Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

COMMENT.

WHen Men apply themselves to the Study and Practice of Virtue, and are convin∣ced that nothing so well deserves their Care as the Improvement of their Minds, many Diffi∣culties offer themselves, to shake these Resolu∣tions; and as Men differ in their Circumstances, so these Objections present themselves different∣ly, both to disquiet their own Thoughts, and to evacuate the Good Advice of others. To the Young Beginners, whose Minds have not yet purged off the Dross of the World, such mean and sordid Reflections as these are apt to step in; If I neglect my Business and Estate, I and my Family shall starve; and except I take the Trouble of punishing my Servant, my Indulgence will be his Ruin.

But to those who have made any considerable Progress, these Objections appear Despicable and Low; they are above such trifling Consi∣derations, and while they are doing their Du∣ty, can trust Providence for a Provision. But then at the same time, they are concerned for the discharge of all those good Offices that may be expected from them; and think, that both the intrinsick Goodness of the thing, and the Honour that attends it, will abundantly justify such a Concern. For their Desires are Generous and Noble, they aim at nothing else but true Honour; they decline Infamy and Obscurity, and propose to themselves the Advantage of their Friends, and the Service of their Country: And from these Topicks, they start some Objections, which Epictetus here undertakes to examine and refute particularly.

And First of all, he applies himself to that General one of Obscurity or Disgrace; that if a Man retire from the Gainful Employments and Business of the World, or quit his Practice at the Bar;

Where Eloquence acquires a just and lasting Fame.

(as Homer observes) it must be his hard fate to be buried alive, without any Respect paid, or notice taken of him.

Now this Objection Epictetus takes off most effectually, by the following Syllogisms: Dis∣grace is an Evil, and Evil as well as Good, is something within our own power. But whate∣ver is so, no other but our selves, can bring upon us. Therefore when any Man is really in

Disgrace, this is in, and by, and from himself, whether others disrespect him, or whether they do not. So that the Disgrace from others, is what we have no just cause to fear, nor indeed ought it to pass for Disgrace in our Opinion, if Disgrace be allowed to be Evil; for then it must by consequence too be our own Act and Deed.

This is the Sum of the Argument; and now if you please, let us examine the several Propo∣sitions whereof it consists. First of all, Dis∣grace or Obscurity, (says he) is an Evil: Now if Honour be (as all Men sure will allow it to be) a Good, Disgrace, and any thing that is Honourable, must needs be Evil: For if it were Good, it would cease to be Dishonorable, and be valued and esteemed. But besides the consent of all Mankind in this notion of Honour, this very thing proves it to be Good, that it is what we account most properly to belong to the best Persons and Things. For Honour is attributed to God, to Blessed Spirits, and to the most ex∣cellent of the Sons of Men, as their strict and just due, as the best acknowledgment we can pay for their Merit and Goodness. So that Dishonour must needs be an Evil upon this Ac∣count also; for where one Contrary belongs to one Extream, the other Contrary will belong to the distant Extream; and this is the Case of Honour and Dishonour, with regard to Good and Evil.

The next thing to be proved would be, that this is a thing wholly in our own power, but this I presume is done already; for there hath been so much said in the former part of this

Treatise, to shew, that all the Good and Evil, properly so called, that can fall upon Rational and Free Agents, must needs depend upon the Liberty of their own Choice; and that nothing which does not fall within a Man's own Dispo∣sal, can in true and strict Speaking, be called Good or Evil; that it is to be hoped there is no need of repeating those Arguments any more. But now, if Disgrace and want of Ho∣nour, be our own Act, and what depends upon none, and comes from none but our selves when we lye under it; a Man may absolutely despise and neglect the World, without incurring any real Dishonour upon that account. You will say indeed, this excludes him from Places of Dignity and Respect, that it hinders him from making a Figure and Interest in his Coun∣try; that he sits at Home, and eats in Private. But then I must ask you again, whether the Of∣fice of a Lord Mayor, or a Member of Par∣liament, whether the City Feasts, or the Ca∣resses of the World, are things in our own Dis∣posal, and such as any Man can give himself when he pleases? You must grant me they are not; and from thence I infer, that no Man is really happy for the want of them; and conse∣quently that Obscurity, and want of publick Honour, of which these are alledged, as the dis∣couraging Inconveniences, is no Evil or Unhap∣piness neither.

