Separation of churches from episcopal government, as practised by the present non-conformists, proved schismatical from such principles as are least controverted and do withal most popularly explain the sinfulness and mischief of schism ... by Henry Dodwell ...

CHAP. XXIV. The Nullity of the Ordinations of the Non-Conformists proved from the Power of the Bishops even as Pre∣sidents over the Presbyteries. (Book 24)

THE CONTENTS.

[§ I] This Supposition, That the Bishops had the right of presiding over Ecclesiastical Assemblies sufficient for our purpose. §. I. 1. In regard of that Power which must be granted due to him, even as President. This proved by these degrees. 1. Even by the Prin∣ciples of Aristocratical Government, no Power can be given but by the act of that Body wherein the right of Government is ori∣ginally seated. §. II. 2. No act can be presumed to be the act of that Body but what has passed them in their publick Assem∣blies. §. III. 3. No Assemblies can dispose of the right of such Societies, but such as are lawful ones according to the constitutions of the Societies. §. IV, V. 4. The indiction of the Assembly by the President is a right consequent to the Office of a President as a President, and a circumstance requisite to make the Assembly it self lawful. §. VI, VII. 5. The Bishops have always been the Presidents of Ecclesiastical Assemblies, even as high as our Adversaries themselves do grant the Practice of Presiding Presby∣ters. §. VIII, IX. This invalidates the Orders of our Adversa∣ries. §. X. This was a right which no Bishops, how great Asser∣tors soever of the identity of their Order with that of Presbyters, ever did renounce, or could renounce, without making their Govern∣ment unpracticable. §. XI. Though the Bishops had received their Power from their Election by men; yet that would not suf∣fice to make valid any Acts of the same men without their consent after their Election. §. XII, XIII. This right of Presidency might hold though the whole right of their Power had been purely Humane. §. XIV. But supposing that right Divine, all that

men can do can be only to determine the Person, not to confine the Power. The reasoning here used will proceed though Bishops had been made by Presbyters alone without the concurrence and Consecration of other Bishops. §. XV. The Primitive Bi∣shops seem indeed to have been made so by Presbyters without Bi∣shops. §. XVI.

BUT though we should suppose those Persons then to have been altogether of the same mind which they conceive those to have been of who lived in the Apostles times; though we suppose, not only that they thought it fit that the whole power of the Bi∣shop should be given to Presbyters, but that they had actually given it them; suppose we that the Bishop had no more Au∣thority reserved to him than only to preside in their Assemblies, that is, to call them, and to fit in the first place of them when they were convened, that is, supposing that the Bishops Autho∣rity were no more than what was consistent with the Aristo∣cratical form of Government which they conceive to have been observed in the Primitive times, (though this supposition be no∣toriously false concerning the Ages I am speaking of) yet I do not see how, even this way, our Brethren can defend the validity of their Ordinations by single Presbyters, especially as it is practised among them. Even by the Principles of Ari∣stocratical Government no power can be given, (I do not mean only that it cannot be given Canonically, but that it cannot be given validly,) but to Persons who are at least in conjunction with those from whom they receive their power, then at least when they actually receive it. Which will consequently null all the Ordinations which have been made in the state of se∣paration, and will therefore make it impossible for any Schism which is made by single Presbyters, in the way that has been observed by our Adversaries, to maintein it self with any pre∣tence of Authority beyond one generation. And this must sure be very acceptable to those generous Spirits who are more so∣licitous for Catholick Ʋnity than for the party in which they were born.

