Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

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Title
Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...
Author
Epictetus.
Publication
London :: Printed for Richard Sare ..., and Joseph Hindmarsh ...,
1694.
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Subject terms
Epictetus. -- Manual.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A38504.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ..." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A38504.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 14, 2024.

Pages

Page 442

Vain-glory, are very often strongly tinctured with, and chiefly owing to it.

It hath also one considerable advantage above other Passions; which is, That its Viciousness and Deformity lies concealed longer than any else, and deceives us with a Colour of Vertue, because it is by Vertuous Actions only that we hope for Reputation; not considering in the mean while, That this very courting of Applause sul∣lies the most commendable Actions, and robs them of all pretension to Vertue, because we do not make that our principal End, nor choose the Good for its own sake, but for the Credit and Honour it will derive upon us. For it is plain, That the Mark we aim at is Glory and Commen∣dation, and the Good we apply our selves to, is not the Effect of Choice but Necessity; and thus many of us would not be Just (for instance) but only that there is no way to get the good O∣pinion of the World without it.

There is this to be said farther in its excuse, That this Passion seems to be extremely useful for the qualifying of several others. For we are content to undergo many sharp Conflicts with our selves, and deny several Inclinations and En∣joyments upon this account; and as it is a restraint to our Vices, so is it likewise a powerful Incentive and Spur to Vertue; it puts us upon engaging in many difficult Encounters, reconciles us to Au∣sterities and Mortifications, and imposes Tasks, which though performed with great Alacrity up∣on this account, would otherwise seem severe and insupportable Punishments.

Page 443

For this Reason Ambition and Desire of Ap∣plause is very significantly termed the inmost Garment of the Soul, as that which sticks clo∣sest to it of all Passions whatsoever; because, when we have stript our selves of the rest, yet this is still etained, and in truth the rest are many times laid aside for the sake of this. At least they appear to be so; for to speak strictly, this is all but Appearance, and Hypocri∣sie; nor does this Passion in reality make the Soul abandon Vice; for it only puts a Restraint upon the outward act, without any effectual Reformation of the mind, or correcting the in∣ward motions to Wickedness. Thus we find, that those very Persons who, to preserve their Reputation, abstain from gross and scandalous Lewdness, do yet without any remorse in∣dulge themselves in unseen Liberties, and loose Imaginations. So that upon the whole matter, men are not one whit the better, but the worse upon this account; for there are not any vicious Desires reclaimed by it; and the abstaining from the open Gratisication of those Desires, blows them up with a false Opinion of Ver∣tue, and adds to their Vanity ten times more.

It seems, I confess, capable of doing some Service to young men, whose Passions ride high; by curbing the Exorbitancies, which Youth, through the Heat and Rashness of that Age, is so exceeding apt to fly out into; but when those importunate Solicitations wear off, and men grow into cooler Reason, no Quality of the mind can be more dangerous and destructive. For it absolutely ruins all Vertue, by seducing the Soul to base Principles, it makes the Opinion of the

Page 444

World the chief end of Action, and lays more stress upon recommending ones self to others, than upon Satisfaction and Testimony of his own Conscience; it proposes Good, to us, as eligible, not for any Intrinsick Excellence of its own, but for the Honour and Fame consequent to the doing of it: So that in short we never really choose Good; not Good I mean, consi∣dered as such, because we do not choose it for its own sake.

Nor is this only a dangerous Vice, but a most extravagantly ridiculous one too, and such as exposes all that are tainted with it, to one most absurd and inconsistent Folly: For men of this Temper commonly value themselves, and despise others extremely; and yet at the same time do they court, and flatter, and fear them, and pin all their Happiness, and all their Expectation upon these very Wretches whom they think so despicable.

Now nothing can cure this extravagant and slavish Passion, so effectually as Moderation; an evenness of Mind, and a frank acknowledg∣ment of our own Faults and Failings. And yet even this hath some hazard in it too; for affected Humility is the greatest Pride, and without due Caution, and prudent Care, we shall fall into the very danger we would a∣void, and become Vain-glorious even in the Accu∣sations of our selves. Many men know, that to lessen themselves in their own Expressions, is to bespeak the Commendation of others by a sly and a surer way. But this Temper recom∣mended by Epictetus must be sincere, free from

Page 445

underhand Trickings, and indirect Ends. And indeed he recommends it upon very good Grounds; for it is easie to perceive, That if Fate should so order the matter, as that our Vertues and Advantages should be known to our selves alone; and our Follies and Defects published to all the World, there would pre∣sently be an end of all Vain-glory: and what∣ever Good we do, we should be invited to it for its own sake, when there could be no Pro∣spect of Applause to tempt us.

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