Now, as to the meaning of what follows, (there seems to be some difficulty in that short Sentence, It is no more in the power of any but your self, to bring any Evil upon you, than it is to bring Idleness or Dishonesty upon you.) For this, not be∣ing

in the power of any other Person to bring any Evil upon a Man, seems to be urged from a proof more evident than it self; and the Insinuation here is, that as the decency of an Action is more easi∣ly discerned, than the real and intrinsick Good∣ness; (for it is by its Comeliness and Beauty, that Virtue recommends it self, and invites us to its Embraces, and engages our Affection,) so also the Vileness and Dishonesty is more visible than the Immorality and Evil. Now Vileness or Turpitude is properly applied to an undue use of Pleasures and Sensual Delights; and this a∣buse can be the effect of no other thing but Choice, because the indulging those Pleasures, is purely our own Act. It is therefore no more in the power of any other Person to bring Evil upon a Man, than to bring Vileness or Disho∣nesty upon him; and Evil it is plain he cannot, for a Man has no more power to engage us in Vice, than he hath to engage us in base and un∣becoming Practices; and Evil both of Crime and Misery, is as much in his own free Dispo∣sal, as Turpitude and Disnonesty: So that if a Man cannot be brought into this latter by another, and if he can no more be brought into Evil, than into That, it follows, that he cannot be brought into Evil at all by ano∣ther.

But possibly the place may be clearer, and a more full and expedient Sense found out, if we transpose that Negative Particle, that so the Sentence may run thus, It is impossible for any Person to be made Miserable by any other; nay, much more so, than to be made Vile and Base by him; that so the strength and stress of

the whole Argument, may lye upon that note of Comparison. And this Conjecture, as well as the whole Interpretation grounded upon it, seems to carry a great deal of Truth, if we attend to the Notions upon which the Masters of Reason and Oratory proceed in these Mat∣ters; for they define Honesty and Turpitude, by that which is Praise or Blame-worthy, and so make Decency and Vileness to depend upon the Judgment of the World. But of things Profitable or Hurtful, and Good and Evil, they give us a very different Account; for these they tell us, have a distinguishing Character founded in Nature, and are not so precarious, as to depend upon the Opinions or Determinations of Men. Now according to this Notion, which allows so much to the Commendations of Men, and makes Dishonesty to consist in the Con∣demnation and dislike of the World, he says, a Man must admit, that it is at least as impos∣sible for another to bring Evil upon him, as it is to bring Dishonesty. And if, (as was pro∣ved before,) this cannot be done, much less can that; and so the Conclusion is still the same, that it is utterly impossible to be done at all.

But then again, What occasion, (says he) is there for that Complaint of living without any Name or Notice taken of you? Is there no way of becoming Eminent, but by appearing in some Office of Authority, and being advanced to the Administration of Publick Business? Alas! poor Man, you have forgot it seems, that this is not the Field where Humane Good and Evil, the proper and peculiar Happiness or Misery of our

Nature is to be contended for. The Desires and Aversions of your Mind, the Actions of your Life, and in a word, the Management of your Freedom, and what is left to its Disposal, these are the Lists which you must enter for that Prize; and this is a Combat in which if you behave your self Gallantly, and act as un∣corrupt Nature, and right Reason would di∣rect, you may render your self highly valuable and conspicuous. Why then do you complain of Obscurity and Contempt, when you have the Post of Honour within your self, and may become as Signal and Eminent on it as you please? Why indeed? But because you have not yet unlearned the Folly of placing your Happiness in Foreign and External Advantages, such as it is one necessary Qualification of every one who would be a Philosopher in good ear∣nest, to neglect and despise.

Well, but allowing, (says the Objector) that I may signalize my self never so much, yet still this is but a private Satisfaction, it gives one no Credit nor Influence in the World, and my Friends are never the better for my Merit. This now is a Pretence calculated for one who hath made some competent Proficiency in Wisdom and Virtue: It argues the Man to have got a∣bove all sordid seekings of his own Interest, and to value the World and its Advantages, no longer for the sake of himself, but in kindness to his Friends. The Assisting of them, he looks upon as a Good and Gallant Action, and there∣fore allows himself in the pursuit of Wealth, and Power, and Interest, to prevent his being an useless and unprofitable part of the Creation,

and render the Good he hath, as diffusive as may be.

