Two treatises in the one of which the nature of bodies, in the other, the nature of mans soule is looked into in way of discovery of the immortality of reasonable soules.

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Title
Two treatises in the one of which the nature of bodies, in the other, the nature of mans soule is looked into in way of discovery of the immortality of reasonable soules.
Author
Digby, Kenelm, Sir, 1603-1665.
Publication
At Paris :: Printed by Gilles Blaizot,
1644.
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Subject terms
Matter -- Early works to 1800.
Atomism -- Early works to 1800.
Immortality -- Early works to 1800.
Soul -- Early works to 1800.
Science -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A35987.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Two treatises in the one of which the nature of bodies, in the other, the nature of mans soule is looked into in way of discovery of the immortality of reasonable soules." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A35987.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 1, 2025.

Pages

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THE PREFACE.

THIS writing was designed to haue seene the light vnder the name of one treatise. But after it was drawne in paper; as I cast a view ouer it, I found the prooemiall part (which is that which treateth of Bodies) so ample in respect of the other (which was the end of it; and for whose sake I meddled with it) that I readily apprehended my reader would thinke I had gone much astray from my text, when proposing to speake of the immortality of Mans Soule, three parts of foure of the whole discourse, should not so much as in one word mention that soule, whose nature and proprieties I aymed at the discouery of. To auoyde this incon∣gruity, occasioned mee to change the name and vnity of the worke; and to make the suruay of bodies, a body by it selfe▪ though subordinate to the treatise of the soule. Which notwith∣standing it be lesse in bulke then the other; yet I dare promise my Reader, that if he bestow the paines requisite to perfect him selfe in it, he will find as much time well spent in the due reading of it, as in the reading of the former treatise, though farre more large.

But I discerne an obiection obuious to be made; or rather a question; why I should spend so much time in the consideration of bodies, whereas none that hath formerly written of this subiect, hath in any measure done the like. I might answere that they had, vpon other occasions, first written of the nature of bodies: as I may instance in Aristotle; and sundry others, who either haue themselues professedly treated the science of bodies, or haue sup∣posed that part sufficiently performed by other pennes. But truly, I was by an vnauoydable necessity hereunto obliged: which is, a current of doctrine that at this day, much raigneth in the Christian Schooles, where bodies and their operations, are explicated after the manner of spirituall thinges. For wee hauing very slender knowledge of spirituall substances, can reach no further into their nature, then to know that they haue certaine

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powers, or qualities; but can seldome penetrate so deepe, as to descend to the particulars of such Qualities, or Powers. Now our moderne Philosophers haue introduced such a course of learning into the schooles, that vnto all questions concerning the proper natures of bodies, and their operations, it is held sufficient to answere, they haue a quality, or a power to doe such a thing. And afterwards they dispute whether this Quality or Power, be an Entity distinct from its subiect, or no; and how it is se∣perable, or vnseperable from it, and the like. Conformable to this, who will looke into the bookes, which are in vogue in these schooles, shall find such answers and such controuersies euery where, and few others. As, of the sensible qualities: aske what it is to be white or red, what to be sweete or sower, what to be odoriferous, or stincking, what to be cold or hott? And you are presently paid with, that it is a sensible quality, which hath the power to make a wall white or red, to make a meate agreeable or disagreeable to the tast, to make a gratefull or vngratefull smell to the nose etc: Likewise they make the same questions and resolutions, of Grauity and Leuity: as whether they be qua∣lities, that is, entities distinct from their subiect: and whether they be actiue or passiue; which when they haue disputed slightly, and in common, with logicall arguments; they rest there, without any further searching into the physicall causes or effects of them. The like you shall find of all strange effects of them. The loadestone and Electricall bodies are produced for miraculous, and not vnderstandable thinges; and in which, it must be acknowledged, that they worke by hidden qualities, that mans witt cannot reach vnto. And ascending to liuing bodies, they giue it for a Maxime: that life is the action of the same Entity vpon it selfe: that sense is likewise a worke of an intrinsecall power, in the part we call sense, vpon it selfe. Which, our predecessors held the greatest absurdities that could be spoken in Philosophy. Euen some Physitians, that take vpon them to teach the curing of our bodies, do often pay vs with such termes, among them, you haue long discourses of a re∣tentiue, of an expulsiue, of a purging, of a consolidating fa∣culty: and so of euery thing that eyther passeth in our body, or is applied for remedy. And the meaner sort of Physitians know no more, but that such faculties are; though indeed they that are truly Physitians, know also in what they consist; without

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which knowledge it is much to be feared, Physitians will do more harme then good.

But to returne to our subiect: this course of doctrine in the schooles, hath forced me to a greate deale of paines in seeking to discouer the nature of all such actions (or of the maine part of them) as were famed for incomprehensible: for what hope could I haue, out of the actions of the soule to conuince the nature of it to be incorporeall; if I could giue no other account of bodies operations, then that they were performed by quali∣ties occult, specificall, or incomprehensible? Would not my ad∣uersary presently answere, that any operation, out of which I should presse the soules being spirituall, was performed by a corporeall occult quality: and that as he must acknowledge it to be incomprehensible, so must I likewise acknowledge other qua∣lities of bodies, to be as incomprehensible: and therefore could not with reason presse him, to shew how a body was able to doe such an operation, as I should inferre must of necessity proceede from a spiritt, since that neyther could I giue account how the loadestone drew iron, or looked to the north; how a stone, and other heauy thinges were carried downewardes; how sight or fantasie was made; how digestion or purging were effected; and many other such questions, which are so slightly resolued in the schooles?

