worke good only. And without peradventure it seemeth so disgustful to many, if it be said, that God wils and produceth the act of Incest of the Father with the Daugh∣ter, of the Son with the Mother, of Parricide, Sedition, Blas∣phemie, and other like sins: and yet not only the Saints, but also the Philosophers speak thus: For who in such an incest pre∣pares the seed, and moves, creates, and infuseth the soul into the foetus, but God? and however it may sound, thus the Saints of God speak, yea the Spirit of God, who speaks in them.
What could be said more acutely, demonstratively and di∣vinely for the deciding our controversie, would men but re∣ceive it?

(5) Again, Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 20. p. 542, &c. proves out* of Altissiodorensis, super 2. sent.

That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil. Altissiodorensis's ar∣guments are these, [1] From the Passion of Christ, which was good, and proceded from a good cause, namely the Wil of God. [2] From the act of Fornication, whereby an holy Prophet is begotten: which act is the cause of good, and therefore good; and yet it is also evil: and therefore an evil action as it is an action is good and from God.
Thence he addes the Testimo∣nie of Thomas, in Quaest. de malo, q. 19. where he demands, Whether the act of sin be from God? and he answers thus:
It must be said, that among the Ancients there was a double opinion concerning this mater: some said more anciently, that the acti∣on of Sin was not from God; attending to the very Deformity of Sin, which is not from God: but some said, that the action of Page  122 Sin is from God; attending to the very Essence of the Act, which must be granted to be from God, and that on a double reason; [1] Commun, because God being Ens or Being by his own Essence, and his very Essence his Being, it must thence necessarily follow, that whatever doth participate of Being, must be derived from him who is Being by Essence. [2] Special: for it is necessary that al motions of second Causes be produced by the first Mover, who is God, as p. 554.

(6) Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 22. p. 559. riseth higher, and proves strongly, That it implies a contradiction for any Nature to act or move without God, of himself, properly, actually, and specially applying it to act, and moving of it. Which he demonstrates many wayes: as [1] Because no natural virtue or forme can operate without Gods cooperating therewith. [2] Because al natural things or causes are but as Instruments in regard of God the first Cause. [3] Because the create wil cannot subsist of it self; therefore neither can it act of it self, as c. 24. p. 563. [4] Because God, by reason of his infinite Actualitie, permits nothing but what he wils.

(8) Bradwardine, l. 3. c. 29. p. 739. ascends yet higher, and* demonstrates, That God, albeit he impel no man violently against his wil, yet he impels al mens wils spontaneously, and draws them to al their free acts, even such as have sin annexed to them.

But fur∣ther, addes he, it may be probably said, that God doth in some sense necessitate to the very act of sin, as to the substance of the act; yet it doth not thence follow that he doth necessitate to sin, or to the deformitie of sin, as it is sin, or the deformitie of sin: for the omnipotent God may, as it appears, separate the very substance of the act and whatever is positive in it from the Deformitie of sin, and can produce and conserve such an effect really positive and good, without such a defect and priva∣tive malice: Specially, sithat Sin, Deformitie, Vitiositie, or de∣fect is not essentially the very act, nor of the essence of the act, nor necessarily a consequent of the substance of the act. There∣fore the good God acting rightly, pre-acting and in some sense necessitating to such an act, according to its substance and na∣ture good, the vitiositie or sin doth not thence necessarily fol∣low: whence therefore doth it follow, but from the free wil of the Creature freely deficient, and from the wil of the Sinner?
What could be said more acutely, more judiciously, more de∣monstratively, Page  123 and more piously, to put a period to this contro∣versie, had not men a strong impulse to oppose the Truth? I have been the more prolixe in rehearsing these illustrious and de∣monstrative Sentiments of Bradwardine, because I find nothing newly started by our Adversaries, but what I find rationally, so∣lidly, and convictively solved by him, above three hundred years since. As for his solutions to the particular Objections made by his Opponents then, and ours now, we shal produce them in what follows in answer to the Objections against our Hypothesis, Ch. 6. §. 1, 2.

Having produced the concurrent Sentiments of the ancient* Fathers and Scholemen for the confirmation of our Hypothesis, we might now descend to the later Scholemen, specially the Tho∣mists; but these lie under the same criminal accusation and im∣putation with our Adversaries, as the orthodoxe Calvinist; and it deserves a particular remarque, that look as the Pelagian Je∣suites oppose the Dominicans in this point under the Bears skin of being Calvinists; so the Arminians and New Methodists op∣pose the Calvinists in the same point, under the Bears skin of being Dominicans: and indeed no wonder, sithat the Domini∣cans and Calvinists in this point about Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin do greatly accord. And let our Adversaries say what they list against the Dominicans, it's certain, that in this mater they have done great service to the cause and interest of Truth: and particularly Alvarez, who is* principally struck at by the adverse partie, deserves great ho∣nor and diligent inspection by those who have any kindness for our Hypothesis, or any part of the Doctrine of Efficacious Grace. I am not ignorant what an heavy load of Imputations, Strangius, and a Reverend Divine of Name among our selves, have laid upon him in their Oppositions to what he has writ in the defense of our Hypothesis; but the Jesuites themselves, who are his most puissant Impugnators, give him a more candid and favorable treatment: For in the treaty between them and the Jansenists begun Feb. 18. 1663. the Jesuites rejecting the Arbitrament of Gregorie Ariminensis and Estius, whom they judged more severe, they pitcht upon Alvarez as the more moderate, to whom they required the Jansenists to conforme in those points controverted, in order to an accommodement: and the reasons they allege are of moment:

For, say they, Alvarez having assisted at the Con∣gregations Page  124 de Auxiliis, there is a grand apparence, that he and those others who writ at the same time and since, took up this mode of speech to salve Libertie, according to the movements and sentiments which the Popes, Clement 8th, and Paul 5th had; albeit they made no Decree on this mater;
of which see Re∣futat. de Pere Ferrier, Chap. 6. and Idea of Jansenisme, p. 82. wherein remarque, (1) That the Jesuites, Alvarez's sworne ene∣mies, give him a more favorable character, as one, who for his moderation was employed by the Popes to assist at the Congre∣gations de Auxiliis, for the composing the differences in those points in controversie between the Dominicans and Jesuites about Predetermination. Yea, (2) That the Popes themselves, Cle∣ment 8th, and Paul 5th, had the same sentiments with Alvarez. Is it not strange then, that the Jesuites, who are professed ene∣mies to Predetermination, and the Popes themselves, who have been generally favorers of Pelagianisme, should have a greater kindnesse for Alvarez's sentiments about Predetermination, than Protestant Divines, whose Doctrine against the Pelagians and Jesuites can never be defended but by those principes on which Alvarez bottomes his Predetermination? For mine own part, I cannot but confesse, that in those Notions about Efficacious Grace and Predetermination, I read Alvarez with al possible di∣ligence and exactitude of spirit, and found therein so penetrant an acumen, so profound soliditie, and such masculine Demon∣strations, as that I never met with his equal, excepting Brad∣wardine and Ariminensis. This Justice I conceive my self under an essential obligation to do him, to wipe off those undeserved cla∣mors and aspersions which Strangius and another Divine of note among us, have loaded him with. His own Sentiments in the defense of our Hypothesis are laid down in his excellent Dispu∣tations de Auxil. l. 3. Disput. 24. where he doth with a great deal of moderation and yet invincible force of argument demonstrate, That God doth by a previous motion, truely and efficiently, or accord∣ing to the mode of a physical cause, premove free-wil to the act of sin, as it is an Act or Being. His Arguments for the demonstration of this Thesis are weighty and invincible, namely from the Parti∣cipation, Limitation, and Dependence of every Second cause, &c. Of which hereafter, c. 5. Lastly, that the Scholemen generally, besides such as are Pelagian, assert divine Predetermination to the material entitie of Sin, see Twisse, Vind. Grat. l. 2. Digress. 2.

Page  125I now passe on to Jansenius and his Sectators, who are brought* upon the Theatre by our Adversaries as Patrons of their Anti∣thesis: but this is so great a mistake in mater of fact, that I can∣not but admire any learned man should take refuge under it. Yet thus Strangius l. 2. c. 14. p. 318. brings in Jansenius opposing Augustin both to the Dominicans and Jesuites as to the point of Predetermination. The like is urged by a Reverend Divine of* repute among us. But this mistake is too obvious and great to take place among diligent and impartial Inquirers: For (1) It's evident, that Jansenius rejected the terme Predetermination as maintained by the Dominicans, not the thing it self as asserted by Augustin: Thus in his August. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. pag. 77, &c. he proves,

That there is no manner of speech among the Schole∣men so efficacious and pregnant to expresse Predetermination by, but Augustin useth the same to illustrate Gods efficacious concurse. And Tom. 3. l. 8. c. 1. p. 343. he acknowledgeth, That those learned men the Dominicans have reached the Mar∣row of Divine Adjutorie, and thence the true opinion of Au∣gustin.
Again, cap. 3. p. 346. he saith expressely, that herein Me∣dicinal Adjutorie agrees with physic Predetermination, that the office of physically predetermining the wil doth truely belong unto it, and it may be termed by that name taken not only in the abstract, but also in the concrete. Whence in the same Chapter he useth the very terme of physic Predetermination to expresse efficacious Concurse by, albeit not in the same manner as it is used by the Scholemen. So that it's evident, he was not averse from the thing, albeit he but seldome used the terme to avoid the cavils of Scholastic Theologues, as also to confine himself to the termes used by Au∣gustin. (2) That reverend Divine among us, who makes use of Jansenius's name against physic Predetermination, doth yet grant, that Jansenius held, the existence of sin to be necessary as a Punishment. Wherein he opposeth Jansenius, and also Augustin, who held, that sin as a punishment, was willed and caused by God, as before. (3) Jansenius August. de Statu Nat. Laps. l. 4. c. 21. p. 264. assures us, That men in their lapsed state, before Faith be in∣troduced, are under the captivitie of lust, and can do nothing but sin; which captivitie is the same with that foresaid necessitie and coaction, whereby sins committed by unbelievers are said to be necessary, and therefore they have no power to abstain from sin. And Tom. 3. de Grat. Christi, l. 10. he stoutly maintains these following asserti∣ons Page  126 about Reprobation, which clearly evince Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin. [1] He proves, cap. 2. pag. 420. That Gods negative Reprobation is▪ also po∣sitive. [2] He demonstrates, cap. 4. pag. 423. That the cause of Reprobation, according to its comparative consideration, is the absolute wil of God. This is owned by reverend Mr. Baxter, Cathol. Theol. part. 3. Sect. 7. §. 22. pag. 93. in these words: [Jansenius's Do∣ctrine is that] the Reprobation of men was by Gods positive absolute wil, of men in original sin, and the effect of it excecation and obdura∣tion. This being his proper opinion, it necessarily follows, that he asserted Gods predeterminative concurse to the entitative act of sin: for, as it is granted by Strangius, and others, efficacious predetermination always follows as a necessary consequent of ab∣solute predefinition: if God absolutely decrees to leave men to sin, it necessarily follows, that he efficaciously determine men to the entitative act of sin. [3] He goes higher than most of our Divines dare do in this point, in asserting, cap. 5. pag. 424. That damnation, excecation, obduration are the effects of Reprobation. But yet cap. 7. pag. 427. he answers the objection of such, that argue hence, That God lies in wait to destroy such as are reprobated; assu∣ring us, that the sinner only is the culpable criminal cause of his own damnation. And cap. 10. pag. 433. he demonstrates, That Repro∣bates are not created unto damnation, i. e. damnation as such is not the end of their creation: which sufficiently vindicates the holy God from being the cause of their sin or damnation.

As for the Jansenists, that they are of the same persuasion with* the Dominicans as touching our Hypothesis, is evident from their concessions to the Jesuites in their Treatie begun Febr. 18. 1663. mentioned in the Refutation of Pere Ferrier, Chap. 6. also Idea of Jansenisme, pag. 82. The sum was this: The Bishop of Comenge, a friend of the Jansenists, proposed this as an expedient to recon∣cile the two Parties, That the Jansenists declare, that they had no other sentiment about this mater, but what was taught by the Thomists. And because some of the Thomists flie higher than others, the Jesuites demanded, That the Jansenists should reduce themselves to the forme of speech used by Alvarez. So that it seems the Jansenists in the point of efficacious Concurse are looked on by the Jesuites (as indeed they are) as those that went beyond the very Do∣minicans. The Jansenists replied,

That the doctrine of Janse∣nius was not different from that of the Thomists, albeit it was Page  127 not his designe to render himself conforme to them, but to Au∣gustin.
And the true reason why the Jansenists do not maintain greater correspondence with the Dominicans, is, not their diffe∣rence in doctrine, but because many of the Dominicans have by a Spirit of Cabal, or of Faction joined with the Jesuites.

Lastly, that our Hypothesis, touching Gods efficacious Concurse to*al actions, even to such as have sin appendent to them, was generally owned, not only by single Sects or Parties, but by the generalitie of the Roman Church, before the rise of the Jesuites, is evident from the Doctrine of the Roman Catechisme, published by the command of the Council of Trent; where in the explication of* the Apostles Creed, about the end of the first Article, par. 1. cap. 2. §. 20. pag. 23. (edit. 1619.) we find this great testimonie to con∣firme our Hypothesis: God doth not only preserve and administrate althings that are by his providence, but also doth by an intime virtue, impel those things that are moved and do act any thing, to motion and action; so that albeit he doth not impede the efficience of second causes, yet he prevents them, in as much as his most secret force reacheth unto althings; and as the Wise-man testifies, Wisd. 8. 1. He reacheth from one end to another mightily, and sweetly doth order althings. Wherefore it is said by the Apostle, Act. 17. 21. For in him we live, and move, and have our being▪ What could have been said more clearly and fully for the asserting a predeterminative Concurse to al actions and motions of the creature, even such as have sin annexed to them? And by whom is this Doctrine taught? By the Council of Trent, which is the standard and measure of the Roman Faith, and no great friend to the Doctrine of Christ. Is it not strange then, that Reformed Divines, yea such as would be accounted Calvinists, cannot allow the efficacious Concurse of God so much as Trent-Papists allow?

§. 3. We have seen how far the Latin Fathers and those who li∣ved* in Communion with the Roman Church have openly espoused our Hypothesis; let us now descend to Reformed Theologues, and examine what their sentiments have been hereof. And here indeed we have an ample field to exspatiate in, albeit our Adversaries the new Methodists would confine us to a smal number of Adhe∣rents. We shal begin with John Wiclef, our first English Apostolic* Reformer, who following Bradwardine his Collegue in this, as in many other points about Grace, asserted, That as God necessitates the futuritions of instants, so also he necessitates al the events which in Page  128 those instants are futures, Art. Constant. damnat. 278. Again, he held, That God necessitates al active creatures to each of their acts; as Walden, tom. 1. cap. 21. pag. 35. & cap. 23. pag. 37. also Wideford, pag. 240, 248. Again he asserted, That to whatever Gods permis∣sion reached, to that also his actual volition reached; as Walden, tom. 1. pag. 39. which clearly demonstrates our Hypothesis.

But we passe on to John Calvin, whom some new Methodists,* particularly Strangius, would force into their Campe. Thus Strang. pag. 384, 554. where he endeavors to take off Calvin from our Partie: but he that looks into Calvins Institutions, l. 1. c. 18. wil find our assertion not only nakedly owned, but fully explica∣ted and demonstrated, and that by a multitude of scriptural in∣stances. Particularly he proves, (1) That God wils the existence*of mens sins; so that things repugnant to Gods wil of precept, are yet brought about by his efficacious wil of Decree and Providence. (2) That Gods permission of sin is not otiose, but active and energetic. (3) That Gods providence moderates and orders the sins of men. And he con∣cludes the Chapter with this seasonable caution:

As for those to whom this Doctrine of Gods judicial induration may seem rigid, let them but a little think, how tolerable their morositie may be, who reject a thing attested by such clear testimonies of Scripture, because it excedes their capacitie, and count it a crime to bring to light things, which if God did not know to be profitable for our knowlege, he would never have reveled them by his Prophets and Apostles.
So in other parts of his Works, as Resp. contra Pighium, de Libr. Arbitr. pag. 225. also Tractat. de occulta Dei providentia, he clearly asserts and demonstrates our Hy∣pothesis. This is wel taken notice of by judicious Davenant, in his Animadversions on Gods love, &c. p. 322.
It is, saith he, Calvins opinion, de occult. Dei provident. resp. ad 2. Lapsum Adae non fortui∣tum esse, sed occulto Dei decreto ordinatum. God foresaw Adams fal; he had power to have hindred it, but he would not, be∣cause himself had decreed otherwise. This is the effect of Cal∣vins doctrine. But as for the involving of men in sin and damna∣tion out of his only wil and pleasure, these are consequents falsely inferred upon Calvins Doctrine, by himself disclaimed, &c.

How much Zuinglius favored this opinion of Gods efficacious* Concurse to the entitative act of sin, is sufficiently evident from those great reproches which the Papists lode him with for it; which he wiped off with this answer,

That the same action, Page  129 which is sinful in regard of man, is not so in regard of God, be∣cause he is not under the same Law with man.
Thus Baronius, Metaphys. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. §. 87. pag. 152. The third mode, saith he, is peculiar to Zuinglius, who teacheth, that God exciting the wil to an evil object doth not sin, because God hath no Law set to him, but man hath. To which Baronius answers, That albeit God hath no Law set to him by any Superior, yet he hath a Law set to him by his own nature, not to deal injustly or cruelly with men. This replie, al∣though borrowed from Bellarmine, is now become commun with our Adversaries, yet without the least shadow of reason: for they do but beg the question, in saying, That God hereby deals injustly or cruelly with his creature. As for Zuinglius's proper sentiments about Gods exciting and applying the wils of men to the entita∣tive acts of sin, they are fully and clearly laid down in his Book de Providentia Dei, cap. 6. tom. 1. of his Workes, pag. 365. Seeing a Law is given to man, he always sins, when he actes against the Law, albeit he neither be, nor live, nor operate, but in God, and from God, and by God: But what God workes by man is turned to man for sin, but not in like manner to God: for man is under a law, but God is free—Therefore one and the same wickednesse, suppose adulterie or homicide,*as from God the Author, Motor, and Impulsor, it is a work, not a crime; but as it is from man, so it is a crime and wickednesse: for God is not bound up by law, but man is condemned by law. Thus he pro∣cedes to illustrate by many exemples, of David, &c. Thence, pag. 367. he instanceth in the induration of Pharaoh, &c. where∣in note, (1) That he cals God the Author, Motor, and Impulsor of the act; which must be understood, not morally, but physically, as he excites and applies the wil to its act. (2) That he frees God from being the Author or moral cause of the sin, because he actes not against any law: a distinction which was valid in his time, albeit scoffed at now-a-days even by Reformed Divines, yea Calvinists. Neither was this distinction coined by Zuinglius, as Bellarmine and others would fain persuade, but in use long before Zuinglius, by Scotus, Ariminensis, and other scholastic Theologues, who followed Augustin herein. Thus Scotus, in Sent. 2. Dist. 37. Quaest. 2. saith, The same action is sinful in regard of the create wil, but not as to Gods concurse, quia voluntas creata debet rectitudinem actioni tribuere, Deus autem non debet, because the create wil is under an essential obligation or law, to give rectitude to the action, but God is not, as before.

Page  130How deeply Beza was engaged in the defence of our Hypothe∣sis* is sufficiently evident by his Controversies in this point: as Tractat. Theolog. vol. 1. pag. 313, &c. in answer to the calumnies of Heshusius about the Providence of God, he saith, (1) That no event ever happens otherwise than God decrees: which he demon∣strates from the Omnipotence of God. Thence he procedes, (2) to demonstrate, That albeit God wil, and know, and decree al∣things in the world, yet that he is not the Author of sin. So pag. 315. (3) He proves, That Gods permission of sin is not idle or merely ne∣gative. This he demonstrates, pag. 317. from the vendition of Joseph; the robbing of Job; the ravishing of Davids wives by Absolon; Davids numbering the people and Gods inciting his heart thereto; Shimei's cursing of David; the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam, &c. (4) He procedes, pag. 319. to the fal of Adam, which he assertes to be from the decree and or∣dination of God, &c. The same Controversie he manageth a∣gainst Castellio, de aeterna Dei praedestinatione, p. 360. where he proves, That Adams fal was decreed and determined by God. The like, pag. 401. where he proves, That God doth not compel men to sin, or infuse sin into them, but justly and rightly incite their wils to the en∣titative act which is good. This he confirmes by the induration of Pharaoh, and Gods making use of wicked instruments for the pu∣nishment of men. That Calvin and Beza did fully espouse our Hypothesis is evident not only by the opposition of Bellarmine and his sectators, but also by that of Arminius, who objectes the very same things against them, as are objected against us, namely, That God ordained that man should fal and become vitiose: by which opinion, saith he, God is made the Author of Adams fal and sin: of which see Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 554. And indeed al the Helvetian Churches to this very day continue very orthodox and zelose against al the Arminian Dogmes, in this as in other points; which sufficiently appears by their new Articles lately added to their Confession, and signed by their Ministers and Pro∣fessors, for the condemning the new method of Amyraldus, and others in the French Churches.

That not only the German and Helvetian, but also the French* Churches in their first Reformation fully maintained our Hypo∣thesis, is most evident by the most elaborate, acute, and demon∣strative determinations of great Chamier, the greatest light that ever France Reformed had, Calvin only excepted, who in his Pan∣strat. Page  131 Cathol. tom. 2. lib. 3. gives us a copiose, distinct, and con∣victive decision of this Controversie as then agitated by the Cal∣vinists and Jesuites; which answers exactly to our present Con∣troversie with the new Methodists. He titles this Book, Of the Author of sin: and proves, cap. 1. That the Reformed Divines do not make God the Author of sin, albeit the Jesuites accuse Calvin, Martyr, and Beza therewith. Thence, cap. 2. he layes down the opinion of the Reformed Divines, namely, That al actions both sinful and good are to be referred to the actuose providence of God. Which he demonstrates by Shimei's cursing David, Absoloms incest, &c. Whence, cap. 3. he passeth on to the Papists opinion touch∣ing the Providence of God about sin, which they make to be on∣ly by speculative, idle permission, as some new Methodists. Cap. 4. he procedes to prove, That God wils the existence of sin. Wherein he answers Bellarmines Objections against Calvin and Beza as to this point. Cap. 5. he passeth on to the second Argument of the Calvinists, namely, that men are in their sinful acts the instruments of God. Thence, cap. 6. he descends to their third Argument, from Gods excecation and induration of mens hearts: wherein he di∣stinctly opens the Scriptures about induration. Whence, cap. 7. he comes to their fourth Argument, from Gods energie in sinful acts; which he demonstrates both rationally and scripturally. And thence, cap. 8. he gives us Augustins opinion consonant to Calvins herein. Whence in the following Chapters, 9, 10, 11, 12. he answers the Objections and Arguments of the Papists, where∣by they endeavor to prove, That the Calvinists make God the Au∣thor of sin: which imputations are stil fastened on us by the Ar∣minians and new Methodists.

We may adde hereto the sentiments of Ludovicus Crocius, Pro∣fessor* at Breme, and a Member of the Synod of Dort, who in many points, specially that of middle Science and universal Grace, fol∣lows the new method, yet in this of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin, seems orthodox and concurrent to Calvins Doctrine. So in his Duodecas Dissertat. Exegetic. De voluntate Dei, Dissert.* 8. thes. 74. pag. 415. where he tels us,

That the fundamen of clearing God from being the Author of sin is the distinction of the material and formal part of sin, namely of the action and the vitiositie, which is in the action: for that, not this, he wils and decrees; and this, not that, he permits.
And his reason is in∣vincible:
for otherwise there should be an action independent Page  132 as to God, and the efficacious providence of God should be de∣nied, which is Epicurean.
And then, thes. 99. pag. 426. he tels us,
That as to the act of the Divine wil about sin, the Scriptures seem to contradict themselves, in that some Scriptures assure us, that God doth not wil sin, but hate it, with those that commit it, as Psal. 5. 5, 6, 7. Zach. 8. 17. and yet other Scriptures say, that God wils, creates, and effects sins, as Esa. 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37, 38. Amos 3. 6. Then he solves these seeming contradictions, by distin∣guishing between the act and the vitiositie of the act: also be∣tween the act as it procedes from God, and as from the Creature: lastly between the decreeing wil of God, and the preceptive wil of God. Whence he concludes, thes. 100. thus: `For God both wils and produceth the act, as an act, of it self indifferent to mo∣ral bonitie and evil, &c.
And he addes, thes. 101. `That this act in itself essentially good, even as it is contaminated by the creature, God wils it as a punishment, and useth it as an ordain∣ed convenient means for the best ends. The like thes. 112. p. 430. where he shews, how God wils sin, not as sin, but as a punishment, &c. of which more fully hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 5. These senti∣ments of Lud. Crocius I rather chuse to cite, because he, in other points, follows the new method, and is cried up by some of that partie.

As for the Judgement of the Synod of Dort touching our Hy∣pothesis,* it is sufficiently evident by their Determinations, as also by the oppositions the Arminians made against them in this point, both whiles they sate, and afterwards. I am not igno∣rant, that some of our Adversaries are so confident as to cite the Synods testimonie in favor of their Antithesis; but this is so false an imputation, as that I judge no intelligent impartial Reader can give credit to it. There needs no more to evince the Synods concurrence with us in this point, than their stout defence of ab∣solute Reprobation; of which see Davenants Animadversions on Gods love, pag. 242.

We might adde almost an infinitude of Testimonies from Re∣formed* Divines, Churches, and Synods for the confirmation of our Hypothesis: but in what remains we shal confine our selves to the Doctrine and Testimonie of the Church of England, and those renowned Professors of Theologie who have maintained and vin∣dicated our Hypothesis. The Church of England as to Doctrine imbibed, even in her first Reformation, the sentiments of Page  133Calvin and the Reformed Churches in France, Holland, Helvetia, and Germanie; albeit as to Discipline she stuck unto Episcopal Jurisdiction. This is evident by that noble designe of Cranmer and our first Reformers, to reduce the Doctrine of al the Refor∣med Churches unto one Confession. I shal here only cul out a few Testimonies of some great Professors of Theologie both in Oxford and Cambridge, who were of an Episcopal Judgement as to Discipline, yet stout Champions for our Hypothesis.

