Two treatises in the one of which the nature of bodies, in the other, the nature of mans soule is looked into in way of discovery of the immortality of reasonable soules.

THE SECOND TREATISE; DECLARING, THE NATVRE AND OPERATIONS OF MANS SOVLE. (Book 2)

THE FIRST CHAPTER. Of simple Apprehensions.

THAT we may duely vnderstand,1 1.1 what a right Appre∣hension is, lett vs consider the preeminence that a man who apprehendeth a thing rightly, hath ouer him who misseth of doing so. This latter can but roue wildely at the nature of the thing he apprendeth; and will neuer be able to draw any operation into act, out of the apprehension he hath framed of it. As for example: if a man be to worke vpon gold, and by reason of its resemblance vnto brasse, hath formed an apprehension of brasse, insteed of an appre∣hension of gold, and then (knowing that the action of fire, will resolue brasse into its least partes, and seuer its moist from its drye ones) will go about to calcine gold in the same manner as he would do brasse; he will soone find that he looseth his labour; and that ordinary fire is not an adequate Agent to destroy the homogeneall nature, and to seuer the minute partes of that fixed mettall: all which happeneth, out of the wrong apprehension he hath made of gold. Whereas on the other side, he that apprehendeth a thing rightly, if he pleaseth to discourse of what he apprehendeth, findeth in his apprehension all the partes and qualities, which are in the thing he discourseth of: for example, if he apprehendeth rightly a knife, or a beetle, or a siuue, or any other thing whatsoeuer; in the knife he will find hafte and blade; the blade of iron, thicke on the backe, and thinne on the edge; tempered to be hard and tough; thus

beaten, so ground, in such manner softened, thus quenched, and what∣soeuer else concerneth the Being or the making of a knife: and all this he draweth out of his notion or apprehension of a knife; which is, that it is an instrument fitted to cutt such and such thinges, in such a manner: for hence he findeth, that it hath an haft, fitt to hold it by in ones hand, to the end it may not hurt the hand, whiles it presseth vpon the knife; and that the blade is apt to flide in betwixt the partes of the thing which is to be cutt, by the motion of being pressed or drawne by the hand: and so he proceedeth on, descending to the qualities of both partes; and how they are to be ioyned, and held fast together. In the like manner, he discourseth of a beetle, of a siuue, or of whatsoeuer else cometh in his way. And he doth this, not only in such manufacturers as are of mans inuention; but (if he be capable) he doth the like in beastes, in birdes, in trees, in herbes, in fishes, in fossiles, and in what creature soeuer he meeteth withall, within the whole extent of nature. He findeth what they are made for: and hauing discouered natures ayme in their production, he can instruct others, what partes and manner of generation they haue, or ought to haue: and if he that in this manner apprehendeth any thing rightly, hath a minde to worke vpon it, eyther to make it, or to vse and order it to some end of his owne; he is able by his right apprehension, to compare it vnto other thinges; to prepare what is any way fitting for the making of it; to apply it vnto what it will worke its effect vpon; and to conserue it from what may wrong or destroy it: so, if he haue framed a right apprehension of a siuue, he will not employ it in drawing water; if of a beetle, he will not go about to cutt with it: neyther will he offer, if he haue a due apprehension of a knife, to cutt stone or steele with it, but wood, or what is softer. He knoweth what will whette and maintaine the edge of it; and vnderstandeth what will blunt or breake it: In fine, he vseth it in such sort, as the knife it selfe (had it knowledge and will) would wish to be vsed; and moueth it in such a manner, as if it had power of motion, it would moue it selfe: he goeth about the making it, euen as nature would do, were it one of her plantes: and in a word, the knife in this apprehension made in the man, hath those causes, proprieties, and effects, which are naturall vnto it; and which nature would giue it, if it were made by her; and which are propotionable to those partes, causes, proprieties, and effects, that nature bestoweth on her children and crea∣tures, according to their seuerall essences.

2 1.2What then can we imagine, but that the very nature of a thing apprehended, is truly in the man, who doth apprehend it? And that to apprehend ought, is to haue the nature of that thing within ones selfe? And that man, by apprehending, doth become the thing apprehended; not by change of his nature vnto it, but by assumption of it vnto his?

Here peraduenture some will reply, that we presse our inference to farre: and will peremptorily deny the thinges reall being in our minde, when we make a true and full apprehension of it; accounting it sufficient

for our purpose, that some likenesse, or image of the thing be there; out of which, we may draw all th••se, whether contemplations, or workes, or disposals of the thing. But by that time this obiection is throughly looked into, and that so much as they allow is duely examined, I beleeue we shall find our quarrell to be only about the word, not about the matter: and that indeede, both of vs, do meane the same, how be it diuersly conceiued: and that in substance their expression, in what they graunt, importeth the same of ours doth: which, it is true, they first deny in wordes; but that may be, because the thing is not by them rightly vnderstood.

Lett vs then discusse the matter particularly. What is likenesse, but an imperfect vnity betweene a thing, and that which it is said to be like vnto? If the likenesse be imperfect, it is more vnlike then it is like vnto it: and the liker it is, the more it is one with it; vntill at length, the growing likenesse may arriue to such a perfection, and to such a vnity with the thing it is like vnto, that then, it shall no longer be like, but is become wholy the same, with what formerly it had but a resemblance of. For example, lett vs consider, in what consisteth the likenesse vnto a man, of a picture drawne inblacke and white representing a man: and we shall find, it is only in the proportions of the limbes and features; for the colours, the bulke, and all thinges else are vnlike; but the proportions are the very same, in a man and in a picture; yet that picture is but a likenesse, because it wanteth biggenesse and colour: giue it them; and neuerthelesse it will yet be but a likenesse, because it wanteth all the dimensions of corporeity or bulke, which are in a mans body: adde also those to it; and still it will be but a likenesse or representation of a man, because it wanteth the warmeth, the softenesse, and the other qualities of a liuing body, which belong to a man: but if you giue it all these, then it is no longer a likenesse or image of a liuing creature, but a liuing creature indeede; and if peraduenture this liuing creature do continue still to be but the likenesse of a man, it is because it wanteth some perfections or proprieties belonging to a man: and so in that regard, is vnlike a man: but if you allow it all those, so that in nothing it be vnlike, then your taking away all vnlikenesse, taketh away likenesse too: and as before of dead, it became a liuing creature, so now of an other liuing creature, it becometh a man, and is no longer like a mā. You see then plainely the reason, why that, which we call a like thing, is not the same; for in some part it is dislike: but if the likenesse were complete in euery regard, then it were no longer to be called like, but the very thing it selfe: and therefore we may conclude, that if the likenesse of a thing, which the obiection alloweth to be in our knowledge, do containe all that is in the thing knowne, then it is in truth, no more a likenesse, but the very knowne thing it selfe: and so what they graunt, amounteth to as much as we require; though att the first they go about to exclude it.

3 1.3Hauing thus concluded, that when we apprehend any thing, that very thing is in vs; lett vs in the next place examine, how it cometh thither, and what it is there. Which we shall best do, by anatomising, and looking narrowly into the nature of such apprehensions, as we dayly make of thinges. It is true we said euen now, that we can not diuide the actions of mans mind, further then into apprehensions; and therefore we called them simple and vncomposed: and with good reason; for if we reflect vpon the operations of our mind, we shall euidently perceiue, that our bare apprehensions, and only they, are such: but withall we must acknowledge, that all the apprehensions we make of thinges coming vnto vs by our senses, are composed of other more single apprehensions, and may be resolued into them: all which are as it were the limbes and partes, that make vp and constitute the other totall one.

4 1.4Lett vs make vse of our former example, and dissect the apprehension we make of a knife: I find in my vnderstanding that it is a thing so long, so broade, so sharpe, so heauy, of such a colour, so moulded, so tempered &c, as is fitt to cutt withall. In this totall appr••hension, I discouer three kindes of particular apprehensions, euery one more simple and refined then the other. The highest of them, and the foundation vpon which the others are built, is the notion of Being: which is of so high, and of so abstracted a nature, that we can not retriue wordes to expresse in what manner we conceiue it; but are faine to content our selues with the outward sound of a word, by whi••h, without discribing our owne, we stirre vp a like conception in an other: and that is the word ••s, by which we intimate the Being of the thing we apprehend. And this notion can be in our minde, without inferring any other: and therefore is the simplest of all others: which of necessity, must imply it, and can not be without it, although it can be without them.

5 1.5Our next apprehension is of that which hath Being: and is expressed by the word Thing. This is not so simple as the former▪ for it is composed of it, and of what receiueth it; of Being, and of what hath Being: yet it is much simpler then the next degree of apprehensions, which is caused in our mind by the great variety of thinges, that come thither through our senses; and can be conceiued without any of them, though none of them can without it; for I can haue in me the notion of a thing, abstracting from all accidents whatsoeuer; as of magnitude, of figure, of colour, of resemblance, or the like: but I can not conceiue it to be long, or sharpe, or blew, &c, without allowing it first to be somewhat or some∣thing, that is in such sort affected: so that the apprehension of a thing, or of that which hath Being, is the basis of all our other subsequent appre∣hensions; as the apprehension of Being, is the basis of the apprehension of a thing: for had it not Being, it were not a thing; and were it not a thing, it could not be said to be a long thing or a sharpe thing; nor indeede that it were long or sharpe: for to be so, doth include Being; and what hath Being, is a Thing. And thus we may obserue, how the bulke of our apprehensions

is composed of something aduentitious, and of something formerly within vs, which is of a very different nature from all the others; and yet so fitted and necessary to them, that none of them can be without it, although it not only can be, but is best conceiued without relation to any of them.

We shall easily discerne,6 1.6 of how different a straine this conception of Being, is from all others, that enter by our senses, (as from the conceptions of colours, of soundes, and the like) if we but reflect vpon that act in vs, which maketh it; and then compare it with the others: for we shall find, that all they do consist in, or of certaine respects betwixt two thinges; whereas this of Being, is an absolute and simple conception of it selfe, without any relation to ought else; and can not be described or expressed with other wordes, or by comparing it to any other thing: only we are sure, we vnderstand and know what it is.

But to make this point the clearer, it will not be amisse to shew more particularly, wherein the other sort of apprehensions are different from this of Being; and how they consist in certaine respects betweene diffe∣rēt thinges, and are knowne only by those respects: whereas this is knowne only in it selfe; abstracting from all other thinges whatsoeuer. An example will do it best: when I apprehend the whitenesse in the wall, I may consider how that white, is a thing which maketh such an impres∣sion vpon my fantasy; and so accordingly, I know or expresse the nature of white, by a respect or proportion of the wall, to worke vpon my fan∣tasy. In like manner, if we take a notion that ariseth out of what entereth immediately by our senses, (for by ioyning such also to the notion of Being, we make ordinary apprehensions) we shall find the same nature: as when I consider how this white wall, is like to an other white wall, the apprehension of likenesse that I haue in my mind, is nothing else, but a notion arising out of the impression, which both those walles together, do make vpon my fantasy; so that, this apprehension is as the former, a certaine kind of respect or proportion of the two walles to my imagi∣nation: not as they make their impressions immediately vpon it, but as an other notion ariseth, out of comparing the seuerall impressions, which those two white walles made in it.

Lett vs proceede a litle further,7 1.7 and examine what kind of thing that is, which we call respect or proportion, and where it resideth. We shall find, that there is a very great difference, betweene what it is in it selfe, or in its owne essence, and what it is in the thinges that are respectiue: for in them, it is nothing else but the thinges, being plainely and bluntly what they are really in themselues: as for example, two white walles to be like, is in them nothing else, but each of them to be white: and two quantities to be halfe and whole, is in them nothing else, but each quantity to be iust what it is. But a respect in its owne nature, is a kind of tye, comparison, tending, or order, of one of those thinges to an other; and is no where to be found in its formall subsistence, but in the apprehension of man: and

therefore it can not be described by any similitude, nor be expressed by any meanes▪ but (like Being) by the sound of a word, which we are agreed vpon to stirre vp in vs such a notion; for in the thinges, it is not such a thing as our notion of it is: (which notion is that, which we vse to expresse by prepositions and coniunctions, and which Aristotle and Logitians expresse in common, by the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or ad) and therefore there is nothing out of vs, to paint it by: as I could do white, or square, or round, or the like; because these haue a being in the thinges that are white, or square &c, and consequently they may be expressed by others of the like nature: but the likenesse that one white hath to an other, or the respect that eyther of them hath to mans imagination, is only in Man; who by comparing them, giueth birth to the nature and Being of respect.8 1.8

Out of this discourse, we may collect two singularities of man; which will much import vs, to take particular notice of▪ the one is, that Being or a thing (the formall notion of both which is meerely Being) is the proper affection of man; for euery particular thing is in him, by being (as I may say) grafted vpon the stocke of Existence or of Being: and accordingly we see, that whatsoeuer we speake of, we say it is something: and what∣soeuer we conceiue, we giue it the nature of a thing; as when we haue said, the wall is white, we frame whitenesse as a thing: so did we immediately before speaking of Respect, we tooke respect as it were a thing and enquired, where it is: so that it is euident, that all the negotiation of our vnderstanding, tradeth in all that is apprehended by it, as if they were thinges.

The other singularity we may obserue in man is, that he is a comparing power; for all his particular knowledges, are nothing else but respects or comparisons betweene particular thinges: as for example, for a man to know heate, or cold &c, is to know, what effects fire or water &c, can worke vpon such or such bodies.

9 1.9Out of the first of these proprieties it followeth, that what affecteth a man, or maketh impression vpon his vnderstanding, doth not thereby loose its owne peculiar nature, nor is it modifyed to the recipient; the contrary of which, we see happeneth perpetually in bodies: obserue the sustenance we take; which that it may be once part of our body, is first changed into a substance like our body, and ceaseth being what it was: whē water or any liquid body is receiued into a vessell, it looseth its owne figure, and putteth on the figure of the vessell it is in: if heate entereth into a body that is already hoat, that heate becometh thereby more heate; if into a cold body, it is conuerted into warmeth: and in like manner, all other corporeall thinges are accommodated to the qualities of the recipient; and in it, they loose their owne proper termes and consi∣stences: but what cometh into the vnderstanding of a man, is in such sort receiued by him or ioyned to him, that it still retaineth its owne proper limitations and particular nature▪ notwithstanding the assūption

of it vnto him: for Being is ioyned to euery thing there; since (as we haue said) it is by Being that any thing cometh thither: and consequently this stocke of Being, maketh euery graft that is inoculated into it, Be what of its owne nature it is; for Being ioyned to an other notion, doth not change that notion, but maketh it be what it was before; sithence if it should be changed, Being were not added to it: as for example, adde Being to the notion of knife, and it maketh a knife, or that notion, to Be a knife: and if after the addition, it doth not remaine a knife, it was not Being, that was added to a knife.

Out of the later of the singularities proper to man,10 1.10 it followeth, that multitude of thinges may be vnited in him, without suffering any confusion among themselues; but euery one of them, will remaine with its proprieties, and distinct limitations: for so of necessity it must be, when that which vniteth them to him, is the comparing of them to some∣thing besides themselues: which worke could not be performed, vnlesse what is to be compared, do retaine exactly its owne nature, whereby the comparison may be made: no more then one can weigh two quantities one against an other, vnlesse he keepe asunder what is in each scale, and keepe all other weights from mingling with them: and accordingly we see, that we can not compare blacke to white, or a horse to an oxe, vnlesse we take together, the properties by which blacke differeth from white, or an oxe from a horse: and consequently, they must remaine vnmingled and without confusion, precisely what in themselues they are, and be different in the sight of the comparer.

But indeede, if we looke well into the matter, we shall find, that setting a side the notion of Existence or of Being, all our other notions are nothing else, but comparisons and respects: and that by the mediation of respects, the natures of all thinges are in vs: and that by the varying of them, we multiply our notions: which in their first diuision, that reduceth their seuerall kindes into generall heades, do encrease into the tenne famous tribes, that Logitians call Predicaments: and they do compre∣hend vnder them, all the particular notions that man hath, or can haue, according to the course of knowledge in this life. Of which Predicaments the seuen last are so manifestly respectiue, that all men acknowledge them to be so. Substance we haue already shewed to haue a respect vnto Being▪ Quantity we proued in the first Chapter of the former Treatise of the nature and of the operation of Bodies, to consist in a respect vnto partes. Quality is diuided into foure branches: whereof Power is clearely a respect to that ouer which it hath power, or from which it may suffer. Habite is a respect to the substance wherein it is; as being the property by which it is well or ill, conueniently or inconueniently affected, in regard of its owne nature; as you may obserue in health, or sicknesse, or the like. The passible Qualities are those which we haue explicated, in dis∣coursing of the Elements and of Mixtes; and whose natures we haue there shewed do consist in respects of acting or of suffering. Figure or

shape (which is the last branch of the diuision of the Predicament of Quality) is nothing else, but a certaine disposition of one part of a body to an other. And so you see, how all the tenne Predicaments do consist purely in diuersity of Respects: and by consequence, all our conceites and notions (excepting that of Being, which is the stocke, vpon which all the rest are grafted) are nothing else, but various respects; since all of them whatsoeuer, are comprised vnder those generall heades. Concerning which, we shall not neede to dilate ourselues any further; seeing they are to be found in Aristotle, and in his Commentators, largely discoursed of.