[§ II] AND that this is so I shall endeavour to prove in two regards: in regard of the power that must be allowed to the Bishop, even as the President of these Assemblies; and in re∣gard

of that which must be allowed to other Presbyters as fellow-members of the same Assemblies. 1. In regard of the power of the Bishop as President of those Assemblies. For by the Fundamental Principles even of Aristocratical Government it is certain, 1. That no power can be given but by the act of that Body wherein the right of Government is originally seated, that is, in our case, of the whole Presbytery. It is against the interest of all Societies, and the principles of all Government, that single Members even of those who have otherwise power in con∣junction with others to dispose of the Government of a Society, should be allowed the power of disposing of it in their single capacities. But it is peculiarly against the right of a Polyarchi∣cal Government, because no particular Member has the right of the whole Society, and therefore cannot dispose of the Govern∣ment of it, which, whether it be supreme or subordinate, must imply either a power over the whole Society, or a power neces∣sarily derived from that which is so. Even subordinate Au∣thority must be derived from the supreme, that there may be such an essential dependence upon it as is necessary for the safety of all Societies. This will therefore make it a Nullity in the thing, if single Members do presume to dispose of that which is not their own right alone, but the right of the whole Body.

[§ III] AND, 2. As by the nature of this Government, the right of it must be supposed to be in the whole Body, so neither can any act be presumed to be the act of the whole Body, but what has passed them in their publick Assemblies. Though every par∣ticular Member for himself should signifie his own consent, yet it is not taken for the act of the Society, till it be also signified in an Assembly, and it is taken for the act of the whole Society, if it pass them in their Assembly, though without the consent of every par∣ticular Person, so it have the prevailing vote; nay, though that prevailing vote be not the greater part of the Society, so it be only of the greater part of those which are present in such As∣semblies. For the reason of this I say no more at present, but that it is found necessary for all Multitudes to agree on these Rules for settling Assemblies, and for giving this power to what is done in such Assemblies to conclude the whole Societies, and to the prevailing vote of those Assemblies to conclude the whole Assemblies, before they can pass out of the state of a Multi∣tude into that of a Society, that is before they can have any

Government that can solidly unite them, at least before they can have any Government that can be practicable. The same rea∣sons which make this fit to be agreed on in any one Society are common to all Societies as Societies, and therefore must be allowed the same force in those that are Ecclesiastical as in those that are Civil, as they are capable of being administred in this Life. And therefore God himself cannot be supposed to have made a Government, even of his own institution, practicable, till he have settled these Rules of administring it. And when they are once settled, however they come to be so, whether by Gods own appointment, or by the consent of the People, it will then be very just, as well as fit to conclude, that what is done on pretence of the right of the Society out of such an Assem∣bly cannot validly confer any right of the Society, because, on the Principles of the agreement on these Assemblies, they are not to be reputed as acts of the Society. And certainly, as nothing, but the Society it self, can in Justice make a valid conveyance of its own right, so it is not conceivable how the Society it self can do it by any thing but its own act. Besides, the very reason of agreeing on these Assemblies as the most con∣venient means for administring the power of the Society, seems to be purposely to preclude all surreptitious acts that might be pretended in the name of the Society, if designing men might be allowed in their pretences concerning what might be trans∣acted privately. And therefore the main design of settling these Assemblies, seems to be for the establishment of this Negative, that nothing might be taken for the act of the Society which is not the act of some such Assembly. But yet proceeding on the Principles on which I have hitherto proceeded in this whole Discourse, the Argument will have yet more force. For sup∣posing that the whole right of these Assemblies could not have proceeded from the bare consent of the Society, but from the actual establishment of God; the Society it self then can have no more power in the matter we are speaking of, than what it can derive from the constitution of those Assemblies, and therefore whatever were acted out of these Assemblies can never convey a right of the Society, how validly soever it have been acted as to the real consent of the particular Members pretended for it.

3. BY the same common Laws of all Assemblies of this na∣ture, [§ IV] no Assemblies can dispose of the right of such Societies,

but such as are lawful ones according to the constitutions of the Societies. This is also agreed on in the practice of Societies of this nature by as unanimous a consent as the former. As out of Assem∣blies they have no power to act who might act in them, how ma∣ny soever of the suffrages, and how freely soever also had been gotten; so all those Meetings, how numerous soever, for acts of Government, if they be not Legal, they add nothing of advan∣tage to the power of particulars singly considered. They are not, in the eye of the Law, Assemblies but Routs, and their concur∣rence, not consent but confederacy. And as it were Rebellion in particular Persons to attempt any thing of that nature concern∣ing the Government, without the consent of their present establish∣ed Governours; so neither is there any thing in such a meeting that can give them any more power as united than they had as they were singly considered, that may excuse them from Rebellion. Nay rather, by the Principles of all Societies, that which had not been Rebellion, if done singly, is counted so, if it be done in unlawful Assemblies. And sure none can think it reasonable that the Socie∣ty should be obliged to ratifie the acts of Rebels. It is not fit that any of its Authority should be given into such hands, much less is it fit that being given them by Persons as criminal as them∣selves, the Commonwealth should encourage the like undutifulness in others by ratifying what is done by these.