We shal begin with Davenant, a great Master of Reason, and* one that went as far as he could, and I think, as far as any ought, in compliance with those of the New Method; yet he stil assert∣ed, and with great strength of reason defended absolute Reproba∣tion and Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin. Thus in his Determinations, when Professor of Theologie at Cam∣bridge, Quaest. 22.

In evil acts, saith he, God hath decreed to permit the event, to concur with the Agent as an universal Mo∣tor, and lastly to order the event itself according to that of Hugo, de sacr. fid. lib. 1. cap. 13. God wils that sin be, and yet he wils not sin, i. e. with a wil of approbation.
So Quaest. 25. pag. 118. he grants, That Gods decree to permit sin is efficacious, so as to extract good out of it. But he speakes more fully for the defense of our Hypothesis, in his Animadversions on Gods love to mankind, pag. 72.
But those who derive the evil actions of men from their own free wil as the proper efficient cause, and the existing or coming of such actions in eventum à Decreto Dei permittente & ordinante, are in no error at al. But if any shal go about to set mans wil at libertie, and to tie up short the decreeing and determining wil of God, as if this had not the determining stroke amongst al possible evil actions or events, which shal infallibly be, and which shal infallibly not be, he may avoid the suspicion of Stoi∣cisme and Manicheisme, but he wil hardly avoid the suspicion of Atheisme. For the greater number of mens actions being wick∣ed and evil, if these come into act without Gods determinate counsel and decree, human affaires are more over-ruled by mans wil, than by Gods.
What could be said more acutely and di∣stinctly for the demonstration of our Hypothesis? He here al∣sertes, (1) That the existence of evil actions is from Gods decree per∣mitting and ordering of them. (2) That Gods decreeing wil doth determine [or predetermine] al possible evil actions or events, which shal infallibly be. And do or need we assert more than this? And Page  134 frequently in that Book Davenant assertes and demonstrates, That the decree of Reprobation is absolute, determining sinful acts and events, yet so as that it leaves no man under a compulsion to sin. So pag. 253. he saith, Gods decrees carrie with them a necessitie of infallibilitie as to the event, but not a necessitie of compulsion as to the manner of acting. And elsewhere he frequently inculcates, That let Reprobation be absolute or conditional, it leaves the same possibilitie and the same liber∣tie to the Agent. So pag. 333, 340, 341, 351, 360. Yea, he proves, That the Arminians must, and do grant immutable absolute decrees, which admit the same objections and difficulties, as those of the Antiar∣minians. So pag. 354, 400, 418, 419. Lastly he proves, That infallible prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much a necessitie on the wil, as absolute Reprobation, asserted by the Calvinists. So p 418, 419, 442, 462.

Davenant was succeeded by Samuel Ward, Doctor of Divinitie,* and Margaret Professor of Cambridge; a person of great natural acumen, and deep insight into the main points in Controversie between us and the Papists, as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections published by Dr. Seth Ward. With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypothesis is fully manifest by his 24. Determination, pag. 115. where he stout∣ly demonstrates this Thesis, That the concurse of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation; according to that great saying (though in an apocryphous Book) Wisd. 8. 1. Wisdome [i. e. the wise Providence of God] reacheth from one end to the other mightily, and yet orders althings sweetly. He first states the Con∣troversie, shewing how the Remonstrants fal in with the Jesuites, Bellarmine, Molina, Lessius, &c. in asserting only a simultaneous im∣mediate concurse of God with the second cause upon its action and effect, yet so, that al the modification and determination of the act, specially in free actions, be from the second cause, as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he assertes, (1) That the concurse of God with second causes, even such as are free, is an antecedaneous influxe upon the very second causes themselves, moving and applying them to their work. This he demon∣strates both by Scripture and Reason. The Scriptures he cites are Esa. 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5, 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36. His Rea∣sons are cogent, namely from Gods prime causalitie, the instrumental concurse of al second causes, the dependence of the human wil, &c. (2) He assertes, pag. 117. That this previous concurse of God the first cause doth, according to its mode, modifie and determine al the actions Page  135 of the second causes. This, which is fully coincident with our Hy∣pothesis, he invictly demonstrates,

[1] because the Divine wil determines itself for the production of every the most special and singular effect; therefore it is not determinable by any in∣ferior cause, as the influence of the Sun is. [2] Because as mans free wil determines althings subject to it, so much more effica∣ciously doth the Divine wil determine al create things subject to it. [3] He demonstrates the same from the supreme Perfe∣ction of Divine Providence, whereunto it belongs determina∣tively to wil and predefine al and singular things which are done in time, and to destine the same to those ends intended by itself, as also to move and applie al second causes to their deter∣minate effects. [4] Because otherwise the concurse and deter∣mination of free-wil should be exemted from the modification of Divine Providence; and so God should not have a Provi∣dence over althings in particular, but only in commun: for, as Thomas, pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth, The Divine providence extendes only to those things, unto which the Divine causalitie extendes: where∣fore if God doth not determine the concurse of free-wil, he wil not have a providence, but only a prescience thereof in particu∣lar, as pag. 118.
Thence (3) he assertes and demonstrates, That this antecedaneous concurse of God on second causes modifying their actions, takes not away from them their proper mode of operating. This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predetermina∣tive concurse with human libertie, and he doth it with a marvel∣lous dexteritie and sagacitie, withal shewing, that the Molinists and Remonstrants, with Cicero, make man sacrilegious, whiles they endeavor to make him free. And Determinat. 26. pag. 132. touch∣ing absolute Reprobation he saith, that it is the antecedent, but not the cause of mens sin. Lastly, what his sentiments were touch∣ing efficacious predeterminative concurse, is to be seen in his most acute Clerum, de Gratia discriminante.

From Cambridge we might passe on to Oxford, and without much difficultie demonstrate, that al the principal Professors of Theologie ever since the Reformation have chearfully espoused and strongly defended our Hypothesis against the Jesuites and Re∣monstrants. Our learned and famose George Abbot, in his Quaestio∣nes*sex, Praelect. &c. cap. 6. discusseth this very Question, An Deus sit Author peccati, Whether God be the Author of sin? And pag. 207. he gives us this distinct decision of the whole: 4. In Page  136 the very actions, which on mans part are vitiose, the divine finger plainly shines forth; but so that God be the motor and impulsor [marque that terme which notes the highest Predetermination] of the action and worke; but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting: For God excites [i. e. predetermines] the spirits of wicked men to attemt some things, &c. And he cites for it that great Effate of Augustin, de Praedest. Sanctor. Quòd mali peccant ipsorum est; quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt, ex virtute Dei tenebras, prout vi∣sum est, dividentis, &c. What the Sentiments of pious and learn∣ed Dr. Holland, Regius Professor of Divinitie, and Dr. Pride∣aux* his Successor, were, is sufficiently evident by their warm zele against the Arminians. As for Dr. Barlow late Margaret Professor, he has sufficiently declared his assent and consent to our Hypo∣thesis, in his Exercitatio 2, de Malo, Conclus. 7. Rat. 3. where he proves, That it is impossible there should be any finite create En∣titie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie. And to con∣clude this Head, it is very evident, that not only the Professors of Theologie, but also the Bishops and Convocation, together with King James, were greatly opposite to Arminianisme, and so friends to our Hypothesis: Yea in Bishop Laud's time, when Arminianisme began to flourish, there were but five Arminian Bishops, Laud, Neale, Buckeridge, Corbet, Howson, and Montague, who espoused that Interest, as Dr. Heylin, in the Life of Bishop Laud assures us. By al which it appears most evident, that not only Rutherford, Twisse, and Dominicans, but the main bodie of Antipelagian and Reformed Divines have given their ful assent and consent to our Hypothesis, for God's predeterminative Con∣curse to the substrate mater of Sin.

§. 4. Having examined the Testimonies of ancient and later* Theologues that concur with us, let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antithesis, and who they are by whom it has been defended. The Antithesis to our Thesis, namely, That God con∣curs not to the substrate mater of Sin, is generally ascribed to Du∣randus, as the principal founder thereof, who denied Gods im∣mediate concurse to actions, under this pretext, that hereby we make God the Author of mens Sins. But to speak the truth, this An∣tithesis is much more ancient than Durandus. Capreolus in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. asserts, That this was the Opinion of the Manichees: and Aquinas in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. saith, That it it is next to the error of the Manichees, who held two Principes, one of Good, and the other of Evil.Page  137 And the reason why this Antithesis is fathered on the Manichees is this, because whoever denies God to be the cause of the sub∣strate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed, must hold, That there is some real positive entitie in sin whereof God is not the cause: whence by consequence such must assert, That there are two first Causes, one of Good, and the other of Evil; which was the error of Marcion and Manes, who held, there were two first Principes, the one 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the supreme good, who was the cause of al good; the other 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the supreme evil God, who was the cause of al evil. And certainly, they that maintain sin to be ac∣cording to its formal reason something positive or real, or that God is not the cause of the substrate mater of sin, wil necessarily fal into the sentiments of Marcion and Manes. Again, Hierony∣mus, Epist. ad Ctesiphontem, makes this Antithesis of Durandus* to be the Doctrine of Pelagius, who, saith he, held, That God having once conferred free-wil, it is not necessary that he further ope∣rate with us: and he speaks of natural operations, as of the mo∣tion of the hand, &c. which was Durandus's opinion. Though I cannot but confesse, Jansenius, August. Tom. 1. l. 5. c. 20. p. 119. tels us, the Pelagians granted, That God concurs to al the opera∣tions of the Wil. But the Conciliation of these two opposite Testi∣monies is not difficult, in that the Pelagians granted Gods con∣curse to al operations in termes, but denied it in effect and con∣sequences, as our Adversaries now-a-days. Compton Carleton, in his Philosoph. Ʋnivers. Disput. 28. Sect. 1. §. 3. assures us, that the opinion of Durandus was asserted and defended before him, by Nicolaus Bonetus, lib. 7. Theol. c. 7. and it is not improbable but it was also by some others.

But yet it cannot be denied, but that the principal Author of* this Antithesis was Durandus; whence among the Scholastic Theologues it receives the Denomination of Durandisme, which they cal a rash, erroneous, dangerous error, little better than Arianisme. Bellarm. l. 4. de Grat. & lib. Arb. saith, it is repug∣nant to the Scriptures, Testimonies of the Fathers, and manifest Reason. Suarez Metaph. Disput. 22. Sect. 1. n. 7. saith, It is er∣roneous in Faith: & de Concursu, l. 1. he assertes, That the opinion of Durandus is not only reprehended, but also rejected by al approved Theologues, as an error in Faith. Is it not strange then, that Re∣formed Divines, yea some of great vogue for Pietie and Learn∣ing should espouse an error so grosse, and so much decried by Page  138 Papists themselves? But to give a convictive demonstration, that those who denie Gods Efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin really fal under the Imputation of Durandisme, we are first to examine what Durandus's opinion as to Gods Concurse is, and then who they are who may be reputed his Sectators.

Durandus proposeth his opinion, in sentent. l. 2. Dist. 1. Q. 5. in these words, Ʋtrum Deus agat immediate in omni actione Crea∣turae, Whether God acts immediately in every action of the Creature? which he denies; and the principal reasons of his negation are these: (1) Because then God should be the author of Sin. (2) Be∣cause such an immediate Concurse destroyes human libertie, in that it determines the wil, and so puts an end to its Indifference: of which see Strangius, p. 142. So that indeed the very same arguments, which were used by Durandus against immediate Concurse, are used by our Adversaries the New Methodists against predetermi∣native Concurse as to the substrate mater of Sin. And albeit the most of them professe a great displeasure against the Hypo∣thesis of Durandus, yet, I must freely declare my mind, I cannot conceive how they can, without apparent contradiction, defend their own, but by espousing that of Durandus, which a reverend Divine of great name among us professedly doth; And that the most of our Adversaries, even among the New Methodists, who in profession disown it, fal under the imputation of Durandisme, we shal anon make evident, when we come to treat of their par∣ticular sentiments: at present take these Criteria or distinctive notes of Durandisme. (1) Al such as assert a Divine Concurse to the principe or subject only, and not immediate unto the Act, fal un∣der the imputation of Durandisme. This is wel observed by Strangius, l. 1. c. 10. p. 57. where he tels us, That those who allow only a Concurse to the second Cause, moving it to act, without a conti∣nued concurse to the action, fal into the error of Durandus. Herein Durandus is followed by Aureolus, a professed abettor of Du∣randisme. Thus also Amyraldus, and a Divine of name among our selves. (2) Al those who hold only a general immediate con∣curse to the act, such as is determinable by the mater it workes on, as the Influence of the Sun is by its mater, are deservedly branded with the black note of Durandisme. Thus Baronius, together with the Remonstrants and Molinists. (3) Al such as denie every real Being or Entitie to be from God by an immediate efficience, justly fal under the marque of Durandisme. Thus Camero, and our Adver∣saries Page  139 generally, who denie that God doth efficaciously concur to the substrate mater of Acts intrinsecally evil. (4) Al those who affirme, That it implies no contradiction for God to make a creature which shal act without immediate concurse, must necessarily symbolise with Durandus. This is acknowledged by Baronius, Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp. 3. S. 61. p. 131. where he brings in this as the Second argument for Durandus, That God can give to the creature a power to act without his concurse, sithat this involves no contradiction. To which he answers wel, in the Negative, that for God to make such creatures as should not depend on him in operation as wel as in essence, involves a flat contradiction, because dependence in Essence and Operation is essential to the creature. This piece of Durandisme Strangius and others seem chargeable with, as hereafter, in our account of Stran∣gius.

But we descend to the particular Sects, who oppose our The∣sis,* with endeavors to evince how far they fal in with the Hy∣pothesis of Durandus. And we shal begin with the Jesuites, who now generally passe under the name of Molinists, from Ludov. Molina their chief Captain, who in his Concordia Lib. Arbitr. cum Gratiae donis, &c. Quaest. 14. Disp. 26. assertes, (1) That Gods immediate concurse terminates not on the human wil by applying it to act, but only on the act it self and effect. Whence, (2) That this Concurse is not antecedent or previous as to the act, but only si∣multaneous; i. e. That God immediately concurs together with the wil to the same act, and conserves the same. Thence, (3) That this immediate concurse of God is not predeterminative, at least as to human acts, but only indifferent and determinable, like that of the Sun. Whence, (4) That as to the substrate mater of Sin, immedi∣ate Concurse doth no way determine the wil, or applie it to its act, but only influence the act in a general indifferent manner, so as the wil stil retains its innate indifference, and libertie of acting or not acting. Such are the Sentiments of the Molinists or Jesuites, wherein they are greatly opposed both by Dominicans and Jansenists: Thus Jansenius, August. Tom. 2. lib. 6. singul. c. 14. p. 58. where he proves, That this simultaneous Concurse confers no forces or aide to second Agents, but only accommodates it self to the forces of the create pow∣er, &c. which sufficiently demonstrates the identitie of this opi∣nion with Durandisme, albeit the avouchers of it oppose Duran∣dus with great vehemence.

Page  140But of late there started up Ludovicus à Dola, a Capucine* Friar, yet learned and acute, who espoused the Hypothesis of Durandus, as the only Medium for the reconciling those two op∣posite parties, the Dominicans and Jesuites. His book he termes, A Quadripartite Disputation, touching the mode how the Concurse of God and the Creature stand in conjunction for the production of free Acts, of a natural order, specially such as are wicked: He bends his Disputation both against the Predeterminants, as also against the Assertors of Middle Science. His first part is general, stating the controversie between the Jesuites, who assert a Middle Sci∣ence, and the Dominicans, the Assertors of Predetermination; and withal explicating the origine of the Controversie from the presupposed Immediation and real Identitie of the Divine and creatural Concurse. His Second Part is against the Jesuites, to demonstrate, That a next, immediate and identific concurse of God to al acts both good and bad cannot be defended by the artifice of their Middle Science. In his third part he disputes against the Dominicans, proving, That God doth not concur with us to acts of a natural order, specially such as are wicked, by a physic Predetermination, and more∣over by an identific and simultaneous concurse. In his fourth and last part he stablisheth and demonstrateth, (with al the force of Arguments such a ruinous foundation wil admit) the Hypothe∣sis of Durandus, That the general Concurse of God to acts of a na∣tural order, specially such as are wicked, is not proxime, immediate and identific, but remote, mediate, and really distinct from the act of the creature. This Hypothesis he defends as the only expedi∣ent for the conciliation of Divine Concurse with human Libertie, the vindication of Gods Sacred Majestie from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and the putting an end to those endless controversies about Divine Concurse. And I cannot but conceive my self under an essential obligation freely to deliver my mind in this point, that it is impossible for our Adversaries, the New Methodists, or any others, to defend their Antithesis against us from apparent contradictions and inconsistences with it self, or to free themselves from those blasphemous Imputa∣tions they charge upon us, unless they betake themselves to this stratageme and subterfuge of Durandus and Lud. à Dola: and therefore I do no way wonder, that a Divine of great name and Head of that partie among us, doth openly declare his assent and consent to this Hypothesis of Durandus, it being the only refuge Page  141 to preserve him and his Adherents from self-contradiction and condemnation.

Among the Reformed Churches, the first Impugnators of* our Hypothesis were the Remonstrants, communly stiled Armi∣nians, from Arminius, their first Founder, Professor of Theolo∣gie at Leyden, who began to diffuse his Pelagian Infusions about the year 1610. His Sentiments about Gods Concurse to the sub∣strate mater of sinful acts he layeth down Disputat. publica, Thes. 7. §. 8, 9, 10. p. 193. but more fully, Thes. 9. de justitia & effi∣cacia Providentiae Dei in malo, p. 198. where he distinguisheth Gods efficience about the act of sin from that about its vitiositie. This efficience of God about sin he makes to be both about the beginning, progresse and consummation of Sin. (1) As for Gods efficience about the beginning of sin he distinguisheth it into [1] Impedition, both sufficient and efficacious, whereby God puts an impediment to sin; and [2] Permission, which is contrary to Impedition, the suspension of al impediments, which might hinder the execution of Sin. The fundamen of this Permission he makes to be mans Libertie, and Gods infinite Wisdome and Power to bring good out of evil. (2) Gods Efficience about the progresse of Sin he placeth in Direction and Determination. [1] Di∣rection of Sin he makes to be an act of Divine Providence, whereby God doth most wisely and potently direct sin to what end he pleaseth, passing on from one extreme to the other mightily, and yet disposing althings sweetly, according to that great effate of apocryphous Wisdome, c. 8. v. 1. [2] Determination he takes to be an act of Divine Providence, whereby God puts measures to his Permission, and termes to sin, that it run not into infinite, according to the pleasure of the creature. (3) Gods Efficience about the consummation and terme of Sin he placeth in Punition, and Remission. As for Gods Concurse to the Act of Sin as naturally good, he doth craftily, according to his wonted mode in such cases, wave that difficult point: Yet in his Articles, De Peccati Causa Ʋniverse, p. 779. he Scepticly urgeth the Arguments of our Antagonists, to prove, That we make God the Author of Sin. But to sum up Ar∣minius's Sentiments in this point, Albeit he placeth Gods Per∣mission about Sin in a mere suspension of Impediments, which is no way influential on the Act, yet in that he allows also a provi∣dential Direction and Determination of the Act to its end and due measures, we may thence evidently demonstrate our Hy∣pothesis, Page  142 that God predetermines the Wil to the entitative act of Sin, of which hereafter, Chap. 5.

Arminius's Sectators usually stiled Remonstrants, (from their* Remonstrances in the Synod of Dort) Grevincovius, Vorstius, Epi∣scopius, Corvinus, &c. who being animated by many of the Civil Magistrates of Holland, gave themselves the confidence, but those poor Churches the peste, of divulging their Pelagian Poi∣son; which, by the interposure of King James, (who was a professed enemie to that faction) occasioned the Synod of Dort, An. 1618. where Divines out of England, France, and Germanie resorted, to put a period to those Pelagian Dogmes. The Remon∣strants in opposition to that Synod, writ their Acta & Scripta Synodalia Dordracena, wherein they greatly impugne the Synods Determinations for Absolute Reprobation, and Gods Providence in sinful Acts, falsely charging on our Divines, (1) That they held, the Reprobate were destined to Incredulitie, Impietie, and Sins, as the Means and Causes of Damnation. (2) That they made God the Au∣thor of Sin, and the like, of which see Acta Synodalia, Scripta Remonstrantium Dogmatica, p. 40, 41. I shal here only adde, what is wel remarqued by Le Blanc, Conciliat Arbit. Humani, Thes. 32. p. 434.

That these Arminians and Remonstrants di∣rectly follow the Jesuites and Molinists in asserting a general simultaneous indifferent Concurse, such as is determinable by the cooperation of the human wil.

These Remonstrants, from a spirit of Cabal, to fortifie them∣selves* against the Calvinists, who overpowered them in the Sy∣nod, fel into a league offensive and defensive with many German Anabaptists, who thereupon drank in many Pelagian and Armi∣nian Dogmes, particularly that of Free-wil; which Infusions have been since diffused throughout some, yea whole Churches of that Perswasion in England. I am not ignorant, that a great num∣ber not only of Professors but also Churches, who are for Re∣baptizing, do yet keep themselves unspotted and untainted as to these Arminian Notions; and with these I have no controversie, but particular love and kindness for many of them, albeit I differ from them in the point of Pedobaptisem. But as for those of that persuasion, who fight under Arminius's banner, they seemed most forward, after the breaking up of the Synod of Dort, to oppose the Calvinists in their sentiments about Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin. And (that which deserves Page  143 a particular remarque) the very arguments that are now urged against us by the New Methodists, were urged against the Synod of Dorts determinations in this point by them, and that in the same forme. Which is to be seen in a Dialogue of the Anabaptists, intituled, A Description of what God hath predestinated concerning man, &c. wherein pag. 16. they have this very expression, which they impute to the Calvinists, (as our Adversaries impute the same to us) namely, that they say, That God punisheth man with Hel-torments for doing those things, which he himself hath predestina∣ted, ordained, decreed, determined, appointed, willed and compelled him to do; and that which a man cannot chuse, but must needs do by the force and compulsion of his predestination. Are not the very same forged calumnies charged on us now-adays? See an excel∣lent replie hereto, as to the rest of their false imputations, by pious and learned Ainsworth in his Censure upon this Dialogue, pag. 2, 4, 5, &c.

But we descend now to our principal Antagonists, such as* would passe under the name of Calvinists, and yet are professed, yea vehement oppugnators of our Hypothesis. Thus Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. Thes. 34. pag. 434.

But of those Reformed Divines, which subscribe to the Synod of Dort, some in this part agree with the Molinists and Remonstrants, neither do they ac∣knowlege any other general concurse of God with second cau∣ses, than what is simultaneous and indifferent, whereby God doth not influence the cause itself, but its act, &c.
He instanceth in Baronius, Strangius, Amyraldus, &c. And what terme or title to give this new Sect of Adversaries more proper than New Me∣thodists I know not, this being the softest title, and that which they seem to recreate themselves in: some terme them down∣right Arminians; and albeit I conceive their Principes directly issue from and tend to Ariminianisme, yet I dare not lode them with this reprocheful style, because they generally assert efficaci∣ous Grace. I think we might terme them without injustice Semi∣arminians, (as the Semipelagians of old, who refined Pelagianisme) because they assert conditionate Reprobation and al the conse∣quents thereof: But yet because nothing more becomes an oppo∣nent than candor and ingenuitie, therefore to let passe al Titles that may carrie any thing of reproche, I give them only this of New Methodists, because they affect and attemt to give us a new Method or Scheme of Predestination, efficacious Grace, Divine Concurse, &c.

Page  144The first that opened the way to this New Method, was John*Camero, a person of excellent naturals, and those wel improved by acquired literature, but too much addicted to innovation in the doctrine of the Gospel, which he could not dissemble, but too oft made profession thereof; as in a Letter to Ludovicus Capellus, where he saith, That many things occurred to him, which neither his own mind nor the reason of the times would permit him to publish. He too much abounded in his own sense and words, with too great contemt of such as differed from him, though more deserving than himself, as Chamier. There were few Theologic Questions pro∣fessedly handled by him, specially such as belong to the Doctrine of Grace and Free-wil, but he divulged something of Novitie therein: among which novel opinions this was one, That he de∣nied every real positive Being to be from God immediately as the prime*efficient cause, as Epist. ad Thom. Rhaedam, (oper. edit. 1642.) p. 526. and Epist. ad Jac. Gallovaeum, pag. 528. Which sentiment of Ca∣mero laid the foundation, which Baronius and Strangius his Coun∣try-men afterward built their Antithesis on. Camero had for his intime Camrade Milleterius, who after his death turned Roman Catholic, and publisht many Antichristian Errors, which he pro∣fessed to have received from Camero.

But Camero's principal Sectator was Moses Amyraldus, who suc∣ceded* him in the profession of Theologie at Saumur, and indeed much out-went him in his propensions and closures with Duran∣disme and the Arminian Dogmes; particularly with this about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin. And that I may not be thought falsely to accuse so learned a man, one that passed under the name of a Calvinist, I shal faithfully relate the Character given him in this particular by one of his own friends and adherents, Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. par. 3. thes. 48. pag. 436.