11 1.11In the next place, lett vs obserue, how our vnderstanding behaueth it selfe, in considering and in apprehending these respects. We haue already declared, that the variety of our notions, doth arise out of the respects which diuers thinges haue to one an other: hence will follow, that of the same thing, we may haue various notions: for comparing it to different thinges, we shall meete with different respects betweene them; and con∣sequently, we shall consider the same thing, vnder different notions: as when we consider an apple, vnder the notions of greenenesse, of sweet∣nesse, of roundenesse, of mellownesse &c: in such sort, as we haue amply declared in the first Treatise, and therefore neede not here enlarge our∣selues any further vpon this particular. Now these notions are so absolu∣tely seuered one from an other, and euery one of them hath such a completenesse within it selfe, that we may vse any one of them, without meddling at all with any of the others. And this we do two seuerall wayes: the one, when our māner of apprehension determineth vs to one precise notion, which is so summed vp within it selfe, as it not only abstracteth from all other notions, but also quite excludeth them, and admitteth no society with them. The other way is, when we consider a thing vnder a determinate notion, yet we do it in such a manner, that although we abstract from all other notions, neuerthelesse we do so, rather by neglecting then by excluding them: and euen in the manner of our expression of it, we insinuate that there are other notions (without specifying what) belonging vnto it.

Of the first kind of notions, are whitenesse, weight, heate, and such like, (whose names are called abstracted termes) which although they arise out of our comparing of the thinges that are white, heauy, hoat, &c: to our fantasy, or to other thinges; yet these notions are so precise, and shutt vp within themselues, that they absolutely exclude all others, (as of long, short, square, rough, sharpe, or whatsoeuer else) which may in the thinges accompany the whitenesse, weight, heate, &c, that our con∣sideration is then busied only withall Of the second kind of abstracted notions, are white, heauy, hoat &c (whose names, expressing them, are called concrete termes:) which although they cause in vs no other appre∣hensions then of whitenesse, of weight, of heate &c: yet they are not so rigorously paled in, as the others are, from admitting society with any

besides; but do imply tacitely, that the thing which is white, heauy, hoat &c: hath besides that, some other consideration belonging vnto it (whatsoeuer it be) which is not expressed.

Now in this later abstraction, it happeneth sometimes, that the notion expressed, hath but an accidentall connexion with the other notions, that are in the thing vnexpressed: as for example; it is meerely accidentall to the white wall as it is white, to be high or lowe, of stone, of plaster, or the like. But otherwhiles, the expressed notion is so essentiall to the concealed ones, that they can not be without it: as when we apprehend a clouen foote; although this apprehension do abstract from all other notions besides clouenfootednesse (if so I may say) yet, (as aboue we haue declared) it is in such a manner, that it implyeth other considerations, not yet expressed, in that clouen foote: among which, some may be of that nature, that they can not haue a Being without presupposing clouen∣footednesse; but others may be meerely accidentall to that notion: as (for instance sake) lett one be, that the foote is clouen into three partes; and lett an other be, that it is blacke or hairy; of these, this later notion of blacke or hairy, is of the first kind of abstractions, which we said had but an accidentall connexion with that which comprehended them without expressing them: for other thinges besides the clouen foote, may be blacke or hairy; in such sort as height or lownesse, to be of stone or of plaster, may belong vnto other structures besides the white wall: but to be clouen footed into three partes, doth so necessarily depend of being clouen footed in generall, (which implyeth this particular) and so directly includeth it, as it can not subsist without clouenfootednesse: for though we may conceiue a foote to be clouen, without determining in our apprehension, into how many toes it is clouen; yet we can not conceiue it to haue three, foure, or fiue toes, without apprehending it to be clouen: so that in such like apprehensions, the notion which is expressed, is so essentiall to the notion that is concealed and added vnto it, as the concealed one can not be conceiued without the expressed one; and whensoeuer it is mentioned, the other is necessarily also brought in, and affirmed with it.

Now,12 1.12 some of these later kindes of notions, (in which what is expressed is essentiall to what is concealed) may be of such a nature, as to be capable of receiuing the addition of sundry other notions, so repugnāt vnto one an other, that they can not agree together in one subiect; and yet that generall notion, without determining any of the others, be indifferent to the contrary additions that include it, and belong as much to any one, as to any other of them: and so consequently, whatsoeuer may be affirmed, and is true, of the primary notion, may as well be affirmed, and is as true, of the seuerall particulars, arising out of the repugnant additions. Such a notion, Logitians terme an Vniuersal one: that is, one that reacheth indifferently and equally to all the particulars comprised vnder it. As for example: to the notion of a liuing creature, may be added the notions of

Reasonable and vnreasonable: which first notion, when it is barely expressed, it determineth no one of the two secondary notions, more then it doth the other▪ but is alike indifferent to eyther; and whatsoeuer belongeth to a liuing creature, belongeth entirely both to a man and to a beast: yet no one thing, can be both reasonable and vnreasonable. In like manner when I say, a man is a discursiue creature; vnder this word man, there lyeth a notion, by which may be signifyed any particular man, as Thomas, Iohn, William, &c: though of it selfe, it determine no one man whatsoeuer: and consequently, euery one of these particular men, must be allowed to be a discursiue creature, because the being such, belongeth vnto the notion of man, and that notion vnto all the particulars of Thomas, Iohn, Willian, &c: and yet no particular man can be both Thomas and Iohn, or Iohn and Willian, &c.

In this kinde of notion, we may obserue yet one propriety more: which is, that of it selfe, and in its common terme, it doth not cause ones thought to range vnto seuerall obiects; nor doth it imply that there are many particulars comprised vnder it: yet if there be neuer so many, that conceite will fitt them euery one; and if there be but one, still it will be no lesse accommodated to that one. As for example: He that maketh a right apprehension of a sunne, doth not by that conception determine, whether there be many sunnes or but one: and if euery one of the starres (which we call fixed) be sunnes to other earthes, it fitteth them all; and if there be no other sunne, then that which shineth to vs, it is satisfyed and taken vp with that: so likewise; before the production of Eue, the notion of a man was as fully taken vp by Adam alone, as it is now by his numerous progeny that filleth the world: nor doth our vnder∣standing, when that terme is pronunced, consider (out of the force of the terme) whether there be many men, or only one.

13 1.13An other propriety in mans apprehension not much vnlike to this, is, that he is able to comprise a multitude in one indiuisible notion; and yet, that notion expresse the multiplicity of what it containeth: as we see in numbers, where the indiuisible conception of tenne, a hundred, a thousand, &c, doth plainely expresse the subiect to be many; and yet that notion of the nūber bindeth thē vp (as I may say) into one bundle, that in it selfe admitteth no diuision, nor will permitt that the least part be taken from it▪ for if it be, the whole bundle is destroyed and vanisheth: as when I take tenne, if one be diminished from it, it is no longer tenne, but nine. It fareth in like manner with the conceptions we frame of All, and Euery one, as it doth with numbers; for if but one be deficient, it is but a part, and not all, or euery one: so that these notions do indiuisibily termi∣nate a multitude. And like to this notion, is the name or terme whole, in respect of thinges which as yet haue not diuision, but are capable of being diuided; for it is so rigorous, that if the least atome or thought be wanting, it is no longer the whole, but only a part.

And this is as much as at present appeareth vnto me needefull to be

said, concerning single apprehensions: vnlesse I be permitted to adde for a conclusion,14 1.14 this litle note (which peraduenture might haue beene more properly sert downe in an other place where we discoursed of Being, but that it occurred not then to me) that apprehension being rooted in the nature of Being, the power of it spreadeth it selfe as farre as the extent of Being: and consequently reacheth to all thinges what∣soeuer; for whatsoeuer is a thing, hath Being; and that vnto which Being doth not reach, is nothing. Nay, it is not limited there, but graspeth euen at nothing, and aymeth to make a notion of it, and planteth its gene∣ration, by multiplying it selfe by negations of whatsoeuer is. Hence we haue the notions of deafenesse, of dumbenesse, of blindnesse, of lame∣nesse, of baldenesse, of death, of sinne, and of all euills whatsoeuer, by the want of such goods, as are sensible vnto vs.

THE SECOND CHAPTER. Of Thinking and Knowing.

HAuing thus declared the nature of single apprehensions,1 1.15 the methode we haue prescribed ourselues, requireth that we examine in the next place, what effect the ioyning of them together may haue; for from thence do spring Enunciations or Iudgements; which are in the next ranke after simple apprehensions, and are the materials whereof discourses are immediately framed: as when of the two apprehensions of knife and of sharpe, we make this enunciation, the knife is sharpe. In this enquiry the first thing that occurreth vnto vs, is to consider, in what manner two differing simple apprehensions, do become ioyned to one an other: and we shall find, that they are not tyed together like seuerall distinct thinges in one bundle, or like stones in a heape, where all that are cōprised vnder one multitude, are yet circumscribed within their owne limits, and thereby are wholy distinguished from each other; but that they are as it were grafted vpon one stocke; which being common to both, giueth the same life to both; and so becoming one with each of them, maketh them be one and the same thing betweene themselues. And this is the notion of Being or Existence, in the subiect we speake of: which (as we haue already shewed) is the Basis and foundation of all other apprehen∣sions; and by being common and indifferent to all, is the fittest glew to vnite those that are capable of such coniunction: and accordingly we see, that most of our speech runneth vpon this straine, that this is that, or doth that (which is as much to say as is doing that) that Socrates is a man, or that Socrates runneth, (which signifyeth, is running) and the like: and since our speech proceedeth from the conceptions of our mind; it is cleare, that as the wordes which expresse Being or Existence, do ioyne

together the other wordes that we vse, (or at least, the greatest part of them) so likewise in our mind the apprehension of Being, is the glew that ioyneth our apprehensions corresponding to our wordes.

2 1.16All which will appeare to be said with great reason, if we reflect vpon it; for when diuerse apprehensions may be thus ioyned together, it is indeed, that one and the same thing affecting vs seuerall wayes and under different considerations; those different impressions do begett different apprehensions in vs: and so, till we examine the matter, euery one of them seemeth to be a different thing: but when we trace these streames vp to the fountaine head, we discerne that all of them do belong to one and the same thing; and that by being in that thing, they are among themselues the very same thing, howeuer they affect vs variously; and therefore may truly be said to be one, as indeed they are: and consequently, nothing is more fitt to ioyne together in our mind those different apprehensions, then the apprehension of Being; which maketh vs apprehend as one thing, those notions which really, and in the thing it selfe, are but one, as we haue often touched, both in the former Treatise, and lately in this: for this is the way to ioyne thinges in the mind intelligently, and according to the proper nature of the mind; which receiuing impressions from thinges existent, ought to consider those impressions as they flow from the very thinges, and not as they are in the mind it selfe; and by mediation of those impressions, must take a suruay of the thinges themselues; and not stay at the intellectuall impressions they make in her: and consequently, must apprehend those thinges to be one in themselues, (although in vs they be not so) according to the course of our originall and legitimate apprehensions of thinges; which is, as they are existent; that is, as they are in their owne nature, and in themselues; and not according to the discourses and secondary apprehensions we make of the images we find of them in our mind. And thus thinges are rightly ioyned by apprehen∣sion; without caution in which particular, we shall runne into great errors in our discourse: for if we be not very carefull herein, we are apt to mistake the vse of the impressions we receiue from thinges, and to ground our iudgements concerning them, according to what we find of them in our mind, and not according to what they are in themselues: which two seuerall considerations, haue quite different faces; although (it is true) those impressions are made by the thinges, and are the only meanes by which we may rightly iudge of them: prouided, that we consider them as they are in the thinges, and not as they are in vs.

Now this coniunction of apprehensions, by the mediation and the glew of Being, is the most naturall and fitting, not only in regard of the thinges, but euen in regard of vs: for (as we haue already shewed) it is of all others the most common and vniuersall, the most simple or vncom∣posed, and the most naturall and deepest rooted in man: out of all which, it is euident, that this vnion of apprehensions by the meanes of Being, is

in truth an Identification of them: for Vnity being a negation of multi∣plicity, it followeth, that what is one, is the same: and this identification is truly and naturally expressed by saying, that the one is the other.

But insisting a litle further vpon this consideration,3 1.17 how different apprehensions become ioyned and vnited together, by the notion of Being; we may obserue that this happeneth, not only to two single ones, but to more; according as more then two, may belong vnto one thing: and it may so fall out, that more then one, be on eyther side the common ligament. Thus when we say, A Man is a discoursiue creature; or a Rationall soule, is an immortall substance, the two apprehensions, of discoursiue, and of creature, are ioyned together in a third of Man, by the tye of one Being: and the two apprehensions of Immortall, and of Substance, are vnited to the two others of Rationall and of Soule, like∣wise by the ligament of one single Being. Euident it is then, that the extremes are vni••ed by one Being: but how the two apprehensions that are ranked together on the same side of the ligament (as in our former examples, the apprehensions of discoursiue and of creature, of rationall and of Soule, of Immortall and of substance) are betweene themselues ioyned to one an other, is not so easy to expresse. It is cleare, that it is not done by meere conglobation; for we may obserue, that they do belong, or are apprehended to belong, vnto the same thing; and the very wordes that expresse them, do intimate so much, by one of them being an adiectiue; which sheweth, they are not two thinges; for if they were, they would require two substantiues to describe them: and consequently it followeth that one of them must needes appertaine to the other: and so both of them make but one thing.

And there is no doubt, but in the inward apprehension, there is a variety correspondent to the variety of wordes which expresse it; since all variety of wordes that is made by intention, resulteth out of some such variety of apprehensions. Therefore, since the wordes do import, that the thinges haue a dependance the one of the other, we can not doubt, but that our apprehensions haue so too: which will be conceiued best, by looking into the act of our mind, when it frameth such variety of apprehensions belonging to one thing, correspondent to the variety in wordes of an adiectiue glewed vnto his substantiue; and attending heedfully to what we meane, when we speake so. The Hebrewes do expresse this vnion, or comprising of two different apprehensions vnder one notion, by putting in the genitiue case, the word which expresseth one of them, (much like the rule in Lillies grammar, that when two substantiues come together, if they belong to the same thing, the one is putt in the genitiue case.) As when in the scripture we meete with these wordes, the iudge of vniustice, the spence of wickednesse, the man of sinne, or of death; which in our phrase of speaking, do signify an vniust iudge, a wicked spence, and a sinnefull or dead man. In which it is euident, that as well the manner of vnderstanding, as of speaking, taketh each paire of

these notions to belong vnto one thing; that is, to haue both of them, one and the same Existence, although there interuene not the formall expression of their being one. Thus we see, how one Being serueth two different wayes to ioyne and vnite seuerall apprehensions: and if we will examine all the negotiations of our vnderstanding, we shall hardly find any notions so farre distant, but may be brought together, eyther by the one of these wayes, or by the other.

4 1.18But this composition and ioyning of seuerall apprehensions by the glew of Being, is not sufficient to make vs deeme a thing to be really such, as their vnion painteth in the mind, or as the wordes so tyed together do expresse in speach. Well may it cause vs to thinke of the thing; but to thinke, or to deeme it such an one (which word of deeming, we shall be obliged henceforward to vse frequently, because the word thinking is subiect to equiuocation) requireth the addition of something more, then barely this composition of apprehensions; which vnlesse they be kept straight by some leuell, may as well swarue from the subiect, as make a true picture of it. Here then we are to examine, what it is that maketh vs thinke any thing to be such as we apprehend it: this we are sure of, that when we do so, our actions which proceede vpon reason, and which haue relation to that thing, are gouerned and steered in euery circumstance, iust as if the thing were truly so: as for example, if a man do really deeme the weather to be cold, or that his body is distempered, he putteth on warmer clothes, or taketh physike; although peraduenture he is mistaken in both: for his deeming them to be so, maketh him demeane himselfe in such sort, as if really they were so. It is then euident, that by such thinking or deeming, the nature conceiued, is made an actiue principle in vs: vnto which if we adde, that all the knowledge we haue of our soule, is no more, but that it is an actiue force in vs, it seemeth, that a thing, by hauing apprehensions made of it in our mind, and by being really thought to be agreable to such apprehensions, becometh (as it were) a part or affection of our soule, and one thing with it. And this peraduenture is the cause, why an vnderstanding man can not easily leaue an opinion once deepely rooted in him; but doth wrestle and striue against all arguments that would force him from it, as if a part of his soule or vnderstanding were to be torne from him: in such manner as a beast will cry and struggle to saue his body, from hauing any of his limbes disioynted or pulled in pieces.

5 1.19But this obseruing the effect which followeth of our deeming a thing to be thus or so, is not sufficient to informe vs, what it is that causeth that deeming. We must therefore take the matter a litle higher, and looke into its immediate principles: and there we shall find, that it is the knowing of what we say to be true, and the assurance, that the thinges are as we deeme them, which quieteth our soule, and maketh it consent vnto them, and proceede to action vpon that consent. Now this knowledge, is the most eminent part of deeming; and of all our acqui∣sitions, is the most inseparable from vs: and indeed in rigour, it is

absolutely inseparable by direct meanes; howeuer peraduenture by indirect meanes it may be seperated.

