Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

COMMENT.

BY this Passage you may plainly perceive, that the Person address'd to, is not supposed to be a compleat Philosopher; for such a one is in no danger of bringing up indigested Notions; nor can he need the Advice given to that pur∣pose. This is applicable only to one that is still in a state of Probation and Proficiency, who hath not yet absolutely delivered his Mind from the importunate Passions of Popularity and Self∣conceit, and affecting to be thought wise, Vices, which this Author hath taken great Pains to ex∣pose, and reform, and that, as by other Argu∣ments,

so particularly by one, which the Method taken in this Chapter plainly insinuates; viz.

That as one cannot with any truth say, That the Brass while it is melting down is a Statue, or that an Embryo is a Man; so neither can we, That a Person who is still under Discipline and Profi∣ciency, is a Philosopher. These are the rude and imperfect Beginnings of what is to come after; but they are not the Things themselves: They are the Matter under preparation, but they have not the Form, which must constitute their Es∣sence: And though they be in never so fair a Disposition to receive it, yet till this is done, they are not the perfect Beings which they must and would be. But, though in other cases it be sufficient to say, That to call them so were a Breach of Truth, yet in this that seems too gencle an Imputation: For there is, in a truly Philoso∣phical Life, something so great and venerable, something so much above the common Condition of Humane Nature, and so very near approach∣ing to Divine, that the ascribing such exquisite Perfection to Persons who are as yet only climb∣ing up to it, may justly seem not only a bold Falshood, but an imperious and blasphemous one too.

Shall then that Man, who must not pre••ume to call himself a Philosopher, take upon him the Office of one? Shall he set himself in the Chair, and think it becomes him, who is but a Learner, to teach, and magisterially dictate to others? No, certainly: It is fit he should know his di∣stance, and keep it. But you••ll object, That this will be a mighty Hindrance to his Proficiency, by de∣barring him that Discourse with Men of less Attain∣ments,

which should exercise and improve his Talent. I answer, That the Discourse Epictetus disallows, is not such as is intended for a Trial, but the Effect of Vanity; nor is the Design of it Ad∣vancement in Wisdom, but Ostentation and Ap∣plause. Well; but, How must he behave himself in such Company then? Why, the properest and most effectual course to recommend himself, will be, to forbear the vending his Principles in Words, which is but an empty and a very superficial way of propagating them; and to demonstrate the Power and Influence of them in his Actions. This is a substantial Argument, and answers the true End of Philosophy, which is not florid Ha∣rangue and nice Dispute, but prudent and un∣blamable Practice; for this was never intended to teach us to talk well, but to live well. If therefore you be at a Publick Dinner, do not trouble your self to read grave Lectures to the Company, concerning Temperance in Eating, and its just Bounds and Measures; but take care to observe those Mea∣sures, and to keep within those Bounds your self. For by this means you will gain Authority to your Instructions; and when it comes to your turn to prescribe to others, every Word will make its own way. For, how ridicu∣lous and absurd is it, to set other Men Rules of Temperance, or Patience, and at the same time to be guilty of Gluttony, or sink under the Burden of Afflictions one's self? What force or weight can such a one expect his most studied Discourses should find? And, How unreasonable and inconsistent is it to impose such Laws upon other Men's Conduct, as we are not content to submit to in our own?

But this is not all. He requires a higher de∣gree of self-denial still. He does not only for∣bid the beginning of such kind of Discourse; but if any of the Ignorant and Vulgar engage in it of their own accord, he will not allow us to join with them, nor set up for an Oracle, or great Doctor, among Men of meaner attain∣ments than our selves. For this (he says) is very suspicious, and looks as if what is so very ready to come up loaded the Stomach, and was never well digested. For as Meats, when they are duly concocted, distribute themselves into the several parts, and mix with the vital Juices and Blood to nourish and strengthen the Body; so do Maxims and Doctrines, when well digested, convert into nourishment, and make the Soul healthful and vigorous. There they lie like Sap in the Root, which when occasion serves, spreads it self, and brings forth the Fruits of vertuous Actions first; and when the proper Season comes, and these have attained to a just matu∣rity, then of edifying Discourses in great abun∣dance. But if any one shall force this Fruit of Discourse before its time, when it is not yet ripe and kindly, this in all likelihood will turn to no better account, than the discharging ones Sto∣mach of undigested Meat. And there cannot be a clearer proof that it wants digestion, than our not being able to keep it any longer. For this is directly that Man's Case, that brings up his Precepts of Philosophy again, while they are raw and whole, and does not shew the effect, and strength of them in the improvement of his Mind, and growing in those vertuous Habits, which they were intended to produce and con∣firm.

