Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

COMMENT.

THere is not in the whole World any thing more pernicious to the Soul than the Pleasures of Flesh and Sense; for these fetter and fasten down the Mind; and God, who saw those destructive Consequences of them, hath therefore in his infinite Wisdom, and marvel∣lous Goodness, made all such Pleasures of exceed∣ing short Continuance. Thus those of the Epi∣cure last no longer, than just while his Mea••s and Drinks lie upon the Tongue, when once they are swallowed into the Stomach, all the Relish of them is lost and gone, and the Palate returns to its former Habit again. So likewise those Pleasures, which Sense is fondest of, and the most exquisitely affected with, continue no long∣ger, than just the time of Fruition. When that short Moment is once past, the Man is as if he had never been at all. It is very plain too that Pleasure is properly the Object of the Sensi∣tive Faculties, and does not extend to the Ratio∣nal Soul; for those Creatures that are void of Sense, are not capable of Pleasure.

Nor is this the Condition of bodily Pleasures only, but those other Satisfactions which we call so, such as Men take in gay Clothes, pompous Equipage, rich Jewels, and Furniture, large E∣states,

and the like; even they are but very short-lived neither. For when once the first Flush of Joy is over, they pall and sink down into nothing; and Time, in proportion as it makes them familiar to us, makes them flat and insipid too. But, alas! the Case is not the same in the contrary Extreme; nor do our Griefs for the loss of these things wear off so fast, as our Satisfactions of acquiring, or possessing them: These are long and lasting, and very often grow by time. Thus Pleasure, it seems, of all sorts, but especially such as affects our bo∣dily Senses, vanishes very quickly; and well it were for us, if it, and all its Effects went off to∣gether: But it leaves a Sting behind it, wounds the Soul, disarms Reason; and, if it be indulg∣ed to excess, does not stop there neither; but many times proves of terrible Consequence to the Body too. Whereas Abstinence from Plea∣sure, and the Conquests we gain over it, are of infinite Advantage to the Soul; fill it with du∣rable Satisfaction, and inspire Joys of quite a∣nother kind, Joys agreeable to Reason and un∣corrupted Nature, such as no Guilt pollutes, no mixture or remains of Sorrow taint, no Time wears away.

Thus much I thought necessary to premise in general, by way of Introduction to Epictetus his Advice, which begins in these Terms:

When the Idea of any Pleasure strikes your Imagination, as you must in other Cases, such as Power or Riches, or the like; so should you in this of Pleasure, more especi∣ally stand upon your Guard, and not suffer your self to be hurried away from Thought,

to Act.

Be not too rash and hasty, but al∣low your self leisure for better Consideration. And, when you have so far prevailed upon your self as to gain time, and suspend the gratifying of your Fancy for a while, employ this time in making a just Computation. Weigh first the time of Enjoyment well, and consider how short how very short it is; and afterwards observe, how infinitely this is over-balanced by that of Repentance. Think how many sad Remem∣brances, what bitter Remorse, what lasting Shame, what self condemning Reflections, the being vanquished by this Temptation will cost you; and then you will be ashamed to purchase so fugitive a Pleasure, with so permanent a Misery.

But, that you may have no Prete••••••, no Co∣lour left for so imprudent an Exchange, consi∣der once more the durable Advantages of Self∣denial; the sincere and never fading Satisfactions that result from a Lust subdued; the perpetual Applauses of a good Conscience, and the Hap∣piness of being approved by ones one Breast: For if you do but cast these things into the Seale, and give them their due weight, the Disparity will be so manifest, that Appetite must yield to Reason. And if you repeat this again and a∣gain, as fit Occasions offer themselves, you will by degrees gain an habitual and compleat vi∣ctory, and so absolutely reduce the sensual In∣clinations, that they will not be in a Conditi∣on to rebell, or give you any considerable di∣sturbance.

Since then the Pleasure lasts no longer than the single Instant of an Action, when once that Instant is over, there is no difference between one that hath had this Enjoyment, and one that had it not, it is evident, that Pleasure can have but very little to recommend it. You will say, per∣haps, that the Voluptuous Person hath the Sa∣tisfaction of Remembrance, and recollecting the Delights he enjoyed, which is a kind of bring∣ing them back again, and an acting them over in Imagination a second time. But, alas! this is a very poor and lame Satisfaction; and we need no other proof of its being so, than those dark and imperfect Ideas, which the remem∣brance of a pleasant Dream gives us; for those of a past Pleasure are exactly the same, every whit as feeble and imaginary.

But in regard there are some Pleasures no way inconsistent with Duty, and right Reason; such as those of the Marriage Bed, or Bathing after a Fever, and the like; therefore he adds one necessary Caution more; That even these Pleasures, which may be innocent and convenient in themselves, should yet be so tempered with a prudent Restraint, that the Gratefulness of them to Sense do not over-bear our Reason; nor we so absolutely give our selves up to the Enjoyment, as to be transported with Rapture and Joy. But even then, when we allow our selves the Fruition, to check and correct the Ex∣uberance of our Pleasure, by a seasonable Refle∣ction, That Reason ought always to be upper∣most; and that it is infinitely more becoming and advantageous to be above Sense, than to be a Slave to it. For indeed, this is as much more

eligible, as the due Government of our Passi∣ons, is better than the living under the Tyran∣ny and Usurpation of them; as much more Noble, as Reason is Superiour to Instinct, and the Dignity of the Humane Nature, above that of a Brute.