There are not wanting, saith he, among the Doctors of the Reformed Schole some who touching the general Concurse of God neces∣sary to al the acts of creatures, seem to have the same sentiments with Durandus, and Ludovicus à Dola, Doctors of the Roman Schole. For that illustrious man Moses Amyraldus seems not to acknowlege any other general Concurse of God, by which he concurs with al second causes, besides that continued efficace, whereby he doth preserve and sustain the nature of every thing, and the forces given by nature. Whence he gathers, that such a concurse belongs not to libertie.
So Amyrald. de Lib. Arbitr. sect. 4. Page  145pag. 246. Make, saith he, nature and its abilities able to consiste with∣out the aide of such a concurse, and they wil truly act freely. Therefore let there be granted a concurse, which performes nothing else, but that these abilities, which would otherwise flag and vanish, consiste and be preserved in their natural state, Libertie wil thence receive no detriment. He had been speaking of Gods concurse to sinful acts, and as Le Blanc wel observes, by these words sufficiently indicates, that in this part he has the same sentiments with Durandus. Wherein note, (1) that Amyraldus grants, that sometimes it is sufficient for God to preserve the subject, and render its faculties habile or capable of acting, without immediate concurse to the act: which is also the opinion of some among us. (2) That this opinion, according to Le Blanc, fals in with that of Durandus, &c. So Thes. 50. pag. 437. Le Blanc addes,
That Amyraldus held a dou∣ble act of providence about evil acts, one externe, and the other interne: as for the externe act, he placeth it in two things, (1) in proposing objects, (2) in permitting Satan to set home those objects with efficace. The interne act of God consistes, accord∣ing to him, in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil, obscure, or remove the one, or cause some other object to be offered, which is most taking. In al which there is no violence offered to human libertie, nor indeed any efficacious immediate concurse asserted.
Yea in his Speciminis special. p. 468. he saith in down-right termes, That the wil of God dependes on us, not we on the wil of God: which is rank Durandisme and Molinisme. More of his wild sentiments in this as in other Arminian points, see Pet. Molinaei, de M. Amyraldi adversùs Spanhemium libro, Judicium, prae∣sat.

Placeus, another Salmurian Professor, albeit in other points he* stiffely defendes the New Method, yea, in that of original sin is greatly Pelagian, yet in this point touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin, he seems pendulous and in suspense. Thus, De libero Hom. Arbitr. p. 174. (edit. 1656.)

What the dependence of the second causes on the first in causing is, the Papists sharply dispute. It is truly confessed by al, that God doth concur with every cause, so as to operate conveniently with its faculties: but this concurse some make immediate, proxime, and altogether the same with the very action of second causes; but others de∣nie it—But we, according to that reverence we bear to the in∣finite Majestie of God, dare not determine how great the de∣pendence Page  146 of the second cause on the first is: it sufficeth us, that, provided the least spot of sin be not imputed to God, too much cannot be ascribed unto God, &c.

Le Blanc also, Professor of Theologie at Sedan, though he seems* to affect the like suspensive modestie, Concil. Arbitr. thes. 55. yet thes. 56. pag. 438. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius, and others, That God cannot physically premove and predetermine to acts intrinsecally evil, without being the Author of sin. But yet thes. 57. he recals himself, and saith, That provided God be not constituted the Author of sin, the dependence of the second causes on the first can∣not be too much asserted. And thes. 58. he addes this as most cer∣tain, That the aide and efficace of Divine providence, even about sin∣ful acts, may no way be restrained to a certain general indifferent con∣curse, &c.

But from the French Professors we passe on to those of Scotland,*Baronius and Strangius, who have been stiffe and tenacious Adhe∣rents to this New Method, about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin. As for Baronius, he is accused of rank Arminia∣nisme; and that which has given just ground for such an imputa∣tion is his denying al kind of predetermination as wel to good as to evil acts. Thus in his Metaphys. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. §. 78. pag. 146, &c. he endeavors to prove, That God doth not by a previous motion excite second causes to act. And his arguments to prove his Antithesis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians, Jesuites, and Arminians: namely that this previous motion and predetermination (1) destroyeth human li∣bertie, pag. 147. (2) That it taketh away the power of the wil to opposite acts, pag. 148. (3) That it maketh God the Author of sin, pag. 149. which he endeavors to prove many ways: [1] Because the entitative act of sin as being determined by God can∣not be separated from the obliquitie, pag. 150. [2] Because the action then as of such a species must be from God. [3] Because this opinion makes God to be injust and cruel, as pag. 151. [4] That hereby God is made the Author of sin more than the sinner. Al which are but trite and thread-bare arguments, urged by Pe∣lagians and Arminians, to which we shal answer more fully here∣after, chap. 6. §. 1, &c. Thence he procedes pag. 153. to answer our principal argument, That the second cause doth not act, but as moved by the first, and therein agrees with Suarez and other Jesuites in asserting a previous indifferent concurse. It's true, §. 58. p. 129. Page  147 he argues strongly against Durandus, yet in fine pag. 153. fals in very far with him, but more fully with the Molinists and Remon∣strants; which is wel observed by Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. thes. 35. pag. 434.

This at least, without al dout, is the opinion of Robert Baronius, in his Metaphysic, where touching the Con∣curse of God, and so of its concord with human libertie, he pro∣fesseth to have altogether the same sentiments with Fonseca and Suarez, namely that this concurse is of itself indifferent, and de∣termined by the second cause to a certain species of action: nei∣ther is it needful, that God premove second causes, but it is suf∣ficient, that together with them he influence their actions and effects.
And indeed Baronius's own illustration, Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. pag. 143. sufficiently clears this to be his proper opi∣nion; where he compares the Concurse of God to that of the Sun, which is the same in the production of perfect animals and monsters, in itself indifferent, but modified and determined by the mater it workes upon: which is the very instance given both by Jesuites and Arminians. Lastly, pag. 159. he gives us four acti∣ons of God in the induration of sinners, which are no more than what Molinists and Remonstrants acknowlege. Whence it is to me apparent, that it would not be an act of injustice, should we reckon him among the Arminians, whose sentiments and cause he has espoused; yet by reason of his nominal repute among the Calvinists, I rather incline to the more favorable censure of rang∣ing him among the new Methodists.

But yet our principal Antagonist is John Strangius, Professor at*Glascow, who (as they say) having had his spirit chafed and exa∣sperated by the opposition of Rutherford, writ a great Volume in four Books, Of Gods Wil and Actions about sin: wherein he bends his forces principally against the Dominicans, Twisse and Ruther∣ford, (who in his influences of the life of Grace, both Preface and Book, oft animadvertes thereon) as if these al, by asserting prede∣termination to the mater of sinful acts, made God the Author of sin. I must confesse, he discovers a natural acumen and a nervose vene of Reason in his Book, yet mixed with so great incongrui∣ties and self-inconsistences, yea contradictions, that I cannot but marvel how such a Master of Reason could satisfie himself with such poor subterfuges and evasions: But this I impute not to any defect in naturals, but in his cause, which admits not any solid reason for its defense. And that which yet seems more strange Page  148 to me is this, that he who opposeth with much vehemence Duran∣dus, Molina, Bellarmine, and the Remonstrants in this point of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin, yet at long-run fals in with each of these parties in some one, if not al their sentiments about this mater. (1) That he comes very near Durandisme is evident, in that he holds the Concurse of God not to be necessary to al acts of the creature, particularly to such as are intrinsecally evil: For to suppose any real positive Being, that fals not under Gods efficacious concurse, is to me no lesse than Durandisme. It's true, Strangius in words appears against Durandus, in owning an immediate Concurse of God to al actions of the creatures, as lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. But when he comes to explicate this im∣mediate Concurse as to actions intrinsecally evil, he placeth it only (as some now adays among us) in Gods conserving the nature and innate disposition of natural Agents, and giving them a self-deter∣mining power, whereby they are rendred apt and habile for any congene∣rous action, as they now phrase it. Thus pag. 164. Ergo si una Dei determinatio sufficiat, quâ Deus Agentium naturalium naturam ac in∣dolem à se insitam ac conservatam determinavit, quid opus est multipli∣cibus imò innumeris determinationibus ad eundem effectum, &c. So lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 584. he layes down this as his Hypothesis, That God doth not in althings determine the wil, but sometimes permit it a free election, to chuse this or that, to do this or that; and therefore in such acts he has not decreed, that man should precisely chuse this or that, &c. And he proves it by this argument, That it is not impossible for God, who hath made man a free Agent, and conserves his nature and forces, to permit something to mans free-wil, it a ut per Deum non stet quin homo possit eligere alterutrum, agere aliquid, aut non agere, &c. Wherein he proves, that it is not impossible for God to leave some things to mans indifference, without determining him to either extreme: and he proves this is not impossible, because it im∣plies not any contradiction; which is Durandus's very argument against immediate Concurse. (2) That Strangius conspires with and espouseth the sentiments of the Molinists and Arminians a∣bout indifferent simultaneous Concurse is partly acknowleged by his friend Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. thes. 36. pag. 434. having shewen the agreament of Baronius with the Molinists and Remon∣strants, he addes:

Neither doth John Strangius seem to differ much from this opinion: for albeit he thinkes, lib. 1. cap. 11. That the action whereunto God and the creature concur, is in order of Page  149 nature first from God, before from the creature;—and moreover, l. 2. p. 3. denies, That God concurs only by a general concurse; as the Sun concurs in the same manner to the generation of a man and horse; but determines, that the influxe of God is special to special effects, as they are specifically distinguished, not morally but physically; yet he doth by many arguments contend and prove, that the pre∣motion and predetermination of God, which the Schole of Thomas defendes,
to al and singular acts of the creature is not necessary. Note here, that albeit Strangius seems to differ from the Moli∣nists, Remonstrants, and Baronius in asserting Gods Concurse to be previous, particular, and special; yet in that he denies Divine predetermination to al creatural acts, Le Blanc makes him not to differ much from the Molinists and Remonstrants: which to me indeed is a great observation; for I am under a very strong, and I am apt to persuade my self, rational presumtion, that predeter∣mination to good acts can never be rationally defended by these New Methodists, who denie predetermination to the substrate mater of al evil acts; as Strangius doth, pag. 167, 584. of which more hereafter, chap. 5. §. 4, 5.

Here it were worthy of some labor to inquire How these New*Methodists fel into those novel sentiments about Divine Concurse, and on what reasons or grounds? As it was with the Semipelagians of old, so it has befel these New Methodists or Semiarminians: when the Pelagians were by Augustin driven from their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Diana of Free-wil and the potence of corrupt nature, the Semipelagians come with fresh forces and assault him in the point of Reprobation, and pretend, that he asserted, That God by a fatal necessitie compelled men to sin, and then damned them for what he had compelled them to: Just so the Arminians having been suppressed by the Synod of Dort, these New Methodists owning absolute par∣ticular Election and efficacious Grace with the Calvinists, thought they might more securely fal in with the Arminians in the points of universal Grace, conditional Reprobation, and that of denying Predetermination as to the entitative act of sin. Thus they divide the battel between the Calvinist and Arminian. But as Jansenius has wel observed out of Augustin, If there be the least point granted to Pelagius, al wil be at last granted; so I am very apt to fear, that these New Methodists, by going so far in symbolising with the Arminians, wil at last be wholly drawen over into their Campe. Thus much I am very confident of, they can never rationally de∣fend Page  150 absolute Election and efficacious Grace against Jesuites and Arminians, so long as they denie absolute Reprobation and Pre∣determination to the entitative act of al sins. As for the princi∣pal grounds, which induce these New Methodists to take up those sentiments, we shal endeavor to lay them down, when we come to treat of their proper Opinions and the consequents that attend them, Chap. 7.

But whiles we are thus characterising the Authors of this new* Method, we must do such Calvinists, who incline to them in some points, that justice, as to free them from al imputation or suspi∣cion of Arminianisme: It's wel known, that some of great worth and truly orthodox in point of Grace, have yet somewhat incli∣ned towards the new Method in point of universal objective Grace, as pious and learned Ʋsher, Davenant, and others both in our and the French Churches, who hold, Christs death to be an universal remedie applicable to al, but yet are far from asserting an universal subjective Grace, or any velleitie in God of saving al men, which Amyraldus and others assert. As for those who hold absolute and particular Election and Reprobation, Original sin in its ful ex∣tent, mens natural impotence and being dead in sin, efficacious Grace in the conversion of sinners, with Gods absolute, efficaci∣ous, immediate, total and predeterminative concurse to al natu∣ral as wel as supernatural actions, as Davenant, and some others, who incline to an objective universal Grace, do, I have no contro∣versie with them, but can owne them as friends of Grace, albeit in some modes of explicating it, they differ from us.

CHAP. V. Rational Demonstration of Gods predeterminative Con∣curse to the substrate mater of Sin.

Arguments for Divine predetermination of the Wil to the entitative act of sin. (1) From the Futurition of althings in the Divine Decree: the objections against this argument solved. (2) From the certi∣tude of Divine Prescience; with the solution of objections. (3) From the Decree of Reprobation. Davenants Hypothesis touching abso∣lute Reprobation and Decrees. (4) From Divine Concurse, [1] Its Principe and Origine. [2] Its Nature; Totalitie, Ʋniversa∣litie, Page  151 Particularitie, Immediation, Prioritie, and Independence. [3] Its Efficace, as to al natural and supernatural Acts and Effects. Al the Arguments urged against Predetermination to the entitative act of sin, strike as much against Predetermination to what is good. (5) From the nature of sin, its substrate mater and formal reason. (6) From Gods permission of sin; which is natural, negative, and positive. (7) From Divine providence about sin, both conservative, restrictive, gubernative. (8) From the absolute, immediate, essen∣tial dependence of al creatures on God, as the first cause.

§. 1. HAving given a scriptural Demonstration, as also the una∣nimous* testimonie of such as undertook to defend effi∣cacious Concurse in al Ages of the Church, for the confirmation of our Hypothesis, we now procede to demonstrate the same by rational Arguments grounded on scriptural principes and evi∣dence; which we shal reduce to the following Heads.

1. Arg. From the Futurition of althings in and by the Divine De∣cree;* which we thus forme: That which dependes on the Divine Decree for its futurition, necessarily fals under Divine predetermina∣tion as to its existence: But the substrate mater of al sin dependes on the Divine Decree as to its futurition: therefore it necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence. The major is granted by our Adversaries, particularly by Strangius, who oft as∣sertes, That Divine Predetermination is exactly adequate and com∣mensurate to Divine Predefinition; so that whatever is predefined by God in his Decree, must necessarily be predetermined by him in the execution and event. And what more rational than this assertion? Yea, what is predetermination of the event, but pre∣definition in the Decree? The difference between Gods eternal predefinition in the Decree, and predetermination as to actual concurse and execution in time differ only as active and passive Creation: as active Creation gives futurition to things, and pas∣sive, actual existence; so predefinition and predetermination; and therefore among the Greeks one and the same Verbe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies both to predefine and predetermine. So that our major seems so clear as to carrie with it its own evidence. Wherefore we passe on to demonstrate the minor, which our Adversaries principally strike at, and therefore needs our strongest forces: This we shal endeavor to make good in and by the following Pro∣positions. (1) Prop. Nothing is or can be future in its own nature, Page  152 without some cause of its futurition. How is it possible that any thing should passe from a state of mere possibilitie, contingence, and indifference, but by some cause? Do not possible, and fu∣ture differ? and must there not be some cause of this difference? (2) Prop. Whatever is the cause of futurition to any thing must be eternal. This is most evident; because whatever is future was so from Eternitie; for God foreknew it to be so: otherwise, how could his knowlege be certain? Hence, (3) Prop. Nothing can give futurition to things but God. For is there any thing but God eternal? (4) Prop. Nothing in God gives futurition to things but his wil. His Essence simply considered cannot give futurition to things; because possible and future are the same as to the Divine Essence: neither doth the Prescience of God give futurition to things; for things are not future because God foreknows them, but he therefore foreknows them because future. Hence it fol∣lows, that nothing but the Divine wil can give futurition to things, as Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 11. §. 9. whence also it necessarily follows, (5) That the futurition of the substrate mater of al sin is from the Divine wil and decree. For what can make sinful acts fu∣ture and so the object of Divine foreknowlege, but the wil of God, which gives futurition to althings? And if Gods predefining decreeing wil give futurition to the substrate mater of sin, must not his predeterminative wil also give existence to it?

But let us examine what assaults our Adversaries make against* this Argument by Responses and Objections. (1) They replie to our minor, That the futurition of the substrate mater or entita∣tive act of sin is not from the wil of God, but from the wil of man, that gives existence to it. Thus Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he endeavors to prove, That it is not repugnant that something should be future, which God hath not absolutely predefined, but left to the wil of man to effect. So cap. 9. pag. 628. he peremtorily as∣sertes, That God hath not decreed al futures, namely, the Fal of Adam, or the sin against the Holy Ghost, &c. So pag. 631. he saith, Nothing hinders, but that there may be some cause of the futurition of a thing besides the Decree of God, namely the create wil. The like Le Blanc, Concord. Libert. Hum. p. 1. thes. 55—57. where he endea∣vors to prove, That what is the cause why things existe in time, the same is the cause of their futurition from Eternitie: but mans wil only is the cause why sin existes in time, ergo, &c. A poor Response in∣deed, or rather begging of the Question! For is it possible that Page  153 the second cause loged in time should give futurition to a thing from Eternitie? Is it not an approved Maxime in Philosophie, yea in Nature, that the cause is ever, at least in order of nature, before the effect? and is the second cause confined by time, be∣fore the eternal futurition of its effect? (2) But Le Blanc an∣swers hereto, thes. 56. pag. 454. That Futurition is nothing else but a respect of reason, and an extrinsec denomination of the thing, which is said to be future, not something really distinct from the thing future, &c. But the vanitie of this subterfuge is most evident; for here∣by it follows, that the thing is not future before it is existent: can a modal extrinsec denomination of a thing existe before the thing that gives it existence? How many absurdities would follow hereon?

But our Adversaries have one grand Objection, which they lay much weight on, against our minor, and that is this: If the wil of God gives futurition to sin, then sin as future hath one and the same Idea with the wil of God: and so the futurition of sin must be God. This objection is urged and adorned with many Trophies by Strangius, Le Blanc, and a Divine of name among us. So Stran∣gius, lib. 3. cap. 9. pag. 631, 632. having pag. 626, &c. recited Twisses argument from the eternal futurition of sin, he replies thus: Herein, saith he, lies the whole force of the argument, that there can be no other cause of a futurition made from Eternitie, but what is eternal. To which he answers with a scoffe thus: A pretty argumentation indeed! why may we not by the same reason prove, that the futurition of sin is God? The same is urged by Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. par. 1. thes. 55, 56. pag. 454. where he endeavors to prove against Twisse, That if the futurition of sin be from the wil of God, it is God; which makes God manifestly the Author of sin. The same is urged by a Divine of some note among us. But in answer hereto, I must confesse, I cannot but marvel at the confidence of persons so learned, and in other points judicious, on such infirme and rotten grounds: For when we speak of the futurition of sin, which is a complexe aggregate thing, we must distinguish its material from its formal part. (1) If we speak of the material entitative part of sin, which is in itself a natural good, so we may without the least violation of Gods sacred Majestie affirme, that its futurition is the same, or not really distinct from Gods wil the cause thereof: and why not? is not the futurition of al natural Beings good? And whence procedes al good but from the immense Ocean of good? Page  154 Yea, was not al good from Eternitie loged in the bosome of God, and sonot really distinct from him? So that indeed this objection of Strangius and Le Blanc against the futurition of the material entitative act of sin from the wil of God strikes at the futurition of althings, even the most gratiose acts from the same wil: for if the futurition of any one natural act may be resolved into the wil of man as its first cause, why may not the futurition of al grace be as wel resolved into the same human wil, specially in Adams innocent state, who had then perfect free-wil? But yet (2) if we speak of the futurition of sin in regard of its formal na∣ture, consisting in its vitiositie and obliquitie, so we utterly denie, that its futurition is the same with God: for the futurition of sin as to its vitiositie is not from the effective wil of God, but per∣missive; God decrees to effect the entitative act, but only to per∣mit the vitiositie appendent thereto, which follows on the act, as other privations do on the absence of their habit. To make this evident by a parallel instance; God decrees the diurnal motion of the Sun, and that at night it shal retire into the other Hemi∣sphere, whence darknesse necessarily follows: may we thence argue, that the futurition of darknesse, or darknesse itself is the same with God? Would not any Fresh-man in Logic hisse such a consequence out of the Scholes? And yet who dares denie, but that the retirement of the Sun out of this Hemisphere into the other is from God, as also its futurition? The like may be instan∣ced in al other privations, which have no real being, and there∣fore no real efficient of their existence or futurition: for nothing can admit a real efficient cause of its futurition, but what has a real efficient cause of its existence: what is the first efficient of the existence of things? Is it not the wil of God? and is it not also the same Divine wil that gives futurition to things? Yea doth not the very same act or decree of the Divine wil that gives real Beings their futurition, give them also, in their appointed periods of time, their existence? So that in this regard the Rule of Stran∣gius and Le Blanc is most true, That the same cause that gives things their existence, gives them also their futurition: this I say holds true of the first cause, but not of second causes, as they would needs persuade us. So that, to conclude this argument, in as much as the wil of God gives futurition to al sin, the effective wil of God to the entitative act or substrate mater of sin, and the permissive wil of God to the formal reason, or vitio∣sitie Page  155 of sin, hence it necessarily follows, that the predetermina∣tive Concurse of God, (whereby I understand nothing else but the Efficacious Divine Wil as operative) gives existence to the substrate mater of Sin.

§. 2. Our second Argument shal be taken from the certitude*of Gods Prescience; and we may forme it thus: God can certainly foreknow nothing, but what he certainly decrees, predefines, and pre∣determines to be: But God certainly foreknows al sin. Ergo. The Minor is granted by our Adversaries and denied by none, that I know, except Atheists and Socinians: Thus Job 34. 21. For his eyes are upon the wayes of man and he seeth al his goings. Our prin∣cipal worke therefore wil be to make good our Major; which we dout not but to performe in and by the following Proposi∣tions: (1) Prop. Nothing can be certainly foreknown by God, but what has some certain Reasons, Principes, and Causes of such a fore∣knowledge. Now there are three causes that give certitude to al Science and Prescience: [1] A certitude of the Object: for if the object be uncertain, the Science can never be certain: can the Structure or Edifice be firme, if the foundation be infirme? [2] A certain Medium, which is the principal fundamen of al Science. [3]▪ A certitude of the Subject: for be the Object and Medium never so certain, yet there can be no certain Science, unless the Subject apprehend the same. And doth not the Pre∣science of God include al these degrees of Certitude? Must there not be a certitude of the Object, Medium, and Subject? (2) Prop. The Divine Prescience as to future sins admits not any of these degrees of certitude, but as originated from the Divine Wil and Decree. [1] How can Sin as the Object of Divine Prescience be certainly future, but by the efficacious Wil of God making it so? [2] What certain Medium can there be of Divine Pre∣science, but the divine Wil and Decree? [3] And thence, how can God have a subjective Certitude of sin but in and by his own Wil? Hence, (3) Prop. Gods certain Prescience of Sin infers also a certain predefinition and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin. That God knows nothing future but by his decree making it future, has been the persuasion not only of Calvinists, but also of the most sober Scholemen in al Ages, Scotus, Ricardus, Hervaeus, Bradwardine, Johannes Major, and others not a few, as Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. Par. 3. Thes. 33. p. 443. confesseth. Yea, Strangius himself grants the futurition of Sin in Gods Presci∣ence,Page  156 as l. 3. c. 9. p. 640. Yea, Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. Hum. Par. 1. Thes. 59. &c. p. 455. proves strongly, That according to Strangius's opinion, there can no contingent [i. e. sinful act] be fore∣known by God as absolutely future, but what God first decreed to be abso∣lutely future. His words are these:

But some also of those who hold some free acts of God to be absolutely future, and as such to be foreknown by God, without any Decree predetermining the free causes to those acts, as Learned Strangius, yet denie, that free future contingents may be known by God according to any Hy∣pothesis, which doth not include an absolute Decree concerning their futurition: as Strang. de Volunt. l. 3. c. 11. His reason is, be∣cause nothing can be certainly known, but what is certainly true: but nothing is certainly true, but what is necessary either abso∣lutely or conditionally. Whence he collects, that future condi∣tionates cannot be the Object of divine Science, which is infallible and most certain, unlesse there be included the condition, whence that which is said to be future may be certainly inferred. But if this reason prevails, God can foreknow nothing contingent as absolutely future, but what he before decreed as absolutely future; which yet Strangius admits not, who confesseth, that men act many things freely to which they are not predetermin∣ed by God.
Thus Le Blanc of Strangius's self-contradicting Hypothesis. And indeed, to speak the truth nakedly, there seems so much force in Strangius's reason, whereby he proves, That al Gods Prescience of free future Contingents includes an absolute Decree of their futurition, namely from the certainty of divine Presci∣ence, that I no way wonder that he urgeth the same, albeit to the subversion of his own Phaenomena. And I am very bold, yea confident in asserting, and demonstrating these following Pro∣positions. (1) Prop. That God can have no certain Prescience of things future, but from his own decree, the only certain determinate cause of their futurition. And therefore the Socinians denying a certain determinate Cause of things contingent, denie also Gods Prescience to be certain, as Le Blanc, De Concord. P. 3. Thes. 1. p. 438. and I cannot see how any can rationally avoid the Soci∣nian objection, who do not resolve the certitude of the divine Prescience into the divine Decree. Hence, (2) Prop. There is an hypothetic or consequential necessitie that ariseth from Gods certain Prescience. This is wel urged, though in the defense of an hell∣bred Hypothesis, by the Socinians, and cited by Le Blanc (as a Page  157 knot not easily untied) de Concord. Par. 3. Thes. 22. pag. 441.
There is, saith he, much of difficultie here, which in times past has exercised the ingenies of Doctors. For seeing it is impossible, that the Prescience of God may be deceived, it cannot be but that those things must happen, which God foresees wil happen; and therefore that althings happen necessarily: and it is im∣possible, but that the very wil of man must produce those acts, which God from eternity foreknew it would produce.
This Objection I despair ever to see rationally answered by our Ad∣versaries without contradicting their own Hypothesis. See more of this Chap. 6. §. 5. Hence (3) Prop. The same arguments that are urged by our Opponents against Gods predetermining the Wil to the substrate mater of sin, may be, as they are by the Socinians, urged with as great force against Gods certain Prescience of Sin. For our Adversaries, Strangius, Le Blanc, &c. granting the certain futu∣rition of sin in the eternal Prescience of God, fal under al those Imputations and black Consequences which they charge on us, who assert the predefinition, futurition, and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin in the divine Decree. This Proposi∣tion is incomparably wel demonstrated by judicious Davenant, in his Animadversions on Gods Love to Mankind, p. 418, 419, 442, 462. where he proves, That Infallible Prescience granted by the Arminians, infers as much necessitie on the Wil, as absolute Pre∣destination and Reprobation. Of which more in our next Argu∣ment; also c. 6. §. 5.

