Two treatises in the one of which the nature of bodies, in the other, the nature of mans soule is looked into in way of discovery of the immortality of reasonable soules.

THE CONCLVSION OF THE FIRST TREATISE.

THus at the last (by Gods assistance) we are clymbed vp to the toppe of the hill; from whence looking downe ouer the whole region of bodies, we may delight our selues, with seeing what a height the weary steppes we ascended by, haue brought vs vnto. It is true, the path we haue walked in, is of late so vntrodden, and so ouergrowne with bryars▪ as it hath not beene without much labour, that we haue made our way through. And peraduenture, it may seeme toylesome vnto others to follow vs, especially such as are not much enured to like iourneyes: but I hope, the fruite which both we and they are now arriued to gather of our paines, in this generall view we haue taken of the empire of matter, and of corporeall agents, is such, as none of vs hath reason to be ill satisfyed with the employing of them. For what can more powerfully delight, or more nobl•• entertaine an vnderstanding soule, then the search and discouery of those workes of nature, which being in their effects so plainely exposed to our eyes, are in their causes so abstruse and hidden from our comprehension, as (through despaire of successe) they deterre most men from inquiring into them?

And I am persuaded, that by this summary discourse (short indeede in regard of so large a scope, how euer my lame expressions may peraduenture make it appeare tedious) it appeareth euidently, that none of natures greatest secrets, whereof our senses giue vs notice in the effects, are so ouershaded with an impenetrable veyle, but that the diligent, and wary hand of reason, might vnmaske them, and shew them to vs in their naked and genuine formes, and delight vs with the contemplation of their natiue beauties; if we had as much care and constancy in the pursuite of them, as we dayly see men haue in heaping vp of wealth; or in striuing to satisfy their boundelesse ambitions; or in making their senses swimme in the muddy lake of base and contemptible pleasures. For who shall througly consider and weigh what we haue hitherto said, will plainely see a continuall and orderly progresse, from the simplest, heighest, and most common conception, that we frame of a body in generall, vnto the furthest and most abstruse effects, that in particular are to be found in any body whatsoeuer: I meane, any that is meerely corporeall, without mixture of a nobler nature; for hitherto we haue not moued, nor so much as looked out of that o••be. He shall find one continued thridde, spunne out from the beginning to the end. He will see, that the various twisting of the two specieses of Bodies, Rare,

and Dense, do make the yarne, of which all thinges and actions within the sphere of matter, are wouen.

And although peraduenture, in the drawing out of the thridde, there may be some litle brackes, or the stuffe made of it, be not euery where so close wrought, as a better workeman, at more leisure might haue done; yet truly, I beleeue, that the very consent of thinges throughout is such, as demonstrateth, that the maine contexture of the doctrine I haue here touched, is beyond quarrelling at. It may well be that in sundry parti∣culars, I haue not lighted vpon exact truth: and I am so farre from maintaining peremptorily any thing I haue here said, as I shall most readily ha••ken to whatsoeuer shall be obiected against it; and be as ready vpon cause, to desert my owne opinions, and to yield vnto better reason. But withall, I conceiue, that as the fayling of a bricke here and there in the rearing of the walles of a house, doth nothing at all preiudice the strength and security of the fabrike; no more (I hope) will the slight escapes, which so difficult a taske as this is subiect vnto, endamage or weaken the maine body of what I haue here deliuered. I haue not yet seene any piece vpon this subiect, made vp with this methode; beginning from the simplest and plainest notions, and composing them orderly, till all the principall variety which their nature is capable of, be gone through: and therefore it can not be expected, but that the first modell of this kind (and moulded by one distracted with continuall thoughts of a much different straine; and whose exercise, as well as profession, hath allowed him but litle commerce with bookes and study) must needes be very rough hewed, and require a great deale of polishing. Which whosoeuer shall do, and be as exact and orderly in treating of Phylosophy and Theology, as Mathematicians are in deliuering their sciencies, I do assure my selfe, that Demonstrations might be made, and would proceed in them as currently, and the conclusions be as certaine and as full, as in the Mathematikes themselues. But that is not all: these demonstrations would haue the oddes exceedingly of the other, and be to vs, inestimably more aduantagious: for out of them, do spiring much higher and nobler effects, for mans vse and life, then out of any Mathe∣maticall ones; especially when they extend themselues to the gouuerne∣ment of Man as he is Man: which is an art, as farre beyond all the rules of Physike, or other gouuernement of our body, or temporall goodes, as the end is beyond the meanes we employ to gaine it; for all the others, do but serue instrumentally to this end, That we may liue well: whereas these do immediately teach it.