Besides this reason, the very desire of knowledge in my selfe; and a willingnesse to be auaylable vnto others (att the least so farre as to sett them on seeking for it, without hauing a preiu∣dice of impossibity in attaining it) was vnto me a sufficient motiue, to enlarge my discourse to the bulke it is risen vnto. For what a misery is it, that the flower and best wittes of Christendome, which flocke to the Vniuersities, vnder pretence and vpon hope of gaining knowledge, should be there deluded; and after many yeares of toyle and expence, be sent home againe, with nothing acquired more then a faculty, and readynesse to talke like par∣rats of many thinges; but not to vnderstand so much as anyone; and withall with a persuasion that in truth nothing can be knowne? For setting knowledge aside, what can it auayle a man to be able to talke of any thing? What are those wranglinges, where the discouery of truth is neyther sought, nor hoped for, but meerely vanity and ostentation? Doth not all tend, to make him seeme and appeare that which indeed he is not? Nor

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lett any body take it ill at my handes, that I speake thus of the moderne schooles: for indeed it is rather themselues then I that say it. Excepting Mathematikes, lett all the other schooles pro∣nounce their owne mindes, and say ingenuously, whether they themselues beleeue they haue so much as any one demonstra∣tion, from the beginning to the ending of the whole course of their learning. And if all, or the most part, will agree that any one position is demonstrated perfectly, and as it ought to be, and as thousands of conclusions are demonstrated in Mathe∣matikes; I am ready to vndergoe the blame of hauing calum∣niated them, and will as readily make them amendes. But if they neither will, nor can; then their owne verdict cleareth me: and it is not so much I, as they, that make this profession of the shallownesse of their doctrine. And to this purpose I haue often hard the lamentations of diuers, as greate wittes as any that conuerse in the schooles, complaining of this defect. But in so greate an euidence of the effect, proofes are superfluous.

Wherefore I will leaue this subiect, to declare what I haue here designed, and gone about, towardes the remedy of this in∣conuenience. Which is, that whereas in the schooles, there is a loose methode, or rather none; but that it is lawfull, by the li∣berty of a commentator, to handle any question, in any place (which is the cause of the slightnesse of their doctrine, and can neuer be the way to any science or certitude) I haue taken my beginninges from the commonest thinges that are in nature: namely, from the notions of Quantity, and its first differences: which are the most simple, and radicall notions that are, and in which all the rest are to be grounded. From them I endeauour by immediate composition of them, and deriuation from them, to bring downe my discourse to the Elements, which are the primary, and most simple bodies in nature. From these, I pro∣ceed to compounded bodies; first, to those that are called mixed; and then, to liuing bodies: declaring in common the proprie∣ties and operations that belong vnto them. And by occasion as I passe along, I light here and there on those operations, which seeme most admirable in nature, to shew how they are performed; or att the least, how they may be performed: that though I misse in particular of the industry of nature, yet I may neuerthelesse hitt my intent; which is, to trace out a way, how these, and such like operations may be effected by an exact disposition, and

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ordering (though intricate) of quantitatiue and corporeall partes: and to shew, that they oblige vs not to recurre vnto hidden and vnexplicable qualities. And if I haue declared so many of these, as may begett a probable persuasion in my reader, that the rest, which I haue not touched, may likewise be displayed, and shewed to spring out of the same groundes, if curious and constant searchers into nature, will make their taske to penetrate into them; I haue therein obtained my desire and intent; which is onely, to shew from what principles, all kindes of corporeall operations do proceed; and what kind of operations all these must be, which may issue out of these prin∣ciples: to the end, that I may from thence, make a steppe to raise my discourse to the contemplation of the soule; and shew, that her operations are such, as cannot proceed from those principles; which being adequate and common to all bodies, we may rest assured, that what cannot issue from them, cannot haue a body for its source.

I will therefore end this preface, with entreating my reader to consider, that in a discourse proceeding in such order as I haue declared, he must not expect to vnderstand, and be satis∣fied, with what is said in any middle or later part, vnlesse he first haue read, and vnderstood what goeth before. Wherefore, if he cannot resolue with himselfe, to take it along orderly as it lyeth from the beginning, he shall do himselfe (as well as me) right, not to meddle att all with this booke. But if he will employ any time vpon it, to receiue aduantage by it, he must be content to take the paines to vnderstand throughly euery particular as it is sett downe. And if his memory will not serue him to carry euery one along with him, yet att the least lett, him be sure to remember the place where it is handled, and vpon occasion, returne a looke backe vpon it, when it may stand him in steede. If he thinketh this diligence too burthensome, lett him con∣sider that the writing hereof, hath cost the Author much more paines: who as he will esteeme them exceedingly well employed, if they may contribute ought to the content or aduantage of any free and ingenuous mind; so if any others shall expresse a neglect of what he hath with so much labour hewed out of the hard rocke of nature; or shall discourteously cauill att the notions he so freely imparteth vnto them; all the ressentment

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he shall make thereof, will be to desire the first, to consider, that their slight esteeme of his worke, obligeth them to entertaine their thoughts with some more noble and more profittable subiect, and better treated, then this is: and the later sort, to iustifie their dislike of his doctrine, by deliuering a fairer and more complete body of Philosophy, of their owne. Which if herevpon they do, his being the occasion of the ones bettering themselues, and of the others bettering the world, will be the best successe he can wish his booke.

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