The divine history of the genesis of the world explicated & illustrated

THE Divine History OF THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD. (Book 1)

SECTION I. (Book 1)

In the Begining, &c.

EXPLICATION.

In the very First Being of Heaven and Earth, or of any Thing therin, or of any Originals therof from Absolute Not being. And in the very First Instant of their Dura∣tion, or Time it self, then also commencing from Non-time or an Absolute Nullity therof.

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

ILLUSTRATION.

1 That the World is Finite; Proved by the Corporeal Quantity therof. 2 By Successive Quantity. 3 By Discrete Quan∣tity. 4 Rejection of Impertinencys, and what Postulations only are required. 5 Sensible Demonstration of the first Proof. 6 Of the Second. 7 Of the Third. 8 The Pos∣sibility of the Worlds being Ab Aeterno disproved. 9 The Possibility of being In Aeternum, or Immortality, in what Sens granted. 10 The Summ of the whole Discours, That there was a Begining of the World.

I. THat there was a Begining of the World (besides the Divine Authority of the Text) is as Rationaly De∣monstrable, as it is Sensibly evident, That there is a Heaven and Earth: for it is also evident, that they are Bodys, Ex∣tended by Part beyond Part, and therefore Finite, or bounded with Extremitys of that Extension (which we call First, or Begin∣ing; and Last, or End; becaus we may begin to measure at one, and end at the other) for that very Extension which renders them Bodys by Extending Part beyond Part, doth also Terminate them, that is, Extend them so far, and no farther. Thus the whole Bo∣dy of the World hath two great Parts; Heaven, and Earth. And whatsoever hath Parts is Finite, becaus every Part is Finite or Li∣mited to a Proportion not so great as the Whole, otherwise it should not be a Part of the Whole. And as one Part is Finite, so are all the Parts of the Whole, becaus they are all Parts. And so Consequently is the Whole; becaus it is equal to all the Parts; otherwise it should not be the Whole of all the Parts therof. And thus Heaven, which is one Part of the whole Body of the World, is a less Whole in it self; becaus it is the whole Heaven. And so likewise Earth, which is the other Part of the whole Body of the World, is also a less Whole in it self; becaus it is the whole Earth. Now either of these two less Wholes is Finite in it self; becaus it is only a Part of the whole Body of the World: and be∣caus both these less Wholes are Finite, therefore the whole Body

of the World is also Finite, though it be a greater Whole: for there is no Greater nor Less in Infinite, which is Infinitely be∣yond any Proportion, and without any Parts whatsoever; becaus a greater Whole is that which hath greater Parts, or more equal Parts; and a less Whole is that which hath less Parts, or fewer equal Parts. And since whatsoever hath Parts is Finite, therfore what∣soever hath greater or more, or less, or fewer Parts, is also Finite, and cannot be Infinite. Again every Part is such a certain Proportion of the Whole as it is, otherwise it should not be such a Part therof; and therefore hath such a certein Measure of it self, whereby it is such a certein Proportion as it is, and not greater nor less. And as all the Proportions of all the Parts, are the Whole Pro∣portion of the Whole; so all the Measures of all the Parts, are the whole Measure of the Whole. And whatsoever is Mensura∣ble is Finite; becaus it is Mensurable, and not Immens. Where∣fore the whole Body of the World is Finite, as well as Heaven, and Earth, or any less Part, or the least Particle therof whatso∣ever; wherof there is the same reason: Otherwise the Whole should be greater then all the Parts, or the Parts greater, or more, then they are, which is Impossible. And the contrary ther∣of So Mathematicaly true, and evident according to Common Sentence, (that every Part is less then the Whole, and the Whole greater then any Part, and equal to all the Parts therof) that it cannot be further proved by any thing more evident then it self. Wherefore this Conclusion is most true and evident; Omne Sec∣tile est Finitum.

