A defence of the vindication of the deprived bishops wherein the case of Abiathar is particularly considered, and the invalidity of lay-deprivations is further proved, from the doctrine received under the Old Testament, continued in the first ages of christianity, and from our own fundamental laws, in a reply to Dr. Hody and another author : to which is annexed, the doctrine of the church of England, concerning the independency of the clergy on the lay-power, as to those rights of theirs which are purely spiritual, reconciled with our oath of supremancy, and the lay-deprivations of the popish bishops in the beginning of the reformation / by the author of the Vindication of the deprived bishops.

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Title
A defence of the vindication of the deprived bishops wherein the case of Abiathar is particularly considered, and the invalidity of lay-deprivations is further proved, from the doctrine received under the Old Testament, continued in the first ages of christianity, and from our own fundamental laws, in a reply to Dr. Hody and another author : to which is annexed, the doctrine of the church of England, concerning the independency of the clergy on the lay-power, as to those rights of theirs which are purely spiritual, reconciled with our oath of supremancy, and the lay-deprivations of the popish bishops in the beginning of the reformation / by the author of the Vindication of the deprived bishops.
Author
Dodwell, Henry, 1641-1711.
Publication
London :: [s.n.],
1695.
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Subject terms
Dodwell, Henry, 1641-1711. -- Vindication of the deprived bishops.
Hody, Humphrey, 1659-1707. -- Letter from Mr. Humphry Hody, to a friend, concerning a collection of canons.
Hody, Humphrey, 1659-1707. -- Case of sees vacant by an unjust or uncanonical deprivation.
Welchman, Edward, 1665-1739. -- Defence of the Church of England.
Church of England -- Bishops -- Early works to 1800.
Nonjurors -- Early works to 1800.
Bishops -- England -- Early works to 1800.
Dissenters, Religious -- Legal status, laws, etc. -- England -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A36241.0001.001
Cite this Item
"A defence of the vindication of the deprived bishops wherein the case of Abiathar is particularly considered, and the invalidity of lay-deprivations is further proved, from the doctrine received under the Old Testament, continued in the first ages of christianity, and from our own fundamental laws, in a reply to Dr. Hody and another author : to which is annexed, the doctrine of the church of England, concerning the independency of the clergy on the lay-power, as to those rights of theirs which are purely spiritual, reconciled with our oath of supremancy, and the lay-deprivations of the popish bishops in the beginning of the reformation / by the author of the Vindication of the deprived bishops." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A36241.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 21, 2025.

Pages

§ LXIV. In this Case, particularly, no Temporal Fa∣vour whatsoever can make a∣mends for the loss of the benefits of the Spiritual So ciety. There can therefore be no implicite Con∣tracts for such an Exchange that can in Equity o∣blige the Ecclesi∣astical Gover∣nours to perfor∣mance, tho' it had been in their Power to make such a Contract. (Book 64)

Particularly, this Reasoning holds in our present Case, more strongly than it would in others. It may indeed be possible, by being Members of another Society, that all the Particulars of which a Society does con∣sist, may enjoy greater advantages by being dissolved into another Soci∣ety, than by being a Society by themselves, and at their own disposal. And a Case may therefore fall out, wherein a less beneficial Society, may not only put their Liberties in the power of another more beneficial Society, to be by it disiolved at pleasure, but may also actually surrender their very Liberties themselves, in consideration of greater benefits, to all the particulars of the less beneficial Society, not only than those which they possess on account of their Incorporation, but also than that Li∣berty also which they enjoy on account of their independency, which is it self also a very valuable benefit, and adds considerably to the other advantages of their present Society, in the common esteem of Mankind. But for this, two things are requisite to make the Case Practicable, neither of which are applicable to the subject of our pre∣sent Discourse First, the benefits of the New Society, must indeed be more valuable than those of the old one, together with their Li∣berty considered into the bargain. 2dly. They who are possessed of the Rights of the old Society, must be possessed of them on their own Accounts, not as Trustees of any other, that so they may have no further Obligation to preserve them, than their own present Interests in them, and may therefore be at Liberty to accept of con∣siderations of graeter present Interest. If either of these Considera∣tions fail, they cannot think themselves obliged in Equity to stand to such a Contract, especially where no more is pretended than an implicite

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one, not expressed in Words, but gathered only from considerations of Equity. And here neither of them can be so much as pretended. First it cannot be pretended that any Secular Favours or Immu∣nities whatsoever can make amends for the benefits of their present spi∣ritual Society. This has been proved already. I shall therefore here take it for granted. Indeed it is in our present Case so very manifest, that I need no great Favour of our Adversaries themselves to give me leave to do so. Supposing it therefore granted, all the Rules of equitable Reasoning in the sense of those Ages wherein the State first became Christian, will relieve the Church against any such pretentions, as are here insisted on, of an implicite contract for surrendring her independency. Societies had in the Roman Civil Law (which is the best standard for judging what was thought equitable in those times) the same favour as Minors, from being obliged by over-reaching Contracts. And indeed there was reason for it, when their Interests were trans∣acted by others who as seldom consulted the sense of the Communities, as Guardians did their Pupils, and who were liable to as just suspicions of corrupt insidious dealings, and private interests, as Guardians were. This therefore would allow the Church a Restitution in integrum, a perfect rescission of such a Contract, made in her name by her Repre∣sentatives, where the disadvantage was in it so manifest, as the alie∣nating spiritual Rights in exchange for Temporal; and the contract had yet proceeded no further than to be implicite only and inter∣pretative. Indeed here the very Representatives themselves might ex∣pect to be relieved in Equity. For, receiving a valuable consideration, is that which is expresly mention'd, even in our Modern Contracts, even where that valuable consideration it self is not mentioned, pur∣posely to prevent their revecableness, if it had not been mentioned. It is therefore supposed that when the Consideration is not valuable in comparison with the Right contracted for, it is but reasonable in E∣quity, that such a Contract be rescinded. Especially, where the Con∣tract is not expressed in Words, there is no reason in Equity to pre∣sume that any such Alienation was intended. All that can be pretend∣ed in this Case, is, that the Prince's Favour, and Protection, is accepted of by the Representatives of the Church. But how does it appear, with∣out an explicite Contract, that it is accepted of with a design of entring into a Contract? How does it appear, that it is accepted of as a con∣sideration? How does it appear, that any Right, on their own side, is intended to be parted with in consideration of it? How does it ap∣pear, but that it is thought already sufficiently required in the favour al∣ready conferred on the Prince and his Subjects, in admitting them into

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a Society so much more beneficial than their own? If any Cession of Rights, had been thought of, why must it needs be of a Right, so essential to its subsistence and continuance, as that is of the Independence of the Supream Govornours of their own Society? How can it appear, that in accepting of the Prince's favours, such a Contract as this was ever thought of? Nay the very unequalness of it would be in Equity a strong Presumption, that it was not though of, nor intended, nor e∣ver would have been consented to, if it had been expresly insisted on. It is certain many kindnesses are accepted of, without any thoughts of a Contract, It is strongly presumable such an Alienation as this, would never have been consented to, if it had been thought of. Here is no proof of a Contract, but bare acceptance. On these considerations, there can be no reason or Equity to oblige the Ecclesiasticks to stand to so partial an Interpretation of a Contract imposed on them by their Ad∣versaries. Indeed there can be no such Contract at all, as an implicite one, which can be no otherwise proved, but by reasonable equitable In∣terpretation.

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