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CHAP. IX. Concerning the Philosophers, who, because they desired to know all things, erred as to their Opinions; a 1.1 and some of them were exposed to dangers. Also, concerning the Opinions of Plato.
WHerefore, we ought to attempt those things that are possible, and which exceed not the capacity of Our Nature. For, the perswasiveness b 1.2 of such matters as are found in Dia∣logues and Disputations, does usually draw away most of us from the truth of things. And this befell many of the Philosophers, whilst they c 1.3 exercise their wits in dis∣courses, and in finding out the Nature of things. For, as often as the Greatness of things transcends their en∣quiry, they * 1.4 involve the Truth by various methods of arguing. Whence it hap∣pens, that their Sentiments are contrary, and that they oppose one anothers Opinions: and this [they do] when they would pretend to be wise. From whence [have been occasioned] Commotions of the people, and severe Sentences of Princes [against them;] whilst they think, that the usages of their Ancestours are subver∣ted by them. And their own ruine has very frequently been the consequence hereof. For Socrates, proud of his knowledge in disputing; d 1.5 when he would undertake to render Reasons that were weaker, more strong; and would frequent∣ly make Sport in contradicting; was killed by the envy of those of his own Tribe, and of his fellow-citizens. Moreover Pythagoras, who pre∣tended highly to the exercise of Temperance and Silence, was taken in a Lye. For, he de∣clared to the Italians, that e 1.6 those things long before predicted by the Prophets, which he had heard whilst he was a Traveller in Aegypt, were revealed by God to him as 'twere in particular. Lastly Plato, the mildest and sweetest tempered person of them all, and the first man that drew off mens minds from the senses, to things intelli∣gible, and such as always continue in the same state; accustoming men to look upwards, f 1.7 and in∣structing them to raise their eyes to things sublime; in the first place taught, that God was above every * 1.8 Es∣sence: wherein he did well. To Him he subjoyned a Se∣cond; and in number distinguished the two Essences, although the perfection of them Both be one; and notwithstanding the Essence of the Second God, † 1.9 proceeds from the First. For He is the Framer and Governour of the Universe; and therefore transcends [all things.] But He who is the Second from Him, ministring to His Commands, ‖ ascribes the Constitution of* 1.10 all things to Him, as to the Cause. Therefore, according to the most accurate way of Philo∣sophizing, there will be but One who takes the Care of all things, and consults their Good; God The * 1.11 Logos namely, who has beautified all things. Which Logos Himself being truly God, is also the Son of God. For, what other Name shall any one impose upon Him, besides the appellation of a Son, who at the same time shall not commit a sin of the deepest dye? For▪ He who is the Father of all, is deservedly esteemed the Father of His own Word also. Thus far Plato's Sentiments were right. But, in those things which follow, He is found to have wandred far from the Truth; whilst he both introduces a multitude of Gods, and also ascribes different Forms to each of them. Which was the occasion of a greater mistake amongst unthinking men: who do not consider the Pro∣vidence of the most High God; but pay a ve∣neration to Images framed by themselves, made according to the likeness of men, and some other Creatures. And thus it hapned, that that excellent g 1.12 Wit, and that Learning worthy of the highest Commendation, being mixt with some such errours as these, had in it less of purity and perfection. The same person seems to Me, to reprove Himself, and to correct that discourse; whilst he attests in express words, that the Rational Soul is the Spirit of God. For h 1.13 He divides all things into two sorts, intelligible namely and sensible: [the Former sort is simple and uncompounded,] the Latter consists of a Frame of Body. And, that is apprehended by the understanding; but this is perceived by Opinion with sense. Therefore, that which partakes of the Divine Spirit, in regard 'tis unmixt and immaterial, is also eternal, and has for its allotment an endless life. But, that which is sensible, be∣cause 'tis dissolved the same way whereby it was at first framed, has no portion in an endless life. But, the Doctrine which * 1.14 he delivers in the following words, is highly admirable; that those who have lived well, the Souls namely of