Separation of churches from episcopal government, as practised by the present non-conformists, proved schismatical from such principles as are least controverted and do withal most popularly explain the sinfulness and mischief of schism ... by Henry Dodwell ...

CHAP. XXV. The Nullity of the same Ordinations proved from the right of Episcopal Presbyteries as Presbyteries. (Book 25)

THE CONTENTS.

2. Even from the Principles of Aristocratical Government, from the right which Episcopal Presbyteries ought to have in giving Orders, as they are considered as Presbyteries. §. I, II. This proved by these degrees, 1. Though a Presbyter, when he is once made, is a Presbyter in the Catholick Church, yet the reason that makes him so is that correspondence of the whole Catholick Church with that particular one of which he was made a Member at his Ordination. §. III, IV, V, VI. 2. Hence it follows that he who cannot validly make out his Authority in the particu∣lar Church in which he pretends to have received his Orders, can∣not, in reason, expect that the exercise of his Authority should be ratified in other Churches who cannot thus be satisfied that he has received them. §. VII. 3. The Church, by which the validity of the Orders of every particular Presbyter must expect to be tryed, must not be a Church that derives its beginning from him, but such a one as must be supposed settled and established before he could be capable of any pretensions to Orders. Applied to single Presby∣ters. §. VIII. To whole Presbyteries made up of overvoted sin∣gle Presbyters. §. IX, X, XI. 4. No Orders can be presu∣med to have been validly received in any particular Episcopal Church as Presbyterian, without the prevailing suffrages of the Presbyteries. §. XII. A smaller over-voted number of Pres∣byters cannot validly dispose of the common rights of the whole Presbyteries. §. XIII, XIV, XV. The power given in the Ordination of a Presbyter is a right of the Presbytery in com∣mon by the Principles of Aristocratical Government. §. XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX. An Objection answered. §. XX, XXI,

XXII. Another Objection answered. §. XXIII, XXIV. Re∣torted. §. XXV. The reason of the Retortion given. §. XXVI.

[§ I] BUT, 2. There is also another just exception against the validity of our Adversaries Ordinations, even from the right of Aristocratical Government, and that is from the right of their Fellow-Presbyters as well as themselves. If we should allow the right of Ordina∣tion to Presbyters as Presbyters, as our Adversaries desire, yet that will not justifie the validity of the Ordinations of single Presbyters, no nor of a smaller part in opposition to the greater by which it is over-voted. And our Adversaries cannot defend their Ordina∣tions at present any better than by the single acts of particular Pres∣byters over-voted by the greater part of the Presbyteries of which they were originally Members. Their first Ministers which be∣gan the separation were much the smaller part of the respective Presbyteries to which they were related. And though they might, if they had continued in the Communion of the Church, have had their single votes in all the acts of Government, and the disposal of all the Offices which, by the practice then obteining, were allow∣ed to the whole Presbyteries; yet they could never have obteined that the Offices disposed of by their single votes, must have been validly disposed of and ratified by the rest by whom they were o∣ver-voted. And sure they cannot expect to be gainers by their unpeaceableness; that their single votes must be esteemed of greater value out of the Church, than in it; that they, who could not have made Presbyters in the Church against the prevailing vote of their Brethren, should be allowed to make as many as they please on condition they will divide from their Brethren, and make them∣selves the Heads of a popular party.

[§ II] THIS is not allowed in any Societies of the like nature. Though the Aldermen of Corporations have a power together with the Mayors to dispose of the Offices belonging to their respective Corporations; yet if the whole Table shall meet by themselves in separation from the Mayor, and in opposition to him, however they might over-vote him if he had been present, and their assembly law∣ful, yet what they should do in the Case we are now supposing, would be a perfect Nullity, and unobliging to the Corporation. But if any single Alderman should separate from all his Brethren also,

and should of himself undertake to dispose of the things or Offi∣ces of the Corporation, could any of our Brethren themselves ap∣prove them in it? Could they think the Offices so disposed of by them validly disposed of? Could they think the Corporation obli∣ged to ratifie them? And yet it is strange that they should not see how like this Case is to that of their own Predecessors. The first Ministers they had ordeined in the separation were ordeined by such Presbyters as these, and by such an act as this now mention∣ed. And their whole Succession since that time has been maintein∣ed generally on no better a Title. This representation of their case may possibly affect some popular capacities better than the na∣ked reasons. But that the more judicious among them may see that my desire it to deal fairly and candidly with them, and not to represent their cause more invidiously than it deserves, or to take any advantage that may be taken from a false representation of it, I shall endeavour to reduce the reason to a more close way of management under the following considerations, which I shall intreat our Adversaries to consider impartially.