And, in regard the Soul is naturally given to look abroad into the World, and, for that rea∣son, feels it self very powerfully wrought upon by good Examples, he proposes Socrates for an eminent pattern of Modesty: Who, though a most accomplished Philosopher, and declared by the Testimony of Apollo himself to be the wisest Man in the World: One, who consequently had good warrant to take more upon him than any mere Proficient ought to pretend to, was yet the farthest that could be from an assuming Tem∣per, and made it the business of his whole Life to decline and discountenance Pride and Ostenta∣tion. One very remarkable instance of this kind, was his behaviour to some silly people, who came with a design to put a Slur upon him, and desired, that he would recom∣mend them to some Philosopher, capable of in∣structing them. He saw through their pretence well enough, but without taking any notice, or shewing the least resentment of the affront they intended him; carried them to the Sophisters Men, who had the Confidence to call themselves Masters and Professors, and made a Trade of teaching others. Thus when Hippocrates the Son of Apollodorus made it his request to be helped to a Master, he recom∣mended him to Protagoras. And in that Tract of Plato, which is entituled Theoctetus, he says of himself, that he delivered over several to the Tuition of Predicus, and several to other wise and great Men: So very sparing was this divine Person in putting himself forward, and so far was he from thinking it a diminution or refle∣ction upon himself to be so.

For this, after all, is the mighty Objection, and that against which Epictetus fortifies his Scho∣lar. He does not think it a sufficient renoun∣cing of vain Glory, not to begin a Philosophical Discourse among Men who do not make Philo∣sophy their business: No, nor to sit still, and not interpose when they have begun it; but there is yet a farther disclaiming of this vicious Quality expected. It is probable that this si∣lence may be thought to betray your Ignorance; it is possible some of the Company may be so plain as to tell you so; and though no reproach can be more grating than that of a defect in ones own Profession, yet this Proficient is to run the risque of that, and to hear it without being moved. This if he can do, it is a surer sign that he hath mortified his Vanity, than his ut∣tering the most elaborate Satyr in the World against it; for you have an assurance now that other people contemn you. And if you can see, and hear this without Passion; if you find that the Resentments, which used formerly to boil up in your Breast upon the like occasions, now lie cool and quiet, take comfort, and triumph; for the subduing of your Anger proves that the O∣peration is begun, and that you are now reaping those Fruits, which all the wise Exhortations you have heard, were intended to cultivate, and all your own Pains and Study proposed to pro∣duce; which is, a Life of Vertue and strict Rea∣son, and the making you not so much a florid, and well-spoken, as a prudent and a good Man. For Moral Precepts are learned not to be re∣peated but practised; and the Excellency of them must be proved not by the Memory, or the

Tongue, but by the Conversation of the Hea∣rer. And the bearing this imputation of Igno∣rance without any disorder, is it self such a proof; for it shews the Mind to be got above both the Fame and the Censures of the World. And this is the Improvement every Master ex∣pects to find; for he, that, instead of Practice, gives him his Lectures again, and thinks himself the better for being able to remember and repeat them, is guilty of as great an Absurdity in Nature, as it would be for Sheep to throw up the Grass they had eat, that so the Shepherd may be satisfied of that good Feeding, which ought to shew it self in a large Fleece, firmness of Flesh, and abundance of Milk.