These are the fruites in generall, that I hope may in some measure, grow out of this discourse, in the handes of equall and iuditious Readers: but the particular ayme of it, is to shew what actions can proeeed from a body, and what can not. In the conduct whereof, one of our chiefe endeauours hath beene to shew, that those actions which seeme to draw strongly into the order of bodies, the vnknowne nature of certaine

entities named Qualities, eyther do or may proceed, from the same causes, which produce those knowne effects, that all sides agree, do not stand in neede of any such mysticall Philosophy. And this being the maine hinge, vpon which hangeth and moueth, the full and cleare resoluing of our maine, and great question, Of the Immortality of the Soule; I assure my selfe, the paines I haue taken in this particular, will not be deemed superfluous or tedious: and withall, I hope I haue employed them with so good successe, as hence foreward, we shall not be any more troubled, with obiections drawne from their hidden and incomprehen∣sible nature: and that we stand vpon euen ground, with those of the contrary opinion: for since we haue shewed how all actions may be performed among bodies, without hauing any recourse to such Entities and Qualities as they pretend and paint out to vs; it is now their part (if they will haue them admitted) to proue that in nature there are such.

Hauing th••n brought the Philosophy of bodies vnto these termes; that which remaineth for vs to performe, is to shew th••t those actions of our soule, for which we call her a spiritt, are of such a nature, as they can not be reduced into those principles, by which all corporeall actions are effected. For the proofe of our originall intent, no more then this, can be exacted at our handes; so that if our positiue proofes, shall carry vs yet beyond this, it can not be denyed, but that we giue ouermeasure, and do illustrate with a greater light, what is already sufficiently discerned. In our proceeding, we haue the precedency of nature: for laying for our ground, the naturall conceptions which mankind maketh of quantity; we find that a body is a meere passiue thing, consisting of diuers partes, which by motion may be diuersly ordered; and consequently, that it is capable of no other change or operation, then such as motion may produce, by various ordering the diuers partes of it: and then, seeing that Rare and Dense, is the primary and adequate diuision of Bodies; it followeth euidently, that what can not be effected by the various dispo∣sition of rare and dense partes, can not proceed or be effected by a pure body: and consequently, it will be sufficient for vs to shew, that the motions of our soules are such: and they who will not agree to this conclusion, must take vpon them to shew, that our first premisse is defectiue; by prouing that other vnknowne wayes are necessary, for bodies to be wrought vpon or to worke by: and that the motion, and various ordering of rare and dense partes in them, is not cause sufficient for the effects we see among them. Which whosoeuer shall attempt to do, must remember that he hath this disaduantage before he beginneth, that whatsoeuer hath beene hitherto discouered in the science of bodies, by the helpe, eyther of Mathematikes or Physickes, it hath all beene resolued and hath fallen, into this way which we declare.

Here I should sett a periode to all further discourse concerning this first Treatise of bodies, did I not apprehend, that the preiudice of

Aristotles authority, may dispose many to a harsh conceite of the draught we haue made. But if they knew how litle reason they haue to vrge that against vs, they would not crye vs downe for contradicting that oracle of nature: not only because he himselfe, both by word, and by example, exhorteth vs, when verity leadeth vs an other way, to forsake the trackes, which our forefathers haue beaten for vs, so we do it with due respect and gratitude for the much they haue left vs: nor yet because Christian Religion, as it will not heare of any man (purely a man) free from sinne, so it inclineth to persuade vs, that no man can be exempt from errour; and therefore it sauoureth not well, to defend peremptorily any mans sayings (especially if they be many) as being vncontrol∣lable; how be it I intend not to preiudice any person, that to defend a worthy authors honour, shal endeauour to vindicate him from absurdities and grosse errors: nor lastly because it hath euer beene the common practise of all graue Peripatetikes and Thomistes, to leaue their Masters, some in one article, some in an other: but indeede, because the very truth is, that the way we take, is directly the same solide way, which Aristotle walked in before vs: and they who are scandalised at vs for leauing him, are exceedingly mistaken in the matter: and out of the sound of his wordes (not rightly vnderstood) do frame a wrong sense of the doctrine he hath left vs, which generally we follow.