[§ III] 1. THAT though a Presbyter, when he is once made, is a Presbyter in the Catholick Church, yet the reason that makes him so is the correspondence of the whole Catholick Church with that particular one of which he was made a Member at his Ordination. By his being a Presbyter in the Catholick Church, when he is once made, I do not mean that he may canonically exercise his Power in all particular Churches where he may have occasion to come, with∣out dependence on the respective Governours, but that the exercise of his power in his own Church is to be ratified over the whole Ca∣tholick Church in general, that they are to suppose the Sacraments administred by him to be validly administred, and that therefore they are not to rebaptize Persons baptized by him when they come to live among them, nor to refuse their Communion to such to whom he thinks fit to give it, nor to receive to their Communion those who are excluded from his; and that they are also so far to ratifie the Authority received in his own Church from those who had power to give it him, as that, if they think fit to permit him to exercise his power within their Jurisdiction, they do it without pre∣tending to give him a new Authority, but only a new Licence; and that where-ever he can exercise his Authority without Canonical in∣jury, as in Heathenish or Heretical Countries (where no Canons do oblige) ratifie all his acts of power the same way as if he had

performed them within his own Canonical Jurisdiction. This is more than is observed in civil Societies. One Country is not bound to confirm the censures of another, they are neither obliged to banish their exiles, nor to receive their Countrimen to the same priviledges among themselves which they enjoyed in their own Country, nor to receive their Magistrates to ex∣ercise power among themselves without a new Commission which may give them a new power, which the Authority of their own Country was not able to give them.

[§ IV] AND the reason why I level my discourse against the pow∣er that the Presbyters of our Adversaries may pretend to on ac∣count of their being Presbyters of the Catholick Church, is, be∣cause this is the only pretence that they can plausibly make for the validity of what they do. Canonical Licence they can∣not so much as pretend to, for exercising their power within the Jurisdictions of others without their leave. And it has al∣ready appeared that they can make out no Succession from the Apostles, but what must originally have come from Episcopal Ordination. That therefore they should expect that the exer∣cise of a power received from the Bishops, yet exercised within their Jurisdiction, without the Licence of the Bishops; nay, contrary to their express prohibition, should be counted valid, how unlawful soever, must be from the irrevocableness of the Authority at first received by them, and the unconfinedness of the design of that power antecedently to those Canons by which it was afterwards made irregular in its practice. Were it not for the nature of the unconfinedness of this power, they could not pretend to any right to exercise it out of the Jurisdiction of him who gave it them, nor even within that Jurisdiction with∣out his leave. And therefore if this will not do it, they can have nothing that can defend their Ʋsurpations from being in∣valid, as well as uncanonical.

[§ V] AND that this correspondence of the Catholick Church with that particular one in which he was ordeined, is the true reason why all other Churches are obliged to ratifie the acts of every par∣ticular Presbyter, will appear, if it be considered, that by his Ordination in his own particular Church he can have no Ju∣risdiction given him over any other which is not under the Ju∣risdiction of that particular Church from which he has recei∣ved his Orders. And therefore the reason why they are obli∣ged

to confirm his censures cannot be any Authoritative defe∣rence they owe to him, such as Subjects owe to even their fallible Superiors, even in matters, wherein they think them actually mistaken, yet so to practise as if they thought them not mistaken; but purely their own actual conviction concern∣ing the reasonableness of the thing it self, because they either know or presume it to be fit that his censure should be confir∣med. But this reason of the thing would not hold, were it not that his Church and theirs are in those things the same, and as they give the same advantages, so they require the same qualifications, which whoever is presumed to have in one, can∣not, by them by whom he is presumed to have them, be at the same time, presumed to want them in the other. In other Societies, where the priviledges conferred are proper to the Soci∣ety, the qualifications are so too. And therefore though one Society be really satisfied that a Subject has deserved well of another, and that he has deservedly received his reward for his eminent deserts from that Authority which had power to give him it, and therefore that he has a just title to a reward; yet are they not obliged, in any reason, to give him the same honour in their own. For the nature of these Societies are so little interessed in common as that the very same performance which is eminently serviceable to one may for that very cause be as eminently disserviceable to the other, as when they are in a state of hostility. However it is certain, that, as their in∣terests are very different, so the means of serving those interests are very different also, and therefore that there is no real con∣sequence that he who has indeed obliged one Society, must, in doing so, oblige all others also.

[§ VI] BUT the benefits of the Sacraments are such as that he who has them in one Church cannot, by him, who supposes him to have them there, be, at the same time, supposed to want them in another. Regeneration, and pardon of sins, and a Mystical Ʋnion with Christ, are the designed effects of the Sacraments. And it is impossible that he who has these in any one Church can be presumed to want them in another, by them who pre∣sume he already has them. And as no Church can think it in her power to exclude from her Communion those very Per∣sons whom she judges regenerated and pardoned and united to Christ; so if she be convinced that these benefits are validly con∣ferred

by a Presbyter in another Church, she must, in reason, be obliged to treat them as such in her own. Now whether they be validly conferred, or not, that she is to try by his Mini∣stry. If his Ministry be a valid Ministry, his Sacraments must be valid Sacraments, and actually confer the benefits designed by them to Persons not unqualified to receive them. And whe∣ther his Ministry be valid or no, that is, whether he be indeed a Legal Representative of God, so as to oblige him to ratifie what is done by himself in his name, this being an act of Au∣thority, and of Authority visibly administred by men, however proceeding originally from God, it must be judged the same way as is usually made use of in judging concerning acts of Humane Authority, that is, by considering the power by which he has received it. And because, by communicating with the Church of which such a Presbyter is a Member, and from whence himself pretends to have received his Authority, she plainly ac∣knowledges that that Church has really a power to give him that Authority he pretends to, therefore the only way to satis∣fie her self in this matter is to examine the truth of his pre∣tences, whether he has indeed received that Authority he pre∣tends to, from those Persons from whom he pretends to have received it. Which way of tryal does plainly resolve her judg∣ment in this matter into her correspondency with his Church. By that she judges whether his Authority be good, and whether he have actually received it.