[§ V] BUT besides, as it is not fit, so neither is it just that the So∣ciety should be obliged by the act of Persons unauthorized by her; nay, of Rebels against her Authority. And the very reason why Rules are agreed on what Assemblies shall be counted lawful, and what not, seems plainly to be that it may be known by what As∣semblies the whole Society shall be represented, and by what they shall not be so. And if the Society be not represented by unlawful Assemblies, how can it in Justice be obliged by them? How can any of its Legal rights be disposed of by them who are not its Legal Representatives? All Societies are sensible of the great danger to the publick that may follow from promiscuous Assemblies; not only what corrupt Arts may be used in them for depraving the senten∣ces of Persons otherwise of themselves never so justly disposed, but also what seditious practices may be fomented and driven on for a forcible execution of such corrupt sentences, and embroil∣ing the publick in intestine animosities. And therefore the very design of these Rules seems to be for preventing this corruption

and disorder. And the most natural way of that is by abro∣gating the acts of such Assemblies. Which antecedent Rules, whether they be from God or from the People, are notwithstan∣ding from that power by which the Society it self, and all its particular Assemblies subsist, and consequently of greater pow∣er than any particular Assemblies. And therefore it cannot be admired that the ratification of particular Assemblies should de∣pend upon it.

[§ VI] 4. THEREFORE, the indiction of the Assembly by the President, is a right consequent to the office of a President as a President, and a circumstance requisite to make the Assembly it self Lawful. But especially this, by the Rules of all Societies, is understood to be the inseparable prerogative of that Office, when, by the fundamental constitutions of the Societies them∣selves, no certain places, nor periods of time are agreed on for the keeping of any. For as the very reason of ascertain∣ing Rules for making Assemblies seems to be purposely to re∣strain the Liberty of particular Members, to assemble when they please, for the inconveniences now mentioned; so withal there must be some who may have the power of assembling them when they judg it convenient for the publick, and who may withal be al∣lowed for competent Judges of that convenience. For their having no certain time allotted for them plainly implies that they are to be celebrated as occasion requires. And when every one is not permitted to judg of the occasion, and to meet when he pleases, and yet withal it is impossible they should ever meet, unless some be allowed to judg when there is a fit occasion, and to oblige others to be determined by them, it plainly fol∣lows that it must be presumed that the Society is not destitute of a power which is so absolutely necessary for the practicable∣ness of Assemblies, and therefore that this power must be pre∣sumed to be in some, though none be expresly mentioned for it. But there is none concerning whom this power can be so probably presumed, none so likely to have been mentioned, if any had been mentioned, none to whom all undisposed power does, by the common Rules of all Societies, so naturally escheat, as the President of the Assemblies. Even in the Assemblies a veneration is due to him for his Office above all other Mem∣bers, but much more so out of the Assemblies, when none is in a likely way to be able to oppose him, by the Laws of the

Societies, whether singly or conjunctly, which must needs give him the preference above all other particular Members where none are expresly mentioned. For certainly he who calls an Assembly, must have some advantage over all the Members called by him that he may oblige them to convene, and it is necessary for the publick, that they may be obliged to meet when they are so called, that is, when the Judg of circumstances thinks it necessary for the publick good in present circumstan∣ces. But there is none who can pretend to this advantage, I do not say of Jurisdiction, but even of Authority and Reve∣rence, above his Fellow-members, besides the President.