This Objection too, Epictetus removes by Two Arguments; the First proceeds upon the distinction of things within our own Power; the other urges, that a Man who retains his Virtue and Fidelity, and all the good Qualities that create and preserve a true Friendship, is more serviceable and beneficial to his Friends, than if he should enrich or promote them, when the power of doing so, was purchased at the Ex∣pence of those good Qualities.

From the Distinction of Things in our Power, he argues, that Riches, and Honours, and Pre∣ferments, are none of them which Nature hath left within the Disposal of our own Wills: If therefore it happen at any time, that a Wise and Good Man be possessed of these Advanta∣ges, let him impart to others liberally; nay, le•• him esteem the Opportunity of doing Good, a greater kindness to himself, than to the Person that receives it from him. But if it be not his Fortune to be placed in such Circumstances, this is no Reflection upon his Virtue, nor any Disparagement to his Kindness and good Inten∣tions: He is not one whit the worse Man in himself, nor the less a Friend to others. For (as Epictetus says,) what Madness is it to expect that a Man should give that to us, which he is not possessed of himself?

But pray get these things, say your Friends, that we may partake of them with you. Yes, with all my Heart, if I can get them, and not lose my self. Do but order Matters so, that I may still retain my Fidelity and my Innocence, and

not bring any aspersion upon the Characters I pretend to, viz. Those of a Friend and a Phi∣losopher; and when you have thus smoothed the way, give your Directions, and I will not fail to follow them. Now by this Answer, our Author seems plainly to allow a Liberty, both of endeavouring to improve an Estate, and to embrace publick Offices and Honours, provided those Riches and Honours may be acquired and enjoyed, without being engaged in any thing inconsistent with Virtue, or unbecoming our Cha∣racter. But if this be an impossible Condition, as it too often proves; if the Corruption of the World be such, that a Man who makes it his Business to acquire these Advantages, do at the same time bring himself under a manifest hazard, if not a fatal necessity of parting with something that is a greater and more substan∣tial Good; a Good more properly his, in ex∣change for them: Then what do those Friends, who importune a Man to make himself Rich and Great, that he may make them so too; what do they, I say, but desire, that he would part with a Happine••s that is real and his own: (that is the Good of his Rational Soul,) to pro∣cure them a Happiness which is but imagina∣ry, and cannot be truly called their own, though they had it? For the Advantages they are so eager for, have no relation to the Rational Mind, in which the very Essence and Nature of a Man consists, (and consequently all the Happiness he is capable of, considered as a Man, must needs depend upon that too,) but they are the Objects of meaner Appetites.

This therefore is the most unequal Dealing, and the greatest Folly imaginable: They deal unequal∣ly, because they transgress the Laws of true Friendship; (for the Pythagoreans, you know, make Friendship to consist in Equality,) and be∣sides, nothing can be more unfair, than for me to engage a Friend in some great hazard, and expose him to certain and extream Misery, and all this, only to satisfy some unreasonable Desire of my own: The Folly of it is double; for who but Fools would be so barbarous, as to impose such an unreasonable Trial of his Kindness upon an Intimate Acquaintance, and particular Friend? And who but such could be so blind, as not to discern the mighty diffe∣rence between the Loss their Friend would su∣stain, by gratifying their Requests, and the Gain themselves should reap, in case he did so? He sacrifices his All; forfeits his Greatest, his own peculiar Happiness, to purchase that for them, which is not, cannot be their pro∣per Happiness; and is so far from being a Great one, that it very often proves to be none at all in the Event, but a great and sore Evil.

But besides all this, there may still another very good Reason be given, why he should call such Men Foolish and Senseless; and that is, their esteeming Mony to be of greater and more valuable Consideration to them, than the Modesty and Fidelity of a Friend. And to this purpose, he proceeds to shew, that a Person thus quali∣fied, is so far from being unserviceable to his Friends, that he is really much more useful

and beneficial, than even those who feed them with the Dross they so much admire.