[§ VII] 2. THEREFORE, Hence it follows that he who can∣not validly make out his Authority in the particular Church in which he pretends to have received his Orders, cannot, in rea∣son expect that the exercise of his Authority should be ratified in other Churches who cannot thus be satisfied that he has recei∣ved them. For their duty of correspondence being primarily with Churches, and only secondarily with particular Persons as they relate to particular Churches, (which is particularly true in acts of Authority, which cannot be supposed in any parti∣cular Person, but by derivation from some Church, or, which is to the same purpose, from some Ecclesiastical Person whose act is to be taken for the act of the Church) it must follow that the tryal of the pretences of any particular Person to Au∣thority must be by examining his reception of it from the Church. And therefore if it cannot appear that he has received any

such Authority as he pretends to, from that Church wherein he pretends to have received it, he is to be presumed not to have it at all, and therefore all that he presumes to do on suppo∣sition of it must be null and invalid.

[§ VIII] 3. THE Church by which the validity of the Orders of eve∣ry particular Presbyter must expect to be tryed, must not be a Church that derives its beginning from him, but such a one as must be supposed settled and established before he could be capable of any pretensions to Orders. For no other Church can be supposed proper to try him by, because the Authority of no other Church can be presumed good antecedently to his being so. All the Authority, nay, the very being of a Church set up by a particular Presbyter, must it self depend on the Authority of the Person by whom it is set up. If he be no Presbyter▪ such a Congregation cannot be a Church, in the sence we mean the word at present, and therefore cannot be capa∣ble of any Ecclesiastical Authority. Whence it will follow that he cannot by any act of such a Church derive Authority, if he wanted it before, because they can have no Authority but what he brought over to them. If he brought none, they have none to give him. If they had any, yet not such as were proper for this purpose; both because it is hardly possible that it can be more notorious than that which was, at least, in time an∣tecedent to it, and because at least it cannot be such a Church as other Churches have held correspondence with antecedently to their correspondence with his particular Person, and therefore whose Authority might have been presumed to have been gran∣ted by them on account of their correspondence with them. And there will appear the less reason either that this way of tryal should be right, or should be admitted by them, because it is against the interests of all Government whatsoever, and will ju∣stifie the practices of any seditious Person who can be so suc∣cessful in his seditious practices as to gain himself the reputa∣tion of being the Head of a seditious party. To be sure the party headed by him will give him all the Authority they are capable of giving him. It is their interest to do so, at least in the beginnings of disturbances, and as it will oblige him to their interests, so it will give him greater advantages for promoting those interests effectually. And then what Government can think it self secure, if it were so easie to justifie seditious

practices? How can we think that Governments should ever be favourable to Principles so pernicious to the rights of Govern∣ment in general?

[§ IX] NOR are these things only true concerning Churches ere∣cted by single Presbyters, but concerning such also as had whole Presbyteries made up of multitudes of single Presbyters, who had been over-voted in their several Presbyteries respectively. Especially if they presumed to exercise their Government in the Jurisdiction of another. This would also be a precedent as fa∣vourable to sedition and as destructive to Government as the o∣ther. If fugitive over-voted Magistrates of several places may invade the Territories of a Third, and there erect themselves into an absolute Senate, independent on the Government of the place, what security could there be for any Government? For can we think that those same Persons who had behaved them∣selves seditiously in their single capacities, would not do so al∣so when they were united, and when their common interest still obliged them to do so, when they might thereby so much bet∣ter their disadvantages in their respective Presbyteries? It is the humour of such Persons to unite against a common Adversary; at least, for a time, how seditious soever they might be other∣wise. And certainly they might expect better condescensions from Persons as criminal as themselves, who had themselves also many unreasonable things to be born with, than from their more innocent equals who had Justice on their side, much more than from their Superiors. And what could any Ecclesiastical censures signifie, if they who had been ejected singly might be thus allowed to confederate themselves into a Communion and a Presbytery independent on those from which they had been ejected? Who would value Excommunication or Deprivation, when they might so easily restore themselves into a condition as good as that from which they had been ejected, and might, at the same time, so easily revenge themselves on those by whom they had been ejected, by setting up another Government within their Jurisdiction, whose acts must also be accounted as valid as their own? These things shew that such a precedent of Presbyteries erected out of Per∣sons over-voted in their particular Presbyteries, would be injurious to the common interest of Government in general, though the form were every where Presbyterian, as well as to those par∣ticular Governours by whom they had been ejected, and to

those in whose Jurisdiction they were assembled▪ And its be∣ing against the common interest of Government, is, as has been observed, a great presumption that it is against Justice also.