[§ VII] BESIDES the power of particular Members in such As∣semblies expires with the Assemblies themselves, so that in the intervals of Assemblies there remains no more of that power in any of them which they have in Assemblies. But the con∣vening of the Assemblies is an act of Authority in that very in∣terval, and therefore cannot agree to any but the President, whose Authority alone can be antecedent to the meeting of the Assem∣bly, so that if it be the right of any, it must be his, because none besides him is capable of it. And this is more certain∣ly true of him who has a right to preside in Assemblies when they are convened by vertue of his general right to preside over the whole Society, as well when Assemblies are not convened as when they are, than of him who is chosen by the particu∣lar Assemblies for their particular occasions. And he who has his Presidency not by vertue of any particular Election distinct from that whereby he received his Office, (if his Office be not arbitrary, or confined within a certain time,) but given him for term of Life, must have such a Presidency as I am speak∣ing of. Concerning such a President as this, the Negative Ar∣gument will hold, for which I am at present concerned, not only that the Assemblies convened by him are, in that regard, lawful, as they are convened by him, but also that no Assem∣blies are lawful but what are called by him, because there is no other way of making them lawful but the lawfulness of their Call, nor any power to call them distinct from that of such a President.

[§ VIII] 5. THE Bishop was, not only in the more modern Ages, of which I have been discoursing, the President of their Ecclesiasti∣cal Assemblies, and that not arbitrarily, or by vertue of parti∣cular

Elections, but constant, and for term of Life; I say not only then, but as high as our Adversaries themselves do grant the practice of presiding Presbyters. Which as they among them who understand any thing of Antiquity do not deny to have been very early after the Apostles days, so truly I do not un∣derstand how they can deny it to have been practised even then, without destroying the very Historical Faith of the Primi∣tive Church, without weakening that testimony on which we re∣ceive the Canon of the New Testament in a matter as notori∣ous to them as that Canon it self. Not to mention the testi∣mony of Ignatius, though truly I think they who question it, (since the late excellent a 1.1 defence of it performed with as great evidence as a matter of that Antiquity, after the mis∣carriage of so many Primitive Records, is capable of,) might as well have questioned several Books of the New Testament it self, which notwithstanding they receive on lesser evidence; I say, not to mention this, What can they say to the Angels in the Revelations? What to the testimony of St. Irenaeus b 1.2 con∣cerning St. Polycarp who seems to have been one of them, whom he makes to have been ordeined Bishop of Smyrna by the Apostles themselves? What to the testimony of Clemens c 1.3 Alexandrinus who mentions Bishops among other Offices of the Church settled by St. John? What to the testimony of He∣gesippus d 1.4 who makes the Kinsmen of our Saviour to have been made Bishops from Domitians time to that of Trajan? What to those who mention St. James e 1.5 to have been made Bishop of Hierusalem by the Apostles themselves? What of the seven Polycrates f 1.6 mentions as Bishops in his own See before himself, the first of which seems, in all likelihood, to have be∣gun in the Apostles times? Nay, what to all those Catalogues of Bishops succeeding in the four Patriarchal Sees, particular∣ly the fifteen in g 1.7 Hierusalem from St. James to the destructi∣on of the Jews under Adrian? Nay, what to the Succession of all the h 1.8 Apostolical Sees to which the Fathers of the second Cen∣tury do so solemnly appeal to prove their own Doctrine A∣postolical in opposition to the contrary pretences of the Here∣ticks?

[§ IX] CAN they think them all to have been either wilful for∣geries, or general mistakes in a matter of Fact so near their own time, without so much as any likely ground in History? How

