make it stand with the rest, and with reason. And it may be collected, that by Law of the Land in Magna Charta, by the course of the Law in 25 E. 3. by due process of the Law in 28 E. 3. other due process to be made by the Law, in 36 E. 3. pro∣cess of the Law 37 E. 3. and by process and Writ Original in 42 E. 3. are one and the same thing; the latter of these Statutes alwaies referring to the former; and that all of them import any due and regular proceedings of Law upon a cause other than the Trial by a Jury; and this appeareth, Cook 10. 99. James Bagg's Case, where it is un∣derstood of giving Jurisdiction by Charter, or Prescription, which is the ground of our proceed∣ing by course of Law. And in Selden's Notes on Fortescue, fol. 29. where it is expounded for Law∣wager, which is likewise a Trial by Law, by the Oath of the Parties, differing from that by Jury, and it doth truly comprehend these and all other regular proceedings in Law upon Cause, which gives Authority to Constables to Arrest upon Cause, and if this be not the true Exposition of these words, Per Legem terrae, the King's Council were desired to declare their meanings, which they never offered to do. And yet certainly these words were not put into the Statute, without some intention of consequence, and thereupon Mr. Serjeant Ashley offered an Interpretation of them thus; namely, that there were divers Laws of this Realm, as the Common Law, the Law of the Chancery, the Ecclesiastical Law, the Law of the Admiralty, or Marine Law, the law of Mer∣chants, the Marshal Law, and the Law of State; and these words per legem terrae do extend to all these Laws. To this it was answered, That we read of no Law of State, and that none of these can be meant there, save the Common-Law, which is the principal and general Law, and is alwaies understood by the way of Excellency, when men∣tion is made of the Law of the Land generally; and that though each of the other Laws which are admitted into this Kingdom by Custom or Act of Parliament, may justly be called a Law of the Land, yet none of them can have that prehemi∣nence to be stiled the Law of the Land. And no Statute Law, Book or other Authority Printed or unprinted, could be shewed to prove that the Law of the Land being generally mentioned, was ever intended of any other than the Common-Law; and yet even by these other Laws a man may not be Committed without a Cause expressed, but it standeth with the Rule of other legal expo∣sitions, that per legem terrae, must be meant the Common-Law, which is the general and univer∣sal Law, by which men hold their Inheritances: and therefore, if a man speak of Escuage general∣ly, it is understood, as Littleton observeth, pl. 99. of the incertain Escuage, which is a Knights Ser∣vice tenure for the defence of the Realm, by the Body of the Tenant in time of War, and not of the certain Escuage, which giveth only Contribu∣tion in Money, and no personal service. And if a Statute speaks of the King's Courts of Record, it is meant only of the Four at Westminster, by way of excellency. Cook 6. 20. Gregories Case; so the Canonists, by the Excommunication simply spoken, do intend the greater Excommunication. And the Emperour in his Instructions saith, That the Civil Law, being spoken generally, is meant of the Civil Law of Rome, though the Law of every City be a Civil Law: As when a man names the Poet, the Graecians understand Homer; the Latines, Virgil. Secondly, Admit that per legem terrae extends to all the Laws of the Land, yet a man must not be Committed by any of them, but by the due pro∣ceedings that are exercised by these Laws, and up∣on a Cause declared. Again, it was urged, that the King was not bound to express a Cause of Im∣prisonment, because there may be in it matter of State, not sit to be revealed for a time, lest the Consederates thereupon make means to escape the hands of Justice, and therefore the Statutes can∣not be intended to restrain all Commitments, un∣less a Cause be expressed; for that it would be ve∣ry inconvenient and dangerous to the State, to publish the Cause at the very first. Hereunto it was Replied by the Commons, that all danger and inconvenience may be avoided, by declaring a general Cause, as for Treason, Suspicion of Treason, Misprisi•••• of Treason or Felony, with∣out specifying the particular, which can give no greater light ot a Confederate, than will be con∣jectured upon the very apprehension, upon the imprisonment, if nothing at all was expressed. It was further alledged, that there was a kind of contradiction in the Position of the Commons, when they say, The Party Committed without a Cause shewed, ought to be Delivered or Bailed. Bailing being a kind of Imprisonment, Delivery a total freeing. To this it was answered, That it hath alwaies been the discretion of the Judges to give so much re∣spect to a Commitment, by the Command of the King, or the Privy-Council (which are ever in∣tended to be done upon just and weighty Causes) that they will not presently let him free, but Bail him, to answer what shall be objected against him, on his Majesties behalf. But if any inferi∣our Officer Commit a man without Cause shewed, they do instantly deliver him, as having no Cause to expect their pleasure; so the Delivery is applied to an Imprisonment, by the command of some mean Minister of Justice; Bailing, when it is done by the Command of the King, or his Coun∣cil. It was urged by Mr. Attorney, That Bailing is a grace and favour of a Court of Justice, and that they may refuse to do it. This was agreed to be true in divers Cases, as where the Cause ap∣peareth to be for Felony, or other Crime expres∣sed, for that there is another way to discharge them in convenient time by their Trial; (and yet in these Cases the constant practise hath been con∣stantly and moderately to Bail men:) But where no cause of the imprisonment is returned, but the Command of the King, there is no way to deli∣ver such Persons by Trial or otherwise, but that of the Habeas Corpus. And if they should be then remanded, they may be perpetually Imprisoned without any remedy at all. And consequently, a man that had committed no offence, might be in a worse case than a great Offender; for the latter should have an ordinary Trial to discharge him; the other should never be delivered. It was ••••••∣ther said, That though the Statute, Westminster 1. Cap. 15. is a Statute by way of Provision, and did extend only to the Sheriff; yet the recital in that Statute touching the Four Causes, wherein a m•••• was not Replevisable at the Common-Law; name¦ly, those that were Committed for the Death o•• a man by the Command of the King, or of his Ju∣stices, or for the Forest, did declare, that the Ju∣stices could not Bail such a one; and that Reple∣visable and Bailable were Synonyma••s all one; and that Stamford a Judge of great authority doth ex∣pound it accordingly, and that neither the Sta∣tute, nor the said Replevisable by the Sheriff, but generally without restraint; and that if the Chief Justice Commit a man, he is not to be enlarged by another Court, as appeareth in the Register.