[§ X] BUT besides this presumption, the same reasons of excepti∣on lye against the Justice of such a Presbytery as against the acts of single Presbyters. I mention not the Canons that for∣bid all Churches to receive the Excommunicates of each other, that put Communicants with them into the same condition with the Excommunicates themselves, that deprive them all of the Communion of all those Churches who maintein a correspondence with each other in the observation of those Canons. I menti∣on not that common interest which, at first, induced the Gover∣nours of particular Churches to agree upon those Canons, and obliges all, even those that never received nor heard of those Canons, yet to be determined by them in their practice, on the same account as all, even the most barbarous, Nations are ob∣liged by the Law of Nations though never explicitely recei∣ved by them, because these are as necessary for the common in∣terest and correspondence of Ecclesiastical, as the other are for those of Civil Societies. Which consideration must extend the ratification of the censures of particular Churches to the Catho∣lick Church, as the Law of Nations is common to all Nations, so that the Excommunicates of every particular Church must be so to the Catholick Church also. And then sure it will be hard to understand how they who are de Jure out of the commu∣nion of all Churches, can yet be in the Catholick Church, or how they, who have no right to be members of any Church, can by their meeting together become a Church, and become capable of Ecclesiastical Authority. Which reason will, in the consequence of it, reach Schismaticks as well as Hereticks, how little soever it be observed by our Brethren who are very little used to take in the rational rights of Government in general in their disputes concerning the Government of the Church.

[§ XI] BUT besides, the same reasons invalidate the acts of these Presbyteries which were urged against the acts of single Presby∣ters among them. Whatever may be thought of such a Mul∣titude of over-voted Presbyters in a Heathen Country, where the right were primi occupantis; yet where a Government is already

possessed, their encroaching on that must be as invalid as if they should take upon them to dispose of the goods of such Persons as were in actual possession, whatever might be thought of what conveyances they might also make of goods that were under no propriety. And the reason of these two cases is so exactly the same as the conveyances of power must, in such a case, be as invalid as the conveyance of property. Be∣sides, according to the nature of Government, which admits of no competition within its own Jurisdiction, strangers, how nu∣merous soever, immediately become Subjects by living in the Jurisdiction of another, whatever they be in their own, and that with this disadvantage also beyond the natural Subjects of the place, that they can have no interest in so much of the Government as the Natives of the place may pretend to where the Government is Democratical. And the acts of such Subjects, how numerous soever, must be invalid in matters of Govern∣ment. Now in this I believe our Adversaries will find them∣selves deeply concerned. They who pretend to the most re∣gular Ordination of them since the defection, who were not im∣mediately ordeined by Bishops, can only say that the Presby∣ters by whom they were ordeined had received Episcopal Ordi∣nation, and that they were ordeined by a full Presbytery of such Presbyters, not of the greater part of the settled Presbytery of the place where they were ordeined, or of any other, but on∣ly of a Multitude of particular Presbyters from several parts who were over-voted in their several respective Presbyteries. I be∣lieve they cannot give an instance in any place where the grea∣ter part of a settled Presbytery revolted from the Bishops to them. I am sure they cannot justifie their ordinary successions by such Ordinations.

[§ XII] AND, 4. As the order of Presbytery which would be al∣lowed in the Catholick Church must first appear to have been validly received in some particular Church, and that particular Church must on the Principles now mentioned be some Epi∣scopal Church as Presbyterian; so no Orders can be presumed to have been validly received in such a Church without the pre∣vailing suffrages of the Presbyteries. Let none be surprized at my speaking of an Episcopal Church as Presbyterian. I do it only that I may, in dealing with our Adversaries, accommo∣date my self to their Notions. It is therefore certain that in

the Ordination of Presbyters after the Episcopal way, the Bishop does not lay on his own hands alone, but has the assistance of several other Presbyters, who are present to lay on their hands together with him. On this account it is that several of our Adversaries, who are sensible of their obligation in interest to do it, do justifie the validity of those Orders they have recei∣ved by Episcopal Ordination. They consider the whole act on∣ly as the act of an Episcopal Presbytery, and consider the Bishop himself in that act only as an ordinary Presbyter, who cannot lose the power he has as a common Presbyter by being made a President of the whole Presbytery. Yet in that act they consider him only as an ordinary Presbyter, because they think it would belong to him as a Presbyter, though he were not also a Pre∣sident of the Presbytery, and therefore cannot take it for a Pre∣rogative of his Office as President. That it is therefore from some such a Presbytery as this that they must derive the validity of their Orders, appears from the Principles already premised, that no other Presbyteries can make out their Succession from the Apostles, that particular Members of even these Presbyteries cannot do it alone, in a separation from them, that Multitudes of such particular Persons though meeting together cannot make up such a Church among them as were requisite to attest the Orders of Persons ordeined to the rest of the Catholick Church who maintein correspondence with them.