II. Now as Corporeal Quantity, which is Consistent, and hath Part beyond Part, is therefore Finite; So also Time, which is Successive and hath Part after Part, is also Finite. And though Part beyond Part may be Inverted, and the First become Last, or the Last First; or Circulated, and the Begining United to the End (and so every Consistent Quantity is Finite, becaus it hath such Parts) Yet Part after Part Succeed and follow one ano∣ther in a most direct Line, and by Such an Immutable Law and Or∣der, as can neither be Inverted, nor Circulated: otherwise there should not be Part after Part; which must necessarily be in Tem∣porary Succession: for Past can never be Present, nor Present Future, nor all together. Wherefore Time cannot possibly be

Circular: for in a Circle all the Parts must Consist together; as in Circular Motion all the Parts must Move together. Though probably the Opinion of the Eternity of the World was groun∣ded on some such Imaginary Circulation of Time, and Revoluti∣on of Platonical Years. Whereas though all things measured by Time might be supposed to return again into the same State in all other respects, yet Time it self can never return to be the Same; becaus it is as Impossible to recall Past, as to anticipate Future. So that where there is such a fixed Priority and Posteriority runing still forward in a most Direct and Immutable Succession of Part after Part, which is Finite, there must necessarily be a Finite and Fixed First, or Begining; and Last, or End; according to the Fixed Order and Succession of the Parts. And as certein∣ly as this Present Instant is now the Last or End of all Time Past, or Present, which hath hitherto Actualy Existed, or doth Ex∣ist; so certeinly there was some determinate Instant, which was the first or Begining therof. And so this Conclusion also is most true and evident; Ubi Prius & Posterius, ibi Primum et Postre∣mum.

III. Lastly as Bodys and Time, so Number or Quantity Dis∣crete, which hath Part Discreted and severed from Part, is al∣so Finite in it self; and doth most Discernibly manifest the Fi∣nite Nature, both of Bodys, as in the Scale; and also of Time, as in the Dial: whereby their Continuous Parts being Arith∣meticaly Divided into Numerable Proportions are rendred most apparently Numerable and Finite. And so also this Conclusion is most true and evident Nullum Multiplex est Innumerum. From all which Conclusions drawn from every kind of Quantity, Cor∣poreal, Successive, and Discrete, it most Necessarily follows, That whatsoever is Quantitative is Finite▪ for it must be grant∣ed under the highest pain of Contradiction, That Actualy Men∣surable cannot be Actualy Immense, nor Temporary Eternal, nor Numerable Innumerable.

IIII. Nor is this plain Probation concerned in those more Cu∣rious Disquisitions, Whether Quantity be any Real thing in it self, or only a Mode, or Relative Respect (or I know not what others pleas to term it) Since it is most evidently the Geometrical,

Chronical, or Arithmetical, Measure of all Quantitative things, which are within the Virge therof, and Measurable by it. Nor of what Parts it doth Consist, or how it is Divisible into them; since it is most evident that it hath Parts. Nor yet whether any Whole Quantity hath Physical Parts; since it is most evident that it hath Mathematical Parts, and is Divisible into them. And though I shall heerafter inquire into all these, yet I will neither now pre∣vent my Self, nor intangle this Probation (which as it is most firm and solid in it self, so I desire to render it most clear and free from all Impertinencys) with any such Curiositys. Nor do I begg any therof before hand; but only insist upon these most reasonable and undeniable Postulations, That an Inch is the twelfth Part of a Foot, not more nor less; and a Foot twelve Inches, not more nor less. That an Hour is the fower and twentieth Part of a Day, not more nor less; and a Day fower and twenty Hours, not more nor less. That an Unit is the hundredth Part of a Century, not more nor less; and a Century an hundred Units, not more nor less. Or yet more plainly, That an Inch is an Inch, a Foot a Foot, an Hour an Hour, a Day a Day, an Unit an Unit, and a Century a Cen∣tury. And so any greater, or less, Part, or Whole whatsoever; which are all Identical Propositions, and neither need, nor are indeed capable of Probation. Nor are these Sections of Conti∣nuitys only Imaginations, or the Institutions of Reason; but Rea∣litys in Nature. And so God Created the Heaven and the Earth distinct Parts of the whole Body of the World, and made the Evening and Morning a distinct Day, and consequently the Cardi∣nal Numerations therof. And he made the Heaven to be above, or without, the Earth; and the Earth to be beneath, or within, the Heaven: and the First day to be before the Second, and the Se∣cond before the Third; and consequently the Ordinal Numerati∣ons therof. And heerin I suppose no Human Reason or Sens will or can dissent from Divine Authority; becaus these are things also Rationaly, and Sensibly, evident in themselvs: however some may doubt or dispute what I have evidently proved heerby, That there was a Begining of the World. Nor do I labor, or care to prove, when that determinate Begining was (which I leav to Chronologists) but only that there was such a Begining whenso∣ever it was, which sufficeth my present Intention.