Let us now a little inquire into the Subterfuges which our Ad∣versaries take Sanctuarie in to secure themselves from the force of this Argument taken from Divine Prescience. And here at what a miserable losse and confusion are they among themselves? How few of them agree on any one Principe or Medium for the solving this argument? Some flie for refuge to the Molinists Middle Sci∣ence, telling us, That God foresaw that men being placed under such hy∣potheses, and circumstances, would sin against him, &c. Thus Baronius, Metaphys. Sect. 12. Disp. 2. n. 55, 56. p. 326. where he professedly defendes Fonseca's conditionate Science, making God to have a condi∣tionate Science of the first sin, if Eve seduced by the Serpent should temt Adam, &c. Thus also one and another Divine of good note among us. But this subterfuge is greatly disliked by the more fober of this new Method, particularly by Strangius; who, l. 3. c. 11. p. 651. proves nervo•…. That there can be no such thing as a MiddlePage  158 or conditionate Science in God, because its Object is not certainly Cognoscible, or Knowable: and this he proves; because an object cannot be certainly knowen, unlesse it be certainly true: which the ob∣ject of this conditionate Middle Science is not. Thus also Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. Par. 1. p. 452, &c. Others therefore per∣ceiving the infirmitude of this evasion, have recourse to the Do∣minicans real presence of things future in Eternitie; whereby they make God, by his Science of Vision, to behold the sins of men. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 10. p. 646. If it be demanded, saith he, to what Science Gods Knowledge of Sins must be referred, I easily grant that it is to be referred to his Science of Vision, &c. But more fully, l. 3. c. 7. p. 594. Among al the modes which are wont to be explicated, there is none more probable than that which is taken from the presence of althings in Eternitie; because the Eternitie of God is Insuccessive and Indivisible. The same he inculcates, p. 595, 596, 597. But this mode also of solving the difficultie, is greatly opposed, by some of his own party, the New Methodists, who take some pains to shew the invaliditie thereof. So Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. Par. 3. Thes. 37. p. 443. First, saith he, as for that real presence of futures in Eternitie, namely as they are supposed to coexiste from eternitie to eternitie it self, it appears to be a mere figment; for that one thing coexiste to another, it is necessary that both existe, &c. Thus also a learned and pious Divine among our selves, who has espoused Strangius's Hypothesis, fals soul on the Thomists for asserting, Althings to be eternally present to the divine Intellect in esse reali, &c. Lastly, others therefore to evade the fore-men∣tioned inconveniences, take up their refuge under the Infinitie of Gods Prescience. Thus Le Blanc, De Concord. Par. 1. Thes. 40. p. 444. As for the fourth opinion, which seeks the certitude of the divine Prescience in the infinitie of the divine Intellect, and in the de∣terminate truth of those things which are contingently future, it esta∣blisheth nothing but what is certain and indubitable, &c. Yet he grants, Thes. 41. That albeit this opinion contains in it nothing but truth, yet it doth not satisfie the Question, nor remove the main diffi∣cultie, namely, How things passe from a state of possibilitie to a state of futurition, &c. Whence he concludes, Thes. 43. Sithat there is so much darknesse on every side, there is nothing more safe than to professe our Ignorance in this particular. And this indeed is the best refuge these New Methodists have, when they see them∣selves involved in so many self-contradictions, and absurdities, Page  159 to professe their Ignorance as to the Mode of Divine Prescience. Yea, some of them procede so far in this pretended modestie, as to professe, That the mode of Divine Prescience is not determined in Scripture. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. That God is omniscient is put out of dout, but touching the mode and manner of Prescience nothing is expressely delivered in Scripture. The like others. But is it so indeed? Doth not the Scripture declare expressely the mode of Prescience? Why then (1) are our Adversaries so dog∣matic and positive in their new modes and measures of Divine Prescience, contrary to the received Sentiments of the Church in al Ages? How comes it to passe, that they contend with so much heat and passion, for that which they confesse is not ex∣pressely delivered in Scripture? Were not a modest 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or suspension of assent more agreeable to such a Confession? But (2) We easily grant them, that the mode of Divine Prescience is unsearchable and past finding out, as indeed al Divine Per∣fections are, but yet must we thence necessarily conclude, that nothing of the mode of Divine Prescience is expressely delivered in Scripture? [1] Doth not the Scripture evidently declare, That the mode of Gods Prescience is far above yea opposite to that of Mans science, as much as Heaven is above the Earth, yea infinitely more? [2] Doth not the Scripture also remove from the mode of Divine Prescience al manner of Imperfections, much more Contradictions? And is not the mode of Gods Prescience in his own Essence and Decrees, much more perfect than that which makes his Infallible immutable Prescience dependent on the mutable fallible Wil of Man? But see more hereof, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. §. 2.

§. 3. We passe on to our third Argument, which shal be ta∣ken* from the Divine Wil and Decrees; and more particularly from the Decree of Reprobation. And here we shal lay down this Prin∣cipe, which is granted by Strangius, and others of the New Me∣thod, That Divine Predetermination is adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition or Predestination. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. We easily grant, saith he, that the predefinition of God from eternitie, and the predetermination of the create wil in time, mutually follow each other, so that if God doth absolutely predefine any parti∣cular and singular act to be brought about by us, he must also deter∣mine our Wil to the same. This he inculcates, c. 5. p. 584. Now this ingenuous Concession is as much as we desire to build our Page  160 Demonstration on: for we no way dout but to demonstrate, That God doth absolutely predefine the material entitative act of Sin: Which we shal endeavour to make good in the following Propo∣sitions. (1) Prop. Reprobation admits no formal motive, proper condition or cause. This Proposition is generally denyed by the New Methodists, who grant, That God decrees al good absolutely, but as for Sin, say they, God decrees that only respectively and con∣ditionally. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 546-548. But we no way dout, but, before we have finisht this Demonstration, to make it evi∣dent, that Gods Decree of Reprobation, whereby he determines to leave men to sin, is absolute, as wel as the Decree of Election: Yea, it is to me a thing altogether impossible, to defend an ab∣solute Decree of Election, and yet to make the Decree of Repro∣bation conditional and respective: for if the absolute good plea∣sure of God be the only cause why some are elected, must it not also be the only cause why others are rejected? Doth not the Election of the one necessarily implie the Reprobation of the other? It's true, our Divines, that follow the Sublapsarian mode, as Davenant, &c. speak of Sin as a commun condition belong∣ing to the whole masse of corrupt nature, yet they allow not of any distinctive condition or formal cause or motive, which should incline the divine wil to reprobate one rather than another: for nothing can move the divine Wil, but what is some way an∣tecedent to it: Now the consideration of al sin is subsequent to some act of Gods Wil. (2) Prop. The act of Reprobation is not merely negative, but positive and efficacious. It's granted, that some of our Divines make mention of a negative act of Reprobation, which they terme Non-election, or Preterition, yet hereby they intend not a suspense act of the Divine wil, but include also a posi∣tive efficacious act. Thus Jansenius, August. de Grat. Christi, l. 10. c. 2. pag. 420. proves out of Augustin, That Gods negative Repro∣bation is positive. So Davenant, Dissert. de Elect. & Reprob. p. 113. But we must take heed, saith he, lest with Scotus we think, that the Wil of God in regard of Reprobates, which he electes not but passeth by, is merely negative: for in this very act, which we expresse by a Negation, is contained an expresse and affirmate Wil of God. So in his Determinations, Quaest. 25. p. 117. he tels us, That it's most certain, there can be no Decree permitting sin, to which there doth not adhere some efficacious Decree. And p. 118. he instructs us, That this Decree of permitting sin is efficacious, not in a way of effici∣ence, Page  161 but by directing and ordaining to extract good out of evil. (3) Prop. In the mater of Reprobation God is considered as a soverain Absolute Lord, not as a Righteous Judge. The Pelagians, Molinists, Armi∣nians, and New Methodists consider God in the act of Reproba∣tion as a just Judge, not as a supreme absolute Lord: whence they conclude, that it is unjust with God to reprobate any but on the prevision of their sins; not considering, that Reprobation is not an act inflicting punishment, but of denying Benefits, where∣in the Libertie and Dominion of God is only to be attended; ac∣cording to that of the Apostle, Rom. 9. 21. Has not the Potter power over the clay, &c? What is soverain Dominion, but an absolute right to dispose of what is our own? And shal we not allow the same Dominion to God, which is allowed to the Pot∣ter over his Clay? Is the soverain Lord tied to his Creature by any Law, more than what is in his own nature and wil? Hence it follows, (4) That the Decree of Reprobation is most absolute and Independent as to al distinctive conditions or causes in man. Thus Jansenius, August. de Grat. Christi, l. 10. c. 4. p. 423. proves out of Augustin, That the absolute Wil of God is the alone cause of Re∣probation. And Augustin complains, That it is a great injurie to God, when men search for causes of things superior to his soverain Wil: for his Wil is such a supreme Rule of Justice, as that whatever he wils is for that very reason, because he wils it, to be accounted just. So Bradwardine, de Causa Dei, l. 1. c. 47. proves strongly, That albeit God punisheth no man eternally without sin committed in time; yet he doth not eternally reprobate any for sin as a Cause antecedently moving his divine Wil. So Alvarez, de Auxil. Disput. 109. 3a Con∣clus. The positive act, whereby God from eternitie would not admit some into his Kingdome, was not conditionate, but absolute, antecedent, in a moment of Reason, to the il use of Free-wil. And it is proved, [1] Because there can be no cause of Reprobation. [2] Because su∣pernatural Beatitude is not due to any upon the account of natural improvements: Therefore God could from al eternitie without any In∣jurie, before the Prescience of the good or il use of free-wil, elect some to life eternal, and by a positive act wil not to admit others. And our Divines generally grant, That there can be no other cause as∣signed of Reprobation, than the absolute 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or good pleasure of God.

But none is more categoric and positive in this, than judicious*Davenant, (who yet in some points came nigh the new Methodists) Page  152 in his incomparable Animadversions on Gods love to mankind. Wherein he doth puissantly defend the following particulars greatly conducing to the establishment of our Hypothesis. [1] That Gods secret wil of good pleasure is very different from his reveled, preceptive, complacential wil, as pag. 221, 349, 376. [2] That Gods reveled, complacential, approbative wil is the measure of our dutie, but not of Gods decrees or operations, pag. 222, 356, 391, 399. [3] That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleasure is only properly his wil, pag. 392. [4] That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleasure is moved by nothing but itself, pag. 375, 376. [5] That the absolute Decrees of God contradict not general conditional promisses of life and threats of death, pag. 241, 332, 375, 387, 398. [6] That God may be said, according to his wil of complacence and approbation, to intend the sal∣vation of sinners, yea Reprobates, by providing the means of grace con∣ducing thereto, pag. 271, 376, 394. [7] That the externe means and offers of grace must be measured and interpreted according to the knowen nature of the means, not the unknowen wil of God, pag. 353. [8] That God, by his approbative complacential wil unfeignedly wils what he commands, pag. 329, 393, 394, 401. [9] That al under the means of grace are under some remote conditional possibilitie of sal∣vation, pag. 256, 257. [10] That Gods evangelic, providential in∣tention of saving sinners is oft frustrated as to its events by mans sin, although his decretive beneplacite intention is never frustrated, p. 377, 381, 387, 388, 395. [11] That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibilitie to contrary events, though not with contra∣ry events, pag. 240, 333, 341, 360, 402, 253. [12] That abso∣lute Decrees oppose not the Justice of God; with its difference from that of men, pag. 232, 321, 336, 339, 342. [13] That absolute Decrees oppose not Gods Holinesse, pag. 240-272. [14] That absolute De∣crees oppose not the Mercie of God, pag. 277-310. [15] That mere conditional Decrees are inconsistent with Gods soverain Being and Inde∣pendence, pag. 226. [16] That absolute Reprobation is not repug∣nant to Gods Truth, pag. 349-362. [17] That absolute Repro∣bation takes not away the end and use of Gods gifts, pag. 374-404. [18] That absolute Reprobation leaves no man under an absolute ne∣cessitie or compulsion to sin, pag. 253. [19] Let Reprobation be ab∣solute or conditional it leaves the same possibilitie and libertie to the Agents, pag. 333, 340, 341, 351, 360. [20] That the Arminians grant an absolute, immutable, fixed Decree of Reprobation, which ad∣mits the same objections that they urge against the Calvinists, p. 302, Page  163 332, 333, 340, 351, 354, 400, 418, 419. [21] Infallible Prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much necessitie on the wil, and com∣pulsion to sin as absolute Reprobation, pag. 418, 419, 442, 462. [22] Lastly, he shews us, What is the right use and abuse of absolute Decrees, pag. 454-526. These Propositions clearly and fully explicated by our judicious Davenant give great evidence and de∣monstration to our Hypothesis, as also distinct solution to the ob∣jections of our Opponents, of which hereafter, Chap. 6.

§. 4. Our next Argument shal be taken from Divine Concurse,*its Principe, Nature, and Efficace; the explication whereof wil give us a ful demonstration of our Hypothesis; which we shal endeavor to lay down in the following Particulars.

1. That God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or* entitative act of that which is sinful, may be demonstrated from the Principe of al Divine Concurse. What is the active principe of al Divine Concurse, but the Divine wil? Doth not sacred Pa∣gine expressely speak so much? So Eph. 1. 11. Who worketh althings after the counsel of his own wil. And more particularly as to the substrate mater of sin it's said, Act. 4. 28. that those who cruci∣fied our Lord, did acte but what Gods hand, or wil and counsel prede∣termined to be done, of which before. And Strangius himself grants us, lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 63. That concurse, as to its prime act is in God, and the same with God. Now such is the Omnipotence of* the Divine wil, that althings must necessarily be done, which he wils to be done, and in that manner as he wils them, as Aquinas wel determines. How then is it possible, but that if God wil that the substrate mater of sin existe, it must necessarily existe, and in that manner as he wils it? Can any person or thing resiste the Divine efficacious wil? And what is al active concurse but the determination of the same efficacious wil? See more of Gods wil being the spring and principe of Divine concurse, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 3.

2. That God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater of* sin may be demonstrated from the nature of Divine concurse as to its Totalitie, Ʋniversalitie as to effects, Particularitie as to manner of working, Immediation, Antecedence, and soverain absolute Indepen∣dence. (1) The Totalitie of Divine concurse sufficiently demon∣strates* its predetermination as to the substrate mater of sin. That Gods concurse to al second causes, acts, and effects is total we have sufficiently demonstrated, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. pag. 417. Page  164 Thus much is also granted by Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55.* where he assertes, That the whole action dependes on God, as also on the creature; otherwise God should not concur immediately: Though I am not ignorant that a Divine of name among us, as also of the same partie with Strangius, denies Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be total; yet because he is singular therein, and different from his own partie, I shal take it for granted, that Gods concurse is total, and thence endeavor to prove its predetermining the wil to the substrate mater of sin. For if God totally concur to the substrate act of sin, must he not also concur to the wil that puts forth that act? And if God concur to the wil in the produ∣ction of the act, must he not also necessarily determine the wil to that act? That Gods total concurse doth not only reach the act and effect, but also the wil itself is granted by Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 6. pag. 171.

Neither, faith he, do we say, that the Concurse of God doth reach only the effect, but not the efficient cause, sithat the very 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Energie of the second cause must be from God; and the action is not lesse an effect than the work, &c.

(2) The Ʋniversalitie of Divine concurse as to al effects what∣soever* gives us a further demonstration of its efficacious prede∣termination as to the entitative act of sin. That Divine concurse is universally extensive to al acts of the wil, as wel as to al other objects, by giving forces and assistances to faculties, exciting and appling them to their acts, and ordering them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends, we have copiosely de∣monstrated, Court Gent. Part 4. Book 2. Chap. 7. §. 2. pag. 296, 297. And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be predeterminative? Yea, to speak properly, is there, or can there be any real efficience, influxe, or concurse sent forth by God as the prime universal cause of al∣things, which is not predeterminative? To talke of an universal general concurse of God, which immediately influenceth the wil and al its natural acts, and yet doth not predetermine, i. e. excite and applie the wil to its act, what is it but pure non-sense and virtual contradiction?

(3) The Particularitie of Gods concurse as to its manner of* working doth also invictly demonstrate its predetermination as to the entitative act of sin. Divine concurse, albeit it be universal as to the extent of its object, yet it's most particular and proper as to its manner of working. Our Adversaries generally, both Page  165 Pelagians, Molinists, Arminians, and New Methodists talke much of a general indifferent concurse, alike commun to al effects, and determinable by its substrate mater; as the general influence of the Sun is determinable by the mater it workes on. But, alas! how unbecoming and incongruous to the Divine perfections is such a general indifferent concurse? Doth not this make the first cause to be second, because dependent; and the second cause first, because independent? And doth it not hence also necessarily fol∣low, that the first cause may, by the indisposition of the mater or resistence of second Agents, be frustrated of its intended effect? What more expressely overthrows the soverain Dominion and universal Concurse of God, than such a general indifferent Con∣curse? And yet is not this one of the most plausible subterfuges our Adversaries have to shelter themselves under? They object, If God should by a particular predeterminative concurse deter∣mine the wil to act in sins intrinsecally evil, as the hatred of God, or the like, then the specification of the act and moral determi∣nation of it to its particular object would be from God; and so God inevitably should be the Author of sin. This is their prin∣cipal and indeed their only objection worth a naming against our Hypothesis; to which we intend a more ful answer in the next Chapter, §. 1. at present let this suffice, [1] We say not, that God is a particular cause, but universal, working in and by a parti∣cular concurse suitable to the indigence of the mater it workes on. [2] We say not, that this particular Concurse of God doth morally specifie, or determine the sinful act to its object, but only physically individuate or naturally modifie the substrate mater of the sinful act. This is incomparably wel explicated by Dr. Sa∣muel Ward, that great Professor of Theologie, in his Determina∣tion of Gods Concurse, pag. 117. where he strongly demonstrates, That the previous Concurse of God, as the first cause, doth in its way modifie and determine al the actions of second causes: and if so, then surely the substrate entitative act of sin, as hereafter. [3] That general indifferent concurse, which our Adversaries so warmly contend for, sithat they grant it to be causative and influential on the sinful act, doth equally infer God to be the Author of sin, as our predeter minative concurse. For if it be causative and effe∣ctive of the act, then surely of that individual act, as determined to such an object: for to talke of its concurrence to the act in genere, in the general, and not in individuo, in its individual deter∣mination Page  166 to its object, is such an absurditie in Philosophie, that al awakened Philosophers wil decrie it: for what Tyro cannot informe us, that al physical acts are suppositorum, of individual sin∣gular substances, and so without al peradventure individual and singular: and if so, then must not their general concurse reach not only the action in general, but also individually considered, as relating to its object, not morally, but physically? And wil it not hence follow, that their general concurse is causative of the enti∣tative act, as determined to its object, and so makes God the Au∣thor of sin, as much, at least as wel as our predeterminative con∣curse, as more fully Chap. 6. §. 1. Of the particularitie of Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 4.

(4) The Immediation of Divine Concurse strongly demonstrates* the predetermination of the wil as to the entitative act of sin thereby. Our Adversaries generally, both Jesuites, Arminians, and new Methodists, excepting some very few that adhere to Du∣randus, grant an immediate concurse to the entitative act of sin; which if wel followed wil necessarily infer predeterminative con∣curse, specially according to the concessions of the new Metho∣dists; who say, That this immediate concurse reacheth not only the effect and act, (which the Jesuites and Arminians grant) but also the very wil itself, as the immediate efficient of the act. Touching this immediate Concurse see Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 54, &c. & lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. And among the Jesuites none has more acutely demonstrated this, than Suarez, Metaphys. Disp. 22. Sect. 1. and our Country-man Campton Carleton, in his Philos. Ʋnivers. Disp. 28. Sect. 2, 3. pag. & Disput. 29. Sect. 1, 2. pag. 323, 324. where he demonstrates strongly, against Lud. à Dola, That God immediately together with the creature produceth the very act of sin. Now hence we thus argue: If God, together with the human wil, immediately produceth the very act of sin, then certainly he must of necessitie predetermine the wil to that entitative act: For sup∣pose the sinful act be motus primò primus, as they phrase it, or a mere simple volition of the wil, how is it possible, that God should immediately produce this act of the wil, without applying the wil to the act? Do not the very Jesuites, Suarez, Carleton, with others grant, That one and the same sinful act is produced by God and the human wil? And doth not Strangius with others of the New Methodists also acknowlege further, That Gods Concurse to this sin∣ful act of the wil is previous to that of the wil, not only simultaneous, as Page  167Strang. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 56? Yea Strangius and those of his per∣suasion grant yet more, That Gods immediate concurse reacheth not only the act and effect, but also the wil itself, as Strang. pag. 171. And is it not most evident, from these ingenuous concessions of our Ad∣versaries, touching immediate concurse, that God doth predeter∣mine the wil to the entitative act of sin? Can we imagine, that one and the same sinful act should be produced immediately by God and the human wil, and yet God not applie the wil to its act, which is al that is meant by predetermination? Yea, doth God not only concur with the wil to one and the same act, but also influence the wil in the production of that act, as Strangius and others grant, and yet not applie it to act? How is it possible, that God should influence the wil in the production of any act, without actuating or drawing forth the wil to act? And if God actuate or draw forth the wil to act, doth he not applie it to the act, and so predetermine the same? Again, doth God by an im∣mediate concurse not only influence the wil and its act, but also antecedently and in a moment of reason and causalitie before the wil concurs to its own act, as Strangius also grants? and doth not this give us a more abundant demonstration, that God pre∣determines the wil to that act? Can there be any previous con∣curse immediately actuating and influencing the wil in its act, but what is predeterminative? Doth not the wil necessarily depend on the previous concurse of the first cause? and if so, must it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby? But more of this previous concurse in our next Argument. Lastly, if we al∣low (with the Jesuites) unto God only an immediate concurse to the act of the wil, al those black consequences which our Adver∣saries cast on the Assertors of predetermination, may with the same facilitie be reflected on them: for if they make God, by an immediate concurse to concur to the act of sin, do they not make him the cause and so the Author of sin as wel as we? More of im∣mediate Concurse, see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4.

(5) The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse doth in∣victly* demonstrate its predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sinful acts. We shal here reassume a Principe already established, and granted by Jesuites and New Methodists, namely, That the action of the first cause concurring with the second, is not, as to passive attingence, distinct from the action of the second cause. This is generally granted by the Molinists, as Le Blanc, Concil. Page  168 Arbitr. par. 3. thes. 28. pag. 433. and by Jansenius, August. tom. 1. lib. 5. cap. 20. pag. 119. It's true, the Concurse of God the first cause is really different from that of the second, as to active attin∣gence or principe, because Gods concurse, actively considered, is the same with his wil; yet as to passive attingence, the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect pro∣duced by the second cause. This being premissed, we procede to demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the prioritie and antecedence of Divine concurse, and that in and by the following Propositions. (1) Prop. The first cause doth in order of nature or causalitie concur before the second. This Proposition is potently demonstrated by the acute Dr. Sam. Ward, Determinat. de Concurs. Dei, pag. 116, &c. And the argu∣ments for it are invict: for [1] where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie, which is proper to every second cause, there posterioritie is essentially appendent. Again, [2] al second causes in regard of God are but instruments, as Aquinas proves: yea the wil of man as dependent on God is but a vital instrument, albeit in regard of the effect it may sometimes be ter∣med a principal Agent: Now doth not every instrument subserve the principal Efficient? And doth not that which is subservient in order of causalitie move after that which is the principal A∣gent? But here we are to remember, that when we assert Gods Concurse to be previous in regard of its principe and indepen∣dence, we denie not, but that it is also simultaneous in regard of the action and effect produced by the second cause, as Alvarez, lib. 3. de Auxil. Disput. 19. num. 4. & Twisse, Vind. Grat. lib. 2. de Criminat. part. 3. pag. 56. But that which we denie is, That Gods Concurse is solely concomitant and simultaneous; and that [3] be∣cause this simultaneous concurse makes God only a partial cause, and dependent on the second cause in the production of its effect. Yea, some of the Jesuites grant, That if we consider the concurse of God absolutely, without respect to this or that second cause, so it is in order of nature before the influxe of the second cause. So Fonseca, Metaphys. lib. 6. cap. 2. quaest. 5. sect. 13. The like Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 60, 61. Thus also Burgersdicius, Me∣taphys. lib. 2. cap. 11. grants, Gods concurse in supernaturals to be previous, albeit in naturals he would have it to be only simultane∣ous: which is most absurd: for the active concurse of God, being nothing else but the immanent act of his wil, must necessarily be Page  169 the same in naturals as in supernaturals. More of the prioritie and Antecedence of the Divine Concurse, see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 4. p. 416. Hence, (2) Prop. This previous Concurse of God as the first Cause must necessarily move and applie every second cause to its act and effect. For how is it possible, that the second cause should act, unlesse the first move and applie it to its act? Can a second cause move it self to an act, unlesse it be first moved thereto by the first cause? Whence, (3) Prop. This previous Con∣curse of God in applying and moving the Wil of man to the substrate mater of sin predetermines the same. For if one and the same sin∣ful action be produced by God and the human Wil, and God concurs in order of nature before the wil, yea premove and ap∣plie it to the act, must he not necessarily predetermine the same? Al the wit and subtilitie of our Adversaries wil never ex∣tricate themselves or satisfie any awakened mind in this point, How God doth by a previous concurse move and actuate the Wil, and yet not predetermine it to the act. Indeed to speak the truth, the Sentiments not only of the Arminians, but also of the new Me∣thodists, Baronius, Strangius and others about Concurse, fal in with those of the Jesuites for a simultaneous Concurse only, albeit some of them in termes disown it.