[§ XIII] CONSIDERING therefore these Episcopal Presbyteries only as Presbyters, and the Bishop himself as acting herein by no higher a power than that of an ordinary Presbyter; yet e∣ven so no Orders can be valid but those which were confer∣red by the prevailing vote of even such a Presbytery, at least those are invalid which are given by the votes of a smaller over voted part of them. Even by the Principles of Aristocra∣tical Government, though it were doubtful whether the greater part might dispose a right common to them all without the con∣sent of every particular; yet it hardly can be doubtful whether a smaller part can dispose of such a common right though over-voted by a greater number of suffrages than their own. Though it may be thought reasonable that some reserved cases of that nature wherein the whole Society were deeply concern••d should not pass without the unanimous suffrages of every individual Member; yet as there is no Justice, antecedently to compacts,

that any individuals should dispose of the rights of others, though less considerable than themselves, till by the general acts and compacts of all, whereby Polyarchical Societies are most natural∣ly settled, such general rules are agreed on by which some par∣ticular Members, may, for peaces sake, be allowed to dispose of the common rights of their Fellow-members without their express consent in the particular, but by vertue of their gene∣ral consent once given to such general rules; so neither is there any reason in prudence, that, where unanimous consent cannot be had, and it is therefore necessary that one part yield to the other, the greater should be swayed by the smaller part. The fundamental rule of all this publick justice is, that, where there is a necessity of a choice, the publick be preferred before pri∣vate interests, that therefore it is very just to bear with injuries to private Persons when they cannot be avoided without inju∣ries to the publick. Which will in generosity oblige a smaller part to yield to a greater, but can on no terms oblige the grea∣ter to yield to the smaller, because indeed the interest of the greater part is more the publick interest than that of the smal∣ler.

[§ XIV] BESIDES the reason of all compacts of this kind of re∣ferring their differences to a publick decision, is the presumed equality of the decision above what would be among the in∣teressed Persons themselves, and the power to execute what is resolved on beyond the resistance of those against whom the cause is decided. And therefore if we should again suppose men free; as they were before these compacts I am speaking of; we have reason to presume that they would settle this power of deciding their differences in such hands, where there might be presumed less danger of corruption, and where there were the greatest power to execute their own decrees. And both these reasons give the preference to these major votes above the smaller part. It is to be presumed that it is not so easie to corrupt a greater as it is to corrupt a smaller part. And when it is necessary that the decree be executed, the power of the greater is greater than that of the smaller part, where the par∣ticular Subjects of power are supposed equal, as they are in our present case. And though it be very possible, in after cases, that it may so fall out that the greatest right may sometimes belong to that side where there is the smallest power, yet we

have reason to believe that the only reason why it comes to be so is the unexpectedness of revolutions to which humane affairs are obnoxious, which could not be so much as proba∣bly foreseen when the rules of such Societies were first agreed on. Otherwise it is reasonable to presume that, at the first constitution of those rules, they would chuse the greatest power and interest for the fittest seat of Authority▪ because they would by that be best secured of the execution of the Sentences given by them. And therefore where we may presume the greater power lay at the passing of those compacts, and where they who made those compacts had reason to see the greatest power would always be, there we have also reason to presume that they would intend to place the greatest Authority.

[§ XV] AND this is a reason which might, in all probability, in∣duce them to resolve that the major vote should prevail through all succeeding generations, because the major vote, in the case I am speaking of, must inseparably carry with it the greatest power. And this is a reason that alike concerns all by whom the Government were at first settled, whether it were by com∣pacts of the Parties themselves who were to be governed, or whether the Government were placed over them by a power who had a Jurisdiction over them antecedently to their own consent: There is the same reason why such a power should decree that the smaller number of suffrages in opposition to a greater number should be null in Societies to be established by him, as that the Parties themselves should at first agree that it should be so. The reasons now mentioned proceed alike in both cases: Which I therefore observe that our Adversa∣ries may perceive, that as to the case of which I am now speak∣ing, it will come to the same event, whether the power of the Presbyteries do come from the consent of the particular Presby∣ters, or whether it proceed immediately from the Divine in∣stitution. Still it is to be presumed that things are to be decided by the vote of the greater part, where nothing is otherwise expresly determined, because this way of determi∣nation is so certainly for the publick interest, for which we have as much reason to presume that God would be solici∣tous, as that the Presbyters themselves would be so.

[§ XVI] BY this it appears, even from the Principles of Aristocra∣tical Government, how invalid as well as how irregular it must

be for a smaller over-voted number of the Presbyters to un∣dertake to dispose of the common rights of the whole Presby∣teries, whether as acting by themselves, or as acting in Pres∣byteries made up of multitudes of such Presbyters as had been severally over-voted in the Presbyteries to which each of them did at first belong. Now that the power given in the Ordi∣nation of a Presbyter must be a right of the Presbytery in com∣mon, according to our Adversaries Principles, who conceive Go∣vernment to be a right common to them, I do not know whether our Adversaries themselves will think it necessary for me to prove. If the supreme visible Government of the Church be the right of such Presbyteries in common, not of particular Presbyters singly considered; I cannot conceive how such a Go∣vernment can be practicable unless the valid investiture of sub∣ordinate Governours be also appropriated to them.