For if among Servants, those who are honest and respectful, recommend themselves more to the Esteem of their Masters, than others who are of quicker Parts, and more dextrous in the Business of their Trade; sure the Reason holds much stronger, why a Faithful and Vertuous Friend should have the Preference infinitely be∣fore what the World calls a gainful one, and the Preference they will have in the Opinion of wise Men. For we feel the Benefit of these up∣on every Occasion; they give us the Sweets of good Conversation, and the Assistance of sea∣sonable Advice; they are a perpetual Guard upon whatever we esteem most dear, and a sure Relief in Dangers and Distresses; they are Phy∣sicians in our Diseases, and (as if Life were too short a Space for so much Goodness to exercise it self in) we find our Account in such Friends even after Death: And upon all these Occa∣sions, there is a perpetual good Correspondence, a mutual Agreement between the Giver and the Receiver of Favours; no Discord in the whole Course of their Lives, but constant Consent, and perfect Harmony of Souls. Those therefore that are Friends indeed, will contribute their utmost Endeavours towards the preserving the Virtue and Fidelity of their Friends; nay, they will find themselves obliged to it, in Tender∣ness to their own Interest; and cannot be guil∣ty of so great an Absurdity, as to desire any Thing for their own Sakes, which must turn at last so infinitely to their own Prejudice, by robbing their Friend of his Honesty, and ren∣dring

him incapable of doing them any far∣ther Service.

Thus also that other Argument might be an∣swered, and the observing what is in a Man's own Power, and properly belongs to him to do, would serve to refute what follows. For, who ever told you, that it was a Duty incum∣bent upon you, or a Thing in your own Power and Choice, to procure Portico's and publick Buildings for the Benefit of your Country? To this may be replied again, as it was in the Case of your Friends; Who can be expected to bestow that upon others which he never had himself? And if to this it be rejoyned, Get them your self, that you may have it in your own Power to give to your Country; what was said before will serve every jot as well upon this Occasion too. But these Considerations he hath left in the general, for us to apply as we see requisite; and hath supplied us with ano∣ther clear and full Answer, much more pertinent, and particular to the Matter in hand.

What need this trouble you (says he)? Is it your Concern to provide Cloisters and Ex∣changes for your Country? The Smith does not think it his Business to supply his Country with Shoes, but with Arms; and the Shoe-maker does not think himself obliged to furnish out Arms, but Leather and Shoes. And sure every Commonwealth is served in best Order, and to most Advantage, when every one attends strict∣ly to the proper Business of his Calling, and does not intermeddle with other Peoples Con∣cerns; but takes care to do his own part, and interrupts no Body else in the Discharge of theirs.

Well, but what is my part then, says the Philosopher, and wherein will it be expected that I should contribute to the Publick Good? The seeming force of this Question he obviates most excellently, by appealing to his own Judg∣ment in another; What, says he, if you have been the Means of making a good Man, have not you been beneficial to your Country? Is not this a piece of Service of much greater Con∣sequence than the Profits every mean Artificer brings to the Publick? This would be the Ad∣vantage, and this the Thanks and Honour due to you, for making your self an honest Man and a good Subject: But if your Wisdom and Virtue have a kindly Influence upon others too; if your Instructions and your Example form them into the same good Principles, you are then a publick Blessing, and more beneficial still, in proportion to the Numbers you have an In∣fluence upon.

And now you desire to know, what Rank or Office shall be assigned you, and would fain be like the General in the Army, or the Magistrate in the City, or the Artificer in the Shop, who know their respective Trusts, and have some Station or Business, Military or Civil, which they can properly call their own: To this the Author replies in general Terms, You may have any that will fall to your share, only with this Provision, that it be consistent with Virtue and Honesty. But if you make Shipwrack of these, while you pretend to venture for Monuments and stately Buildings, it is great odds but you lose your Magnificence at the same time that your Modesty and Fidelity is cast away. And, I

pray, whether of the two is the greater Grace to a Commonwealth? a City well stored with true and good Men, or adorned with sumptu∣ous Halls and splendid Palaces?