(6) Lastly, the soverain and absolute Independence of Gods Con∣curse* gives us further demonstration of his predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sin. That Gods Concurse is not Conditionate but absolute and independent, we have copiosely proved, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 4. p. 412, &c. And indeed, what more absurd, yea impossible, than such a conditionate Concurse, whereby the Molinists and Arminians suppose Gods concurrence to depend on mans? Is there not hereby an effectual dore open∣ed to a progresse into infinite? For if God concur on condition that man concur, doth God concur to that condition, or not? If not, is there not then some act of the creature produced with∣out Gods concurse? If God concur to the working of that con∣dition, then absolutely, or conditionally: if absolutely, then his for∣mer Concurse is not conditional: if conditionally, then what an infinitude of Conditions will follow hence? We take it then for granted, that Gods Concurse is not conditional, but absolute and independent. And hence we thus argue: If God concur abso∣lutely and independently to the substrate mater of sin, then he doth predetermine the wil thereto: the consequence is rational Page  170 and clear: For where two Agents concur totally and immediate∣ly to one and the same action and effect, the one must necessarily depend on the other; and that which depends on another must be determined by that other: for every cause that is dependent on another, is so far as it depends thereon determinable thereby. It's true, natural corporeous effects have some dependence on the Sun, without being determined thereby, because the Sun is a li∣mited cause, and has not efficace sufficient to determine the mater is workes on, but is rather determined thereby, and so in that re∣spect dependent thereon: But as for God the first cause whose wil, the principe of his concurse, is omnipotent and most effica∣cious, it's impossible, that he should have any dependence on, or be any way determinable in his concurse by the mater he workes on: he being the most universal cause, infinitely perfect, and void of al potentialitie or passive power must necessarily predetermine al second causes to their acts, but be determined by none. But more of this in what immediately follows of the efficace of Gods Concurse.

3. Having demonstrated Divine predetermination to the sub∣strate* mater of sin from the Principe and Nature of Divine con∣curse, we now procede to demonstrate the same from the Efficace thereof. Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 61. albeit he denies Gods general Concurse, whereby he concurs to the mater of sin, to be pre∣determinative, yet he grants it is efficacious, calling it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the force and efficace of God, whereby he subordinates second causes to him∣self; so that whatever they are or act, they essentially depend on him in both respects. And this ingenuous concession touching the efficace of Divine concurse, is al that we require to build our present De∣monstration on, which we shal distribute into two branches, (1) Gods efficacious concurse unto al natural acts and effects. (2) Gods efficacious concurse to al supernatural acts and effects.

1. We shal demonstrate Divine predetermination to the sub∣strate mater of sin from the efficacitie of Divine concurse as to al natural acts and effects; which evidently appears in the following particulars. (1) Gods concurse to al physic or natural causes, moti∣ons, and effects is most efficacious. This Proposition the sacred Scri∣ptures do abundantly confirme, as Esa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Act. 17. 28. of which before Chap. 3. §. 1. Thus much Strangius and those of his persuasion grant us, as before, c. 2. §. 1. (2) The efficace of Divine concurse dependes on the efficace and deter∣mination Page  171 of the Divine wil. For what is efficacious concurse, con∣sidered actively, but the efficacitie of the Divine wil predetermi∣ning to act so or so? To presume that active concurse is any thing else but an immanent efficacious act of the Divine wil is to crosse the mind of sacred Scriptures and the most awakened Divines, as we have copiosely demonstrated, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 3. (3) Gods wil being efficacious and determinate determines al second causes to al their natural actions and effects. Is it not impossible, but that the wil of God being omnipotent and determined for the production of such an action of mans wil, the said action or effect must necessarily follow? Is not the wil of God sufficiently potent to determine the wil of man in al its natural acts? Is not the effi∣cacitie of the Divine wil so great, that not only those things are done, which God wils shal be done, but in that manner as he wils* them? Doth not Strangius confesse so much lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. & lib. 2. cap. 11. pag. 266.? Whence if God in his own wil pur∣pose and determine, that the human wil should produce such or such an action, suppose that whereto sin is necessarily annexed, is not the human wil necessarily in regard of the Divine wil, and yet freely in regard of its own manner of working predetermined thereto? This is most evident in the crucifixion of our Lord, ex∣pressed, Act. 2. 23. By the determinate counsel, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e.*by the decreed, fixed, determined wil of God. The like Act. 4. 28. of which places before, Chap. 3. §. 2. Hence (4) The efficacious concurse of God modifies, and according to its mode determines al actions of second causes, not only necessarily but freely. Doth the Divine wil determine itself to the production of every singular individual effect? and may it not, yea must it not then determine the hu∣man wil to al its natural acts? Has mans infirme ambulatorie wil power to determine al such faculties, acts and effects as are subject to its Empire? and has not the Divine wil, which is infinitely more efficacious, power to determine al inferior powers, acts and effects subject to its universal Dominion? And doth it not hence follow, that the soverain Divine wil doth by its efficacious con∣curse predetermine al the free acts of the human wil, which ne∣cessarily fal under its Empire and modification? See this wel de∣monstrated by that judicious Professor Sam. Ward, Determinat. de Concursu Dei, pag. 118, &c. Whence (5) The efficacious prede∣terminative concurse of God equally extendes itself to al natural good, even to the substrate mater of sinful acts. Strangius and others of Page  172 our Opponents grant, That Gods efficacious predetermining Con∣curse extendes it self not only to al supernatural good, but also to al natural good, that has not sin intrinsecally annexed to it: whence we may, by a paritie of reason demonstrate divine Pre∣determination to the substrate mater of al actions, though never so intrinsecally evil: for the substrate mater of al actions though intrinsecally evil, is naturally good. Take the Hatred of God, which is reckoned to be an act most intrinsecally evil, and if we consider it in its substrate mater or entitative act, so it is natu∣rally good, and if it were exerted against sin, its proper object, it would be also morally good: So that indeed the substrate mater of bad and good actions is the same, namely some natural good, and Gods Concurse to the one and other is the same. Yea this indeed is acknowledged by Strangius, l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. Al natural acts are good by the bonitie of Being, i. e. entitatively and naturally—whence he concludes, and so as to Concurse we say, that God con∣curs*in the same manner to generation from lawful Matrimonie and that from adulterie; because the action on both sides is physically of the same kind. A great concession indeed, which would our Ad∣versaries fully come up unto, how soon and how easily might we put a period to this Controversie? For if the same action may be, as to its substrate mater naturally good and sinful, and both phy∣sically of the same kind, and so Gods Concurse to both the same, why then may not God be allowed to predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is sinful, as wel as to the sub∣strate mater of that which is good? Surely if the action be, as to its substrate mater, in one and t'other naturally good, and physically of one and the same kind, there can be no rational account given, why God should not predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is evil, as wel as to that which is good. In short, as there is no moral act so perfect in this im∣perfect state, but has some vitiositie adherent to it, so there is no natural act so sinful, but it has for its substrate mater some natural good: and as God by predetermining the wil to the moral good is no way the Author of the vitiositie appendent to the act; so by predetermining it to the natural substrate mater of the sinful act, he is as much exemted from being the Author of the sin. The substrate mater of the one and the other being the* same, of which more §. 5.

2. We procede to demonstrate Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin from the Efficacitie of Divine Con∣curse Page  173 as to supernatural Acts and Effects. Our Adversaries the New Methodists, Baronius only excepted, grant that efficacious Concurse as to supernatural good is predeterminative; from which we no way dout, but to draw an invict Demonstration, that Di∣vine Concurse is also predeterminative as to the substrate mater of sinful acts, even such as are intrinsecally evil. This Province we shal endeavor to make good by several Arguments, (1) From the Principe of al Predetermination: what is the principe of al Predetermination, but the omnipotent efficacious wil of God? And how are al Acts and Effects predetermined by the Divine Wil, but by an immutable predeterminative Decree, termed his Determinate Counsel, Act. 2. 23? which is said, Act. 4. 28. to pre∣determine the Crucifixion of Christ? Doth not therefore the same determinate Counsel or wil of God predetermine the sub∣strate mater of sin, as wel as any act morally good? Is not then predetermination as to its active Attingence or principe one and the same, both as to natural and supernatural good, albeit as to its passive Attingence and effect it be greatly different? For al∣beit there be a double Concurse required to supernatural good, one to the substrate mater, which is a natural good, and the other to the moral good, which is supernatural, but only a single concurse to the substrate mater of sin; yet in point of efficace the predetermination to the later is equal to the former, as to Divine efficience: For there is as much power and efficace re∣quired to predetermine or premove the wil to the substrate mater, or natural entitative act of sin, as there is to any supernatural good: both are alike facile to the divine omnipotent wil: and surely no reason can be given, why predetermination is necessary for the production of any gracious act, and not as necessary for the production of the entitative act of sin: for the Wil of Man is equally uncapable of acting at al, as of acting graciously with∣out Predetermination, whatever some may imagine to the con∣trary.

(2) From the substrate mater of al natural and supernatural good. Are not al gracious acts and habits loged in human nature? What is supernatural good but a ray of the divine Nature irra∣diated into human Nature, and seated therein as its proper sub∣ject? Is not al grace a supernatural mode implanted in human nature? whence, if God by efficacious Grace predetermine the wil to receive any habitual infusion, or act of Grace, must he not Page  174 also necessarily predetermine the wil to the natural act which is the substrate mater of that supernatural mode? And if God pre∣determine the wil to the natural act of that which is good, must he not also predetermine it to the natural act of that which is evil? What difference can there be assigned between the natural act of Crucifying our Lord, which was intrinsecally evil, and that of crucifying the Thieves, which was a piece of Justice? Did not God then as much predetermine the former as the later? Yea, to raise this Argument higher, hath not the same substrate mater, which is supernaturally good and gracious as to its sub∣stance, some modal vitiositie and obliquitie appendent thereto in this imperfect state? If then God predetermine the Wil to the substrate mater of that which is supernaturally good, must he not also necessarily predetermine it to the substrate mater of that which is also evil? I am not ignorant what is replied hereto, which we no way dout but wil prove invalid, and no better than smoke or vapor, when we come to enlarge more fully on this Argument, §. 5.

(3) We demonstrate the necessitie of Divine Predetermina∣tion to the substrate mater of what is sinful, from the Invaliditie yea vanitie of those reasons which are urged by our Adversaries against it, which do with as much force strike at Predetermina∣tion to what is supernaturally good. [1] One principal Ob∣jection that our Adversaries urge against predetermination to the substrate mater of sin, specially such sins as are intrinsecally evil, is That it destroyes the libertie of the Wil, &c. We shal not now attemt any answer to the Objection, but reserve it for its proper place, Chap. 6. §. 5. only we are to shew, that the whole of this Objection, and the reasons urged to enforce it, do with as much force strike against al Predetermination, even that which is grant∣ed to supernatural good: For doth not Predetermination to gracious acts, lay as much compulsion on the wil, and thence as much destroy its libertie, as predetermination to the substrate mater of sin? And is not the same objection with its reasons as much urged, and that with as great color of Reason, by the Molinists and Arminians, against al Predetermination to gracious acts? I must confesse, I could never, neither do I think any else can maintain and defend our ground against the Jesuites and Ar∣minians, if those reasons and grounds which our Adversaries urge against Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin, be ad∣mitted Page  175 as valid. [2] The like may be said of that other ob∣jection or reason, why our Adversaries reject Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin, namely, That it makes al Gods Laws naturally and absolutely impossible, &c. Is not this very objection, and the reason urged to enforce it, as much urged by Molinists and Arminians, against al Predetermination even to gracious Acts? And are not the reasons as valid on the later as on the former side? What reason do the new Methodists give, that Pre∣determination to the entitative act of sin makes Gods Laws im∣possible, but that it takes away the Wils Indifference, and de∣stroys the natural power that the wil is invested with to act or not to act? And doth not Predetermination to good as much destroy the wils indifference, and its power to act or not to act? [3] Our Adversaries urge, That this Predetermination takes away the use of Promises, Invitations, and al evangelic offers of Grace, and supposeth God not to deal sincerely with Sinners, in ma∣king offers of Grace, and yet irresistibly determining their Wils against the acceptance of these offers? Is not this very objection, with its reason urged, and that with as much force of reason by Jesuites and Arminians against Predetermination to gracious Acts? For if no man can entertain those offers of Grace by his own free∣wil, without a predeterminative Concurse, are not al gracious Promises, Invitations, and offers of Grace to Sinners, who fal not under this Predetermination, vain and uselesse? Our Adver∣saries the new Methodists generally, (some few excepted) denie any sufficient Grace or Free-wil in corrupt Nature for the re∣ception of evangelic offers and Grace: and is not then the viti∣ous wil of corrupt Nature as wel determined by its own vitiositie against the offers of Grace, as by the predeterminative Concurse of God? [4] Our Adversaries object, That this Predetermina∣tion to the entitative act of sin, supposeth God to compel and force men to sin, and so makes him to be the real Author of Sin, yea more than the Sinner that is under a violent compulsion, &c. and is not this very argument urged by Jesuites and Arminians against al Predeter∣mination even to what is good, and that with as much color of reason? For say they, If God predetermine the wil to what is good, then he compels and forceth the wil to be good; so that the wil being under a compulsion cannot be said to be the Au∣thor of its own act, but is as a Stock or Stone in the exercice of that act, which destroyeth al moral good, &c. Which obje∣ction Page  176 is as valid as that of our Adversaries, and can never be so∣lidly answered if their objection be good; though according to our Principes neither the one or the other objection has any force in it, as we shal demonstrate, c. 6. §. 5. To conclude this argument, I am very confident, our Opponents the new Metho∣dists wil never be able to defend an efficacious determinative Concurse to what is morally or supernaturally good, so long as they denie the same to the substrate mater of sin, which is natu∣rally good: for al, or at least the most of those arguments they urge against the later, may, and are urged by the Molinists and Arminians against the former, and that with equal force. And this Baronius did by his natural acumen foresee, and therefore he took a course more seemingly rational according to his Prin∣cipes, though lesse friendly to divine Concurse, to denie al Pre∣determination as wel to supernatural as natural good; of which see his Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. n. 66. &c. p. 136.

§. 5. Our fifth Argument shal be taken from the Nature of Sin,*its substrate mater and formal reason. 1. As to the general Idea and substrate mater of sin, we have demonstrated, Ch. 1. §. 2. (1) That al human acts considered in their natural entitie, abstracted*from their moral constitution, are neither good nor evil. (2) That al moral acts whether good or evil receive their formal Constitution and Determination from the Moral Law. (3) That no human Act con∣sidered physically, or according to its natural entitative substance, is intrinsecally evil, but only morally, in regard of its moral specification or determination to such or such an object. Hence, (4) That sin has for its substrate mater some natural good. Now these Propo∣sitions being laid as so many Principes, we hence argue, That God must necessarily concur to, yea predetermine the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil: For, if al sinful acts, even such as are intrinsecally evil morally, are, according to their substrate mater physically good, doth it not necessarily follow, that God the first cause must concur thereto, yea predetermine the same? Must not every second Cause as such be actuated and so determined by its first Cause and his efficacious Concurse? Doth not the sub∣ordination of the second Cause to the first, necessarily demon∣strate, not only its dependence on, but also Predetermination by the same in al its natural operations and effects? Is not every Being by participation necessarily limited, defined, and predeter∣mined in al its natural entitative motions by the first Being, which Page  177 is such by Essence? May not this also be demonstrated from the very concessions of our Adversaries, who grant, that vitio∣sitie follows not any Act as a natural Act? So Strangius, l. 2. c. 11. p. 243. We confesse, saith he, that Vitiositie doth not follow the*act of sin as an act; for then every act would be sin; also that it doth not follow, as the act procedes from God, for then every act that procedes from God, would have sin. Now if sin follows not the act of sin as an act, what reason can there be why God should not efficaciously concur to, yea predetermine the entitative act of Sin? This is wel explicated by Lud. Crocius, (that Breme Pro∣fessor, who was a member of the Synod of Dort, and there be∣gan the New Method) Duodecas, Dissert. de Volunt. Dei, Dissert▪ 8. Thes. 99. p. 426.

As to the Act, saith he, of the Divine Wil about sin, the effates of Scripture seem to contradict themselves, whiles that some expressely affirm, That God nils and hates sins, and those that commit them, Psal. 5. 5, 6, 7. Zach. 8. 17. but others seem to say, That God wils, creates, effectes them, Esa. 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37, 38. Amos 3. 6. But these things do wel agree, if the distinction be rightly observed, (1) Between the Act, and the Vitiositie of the Act. (2) Between the Act as it is from God, and as it is from the Creature. (3) Between the wil of God decreeing, and the wil of God commanding.
Whence he concludes, Thes. 100. p. 427.
For God wils and produceth, by the Creature as the first Cause by the second, the Act, as an Act, of it self indifferent to moral Bonitie, and Vitiositie; and wils and effectes the same, albeit depraved by the Creature, as invested with his moral rectitude, because he produceth it by his own power, from his immaculate Sanctitie and Justice, which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any second Cause.
Whence he addes, Thes. 101.
And this act essentially good, even as defiled by the Creature, God justly and holily useth either as an Instrument of punishment, or of explorati∣on or exercice, and as an ordinate convenient Medium, accord∣ing to his Justice for the best ends. Thes. 102. In this sense God is said, To create evil, to produce it out of his mouth, to send Jo∣seph into Egypt by the Vendition of his Brethren, to rob Job of his goods, to command Shimei to curse David, to use Absolon for the defiling his Fathers Concubines, to deliver Christ into the hands of Jews and Gentiles. Thes. 103. For God decreed to produce those acts, as acts, and to permit the depravation of them by Page  178 the Sinners, and to use them albeit depraved, wisely and justly to ends holily ordained by him.

2. Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may* be also demonstrated from the formal nature of Sin, which con∣sistes in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions, as Ch. 1. §. 2. we have more fully explicated. Whence we thus argue: If every deflexion from the Law of God be sin, then cer∣tainly God necessarily predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins: and if of some, why not of al, even such as are in∣trinsecally evil? That God predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins is evident, and that from the concessions of our Ad∣versaries, who grant, That God doth predetermine the Wil to actions imperfectly good, which also, according to their own confessions are modally sinful: Whence we thus argue; The substrate mater of the same action as good and as sinful is the same: wherefore, if God predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as good, must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful? When we say, That God prede∣termines to the substrate mater of the same action as sinfil, As here, may not be taken reduplicatively, but only specificatively, i. e. as it specifies and distributes the same action into good, and sinful; which are different modes of one and the same substrate mater or en∣titative act: so that our Opponents granting, that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as im∣perfectly good, how can they possibly denie, that God prede∣termines it also to the same substrate mater which is modally sinful? When I can see a rational solution given to this argu∣ment, (which I despair of) I shal think our Adversaries have done much service to their Cause. But they replie, If God con∣cur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions, it doth not thence follow, that he concurs to actions intrinsecally, and in the sub∣stance of them evil. But I conceive this evasion wil soon vanish into smoke and vapor, if we consider wel, (1) That the least sin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it, any more than the greatest: the difference between sins modally and in∣trinsecally evil finds no place here: dare our Adversaries say, that God is the Author of that modal sin which adheres to acti∣ons imperfectly good, but not of that intrinsecal evil which is in the hatred of God, or the like? Whence, (2) The force of our Argument ariseth from this paritie of reason, If God doth Page  179 concur, yea predetermine the wil to an act only modally sin∣ful, without falling under the imputation of being the Author of sin, why may he not also predetermine the wil to the sub∣strate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil, without the like imputation? Albeit there be a disparitie in the sins, yet is not the paritie of reason for the one and the other the same? Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majestie of God from having any hand in the least sin, as in the greatest? And if we allow our selves the libertie of making him the au∣thor of the least sin, wil not that open a wide gate for atheistic blasphemous wits to impute to him the greatest sins? Whence, if we can prove, what our Adversaries wil never be able to dis∣prove, yea what they approve of, namely, that God doth pre∣determine the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act, which is imperfectly good, but modally sinful, it thence follows by ne∣cessary consequence and inevitable paritie of reason, that he can and doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil, without the least imputation of be∣ing the Author of sin annexed thereto. I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argu∣ment.

§. 6. Our next Argument for Gods Predetermination to the* substrate mater of sin shal be drawen from his Permission of Sin. And to make way to this demonstration we must distinguish of Permission; which is either legal or natural: Natural Permission is either divine or human; and both either negative or positive. (1) God gives no legal Permission or Indulgence to sin, but on the contrary severely prohibites it, and that on pain of death. (2) Gods natural Permission as Rector of the World is not of sin sim∣ply as sin, but as conducible to the principal ends of his divine Guber∣nation. It's true, Divine Permission regardes not only the sub∣strate mater of sin, but also sin formally considered, and so sin under that reduplication, as sin, yet not simply considered, but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glorie: and so much is confessed by Strangius, l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. If the Reduplication be joined to the terme sin, it's true, that sin as sin is permitted by God, physically not morally. Yet I adde, not sim∣ply, but respectively, as conducible to Gods supreme ends of Go∣vernment. And Lud. Crocius, Duodec. Dissert. 8. Thes. 74. pag. 415. assertes, That God, albeit he wils and decrees only the material of sin, yetPage  178 unbelieving and disobedient, both Iews and Cananites, &c. 2. Whereas he tels us, that the Mythologists say, Mars was the first that invented militarie weapons and affairs, &c. This may as well refer to Joshua, as to Nimrod. For albeit Nimrod began wars in Asia the greater, or Babylon; yet we find no considerable wars amongst the Cananites, or Phenicians, till Ioshua's time; who by reason of his great militarie Exploits and victories, might well be reputed the God of War, Mars, or Hercules. 3. That which may adde to this parallelizing of Mars with Ioshua is, that the Mythologists (whom Diodorus here brings in as the Authors of this description) found abundant more matter and reason to reduce the stories they had received by Tradition touching Ioshua, unto Mars, than those of Nimrod. For the stories of Ioshua were then, when Mythologie began to creep into the world, very fresh and pregnant, &c. 4. We have proved before, out of the concessions of Vossius himself, that Mars was the same with Hercules, and therefore with Ioshua.

3. Yet we need not reject, but may also allow, without any contradiction, a parallel betwixt Mars and Nimrod: as 1. Nim∣rod* was called by his subjects, Belus. So Servius on Virg. Aen. 1. saies, that Belus was the first that reigned in the Assyrian Mo∣narchie. Mars also had the same title given to him; whence some derive bellum war, from Belus, Mars's name. 2. Nimrod is said to be a mighty hunter, i. e. Warrier, Gen 10. 8. so Mars. See more of this parallel betwixt Nimrod and Mars, in Vossius, de Idololatr. lib. 1. cap. 16.

CHAP. VI. The Theogonie of Vulcan, Silenus, Pan, Prometheus, Nep∣tune, Janus, Aeolus, Rhea, Minerva, Ceres, Niobe, and the Sirenes.

Vulcan the same with Tubal cain, Gen. 4. 22. Silenus's parallel Page  179 with, Silo, Gen. 40. 10. &c. Silenus the same with Silas and Si∣lo. Silenus is said to be without Father and Mother; as Silo and Melchisedek his Type Heb. 7. 3. Silenus is said to be the greatest Doctor of his Age, from Silo's Character Gen. 49. 10. Silenus's riding on an Asse, from Silo's Gen. 49. 11. Si∣lenus's being filled with Wine, from Silo's Gen. 49. 12. Silenus's meat Cows milk, from Silo's Character Gen. 49. 12. Silenus's Parallel with Balaam. The Theogonie of Pan and his Paral∣lel with the Hebrew Messias. Pan the same with Silenus, Fau∣nus, and Satyrus. Pan's parallel with Abel, Israel, and Cham. Prometheus's Theogonie and Parallel with Noah: as also with Magog. Neptunes Theogonie and Parallel with Japhet. Janus's Parallel with Noah, and Javan. The Theogonie of Aeolus, Rhea, Minerva, Ceres, Niobe, and the Sirenes, He∣braick.

§. 1. FRom Mars we passe to Vulcan, who was exactly pa∣rallel* unto, and derived from Tubalcain, as both their Names and Attributes prove. First, as to the name Vulcan, Vossius de Idolatr. lib. 1. cap. 16. shews us that Vulcanus is the same with Tubalcanus Gen. 4. 22. only by a wonted and easy mutation of B into V. and casting away a syllable: as from*〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉lacte and from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉rura:

2. As for the main Art or Office attributed to Vulcan, we have it mention'd by Diodorus lib. 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉&c.

By Vulcan, as they say, was invented the fabrication of Iron, Brasse, Gold, Sil∣ver, and all other metals, which receive the operation of fire; as also the universal use of fire, as imployed by Artificers and others. Whence the Masters of these Arts offer up their prayers and sacreds to this God chiefly: and by these, as by all others, Vulcan is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉fire, and having by this means given a great benefit to the common life of men, he is conse∣crated Page  180 to immortal memorie and honor.
Thus Diodorus: wherein he gives us an exact account why the Mythologists con∣secrated Vulcan, and made him the God of Fire, and all Arts per∣fected by fire. Which exactly answers to the character given to Tubalcain Gen. 4. 22. Tubalcain an instructor of every Arti∣ficer*in iron and brasse, &c. Thence Bochart in his Preface to Phaleg speaks thus:
The Grecians, when they write of the first Inventors of things, to Tubalcain, who first invented the conflature of Metals, they substitute the Curetes, or the Cy∣clopes, or Vulcanus Lemnius, &c.
This also exactly answers to Sanchoniathons character of Vulcan, whom (according to Philo Byblius's Version) he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the Phenician Tongue 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Chores ur, i. e. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉one, who by the ope∣ration of fire, fabricates metals into any forme: whence Lucian cals Vulcan〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and the Poets feign him to be the chief fa∣bricator of all Jupiters thunderbolts, &c. So Bochart Can. lib: 2. cap. 2.