[§ XVII] I AM not concerned whether they will here allow the pow∣er given at the Ordination of a Presbyter to be a proper power of Government. It suffices at present that the power given to particular Presbyters is as properly a power of Government as that is of the whole Presbyteries. The power of the whole Presbyte∣ries is only an Aggregate resulting from the valid Succession of the particular Presbyters whereof it consists. And the power of Administring the Sacraments which is given to particular Pres∣byters at their Ordination is that on which their power of Go∣vernment is grounded. That is the reason which obliges all private Persons to submit to the Presbyteries, and to all their lawful impositions, because God has put it in their power to ex∣clude refractory Persons from the ordinary means of Salvati∣on. And as far as this power of administring the Sacraments is granted to particular Presbyters when they are ordeined Pres∣byters, so far also it is put in their power to exclude private Persons from the Sacraments by refusing to perform their Office to them. Only because this exclusion by a particular Presbyter does not hinder other Presbyters, who have as great a power as himself who should exclude one, from performing their du∣ty to a Person so excluded, and the exclusion does oblige the Person excluded to submission no further than as he cannot hope for the benefit of the Sacraments without the consent of his excluder; therefore it can only be to the whole Presbytery that every Member of a Church can be obliged to submit, be∣cause

it is the Presbytery alone that can oblige all to ratifie their censures, so that the Sacraments cannot at all be gotten without their consent. They can ••••lige their own Members to ratifie them by vertue of the Subjection which each of them owes to the whole Community. And they can oblige all other Churches and Presby∣teries to ratifie their censures by vertue of that correspondence which all Churches and Presbyteries are obliged to maintein with each other on account of their common interest. But still this does not hinder but that the power of particular Presbyters must be of the same kind with the power of the whole Presbyteries, though it be not of the same ex∣tent, which, on the Principles now mentioned, is sufficient to ap∣propriate the disposal of it to the common right of Government.

[§ XVIII] AND as by the former Argument it has appeared that de facto no such power was actually designed for them by their first Ordei∣ners as is at present exercised by our Brethren in their separation; so by this later Topick it appears that it does not de jure belong to them by vertue of any thing given them by the Episcopal Presbyte∣ries, though we consider them, as our Brethren are willing to consider them in this act of Ordination, only as Presbyteries, or at the utmost, only as Presbyteries with a President, which cannot make any substantial difference, much less can the honour of pre∣siding lose the President any of that honour which belongs to him as a single Presbyter. Which I therefore observe that our Brethren may see how unjustifiable their Ordinations are upon any terms. Though this power had been designed for them by their Ordeiners, or though their being made Presbyters by their Ordeiners, did, as they think, confer this power upon them really, how little soever it was designed for them; yet neither of these pretences can be a∣vailable, if their acts were not valid acts of the Presbyteries. If they were not, they could not give what they did intend to give them, because they could not confer a valid legal title to that which was not their own to give. So far must they be in such a case as this from giving really more than they intended to give. If they think it usurpation for the Bishops and the Presbyters who ad∣here to them to act in the name of the whole Presbyteries; how much greater Ʋsurpation must it be for a smaller over-voted num∣ber of Presbyters to attempt the same without the Bishop? Cer∣tainly his presence, though only as a first Presbyter, must add great Authority to the legitimating their Assemblies as that must also do to the validity of their actings in them.

[§ XIX] NAY on the contrary, as they cannot, either by any prece∣dent, or any reason, defend the validity of such acts of a smaller part of the Presbyters without the Bishops; so I do not understand how they can avoid the owning the validity even of the acts of a smaller number of Presbyters in conjunction with the Bishops, if they will consider their own interest in them. The Presbyters who assisted the Bishops in the solemnities of ordeining their first Prede∣cessors were much the smaller part of the Presbyteries. As for the rest, their consent was not so much as required, neither by any ex∣press act of their own, nor by any delegation of their power to those who were present, nor presumed from their absence after a Cano∣nical summons. And yet if these acts were not valid, our Brethren cannot possibly defend the validity of their own Ordinations. But if they be, I might then shew how impossible it is that the validi∣ty of such acts can be derived from the power of the Presbytery; and how necessary it is that they be resolved into an absolute power of the Bishop; and therefore how much they will be obliged to own the power of the Bishops that they may defend the validity of their own Orders. And considering that the Bishops and Presbyters make up one Government, it is impossible, if he be absolute, that they can be so too. And therefore if he can validly dispose of the common right without their consent, they cannot possibly dispose of it without his, which will again invalidate the acts of those Presbyte∣ries for which our Brethren are concerned. And if this power of ordeining others was never given to our Brethren de facto, and if withal the validity of the conveyance fail by which they may pre∣tend to it de jure, beside the intention of their Ordeiners; I do not understand what more can be requisite for overthrowing the va∣lidity of their Ordinations.

[§ XX] THAT which they are apt to object after all is, that they are made Presbyters, and were designed to be made so, and to be made so in the Scripture Notion of that word; and that Ordination is a right belonging to a Scripture Presbyter. But why should they pre∣sume that their design was to make Presbyters in the Scripture sense any otherwise than as they thought the Presbyters in the modern sense justified by the Scripture? If this was the reason, as in all likelihood it must according to the sense of those times; then cer∣tainly their prime design was only to give that power which was then granted to Presbyters, which will not include the power of ordeining others, as I have already shewn. Besides it cannot be

presumed that their design was to make Presbyters in the Scrip∣ture sense any farther than as they thought Scripture precedent obliging to their own times. If they thought it lawful for them to alienate the right which originally belonged to them; if, at least, they thought such an Alienation valid when done, however unlawful to be done; why should they rather think of retrieving the Scripture-practice in this particular, than in those of the Dea∣conesses, and the feasts of Love, &c. to which no parties think themselves obliged at present.