Let vs then consider how we attaine vnto it, and how sometimes we faile in the purchase of it; and what degrees of assurance or of proba∣bility there are betweene it and errour. To this intent, we may obserue that the greatest assurance, and the most eminent knowledge we can haue of any thing, is of such Propositions, as in the schooles are called Identicall; as if one should say, Iohn is Iohn, or a man is a man: for the truth of these propositions is so euident and cleare, as it is impossible any man should doubt of them, if he vnderstand what he saith: and if we should meete with one that were not satisfyed of the verity of them, we would not go about to proue them to him, but would only apply ourselues to make him reflect vpon the wordes he speaketh, without vsing any further industry to gaine his assent therevnto: which is a manifest signe, that in such propositions, the apprehending or vnderstanding them, is the same thing as to know them and to consent vnto them: or at the least, that they are so necessarily conioyned, as the one followeth immediately out of the other, without needing any other causes to promote this effect, more then that a man be disposed, and willing to see the truth: so as we may conclude, that to vnderstand a proposition which openly carrieth its euidence with it, is to knew it. And by the same reason, although the euidence of a proposition, should not at the first sight be presently obuious vnto vs, yet with vnfolding and explicating of it, we come at length to discerne it; then likewise the apprehending of it, is the knowing of it.

We must therefore enquire, what it is that causeth this euidence: and to that purpose, reflecting vpon those instances we haue giuen of Identicall propositions, we may in them obserue, that euidence ariseth out of the plaine Identification of the extremes that are affirmed of one an other; so that, in what proposition soeuer, the Identification of the extremes is plaine, the truth of it is euident vnto vs, and our minde is satisfyed and at quiet; as being assured that it knoweth it to be so as the wordes say it. Now all affirmatiue propositions do by the forme of them import an Identification of their extremes, (for they all agree in saying This is that) yet they are not all alike in the euidence of their Identification: for in some it sheweth it selfe plainely, without needing any further helpe to discouer it; and those are without any more adoe knowne of themselues, as such Identicall sayings, we euen now gaue for examples: others require a iourney somewhat further about to shew their Identification; which if it be not so hidden, but that it may in the end be discouered and brought to light, as soone as that is done, the knowledge settled by them in the soule, is certaine and satisfactory as well as the other: but if it be so obscure, that we can not display the Identification of it, then our mind suspendeth his assent, and is vnquiet about it, and doubteth of the truth

of it: in some propositions, whiles he searcheth and enquireth after the Identification of their extremes; peraduenture he discerneth, that it is impossible there should be any betweene them; and then on the other side, he is satisfyed of the falsity of them: for if a proposition be affirma∣tiue, it must necessarily be a false one, if there be no Identification betweene the extremes of it.

By this discourse, we haue found two sortes of propositions, which begett knowledge in vs. The one, where the Identification of the extremes, is of it selfe so manifest, that when they are but explicated, it needeth no further proofe. The other, where though in truth they be Identified, yet the Identification appeareth not so cleare, but that some discourse is required to satisfy the vnderstanding therein. Of the first kind, are such propositions as do make one of the extremes the defi∣nition of the other whereof it is affirmed: as when we say, a man is a reasonable creature; which is so euident, if we vnderstand what is meaned by a Man, and what by a reasonable creature, as it needeth no further proofe to make vs know it: and knowledge is begotten in vs, not only by a perfect Identification of the extremes, but as well by an imperfect one: as when what is said of an other, is but part of its definition; for example, if one should say, a man is a creature, no body that knoweth him to be a rationall creature, (which is his complete definition) could doubt of his being a creature; because that the being a creature, is partly identifyed to being a rationall creature. In like manner, this obuious euidence of Identification, appeareth as well where a complete diuision of a thing is affirmed of the other extreme, as where that affirmation is made by the totall or partiall definition of it: as when we say, number is euen or odde: an enuntiation is true or false, and the like: where, because what is said, compriseth the differences of the thing whereof it is said, it is plaine that one of them must needes be that whereof we speake.

Peraduenture some may expect, that we should giue Identicall propo∣sitions (among others) for examples of this plaine euidence: but because they bring no acquisition of new knowledge vnto the soule, (the doing of which, and the reflecting vpon the manner, is the scope of this Chapter) I lett them passe without any further mention, vpon this occasion hauing produced them once before, only to shew by an vnde∣nyable example, what it is that maketh our soule consent vnto an enuntiation, and how knowledge is begotten in her, that we might afterwardes apply the force of it to other propositions.

Lett vs therefore proceed to the second sort of propositions, which require some discourse, to proue the Identification of their extremes. Now the scope of such discourse is, by comparing them vnto some other third thing, to shew their Identification between themselues; for it sheweth, that each of them a part is identifyed with that new subiect it bringeth in: and then our vnderstanding is satisfyed of ther iden∣tity, and our soule is secure of that knowledge it thus acquireth, as well as it is of that which resulteth out of those propo∣sitions,

which beare their euidence in their first aspect.

This negotiation of the vnderstanding to discouer the truth of propositions, when it is somewhat hidden, (which we call discourse) as it is one of the chiefest and noblest actions of the soule, so doth it challenge a very heedefull inspection into it: and therefore we will allow it a peculiar Chapter by it selfe, to explicate the nature and particularities of it. But this litle we now haue said concerning it, is sufficient for this place; where all we ayme at is to proue (and I conceiue we haue done it very fully) that when Identity betweene two or more thinges, presenteth it selfe to our vnderstanding, it maketh and forceth knowledge in our soule.

Whence it is manifest, that the same power or soule, which in a single apprehension is possessed with the Entity or Vnity of it, is that very power or soule, which applyed to an Enunciation, knoweth or deemeth; since knowing is nothing else, but the apprehending of manifest Identity in the extremes of a proposition, or an effect immediately consequent out of it, in the soule that applyeth it selfe to apprehend that Identity. Which apprehension is made, eyther by the force of the extremes, applyed immediately to one an other, or else by the application of them to some other thing: which peraduenture may require yet a further application vnto new apprehensions, to make the Identity betweene the first extremes appeare euidently.

Now,6 1.20 as when Identity truly appeareth, it maketh euidence to our vnderstanding, and begetteth assured knowledge in our soule; so, when there is only an apparent Identity, but not a reall one, it happeneth that the vnderstanding is quieted without euidence; and our soule is fraught with a wrong or slight beliefe, insteed of certaine knowledge: as for example, it is for the most part true, that what wise men affirme, is so as they say; but because wise men are but men (and consequently not infaillible) it may happen that in some one thing, the wisest men that are may misse, though in most and generally speaking, they hitt right. Now if any body in a particular occasion, should (without examining the matter) take this propositiō rigorously and peremptorily, that what wise men affirme is true; and should there vpon subsume with euidence, that wise men say such a particular thing, and should there vpon proceede to beleeue it; in this case he may be deceiued, because the first proposition is not verily, but only seemingly euident.

And this is the manner how that kind of deeming, which is eyther opposed, or inferiour to knowledge, is bred in vs: to witt, when eyther through temerity, in such cases where we may, and it is iust we should examine all particulars so carefully, that no equiuocation or mistake in any part of them, be admitted to passe vpon vs for a truth, and yet we do not: or else, through the limitednesse and imperfection of our nature, when the minutenesse and variety of petty circumstances in a businesse is such, as we can nor enter into an exact examination of all that belongeth to that matter, (for if we should exactly discusse euery slight

particular, we should neuer gett through any thing of moment) we settle our vnderstanding vpon groundes, that are not sufficient to moue and determine it. Now in some of these cases, (and particularly in the later) it may happen, that the vnderstanding it selfe is aware, that it neyther hath discouered, nor can discouer euidence enough, to settle its assent with absolute assurance: and then it iudgeth the beliefe it affordeth vnto such a proposition, to be but probable; and insteed of knowledge, hath but opinion concerning it. Which opinion appeareth to it more or lesse probable, according as the motiues it relyeth on, are stronger or weaker.

7 1.21There remaineth yet an other kind of deeming for vs to speake of; which though it euer faile of euidence, yet sometimes it is better then opinion, for sometimes it bringeth certitude with it. This we call faith; and it is bred in this sort: when we meete with a man, who knoweth something which we do not, if withall we be persuaded that he doth not, nor will not tell a lye; we then beleeue what he saith of that thing to be true: now according to the persuasion we haue of his knowledge and veracity, our beliefe is strong, or mingled with doubt: so that if we haue absolute assurance and certainety, that he knoweth the truth and will not lye, then we may be assured, that the faith which we yield to what he sayth, is certaine as well as euident knowledge is certaine, and admitteth no comparison with opinion, be it neuer so probable: but so it may happen, that we may be certainely assured that a man doth know the truth of what he speaketh of, and that he will not lye in reporting it to vs: for seeing no man is wicked without a cause; and that to tell a lye in a serious matter, is a great wickednesse; if once we come to be certaine that he hath no cause, (as it may fall out we may) then it followeth, that we are assured of the thing which he reporteth to vs.

Yet still such faith falleth short of the euidence of knowledge in this regard, that its euidence sticketh one degree on this side the thing it selfe: and at the push, in such a case we see but with an others eyes; and conse∣quently, if any opposition do arise against our thought thereabout, it is not the beames, and light of the thing it selfe, which strengthen vs against such opposition, but the goodnesse of the party vpon whom we rely.

8 1.22Before I go any further, I must needes remember one thing, that our Masters teach vs: which is, that truth and falsehood are first found in sayings or Enuntiations; and that although single apprehensions are in our mind before these iudgements, yet are they not true or false them∣selues, nor is the vnderstanding so by them. To comprehend the reason of this maxime, lett vs consider what truth and falsehood are: surely truth is nothing else, but the confirmity of our vnderstanding, with the thinges that make impression vpon it: and consequently, falsehood is a disagreeing betweene our mind and those thinges: if the existence which the thinges haue in vs, be agreeable to the Existence they haue in them∣selues;

then our vnderstanding is true; otherwise it is false. Now the naturall perfection of our Soule or vnderstanding, is to be fraught with the rest of the whole world, that is to haue the knowledge of all thinges that are; the knowledge of their essences, of their natures, of their proprieties, of their operations, and of whatsoeuer else belongeth to them all in generall, and to euery one of them in particular: but our soule can not be stored or fraught with any thing, by other meanes then by her assent or deeming: wherevpon it followeth, that she can not haue her perfection, vntill her deemings or iudgements be perfect; which is, that they be agreeable vnto the thinges in the world: when they are so, then are they true. And this is the reason why truth is the ayme and perfection of the soule. Now then, truth residing only in the assents and iudgements of the soule, (which are the trafficke whereby she enricheth her selfe with the rest of the world) and they being framed by her discerning an identity betweene two thinges; which she expresseth by affirming one of them of the other: it followeth, that nothing can be true or false, but where there is a composition of two extremes, made by the ones being affirmed of the other; which is done only in Enuntiations or iudgements: whiles single apprehensions assent to nothing, and therefore settle no knowledge in the soule; and conse∣quently are not capable of verity or falsity, but are like pictures made at fansy, some one of which may happen to be like some Person, but can not be said to be the picture of him, because it was not drawne from him: so these bare apprehensions, because there is not in the man vnion of the soule to the outward world, or to the Existence which actuateth its obiect, therefore they make not the soule to be the image of the thinges existent: but the iudgement, which still taketh a thing existent, or as existent, in the subiect of the proposition, draweth its picture from the thing it selfe: and therefore it maketh the soule to be well or ill painted, in respect of the thing that is true or false.

And this is the reason, why in one sense doubtfull propositions, which the vnderstanding (not being yet resolued) maketh inquiringly to informe it selfe of the truth of them, can not be said to be true or false; for all that while, the soule yieldeth no assent vnto them, eyther one way or other; yet in an other sense they may, which is, taking them as subiects that the vnderstanding determineth vnto it selfe to treate of: for there being two extremes in them, and the proposition consisting in this, whether these extremes be identifyed or no, it followeth, that since one part must of necessity be, such a proposition spoken at randome, or written by chance without designe, is of necessity eyther true or false; according as the extremes of it, are or are not one thing.9 1.23

There occurreth no more vnto my consideration to be said in this place, concerning the assents and iudgements of the mind: vnlesse it be, to explicate in a word or two, the seuerall qualities of them, which are found in seueral Persons; and to point at the reason why they are called

by those names, which they are vniuersally knowne by. To which purpose we may obserue, that iudgement or deeming, being a quieting of the mind, it followeth that the mind must needes be in disquiet and at vnrest, before it cometh to iudge: so that we may conclude, that iudgement or thinking, is a good attained by a former motion. Now according to the quality of this motion, the iudgement or assent, is qualifyed and denominated. We must therefore consider what belongeth to motion; which when we haue done, we shall in iudge∣ments find something proportionable therevnto.

We know there is a beginning and an ending in motion; and that there are partes by which it is drawne out in length: all which must be particularly considered, in our comparing of motions vnto iudgemēts. Now then, as he that would know precisely the nature of any motion, must not beginne his suruay of it, after it hath beene some time in fluxe; nor must giue ouer his obseruing it, before it haue arriued vnto its vt∣most periode; but ought to carry his attention along from its first origine, and passe with it through all its partes, vntill it ceasing, giue him leaue to do so too (for otherwise, it may happen that the course of it be differing in those partes he hath not obserued, from those that he hath, and accordingly, the picture he shall make of it by that imperfect s••n••tling, will proue an erroneous one;) so in like manner, when a man is to make a iudgement of any matter in question, to giue a good account of it, he must beginne at the roote, and follow successiuely all the branches it diuideth it selfe into, and driue euery one of them to their vtmost extremity and periode: and according as in iudging he behea∣ueth himselfe well or ill, in the seuerall circumstances that are propor∣tionable to the beginning, ending, and partes of motion; so his iudge∣ment is qualifyed with the names of seuerall vertues agreeing therevnto, or of their opposite defects.

If he beginne his considerations very lowe, and from the very bottome and roote of the affaire, which is from the first and all compre∣hending principles of the question, and proceede on orderly taking all before him; his iudgement is accounted deepe, profound, and solide: for he that casteth so farre, as to leaue behind him no part of the matter he is inquiring about, and then driueth his course steadily and smoothly forwardes, without any leapes ouer rugged passages, or interruptions, or loose breaches; must of necessity make a well grounded iudgement; and such an one, as can not easily be ouerthrowne, or he be easily remoued from it.

And this is indeede the full reason, of what a litle aboue we only glanced att: namely, why vnderstanding men are vsually accounted obstinate in their tenets, and are hard to be remoued from their opinions once settled in their minds: for when other men oppose them,they vrge nothing (for the most part) against these iuditious mens resolutions or beliefes, but what they haue already throughly foreseene: but these on

the other side, do see a great deale, that their opposers reach not vnto; so that notwithstanding all such opposition, they continue still vnshaken in their iudgements: for which, the others which see not as much as they, do thinke them obstinate, and not ledde by reason, because they follow not that short reason, beyond which themselues can not reach.

The contrary vice to this, is called a slight iudgement: and consisteth herein, that a man out of a few, and an insufficient number of circum∣stances, resolueth the whole case: which temerity and short sightednesse of iudgement, is significantly taxed in our English prouerbe, that a fooles bolt is soone shott.10 1.24

Thus much for the beginning of a iudgement: the next conside∣ration may be concerning the end of it; in regard whereof, if it reach to the vtmost extent and periode of what is considerable in a hard question proposed, it gaineth the title of sharpe, or of subtile, and acute; for the hardnenesse of the matter that perplexeth ones iudgement, consisteth in the inuolution of thinges, which looked vpon in grosse, do seeme to haue no distinction or opposition among themselues; and yet are in truth of very different and contrary natures. Now a good iudgement diuideth and cutteth through them, and allotteth vnto euery particular thing its proper limits and boundes: wherefore, as in corporeall substan∣ces, the vertue of diuiding is sharpenesse and edge, by translation from thence, such a iudgement as pierceth neately and smartly betweene con∣tradictories that lye close together, is called sharpe and acute. In like manner, subtility is a vertue, whereby a liquor or other body searcheth euery litle hole and part of what it worketh vpon, till it gett through it; and from thence, it is vsed in iudgements to signify the same: whose opposite vice is called dullenesse.

In the last place we are to examine,11 1.25 what proportion a iudgement holdeth with the partes of motion: in these, two thinges are to be consi∣dered, namely the quantity or multitude of those partes, and the order of them. As for the quantity in a motion, it belongeth eyther to long or short, or to quicke and slow: now, where the beginning and ending are already knowne and determined, and consequently where the length is determined, and dependeth not at all of the iudge to alter it, (for he must take it as the matter giueth it) there a iudgement can acquire no deno∣mination of perfection or deficiency, from length or from shortnesse; for they belong originally to the matter of the iudgement; and the iudgement must accordingly fitt it selfe to that; and therefore is lyable neyther to commendations nor to reproach, for being long or short: it remaineth then, that the vertue is iudging answerable to the quantity of motion, must consist in quickenesse and celerity; and the contrary vice, in slownesse and heauynesse.

As for order in the seuerall partes of motion, we know that if they be well ordered, they are distinct and easily discernable. Which vertue, in our subiect, is called cleerenesse of iudgement; as the contrary vice is confusion.

THE THIRD CHAPTER. Of Discoursing.

1 1.26IN the last Chapter we haue shewed, how two apprehensions ioyned together do make a iudgement: now in this our first employment will be, to shew how three of these thoughts or iudgements, well chosen and duely ordered, do compose the first and most simple of perfect discourses; which Logitians call a syllogisme: whose end and effect is to gaine the knowledge of something, before hidden and vnknowne. The meanes whereby this is compassed, is thus. By the two first iudge∣ments, we ioyne the extremes of the proposition we desire to know, vnto some third thing; and then, by seeing that they both are one third thing, and that one can be but one, we come to discerne, that truly one of them is the other; which before we saw not: so that, the identity which first made an identicall propo∣sition be knowne and agreed vnto, and afterwardes caused the like assent to be yielded vnto those maximes, whose identification presently shewed it selfe, now by a little circuit and bringing in of a third terme, maketh the two first (whose identification was hidden and obscure, whiles we looked vpon the termes themselues) appeare to be in very truth but one thing.

