Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

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Title
Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...
Author
Epictetus.
Publication
London :: Printed for Richard Sare ..., and Joseph Hindmarsh ...,
1694.
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Subject terms
Epictetus. -- Manual.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A38504.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ..." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A38504.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 14, 2024.

Pages

Page 491

COMMENT.

THis Chapter is plainly intended to persuade us to bearing of Injuries with Meekness and Moderation; and the Arguments made use of to this purpose are Two.

The first proceeds upon a Foundation evident to common Sense, and confirmed by the Practice and Experience of all the World; which is, That every Man acts in agreement with his own par∣ticular Notions of things, and does what at the instant of doing it appears to him fittest to be done. And therefore if his Apprehensions dif∣fer from ours, as it cannot be any great Matter of Wonder, so neither does it minister any just Cause of Resentment, because he follows the Dictates of his Breast, and I follow mine, and so do all the World. So that it would be a most extravagant and senseless thing for me to be an∣gry for his acting according to Nature, and up∣on a Principle universally consented to by all Mankind.

But you will say perhaps, That his follow∣ing his own Opinion is not the thing you quarrel with, but the entertaining an ill Opinion of you, for which there is no Ground or Colour of Justice. Now upon Examination of this Pre∣tence too, it will be found, that you have not at all mended the Matter, but that this is as ridiculous and absurd a Passion as the other. For if he have done you no harm, where is the Pro∣vocation? and that it is plain he hath not, for no body is the worse for it but himself. He

Page 492

that thinks he does well when he really does ill, and mistakes Falsehood for Truth, is under a dan∣gerous Delusion, and suffers extreamly by his Error. And therefore the Man that injures your Person or your Reputation, does but wound himself all the while: And this he does more effectually, and to his own greater Pre∣judice, than it is possible for you in the height of all your desired Revenge, or for the most Potent and malicious Enemy in the World to do. For whatever the world commonly esteems most noxi∣ous, can reach no farther than the Body, or the External Enjoyments, and consequently does not, in strict speaking, hurt the Man himself: But Er∣ror is a Blemish upon the Soul, an Evil that af∣fects his Essence, and taints the very distinguish∣ing Character of the Humane Nature.

Now, that the Person who entertains this false Opinion, and not he concerning whom it is entertained, receives all the Prejudice by it, he proves beyond all Contradiction, by the Instance of a compleat Proposition. For suppose one should say, If it be Day, then the Sun is above the Hori∣zon, and another Person should maintain that this is false; his standing out against it, does not in any degree weaken the Truth of the As∣sertion, nor invalidate the necessary dependence of the Two Parts of it upon each other: It remains in the same Perfection still; but the person who judges amiss concerning it, does not so. Thus the Man that affronts or traduces you, contra∣ry to all the Rules of Justice, and Honour, and Duty, injures himself, but you continue un∣touch'd; and neither the Edge of his Wea∣pon, nor the Venom of his Tongue can enter

Page 493

you. Especially if you are as you ought to be, fully convinced, that there is no such thing as Good or Evil to be had from any thing, but what falls within the Compass of our own Choice.

When therefore you have called up your Rea∣son, and have reflected, first, how natural it is for every Man to be governed by his own Sense of things; and then, that the Injury does not really reach you, but falls back upon the Person who vainly intended it for you; this will cool your Passion, and fill you with a generous Disdain, you will think his impotent Malice de∣serves to be slighted only, and may check both his Folly, and your own Resentment, with some such scornful return as this, That he does but what all the World do; for though all are not of the same mind, yet in that vast variety of Opinions every man acts according to his own.

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