[§ XXI] I CANNOT but think that this was really St. Hieromes sense of this matter,* 1.1 who never thought himself obliged by his singular opinion concerning the Primitive form of Ecclesiastical Go∣vernment to make any disturbance in the present settlement. And the reason he gives for the change, that it was for the avoiding Schism, was a commendable reason, and as much concerning his own, and all future times, as it did those wherein this change was first supposed to have been made. Schism is still as dangerous to the Church, and Episcopacy is still as prudent an expedient for preventing the occasion of Schism arising from parity, now and for ever, as it was then. And the decree of the whole World which he mentions as the Authority by which this change was made, if it do not include the Apostles or some such extraordinary Officers, who, in those times had alone the power of making such a Decree as he there speaks of, which might oblige the whole World, and in whose time the expressions he makes use of for expressing this Schism, that one said he was of Paul, another of Cephas, ano∣ther of Apollos, were first and most literally fulfilled, and it is un∣likely that they would defer the remedy so long after the occasion, as our Adversaries suppose; besides that the mistake of mens thinking that the Disciples baptized by them were their own, is not likely to have continued so long, and to have prevailed so univer∣sally as to occasion a general Decree against it after the death of all the Apostles, when St. Paul himself had so expresly condemned it so long before: If, I say, the whole World concerned in this busi∣ness did not include the Apostles, (and it is most certain that it cannot exclude them) yet certainly it must have included all those extraordinary persons of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, who, besides their intimate acquaintance with the Apostles, were themselves indued with great and Apostolical gifts; and as they cannot be presumed ignorant of the Apostles mind in a matter of fact so notorious as this

was of Government, so they cannot be presumed unfaithful to their trust in a matter of this consequence as to make a Decree directly contrary to an establishment of the Apostles designed by them to be unalterable, and this Decree an universal one without contradicti∣on of any one of these Apostolical Persons.

[§ XXII] WHATEVER our Brethren may think of these things now; yet certainly St. Hierome could not, on these terms, think this change invalid. Nor consequently could any of them think so who were in this matter guided by St. Hierome. And if so, we have no reason to presume that they must have intended to re∣store the antiquated Scripture-right of Presbyters, which, if it prove true, must overthrow all our Adversaries Arguments for proving that Ordination was a right of Scripture-Presbyters, in or∣der to the proving the like right in Presbyters now. Though it was their right then, yet if it be alienable, it may cease to be their right now. If it were unalienable from those who once had it, yet without defending the validity of any alienation, they may want it now, not because they alienated it, but because they never had it. However, though it had been their design to give our present Presbyters all that right which belonged to Presbyters in the A∣postles times; yet certainly they who made these Presbyters are the most competent Judges of their own intentions, if we will deal fairly, not captiously. And therefore, even in this case, our Adversaries should not immediately conclude that to be the right of modern Presbyters, because themselves think that Presbyters in the Apostles time had it, unless they could prove our modern Or∣deiners to have been of their mind in this particular. It suffices at present that I have shewn, that it is not from the Scriptures as a Charter, but from their Ordeiners as Persons Authorized by that Charter, and as Authentick Expositors of it, if not as to truth, yet at least as to practice, that they receive their Orders; and therefore that the power actually received by them must not be measured by the true sence of the Scriptures, but from that wherein their Ordei∣ners understood them. But I have already proved that they who intended to make them Presbyters in the Scripture-sence, did not, could not, suppose that the power of Ordination was the right of Scripture-Presbyters.

[§ XXIII] BUT they may object further, that the rights united by God are inseparable by any Humane Authority, and that the power of Ordination is by God united to the other rights of Scripture Presby∣ters,

so that it was impossible to give them any one right without giving them all, or to retein one without reteining all, and there∣fore that if our present Presbyters have the power of administring the Sacraments, they must not be denied the power of Ordination. If our Adversaries mean that those Presbyters who had both those powers united in them by God could not be deprived of the one pow∣er without the other, nor indeed of any by any Humane Authori∣ty, this, if it should prove true, yet, is a case wherein our pre∣sent Ordinations are not concerned, which were not received in those times wherein our Adversaries pretend to prove that these two powers were so inseparably united. If further they say that de jure they ought not to be separated, as they will find the bare Argument from Scripture-precedent very unconcluding to this pur∣pose (they neither can prove that ever Scripture-Presbyters did ordein in separation from a President, much less that smaller over∣voted parts of any particular Presbyteries, or any Presbyteries made up of fugitives, from many, did so; nor, if they could, can they prove the precedent obliging now, without some more inforcing considerations from the nature of the thing) so they will not find it easie to produce better. And it is at present sufficient for my purpose, that they may be separated de facto though they who se∣parate them be to blame for doing so.