will they then assure us that they were not mistaken in deli∣vering to us the Books of the Apostles which were not more notorious to them than their Government? And what could have been a more likely occasion of their mistake of the Bishops be∣ing the Governours of their respective Dioceses than this, that they were, at least, the ordinary Presidents of their Ecclesiastical Assemblies? They will not, when they consider it, find it so easie to avoid this Presidency of Bishops, even in the Apostles times, whatever they may think of their absolute Monarchy. They will not find their Arguments concerning the confusion of the names of Bishops and Presbyters in those first times to pro∣ceed so firmly against this. Though both these names had be∣longed to the same Office, yet it does not follow but that one of that same rank might have been first, and, by his priviledg of being so might have had the power of their Ecclesiastical Assemblies, though he had no further Jurisdiction over the par∣ticular Members of such Assemblies when they were once con∣vened. And without granting thus much at least, they will not find it so easie, as they may think before they try it, to solve the Phaenomena now objected. The most learned of our Adversaries do themselves grant as much as I am concerned to infer from them. The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by which they account for these things, amount to as much as I desire at present. And * 1.9 Blondell does expresly grant that these ear∣lier Bishops who lived before the deviation (as he thinks it) from the Rule of the Apostles, had this power of calling the Ec∣clesiastical Assemblies.

[§ X] BY all which it appears, that though we judg of the right∣ful possessions of those times by a recourse to the Primitive esta∣blishment of the Apostles, yet it will be impossible for our Ad∣versaries to convict the Bishops of the Ages I am speaking of, of usurping this right, at least, of presiding in the Ecclesi∣astical Assemblies, and that even for term of Life. And there∣fore if by this concession the Orders of our Adversaries may be convicted of a perfect Nullity, it will then very nearly con∣cern

them to consider how they can clear themselves of the Sacri∣ledg of such exercising such Orders, how they can expect any blessing or comfort in such Administrations. Now that this is so will appear clearly from the Principles now mentioned. For grant this power of perpetual presiding to the Bishops, and it will then follow that the right of convening Ecclesiastical Assemblies will belong to them. Therefore those Assemblies which meet without their Calling (as all those must do which meet out of their Com∣munion) can be no lawful Assemblies. But the acts of unlawful Assemblies, though otherwise consisting of such Persons as had a real power in lawful ones, are Nullities, can oblige the Society to nothing, much less can they dispose of a thing of so great mo∣ment to them as their power. They are not only Nullities, but offences of that nature as that they are so far from obliging the So∣cieties in any equity to confirm them as that they do oblige them by the highest common interest to punish them. Which plainly shews that though Presbyters had been allowed a power of Ordination, yet they could not validly exercise it out of the Episcopal Communion, and therefore that whatever may be said to that Question, yet that cannot make it questionable whether the Orders of our present Adversaries be valid.

[§ XI] THIS right of presiding in the Assemblies was a thing which the highest Asserters of the Identity of Order between Bishops and Presbyters in the modern Ages I am speaking of, did undoubtedly never think the Bishops obliged to renounce. Nor could any Bi∣shop, how heartily soever he believed that opinion, be presumed to give the Presbyters ordeined by him a power of meeting with∣out his leave, when themselves pleased. And yet undoubtedly the Bishops were actually possessed of that power by a peaceable pre∣scription of many Centuries, and by the consent of the Presbyters themselves who lived in them, so that the Presbyters then ordeined could lay no claim to it without an express gift from the Bishops who ordeined them, because they never had that power, nor were there any remaining then who could give it them besides the Bi∣shops. And indeed the Bishops could not renounce this power with∣out dissolving the Society, by making the exercise of Government unpracticable, or without changing the whole frame of Govern∣ment. For supposing they had renoun••ed this right, who must have had it? If none had it, how could the Society be secured that As∣semblies should meet if none had power to call them, if non had

power to oblige particular Members to be present at them when called? If any particular Presbyter had been intrusted with it, that had only been an alteration of the Person, not of the right of the Office. The new intrusted Presbyter would thereby be∣come the Bishop, by what name soever they would be pleased to call him, and all the change that ordinary Presbyters would find by such an act would be only of their Master, not of their subjection. If it had been given away indefinitely, no particu∣lar Presbyter could lay a better claim to it than all his Brethren, and by all it is not practicable, till they be considered as con∣vened in an Assembly If it had therefore been given to the whole Assembly, either they must thenceforth have stated times allotted them for meeting, or every meeting must be allowed to adjourn themselves and to appoint the time and place for meet∣ing again. If at any time no meeting were ascertained the Go∣vernment would be dissolved. This is indeed the way practised in Peliarchical Governments, but such a resignation of the Bishop as this must therefore have altered the very frame of the Go∣vernment. And where can our Adversaries give any precedent, either in Catholick Tradition, or even in the times of the Scrip∣ture it self wherein any such thing was practised by Presby∣teries? Where was it ever heard that they called or adjourn∣ed themselves without the Authority of the President of their Assemblies, by what name soever our Brethren will be pleased to call them?