§. 2. We now come to Silenus, so famous amongst the* Poets, whom they place in the order of their Gods; whose Names, Genealogie, and Attributes, apparently prove him to have been, by a monstrous Satanick imitation, of sacred origi∣nation. 1. As for his Greek name, which is variously written either 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Bochart (Can. lib. 1. cap. 18. fol. 482.) makes it to be an evident derivative from the Hebrew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Silo, the Messias's name Gen. 49. 10. for from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Silo comes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Silan, whence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Silenus.

2. Neither does Silenus agree with Silo, the Jewish Messias, in Name only, but also in Genealogie, according to that of Dio∣dorus lib. 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

The first that ru∣led at Nysa was Silenus; whose Genealogie is unknown by all, by rea∣son of his antiquitie.
*

1. As for Nysa, where Silenus reigned, it seems either the same with Mount Sina (by the transposition of S. and N.) the Page  181 place where God delivered the law to Moses, who therefore was said to reign there, as Vossius; or else Nysa is the same with the place where Moses, Exod. 17. 15. built an Altar, and called the name of it Jehovah Nissi. as C. 5. § 3. Whence Nysa according to Bochart, as before. And that which makes this more evident is, that this Nysa, where Silenus reigned, is the same with that of Bacchus, who is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the God of Nysa from that of Moses, Exod. 17. 15. Jehovah Nissi. For Bacchus and Sile∣nus are made by the Poets to be inseparable companions as C. 3. §. 3.

2. As for Silenus's Genealogie, Diodorus also tels us, that it*was unknown to all by reason of its Antiquitie or Eternitie: which answers to the Hebrews account of their Messias, Hebr. 7. 3. without father, without mother, having neither beginning of daies, &c. the character of Melchisedek, the type of Christ.

3. There is yet a more exact Parallel betwixt Silenus and* the Hebrew Silo or Shiloh, as to Attributes, and Offices: for 1. Of Silo 'tis said Gen. 49. 10. and to him shall be〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉the Do∣ctrine of the people, or the Congregation of the people, to be endoctrinated. Thus Silenus is also made by the Poets to be the greatest Doctor of his Age: for he is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Bacchus's Praeceptor, i. e. according to Vossius's account, Bacchus was Moses, and Silenus was Silo or Christ, who instructed Moses on Mount Sina or Nysa, the place where Bacchus and Silenus were said to be. Again Tertullian, de Anima cap. 2. makes*Silenus

to be a Phrygian, who being brought by the Pastors to Midas the King, he lent him his great Asses ears.
Vossius (de Idololat. lib. 1. cap. 21.) thus deciphers this fable.
It is no wonder that Midas is said to lend Silenus his Asses ears; be∣cause he was the most intelligent of his Age both in nature and Antiquitie. The import is; that Midas listened greatly to him as his Instructor.
I suppose Silenus is said to be a Phry∣gian, because the Phrygians were some of the first great My∣thologists, who traduced fables into Greece, particularly this of Silenus, from the Phenicians and Hebrews.

Page  1822. Another Attribute given to Silenus is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉* carried for the most part on an Asse: and hence Silenus had a particular remarque for riding on an Asse: which Bochart re∣fers to that prophecie of Silo Gen. 49. 11. binding his Asses colt to the choice Vine. 3. The Mythologists fable Silenus, camrade of Bacchus, to be imployed in treading out the Grapes. This Bo∣chart refers to Gen. 49. 11. he washed his garments in wine, and his cloths in the blood of Grapes, which is explicated Esa. 5. of such as tread out the grapes.

4. They characterize Silenus, as one that was alwaies drunk;* as 'tis supposed from what followes Gen. 49. 12. His eyes shall be red with wine: which Solomon makes the character of one over∣come with wine, Prov. 23. 29, 30. to whom rednes of eyes, &c. 5. They ascribe to Silenus for his meat, Cows Milk: which Bo∣chart* makes to be traduced from Gen. 49. 12. and his teeth white with Milk. Whence he concludes thus:

The Devil could have imagined nothing more abominable whereby to profane the most holy misteries of our Religion, and to expose it to the cavils of most wicked men, &c.

6. That Silenus had his original traduction from Silo the Jewish Messias will farther appear from that of Pausanius Eliacon. 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉The monument of Silenus remains in the Countrey of the Hebrews, i. e. all the Tra∣ditions of Silenus came from the Hebrews, whose Messias he was. I know, that Sandfordus de Descensu Christi l. 1. §. 21.* supposeth Balaam to be Silenus.

Nothing, saith he, hinders, but that Balaam should be Silenus; namely, he who was so fa∣mous for his Asse, and Prophecie. The Ancients fable, that Bacchus gave a reward to a certain Asse that he should speak with human voice, with which the Giants, which were Bac∣chus's enemies, were terrified. Whence came these things but from the sacred Scriptures? Numb. 22. 28. the Lord opened*the mouth of the Asse, &c. which being divulged far and near, we need not doubt but that the Moabites were terrified thereat.
Page  183 So Stilling fleet, Origin. S. Book. 3. cap. 5. sect. 11. makes this whole fable of Silenus to be taken from the storie of Balaam, to whom he seems parallel; in that both were noted for their skill in Divination; both taken by the water, Numb. 22. 5. both* noted for riding on an Asle, &c. Though tis possible, that many Branches of Silenus's storie may be referred to that of Balaam, yet I should rather refer the main of it to Silo, Gen. 49. 10. ac∣cording to that of Bochart (Can. lib. 1. cap. 18. fol. 482.) The first of Bacchus's companions is Silenus, whose fable took its original from the prophecie of Silo, Gen. 49. 10. in a monstrous manner de∣torted &c. This may be farther evinced by what follows, of Pan, which some make the same with Silenus.

§. 3. That Pan, whom the Poets feign to be the God of*Shepherds, was parallel to, and, as tis presumed, originally traduced from the Jewish Messias, stiled the Shepherd of Israel, may be evinced from their parallel Names, Attributes, and Offi∣ces. 1. As for the origination of Pan, Bochart (Can. lib. 1. cap. 18. fol. 483.) groundedly draws it from the Heb.〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Pan, which signifies such an one as is struck, or strikes with astonishing fears, and stupifying terrors, as Psal. 88. 16. and the reason of this nota∣tion is considerable: for Pan being supposed to be one of Bac∣chus's Commanders, is said to have sent astonishing fears on all their enemies; whence that proverbial speech, of Pannick fears. This seems to allude to the storie of Israel's being conducted in the wildernesse by Christ, the Shepherd of Israel, who cast Pan∣nick fears on all their Enemies: according to that confession of Rahab, Joshua 2. 9. Your terror is fallen upon us, &c. so v. 24.*The inhabitants of the countrey do faint because of us. The like Joshua 5. 1. Their heart melted, neither was their spirit in them*any more, because of the children of Israel. 2. Pan is called also by the Latines, Sylvanus: which some derive from Sylvis; but o∣ther, on more probable conjecture, make it the same with the* Greek Silenus, or Silas: and so in Scripture the same person, who is called Sylvanus, 1 Thes. 1. 1. is stiled Silas, Act. 17. 4. as Gro∣tius,Page  184 and Deodati. Now Silas is the same with Silenus, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Silo, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Silan. 3. That which makes this farther evi∣dent,* is the identitie betwixt Pan and Faunus; which Bochart Can. lib. 1. cap. 18. asserts in these words.

Faunus, amongst the Latines, is the same God, and of the same original with Pan: for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 with some sounds Fun.
Thence Ovid, in Phaedra;
—Fauni{que} Bicornes
Numine contactas attonuere—

And Bochart (can. lib. 1. cap. 33.) affirmes, that many make Faunus to be the same God with Sylvanus, and both the same with Pan: and then he addes,

And truely, Evander Arcas was the first that brought the worship of Faunus into Latium, out of Arcadia, where Pan was worshipped.
4. Yea Vossius de Idololatr. lib. 1. cap. 8. seems to make Satyrus the same with Pan,*Faunus, and Silenus: and the main difference he makes between them is onely this;
That whereas Pan, Faunus, Silenus, and Satyrus, are all wood Deities, the name Satyrus is more general, and usually attributed to the younger; whereas that of Silenus was given to the more ancient.
That which makes for this affirmation is, that Pan, Faunus, Satyrus, and Silenus are all reck∣oned as companions of Bacchus in his expedition. Bochart (Can. lib: 1. cap. 18. fol. 483.) derives Satyr from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Sair, which a∣mongst the Hebrews signifies both a Goat and Devil; (as Mai∣monides) because the Devil oft presents himself in the forme of a Goat &c. But

2. To passe from names to the thing it self. Pan is said to be an Egyptian God, who came up with Bacchus to fight against the Giants. So Diodorus Sic. Bibl. 1. Unto this God Pan the natives not onely erect〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Images in every Temple; but also they have a citie in Thebais, which they call〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 [i. e. Cham's citie,] but interpret it,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉the citie of Pan. By which it is evi∣dent, that Pan was an Egyptian God, and, as we may presume, the same with the Hebrew Messias, who conducted Moses (the Egyptian Bacchus) and the Israelites out of Egypt, unto Canaan,Page  185 striking terrors into the Cananites, as before. That Pan, the* God of Shepherds, and those many fabulous Attributes and Offi∣ces given unto him, were originally borrowed from the Jewish Messias, held forth in the old Testament under the Embleme of a Shepherd, is proved at large by Jackson, in his discourse of the Divine Autoritie of sacred Scripture, fol. 31. where he cites a re∣lation out of Plutarch, touching the mourning of the Demoni∣ack Spirits, for the death of their great God Pan, and the ceasing of all their Oracles thereupon: which was truely and onely veri∣fied in Christ, whose death put a period to all Heathen Oracles, as both sacred and pagan stories relate. But to finish this Gene∣alogie of Pan, Bochart (in the Preface to his Phaleg fol. 2.) redu∣ceth his original to Abel.

The Greeks (saies he) when they* write of the first Inventors of things, substitute Pan the Ar∣cadian unto Abel, the Prince of Pastors, &c.
Sandford, de de∣scensu Christi l. 1. §. 19. supposeth Pan to be the same with the*Patriarch Israel, or Jacob. His words are these: for Joseph is that*old Osyris, nourished by Pan, whom I conceive to be Israel. Dick∣inson, Delph, Phoenciz. cap. 4. makes Pan the same with Cham: which he indeavors to prove from that of Diodor. Sicul. l. 1. where the same citie in Egypt, which is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 i. e. the citie of Cham, is interpreted by the Natives, the citie of Pan. We need not exclude either of these Parallels with Pan; because we find that the Mythologists were, according to their different humors, very difforme and different in the application of their Fables. Only, I suppose, the great Pan, so much idolized by the Poets as the God of Shepherds, refers chiefly to the Jewish Messias, the great Shepherd of Israel, as before.

§. 4. We now proceed to Prometheus, and his Genealogie,*Names, and Attributes, with their parallel in sacred storie and per∣sons. There is some difference among Philologists about the Traduction of Prometheus; some reducing him to Noah, others to Magog, Japhet's son: which controversie may be, with much ease, reconciled, by taking in both reductions. For its certain Page  186 that the old Mythologists were no way uniforme or conforme in the application of those fables, they gleaned up in the Oriental parts. Therefore to begin with those who make Prometheus the same with Noah: as Vossius de Idololatr: lib. 1. cap. 18. pag. 141.

The Patriarch Noah (saies he) is adumbrated to us, not onely in Saturne, but also in Prometheus, whose Feast is called at A∣thens〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in which there is a contest of Lamps; also an Al∣tar in the Academie, on which the Lamps are wont to be kindled in this Contest;
as tis attested by Harpocration, &c. Thus Vossius. This Rite, consecrated to Prometheus, I presume, had its original Idea from the Lamps which burned in the Tem∣ple at Ierusalem, and from the fire on the Altar: whence also that fable of Prometheus's stealing fire from Heaven: (which may al∣lude to Elijah's praying for fire, which descended from Hea∣ven, &c.) But as to the parallel betwixt Prometheus and Noah, take these particulars. 1. As under Noah, so also under Prome∣theus, the great Floud was supposed to happen. So Diodorus, lib. 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 &c. They say that Ni∣lus having broken down its bounds, overwhelmed a great part of Egypt, especially that part where Prometheus reigned, which de∣stroyed the greatest part of men in his Territorie. Whereas some may object, that this is meant onely of a particular Deluge in Egypt, under Prometheus &c. Tis replied, that as the Grecians attributed the general Floud to Deucalion, so the Egyptians at∣tributed the same to Prometheus, or, as Eusebius, to Ogyges; whereas all these fabulous Deluges, were but broken Traditions of the real universal Deluge under Noah. And particularly, that this under Prometheus was the same with that of Noah, Vossius endeavors to prove from the notation of the name: for (saies he) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉signifies one who is so wise, as to foresee evil; whereas on the contrary,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉is one, who is too late, or after-wise: which agrees to Noah, who being divinely taught, foresaw the floud, and so preserved himself and his. 2. Prometheus is said to rebuild and restore human kind after the floud: which exactly answers Page  187 to Noah, the father of Man-kind, &c. 3. Herodot: lib. 4. tels us, that Prometheus's wife was called Asia. And indeed, Noah's wife was no other than Asia, or Asiatica, an Asiatick. But whereas it may be objected, that Prometheus is made to be the son of Iapetus, and therefore cannot be Noah, but must be his Grandchild; Vossius replies, that tis no wonder, if in Ages so remote, posteritie miscalled the Father and the son, and so con∣founded one with t'other.

2. Bochart, to avoid this contradiction, makes Prometheus to* be Magog the son of Iapetus, or Japhet. So Bochart Phaleg lib. 1. cap. 2. fol. 11. also lib. 3. cap. 13. where he proves, that Pro∣metheus is the same with Magog. 1. In that he is stiled the son of Iapetus; as Magog was the son of Japhet. 2. From the eating of Prometheus's heart; which fable sprang from the name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Magog; which, being applied to the heart, implies its consumti∣on, or wasting away. 3. Prometheus is said to have his seat, and to lie in Caucasus; because Magog, and his posteritie seated themselves there. 4. They fable, that fire and metals were in∣vented by Prometheus, (as formerly by Vulcan:) because there are many subterraneous fires and metals in these places. Stilling∣fleet; Orig. S. book 3. cap. 5. § 9. &c. follows Bochart herein.

§. 5. From Prometheus we passe to Neptune; which is in∣deed* a name rather appellative and common, than proper. For as in ancient times, especially before the Trojan wars, they stiled all illustrious Kings, Jupiter, and all renowned Captains, Mars, or Hercules; so also they called every Insular Prince by the name of Neptune: whence multitudes partook of one and the same name; which made their characters and stories the more fabulous and ambiguous: yet are we not without evident ideas and notices of their Traduction, originally, from some sacred person or storie, as has been already demonstrated by a large enumeration of particulars; which will farther appear by the genealogie and storie of Neptune, who according to the general consent of the Lear∣ned, was originally Japhet the son of Noah. For look, as the Page  188 memorie of Noah was preserved in Saturne; and of Shem (whose posteritie possessed the septentrional and oriental Asia)* in Pluto; and also of Cham (whose progenie seated in the Me∣ridional, Asia, & Africa) in Jupiter Hammon: so also the memo∣rie and storie of Japhet was continued in Neptune, as Philolo∣gists generally accord, and that one these rational conjectures: 1. From the very name Neptune; which Bochart derives from*〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Niphtha, which belongs to Niphal, or the Passive Conju∣gation of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Patha to enlarge; whence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Japhet, accor∣ding to the allusion of Noah Gen. 9. 27. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Japht*Elohim lejaphet, i. e. God shall enlarge Japhet. Proportiona∣ble whereto Neptune was called by the Greeks 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; which*Grammarians in vain attempt to deduce from the Greek tongue; seeing, as Herodotus in Euterpe assures us; the name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, was at first used by none, but the Libyans or Africans, who alwaies honored this God. Namely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is the same with the Punick 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Pesitan; which signifies Expanse or broad; from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Pesat to dilate, or expand. Whence it ap∣pears, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and Japhet are Synonymous; and both derived from Radix's, signifying latitude: which well suits with Neptune's Character; who is stiled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 latè imperans and la∣tifonans; as also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 one that has a large breast, &c. See more of this Bochart, Phaleg. lib. 3. cap. 1. 2. From the Genea∣logie of Neptune; whom the Mythologists make to be Saturnes son; as Japhet was son to Noah, who passed for Saturne.

3. Neptune was fabled to be the God of the Sea, and Instructor* of Navigation; So Diodorus lib. 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉&c.

The Cretenses say, that amongst other Gods borne of Saturne and Rhea, Neptune first began to mannage the Affairs of the Sea, and to instruct for Navigation; he having obtai∣ned this prefecture from Saturne, whence it came to passe, that in after time the common Vogue so far obtained, that what∣ever Page  189 was done at Sea, was said to have been in the power of Neptune, and therefore the Mariners sacrificed unto him.
Thus Diodorus. All which seems to have been taken up from the real storie of Japhet, & his Posteritie, their possessing the Ilands in the midland Sea, Greece, &c. So Bochart Phaleg lib. 1. cap. 2.
Japhet (saies he) passed for Neptune the God of the Sea; be∣cause his portion was in the Ilands and Peninsules. In the Ilands are Britannie, Ireland, Thule, Crete, Sicilie, Sardinia, Corsica, Ba∣leares, &c.
In the peninsules are Spain, Italie, Greece, Asia mi∣nor, &c. So Lactantius de falsa Relig. l. 1. c. 11. All the ma∣ritime places, with the Ilands, belonged unto Neptune, &c. This suits with Plato's origination of Neptunes Greek name; who (in his Cratylus) deriveth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from his giving drink, i. e. the Sea and Water unto all: which argues thus much, that they looked on Neptune as the God of the Sea, and that in allusion to Japhets possessing the maritime parts of Europe, &c.

4. Neptune was also called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Equestris: which is thus explicated by Diodorus lib. 5. where having spoken of Nep∣tune as God of the Sea, he addes. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

They adde also this of Neptune, that he was the first that tamed horses; and that the Science of Horsemanship was first delivered by him; whence he was sti∣led 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a good horseman.
This also Vossius applies to Japhet: (Vossius de Idolol lib. 1. cap. 15. pag. 118.) his words are these:
Japhet had for his portion the Mediterranean Ilands, and the European continent: wherefore his posteritie had need of a twofold Science, 1. Of Nautick, to direct them in their Navi∣gation, 2. Of Horsemanship to conduct themselves in those rude and wild countries, thorow which they were to passe into the Northerne and Westerne parts of Europe. This I con∣jecture was the cause why Neptune, whom I interpret Japhet, was made to be the God of Nautick Science and sea Affairs,
as Page  190 also of Horsemanship, &c. But touching the Parallel 'twixt Japhet and Neptune, see more Bochart Phaleg. lib. 3. cap. 1.

§ 6. As for the Theogonie of Janus and his parallel; if* we consider him historically, and according to the Mytholo∣gie of the Poets, so he refers to the storie of Noah, or Javan. That which inclines some to make him Parallel with Noah, is 1. The cognation of his Name, with the Hebrew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉jain wine; whereof Noah was the first Inventor, according to Vossius. Again, 2. Janus was pictured with a double forhead; because he saw a double world, that before and after the Floud: as Noah. 3. As the beginning and propagation of mankind, after the Floud, was from Noah; so also they ascribe the begin∣nings of all things unto Janus: whence the entrance to an house is called by the Romans, Janua; and the entrance to the year Januarie. Whence some make the name Xisythrus, given by the Assyrians to Noah, (as in the storie of the Floud Book. 3. chap. 6. §. 4.) to signifie an entrance or door, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉ziz a post or threshold of a door; as Vossius. 4. Latium, where Janus's seat was, (whence part of old Rome was called Janicule) was called Oenotria. Now 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 comes from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Wine. Thus much for Janus's parallel with Noah. Others refer the origination* (both name and person) of Janus to Javan the son of Japhet, the parent of the Europeans. For 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Javan is much the same with Janus. 2. Thence that of Horat. l. 1. 3. Japeti Genus. So Voss. Idol. l. 2. c. 16. Janus's name taken historically is the contract of Javan.

§. 7. To Janus we might subjoin Aeolus, the God of the winds* and King of the Aeoliar Ilands, with notices of his Traduction from the Phenicians and Hebrews. But we shall touch only on his name, which seems to be a good key or Index to decipher his fabulous Office. This fable of Aeolus, the God of the winds, is supposed to have been first brought into Greece by Homer; who had it from the Phenicians; with whom 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉aol (as the Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) signifies a storme or tempest: which the Chaldee Paraphrase more fully expresseth by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉alol: and the King Page  191Aeolus is thought, by the Phenicians, to be the King 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉aolin of Tempests: as Bochart Can lib. 1. cap. 33. fol. 658.

§. 8. Having discoursed, at large, touching the chief of the*Grecian Gods, and their Traduction from the sacred Oracles; we shall briefly touch on sundry of their Goddesses, and their deri∣vation from the same sacred fountain, 1. Noah is called Gen. 29. 20. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉a husband of the earth, i. e. a husband man. Whence the Mythologists made Saturne, i. e. Noah, the husband of Rhea, i. e. the Earth. Some derive Rea, by an easy anagram∣matisme, from Era. So Sandford Descens. l. 1. §. 26.

The Greeks refer Era. (Heb. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉eres.) i. e. the Earth, unto the number of their Gods: by what ceremonie? Namely accor∣ding to the old Grammarian rule, changing Era into Rea. After the same manner Aer began to be Hera:
for this ori∣gination 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 we have from Plato. I should rather derive 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 from the Chaldee 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Hera, Libera, which was Juno her name; whence also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Cora, or Hora, and Ceres as before, C. 2. §. 1. & C. 5. §. 1. &c.

2. As for Minerva; Vossius (de Idololatr. lib. 1. cap. 17.)* makes her to be the same with Naamah, Tubalcains sister, Gen. 4. 22. Her name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Stephanus makes to be Phenician;〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: which Bochart derives from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to move war; whence the Oncean Gates at Thebes. The fable of Miner∣va her being borne out of Jupiters head, they generally refer to the generation of Christ, the Divine wisdome.

3. Ceres is by Bochart substituted, and made parallel to Adam,* or Cain, the first tillers of ground. 4. Niobe is by some made* the same with Lots wife, who was turned into a pillar of Salt, i. e. of Sulphureous, bitumenous, and salty matter; wherein she was partaker of Sodoms judgement, which overtook her: whence the fable of Niobe, her being turned into a pillar of stone, &c. 5. As for the Sirenes, (which according to the fable were in number three, partly Virgins, partly Birds, whereof one* sung with voice, the other by pipe; and tother by Harpe) Page  192Bochart (Can. lib. 1. cap. 28.) makes the name to be purely Phe∣nician, or Hebrew; in which tongue 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Sir, signifies a song, (whence Solomon's Song of songs,) thence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Siren, a singing monster, &c. 6. As for Juno, & Jana, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, thence also Diana, Astarte, Venus, &c. we have fully handled them before, chap. 2.

§. 9. Thus much for the Theogonie of the Grecian and Roman Gods, and Goddesses, which will receive farther evidence from what follows touching the Genealogie of the Phenician and Egyptian Gods. For that the former were but the product of the later, is evident. Thus Sandford de descensu l. 1. §. 6.

We may not fetch the names of the Gods from the Grecians, but from the Phenicians or Egyptians. It remains therefore that we treat of the Apotheosis of the Barbarian names, which a∣mong those Ancients had not one and the same origination. For either some thing was coined out of forrein letters, the name being relinquisht: or the name, together with the thing, was traduced unto some mysteries of Religion. This again was accomplisht two manner of waies; either when a forrein Name, (so far as the nature of the Tongue would admit it) the right order of the Letters being relinquisht, was referred unto the Gods; or else the Letters being transposed or changed, a new name was composed out of the old; which thence, accor∣ding to the same laws of Tongues, was invested with the Rite of some Deitie. Thus all those appellations of the Gods, which Greece borrowed from the Barbarians, may be digested into 3 ranks. 1. Either they flow from the sole explication of Na∣ture; as from Abaddon sprang Apollon; or if you will rather, according to the sacred Phraseologie, Apolluon: or 2. from the pronunciation of the name; thus from Japhet was made Iapetos: or lastly from an Enallaxis of the Letters; according to which for me it is as clear as the light,
that from Adamah first sprang Hadam, and hence Hadan. Thus Sandford of the origination of the Grecian Gods from the Egyptian, Phenician, or Hebrew names. See more of this Chap. 7. §. 12.

Page  193
CHAP. VII. The Theogonie of the Phenician and Egyptian Gods, with their Hebrew origination.