V. For as in a great Wast or Common, though only the learned Artist can give an exact account of all the Acres, Rodes, and Perches therof; yet every Vulgar Ey can discern that it is Measu∣rable and Finite, and can estimate it more or less. And as every Traveler, though he hath not an Itinerary to instruct him in the just Distances between one City, or Country, and another, yet knows that there is a certein Space between them, otherwise such, and so many Paces, could never bring him from one to the other: so though it be the Work of Geometricians and Astrono∣mers to measure Heaven and Earth; yet we all know that the Earth on which we tread hath a Surface, and a Diameter, which are Fi∣nite; because the Surface on which we tread doth end and termi∣nate it self under our feet; and that doth also determinate the Di∣ameter, which is Proportionable unto it: and because the Diame∣ter is Finite, therefore also the Circumference which must be Pro∣portionable therunto is Finite. And so is every Sphere of the World, Air, Aether, and any higher Heaven, or whatsoever we can Imagine to be the utmost Circumference of the whole World: for to whatsoever Circumference our Imagination can extend it self, it can only be Proportionably greater then the Circumference of the Earth, which it encompasseth; and must also have a Diame∣ter proportionable to it self: both which evidently prove it to be Finite, as well as the Earth; becaus there is no Greater nor Less in Infinite, as I have already proved.

VI. And so though we may dispute the Nativity, or certein Be∣gining of the World; yet it is most evident and indisputable that it had a Begining: for none can deny it to be this Day, or Hour, or the like, one Day, or Hour, or the like, elder then it was the last; and so backward as far as he pleaseth: therefore he must al∣so confess, that there was some First Day, Hour, and the like, and consequently some First Instant, and Begining therof: for the Du∣ration and Age of every thing must necessarily be computed from a Begining or Nativity; otherwise it should be incapable of any Addition or Succession (which is apparently in all time) becaus it already exceedeth all Number: for Precedency of Part before Part without any Begining renders the Precedent Parts Innumerable, and consequently incapable of any Succession or Addition.

VII. So also in Number there must necessarily be a First, and no Number can precede an Unit; though you may still add to it, and possibly multiply it to any Summ Imaginable; which yet being once Stated will be found as Numerable as a Single Unit; becaus it is only the Addition of so many Units: for as a Day, or Hour, or any other Part of Time Actualy Past, is only a Day, or Hour, or such Part of Time as it is, and not greater, nor less; so every Day, or Hour, or other Part of Time whatsoever, is only One Day, or Hour, or One such Part of Time as it is, and not more, nor fewer: and therefore so many Days, or Hours, or other Parts of Time as are Actualy Past, are only so many Ones as they are, and not more, nor fewer; which though never so many must ne∣cessarily be all Numerable, by Addition of so many Ones as they are, and not more, nor fewer. And consequently all Time Actu∣aly Past, which may be Numbred by them, is Numerable and Fi∣nite: and therefore had a Begining; becaus the Number therof is Ordinal or Successive; wherof there must be a First. Thus if we should compute the whole Age of the World according to the particular Ages, or Secula, of Men or Brutes; or if you pleas according to the Revolutions of Platonical years; yet there must necessarily have been a First, Second, and Third Seculum, or Re∣volution, or so many as we will suppose to have been Actualy Past and Precedent, and not more, nor fewer, nor other then Succes∣sive. All which summed up together will be found as Finite as a single Unit, and must have a First, and Last, aswel as One and One Ordinaly and Successively. Nor indeed can we Rationaly Imagin any Time whatsoever Actualy Past and Precedent, not to be Actu∣aly Finite. And if it cannot be otherwise in Imagination, much less in Reality.