[§ XII] NOR am I concerned by my present interest, how the Bi∣shops came by their power of presiding, whether by the Electi∣on of their Clergy or People, or whether by a new consecration by Bishops only. Let the guesses of St. Hierome, the coun∣terfeit Ambrose and Eutychius be as true as our Adversaries can wish them. Let it be so, that the Bishops received no new Consecration of their own Order, that no men but the Presby∣ters were concerned in giving their power to them. Our Ad∣versaries usually think they have performed a great matter when they have produced these conjectures of these Authors. And yet when they have made all they can of them, they are no bet∣ter than conjectures. These Authors lived too far from the times they speak of to assure us of any thing Historically. Nor do they pretend to any Histories we know not of, that might put us in any hope that they speak what they say on better

grounds than eonjecture. Yet these are the only grounds of all that our Adversaries say positively in this matter. But, I say, granting that these conjectures were true, and that not only the ancient Bishops, but the Bishops of the Ages we are speaking of, had no new consecration, nor consequently had any new power from what they were capable of receiving by the Canonical E∣lection of their Clergy, and granting therefore that all the fur∣ther power they pretend to by their Consecration is no just ac∣cession of power, and therefore none at all; I do not see how, even by this power which they may receive by their Election, our Adversaries can defend the validity of their present Ordi∣nations. For what if the Bishop had received his power from the Presbyters? Does it therefore follow that the Presbyteries must not depend on him when he has received it? Does it fol∣low that they must still have power, as freely as formerly, to assemble themselves without his leave, and either to depose him, or to set up another in his stead, or at least to erect themselves an independent Body on any Superior? Does it follow that such practices of theirs would be valid, if they should attempt them?

[§ XIII] NAY, the very contrary has been taken hitherto for the only solid security of peace in all prudent humane establishments. In all elective Kingdoms, the Interreges have a power during the vacancy to dispose of the affairs of the Kingdom till a new King be elected. But they as well as other Subjects would be guilty of Treason, if they should attempt the same things af∣terwards. Their Assemblies would be as illegal, and their pro∣ceedings in them of as little validity as those of other Sub∣jects. So in St. Hieromes instance,* 1.10 the Army chose the Empe∣ror, and when he was so chosen he was not invested in his power by any Authority superior to that of the Army. Yet that power of the Army expired as soon as he was once peaceably settled in the power received from them. They could not then meet as they had done formerly. If they did, such meetings were thenceforwards illegal, and their proceedings null. Much less could they justifie a revolt from him, or validly defend their independence on him. Nay, the Emperour Valentinian, though he was chosen by the Army, yet when he was chosen, he would not endure to be obliged by them even to the no∣mination of a Colleague, though he after did it freely. So

though the Presbyteries had a power, in the vacancy of Sees, to do all things necessary for the Succession of a new Bishop, yet, by the Rules of all successive Governments, they can only be supposed to have it in trust, and that trust must be pre∣sumed limited according to the design of the power by which it was committed to them. It does not therefore follow that they can forbear the Election of a Successor, and much less that they can justifie their Assembling and Acting without him when he is once named. Their power may then for all this, expire, and they return to the condition of ordinary Subjects, whose acts I believe our Adversaries themselves cannot think valid, if they presume to give Authority. And the reason is plain be∣cause they cannot be supposed still to have the power, after they have given it out of their own hands. And therefore after∣wards they can neither validly exercise it, nor validly dispose of it otherwise against the fundamental Laws for settling Suc∣cession in the Society, for which they are supposed to be in∣trusted.