2 1.27The various mingling and disposing of these three termes in the two first propositions, begetteth a variety in the syllogismes that are composed of them: and it consisteth in this, that the assumed terme vnto which the other two are interchangeably ioyned, is eyther said of them, or they are said of it: and from hence spring three different kindes of syllogismes; for eyther the assumed or middle terme, is said of both the other two; or both they are said of it; or it is said of one of them, and the other is said of it: neyther is there any deeper mystery then this, in the three figures, our great Clerkes talke so much of: which being brought into rules, to helpe our memory in the ready vse of this transposition of the termes; if we spinne our thoughts vpon them into ouer small thriddes, and thereof weaue too intricate webbes (meane while not reflecting vpon the solide ground within ourselues, where on these rules are built, not considering the true end why;) we may spend our time in triuiall and vselesse subtilities: and at length, confound and misapply the right vse of our naturall discourse, with a multitude of precepts drawne from artificiall logike.

But to returne to our matter in hand; vnder this primary threefold variety, is an other of greater extent, growing out of the diuers compo∣sition of the three termes, as they are qualifyed by affirmation or negation,

and by vniuersality or particularity: for that vnity, which the two termes, whose identification is enquired after, must haue by being ioyned with the third, becometh much varied by such diuers application: and from hence shooteth vp that multitude of kindes of syllogismes, which our Logitians call moodes. All which I haue thus particularly expressed, to the end we may obserue how this great variety hangeth vpon the sole string of identity.

Now these Syllogismes,3 1.28 being as it were interlaced and wouen one within an other, (so that many of them do make a long chaine, whereof each of them is a linke) do breede, or rather are all the variety of mans life: they are the stepps by which we walke in all our conuersations and in all our businesses: man as he is man, doth nothing else but weaue such chaines: whatsoeuer he doth, swaruing from this worke, he doth as defi∣cient from the nature of man: and if he do ought beyond this, by breaking out into diuers sortes of exteriour actions, he findeth neuer∣thelesse in this linked sequele of simple discourses, the art, the cause, the rule, the boundes, and the modell of it.

Lett vs take a summary view of the vast extent of it, and in what an immēse Ocean one may securely sayle, by that neuer varying compasse, when the needle is rightly touched, and fitted to a well moulded boxe; making still new discoueries of regions, farre out of the sight and beliefe of them, who stand vpon the hither shore. Humane operations are comprised vnder the two generall heades of knowledge and of action: if we looke but in grosse, vpon what an infinity of diuisions these branch themselues into, we shall become giddy, our braines will turne, our eyes will grow weary and dimme, with ayming only att a suddaine and rouing measure of the most conspicuous among them, in the way of know∣ledge. We see what mighty workes men haue extended their labours vnto; not only by wild discourses, of which huge volumes are cōposed, but euen in the rigorous methode of Geometry, Arithmetike, and Algebra; in which, an Euclide, an Apollonius, an Archimedes, a Dio∣phantus, and their followers, haue reached such admirable heights, and haue wound vp such vast bottomes, sometimes shewing by effects, that the thing proposed must needes be as they haue sett downe, and can not possibly be any otherwise; otherwhiles, appaying the vnderstanding (which is neuer truly at rest, till it hath found the causes of the effects it seeth) by exposing how it cometh to be: so that the reader calling to mind, how such a thing was taught him before, and now finding an other vnexpectedly conuinced vpon him, easily seeth that these two put together, do make and force that third to be, whereof he was before in admiration how it could be effected: which two wayes of discourse, are ordinarily knowne by the names of Demonstrations; the one called a Priori, the other a Posteriori.

Now if we looke into the extent of the deductions out of these, we shall find no end. In the heauēs, we may perceiue Astronomy measuring

whatsoeuer we can imagine; and ordering those glorious lights, which our Creator hath hanged out for vs; and shewing them their wayes, and pricking out their pathes, and prescribing them (for as many ages as he pleaseth before hand) the various motions they may not swarue from in the least circumstance. Nor want there sublime soules, that tell vs what mettall they are made of, what figures they haue, vpon what pillars they are fixed, and vpon what gimals they moue and perform•• their various periodes:* 1.29 wittnesse that excellent and admirable worke, I haue so often mentioned in my former Treatise. If we looke vpon the earth, we shall meete with those, that will tell vs how thicke it is, and how much roome it taketh vp: they will shew vs how men and beastes are hanged vnto it by the heeles; how the water and ayre do couer it; what force and power fire hath vpon them all; what working is in the depths of it; and of what composition the maine body of it is framed: where neyther our eyes can reach, nor any of our senses can send its messengers to gather and bring back any relations of it. Yet are not our Masters contented with all this: the whole world of bodies is not enough to satisfy them: the knowledge of all corporeall thinges, and of this vast machine of heauen and earth, with all that they enclose, can not quench the vnlimited thirst of a noble minde, once sett on fire with the beauty and loue of truth.

Aestuat infoelix, angusto limite mundi, Vt Gyarae clausus scopulis, paruâque seripho.

But such heroike spirits, cast their subtile nettes into an other world, after the winged inhabitans of the heauens; and find meanes to bring them also into account, and to serue them (how imperceptible soeuer they be to the senses) as daynties at the soules table. They enquire after a maker of the world we see, and are ourselues a maine part of; and hauing found him, they conclude him (o••t of the force of contradiction) to be aeternall, infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, and a thousand other admirable qualities they determine of him. They search after his tooles and instruments, wherewith he built this vast and admirable pallace, and seeke to grow acquainted with the officiers and stewardes, that vnder him gouerne this orderly and numerous family. They find them to be inuisible creatures, exalted aboue vs more then we can esti∣mate, yet infinitely further short of their and our maker, then we are of them. If this do occasion them, to cast their thoughts vpon man him∣selfe, they find a nature in him (it is true) much inferiour to these admi∣rable Intelligences, yet such an one, as they hope may one day arriue vnto the likenesse of them: and that euen at the present, is of so noble a moulde, as nothing is too bigge for it to faddome, nor any thing too small for it to discerne.

Thus we see knowledge hath no limits; nothing escapeth the toyles of science; all that euer was, that is, or can euer be, is by them circled in:

their extent is so vast, that our very thoughts and ambitiōs are too weake and too poore to hope for, or to ayme at what by them may be cōpassed. And if any man, that is not invred to raise his thoughts aboue the pitch of the outward obiects he cōuerseth dayly with, should suspect that what I haue now said, is rather like the longing dreames of passionate louers, whose desires feede them with impossibilities, then that it is any reall truth; or should imagine that it is but a poetike Idea of science, that neuer was or will be in act: or if any other, that hath his discoursing faculty vitiated and peruerted, by hauing beene imbued in the schooles with vnsound and vmbratile principles, should persuade himselfe, that howsoeuer the pretenders vnto learning and science, may talke loude of all thinges, and make a noise with scholastike termes, and persuade their ignorant hearers that they speake and vnfould deepe mysteries, yet in very truth, nothing at all can be knowne: I shall beseech them both, to suspend their coniectures or beliefes herein, and to reserue their censure of me, whether or no I haue strained too farre, vntill the learned author of the Dialogues of the world, haue enriched it with the worke he hath composed of Metaphysikes: in which, going orderly and rigorously by continued propositions, in such sort as Mathematicians demonstrate their vndertakinges, he hath left no scope for wrangling braines to make the least cauill against his doctrine: and casting his sharpe sighted thoughts ouer the whole extent of nature, and driuing them vp to the Almighty Authour of it, he hath left nothing out of the verge of those rules, and all comprehending principles he giueth of true science. And then I doubt not, but they will througly absolue me frō hauing vsed my amplification, in ayming at the reach of this allgrasping power. For my part, the best expression that I am able to make of this admirable piece, I must borrow from witty Galileus, when he speaketh of Archimedes his long missed booke of glasses; and professe, that hauing some of the Elements or bookes of it entrusted in my handes by the Authour, I read them ouer with extreme amazement, as well as delight, for the wonder∣full subtility, and solidenesse of them.

Thus much for knowledge.4 1.30 Now lett vs cast an eye vpon humane actions. All that we do (if we do it as we should do, and like men) is gouerned and steired by two sortes of qualities: the one of which, we call Artes: the other Prudences. An art, is a collection of generall rules, comprehending some one subiect, vpon which we often worke. The matters we worke vpon (out of which the particular subiects of artes do spring) are of three kindes: our selues, our neighbours, an such dumbe or in sensible thinges, as compose the rest of the world.

Our actions vpon our selues, are the highest and the noblest of all the rest, and those by which we liue and worke as men: or to expresse my selfe better, they are those by which we perfect that part of vs, which maketh vs men, and by which we direct and leuell all we do, according to the rule of reason; not suffering our actions to swarue from what she

dictateth vnto vs. This is done, by multiplying and heightning the thoughts of those thinges, which maintaine vs in reason; whether the motiues be morall, as the examples of worthy persons, and the precepts and persuasions of wise men, and the like; or whether they be naturall, as the consideration of the sweete and contented life, which vertue giueth ve here, by good conuersation, honour, profit, quiet, pleasure, and what else soeuer groweth out of so excellent a roote: as also, of the beatitude and happy state it bringeth vs to in the next; and of the contrary effects which spring from vice. Againe, by obseruing the motiues and wayes of our passions and animall desires, we learne how to preuent them; how to terrify them; and how to weare them gently away by litle and litle, through sometimes giuing them diuersions, through otherwhiles restraining them with moderation, and through oftentimes cutting of the occasions, and abridging them of their naturall encreasings. All these thinges are brought into art and rule; whose lessons, were men but as carefull and industrious to studie, as they are to become Masters in vaine and triuial thinges, they would enioy happy lifes.

5 1.31In the next place, we are to consider the actions whereby we worke vpon our neighbours. They are chiefely gouuernement and negotiation: both which are of one kind; and haue but this difference, that the one is done in common, the other is performed in particular. The meanes by which we command, are rewards and punishments; which who hath in his handes, may assuredly by wise vsing them, bring to passe what∣soeuer he hath a mind vnto.

Vpon occasion of mentioning these two powerfull motiues, which haue so maine an influence in mens actions, we may note by the way, that many of them, and that worke most forcibly vpon mens mindes, are thinges whose subsistence we know not where to find; as honour, praise, glory, command, singularity, eminency, shame, infamy, subiection, reproach, and the like: vnto any of which, none of our senses can reach; and yet they gouerne mans life, in a manner wholy and perfectly.

In negotiation, we propose to single men their owne interests and profits; not such as the proposer can, or will effect; but such as are likely to arise out of the action we endeauour to draw him vnto with whom we treate. In both these, the vsuall labour is, to make our neighbours willing to leaue some present good, in hope of a greater to come; or to be content to vndergoe some present harme, for feare of a greater to ensue. The generall instrument which they vse, is discoursing, whose vertue con∣sisteth partly in our owne mind, and partly in deliuering our mind to others: for first we must know what we should say, and next in what manner we should say it.

6 1.32The art which directeth our owne minde, and teacheth vs what to say, is Logike: whose partes are two; according as the affaires falling into discourse, are likewise of a twofold nature: the one instructeth vs how to

manage and order our reason, when it dealeth with such subiects as we may attaine to certainety in. And here the rules of Demonstration take place; teaching vs to define, to diuide, and to cōclude. The other instruc∣teth vs how to behaue ourselues, when we meete with such subiects, as a good and probable guesse is the farthest we can reach vnto towardes the knowledge of them: and for these, the Topicall part of Logike serueth; the which, taking a view of all the accidents belonging to any thing propounded, sheweth how to draw probabilities from euery one of them.

Our discoursing to others,7 1.33 is eyther to open our mindes barely vnto them; or to persuade them of somewhat ourselues beleeue; or to winne them to somewhat we would haue them do. For the bare deliuery of our mindes to others, we haue Grammar; the scope of which art, consisteth first, in teaching vs to deliuer our conceptions plainely and clearely, (which is the maine intent of speaking) next, in making, our discourse be succinct and briefe, (which is the measure of our speaking, both for ourselues and others;) and lastly, in sorting our wordes, so as what we say, may be accompanied with sweetnesse; both in commō, in regard of the eare, by auoyding such harsh soundes as may offend it; and in particular, in regard of the custome of the language wherein we speake, and of the persons to whom we speake.

The art whereby we may persuade others,8 1.34 and winne them to assent vnto what we would haue them, is Rhetorike. Her rules instruct vs how to dispose and order with best aduantage, in regard of the Auditors dispo∣sition, both the reasons which Logike affordeth vs, and the wordes which Grammar storeth vs with: as also, how to giue life and motion to what we say, by our action and gesture; that so we may persuade our Auditory, such passions raigne in vs, as we seeke to stirre vp in them: for as we may obserue, that one who yawneth, maketh an other likewise yawne; and as our seeing others laugh, prouoketh laughing also in vs (the reasons whereof we haue touched in the former Treatise;) after the same manner, what passion soeuer we exhibite in ourselues, the same stealeth insensibly vpon those we speake vnto; whiles their mind attending to the wordes they heare, is not a ware of the subtile spirits motions, that by a kind of contagion rise and swell in their hartes: according to which naturall inclination in all men, the Master of Poets and excellent obseruer of mens humours said passing well:

Si vis me flere, dolendum est Primùm ipsi tibi.

Hence grow those encreases by metaphores, hyperboles, and other tropes and figures: hence those feruors by interrogations, exclama∣tions, apostrophes, and the like; which when they are fittely placed, they carry the Auditor euen against his will.

9 1.35Poetry, is not a gouernour of our Actions, but by aduantagious expressing some eminent ones, it becometh an vsefull directour to vs; and therefore challengeth a place here. The designe of it is, by represen∣ting humane actions in a more august and admirable hew, them in themselues they vsually haue: to frame specious Ideas, in which the people may see, what is well done, what amisse, what should be done, and what by errour is wont to be done: and to imprint in mens mindes a deepe conceite of the goods and euils, that follow their vertuous or vitious comportement in their lifes.

If those who assume the title of Poets, did ayme at this end, and would hold themselues strictly to it, they would proue as profitable instrumēts as any the commōwealth had: for the delightfullnesse and blithenesse of their compositions, inuiteth most men to be frequently conuersant with them; (eyther in songs, or vpon the stage, or in other Poemes) whiles the sober aspect and seuerity of bare precepts, deturneth many from lending a pleased eare to their wholesome doctrine; and what men swallow with delight, is conuerteth into nourishmēt: so that, if their drift were to settle in mens mindes a due valuation of vertue, and a detestation of vice, no art would do it more vniuersally, nor more effectually: and by it, mens hartes would be sett on fire to the pursuite of the one, and be shrunke vp with dislike and horrour against the other. But vnto such a Poet as would ayme at those noble effects, no knowledge of Morality, nor of the nature and course of humane actions and accidents must be wanting: he must be well versed in History; he must be acquainted with the progresse of nature, in what she bringeth to passe; he must be defi∣cient in no part of Logike, Rhetorike, or Grammar: in a word, he must be consummate in all artes and sciencies, if he will be excellent in his way.

10 1.36But whiles we thus entertaine ourselues with those artes, which serue vs in discoursing with others, it were a great ouersight to forgett that faculty, which is the basis and ground worke of all those: and that is, the power of speech, which nature hath bestowed vpon vs. It consisteth in two actions: the one outward, the other inward: the outward, is the giuing of various soundes to our breath, as it passeth through our mouth, by diuers coniunctions of our tongue, teeth, and lippes, to themselues, or to diuers parts of our mouth, or by their separations from them: in which, we see that birdes are able to imitate vs, and I am persuaded, the like might be effected by insensible creatures, if a dexterous man would employ his time, in contriuing and making an instrument to expresse those different soundes; which, not hauing more then seuen substantiall differences besides the vowels (as some who haue carefully noted them, do affirme) it would peraduenture be no hard matter to compose such an engine.

The inward action of locution, is the framing of conuenient answeres to what is asked; of fitt replies to what is said; and in a word, to

speake appositely, and to the purpose; wherevnto, neyther beast nor dead instrument can be brought, vnlesse the artificier be able to endue it with vnderstanding.

All other artes,11 1.37 instruct vs how to worke orderly vpon beastes and insensible bodies: by some of them, we cultiuate liuing creatures; as when husband men nourish sheepe, oxen, foule, and the like, for slaughter: by others, we discipline them, as when we teach horses, dogges, apes, hawkes, parrats, and some kind of fishes, to hunt, to play, and in a word, to do somewhat eyther for our profit, or for our pleasure: and againe, by others we vse their natures to our endes; as when we lay baites to catch them, when we sett egges vnder hennes, to haue the chickens, and the like: by other artes, we worke as powerfully vpon insensible creatures; among which, by knowing the natures of diuers trees, herbes, minerals, &c: we are able to bring any of them to what vse soeuer we find most expedient for our seruice: from hence grow all those artes and trades, in which we see men dayly spend their whole lifes; so as it is needelesse to insist vpon the particulars of them, since townes and the citties are composed of the seuerall tribes of persons that professe them and liue by them.

But we must not leaue this subiect, without noting how admirably mans witt turneth it selfe to so different sortes, and to such an infinite variety of thinges. For what man is there, (if he be a man) but might haue become Master in any of these so differing trades, in case h•• had applyed himselfe as constantly to that, as he hath done to some other he is perfect in? Againe, lett vs consider how it happeneth often, that he doth not the same thing twice the same way, but according to his owne, or an other mans fansie, changeth his worke at will, now doing it after one fashion, now after an other; as hauing no law or determination from nature, but being wholy left to his owne direction.

