Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

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Title
Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...
Author
Epictetus.
Publication
London :: Printed for Richard Sare ..., and Joseph Hindmarsh ...,
1694.
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Subject terms
Epictetus. -- Manual.
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http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A38504.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ..." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A38504.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 14, 2024.

Pages

COMMENT.

AFter the distinction between things within, and things out of our own power, and an Advertisement how we ought to esteem each of them: That the former sort only must be look'd upon as our own, the latter as Foreign, and in the Disposal of others; he had told us how we ought to be affected with regard to those that fall within our power, to make such of them 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

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as are contrary to Reason and Nature, the Ob∣ject of our Aversion, and to suspend all manner of Desire, for some convenient time: (Which Advice in all probability, is grounded upon the Arguments already mentioned.) But since it is impossible to live without having something of Interest in, and much Dealings with those things that are not at the Disposal of our own Will; he now informs us how to converse with them, and tells us, that though they be not at our own pleasure, yet they shall not be able to create to us any manner of Disquiet and Confu∣sion.

And here he takes notice of Three sorts of these External Things; First, Such as can only pretend to please, without profiting us at all; for these are they that minister to our Enter∣tainment and Delight. The Second are such as are beneficial and convenient for use. And the Third, such as we have a particular Affection for, by reason of some natural Relation they bear to us, and what we are tender of, without any regard to our own Benefit and Convenience. And this is a ve∣ry just and true Distinction; for Pleasure and Pro∣fit, and Natural Affection, are the Three things that engage our Hearts; and it is always upon one or other of these Accounts, that we are fond of this Mortal State, and reconciled to all the Hardships and Miseries that attend it.

Now the Entertainments and Diversions that Men are delighted with, differ according to their several Tempers and Inclinations: Some find their pleasure in Plays, and others in Sports and Exercises, in Races, or Tilting, or the like. O∣thers in Dancings, or Tricks of Legerdemain,

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in Jugglers, or Zany's, or Buffoons. Some a∣gain in curious Sights, either the Beauties of Na∣ture, as the Colours of Peacocks, and other fine Birds, pleasant Flowers, and Gardens, and Mea∣dows and Groves: Or in the perfections of Art, as Pictures, and Statues, and Buildings; or the exquisite Workmanship of other Professions. Some value those of the Eye less, and find greater satisfaction in the Entertainment of the Ear, as the Harmony of Vocal and Instrumental Musick; and which is a Pleasure more gene∣rous and improving, in Eloquence or History, and sometimes in Fables and Romances. For that these contribute much to our Delight, is plain from that fondness which all of us natu∣rally have to Stories, from our very Child∣hood.

The Second sort which tend to our Use and Benefit, are likewise various: Some contribute to the improvement of the Mind, as a Skil∣ful Master, Virtuons Conversation, Instructive Books, and the like: Some are serviceable to the Body, as Meats and Cloathes, and Exercise: Some regard only our Fortune, as Places of Au∣thority, Lands and Tenements, Money and Goods, and the like.

But the Third sort we have a natural ten∣derness for, without any prospect of Advantage from them; and these are recommended to our Affection by some common tye of Nature and Affinity between us; and in this relation stand our Wives and Children, our Kindred, our Friends, and our Country-men.

Now the Advice given, with respect to every one of these, is, that we would sit down, and

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seriously consider, what the Nature and Condi∣tion of each of them is; what Hazards and Uncertainties they are liable to; that they are subject to Corruption and Decay; that the En∣joyment of them is short, and not to be de∣pended upon; and that none of them are ab∣solutely at our own Pleasure and Disposal. For such a Reflection as this, that suggests to us continually what their Nature and Circumstances are, is no other, than a Meditating upon the Loss of them. And such a Meditation would render the thing easie and familiar to us, and when any Accident of this kind befalls us, would prevent all that Surprise, and Confusion, and extravagant Concern, which the Unthink∣ing part of the World are oppress'd with upon such Occasions. And indeed the case here, is the very same with several other Instances, wherein we find, that the Troubles and Pains of Body and Mind both, though very grievous at first and in themselves, yet grow much more supportable by Custom and Use.