[§ XXIV] NOR is there any reason for them to oppose God and the Church as they usually do on this and other occasions. If the Church's Authority be received from God, then what is done by her is to be presumed to come from him, the same way as what is done by any mans Proxy is presumed to be his own act, and as what is done by an inferior Magistrate by virtue of his Office is presumed to come from the supreme. Which will especially hold as a pre∣sumption, that is, where there are no clearer proofs of the supreme Magistrates mind being contrary to that of the inferior than our Ad∣versaries can pretend to for proving the inseparable union of these powers by Divine institution. If they were then united by God be∣cause they were united by the men who represented God, why are they not disunited by God now when men alike empowered by him have disunited them? Why should they not oblige God in one case as well as the other? especially, when there is nothing in the Commission it self that implies confinement in one case rather than the other, and when the whole reason of judging is taken only from the actual practice, how is it possible that any actual practice

can prescribe against the power that introduced it, that it may not introduce a different practice as arbitrarily as it introduced this? If there had been a distinct Authority for making the union of these two powers inseparable distinct from that which united them only in practice, or if the same Authority of men which united them in practice had declared Gods pleasure to be that they should for ever be so united; though they might reverse the Authority of their own practice, yet it might not be in their power to evacuate their own Declarations, because those are supposed to belong to an Authority greater than their own, and antecedent to it; and therefore may rationally be supposed such as may null all future acts that are con∣trary to it. But such distinct Authority or distinct Declaration our Adversaries cannot pretend in our present case.

[§ XXV] AND if they could prove this inseparable Ʋnion of these two powers by the Divine appointment, our Adversaries would do well to consider whether it would be more for their interest or their dis∣advantage? that is, whether it will not rather follow that they are no Presbyters at all who have received Episcopal Ordination, that they have no power of administring the Sacraments, because it is certain that they have not received the power of Ordination, than that they must have received the power of ordeining other Presby∣ters because they have received the power of administring the Sa∣craments? The Negative consequence is as unavoidable from the inseparableness of these two powers as the Affirmative, that is, it is as certain that where one of those powers is certainly not given there nothing is given (because it cannot be supposed to be given alone) as that if one be given the other must be given also. As therefore it is certain that the Ordeiners intended to reserve the power of Ordination from the Persons ordeined Presbyters by them; so it will follow, by this principle, that if the whole power was not intended, none was so. And if what was not intended was not given, and what was not given was not received, and the pow∣er of Ordination was not received; then neither could the power of administring the Sacraments be received also. And if so, then let them be called by what name they please, yet really they will be no Presbyters, at least not in the Scripture-sence, if either of these powers be essential to such a Scripture-Presbyter. And then in vain do they challenge the power of such Presbyters when they are not those Presbyters to whom those powers belong. And certainly it is much more certain and prudent to argue from the nature of the

power given to them, that they are Presbyters in the Scripture-sence who have the power given them which is supposed to belong to Scripture-Presbyters, and on the contrary that they are not Presbyters in the Scripture-sence, who have not that power given them; than that they must have the power because they have the name, and that intended in the Scripture signification. Names are imposed arbitra∣rily to signifie what men please, and if they please by the name Presbyter to signifie him whom the Scriptures call so, yet still it is to be supposed to signifie that sense which they understand to be the sence of Scripture, though they be mistaken in the sense of it. And it is certain that the name cannot alter the nature of the power which is given to them though the nature of that power may alter the justice of their title to the name. If they have less power given them than should belong to Scripture-Presbyters, it must certain∣ly follow that the name would be given them improperly; and certainly our Adversaries themselves cannot think it just that they who are improperly called Scripture-Presbyters should claim the priviledges of them who are called so properly.

[§ XXVI] INDEED if the nature of the powers were mutually inseparable, it would be reasonable to argue that where one was given both must be so; or if at least on one side this inseparableness held, it were just to conclude that the other power must be given, if this be that from which that other is inseparable; but not on the contrary that the separable power must be given, because that power is given from which it is supposed to be separable. And on this account there is indeed some colour of reason to presume that where a higher power is given the inferior is given also, because usually the Inferi∣or is included in the Superior, though it be not always so. But it will by no means follow that a Superior power must follow that which is Inferior, because here can be no pretence either of insepa∣rable connexion or of inclusion. Now this is plainly the case here. All that our Adversaries can directly prove to have been given to their first Predecessors who received their Orders in the Communion of the Church is only a power of administring the Sacraments in their own Persons. But the power of giving this power to others is certainly a power of a higher nature than the power of administring in their own Persons. If therefore both these powers be essential to a Scripture-Presbyter; and they cannot prove that any more than one of them was given to their Predecessors, neither by any express donation, nor by any inseparable connexion with that which was ex∣presly

given; it will clearly follow that they were not made Pres∣byters in that sence which our Adversaries understand to be the sence of the Scriptures, and therefore that they cannot claim the priviledges which they conceive due to Scripture-Presbyters. And for my part I do not understand a more prudent Rule for distin∣guishing when the negative way of arguing is seasonable from this Topick, that neither power is given because it is certain that both are not, than this, that where it is, on no account, customa∣ry to include one power in the gift of the other (as it is not custo∣mary to include a superior power in giving an inferior) there it is to be presumed that is was not intended to be given, and therefore that the gift of the other power must be invalid if one cannot be va∣lidly given alone. But where it is reasonable or usual to include the one in the other, there it is reasonable to presume that both were intended to be given, because the Person cannot in such a case be supposed willing to null his own gift, which, on this suppositi∣on, he must do, if he do not give both together, because he must inevitably either give all or nothing.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Ad Euagr.