But to come nearer to the Question, What Place or Esteem is due to a Philosopher, or what Regard should the State have to him? Surely Men should be esteemed according to the Dignity and Value of their Work. And by this Rule the Philosopher may claim Prece∣dence, as a Former and Maker of Men; one that frames and moulds them into vertuous Persons, and useful honest Subjects. For the Matter he hath to work upon, is, himself and others; and the Pains he is at about them, is, to refine and purifie their Nature, and exalt them to a Life of Reason and Virtue. He is indeed, and ought to be respected, as a Com∣mon Father, and Master, a Corrector of Er∣rors, and a Counsellor and Assistant in Good∣ness; one that is liberal of his Care, makes every other Man's Benefit and Improvement his Endeavour and Concern, and hath a Hand in all the Good that is done. One that adds to the Enjoyments of the Prosperous, by congratula∣ting and rejoycing with them; and lightens the Burden of the Wretched, by ministring season∣able Comforts; and himself bearing a part in their Afflictions. In one word, He will do all those Things, that are possible, or can be ex∣pected, to be done by one who thinks no part of the World exempt from his Care, but feels in himself a constant Desire, and kind Intenti∣on to promote the Good of all Mankind.

Now if this general Employment do not sa∣tisfie, but you would needs have this wondrous Man fastned down to some one particular Pro∣fession, in a wise and well-constituted Govern∣ment, this Person would be chosen their Head, because his Eminence and Usefulness must needs give him the Preference before others. And indeed, his Qualifications, if we consider them particularly, seem to deserve no less. His Pru∣dence, so much superior to the common Sheep, capacitates him for a Shepherd to the Flock. His Learning and Wisdom entitle him to the Degree of a Senator or Privy Counsellor; and if he have applied himself at all to that sort of Discipline, none can be fitter to command an Army, because he must needs excell both in true Courage and regular Conduct. * 1.1 Thus Socra∣tes gained immortal Renown by his Bravery at the Battel of Delium, and cast, as we are told, so universal an Awe into his Enemies, that they all stood amazed at his Courage, and he made good his Retreat single, through a whole Body

of them, without their daring to fall upon him. So likewise † 1.2 Xenophon brought off that great Body of Greeks, and had his Praises celebrated in the Olympick Games, for so Noble an At∣chievment.

This, I say, would be the case, this the Re∣spect paid to a Philosopher in a wise and well∣constituted Government. But we must take notice, that wicked and licentious States do quite contrary; They are most Inauspicious Places to dwell in, and have destructive Effects upon the Minds of Men; they stifle and quench that Light which Heaven hath given us, cast a Blemish upon the best Employments, discourage the most useful Sciences, disregard the Persons, and obstruct the good Influence of them who teach us by their Doctrins, and lead us by their Examples. And where so much wicked Indu∣stry is used to damp the Lustre of Virtue, that must be confest a very improper Place, either for Men to lay the first Foundations of Wis∣dom and a good Life in, or to improve and confirm themselves in, after such good Begin∣nings. But then we must observe withall, that if in the midst of such perverse Conversation some one be found of a happier Complexion than the rest; one, whose Soul a particular good Genius hath made proof against a••l Cor∣ruption; the greater such a one's Difficulties are, and the more Tryals his Virtue is exerci∣sed with, the more perfect and illustrious it will appear, and shed abroad its Rays with great∣er

Advantage in the midst of so much Dark∣ness. So true it is, that all the Traverses of Fortune, and this vast Variety of Accidents in Humane Life, contribute exceedingly to the In∣crease of Virtue; and that both Prosperity and Adversity work together for the Good of those Men who have the Wisdom to choose Things with Judgment, and manage them with Dex∣terity.

Notes

• * 1.1

  This Action of Socrates is particularly taken Notice of by Diogenes Laertius. The Battel mentioned here was sought between the Athenians and Boeotians, in which the latter won Delium, under the Command of Pantoeadas; and the former being put to the Rout, Socrates is said to have retreated very leisurely, and several Times to have stood still, and look'd back, to see if any of his Enemies would dare to pursue and attack him. He is also said, a little be∣fore this Fight, to have saved the Life of Xenophon, and to have brought him off, when Unhorsed at the Battel of Am∣phipolu. See Diog. La••rt. Edit. Meibom. Amst. 1692. Segm. 22, 23. Pag. 93. See also Platon. Apolog. Socrat. Edit. Marsil. Ficin. Lugdun. 1590. Pag. 363.
• † 1.2

  See Xenophon in Exp••dit. C••••.