To this purpose, the next Words give us ve∣ry good Council; to begin at first with little matters; nay, not only with little, but with the least and most inconsiderable: for according to the old Greek Proverb, * 1.1 The Potter must try a Cup, before he can make a Jar. He that undertakes the biggest first is presently worsted, proves unsuccessful, spends his Strength to no purpose, and gives out in utter Despair. But he that sets out leisurely, and begins with small and easie Trials, grows stronger and bolder with his good Success, and

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by gaining Ground upon what was a Match for him before, advances more surely, and conquers still greater and greater Difficulties. Thus a Man that hath been used to Four Meals a day, if he attempt all on the sudden to fast a whole Day together, will find the change too violent for his Body to bear, and never get through the trouble and pain of it. And this force upon Nature, is the Reason why such warm Under∣takings, are generally of dangerous consequence, and just only for a spurt and a way. But if such a one abate of his former indulgence by de∣grees, first take himself down to Three Meals, and when this Proportion is grown habitual and easie, then allow himself but Two: Thus it will be very feasible; and afterwards he may without any great trouble, come to content himself with one; and such a Change will be infinitely more safe, and more likely to con∣tinue.

To apply this now by the instance before us: If we consider those things that are dear to us upon the account of their Usefulness and Con∣venience; and from such among them as are of least Consequence and Value, acquaint our selves with the Condition of all the rest; that their Nature is corruptible, the Enjoyment of them uncertain, and the Loss of them what we have reason to expect every Moment: As in an Earthen Pot, which can have nothing but its Usefulness to incline us to value it; we are to remember that it is of a brittle substance, and dashed to pieces with the least Accident. And what can be a poorer and more contemptible instance than this, to begin with? Yet mean

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and trifling as it is, a Man that lays a good Foundation here, and rises by degrees to Matters of greater concern, shall be able at last to en∣counter his Affection for a Child; and not on∣ly in meer speculation, and empty formal Words to say it, but to make his whole Be∣haviour speak, and all the Dispositions of his Mind shall carry the impression of this wise and seasonable Reflection, That what he thus dotes upon, is but a Man; if a Man, conse∣buently a brittle and frail Creature, and what he is in a continual possibility of losing. And when his Mind is once throughly possess'd with this Consideration, and confirmed with an ha∣bitual recollection of it, whenever that Child is snatch'd away from him, he is prepared for the Stroke, and cannot be surprised and confounded with Passion, as if some strange or new thing had happened to him.

And here it is very well worth a Remark, what abundance of Wisdom and Artifice there is in this Management of things; for by it we get a Mastery over those that are not by Nature within our Power, and deal with them as though they were: For the saving my Child from Death, is a thing not in my power; but a due Consideration of his being liable to it, the ren∣dring this Consideration familiar and easie to me, and living in expectation of it, as a thing no less natural and likely than his Life; the not being disturbed if he do Die, and the be∣having my self with such evenness of Temper, as if he were not dead: These are in our power: And which is a great deal more, they do in ef∣fect bring the very Accident of his Death, which

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is of it self not so, within it too. For a Man thus composed, may say, My Child is not Dead to me; or, to speak more truly and properly, Though he be Dead, yet I am still the same Man, as if he were still alive.

I only observe farther, That the Instances produced here by Epictetus, are fetched from the Two latter sorts of Things; such as are useful and beneficial to us, and such as Nature and Affinity gives us a more than ordinary tender∣ness for: And these were prudently chosen, with an intent, I presume, to intimate, that those things which are for Entertainment and Diversion, and can only pretend to please with∣out profiting us, are so very mean and despi∣cable, as to deserve no consideration at all, from Persons that have made any tolerable advances in the study of Wisdom and Virtue.

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