There still remaineth one art,12 1.38 not yet spoken of; which knoweth not where to challenge a place, whether among the moderatours of our owne actions, or among those whereby we gouerne thinges: and that is Arithmetike: which seemeth to belong vnto thinges, and yet it meddleth not with them: and againe, it seemeth to be a maine directour of our internall actions, and yet belongeth neyther to Morals, nor to Logike. Wheresoeuer its due be to place it, I am sure it is not to be forgottē; seeing it is so principall an one, as our life can hardly consist without it. It wor∣keth vpon notions that are no where; for euery thing that is in the world, is but one; and to be, or to make a number, can not happen without an vnderstanding: the affections likewise of them, are as the subiect, all inuisible; as to be euen or odde, to be cubes, squares, rootes, &c: and yet how great the power and extent of this art is, none can rightly vnder∣stand or beleeue, but he that hath the knowledge of it, or hath seene the vertue and efficacity of it.

All these artes,13 1.39 consist in common rules, which require the second of

those qualities, whereby we said humane actions are gouerned, to apply them to their particular matter: and that is Prudence; which we may define to be, a quality or power, by whose assistance we apply vnto the matter we are to worke vpon, such instruments, as in our present iudge∣ment appeare fittest to bring it to that passe, which serueth best for our intentions, when by our senses, or by other guesses, we know the parti∣cular dispositions of the matter, and of the instruments wherewith we are to change it. Now howbeit this occurreth generally in all artes, yet its speciall place and necessity, is in gouerning and moderating our owne or other mens Morall actions; and accordingly, its name is especially addicted therevnto: and that man is said to be prudent or discreete, who gouerneth himselfe and others well.

This quality of Morall Prudence in generall, is diuided into three particular ones: the first of which, belongeth to a gouernour in a state or commonwealth: the next may be assigned to him that is skillfull in the lawes: and the third concerneth the managing and conduct of military actions. The reason of this long receiued distribution peraduenture is, because in these occurrences, our passion swayeth vs generally more then in any others: and the operation and effect of Prudence, (whose prouince is to curbe and moderate our passions by reason) is greatest, and appeareth most in those subiects, where passion raigneth vsually with greatest impetuosity.

14 1.40Thus haue we runne ouer the maine partes of discourse, and the generall heades of mans action as man: which peraduenture may through their numerousnesse, appeare to be as it were but loosely scattered from our penne; (as happeneth vnto all materials, that must serue for after buildinges; and that till they be employed, require no more but sorting, and laying together in seuerall heapes, to the end they may be ready for vse:) and therefore before we go any further, it will not be amisse to make reflexions vpon what we haue said; and to draw it neerer our intended scope; and to square out and giue some figure and polishing to these stones, here where we digge them out of the quarry, whereby they may hereafter with lesse adoe, fitt the places we haue assigned them, in the structure we intend: and so, a litle trouble here, whiles our tooles are still in our handes, and our matter lyeth ready for our stroakes, and our thoughts are warmeth with working vpon them, may saue vs a great deale there, where our maine employment will be, to lay artificially, and to ioyne closely, what now we but hew out: and there∣fore will require finer instruments, and a sharper edge, then what at present serueth our turne.

Lett vs then bring backe to account all we haue said in this Chapter: and when we haue well reflected vpon euery particular, we shall find they all agree in this, that they are nothing else, but a due ordering of one thing with an other: a syllogisme, is an ordering of some few notions: a science is an ordering of syllogismes, in such sort, as a new

proposition may follow out of those which went before: and as we se that when by our thoughts diuers syllogismes are well ordered, hidden thinges come to be disclosed in our vnderstanding; euen so among bodies, if thinges whose proprieties are knowne, be likewise ordered and put together, those very effects, which were discouered by the ordering of notions in our head, will spring forth in nature: as for example, if by knowing the natures of fire and of towe, our discourse findeth that towe put to fire will presently become fire, the same will happen in nature, if we put materiall towe, or some other body that hath the qualities of it, to reall fire, or to some other substance that is endewed with the vertues of fire: in like manner, if by knowing that colours are nothing else, but various mixtures of light and of darkenesse in bodies, our discourse assureth vs, that by seuerall compoundings of these extremes, reds, blewes, yellowes, greenes, and all other intermediate colours may be generated; accordingly we shall find in effect, that by the seuerall minglings of blacke and white bodies (because they reflect or drowne light most powerfully) or by interweauing streames of pure light and of shadowes one with an other, we may procreate new colours in bodies, and begett new luminous appearances to our eyes: so that hence it appeareth clearely, that the same nature is in our vnderstanding, and in the thinges: and that the same ordering, which in the one maketh science, in the other causeth naturall transmutations.

An other reflexion, which will be fitt for vs to make vpon these long discourses, is this, that of necessity there must be a ioyning of some thinges now actually in our knowledge, vnto other thinges we thinke not of: for it is manifest, that we can not at the same time actually thinke of a whole booke of Euclide; and yet to the due knowledge of some of the last propositions, the knowledge of almost all the former is required: likewise it is impossible we should at the same time thinke of all the multitude of rules belonging to any art, as of Grammar, of Metering, of Architecture; and yet when we write in Latine, make a poeme, or lay the designe of a house, we practise them whiles we thinke not of them, and are assured we goe not against them, howeuer we remember them not.

Nay, euen before we know a thing, we seeme to know it; for since we can haue a desire of nothing, but of what we know▪ how could we desire to know such or such a thing, vnlesse we know both it, and the know∣ledge of it? And for the most part we see a horse, or man, or herbe, or workemanshippe, and by our sense haue knowledge that such a thing it is, before we know what, or who, or how, it is: that groweth afterwardes out of the diligent obseruation of what we see: which is that, whereby learned men differ from the vnlearned, for what striketh the sense, is knowne a like by them both but then here is the difference betweene them, the later sorth sitteth still with those notions, that are made at the first, by the beating of our sense vpon vs, without driuing them any

further: and those that are learned, do resolue such compounded notions, into others made by more common beatinges, and therefore more simple: and this is all the oddes in regard of knowledge, that a scholler hath of an vnlettered man.

One obseruation more we will draw out of what we haue said, and then end this Chapter: it is, how a man doth oftentimes enquire among his owne thoughts, and turneth vp and downe the images he hath in his head, and beateth his braines, to call such thinges into his minde, as are vsefull vnto him, and are for the present out of his memory: which, as we see it so necessary, that without it no matter of importance can be performed in the way of discourse (whereof I my selfe haue too frequent experience in the writing of this Treatise) so on the other side, we can not perceiue that any creature besides man, doth it of sett purpose and formally as man doth.

THE FOVRTH CHAPTER. How a man proceedeth to Action.

1 1.41HAuing thus taken a summary view of the principall Quali∣ties a man is endewed withall, Apprehending, Iudging, and Discoursing; and hauing shewed how he is enriched in and by them with the natures of all thinges in the world; it remaineth for our last worke in this part, to consider in what manner he maketh vse of this treasure in his ordinary actions: which it is euident are of two different kindes, and consequently haue two seuerall principles, vnderstanding and sense; these sway by turnes, and sometimes ioyne together, to produce a mixed action of both.

If only sense were the fountaine from whence his actions spring, we should obserue no other straine in any of them, then meerely that according to which beastes performe theirs: they would proceede euer more in a constant vnuaryable tenour, according to the law of materiall thinges, one body working vpon an other, in such sort as we haue declared in the former Treatise.

On the other side, if a man were all vnderstanding, and had not this bright lampe enclosed in a pitcher of clay, the beames of it would shine without any allay of dimmenesse, through all he did; and he could do nothing contrary to reason, in pursuite of the highest end he had pre∣fixed vnto himselfe; for he neyther would, nor could do any thing whatsoeuer, vntill he had first considered all the particular circumstāces, that had relation to his action in hand; and had then concluded, that vpon the whole matter, at this time, and in this place, to attaine this end, it is fitting and best to do thus or thus: which conclusion could be no sooner made, but that the action would without any further disposition

on his side, immediately ensue, agreeable to the principles it springeth from. Both partes of this assertion are manifest: for the first, it is euident, that whensoeuer an Agent worketh by knowledge, he is vnresolued whether he shall worke or not worke, as also of his manner of working, vntill his knowledge (that ought to direct and gouerne his working) be perfect and complete: but that can not be, as long as any circumstance not as yet considered, may make it seeme fitt or vnfitt to proceede: and therefore, such actions as are done without exact consideration of euery particular circumstance, do not flow from a pure vnderstanding. From whence if followeth, that when an vnderstanding is not satisfyed of euery particular circumstance, and consequently can not determine what he must immediately do, but apprehendeth that some of the cir∣cumstances not as yet considered, may (or rather must) change some part of his action, it must of necessity be vndetermined in respect of the immediate action; and consequently, it must refraine absolutely from working. The other part is cleare; to witt, that when the vnderstanding, vpon consideration of all circumstances, knoweth absolutely what is best, the act on followeth immediately (as farre as dependeth of the vnderstanding) without any further disposition on his behalfe: for seeing that nothing but knowledge belongeth to the vnderstanding, he who supposeth all knowledge in it, alloweth all that is requisite or possible for it to worke by: now if all be put, nothing is wanting that should cause it to worke: but where no cause is wanting, but all requisite causes are actually being, the effect must also actually be, and follow immediately out of them: and consequently, the action is done, (in as much as con∣cerneth the vnderstanding, and indeede absolutely, vnlesse some other cause do faile) as soone as the vnderstanding knoweth all the circum∣stances belonging to it: so as it is manifest out of this whole discourse, that if a man wrought only by his vnderstanding, all his actions would be discreete and rationall, in respect of the end he had proposed to himselfe; and till he were assured what were best he would keepe himselfe in suspens and do nothing; and as soone as he were so, he would admitt of no delayes, but would at the instant proceede to action according to hi•• knowledge: the contrary of all which, we dayly see by experience in euery man.

We may then safely conclude,2 1.42 that in humane nature there are two different centers, from whence crosse actions do flow: the one he hath common with beasts, and whose principles and lawes we deliuered in the former Treatise, where we discoursed of life, and the motions of life and of passions: the other is the subiect of our present enquiry; which in this place, expecteth at our handes, that we should consider how it demeaneth it selfe, and what it doth in vs, when by its guidance we proceede to any action. Experience must be our informer in generall: after which, our discourse shall anatomise what that presenteth vs in bulke. She giueth vs notice of three especiall effects of our vnderstāding:

first, that it ordereth a right those conceptions which are brought vnto it: secondly, that when they appeare to be not sufficient for the intended worke, it casteth about and seeketh out others: and thirdly, that it strengthneth those actions which spring from it; and keepeth them regular and firme and constant to their beginnings and principles. Vnto which last seemeth to belong, that it sometimes ch••cketh its owne thoughts, and bringeth backe those it would haue, and appeareth to keepe as it were a watch ouer its owne wayes.

As for the ordering of the present notions, it is cleare that it is done by a secret dependance from the rules of discourse, and from the maximes of humane action: I call this dependance a secret one, because a man in his ordinary course, maketh vse of those rules and maximes which serue his turne as though they were instilled into him by nature, without so much as euer thinking of them, or reflecting vpon them to square out his actions by them: nay, some of them so farre out of the reach of most men, as they can not thinke of them, though they would; for they know them not: as in particular, the rules of discourse, the vse of which is so necessary, as without it no man can conuerse with an other, nor do any thing like a man, that is, reasonably. From whence then can this proceede, that so familiarly and readily a man maketh vse of what he is not conscious to himselfe that he hath any acquaintance withall? It can be nothing else, but that the soule, being in her owne nature ordered to do the same thing▪ which schollers with much difficulty arriue to know what it is by reflection and study, and then frame rules of that after∣wardes carry their discourse to a higher pitch, she by an inborne vertue maketh a man do it orderly, constantly, and certainely.

3 1.43The like may be obserued in the dayly vse men make of the maximes of humane action: which are certaine knowledges that formerly they haue gotten, but that th••y vsually thinke not of, whiles they worke agreeable to them; yet it seemeth they worke by them; for if their action should iarre against any of them, they would presently reflect vpon their Maxime, and by it correct what they were about: for example, one who is skilled in the rules of Grammar, or of accenting his speech, or hath his eare vsed to Musike, whiles he heareth true construction, or euen verse, or consonant song, neuer reflecteth how it is made; or at most doth but consider in grosse, that it is right: but if a solecisme, or false quantity, or discorde interuene he presently is aware, not only that it is amisse, but remembreth the very particular precise rule, against which the breach is made.

This at the first sight might occasion vs to imagine, that the rules by which any composition is made, do w••••ke only negatiuely in vs, whiles we are busie about it: that is, that they contribute nothing to the making of the thing, but only hinder vs from committing errors: but if we consider the matter well, we shall find it impossible, but that they should worke euen positiuely in vs; for we know that when we first

learne any of these thinges, we looke industriously for such a gender, or number, or case, or tense, for such a foote or quantity, such a note, or consonance; and we are sure, that vse and practise of the same thing, doth not change, but only facilitate the worke: therefore it followeth of necessity, that we still vse those very instructions, by which at the first we could but slowly creepe, but now manage them with such celerity, as our fansy can not keepe pace with what we do. And this is the reasō why we do not perceiue that we thinke of them, but may peraduenture at the same time thinke of a quite different matter; as when a musitian playeth voluntary diuision vpon a ground he neuer saw before, and yet hath all the while some other thought in his head; or when a painter draweth a picture, and all the while discourseth with a by stander.

This truth may be conuinced by an other argument: as thus; it can not be doubted, but that a verse or song is made by the power of making such compositions: but that power is the art of them; and that art is nothing else but the rules whereby they are made: and accordingly we see, that who hath not the art, can not make such compositions: but who hath, can when he pleaseth: and if any man would be able to make them, he presently studyeth the art: so that it can not be doubted, but that artificiall thinges are alwayes made by the vse of those rules which teach the making of them; although for the most part we are not able to perceiue how such rules are vsed▪ and besides this, we are sure that we do not only make vse of those rules we learned at the first, but when we are arriued to Maistery in any art, we make vse of them in a quite different manner then we did in the beginning, and then we do in any other thing, wherein we find paine and difficulty.

In the second effect that we experience of our vnderstanding,4 1.44 (which is, our casting about for new conceptions, when those it already hath, appeare not sufficient to direct what it hath in hand) the force and working of it, is very euident: for this effect proceedeth out of a want of satisfaction: and this belongeth properly to the vnderstanding; for if euidence and satisfaction be qualities of it, then of necessity the priuation of these qualities, must likewise belong vnto it; as also to discerne that priuation, and to vse meanes to auoyde it: and in the very casting about, we see a choice made; and that thinges are not taken promiscuously as they come of a rowe, but that some of them are sett aside, and others aduanced for vse: which argueth plainely the know∣ledge and gouernement of the vnderstanding.5 1.45

But the third operation, is that which giueth clearest euidence of the peculiar and distinct working of the vnderstanding: for if we marke the contestation and strife within vs, betweene our sensuall part and his antagonist which mainteneth the resolution sett by reason, and obserue how exceedingly their courses and proceedings differ from one an other; we shall more plainely discerne the nature, and power, and efficacy of both of them. We may perceiue that the motions against Reason, rise

vp turbulently, as it were in billowes, and like a hill of boyling water (as truly Passion is a conglobation of spitits) do putt vs into an vnquiet and distempered heate and confusion: on the other side, Reason endea∣uoureth to keepe vs in our due temper, by sometimes commanding downe this growing sea; otherwhiles, by contenting in some measure the desires of it, and so diuerting an other way its vnruly force: some∣times she terrifyeth it, by the proposall of offensiue thinges ioyned vnto those it is so earnest to enioy: againe, sometimes she preuenteth it, by cutting of all the causes and helpes that promote on its impotent desires, and by engaging before hand the power of it in other thinges, and the like.

All which do euidently conuince, that as Reason hath a great strength and power in opposition of sense, so it must be a quite different thing, and of a contrary nature vnto it: we may adde, that the worke of Reason can neuer be well performed, but in a great quiet and tranquillity; whereas the motions of Passion, are alwayes accompan••ed with disorder and perturbation: so as it appeareth manifestly, that the force of Reason, is not purely the force of its instruments, but the force of its instruments as they are guided, and as the quantities of them are propor∣tioned by it: and this force of Reason, is different from the force of its instruments in themselues, in such sort as the force of a song, is different from the force of the same soundes, whereof it is composed, taken without that order which the musitian putteth in them: for otherwise the more spirits that are raysed by any thought (which spirits are the instruments whereby Reason performeth all her operations in vs) the more strongly Reason should worke; the contrary of which is euident, for we see that too great aboundance of spirits confoundeth Reason.

6 1.46This is as much as at present I intend to insist vpon, for proofe that our vnderstanding hath its proper and distinct operations, and worketh in a peculiar manner, and in a quite different straine from all that is done by our senses. Peraduenture some may conceiue, that the watchfulnesse and recalling of our thoughts backe to their enioyned worke, when they breake loose and runne astray, and our not letting them range abroad at randome, doth also conuince this assertion: but I confesse ingeniously, the testimony of it seemeth not cleare to me; and therefore I ranke it not with those, that I would haue (if it may be) solidely weighty, and vndenyable to who shall consider maturely the bottome and full efficaciousnesse of them. Of such, a few, or any one, is enough to settle ones mind in the beliefe of a truth: and I hope, that this which we haue laboured for in this Chapter, is so sufficiently proued, as we neede not make vp our euidence with number of testimonies.