Lett any vnpartiall Aristotelian answere, whether the conceptions we haue deliuered of Quātity, of Rarity and Dēsity, of the foure first Qualities, of the combinations of the Elements, of the repugnance of vacuities, be not exactly and rigorously Aristotles? Whether the motion of weighty and light thinges, and of such as are forced, be not by him, as well as by vs, atttibuted to externe causes? In which all the differēce betweene vs is, that we enlarge ourselues to more particulars then he hath done. Lett any man reade his bookes of Generation and Corruption, and say whether he doth not expressely teach, that mixtion (which he deliuereth to be the generation or making of a mixt body) is done per minima; that is in our language and in one word, by atomes; and signifyeth, that all the qualities, which are naturall qualities following the composition of the Elements, are made by the mingling of the least partes or atomes of the said Elements; which is in effect to say, that all the nature of bodies, their qualities, and their operations, are compassed by the mingling of atomes: the shewing and explicating of which, hath beene our labour in this whole Treatise. Lett him reade his bookes of Meteores, and iudge whether he doth not giue the causes of all the effects he treateth of there, by mingling and seperating of great and litle, grosse and subtile, fiery and watry, aery and earthy partes, iust as we do. The same he doth in his Problemes, and in his Parua naturalia, and in all other places, where∣soeuer he hath occasion to render Physically, the causes of Physicall effects. The same do Hippocrates and Galen: the same, their Master Democritus; and with them the best sort of Physitians: the same do

Alchymistes, with their Master Geber; whose maxime to this purpose, we cited aboue: the same do all naturall Philosophers, eyther auncient commentatours of Aristotle, or else moderne inquirers into naturall effects, in a sensible and vnderstandable way: as who will take the paines to looke into them, will easily perceiue. Wherefore, lett any iuditious Reader that hath looked further into Aristotle then only vpon his Logicall and Metaphysicall workes, iudge whether in bulke our doctrine be not conformable to the course of his, and of all the best Philosophers that haue beene and are; though in detaile or particulars, we sometimes mingle therewith, our owne priuate iudgements; as euery one of them, hath likewise shewed vs the way to do, by the liberty themselues haue taken to dissent in some pointes from their predecessours.

And were it our turne, to declare and teach Logike and Metaphisikes, we should be forced to goe the way of matter, and of formes, and of priuations, in such sort as Aristotle hath trodden it out to vs, in his workes of that straine. But this is not our taske for the present; for no man that contemplateth nature as he aught, can choose but see that these notions are no more necessary, when we consider the framing of the elements, then when we examine the making of compounded bodies: and therefore, these are to be sett apart, as higher principles, and of an other straine, then neede be made vse of for the actuall composition of compounded thinges, and for the resolution of them into their materiall ingredients, or to cause their particular motions; which are the subiects we now diseourse of.

Vpon this occasion, I thinke it not amisse to touch, how the latter sectatours, or rather pretenders of Aristotle, (for truly they haue not his way) haue introduced a modell of doctrine (or rather of ignorance) out of his wordes, which he neuer so much as dreamed of; howbeit they alleage textes out of him to confirme what they say, as Heretikes do out of scripture to prooue their assertions: for whereas he called certaine collections or positions of thinges, by certaine common names (as the art of Logike requireth) terming some of them Qualities, others actions, others places, or habites, or relatiues, or the like: these his latter followers, haue conceited that these names did not designe a concurrence of sundry thinges, or a diuers disposition of the partes of any thing, out of which some effect resulted; which the vnderstanding considering all together, hath expressed the notion of it by one name: but haue imagined, that euery one of these names had correspondent vnto it, some reall positiue entity or thing, seperated (in its owne nature) from the maine thing or substance in which it was, and indifferent to any other substance; but in all vnto which it is linked, working still that effect, which is to be expected from the nature of such a quality, or action, &c. And thus, to the very negatiues of thinges, as to the names of pointes, lines, instantes, and the like, they haue imagined positiue Entities to correspond: likewise, to the names of actions, places, and the like, they