Baal from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and Bel from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉El. Beelsamen from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Beelzebub, 2 King. 1. 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Baal Peor, Pf. 106. 28. Numb. 25. 1, 2, 3. Moloch the same with Baal. Adra∣melech and Anamelech. 2 King. 17. 31. Esa. 30. 33. Tophet and Gehinnom, whence〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The Samothracian Cabiri, Phenician Gods. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 God's name, Ps. 119. 137. Cabiri from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Axieros〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Axiokersos from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Cadmilus from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the minister of God. Eliun from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, God's name. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Jud. 8. 33. Plautus's Paenulus: Alonim &c. from Gen. 14. 19. Ilus from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; whence also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and Heliogabalus.〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Elohim. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Gen. 28. 18. The Egyp∣tian Gods, their original Hebrew. Apis, a symbol of Joseph; so Serapis, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Gen. 45. 8. Osiris the same with Moses or Adam, as Isis with Eve, from Ischa. Mnevis the same with Joseph. Of Orus, Remphan, &c. The Metamorphoses of the Gods in Egypt. The causes of Mythologick Theologie▪

§. 1. HAving gone through Hellenisme, or the Grecian〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* we now passe on to the Oriental Gods, with endeavors to demonstrate how their Genealogie, Names, and Attributes, received their derivation from the sacred Language and Oracles: We shall begin with the Phenician Gods, which were the first, if not as to time, yet as to dignitie; whence the Grecians tradu∣ced* the chiefest of their Gods. And amongst the Phenician Gods, the chief was Baal, Bel, or Belus; concerning which there is some difference amongst Philologists; yet all unanimously con∣cur Page  194 in this, that its origination was from some Hebrew and sacred name; which will evidently appear from the notation thereof. Damascius, in the life of Isidore, mentioned by Photius, tels us, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉The Pheni∣cians and Syrians call Saturne El, Bel, and Bolathen. Vossius makes Bel the contract of Beel, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Baal, the Lord, which name belonged originally to God, as it appears from Hosea 2. 16, 17. But Servius, on Virgil, supposeth Bel to come of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉El,* Gods name; whence the Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 El, and the Digamma being added, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Bel, and so Belus. Bochart, in a personal conference he favored me with, gave me a good conciliation of these two opinions, by affirming, that there was originally a twofold Be∣lus, the one Assyrian, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Heb.〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, originally 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the As∣syrian God; whence Nimrod, the first of the Assyrian Monar∣chie, was called Belus: the other Belus was a Phenician, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Baal, the Phenician God; whence Ithobaal, King of Tyre, and Jezabel his daughter; as also many of the Phenician Kings, who were called Belus. Tis true; Bochart makes the Phenician 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Baal, to have had its original from the first Phenician King of that name; but yet I conceive it not improbable, but that the first Phenician King, might be so called from their Gods name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Baal; which was the title they gave the Sun, from his office, Gen. 1. 16. as he was reputed the Lord of Heaven: or else, which seems most probable, we may suppose the Phenicians to have had various 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Baalim; some supreme, which they stiled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, natural and immortal Gods; such were the Sun and Moon: others, which they stiled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, mortal Gods, viz. the souls of their great Heroes and Kings. As for the for∣mer supreme natural Gods,▪ they called the Sun Baal, and the Moon Baaltis or Beltis, that is, in the Scripture language, the Queen of Heaven. As for the mortal or made Baalim, they were no other than the Souls of their chief Heroes, or Princes, which after their death received an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Deification; and so became a kind of midling Gods, or Mediators betwixt the su∣preme Page  195 Gods and men, (which the Greeks called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Demons) whereof we find frequent mention in Scripture as Jud. 10. 6.* 13. The Phenicians stiled their supreme Baal 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Baal Samen. So Sanchoniathon, according to the Version of Philo Byblius, in Eusebius praepar. lib. 1. cap. 7. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

A drought happening, they lift up their hands to heaven, to the Sun. For this (saies Sanchoniathon) they ac∣count the only God;
calling him Belsamen, the Lord of Heaven. Beelsamen here, according to Philo Byblius's expli∣cation, is in the Phenician Tongue 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉beelsamen i. e. the Lord of Heaven: whence Philo Byblius immediately sub∣joins. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉which is in the Phenician Tongue, Lord of heaven. To which he addes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but in the Greek tongue, he is zeus Jupiter. So that Belsamen is the same with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Jupiter Olympius. So Vossius, de Idolol. lib. 2. cap. 4.
This (saies he) we may confirme from the He∣brew Tongue, which differs in dialect only from the Phenici∣an. For what the Phenicians pronounce Beelsamen, the He∣brews write 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉baal Schamaim, i. e. Lord of heaven &c.
Thus also Bochart (Can. lib. 1. cap. 42.) And indeed all this tou∣ching Belsamen, Sanchoniathon seems to have evidently traduced from that function or Office, which God had laid on the Sun, mentioned Gen. 1. 16. the greater light to rule the day as Psal. 136. 8.

§. 2. This Phenician God Beelsamen, the Jews called Beel∣zebub,* as 2 King. 1. 2. Baalzebub the God of Ekron. Concerning the Etymon of Baalzebub, various are the conjectures of the Learned. The additament 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉zebub signifies a flie: whence some think it was added by the Jews in a way of opprobium, or scorne; as if one should say, the Lord of a flie. It is most pro∣bable, that this name Beelzebub was given this Idol God, not by the Accaronites or Phenicians, but by the Jews; and that from a great contempt and just hatred of the Accaronitick Idolatrie.Page  196 Yea Vossius (de Idolol. lib. 2. cap. 4.) following the conjecture of learned Jos. Scaliger herein, thinks that this name Beelzebub was curtaild by the Jews; who, by an easy mutation, turned the Accaronitick name (according to Scaliger) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉baal zeba∣him, the Lord of Sacrifices, into the contemptuous Title of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Baal zebub, the Lord of flies, i. e. a God that regarded only flies; or that could not drive away the flies, by reason of their multitude, from the Sacrifices. This name Beelzebub is, in the New Testament, changedinto 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Beelzebul.〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 being made 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉zebul, for greater contempt sake: for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies dung or abominable, by which name the Gentile Gods are characterized, 2 King. 23. 24. whence this name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is in the New Testa∣ment* applied to the Prince of the Devils: as indeed this Acca∣ronitick Beelzebub was the chief of their Idols. Hence also Hell was by the Greeks called Accaron, according to that of the poet, Acheronta movebo; because Beelzebub the Prince of those De∣mon Idols, was God of Accaron, as Mde and Bochart. The like Glassius (lib. 4. Grammat. S. Tract. 3. observ. 4.)

The name Baal∣zebub 2. Kin. 1. 2. which in the New Testament is written 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* B being changed into L. Mat. 12. 24. Luk. 11. 15. refers* to the Idol of Ekron, and signifies the Lord of a flie or flies: peradventure because it was thought to drive away those per∣nicious flies which infested the Ekronitish countrey, as Hercules was stiled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from his driving away Locusts, and Apollo〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from dispersing the Phrygian mice.—The Jews tra∣duced the name of this Idol to expresse the Devil by, and moreover changed Beelzebub into Beelzebul,
which signifies the Lord of dung. See more of this in Selden de Diis. Syrum Syntag. 2. p. 211. That Beelzebub was the same with Beelsamen &c. See Owen de Idolol. lib. 5. c. 5.

§. 3. This Phenician Baal passed amongst the Moabites and*Midianites under the Name of Baal Peor. So Numb. 25. 2, 3, 6. Psal. 106. 28. Hos. 9. 10. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Baal peor, which the LXX render 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. He was called Baalpeor from the mountain Page  197Peor, where he was worshipped as Num. 23. 28. So Apollina∣ris*(Catena patrum Graecorum) on Psa. 106. 28. And they were joined to Baal peor] 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: The Idol of Baal is in the place of Peor; but the Greeks call Baal Belus, whom they affirme also to be Saturne. Joseph Scaliger makes Baal Peor to signifie the same with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Thundering Jupiter. Jerom on Hos. 9. lib. 2. tels us, that Baal peor the Idol of the Moabites, is the same with Priapus. So Isidorus Orig. lib. 8. cap. 11.

Baal peor (saies he) is interpreted an image of ignominie; for it was an Idol of Moab, sirnamed Baal, on the mount of Peor, which the Latins call Priapus, the God of Gardens, &c.
That this Baal peor was the same with the Grecian Priapus, seems evident by their parallel sacrifices and worship. For, as fornication was a main piece of worship, they performed to their lascivious God Priapus, so we find the same performed to Baal peor, even by the Israelites. So Numb. 25. 1. Israel is said to commit whoredom*with the daughters of Moab: which is explicated v. 2. by bowing down to their Gods]. i. e. in a way of fornication: whence 'tis said vers. 3. Israel joined himself to Baal peor] i. e. worshipped him by fornication. We have it expressed in the same manner, Psal. 106. 28. By, joining themselves to Baal peor, is ment their* worshipping him by fornication: and by eating the sacrifices of the dead we must understand (with Austin on this place) their sacrificing to dead men, as to Gods or Baalim. They wor∣shipt Baal peor, their chief God, (which Vossius makes to be the Sun) by fornication and sacrifices: or else we may refer these sa∣crifices of the dead to those they performed to their inferior Baa∣lim, which were but some noble Heroes or Princes; who after their death were deifyed, and so became midling Gods or Me∣diators; as elsewhere. But thus much for Baal peor, concerning whom, see more Vossius de Idololatr. lib. 2. c. 7.

§. 4. The Phenician Baal passed amongst the Ammonites* under the name of Moloch, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Melek, the King. So Page  198 1 King. 11. 7. Moloch is stiled the Abomination of Ammon,* which v. 5. is stiled Milcom, &c. So Lev. 18. 21. Lev. 20. 2, 3, 4, 5. 2 Kings 23. 10. Thus Amos 5. 26. with the parallel, Act. 7. 43. we find mention of the Tabernacle of Moloch; where Iuni∣us and Tremelius subjoin this exegetick Note: You have mini∣stred in shew in the Tabernacle of the Living God; but you have worshipped really Moloch, the God of the Ammonites, (which by your impietie you have made yours) and other Gods of the Heathens, Synecdochically. This God of the Ammonites the Prophet, in this place onely, mentions, because the Ammonites being their neigh∣bors, he would more sharply strike at their Idolatrie. Tarnovius saies, that the Affixe in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 notes, that the Israelites fra∣med an Idol proper to themselves, according to the forme of the Ammonitick Idol. See more Glassius Gram. S. lib. 4. Tract. 3. ob∣serv. 17. (pag. 867. edit. 22.) That Moloch is the same with Ba∣al or Belus, appears 1. from the parallel import of the names: for as Baal signifies Lord, so Moloch King. 2. We find them also both joined in one word, Malech Belus, i. e. Lord King. 3. Their identitie is farther evident from the image of Moloch; which consisted of 7 conclaves, relating to the Sun, Moon, and 5. Planets; answerable to that of Baal. 4. Baal and Moloch had also the same reference: for as Baal passed for the Sun and Saturne, so Moloch. 5. Their Identitie is farther apparent from the same∣nes of their worship. So Owen (de Idololatr. lib. cap. 7.) That Moloch (saies he) is the same with Baal, seems to be evident from the samenes of their worship: for they sacrificed also their sons to Baal and that in the valley of Hinnom, as Jer. 7. 31. &c. As for the worship performed to Moloch, we have a general account thereof in the Scriptures above named; namely, that the Parents in honor of this Idol God, were wont to traduce their children through the fire. This Traduction, as Vossius (de Idolo. lib. 2. cap. 5.) will have it, was not a burning of them, but februation, i. e. pur∣gation of them; or a certain kind of expiation, wherein the chil∣dren were led or drawn by the Priests, or parents, through a space Page  199 between two great fires, &c. This he conceives is the meaning of all these Scriptures which mention their passing through the fire, not their combustion. Though he denies not, but that, be∣sides this kind of Februation, there were also expiations made by burning of persons in times of calamitie, &c. This explicati∣on of that Learned man seems not to answer fully the mind and import of those Scriptures, which mention the sacrificing their children to Moloch: for Psal. 106. 37, 38. tis said, they sacrifi∣ced*their sons and daughters to Devils, and shed innocent bloud, the bloud of their sons &c. Unto Moloch we may refer the Gods of Sepharvajim, Adramelech, and Anamelech; to whom also* they burned their sons, as 2 King. 17. 31. Adramelech, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, signifies the great and valiant Moloch, or King. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Addir is an attribute given unto God, which signifies properly potent, valiant, great, excellent, as Psal. 93 4. Anamelech im∣ports the oracle, or answer of Moloch: for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 implies an answer. Or else it may be derived from the Arabick〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signi∣fies rich, as Voss. lib. 2. c. 5. Bochart (Can. lib. 1. cap. 28. fol. 584.) tels us,

that Adranus is the name of a Syrian or Phenician God, as the Compound Adra-melech, 2 King. 17. 31. which Idol, some of the Hebrews make to have the effigies of a Mule, others of a Peacock.
This Adramelech signifies a magnifick King, &c. I shall conclude this of Moloch, with that account I find of him in Bochart, (Can. lib. 1. cap. 28. fol. 528.)
Tophet, amongst the Hebrews, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉the fire of Gehinnom, i. e. the valley of*Hinnom, or Hell, as they take it Job. 17. 6. and Esa. 30. 33. the translation being taken from the valley of Tophet, which is al∣so Gehinnom; in which they were wont to cast their children a∣live into the fire, in honor of their Idol Moloch, as 2 King. 23.* 10. and Jer. 7. 31. 32. which custome the Phenicians usurped be∣fore Moses's time; as it appears Levit. 18. 21. Deut. 18. 10. and the Carthaginians reteined this impious superstition even unto Hannibal's time.
Thus Bochart.*

§. 5. Amongst the Phenician Gods we may reckon the four¦seth Page  198the Sinceritie and Fidelitie of God, in giving Laws with severe Prohibitions against sin, Promises and Invitations unto Sinners to re∣pent, &c. To this first branch of their Objection we shal answer more distinctly and in its parts in what follows, §. 3, 4, 5. at present let this general Response suffice, that the Sinceritie and Faithfulnesse of God is sufficiently vindicated, in that Gods Com∣mands, Promises, and Invitations unto Sinners, flow from his complacential, legislative Wil, which is the Measure, Rule, and Rea∣son of our dutie and actings towards God; but his Predetermi∣native Concurse flows from his Beneplacite Decretive Wil, the Rule and Measure of his own actings towards his Creature: Now these two wils, albeit they are not repugnant each to other, because they are not ad idem, yet they are disparate and diverse: the things commanded by God may be repugnant to the things predetermined by him, yet his wil commanding is not repug∣nant to his wil predetermining. Indeed Gods preceptive wil is only in an analogic, figurative improper sense termed the wil of God, as significative of his soverain pleasure for the Govern∣ment of his Creature; and therefore Gods predetermining men to the material act of what is sinful, implies not the least sha∣dow of repugnance to his Sinceritie and Fidelitie in giving Laws and Prohibitions against Sin, or Promises to penitent Sinners. Yea, there is nothing that our Adversaries can urge against us for asserting a predeterminative Concurse, but may be retorted against them for asserting an immediate previous Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin: Yea, let them but grant, as they do, Gods certain prescience of sin, and the same black Imputations which they lode us with, wil al fal with as much weight on them∣selves, as before Chap. 5. §. 2.

2. As for what they urge from the Justice of God, that our*Hypothesis is contradictory thereto, in that he cannot in Justice punish that Sin, which he predetermines men unto, we answer, (1) That Gods Predetermination lays no violent force or compulsion on the wil to sin: he doth only as the first cause and God of Na∣ture sweetly though potently applie the wil to its act. (2) The wil doth in the very same moment, wherein it is predetermined by God, voluntarily and freely, as a deficient depraved facultie, elect the very act it is predetermined unto; so that it doth as freely, deliberately, and fully espouse the act, as if there were no Predetermination on Gods part: and what more just than Page  199 that the Sinner should be severely punished for that sinful act which he doth deliberately and voluntarily exert? (3) Here is in this objection a poor Sophisme, which they cal No-cause for a cause: For Gods predeterminative Concurse is not the cause of mens sins, albeit mens sins be a necessary consequent thereof. (4) The same difficulties, which our Adversaries urge us with in point of Divine Justice, return on them, who assert an im∣mediate previous Concurse to the Mater of Sin; neither can they without apparent violence to their own Reason impute this objection to us, which their own Hypothesis is as much obnoxious unto.

3. They urge us with an Imputation on the Clemence and Mer∣cie* of God, in that predeterminative Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin, makes the blessed God to be cruel towards his poor Creature; and this two ways: As (1) In that it makes God abso∣lutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment, without regard to their Sins. (2) In that it supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal Torments, and yet irresistibly to predetermine yea impel men thereto, as Baron. Metaph. p. 151. This Objection our Adversaries adorne and exaggerate with ma∣ny specious and plausible pretextes for the Vindication of Di∣vine Clemence and Mercy, as they pretend, and for our confu∣sion; Yet we no way dout but to make it appear, that al is but as emty vapor before the Meridian Sun. Therefore to answer, (1) to the first branch of the Objection, That our Hypothesis makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punish∣ment, without regard to their sins, [1] We grant, that the De∣cree of Reprobation is, and must be according to our Hypothe∣sis, absolute, because there is an adequate commensuration be∣tween absolute Predefinition and Predetermination, as our Ad∣versaries also maintain; of which before Chap. 5. §. 3. [2] Yet we peremtorily denie, that God reprobates or predestines men to eternal punishment without any regard to their sins. Divines say, that albeit sin be not the motive or ground moving God to reprobate men, yet it is considered in the Decree of Reproba∣tion as that for which God wil at last condemn men. It's true, the Supralapsarian Divines, who make man as labile the object of Reprobation, differ somewhat from those of the sublapsarian per∣swasion, who make the corrupt masse, or lapsed man the object of Election and Reprobation; yet they both take in the consi∣deration Page  200 of sin in the Decree of Reprobation; and they both make the Decree of Reprobation in it self absolute: for the Sub∣lapsarians make sin only a commun condition of the corrupt Masse, not distinctive or discriminative of Reprobates from the Elect; as Davenant, Animadvers. on Gods Love, p. 84. proves, That the Supralapsarians charge not Gods Reprobation with mans destruction; Though he himself goes the Sublapsarian way. But, [3] Here lies the bitter root of this forged Imputation affixed on us by our Adversaries, that they consider the Decree of Re∣probation as an act of Divine Justice, which regards the object as already constituted, and not the constitution thereof. This is incomparably wel observed by judicious Davenant in his an∣swer to Hoard, Animadvers. p. 229.

For those Inferences there∣fore, That if absolute Reprobation be granted, God may be properly called a Father of Crueltie,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, I marvel how he trembled to thinke of them, and how he never trembled to utter them. That wherein he perpetually is mistaken, is, the making of Non-election or Negative Reprobation a Vindicative act, the confounding it with the judicial Sentence of Damnation, the conceiving it to worke in the Non-elect an invincible necessitie of committing Sin, with such like monstrous fansies, which he takes for Principles needing no proof, whereas they are such grosse errors as need no confutation.
(2) The second part of the Objection, which supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal torments, and yet irresistibly to predetermine and impel men thereunto, has been sufficiently refuted in what pre∣cedes, §. 1. and indeed throughout this whole Discourse, and wil also come under consideration in what follows.

4. Our Adversaries charge also our Hypothesis with a Repug∣nance* to the Sanctitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature, in that, by asserting Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin, we make the act of sin to be wel-pleasing to God. This objecti∣on is greatly aggravated by a Reverend Divine among our selves, who in the confutation of Twisse, argues thus: If God willeth that sin existe by his Permission, (1) He willeth Sin. Yea, (2) God wils sin as much as man. Yea, (3) This makes God equally to wil Sin and Holiness. Yea, (4) Then God takes complacence in Sin. Answer. These are high charges indeed, and if they could be made good against us, we should not deserve protection from any wel-governed Kingdome or State: for what more incon∣sistent Page  201 with civil Government, than to make the Supreme Rector and Governor of Mankind equally to wil Sin and Holinesse? But these Calumnies and Reproches are not of yesterday, but have been time out of mind imputed to the assertors of Efficacious Concurse, and therefore we have been more large in the refu∣ting of them, §. 1. of this Chapter. Thus Bradwardine, De Caus. l. 2. c. 28. p. 572.

When it is argued, saith he, that the sinful act doth please God Wel, (1) The Adverbe Wel may determine the Verbe to please God, in regard of the Divine complacence, and so there is no dout, but that as the evil Act [entitatively considered] doth please him, so it is highly wel-pleasing to him: or (2) in regard of the Act that is wel-pleasing; and that either in regard of the substance of the act, or in regard of its vitio∣sitie: [1] If we regard the act naturally, so it's true, that it is wel-pleasing to God, but if we regard it morally, so it's false. [2] If we regard the vitiositie of the act, so it is not properly effected by man, nor yet by God, it being not properly an effect, but pure Privation only.
An acute and excellent De∣cision of this Controversie, were not the minds of men eaten out with Prejudices; the sum whereof is this, The Act of sin en∣titatively and substantially considered is naturally good, and so wel-pleasing unto God, the Author of Nature; yet if we consider it morally in regard of its Vitiositie, so it is infinitely displeasing to God. This is as a Key to open the dore to a more ful solu∣tion to al objections against us: so that at present we need say no more than this, that our Hypothesis is no more obnoxious to these aspersions, than that of our Adversaries. Is not the Di∣vine Sanctitie as illustrious in Gods predetermining to the sub∣strate mater of Sin, as if we held only with our Adversaries an immediate previous concurse thereto? Are not those very Acts, which are morally evil as to the Sinner, both naturally and morally good as to God? Suppose he predetermine to the entitative act of sin, yet must we thence necessarily conclude, that he predetermines men to sin formally considered? Must not the sinful qualities of al moral effects be imputed to the second particular cause, and not to the first universal cause? It's true, the Sinner comes short of the Divine Law, and therefore sins, but doth God come short of any Law? Has not his Wil the same Rectitude which his Nature is invested with, and therefore whatever he wils must be right and holy, even because he wils it? The sin which he governs, Page  202 is it not only sin in regard of the Creatures wil, not in regard of his wil? It is confest, that God and the Sinner concur to the same sinful act materially considered; but yet is their Concurse the same? Yea is there not morally an infinite distance between the one and the other? Doth Sin as to Gods Concurse, include any more than a natural act, which is in regard of God and the conducibilitie it has to his glorie morally good? but doth it not, as to mans Concurse, speake moral vitiositie? Again, what doth Gods permission of sin implie, but a natural or judiciary Nega∣tion of that Grace he is no way obliged to give? But doth not sin as to the sinner denote a moral privation or deficience of that rectitude which ought to be in his act? Is there any thing in the world purely, simply, and of it self sinful, without some substrate mater naturally good? What reason therefore can our Adversaries allege, why God may not predetermine the wil to the said substrate mater, without prejudice to his Sanctitie?

§. 3. We descend now to a third objection taken from the* Word of God, both Preceptive and Promissive, which divine Pre∣determination of the wil to the substrate mater of sin, doth, ac∣cording to the Antithesis of our Adversaries, render uselesse, im∣possible, yea collusive and unsincere. For say they, Gods Precepts, Promises and Comminations, whereof mans Nature is capable, should be al made Impertinences, through his constant overpowering those that should neglect them.

1. As to Gods Laws and Prohibitions they urge, That our*Hypothesis renders them altogether uselesse, yea naturally and simply impossible. This they exaggerate with many fine words and rhe∣toric flourishes, which are the best armes they have to defend their declining cause with. But having God and Truth, though naked and simple, on our side, we no way dout but to stand our ground against al their fiery, or venimous darts. And in answer to the first part of their Objection from the Impossibilitie of divine Precepts and Prohibitions, we answer, (1) That our Adversaries greatly please themselves in their false sophistic Ideas and Notions of what is possible, or impossible; which we have endeavoured to clear from that ambiguitie and confusion, Chap. 1. §. 4. with endeavors to explicate what is possible and what impossible to corrupt Nature, as to divine Commands. (2) We are to know, that the Laws of God in their Second Edi∣tion were primarily intended to subserve the ends of the Gospel Page  203 as to the heirs of Salvation, to whom they are by Grace in an Evangelic way made possible. The Law is said to be given in and by the hands of the Mediator, i. e. to subserve his ends, which principally regard the Elect. (3) Yet we grant, that the Law is also of great use even unto Reprobates, [1] In that it lays a great restraint on them, not only as to wicked actions, but also as to lusts in some measure, as Exod. 34. 24. The Au∣toritie and Majestie of Divine Precepts, backed with many se∣vere Curses, leaves a great awe and restraint sometimes on the most debaucht spirits, and so keeps their lusts from open vio∣lences. [2] The Precepts are so far useful to Reprobates, al∣beit they have no power to observe them, in that they are there∣by instructed, how much obedience is wel-pleasing to God, and how ungrateful they are in not performing of it: whereby they are left without al Apologie or Excuse. The Precept shews us what we ought to do, not what we can do: it is always impera∣tive, albeit not always operative: and may not the Soverain Lord require of man the payment of his debts, although by reason of his profligate bankrupt humor he hath disabled himself from the payment of them? What excuse is it for the Sinner to say, it is impossible for him to obey the Precept, whenas the impossibilitie lies in his own wil, not in any force or defect on Gods part? Doth he not in that very moment, wherein he is predetermined by God to the entitative act of Sin, voluntarily espouse and wil that act? And doth not this leave him without al shadow of Ex∣cuse? Where can he loge the blame of his Sin but on his own crooked depraved wil, which electively and freely determines it self to the Sin, in the same moment of time, though not of nature, that it is predetermined by God to the entitative act? (4) We affirme, that Gods certain Prescience of Mens sins, with the conditional Decree of Reprobation, Gods immediate pre∣vious Concurse to the entitative act of sin, and mans universal impotence to perform what is spiritually good, which are al granted by our Adversaries, bring sinners under as great impos∣sibilitie of obeying Gods Commands, as absolute Reprobation and predeterminative Concurse to the mater of Sin asserted by us. This is wel demonstrated by a judicious and awakened Au∣thor in his late Letter touching Gods Providence about sinful Acts, &c. from p. 67. to 74. But because he is a party, I shal mention only the Response of Davenant, Animadv. p. 341.

As Page  204 for Gods Law, which cannot be kept without supernatural Grace, we say, that men are as capable of any supernatural Grace, considered under the absolute Decrees maintained by S. Au∣gustine, and by the Church of England, as considered under the conditional Decrees of late framed by Arminius.
And p. 418. he strongly proves, That Divine eternal Prescience of future Acti∣ons or Events infers as absolute a necessitie of such events and impossi∣bilitie of the contrary, as the Decrees of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do▪ of which hereafter, §. 8.

2. As for the later part of our Opponents Objection, From*the Promisses and Invitations of God, which are made uselesse and collusive by our supposed divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin, we answer,

(1) That al Gods Promisses and evangelic Invitations, which* are but branches of the Covenant of Grace, are primarily in∣tended for the elect Heirs of Salvation, to whom they are many ways useful, notwithstanding Divine Predetermination: For the blessed God promiseth life and happinesse on the condition of Repentance and Believing, not as if there were any potence or abilitie in corrupt nature, by its own free-wil, to accept of these offers, or performe the Condition on which the offers depend, but thereby convincing the Soul of its extreme impotence, he doth together with the offer and invitation made conveigh Grace into the elect Soul, for the inabling of it to performe the Con∣dition: So that these general and conditional Promisses are in reference to the Elect, for whom they are primarily designed, operative of Grace, albeit as to others they are only exactive of dutie: whence the impossibilitie which attends corrupt Nature is taken off as to the Elect by Divine Grace.