But to shew the exceptions I take against this argument, lett vs examine, how this act within vs which we call watchfullnesse, is performed: truly, me thinketh it appeareth to be nothing else, but the promptitude and recourse of some spirits, that are proper for this effect,

which by a mans earnestnesse in his resolutiō, do take a strōg impression, and so are still ready to knocke frequently at the dore of our vnder∣stāding, and thereby enable it with power to recall our strayed thougths. Nay, the very reflexion it selfe, which we make vpon our thoughts, seemeth vnto me to be only this, that the obiect beating vpon the fansie, carryeth backe with it at its retiring from thence, some litle particle or atome of the braine or Septum Lucidum, against which it beateth, sticking vpon it; in like manner as vpon an other occasion, we instanced in a ball rebounding from a greene mudde wall, vnto which some of the matter of the wall must needes adhere: now this obiect, together with the addition it getteth by its stroake vpon the fansie, rebounding thēce, and hauing no more to do there at present, betaketh it selfe to rest quietly in some cell it is disposed into in the braine, as we haue deliuered at large in our former Treatise, where we discoursed of Memory: but whensoeuer it is called for againe by the fansie, or vpon any other occasion returneth thither, it cometh as it were capped with this addi∣tional piece it acquired formerly in the fansie; and so maketh a represen∣tation of its owne hauing beene formerly there.

Yet, be these actions performed how they will, it can not be denyed, but that both of them are such, as are not fitt, nor would be any wayes vsefull to creatures, that haue not the power of ordering their owne thoughts and fansies, but are gouerned throughout meerely by an vniforme course of nature: which ordering of thoughts, being an operation feasible only by rationall creatures, and by none others, these two actions (which would be in vaine, where such ordering is not vsed) seeme to be specially ordained by nature, for the seruice of Reason and of the Vnderstanding; although peraduenture a precise proper working of the vnderstanding, do not cleerely shine in it. Much lesse can we by experience find among all the actions we haue hitherto spoken of, that our Reason or Vnderstanding worketh singly and alone by it selfe, without the assistance and consortshippe of the fantasie: and as litle can I tell how go about to seeke any experience of it.

But what Reason may do in this particular,7 1.47 we shall hereafter enquire: and end this Chapter, with collecting out of what is said, how it fareth with vs, when we do any thing against Reason, or against our owne knowledge. If this happen by surprise, it is plaine that the watch of Reason was not so strong as it should haue beene, to preuent the admittance or continuance of those thoughts, which worke that transgression. Againe, if it be occasioned by Passion, it is euident that in this case▪ the multitude and violence of those spirits which Passion sendeth boyling vp to the fantasie, is so great, as the other spirits, which are in the iurisdiction and gouernement of Reason, are not able for the present to ballance them and stay their impetuosity, whiles she maketh truth appeare. Sometimes we may obserue, that Reason hath warning enough, to muster together all her forces, to encounter, as it were in sett

battaile, the assault of some concupiscence, that sendeth his vnruly bandes to take possession of the fansie, and constraine it to serue their desires, and by it to bring Reason to their bente. Now if in this pitched field she loose the bridle, and be carryed away against her owne resolu∣tions, and be forced like a captiue to obey the others lawes, it is cleare that her strength was not so great as the contrary factions.

The cause of which is euident; for we know that she can do nothing, but by the assistance of the spirits which inhabite the braine: now then it followeth, that if she haue not the command of those spirits which flocke thither, she must of necessity be carryed alōg by the streame of the greater and stronger multitude; which in our case, is the throng of those that are sent vp into the braine by the desired obiect; and they come thither so thicke and so forcibly, that they displace the others which fought vnder Reasons standard: which if they do totally, and excluding reasons party, do entirely possesse the fansie with their troupes, (as in maddenesse and in extremity of suddaine passion it happeneth) then must Reason wholy follow their sway, without any struggling at all against it; for whatsoeuer beateth on the fansie, occasioneth her to worke; and therefore when nothing beateth there but the messengers of some sensuall obiect, she can make no resistance to what they impose: but if it bappen that these tumultuary ones, be not the only spirits which beate there, but that Reason hath likewise some vnder her iurisdiction, which keepe possession for her, though they be too weake to turne the others out of dores; then it is true, she can still direct fairely, how in that case a man should gouerne himselfe; but when he cometh to execute; he findeth his sinewes already posessed, and swelled with the contrary spirits; and they keeping out the smaller and weaker number, which reason hath ranked in order, and would furnish those partes withall, he is drawne euen against his iudgement and Reason, to obey their appetites, and to moue himselfe in prosecution of what they propose; in such sort as the Poet expresseth that Medea found in her selfe, when she complained and bemoaned her selfe in these wordes: Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor: and in this case, a man foreseeth his misery all the way he rouleth towardes it, and leapeth into the precipice with his eyes open: which sheweth that the army of thoughts on Reasons side, should be encreased in number, to haue her strong enough to wage battaile with the rebellious aduersary: or else, that her aduersary should be so much weakened, that she, though not growne stronger in her selfe, yet might, through the others enfeebling, be able to make her party good; (and hence is the vse of corporeall mortifications, to subiect our Passions to the beheast of Reason) euen as when we see, that when we are in health, our armes, and legges, and all our limbes, obey our will, reaching what we command them, and carrying vs whither we desire, because the spirits which are sent into them from our braine, are strong enough to raise and moue them as they are directed; but if our sinewes

be so steeped in some cold and watry humour, that the spirits coming downe, find not meanes to swell and harden them; well we may wish and striue, but all in vaine: for we shall not be able to make them performe their due functions. In like manner, if reason do send her emissaries into the same arme or legge or other member, and no other spirits do there striue against them, then that limbe is moued and gouerned absolutely according to her directions: but if at the same time, a greater multitude of others, do hinder Reasons seruants from coming thither, or flocking into other sinewes, do carry that limbe a contrary way; in vaine doth Reason striue to moue them to her byas; for those obeyng partes must obserue the rules which the violent conquerour prescribeth.

THE FIFT CHAPTER. Containing proofes out of our single apprehensions, that our soule is incorporeall.

AS in our first Treatise we dissected nature,1 1.48 and shewed, how out of the notion and first diuision of Quantity, ariseth that vast multiplicity of thinges, which filling this world, falleth vnder the consideration of our senses: so in the beginning of this second Treatise, we haue searched into those operations of a man (attributed to his soule) by which he is conceiued to excell all other liuing creatures: and there discouered, that the admirable, and vnlimited variety of workes, which is seene in mens writinges and actions, doth all flow from the source of single apprehensions; and euen from one bare notion of Being: which is the roote and principle, from whence all others deriue their origine; and into which all may be resolued; workes proceeding from resolutions, they from discourses, these being compo∣sed to iudgements, and iudgements of single apprehensions. This part we must now reuiew, and enquire what we can find in mans operation, arguing the Quality of his Soule, whether it be corporeall or no. For if these single apprehensions, and the processes compounded of them, may be performed by the ordering of rare and dense partes (as the other workes of nature are) then they will be corporeall, and of the same kind with those, which we opened in the first Treatise: but if we shall proue, that they can not possibly be deduced from multiplicity, and order of Quantitatiue partes, then we may confidently resolue ourselues, that in the cause from which they flow, is a nature wholy discrepant from that which resideth among bodies, and among corporeall thinges.

This we shall here labour to do: and to that end, we will beginne our worke with reflecting vpon what we haue deliuered of a single appre∣hension, in the first Chapter of this second Treatise: whose nature we there first explicated common; and thence proceeded to some parti∣cular

apprehensions; and lastly shewed the extent they comprehended. These then must be the subiect of our present speculation.

2 1.49As for their nature, we may remember, how we resolued three thinges: first, that by apprehension, the very thing apprehended is by it selfe in our soule: next, that the notion of Being, is the first of all notions, and is resumed in all others: and thirdly, that what is added to the notion of Being, is but respects to other thinges. Now then lett vs consider, what kind of engines they must be, that may haue the power to make thinges themselues to be in our soule, if they were to be there materially? How shall the place, or the time passed, be remoued, and be putt in an other place, and in an other time? How shall the quātity of the heauēs, of the whole world, nay of biggenesse exceeding all that by millions of pro∣portionall encreases, be shutt vp in the litle circuite of mans braine? And yet if we examine our selues strictly, we shall find nothing wanting; all is there. How shall the same thing, be corporeally in two, nay in two thousand places, at the same time? And yet, in so many is the sunne, when two thousand men thinke of it at once. We must then allow, that thinges are there immaterially; and consequently, that what receiueth them, is immateriall: since euery thing is receiued according to the measure and nature of what receiueth it.

But I easily conceiue, that the strangenesse and incredibility of our position, may counterballance the force of it: for who can persuade himselfe, that the very thing he apprehendeth, is in his minde? I acknow∣ledge, that if its being there, were to be vnderstood corporeally, it were impossible: but on the other side, who shall consider, that he knoweth the thing he ••ightly apprehendeth, that it worketh in him, and maketh him worke agreeable to its nature, and that all the properties and singu∣larities of it may be displayed by what is in him, and are as it were vnfoulded in his mind, he can neyther deny nor doubt, but that it is there in an admirable and spirituall manner. If you aske me how this cometh to passe? And by what artifice, bodies are thus spiritualized? I cōfesse I shall not be able to satisfy you: but must answere, that it is done, I know not how, by the power of the soule: shew me a soule, and I will tell you how it worketh: but as we are sure there is a soule, (that is to say, a Principle from whēce these operatiōs spring) though we can not see it: so we may, and do certainely know, that this mystery is as we say; though because we vnderstand not the true and complete nature of a soule, we can as litle expresse the manner, how it is done by a soule. Yet, before we take our leaue of this matter of Apprehensions, we will in due place en∣deauour to say something towardes the clearing of this obscure point.

3 1.50Our second consideration vpon the nature of Apprehension, was, that our primary and maine notion, is of Being. This discouereth some litle glympse of the nature of the soule: for it is manifest that she applyeth this notion, as well to no partes, as to partes: which we proued in the first Treatise, when we shewed that we haue a particular notion of substance,

distinct from the notion of Quantity; for quantity and Partes being the same, it followeth that if there be a notion supposed by quantity, (as in substance there is) it must of necessity abstract from partes: and conse∣quently, we may conclude, that the notion of Being, which is indiffe∣rently applyable eyther to quantity or to substance, doth of its owne nature wholy abstract eyther from Partes, or from no Partes. I then inferre: that since this notion of Being, is the very first and virgin notion our soule is imbued with or is capable of, and that it is the roote of all other notions, and into which she resolueth euery other notion, in such sort, as when we haue sifted and searsed the essence of any notion what∣soeuer, we can discouer nothing that is deeper then this, or precedent to it, and that it agreeth so completely with our soule, as she seemeth to be nothing else but a capacity fitted to Being; it can not be denyed, but that our soule must needes haue a very neere affinity and resēblance of nature with it: but it is euident, that Being hath not of it selfe any partes in it, nor of it selfe is capable of diuision: and therefore it is as euident, that the soule, which is framed (as it were) by that patterne and Idea, and is fitted for Bein•• as for its end, must also of it selfe be voyde of partes, and be in capable of diuisiō. For how can partes be fitted to an indiuisible thing? And how can two such different natures euer meete porportionably?

If it be obiected, that the very notion of Being, from whence we estimate the nature of the soule, is accommodable to partes: as for example, we see that substance is endewed with quantity. We answere, that euen this doth corroborate our proofe: for seing that the substances, which our senses are acquainted withall, haue partes, and can not be without partes; and yet neuerthelesse in our soule, the notion of such substance is found without partes; it is cleare, that such substance hath this meerely from our soule: and because it hath this indisibi∣lity from our soule, it followeth that our soule hath a power and nature to bestow indiuisibility vpon what cometh into her. And since it can not be denyed, but that if any substance were once existent without partes, it could neuer after haue partes; it is euident, that the nature of the soule is incapable of partes; because it is existent without partes. And that it is in such sort existent, is cleare: for this effect of the soules giuing indiuisibility vnto what she receiueth into her, proceedeth from her as she is existent. Now since this notion of Being, is of all others the first and originall notion that is in the soule, it must needes aboue all others, sauour most of the proper and genuine nature of the soule: in which, and by which, it is what it is, and hath its indiuisibility.

If then it be pressed; how can substance (in reality or in thinges) be accommodated vnto Quantity, seing that of it selfe it is indiuisible? We answere, that such substance, as is the subiect of Quantity, and that hath Quantity, is not indiuisible; for such substance can not be subsistent without Quantity▪ and when we frame a notion of it, as being indiuisible, it is an effect of the force of our soule, that is able to draw a notion out

of a thing that hath partes, without drawing the notion of the partes: which sheweth ma••ifestly, that in her there is a power aboue hauing of partes: which being in her, argueth her existence to be such.

4 1.51Our last consideration vpon the nature of apprehension, was, how all that is added to the notion of Being, is nothing else but respects of one thing to an other; and how by these respects, all the thinges of the world come to be in our soule. The euidēce we may draw from hence of our soules immateriality, will be not a whitt lesse, then eyther of the two former: for lett vs cast our lookes ouer all that cometh into our senses, and see if from one end to an other, we can meete with such a thing as we call a respect: it hath neyther figure, nor colour, nor smell, nor motion, nor tast, nor touch; it hath no similitude to be drawne out of by meanes of our senses: to be like, to be halfe, to be cause, or effect, what is it? The thinges (indeed) that are so, haue their resemblances and pictures; but which way should a painter go about to draw a likenesse? Or to paint a halfe, or a cause, or an effect? If we haue any vnderstanding, we can not choose but vnderstand, that these notions are extremely different, from whatsoeuer cometh in vnto vs by the mediation of our senses: and then if we reflect, how the whole negotiation of our vnder∣standing is in, and by respects; must it not follow necessarily, that our soule is of an extreme different nature from our senses, and from our Imagination? Nay, if we looke well into this argument, we shall see, that whereas Aristotle pretendeth, that Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu; this Maxime is so farre from being true, (in rigour of the wordes) that the quite contrary followeth vndenyably out of it; to witt, that Nihil est in intellectu quod fuit prius in sensu. Which I do not say to contradict Aristotle (for his wordes are true in the meaning he spoke them;) but to shew, how thinges are so much changed by coming into the vnderstanding and into the soule, that although on the one side, they be the very same thinges, yet on the other side there remaineth no likenesse at all between them in themselues as they are in the vnder∣stading; which is a most euident proofe, (when the weight of it is duely considered) that the nature of our soule, is mainely different from the nature of all corporeall thinges, that come into our sense.

By this which we now come from declaring, the admiration, how corporeall thinges can be in the soule,5 1.52 and how they are spiritualized by their being so, will in part be taken away: for reflecting that all the notiōs of the soule, are nothing but the generall notion of a substance, or of a thing ioyned with some particular respect; ••f then we consider, that the respects may be so ordered, that one respect may be included in an other, we shall see, that there may be some one respect, which may include all those respects that explicate the nature of some one thing: and in this case, the generall notion of a thing coupled with this respect, will containe all whatsoeuer is in the thing: as for example, the notion of a knife, that it is a thing to cutt withall, includeth (as we haue formerly

declared) all that belongeth vnto a knife. And thus you see, how that mysticall phrase, of corporeall thinges being spiritualized in the soule, signifyeth no more, but that the similitudes which are of them in the soule, are Respects.

Thus hauing collected out of the nature of Apprehension in common,6 1.53 as much as we conceiue needefull in this place to proue our assertion, our next worke must be, to try if we can do the like by reflecting vpon particular apprehensions. We considered them of two sortes, calling one kind, vniuersall ones; and the other, collectiue ones: in the vniuersall ones, we tooke notice of two conditions, the abstraction, and the vniuer∣sality of them: now truly if we had no other euidence, but what will rise from the first of these, that alone would conuince and carry the conclu∣sion: for though among corporeall thinges, the same may be now in one place, now in an other, or sometimes haue one figure, sometimes an other, and still be the same thinges, as for example waxe or water; yet, it is impos∣sible to imagine any bodily thing whatsoeuer, to be at any time without all kind of figure, or without any place at all, or indifferent to this or to that; and neuerthelesse, all thinges whatsoeuer, when they are vniuersally apprehended by the soule, haue this condition in her by reason of their abstraction there, which in themselues is impossible vnto them. When we say water, fire, gold, siluer, bread &c: do we meane or expresse any determinate figure? If we do, none but that precise figure, will serue or content vs: but it is euident, that of a hundred different ones, any and euery one doth a like entirely satisfy vs: when we call for money, if we reflect vpon our fansy, peraduenture we shall find there a purse of crownes: neuerthelesse, if our messenger bringes vs a purse of pistoles, we shall not except against it, as not being what we intended in our mind, because it is not that which was painted in our fansie: it is therefore euident, that our meaning and our fansie were different; for otherwise, nothing would haue satisfyed vs, but that which was in our fansy. Like∣wise, in the very word (which is the picture of our notion) we see an indifferency; for no dictionary will tell vs, that this word Money doth not signify as well pistoles as crownes: and accordingly we see, that if our meaning had beene precisely of crownes, we should haue blamed our∣selues for not hauing named crownes, and not him that brought vs pistoles, when we spoke to him by the name of money: and therefore it is most cleare, that our vnderstanding or meaning is not fixed or deter∣mined to any one particular; but is equally indifferent to all: and conse∣quently, that it can not be like any thing which entereth by the senses; and therefore not corporeall.