haue framed other Entities: as also to the names of colours, soundes, tastes, smels, touches, and the rest of the sensible qualities, they haue vnto euery one of them, allotted speciall Entities; and generally to all qualities whatsoeuer. Whereas nothing is more euidēt, then that Aristotle meaned by qualities no other thing, but that disposition of partes, which is proper to one body, and is not found in all: as you will plainely see, if you but examine, what beauty, health, agility, science, and such other qualities are; (for by that name he calleth them; and by such examples, giueth vs to vnderstand what he meaneth by the word Quality) the first of which is nothing else, but a composition of seuerall partes and colours, in due proportion to one an other: the next, but a due temper of the humours, and the being of euery part of the body, in the state it should be: the third, but a due proportion of the spirits and strength of the sinnewes: and the last, but ordered Phantasmes.

Now when these peruerters of Aristotle haue framed such Entities, vnder that conception which nature hath attributed to substances, they do immediately vpon the nicke, with the same breath that described them as substances, deny them to be substances: and thus they confound the first apprehensions of nature, by seeking learned and strained defi∣nitions for plaine thinges. After which, they are faine to looke for glew and paste, to ioyne these entities vnto the substance they accompany: which they find with the same facility, by imagining a new Entity, whose nature it is to do that which they haue neede of.

And this is the generall course of their Philosophy; whose great subtility, and queint speculations in enquiring how thinges do come to passe afford no better satisfaction then to say vpon euery occasion, that there is an Entity which maketh it be so. As if you aske them, how a wall is white, or blacke? They will tell you, there is an Entity or Quality, whose essence is to be whitenesse or blackenesse, diffused through the wall. If you continue to aske, how doth whitenesse sticke to the wall? They reply, that it is by meanes of an Entity called Vnion, whose nature it is actually to ioyne whitenesse and the wall together. And then if you enquire how it cometh to passe, that one white is like an other? They will as readily answere, that this is wrought by an other Entity, whose nature is to be likenesse, and it maketh one thing like an other. The consi∣deration of which doctrine, maketh me remember a ridiculous tale of a trewant schooleboyes latine: who vpon a time when he came home to see his frendes, being asked by his father, what was latine for bread? answered breadibus; and for beere? beeribus; and the like of all other thinges he asked him, adding only a termination in Bus, to the plaine English word of euery one of them: which his father perceiuing and (though ignorant of Latine) yet presently apprehending, that the mysteries his sonne had learned, deserued not the expence of keeping him at schoole, bad him immediately putt of his hosibus and shoosibus, and fall to his old trade of treading Morteribus. In like manner, these

great Clerkes do as readily find a pretty Quality or moode, whereby to render the nature or causes of any effect in their easy Philosophy, as this Boy did a Bus to stampe vpon any English word, and coyne it into his mockelatine.

But to be serious, as the weight of the matter requireth, lett these so peremptory pretenders of Aristotle, shew me but one text in him, where he admitteth any middle distinction (such as those moderne Philosophers do, and must needes admitt, who maintaine the qualities we haue reiected) betwixt that which he calleth Numericall, and that which he calleth of Reason, or of Notion, or of Definition, (the first of which we may terme to be of, or in thinges; the other to be in our heades, or discourses: or the one Naturall, the other Logicall:) and I will yield that they haue reason, and that I haue grossely mistaken what he hath written, and that I do not reach the depth of his sense. But this they will neuer be able to do.

Besides, the whole scope of his doctrine, and all his discourses and intentions, are carryed throughout, and are built vpon the same foun∣dations, that we haue layed for ours. Which being so, no body can quarrell with vs for Aristotles sake; who as he was the greatest Logician, and Metaphysitian, and Vniuersall scholler peraduenture that euer liued; and was so highly esteemed, that the good turne which Sylla did the world in sauing his workes, was thought to recompence his many outra∣gious cruelties and tyranny; so his name must neuer be mentioned among schollers, but with reuerence, for his vnparalleled worth; and with gratitude for the large stocke of knowledge he hath enriched vs with. Yet withall we are to consider, that since his raigne was but at the beginning of sciences, he could not chose but haue some defects and shortenesses, among his many great and admirable perfections.