(2) Neither are those general evangelic Promisses and Invi∣tations* uselesse as to Reprobates: for, [1] They declare the infallible and essential connexion which there is between the condition and the thing promised therein, namely, Life and Sal∣vation. And to make this more clear, we are to remember, that both Logic and rectified Reason assures us, that a conditional enunciation doth not always note a possibilitie of the Antecedent, and Consequent, but only their necessary connexion: that in al conditional Propositions, on which evangelic Exhortations and Invitations are founded, there cannot be supposed an indifferent and indeterminate possibilitie of the Antecedent and Consequent, Page  205 but only the connexion of the Antecedent with the Consequent, is evident from that of our Lord, John 15 6. If a man abide not in me he is cast forth, &c. Whence it is apparent, that a solid and serious Invitation unto Sinners may be built on a Condition in some mode impossible: The God of al grace has, by his evan∣gelic Constitution and Covenant, established an inviolable con∣nexion between Faith and Salvation, so that this Proposition is infallibly true, If thou believest, thou shalt be saved: and the holy God has given his Ministers Commission to preach it to al Man∣kind, neither is there the least collusion or fraudulent intention on Gods part, albeit he doth predetermine the Most of men to the substrate mater of Unbelief: for the sinceritie of Gods in∣tention appears in the realitie of the offer, which consistes in the infallible connexion of the Consequent with the Antecedent, grounded on the evangelic Pactum or Ordination, as Davenant wel observes, Animadvers. on Gods Love, p. 377. where he shews,

That the Decree of God, permitting Pharaoh to abuse the gifts of God to his own destruction, was not contrary unto the end or use whereunto those gifts and actions of God had a fitting ordination in their own nature. So p. 387, 388. he demonstrates, That Divine eternal Decrees, whereupon may infallibly be in∣ferred the abuse of Grace temporally offered, do not crosse the end for which such Grace is administred to persons not elected.
And he gives this reason for it, p. 352.
God meaning must be always interpreted according to the known nature of the Means, and not according to the unknown Wil of God concerning the infallible event or successe of the Means. Gods meaning, when he offers any Grace unto men, is that they should per∣forme such actions whereunto such grace conduceth: and his meaning when he promiseth glory unto any man, if he believe and persevere, is truely to performe it if he so do. But it is not always Gods absolute wil to cause men to use his Grace to their own good.—If the Remonstrants wil have nothing term∣ed Gods meaning but his absolute Wil, in their opinion as wel as in ours it wil follow, that God had no meaning to give Cain or Judas saving Grace or Glorie.
Lastly, p. 392, 393, 394. he proves, That God doth by his wil of Approbation and Complacence unfeignedly wil what he commands and exhorts men to, albeit he de∣cree the contrary event. Hence, [2] These general Promisses and Invitations have this use also as to Reprobates, that it leaves Page  206 them without the least shadow of pretence or Excuse for their unbelief: for if God doth by such Promisses and Invitations de∣clare his real intention to save men if they believe, and withal an expectation that they accept his offers, yea, his complacence in such an acceptation in order to life, with a provision of al means necessary thereto, what excuse can men have for unbelief? Wil they say, that Gods predetermining men to the entitative act of unbelief contradicts such a real intention? Take the Re∣plie of Davenant, Animadv. p. 271.
We answer, that God is no otherwise said to intend outward events, than by providing orderly means for the producing such events. Non-election provideth no means of making men sin, and therefore it in∣cludeth no intention of God to make men sin, though it in∣clude a prevision of sinful Events, and a Decree to permit them, &c.

(3) The Hypothesis of our Adversaries in granting Predeter∣mination* to what is good, and Divine Prescience of sinful acts, doth as much dispirit and destroy the use of Divine Promisses and Invitations as ours. For, [1] In that they assert none can per∣forme the condition required, and so embrace the evangelic offer made, without efficacious predeterminative grace, do they not leave al Reprobates under as great an impossibilitie of Be∣lieving as we do? Are not al offers, for want of this predeter∣minative Grace, altogether uselesse to them, for whom it never was intended? [2] So also as to Gods certain Prescience of their Sins, did not God, according to their Concessions, certainly foreknow, that they would never, yea never could accept of the offers made to them, without predeterminative Grace, which he decreed never to give them? Hence doth not this certain Prescience infer as natural and absolute impossibilitie, as our pre∣determinative Concurse to the entitative act of Sin? This is wel argued by Davenant, Animadv. p. 242.

His [Hoard's] nibbling at the Synod of Dort, and charging them with mantaining a fa∣tal Decree, is to little purpose. If he cal that fatal, which is certain and immutable, we are not afraid to affirm, that al Gods eternal Decrees are certain and immutable; and that very eternal Decree of Reprobation, which he imagines to follow upon the foresight of mens final impenitence, is as absolute and immutable, and in this sense as fatal as that which we defend.
Thus also p. 332.
The Remonstrants (we adde also the New Page  207 Methodists) dare not promise Salvation to any persons repro∣bated, according to their decree founded upon the prevision of their final Infidelitie and Impenitence, but under these Con∣ditions, Si crediderint & poenituerint, if they shal believe and re∣pent: we assure them of Salvation under the same conditions, notwithstanding the absolute Decree of their Non-election,
we adde, and Gods Predetermination to the entitative act of Sin.

(4) To put a period to the vain Cavils of our Adversaries,* we grant, that even Reprobates, notwithstanding Gods absolute Reprobation, and Predetermination unto the entitative act of sin, stil retain a remote radical power and Indifference of wil to embrace the good things offered in the Gospel. For neither doth the natural corruption of the wil, nor yet Divine Prede∣termination to the substrate mater of sin take away the radical Indifference or Flexibilitie of the Wil, or the passive, natural re∣mote power it is naturally invested with, as a rational elective facultie, to embrace whatever good, whether natural or spiri∣tual, that is absolutely or conditionally tendered to it: and this sufficeth to ground divine Exhortations and Invitations on; for the Propositions and Offers being made to rational Creatures, they might, were they but willing, embrace the things that be∣long to their peace tendered to them; but here lies the Plague of their hearts, Joh. 5. 40. They wil not, &c. So that the blessed God making such gracious offers, so suitable to the needs of a rational creature, and having given him a remote, passive, natu∣ral power of understanding and wil suited thereto, doth not this suffice to leave him without al excuse for his wilful Impenitence and Infidelitie, notwithstanding the predeterminative Concurse of God to the entitative act of his Sin? And that this is the Doctrine of the Calvinists and Church of England, we are assu∣red by Davenant, Animadv. p. 257:

They confesse, that un∣der the Evangelical Covenant, Si credideris, salvus eris, If thou believe, thou shalt be saved, every man hath a true claim to Eter∣nal Life: They confesse, that wheresoever is Christs Church, there is such a sufficient administration of Grace as would have saved the Non-elect, had they not opposed a malignant volun∣tary act of their own wil against the motions and operations of Divine Grace; according to those words of our Saviour, Joh. 3. 17. & 12. 47, 48. & Act. 13. 46. Calvin saith as much, in Page  208 Joh. 3. Mundi nomen iterum iterum{que} repetit, ne quis omnino arceri se putet, modò fidei viam teneat. He therefore, as wel as the Re∣monstrants, grants a conditional possibilitie of Grace and Salva∣tion to al men; but we say, the non-elect are always permitted to fail in the performance of the condition.
And doth not this sufficiently vindicate the sinceritie of God in al his Evangelic pro∣misses, invitations, and tenders of grace and happinesse, yea every way as much as the new Method of our Adversaries, who grant certain prescience and predetermination to what is good?

§. 4. Another Objection urged by our Opponents against pre∣determination* to the substrate mater of sin, is, that is overthrows al Religion, and makes mens faculties, whereby they are capable of mo∣ral government, remisse, sluggish, uselesse and vain; yea they stick not to avouch, that this our Hypothesis opens the dore to Familisme, Enthu∣siasme, and the most prodigiose impieties and enormities: This they ag∣gravate with many rhetoric aggravations. Answer, This Objection is grounded on the same false Hypothesis with the precedent, namely, that the wil predetermined by God is moved only by an inward violent impulse, which makes al Gods precepts, promisses, and commina∣tions mere impertinencies, and mens faculties uselesse and vain. What a grosse Sophisme this is, and how much the Hypothesis of our Ad∣versaries fals under the force of it, as wel as ours, we have alrea∣dy, in what precedes, sufficiently demonstrated, and shal do again in what follows. We shal only adde at present an excellent de∣monstration and solution given by judicious Davenant, Animadv. pag. 418.

For the second branch of this reason, whereby he goeth about to prove that absolute predestination and reprobation de∣stroy both Hope and Fear; it is grounded upon an error confuted and rejected by the commun consent of al Divines, namely that the eternal Decrees of God concerning future events make the contrary events impossible, do make the temporal and im∣mediate Agents to do al they do out of an absolute necessitie, ha∣ving no libertie in modo agendi to abstain from so doing, or to do the contrary. Were this true, the Remonstrants, who acknow∣lege eternal and absolute Decrees, upon a presupposal of an eter∣nal absolute prescience, should by their Doctrine destroy hope and fear (the nerves of Religion) as wel as we.
But more of this in answer to the next Objection.

§. 5. The last Objection we shal mention, (which is indeed first* in order of nature) is, that our Hypothesis overthrows the libertie of Page  209 the wil, introduceth a fatal necessitie, and is the darling of Hobbes, with the like unjust and scandalous reproches. This is much ur∣ged by Strangius, Baronius, and some of name among our selves. Answer, (1) In this I confesse the spirits and principal forces of* al their Objections centre, and that which the Defendents of effi∣cacious concurse have been in al Ages urged with by the Pelagians and Patrones of free wil. Thus Augustin was ever and anon up∣braided by the Pelagians with a designe to introduce a fatal ne∣cessitie: the like the Synod of Dort has been reproched with by the Arminians: and now, because the name of Hobbes sounds very harsh in Christians ears, therefore that is fastened on us. But this is no new method, but long since invented by the Accuser of the Brethren, for the oppressing of this suffering truth. (2) What the true Idea and notion of Libertie includes, and thence how little our Hypothesis doth infringe the same, we have sufficiently de∣monstrated in the explication of the libertie of the wil, Chap. 1. §. 3. (3) We answer with Bradwardine, lib. 3. cap. 29. pag. 739. that God violently impels no man to sin, albeit he spontaneously im∣pels or draws the wil voluntarily to the substance of that act which has sin annexed to it; of which see what precedes Chap. 4. §. 2. (4) Our Adversaries seem herein very unjust, in that they fasten their false Ideas of predeterminative concurse and libertie on us, and so make us to hold what follows upon their sentiments. For they placing the wils libertie in an actual indifference and in∣determination; as also making al predeterminative concurse to acte by violent impulses on the wil, which being so impelled re∣mains no longer free, but is acted as a machine, &c. it's no won∣der, if from such false principes their forged consequence and conclusion follows naturally. Thus Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 11. p. 243. makes Gods predetermination to the entitative act of sin, to be an impulsion to sin. The like is urged by one and another Di∣vine of name among us, who wil allow no predetermination to the entitative act of sin, but what is violent impulsion. It's true Bradwardine, lib. 9. cap. 29. pag. 739. useth the word impel for Gods predetermining concurse, and the like Twisse; but then they limit it to such a spontaneous voluntary impulsion, as is no way prejudicial to the wils libertie: But our Adversaries make al pre∣determinative concurse, even in the supernatural acts of Grace, to be by violent impulses, such as leave the wil no more power to acte in a contrary way, than a mere Machine, which is impelled Page  210 by a vis impressa, a force impressed from some extrinsec efficient: for thus they expresse themselves, that to be predetermined even in the supernatural acts of Grace, is to be constantly managed as mere Machines that know not their own use. I must confess had we such Ideas of predeterminative concurse, it would necessarily follow, that the human wil is thereby divested of al its libertie; neither can I see how our Adversaries wil be ever able to defend them∣selves against the Pelagians and Arminians on their principes, which suppose al predetermination to be a violent impulsion like that of Machines. I ever disliked the Cartesian Hypothesis, which makes the souls of Brutes to be but Machines; but to make the human soul and wil of man to be but a Machine in the reception of predeterminative grace or concurse introduceth that fatal ne∣cessitie the darling of Hobbes, which is injustly fathered on us. We say, that predeterminative concurse is as to its principe and mode of working the same as to natural and supernatural acts; neither doth it in the one or t'other at al infringe the libertie of the wil, but fortifie and confirme the same, in that it workes sweetly ac∣cording to the indigence of the wil. And this I shal with much confidence assert, that we can with as much reason defend the con∣ciliation of human libertie with Divine predetermination of the wil to the substrate mater of sin, as our Adversaries the New Me∣thodists can defend the conciliation of human libertie with Di∣vine predetermination to the supernatural acts of Grace: for al∣beit the termes produced be different, the one a supernatural, the other only natural good; yet predetermination as to its principe the Divine wil, as also as to its manner of working, which is agreable to the condition and libertie of the wil, admits no diffe∣rence. And this Baronius was sufficiently apprehensive of, and therefore denied al predetermination; and I no way dout but that in the issue our Adversaries wil be forced to denie al predetermi∣nation, or to grant us what we contend for as to the substrate ma∣ter of sin. Yea, (5) we shal yet ascend a degree higher and af∣firme, That Gods certain prescience of sin, which our Adversaries generally allow, infers as much a necessitie on the wil, as pre∣determinative concurse to the entitative act of sin. This we have sufficiently demonstrated, Chap. 5. §. 2. and therefore shal here only superadde an excellent demonstration of judicious Davenant, Animadv. pag. 418, 419.

For the Divine eternal prescience of future actions or events inferreth as absolute a certaintie, im∣mutabilitie, Page  211 necessitie of such events, as the Decrees of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do;
(we may adde, by a paritie of reason, predetermination which is adequate to absolute De∣crees)
And therefore the Schole-men are as much troubled in an∣swering the Question, Whether the Divine prescience, or providence brings a necessitie to the things foreknowen? as in the other, Whe∣ther Divine predestination imposeth a necessitie on things? And the Philosophers, who never dreamed of Predestination or Reproba∣tion, were yet much troubled to shew, how any thing could be fortuitous or contingent, admitting an eternal and infallible pre∣science of al future events in God—So that if this Author, or any other Remonstrant, wil but take the pains to consider, how the Schole-Divines clear the eternal and infallible prescience, wil, and providence of God from imposing fatal necessitie upon events foreseen, willed, provided, he may with the same facilitie know how to clear the eternal absolute Decrees of Predestina∣tion and Reprobation from imposing on mens actions any fatal irresistible necessitie. As Gods absolute prescience doth not take away the possibilitie of the contrary action or event, no more doth his absolute Decree.
Thus our judicious Davenant, in vindication of the absolute Decree of Reprobation, which holds most true also of Divine predetermination as to the substrate ma∣ter of sin: for according to the confession of our Adversaries, Strangius and others, absolute Reprobation necessarily infers Di∣vine predetermination as to the entitative act of sin.

CHAP. VII. The genuine Hypotheses of the Predeterminants, with the Antitheses of their Adversaries, particularly the New Methodists.

(1) The genuine Hypotheses of the Predeterminants, with the false Hypotheses and consequents imposed on them by the Molinists, Armi∣nians, and New Methodists. (2) The Antitheses of the New Me∣thodists, with their dangerous consequents.

§. 1. IT has been the practice of our Adversaries in al Ages to clothe our Hypothesis of efficacious predeterminative Con∣curse with the Bears skin of many false Ideas and black ugly con∣sequences, Page  212 but their own Antithesis with the sheeps clothing of ma∣ny fair and colorable pretextes; wherefore to vindicate our selves and unmasque them, we shal adde, as a Coronis to this Discourse, the genuine sentiments of such as defend Divine predetermina∣tion, &c. as also the proper Antitheses of their Adversaries.

The genuine Hypotheses of of the Predeterminants.

1. THere is nothing future but dependently on some absolute Decree of God, either effective or permissive.

2. The Futurition of the en∣titative act of that which is sin∣ful, is from the effective wil of God.

3. The Futurition of sin is from the permissive wil of God, efficaciously decreeing to leave men unto sin.

4. The actual existence of sin is the consequent, but not the effect of Reprobation.

5. God absolutely decreed to permit Adams Fal, Strang. 858. Davenant, Animadv. p. 322, 323.

6. Gods Decree to permit sin is not otiose, but efficacious.

7. God efficaciously decrees to permit sin for the manifesta∣tion of his own Glorie.

Page  213 8. Gods absolute Decree of Reprobation impels no man to sin, Ward, pag. 132.

9. There is no act so sub∣stantially and intrinsecally evil, but the vitiositie thereof may be separated from the entita∣tive act.

10. God doth not predeter∣mine, much lesse impel any man to the least sin.

11. God doth not predeter∣mine the wil to any sinful act, as it morally refers to its ob∣ject, but only physically, Alva∣rez, refer. Strang. 240—242.

12. Gods predetermining the wil to the material entita∣tive act, whereunto sin is an∣nexed, doth not bespeak him the Author of Sin.

13. God, by his efficacious wil and actuose providence per∣mits the wil to sin, but is no moral efficient thereof.

14. God, by predetermi∣ning the wil to the entitative act of sin, doth not temt men to sin, Jam. 1. 13.

15. In sinful acts God prede∣termines the wil only to the en∣titative act, not to its sinful∣nesse; but in good acts, God predetermines the wil not only to the act, but also to the good∣nesse thereof.

16. Sin is committed against Gods wil of complacence and approbation, but not against his wil of natural permission.

Page  214 17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin is very wel consistent with the na∣tural libertie of the wil, and its natural, passive, remote power of receiving Laws, and obeying the same.

18. Gods predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin may very wel be reconciled with his wisdome, veracitie, and sinceritie in the prohibition and punishment of sin.

19. God punisheth one sin by leaving men to another, yet without being guilty of the least sin.

20. Sin by Divine wisdome is made a means accidentally utile and subservient to Divine glorie, albeit it hath no moral bonitie in it.

21. Al Gods invitations, comminations, exhortations, and promisses argue in God a real wil of approbation, and Evangelic intention that Sin∣ners repent and live, albeit they never repent.

22. Gods physic compla∣cence is towards the entitative natural act of sin, and yet his moral displicence is against its obliquitie and vitiositie.

Page  212

The false Hypotheses and Con∣sequents imposed on the Pre∣determinants, by Molinists, Arminians, and New Metho∣dists.

1. GOds absolute Decrees, which give futurition to things, take away al power from the crea∣ture of acting contrarily, yea make the contrary naturally, and simply impossible.

2. The futurition of sin is from the effective wil of God, yea very God, Str. 631, 632, 635. Le Bl. Concord. Libert. par. 1. Thes. 55, &c. p. 454. as before, c. 5. §. 1.

3. The Decree of God giving futurition to sin necessitates men to sin.

4. The existence of sin is from Reprobation as the proper cause thereof.

5. God impelled and necessiated Adam to fal, Baron. Metaphys. 150, 151.

6. Gods efficacious Decree to permit sin makes him the Author of sin.

7. God wils and decrees sin as sin, yea simply wils and intendes the damnation of Sinners.

Page  213 8. Gods absolute Decree of Re∣probation impels men to sin.

9. In acts intrinsecally evil the vitiositie cannot be separated from the entitative act considered in its individual nature.

10. Predeterminative concurse brings men under a fatal and Hob∣bian necessitie of sinning.

11. In acts intrinsecally evil God predetermines the wil to the act as sinfully relating to its ob∣ject, Strangius, pag. 206, 234, 240, &c.

12. Gods predetermining the wil to the material entitative act of sin makes him the cause of sin, Strang. pag. 341, 342. Baron. Metaph. 150, 151.

13. The Sinner doth not deter∣mine himself to any sinful act any other way than God, Strang. pag. 242, 243.

14. God doth more than temt men to sin, in that he predeter∣mines the wil thereto, Strang. pag. 269.

15. Predeterminative concurse to the entitative act of sin maketh God to afford as much influence and concurrence to the worst of actions as to the best, Strang. pag. 277.

16. God doth not only permit sin, but approve of it, yea take complacence in it.

Page  214 17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin, de∣stroys the libertie of the wil, intro∣duceth a fatal necessitie, and makes the mater of al Gods Laws to A∣dam and his posteritie, a natural, simple, and absolute impossibilitie, Strang. 567. Bar. Metaph. 150.

18. Gods predetermination to the entivative act of sin is irrecon∣cileable with his wisdome and sin∣ceritie in prohibiting and punish∣ing sin, Baron. Metaphys. pag. 151.

19. God, in punishing sin by efficacious dereliction or leaving men to sin, becomes guilty of sin.

20. God wils sin and approves of it as a means naturally and mo∣rally conducing to his glorie.

21. That Gods predetermina∣tive Concurse to the substrate ma∣ter of sin makes him not really to intend what he pretends to by al his invitations, promisses, commi∣nations, and exbortations to re∣pent:

22. God takes not only physic complacence in the entitative act, but moral complacence in sin, by predetermining the wil to the enti∣tative act thereof.

§. 2. Having given the proper Hypotheses of the Predetermi∣nants,* with the false Hypotheses and consequences imposed on them by their Adversaries, we now procede to lay down the pro∣per Antitheses of the Antipredeterminants, and more particular∣ly of the New Methodists, and the dangerous consequences which naturally result therefrom.

Page  215

The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipre∣determinants.

1. THE Futurition of al∣things is not from the Divine wil and decree, Strang. 628, 631.

2. The futurition of althings is not simple, but complexe, Strang. 640.

3. The futurition of althings is not eternal.

4. The same particular cause that gives existence to any thing gives futurition to it.

5. The futurition of the en∣titative act of sin is not from the wil of God, but the wil of man, Strang. 585, 628, 631, 632. Le Blanc, 454.

6. Whatever God wils he approves: or complacence is essential to al acts of Gods wil, Strang. 546, 548.

7. God decrees not the enti∣tative act unto which sin is in∣trinsecally appendent, Strang. 562, 587.

8. There is a twofold De∣cree in God, one absolute, the other respective, conditionate, and consequent, Strang. 546.

9. Al Gods Decrees are not particular, but some general only, Strang. 558.

Page  21610. Reprobation is not ab∣solute, but conditional, depen∣dent on the prevision of mens actual sins.

11. Gods prescience of mens sins is conditional, and depen∣dent on mens free-wil, not on the Decree of God, Strang. 642, 647.

12. Gods permission of sin is only privative and inefficaci∣ous, Baron. Metaphys. 157, 158.

13. God wils only his own permission of sin, not the exi∣stence of sin by his permission, Arminius.

14. There is a twofold Con∣curse of God, the one predeter∣minative, the other only gene∣ral.

15. It doth not belong to the perfection of Gods Provi∣dence absolutely to predefine and predetermine al free acts of the human wil, Baron. Meta∣phys. 147. Strang. 568, 584.

16. Al positive real Beings and acts are not from God as the first cause of Nature, Strang. 584, 630.

17. God predetermines to what is good, but not to the material entitative act of that which is intrinsecally evil.

Page  21718. What is predetermined is naturally and simply impossi∣ble.

19. Man in his lapsed state has a moral power to close with Divine exhortations and offers.

20. Unregenerate men may prepare themselves for the en∣tertainment of Grace.

21. To predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin is to impel men to sin.

22. Divine predeterminati∣on to the entitative act of sin puts an end to human liber∣tie.

23. Some human acts are indifferent in individu, and so neither good nor evil.

24. Some human acts are so intrinsecally evil, that the vi∣tiositie cannot be separated from the entitative act.

Page  215

The dangerous Conse∣quents of those An∣titheses.

1. NOthing is certainly and infiallibly future.

2. Complexe Propositions are in order of Nature before their sim∣ple termes.

3. God did not from al Eterni∣tie foresee althings future.

4. Nothing is future before it is existent, at least in its particu∣lar causes.

5. The futurition of sinful acts is a mere contingence to God.

6. There is in God a velleitie, or imperfect conditional volition which never takes effect.

7. There is something in Na∣ture which was never decreed by the God of Nature.

8. God hath a general antece∣dent conditional love and desire of the Salvation of al men.

9. Some Decrees of God may be frustrated and never come to passe.

Page  21610. The reason why God hated Esau and loved Jacob must not be resolved into the 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God, but into his pre∣science of Esau's actual and final disobedience and Jacobs obedience.

11. There is Scientia media, or middle Science in God, depen∣dent on mans ambulatory wil, and so only conjectural and uncertain.

12. God as an idle Spectator looks on the wicked world, but doth not, neither can omnipotently rule, dispose and order their sinful acts for his glorie.

13. When it's said, that God wils the permission of sin, it must be understood only of the effect.

14. Al Divine Concurse is not particular, total, immediate and efficacious.

15. The creature is in some natural acts independent and the first cause of its own acts: or, the second cause can act without be∣ing applied and actuated by the first cause.

16. God can make a creature, which by having its capacitie pre∣served and made habile, can of it∣self act without immediate efficaci∣ous concurse, Baron. 131.

17. Supernatural good is from God, but not al natural good.

Page  21718. Efficacious grace in Con∣version destroyeth human liber∣tie.

19. Gods efficacious Concurse is in the power of mens natural free wil, either to use or refuse the same.

20. God vouchsafeth to al men sufficient grace, which if wel im∣proved, he wil reward with effica∣cious grace, Strang. 229.

21. Al Predetermination im∣pels the wil, and acts it as a mere Machine.

22. There is a twofold libertie, one essential to the wil, but lesse proper, the other accidental, con∣sisting in indifference, which is most proper.

23. Alhuman acts ought not to be performed for Gods glorie.

24. The vitiositie of sin is es∣sential to some human natural acts, as natural.

We do not produce the consequents here drawen from the An∣titheses of Antipredeterminants, as their proper sentiments, at least not of al that espouse those Antitheses, but only as such as may be naturally and logically deduced from their Antitheses, al∣beit they do not formally assent to al of them.