The second cōdition of Vniuersall Apprehensions, is their vniuersality:7 1.54 which addeth vnto their abstractiō, one admirable particularity, and it is, that they abstract in such sort, as to expresse at the same time euen the very thing they abstract from. How is it possible, that the same thing, can be, and not be in the same notion? Yet lett a man consider what he

meaneth when he saith, Euery man hath two eyes; and he shall see that he expresseth nothing, whereby any one man is distinguished from an other: and yet the force of this word Euery, doth expresse that euery man is distinguished from an other; so that in truth, he expresseth particularity it selfe in common. Now, lett our smartest and ingeniousest aduersary, shew or imagine if he can, how this may be done in a picture, or in a statue, or in any resemblance of a body or bodily thing: but if he can not, lett him acknowledge an eminent and singular propriety in the soule, that is able to do it.

Let vs reflect, that particularity in a body, is a collection of diuerse qualities and circumstances; as that it is white, of such a figure, in such a place, in such a time, and an infinitude of such like conditions, conglo∣bated together: then, if our soule be a body, the expression of the parti∣cularity of a body in the soule, must be a participation in her of such a conglobation, or of such thinges conglobated. Now lett vs imagine if we can, how such a participation should be in common, and should abstract from all colour, all place, and all those thinges of which the conglobation consisteth: and yet we see, that in the soule this is done; and he who sai••h Euery man, doth not expresse any colour, place, or time; and neuerthelesse he doth by saying so expresse, that in euery man there is a conglobation of colour, place, and time: for it could not be Euery one, vnlesse there were such conglobations to make Euery one, one: and if any conglobation were expressed in this terme Euery one, it would not be Euery one, but only one alone. Now if any coordination of partes, can vnfould and lay open this riddle, I will renounce all Philosophy and vnderstanding.

8 1.55Collectiue apprehensions will afford vs no meaner testimony then the other two, for the spirituality of our soule: for although it may seeme vnto vs, before we reflect throughly on the matter, that we see, or other∣wise discerne by our sense, the numbers of thinges; as that the men in the next roome, are three; that the chaires there, are tenne; and the like of other thinges; yet after due consideration, we shall find, that our eye, or sense telleth vs but singly of each one, that it is one; and so runneth ouer euery one of them; keeping them still each by themselues, vnder their owne seuerall vnities: but then the vnderstanding cometh, and ioyneth vnder one notion, what the sense kept a sunder in so many seuerall ones, as there are thinges. The notion of three, or of tēne, is not in the thinges, but in our mind; for why three rather then fiue, or tēne rather then twelue, if the matter of which we speake were not determined? and such determi∣nation of the matter, is an effect of the vnderstanding. If I had spoken of thinges, as I did of men, or of chaires, there had beene more then three or tenne: it is then euident, that what determined my speech, made the number be three or tenne.

Againe, we see that the notion of tenne, is but one notion; for as the name of tenne, is but one signe, so it argueth, that there is but one

notion, by which it is the signe of tenne thinges. Besides, we see that Arithmetitians do find out the proprieties and particular nature of any determinate number: and therefore we may conclude, that euery number hath a definition, and a peculiar nature of its owne, as it is a number. If then this definition, or nature, or notion of tenne, be a corpo∣reall one, it is a corporeall similitude of the obiect. But is it like to any one of the thinges, or is it like to all the tenne? If to any one, then that one will be tenne; if it be like to the whole made of tenne, then that whole being but one, tenne will be iust one, and not tenne thinges.

Besides, to be tenne, doth expressely imply to be not one: how then can that be a materiall thing, which by being one representeth many? Seeing that in materiall thinges, one and many are opposite, and exclude one an other from the same subiect? And yet, this notion could not represent many together, but by being one.

Againe, if it be a materiall notion or similitude, it is eyther in an indiuisible of the braine, or it is in a diuisible part of it: I meane, that the whole essence of the notion be in euery part neuer so litle of the braine, or that one part of the essence, be in one part of the braine, and that an other part of the essence, be in an other part of the braine. If you say, that the whole essence is in euery part of the braine, though neuer so litle; you make it impossible that it should be a body; for you make it the likenesse of tenne determinate bodies, in an indiuisible māner; seeing that what by diuision groweth not lesse, hath the nature of an indiuisible: but if you say, that diuers partes of the essence, are in diuers partes of the braine, then you make it impossible that the notion of tenne, should be indi∣uisible; since it selfe is composed of seuerall partes.

In a word▪ tenne thinges can not be represented materially, but by tenne other thinges: and therefore it is most euident, that the soule which representeth tenne by one thing or notion, doth not represent the tenne materially: and consequently, that her selfe is immateriall.

What we haue now said, will be confirmed by considering the termes, All and whole: for it is cleare, that these termes also, are of the nature of numbers; but withall, do expresse particularly that no part is wanting. If then the notion of All or whole, be said to be materiall and quantitatiue, it must be diuisible: but if you diuide it, no part remayneth All or whole: it is not therefore diuisible; and consequently it is not materiall. And as this argument, is manifestly applyable to numbers, so if we looke into the arguments concerning numbers, you will find all them likewise applyable to these termes,9 1.56 All and whole.

Out of what hath beene hitherto discouered, we may gather this note: that it is the nature of the soule, to draw from diuisibility, to indiuisibi∣lity; from multitude, to vnity; from indeterminatenesse and confusion▪ to a clarity and determination: as appeareth euidently in this last example of Collections; in which, whether we take numbers, or other

collectiue termes, wee see that throughout their natures do consist in such a perfect indiuisibility, as no part can be seperated without destroying the essence of the notion: nay, thinges which in themselues are many and consist in partes, do in the mind gett an impartible nature; for tenne, is no longer tenne, if it be diuided: nor all, is all, if any thing be taken away. In the same manner, though Philosophy teach vs, there be neyther pointes in biggenesse, nor instances in motion or time, yet nature maketh vs expresse all biggenesse by pointes, and all time by instantes; the soule euer fixing it selfe vpon indiuisibility.

And this is the reason, why we attribute the nature of substance to all our notions: if we see a thing white, or blacke, or doe, or suffer, or be in a place, or in time; presently in our apprehension we conceiue these modi∣fications of the thing, like substances; and accordingly we call them by substantiue names, Whitenesse, Action, Vbication, Duration, &c: now the reason of this is, because a substance, (that is terminated within it selfe) is a fitt and a steady ground for the soule to fixe it selfe vpon, whereas these other Appendixes of substance, would not afford her easy footing to build her structures vpon, if she considered them as truly they are in themselues: and therefore in her notion, she giueth them the qualities of substance: but withall it happeneth many times, that by her doing thus, if she be not very wary, she is deceiued and falleth into grosse errours.

One thing more we must remember to take notice of▪ and it is, that if we will compare the notions in our vnderstanding,10 1.57 with the signes which beating in our fansie do begett those notions; we shall find, that these are but barely signes; and do not in their owne nature expresse, eyther the notions they raise, or the thinges they are signes of. This is euident in the images of the soundes we call wordes: for it is cleare, they haue no likenesse eyther with the thinges they signify, or with the thoughts they begett in vs: and we shall find it no lesse true of other images; for example, in the exteriour impressions of sensible qualities, which seeme by themselues to be in the vnderstanding; for if we consider the matter well, we shall perceiue that we vnderstand nothing more by them, then we do by meere wordes; and that to worke, or to discourse out of them, we must seeke into the obiects, and their definitions; whereof we learne nothing by those first impressions: for it seemeth, that (for exāple) hoat, or red, or sweete, to a man that first seeth, or feeleth, or tasteth them, signifyeth nothing else, but a thing which maketh such an apprehension in his soule, or such a phantasme in his interiour sēse; and neuerthelesse, as yet the mā knoweth not that he hath a soule, or an interiour sense; nor doth reflect so farre as to consider, that this motion passeth by his exteriour sense; but his apprehension is imme∣diately carried to the thing without him; and he imagineth that the impression he feeleth, is in the thing he feeleth; and so he that should feele himselfe heated by a burning glasse, and were not acquainted with the vertue of such a glasse, would thinke the glasse were hoat: yet certainely,

his first apprehension is of the motion made in his fansie, (though he imagineth it elsewhere) which he conceiueth to be the nature of the thing that maketh it. And thus we see that the conuersion of the soule, is immediate to a thing without the man: which also is the effect of her being fixed to Existence; for by reason of that, she still apprehendeth euery impression as a thing.

But now, whether her apprehension doth include the very impres∣sion, which is in the sense or in the fansie, so that by its owne likenesse it be in the soule, or whether the impression in the fansie maketh a change in the soule, which we can not discerne in it selfe, but conceiue it to be the impression which is in the fansie, because that impression is at the first continually present at the said mutation; is more obscure and hard to discouer. But when we reflect that after some time, wordes do succeed in lieu of this impression, and do performe the same effect as the originall impression, in what language soeuer they be vttered, so they be vnderstood; we may conclude out of this euident signe, that the impres∣sion is in the vnderstanding not in its owne likenesse, but in an other shape, which we do not discouer; and which is excitated, as well by the name, as by the impression, in a man that is vsed to the names.

Againe, in a man that learneth thinges by himselfe, these impressions serue for wordes, and not for thinges; for such a man neuer looketh into his fansie to discourse vpon any thing, but only vpon the mutation he conceiueth is made in the externe sense: out of which he gathereth by litle and litle, the nature of the thing, whose notion was made at first in him by this impression. Out of which it is manifest, that our knowledge is as different a thing, from the Phantasmes which beate at the soules dore, as the thing signifyed is f••om the sound of the word, or as the wine in the cellar is from the bush: and therefore, it is impossible that the soule (in which that knowledge resideth, and which indeede is that know∣ledge) should be a corporeall or bodily thing: since of all bodily thinges, the motions that are made by the sensible qualities, arriue neerest to a spirituall nature.

It remayneth now,11 1.58 that we should argue for the immateriality of the soule, out of the extent of our apprehension: which seemeth to be so excessiue, as not to be comprehensible by the limitations of bodies; and therefore can not belong vnto a body: but because all that needeth to be said in this particular, followeth plainely out of groundes already vrged, and that this point containeth not any notable particularity deseruing mention here; we will not enlarge ourselues any further vpon it: but will passe on to the next line of operations proper vnto our mind.

Only we may not omitt taking notice of the expressions which our mind maketh of nothing, or as Logitians terme it, of Negations and Priuations: which do argue an admirable power in the soule, and of a quite different straine from all corporeall thinges; and do euidently conuince the immateriality of it: for it can not be doubted, but that the

soule knoweth what she meaneth, when she discourseth of Nothing. Now if all her knowledge, were nothing else but corporeall phantasmes, or pictures made by corporeall thinges, how should she come to haue a notion of Nothing? for since it is most cleare, that something can not be like Nothing, and that there can not be a participation of what is not; how can we conceiue that there should be a similitude made of Nothing?

The way therefore that the soule taketh in this operation, is, that comparing two thinges together, and finding that the one of them is not the other; she reflecteth vpon her owne action, and diuiding in it the thing said, from the saying, she taketh the thing said for a quality, or property, or predicate (as Logitians call it) of that thing which she denyeth to be the other thing; and then she giueth it a positiue name, after she hath first made a positiue notion, vnto which the name may agree: as for example; when the soule considereth a man that hath not the power to see, as soone as she hath to her selfe pronunced, that he hath not such a power, she taketh the not power to see, for a quality of that man; and then giueth the name of blindenesse to that not power of seeing; which though of it selfe it be nothing, yet by being that which satisfyeth her act, whē she sayeth that he hath not the power of seeing, it seemeth to be ranked among those thinges, vnto which names are due: for it hath a notion; and the hauing a notion, is the clayme, or merite; or dignity, in vertue whereof thinges are preferred to names.

Now then, lett vs enquire how the power of rarity and density, or the multiplication and order of partes, can be raised and refined to the state of being like nothing, or of being the similitude of a negation; or what operation of rarity ad density, can forge out this notion of blinde∣nesse, which we haue explicated: and when we ••ind, it is beyond their reach to compasse, we must acknowledge, that the soule is an other kind of engine, then all those which are in the storehouse of bodies.

THE SIXT CHAPTER. Containing proofes out of our soules operations in knowing or deeming any thing, that she is of a spirituall nature.

1 1.59OVr next consideration shall be to see what testimony our manner of Iudging, doth yield vs of the nature of the soule: concerning which, three thinges offer themselues, worthy the reflecting on; which are, our manner of thinking; the opposition which frequently occurreth in our thoughts; and the nature of truth and of falsehood. As for the first, we may remember how we haue shewed, that all iudgement or deeming is but an apprehension of identification, or something immediately

following out of it: and that a settled iudgement or assent of the mind is as it were a limbe, or branch, or graft in our soule; so that we find that our perceiuing of identification between two thinges, or our seeing that the one is the other, is that by which our soule encreaseth. Now, because when two thinges are identifyed, the one reacheth not further then the other, it is cleare that this encrease of the soule is not made by partes, which being added one to an other do cause it to be greater: and there∣fore, since this latter course is the only meanes of encrease in bodies and in quantity, it is as cleare that the nature of the soule, is quite different from the nature of all corporeall or Quantitatiue thinges.

Againe, it is against the nature of identification, to be of partes; and therefore, they who take quantity to be one thing, and not many thinges tyed together, do acknowledge that truly there are no partes in it: and this is so rigorously true, that although we speake of two thinges that in reality are identifyed one with an other, yet if our wordes be such, as imply that our vnderstanding considereth them as distinct partes, and by abstraction giueth them the nature of partes; then they are no longer identifyed, but in good Logike, we ought in this case to deny the one of the other. As for example: though the hand and the foote be the same thing, (as we haue declared in our first Treatise) yet because in the name hand, there is a secret exclusion of any thing that is not in the defi∣nition of a hand, it followeth that in our speech we must say, that a hand is not a foote Likewise though it be confessed, that the thing which is rationality is also risibility; neuerthelesse, it is a solecisme in Logike, to say that rationality is risibility; because it is the nature of these abstracted names, to confine their signifycations to one definition; and the defini∣tions of these two termes are diuers. Out of this consideration it follo∣weth clearely, that seeing the nature of partes, is contrary to the nature of identity; and that the soule in her iudgements worketh alltogether by identity, it is impossible that her operations should consist of partes, or in any sort resemble any proceeding of Quantitatiue thinges.

The like will be conuinced out of the opposition we find in our thoughts.2 1.60 In it we may consider two thinges: first the generation of it: next, the incompossibility of opposites in the soule. To beginne with the first: we see that in our speaking, opposition is produced by the addition of this word Not: as when we say, not a man, not a penny, not a word; and therefore it followeth, that in our soule there is a notion of it, corres∣pondent to the word that expresseth it. Now, seeing that a notion is a thing, and that it is the likenesse of its obiect, or rather the same with the obiect; lett vs cast about, how we should of partes and of Quantity, make a nothing, or an identification to not: and when we find that it is ridiculous and absurd to go about it, lett vs conclude, that the manner of working, which our soule vseth, is farre different from that which is vsed in bodies, and among materiall thinges.

And if you obiect, that not only a body, but euen any other substance

whatsoeuer (suppose it as spirituall as you will) can not be eyther like, or identifyed to nothing; and therefore this argument will as well proue that the soule is not a thing or substance, as that it is not a body: we answere, that it is euident out of what we haue already said, that the vnder∣standing is not the obiects it vnderstandeth, by way of similitude, but by a higher meanes; which we haue shewed to be by way of Respects. Now then, the respect which a thing hath to an other thing, by not hauing such a respect vnto it, as a third thing formerly considered hath there∣vnto, may be expressed in way of Respects, though it can not in way of similitude: and so our vnderstanding is able to expresse, what neyther our fansy, nor any corporeall thing can arriue to the expression of: as when first we find, that one man hath a respect to the wall, which we call the power of seeing, it if afterwardes we find that an other man hath a respect vnto the wall of impotence, that he can not see it, this second respect the vnderstanding hath a power to expresse as well as the first: as we haue touched aboue.

3 1.61As for the opposition that occurreth in our thoughts, we may consider it of two kindes: the one is of the thinges or obiects that come into our thougths or into our soule: and this is not properly an opposition in the soule; for although the thinges be opposite by their owne nature in them∣selues, yet they do not exercise their opposition in the soule: nay, though the oppositiō be euen in the soule it selfe, if the soule with this oppositiō, be considered as an obiect, it maketh no opposition in the soule; for so you may consider your soule learned and vnlearned, ignorant and knowing, good and bad, and the like: all which are oppositions in a soule supposed to be so qualifyed, but are no oppositions in a soule that consi∣dereth them: no more then fire and water, heauy thinges and light, white and blacke, being and not being, an affirmatiue proposition and its nega∣tiue, and the like: all which are in themselues so contrary and opposite to one an other, that they can not consist together in one subiect; they haue an incompossibility among themselues; wheresoeuer the one of them is, by its very entrance it driueth out its opposite: and yet in the soule they agree together without reluctance: she knoweth and considereth and weigheth both sides of the scale at the same time, and ballanceth them euenly one against an other: for vnlesse both the opposites were in the same instant in the same comparing power, that power could not by one act whose beginning implyeth its ending, iudge the difference and opposition of them: as when we say blacke is contrary to white, or darke∣nesse is the want of light, we pronounce one common not being of both extremes.