[§ XIV] THIS Argument will hold though this right of Presidency were purely humane. Yet even so Persons, who have given the power out of their own hands, cannot recall it again at pleasure, but must be obliged to stand to their own act. And as this will oblige such as were at first free, if any were such, in matters alienable by them, and those by whom the Laws for Succession were first made; so much more will it oblige posterity who must find themselves already confined by the acts of their Predecessors. These can pretend only such a right as they have received, and therefore if they exceed that, they u∣surp a right, which was never theirs, and therefore all they do must be invalid. Indeed if the supreme right of managing their own Assemblies had been, by divine right, unalienable from the Primitive Presbyters, they, who once had it, might there∣fore challenge it again, notwithstanding any Contracts what∣soever for parting with it, because the Contracts themselves were invalid, and therefore could not deprive them of a right which they had before they made those Contracts, but must leave them in the same condition wherein they found them. But what is that to Posterity? Suppose the modern Presbyters of the Ages I am speaking of, had never given their ••ishops the power of presiding over their Assemblies. Suppose we that they were

not obliged to stand to the Contracts of their Predecessors in this matter. All that would thence follow is only this, that they are now in the same condition as if those Contracts had never been made. But though they have not alienated a right, that does not prove they have it, unless they had it antecedently to the alienation. But that is a thing posterity cannot pretend to. They never had this right given them, and therefore can∣not pretend to have it, though they never alienated it. And they are, at least, thus far obliged by the acts of their predeces∣sors, as they were thereby hindred from having this power gi∣ven them, whether they be, or be not, obliged by those acts of theirs which may pretend to have alienated it from them. And till our Brethrens Predecessors who were then ordeined can prove that they once had this right given them, I shall not be concerned whether they have alienated it, or not, nor conse∣quently whether they be bound to stand to the alienation of their Predecessors.

[§ XV] BUT if the power of Episcopacy be Divine, and all that men can do in the Case be only to determine the Person, not to confine his power; then certainly it will follow that though men may this way make him, (which is all our Brethren can pretend to prove) yet they may not therefore, after he is made, either deprive him, or make another, or exercise the Government themselves without him as freely as before. For as soon as that power is given him by God, they immediately become his Subjects, and have then no more power to prescribe limits to his Authority than they have to do so to the Authority of God himself. Nor am I here obliged to take the advantage I might take from the peculiar way by which I have proved Ecclesiastical power to be derived from God. It is sufficient for my purpose that it be no otherwise from God than that is of every supreme Civil Magistrate. It is not usual for Kings to be invested in their Office by other Kings, but by their Subjects. Yet when they are invested, that does not in the least prejudice the absoluteness of their Monarchy, where the fundamental constituti∣ons of the respective places allow it them, much less does it give any power over them to the Persons by whom they are invested. But they are then, and afterwards, as much his Subjects as any o∣thers are who have no part in the Solemnity. And therefore though it had been true that the Presbyters at first, had not only elected, but placed the Bishop over themselves, as St. Hierome

expresses it; nay, supposing those same Presbyters who had chosen him should have also used all the ceremonies of Con∣secration to him, that they had invested him in his Office by Prayer and Imposition of hands,* 1.11 as Eutychius pretends, nay, supposing that no Bishops had any more to do in his Conse∣cration than Kings have to do in the Inaugurations of our ordinary Kings; all this, I say, being supposed, which is more than they can prove by any competent testimony; it will not thence follow that those same Presbyters who chose and Conse∣crated him, must have any more power over him, or to act any thing without him, or to withdraw their obedience from him, after he is so chosen and Consecrated, than those same Persons have over the Princes who are Inaugurated by them; and all their presumptuous practices of such a power, may, notwithstanding all this, be not only as punishable, but as invalid, as the like presumptions would be in the Inaugurati∣ons of Princes. Nor is it only true that this may be so, (though that alone be sufficient to weaken our Adversaries confidence in this way of arguing,) but indeed it must be so, whenever the Person so invested is supposed to be invest∣ed in the supreme power, and whenever the Society over which he is placed, is also independent on all other Societies. Such a Person can never be placed in his power, if he may not be placed in it by them, who, after he is placed in it, must themselves be his Subjects as much as others, unless he be placed in it by his Predecessor, which no Society can safely de∣pend on for a constant Rule of Succession. In his own So∣ciety he can therefore have none of his own Order that can per∣form the Ceremony to him, because we suppose him to be su∣preme, and there cannot be two such in one Society. And if he must depend on the supreme powers of the neighbouring Societies for an investiture, so that he could not be validly in∣vested without them, this would both be dangerous in suspici∣ous times, and would besides be very prejudicial to the liber∣ty of the particular Society for which such a Governour were con∣cerned.

