Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

COMMENT.

AFter having distinguished Mankind into three Classes, and represented the Qualities proper to each of them; and also made a short recapitulation of the Directions given be∣fore at large to his Proficient; he now begins to enter upon the concluding Part, inculcating in this and the following Chapters, that Rule which alone can give Life and Energy to all the rest; viz. That the reducing these Precepts in∣to Practice, must be our chief Study and Care; and that the Good Works which they are ex∣cellently accommodated to produce, is the ge∣nuine Fruit expected from them, and the very End for which they were composed and com∣municated. For what an Eminent Orator said once upon a like Occasion, is extreamly ap∣plicable to the Case now in Hand, That Words

without Actions are but mere Air, and empty Sound.

To this purpose, he says, a Man should reflect feriously with himself, what his meaning is, when he reads such Moral ••nstructions, and puts his Mind upon a sedulous Enquiry after its true and proper Happiness. The Answer to this Question will be, That he intends to examine into Humane Nature, and see what is the Constitu∣tion, and true Condition of it: And from thence to pursue his Enquiry farther, and con∣sider what Actions, and what Sentiments are agreeable to this Nature; what Impressi∣ons are fit for a Creature so framed to admit and indulge; and what are to be stifled and re∣strained, as incongruous and unseemly. Well, upon due Reflection, I find, that I have a Prin∣ciple of Reason, and a Body, but these not e∣qual in Authority or Value; for my Reason is the Character of my Nature, it challenges a Right over my Body, and commands it as an Instrument subservient to it, and over-ruled by it. The Inference then from hence is plainly this, That God and Nature designed I should live a Life of Reason, and not of Sense; and that all my bodily Passions should conform them∣selves to the Commands of their Lawful Supe∣rior, that all my Fears, and all my Desires, should be reduced into due Order, and pay Ho∣mage to the more illu••trious Perfections of the Soul.

But still I am at a loss how this is to be ef∣fected, and am told, That Chrysippus hath writ∣ten an excelleat 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to this purpose. I fall immediately to re••ding his Book, but find it so

abstruse and dark, that I can make nothing at all of it. I am directed to a good Commentary, and by the help of this, I understand him perfectly. But all this while here is very little good done, and but small praise due, either to the intelligent Reader, or the perspicuous Commentator. For when Chrysippus wrote this, he did not only intend to be understood and expounded, but had a farther and much better End in it; viz. That both his Reader and his Interpreter should pra∣ctise what he had written. If then I do this, I attain to the Benefit the Writings were properly intended for, and they have had their due and full effect upon me. But if I delight in the Author, or applaud the Expositor never so much; if I am skill'd in all his Criticisms, see through all his Intrica••ies, admire the weight of his Sentences, or the turn of his Style; in short, if I master every Difficulty, and have every At∣tainment but only that of Practice, I am not one whit improved in my Business. The Title of a more nice and exact Grammarian I may indeed have some pretension to, but can lay no claim at all to that of a Philosopher: For this Talent of explaining an Author's Meaning, is properly the Qualification of a Grammarian; the only dif∣ference is, That Chrysippus is an Author some∣thing out of his way, and Homer a much more likely Man to come under his Consideration.

But there is another difference which is much more to my Disadvantage; for a Man may read Homer, or explain him, and rest there, and yet not be the worse, if he be never the better for it. Whereas with Chrysippus it is much other∣wise; for the un••difying Reader, in this case

cannot be innocent: And those who do not mend by his Precepts, contract a deeper guilt, and in∣curr a juster and more severe Condemnation. For, would it not be an intolerable reproach to any sick Man, that should read Prescriptions proper for his own Distemper, and value him∣self upon pronouncing the Receipts gracefully, and descanting handsomely upon the Virtues of the several ing••ed••ents, and value himself upon being able to direct others how these are to be applied, and yet make use of none of them him∣self? Does such a Man deserve pity? And, is he not his own Murderer, who knows his Cure, and yet will not take it? And yet as extravagant and absurd a Folly as this is, ours is every whit as bad, or worse, when we have the Diseases of our Souls set plainly before us, and are fully instructed in the Medicines and Restoratives pro∣per for them, and yet are so wretchless and stu∣pid, as to do nothing towards our Recovery.