VIII. Yet the World might Possibly have Existed before it did Exist, or Actualy was; and as long before as you pleas to Ima∣gin; and so it may still be continued Perpetualy in Possibility; which yet will be alway Possible, and can never be Actual: for no such Precedent, or Subsequent Perpetuity, ever was, or shall be, nor can reasonably be Imagined to be Actual. Neither is it properly a Possible Perpetuity, but rather a Perpetual Possibili••y of such a supposed Precedency, or Subsequent Futurity, which

can never be Actual; otherwise it should not be Perpetualy Pos∣sible: for as Possible, while it is Possible, cannot be Actual; otherwise it should not be Possible, but Actual: so Perpetualy Possible can never be Actual; becaus then it should ceas to be Perpetualy Possible. As it is said of Corporeal Quantity, that it is alway Divisible into alway Divisibles; ever Possibly, but never Actualy: becaus if it should once be Actualy Divided into all its Divisibles, then it should ceas to be alway Divisible (which is a most true and evident Ratiocination, supposing such a Perpetual Divisibility therof, wherof I shall heerafter discours) But no Possibility whatsoever, either Precedent, or Subsequent, doth mi∣litate against this present Discours concerning the Actual Existence of the World.

IX. This Perpetual Possibility in Futurity is the Duration of Im∣mortal Spirits; which though it may not seem to be the same with Time in a restrained sens (as Time may be distinguished from Du∣ration) yet is the same with it in a general sens. And so the Soul of Man, both in this Mortal Life, and also in his Immortal Life heerafter, shall continue to be under the same Duration; though his Time may be restrained to this Mortal Life, which hath an End, and is computed according to the Chronology of the Hours, Days, and Years therof: and so we commonly distinguish between Tem∣poral, and Eternal or Everlasting. Thus Plato makes all Time to be the Measure of Duration according to the Motion of the Hea∣venly Bodys, which divide it into such Parts or Sections therof: and therupon, I suppose, grounded his Opinion of the Circular Revolutions of Time, like the Circular Motions of the Heavens. But as Duration was Coetaneous with the first Chaos (for there was an Evening before any Morning, or Illumination of the Aether; and three several Days before the Sun and Stars) so the same Du∣ration shall continue when they shall be dissolved, and when Time, in that sens, shall be no more. And yet in all the Perpetual Possi∣bility of this Duration, so farr as it shall ever heerafter become Actual, it shall likewise be Actualy Finite, as I have already proved. Wheras Proper Eternity is neither in any Precedent, nor Subse∣quent Possibility; but always Actual, and alway Present, or one Perpetual Instant: which is Divine, Infinite, and Incomprehensible, and of another nature, Infinitely and Incomprehensibly Different

from any Finite Duration, Actual, or Possible, whatsoever; which it doth Comprehend, but not in any maner Confound, or Cha••ge the Temporary nature therof; as I shall shew in the next Section.

X. Wherfore I Conclude upon the whole precedent matter, That every Quantity, that hath Existed or doth Actualy Exist, is Actualy Finite. And so is every Quantitative thing measured thereby. And that no Imagination, nor Possibility it Self, can make it to be otherwise. Because all Quantity and Quantitative things have Parts, and all Parts are Finite, and therefore whatsoever hath Parts is Finite, and whatsoever is Finite, is Terminated or bounded with Extremitys, or First, or Begining; and Last, or End; Respectively ac∣cording to the Parts: otherwise it should not be Finite. And particu∣larly, that time and Duration (which is Successive) and all Tem∣porary and Durable things, had a Realy Precedent and fixed First or Begining. Now that the force of this most Cogent Argument may not be lost or spent in so large a Dilatation, I will briefly Summ it up in these few and short Propositions, which I shall pre∣sent to any Man of Reason most strictly to examin, and consider whether he can deny any one of them, or the Consequence of them all, without forfeiture of his Rationality.

I. That every Day is One Day, and of no more nor greater Num∣ber, nor Duration.

II. That Yesterday was One Day, Actualy Past, and Precedent to this Day; and so all the Days Actualy Past and Precedent one unto a∣nother.

III. That the whole Number and Duration of all the One Days Ac∣tualy Past, and Precedent, is as Finite (or bounded with first, or Begin∣ing; and Last, or End) as of any One Day.

IV. Therefore there was a First or Begining of the whole Duration of all the One Days, Actualy Past, and Precedent, aswel as of the parti∣cular Duration of any One Day.

Wherefore I Conclude according to that right and true Sen∣tence, Vim inferunt Humano Intellectui qui Mundum affirmant Infini∣tum ex Finitis Partibus Constantem.