[§ XVI] AND therefore I, for my part, am so little solicitous for any consequence that may hence be inferred to the prejudice of my Cause, as that I am apt to think that this must have been the way observed at first in the making of Bishops, how

absolute soever I conceive them to have been when they were once made, and how invalid soever I think the actings of Presbyters would be which were done without his consent, after his Consecration, though they were those very Presbyters by whom he had been Consecrated. And I wish our Adver∣saries had Authorities suitable to their confidence, either bet∣ter than conjectures, or, if no better, yet more ancient than the time of St. Hierome, whose contemporary he was who wrote the Commentaries under the name of St. Ambrose, much more than the very exceptionable testimony and Age of Eutychius. This seems best to agree with the absoluteness of particular Churches before they had, by compacts▪ united them∣selves under Metropolitans and Exarchs into Provincial and Diocesan Churches, as the word Diocese was understood in the Eastern parts in the language of that Age. And this seems to have been fitted for the frequent Persecutions of those earlier Ages, when every Church was able to secure its own Succession by its own power without depending on the uncer∣tain opportunities of the meeting of the Bishops of the whole Province. And the alteration of this practice, the giving the Bishops of the Province an interest in the choice of eve∣ry particular Colleague, seems not to have been so much for want of power in the particular Churches to do it, as for the security of the compacts, that they might be certain of such a Colleague, as would observe them, whose Communicatory Let∣ters they might therefore not scruple to receive, when they had first, by their own act, satisfied themselves of the trusti∣ness of his Person before his Consecration. However the mat∣ter was, I cannot but think that it was the interest of the neighbouring Bishops in the correspondence of every particu∣lar Bishop that first occasioned and procured their interest in his Election. Nor can I tell how the Succession could have been so secure otherwise, unless every Bishop had named and con∣stituted his Successor in his Life time, for which they had pre∣cedents in the Successions of the Philosophers, in imitation where∣of I have already observed, how probable it is that these Ec∣clesiastical Successions were framed. But then withall, as that way was uncertain, so when the Philosophers failed to nomi∣nate their own Successors, then the Election was in the Schools.

But this would even then only warrant such acts of those Presbyteries which held correspondence with their own Bishops, and with the Episcopal Communion; but in these modern Ages it can only excuse those to whom the power was returned by the Bishops who had been peaceably possessed of it for ma∣ny Centuries before. This I note, that it may not be drawn into a precedent now any further than it is fit and reason∣able.

Notes

• a 1.1

  In vindic. Ig∣nat. cont. Dal∣laeum.
• b 1.2

  Iren. L.iii. adv. Haer. & a∣pud Eus. Hist. iv.14.
• c 1.3

  Clem. Al. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. apud Eus. Hist. iii.23.
• d 1.4

  Eus. L.iii. Hist. Eccl. c. 20.
• e 1.5

  Eus. Hist. ii.1.
• f 1.6

  Eus. Hist. v.24.
• g 1.7

  Eus. Hist. iv.5.
• h 1.8

  Tertull. Praescr. Iren. adv. Haer.
• * 1.9

  Speaking of the Offices of the first Pres∣byter in his first Period before the Year 136. he says they did publice in collectis, sedulis universam fraternitatem hortamentis ad bonum Pietatis certamen fidaque charitatis obsequia excitare, eandem precibus excitare, ordinis consessus cogere, &c. Praef. ad Apol. pro S. Hieronym. p. 6.
• * 1.10

  Ep. ad Euagr.
• * 1.11

  Eutych. Annal. Alex. Ed. Oxon. p. 31.