We may then boldely conclude, that since no body whatsoeuer can entertaine at the same time, and in the same place, these quarrelling Antagonistes, but that by their conflict, they presently destroy one an other, and peraduenture the body too, into which they presse for entrance, and the entire possession of which each of them

striueth for; (those of them I meane, that are proportioned to the reception of bodies) and that the soule imbibeth them together without any difficulty or contrast, and preserueth them allwayes frendes euen in the face of one an other, and lodgeth them together in the same bed; and that (in a word) these opposite thinges do enioy an admirable and vnknowne manner of Being in the soule, and which hath no parallele nor argument in bodily thinges: we may (I say) boldely conclude, that the soule it selfe, in which all these are, is of a nature, and hath a manner of Being altogether vnlike the nature of bodies, and their manner of Being.

Out of this agreeing of all obiects in the soule,4 1.62 and their hauing no opposition there, euen whiles she knoweth the opposition that is betweene them in themselues, there followeth an other consideration, of no lesse importance: which is, that the amplitude of our soule in respect of knowledge, is absolutely infinite; that is to say, she is capable of knowing at the same time obiects without end or measure. For the explicating whereof, we are to cōsider, that the latter conclusions, which the soule gaineth knowledge of, do hang to the former by identificatiō, or by the soules seeing that two notions are identifyed, because they are identifyed to a third, as is before expressed; and the first principles which seeme to be immediately ioyned vnto the soule, haue the identity of their termes plaine and euident, euen in the very termes themselues. Nay, if we insist further, we shall find that the first truthes must haue an identification to the very soule it selfe; for it being euident that truth or falsehoode, is not in the soule but so farre forth, as she doth apply her selfe to the externall obiect, or to the existence of thinges in themselues; and that we find that the soules knowing with euidence that any thing is or hath being, implyeth her knowing that her selfe is; (for she can not know that a thing seemeth so to her, or maketh such an impression in her, without knowing that her selfe is; though peraduenture she may not know what her selfe is, but taketh her selfe to be no other thing then the body of the man in which she is) it is euident that the first truthes which enter into the soule, to witt, that this or that seemeth so or so vnto her, (and these truthes no sceptike euer doubted of) are identifyed with the soule it selfe; seeing that an obiects seeming to be such or such, is nothing else, but the soule so qualifyed.

And by this we find, that the certainty of the first Principles, as for example of this Proposition, That the whole is bigger then the Part, will depend in a particular soule of her certainty of her owne Being: for although this proposition would haue a necessity in the very connexion of the termes, notwithstanding there were not in nature any whole or Part; yet this necessity would not be a necessity of Existence or of Being in the obiect, but a necessity of connexion, as it were of two partes of the soule: and so, if verity and falsity be not perfectly in the soule, but in comparison to actuall existence, the soule would not be perfectly true, or

(to say more properly) would not haue the perfection of truth in her, by hauing or knowing this proposition, vnlesse withall she were certaine, that there were existēt, an obiect of this Propositiō: of which (as we haue said) she can not be certaine, without being certaine of her owne Being; so that in effect, the identification of other thinges among themselues, by which such thinges are knowne, doth come at the last to be retriued in the existence of the soule it selfe, and to be in the soule, by the identifica∣tion of those other thinges vnto her selfe.

5 1.63Now then to proceed to the proofe of our proposed conclusion, it is cleare, that the adding of one thing to an other, doth out of the force of this addition, perfect the thing vnto which the addition is made, if the aduenient thing be added in such way, as the former is apt to receiue it: but it is euident, that the soule is made fitt by former propositions, to be identifyed to later ones; for we see that the former ones draw on, and inferre the later ones: and therefore it followeth, that the more is added to the soule, the greater is her aptitude to haue more, or to be more encreased: and consequently, that the more is added vnto her, the more may still be added; and the more capable and more earnest she is, to haue more. Wherefore it can not be denyed, but that since in the nature of the obiects there is no impediment to hinder their being together in the soule, (as we haue proued a litle aboue) and that in her by receiuing new obiects into her, there is a continuall encrease of capacity to receiue more; she hath an amplitude to knowledge absolutely infinite, in such a manner as we haue aboue expressed.

Now to apply to our purpose what we haue gathered by this discourse, it is cleare, that these two conditions. of one thing not driuing out an other, and of infinity of accessions, do openly disclayme from quantity, and from matter; for we see that what hath Quantity, or is a Body, can not admitt a new thing into it, vnlesse some other thing do first go out of it, to make roome for the aduenient one: and as for infinitude, it breedeth a sea of contradictions, if it be but thought of in Quantity: and there∣fore we may conclude, that the soule, vnto whom these two conditions do belong, is not quantitatiue or corporeall, but immateriall, and of a spirituall nature.6 1.64

The second kind of opposition, that occurreth in our thoughts, or in our soule, is of Contradictory Propositions: it hath its origine in the oppo∣sition of Being to not Being: and is when a thing is identifyed vnto the soule, in such sort as we haue said, that a Iudgement or Deeming maketh the obiect become as it were a limbe, or part of the soule: and because the conflict of two such propositions, if they were together in the soule, would make her be something contrary to the nature of Being (if any thing can be contrary to Being) which in the schooles they call ens & non ens; the impossibility of her admitting into her selfe two such propositions together, doth testify her firme cleauing and her fixednesse to Being: and so doth confirme and bring new euidence to that

argument for the soules spirituality, which in the first Chapter of this part, we drew from the nature of Being.

As for truth and falsehood, they spring from the same roote as the last; as being qualities consequent to the opposition of affirmatiue and negatiue propositions; whereof if the one be true, the other must neces∣sarily be false: and therefore, we neede not spend time in setting downe any particular considerations of these; since what we haue said of the other, is applyable vnto them: but it is sufficient, that we thus note them, to giue the Reader occasion to reflect vpon them.

Among propositions,7 1.65 there are some which Logitians do terme of Eternall truth: and out of these, there are ingenious men, who imagine that the Immortality of the soule may be immediately deduced. Herein they roue not quite from the marke; though withall I must needes say, they do not directly hitt it. To vnderstand the vtmost that may be inferred out of such propositions, we may note two conditions in them: the first is, that generally these propositions are vniuersall ones; and thereby haue that force to conuince the spirituality of the soule, which we haue explicated and shewed to belong vnto vniuersall termes: the second is, that in these propositions, there is a necessity of connexion between their termes; such an one, or at the least very like therevnto, as we explicated in those propositions, which beare their euidence plaine in their very termes. And out of this we may draw an other argument for the spirituality of the soule: for we see that all corporeall agents and patients, are defectible and contingent; that is to say, sometimes, or (if you will) most times, they attaine their effect; but withall, sometimes (be it neuer so seldome) they misse of it: and accordingly, it happeneth some∣times that our eyes, our eares, our touch, and the rest of our senses are deceiued; though for the most part, they giue vs true informations of what they conuerse with: but these propositions of eternall verity do neuer faile: they haue in themselues an indefectibility insuperable; and consequently, they giue euidence that the soules nature is of a higher degree of constancy and certainty, then what falleth within the compasse of bodies: and is of a nobler and different straine, from all corporeall thinges: for this certainty is entayled vpon such propositions by the force of Being; which is the proper obiect of the soule: and they haue their Being, as limbes and partes of the soule.

As for the terme of Eternall verity, it is not to be taken positiuely, as if these propositions, or their obiects, had any true eternity or perseue∣rance, without beginning or ending: but only negatiuely; that is, that there can be no time, in which they are false: and therefore, we can not out of their hauing such a kind of Eternity belonging to them, argue a capacity of infinite time or duration in our soule that comprehendeth them.

THE SEVENTH CHAPTER. That our discoursing doth proue our soule to be incorporeall.

1 1.66HAuing thus runne ouer those proofes for the immate∣riality of our soule, which arise out of her manner of working when she iudgeth; in the next place, we are to enquire what others, her manner of discoursing will afford vs. We are sure, that since our discourse is com∣posed of iudgements, and of single apprehensions, it can not choose but furnish vs with all those pregnant arguments, that we drew from them. But that will not serue our turne: we looke after new euidence; and we shall see it will giue it vs with full handes. It consisteth in this: that when we discourse, we may easily perceiue there is more at one time in our minde, then we can discouer to be in our fantasy; for we find, that in our fantasy, as one proposition cometh, an other is gone: and although they that are gone, seeme to be ready at a call, yet they are not in presence; as being thinges which consist in motion, and that require place; and therefore the one iustleth the other out of the place it possessed. But if it fared in like manner in our inward soule, we could neuer attaine vnto knowledge: for it is manifest, that our soule is not assured of a conclusion, but by her seeing the premisses: if then the premisses be taken away, the conclusion that resteth vpon them, falleth to the ground: but they are taken away, if they be out of our mind: therefore, when our vnderstanding yieldeth its assent to a conclusion, it must of necessity haue the premisses still in it.

But we must not rest here; this consideration will carry vs on a wondrous deale further: we know, that who so goeth to frame a new demonstration in any subiect, must be certaine he taketh nothing con∣trary to what he hath learned in many bookes: likewise, that who will make a latine verse, or readeth a Poeme, knoweth there is nothing in all that Poeme contrary to his Prosodia: do we not then manifestly perceiue a certaine remainder of all these in his soule? The like is in all artes: in which he that goeth about any worke according to art, sheweth he hath in his head all the rules of that art, though he do not distinctly remember them, or call them to mind whiles he worketh: for if he haue them not, how doth he worke by them? Since then it is cleere that he thinketh not of them at that time, it is as cleere, that more is in his soule at one time, then is in his fantasy, or then can be there by materiall bodies, (which we haue shewed is the way, whereby all thinges come into the fantasy) although it be the nimblest and the subtilest Agent of all corporeall thinges whatsoeuer.

An other consideration whereby to euince the immateriality of the soule,2 1.67 concerneth the proceeding of syllogismes by linkes, fastened one to an other: whence we may take notice, that euery one of them is a steppe to an other: and consequently, it is manifest that according to the nature of the soule, they must be all together in her: since, if any one were absent, all the rest that followed and depended vpon that one, would haue no grounding, nor fixednesse in the soule. Now if to this we adde, that what is to be knowne, is absolutely and liquidly infinite, there can not be brought or expected a more pregnant and home wittenesse of our soules spirituality: it following out of these groundes, that the soule by its nature, is not only capable of, but is expressely ordered to an infinite knowledge of infinite obiects all together; for these two, finite and infini••e science, are so vastly different from one an other, that if the same subiect be capable of both, it must of necessity be ordered to infi∣nite, as to its chiefest act and end: and thus out of capacity in this subiect, its being ordered is well inferred; though in other matters peraduenture the consequence may not be good. And accordingly, who looketh into Geometry, Arithmetike, Logike, or euen nature it selfe, will euidently see that the obiects of knowledge, are euery way, and in euery science, multiplyable without end.

Neyther ough•• this to be neglected,3 1.68 that a great part of the soules obiects, and indeed of those that are most naturall to her, is aboue the capacity, and out of the reach of materiall thinges. All Metaphysikes abstract frō quantity: the inuestigation of God, of Angels, of the soule it selfe, eyther concludeth immateriality, or at the least worketh about it. What shall I say of Logicall notions, of those which are called the second intentions; about which there is so much businesse, both in the schooles and in the world? It is sufficient that we haue already expressed, how all our notions are respectiue. But in particular the motiues of humane actions are very abstracted considerations: as for example, hope of thinges to come, memory of thinges passed, vertue, vice, honour, shame, and the like. To these lett vs adde, that when we teach or explicate any thing to ignorant persons, we must frame our owne apprehensions to their capacity, and we must speake such thinges as they may compre∣hend: which capacity or extent of comprehension we can not see not perceiue by any sense, but we iudge it meerely by our Reason, and by our vnderstanding. Wherefore, seeing that our operation is mainely and chiefely on and by such motiues, as are not lyable to materiall principles and compositions, it is euident, that the springhead from whence such an operation floweth, must also be immateriall and incorporeall.

I am not ignorant, that this argument vseth to be answered by vrging, that the soule likewise knoweth Deafenesse, Dumbenesse, Blinde∣nesse, and such other notions of Nothinges; and yet is not from thence inferred to be nothing▪ it conceiueth God and Eternity; and yet it is neither from it selfe, as God is, nor eternall. In like manner (say they) it

may know incorporeall thinges, and yet not be therefore it selfe incor∣poreall. To this I reply, first with wishing them not to mistake me, but to giue my argument its full force and weight: for there is a very great difference betweene the knowing of a thing, in a strained, toylesome, and confuled manner, and the hauing a thing for its ordinary matter and subiect of negotiation: this argueth connaturality between the soule and what it is in such sort conuersant about; but that doth not. Now, what is inferred out of whole sciences and artes, concerneth a maine stocke of the soules businesse, and not some extraordinary vertue or power she hath.

But to come vp close to the answere: I say, that if we being throughly acquainted with materiall thinges, can find that it is not in the possibility of any such to be the likenesse of an immateriall thing; and from thence do inferre that our soule, for being fraught with imma∣teriall notions, is not materiall; our conclusion is well collected, and a very good one; for the premisses out of which we do gather it, are within our kenning; and therefore if there were any defect in the consequence, we should easily perceiue it. Whence it appeareth clearely, that there is no parity between the deduction of our conclusion, and that other which the obiection vrgeth, that our soule, because it can know eternall thinges, is also eternall; for eternity is a thing beyond our comprehēsion: and therefore it ought not be expected at our handes, that we should be able to giue an account where the bracke is. And to say the truth, if knowledge be taken properly, we do not know eternity; howeuer by supernaturall helpes we may come to know it: but in that case, the helpes are likely to be proportionable to the effect. Neyther are negations properly knowne, seeing there is nothing to be knowne of them. And thus we see that these obiections do proceed from the aequivocation of the word knowledge; sometimes vsed properly, othertimes applyed abusiuely.

THE EIGHT CHAPTER. Containing proofes out of our manner of proceeding to action, that our soule is incorporeall.

1 1.69I Doubt not but what we haue already said, hath sufficiently conuinced our soules being immateriall, vnto whomsoeuer is able to penetrate the force of the arguments we haue brought for proofe thereof, and will take the paines to consider them duely: (which must be done, by serious and continued reflection, and not by cursary reading, or by interrupted attempts) yet since we haue still a whole field of proofes vntouched, and that in so important a matter, no euidence can be too cleare, nor any

paines be accounted lost, that may redouble the light, although it shine already bright enough to discerne what we seeke; we will make vp the concert of vnanimous testimonies to this already established truth, by adding those arguments we shall collect out of the manner of our soules proceeding to action, vnto the others we haue drawne from our obseruations vpon her apprehensions, her iudgements, and her discourses.

Looking then into this matter: the first consideration we meete withall is, that our vnderstanding is in his owne nature an orderer; and that his proper worke is to ranke and putt thinges in order: for if we reflect vpon the workes and artes of men, as, a good life, a common∣wealth, an army, a house, a garden, all artefactes; what are th••y, but compositions of well ordered partes? And in euery kind, we see that he is the Master, and the Architect, and is a accoūted the wisest, and to haue the best vnderstanding, who can best, or most, or further then his fellowes▪ sett thinges in order. If then to this we ioyne, that quantity is a thing whose nature consisteth in a capacity of hauing partes and multitude, and consequently is the subiect of ordering and ranking; doth it not euidently follow, that our soule, compared to the whole masse of bodies, and to the very nature of corporeity or quantity, is as a proper agent to its proper matter to worke vpon? Which if it be, it must neces∣sarily be of a nobler straine, and of a different and higher nature then it; and consequently, can not be a body, or be composed of Quantity: for had matter in it selfe, what it expecteth and requireth from the agent, it would not neede the agents helpe, but of it selfe it were fitt to be an Agent. Wherefore if the nature of corporeity, or of body, in its full latitude, be to be ordered, it followeth that the thing whose nature is to be an orderer, must as it is such, be not a body, but of a superiour nature, and exceeding a Body: which we expresse by calling it a spirituall thing.

Well then,2 1.70 if the soule be an orderer, two thinges belong necessarily vnto her: the one is, that she haue this order within her selfe, the other is, that she haue power to communicate it vnto such thinges, as are to be ordered. The first she hath by science, of which enough already hath beene said towardes proouing our intent. Next, that her nature is communicatiue of this order, is euident out of her action and manner of working. But whether of her selfe she be thus communicatiue, or be so by her coniunction to the body she informeth, appeareth not from thence. But where experiēce falleth short, reason supplyeth, and sheweth vs that of her owne nature she is communicatiue of order; for seeing that her action is an ordering, and that in this line there are but two sortes of thinges in the world, namely, such as do order, and such as are to be ordered▪ it is manifest, that the action must by nature and in the vniuer∣sall consideration of it, beginne from the orderer (in whom order hath its life and subsistence) and not from that which is to receiue it: then,

sithence ordering is motion, it followeth euidently, that the soule is a moouer and a beginner of motion.

But since we may conceiue two sortes of moouers; the one when the agent is mooued to mooue; the other, when of it selfe it beginneth ••he motion without being mooued; we are to enquire, vnto which of these two the soule belongeth. But to apprehend the question rightly, we will illustrate it by an example: lett vs suppose that some action is fitt to beginne at tenne of the clocke: now we may imagine an agent to beginne this action in two different manners; the one, that the clocke striking tenne, breedeth or stirreth somewhat in him, from whence this action followeth▪ the other manner is, that the agent may of his owne nature, haue such an actuall comprehension or decurrence of time within himselfe, as that without receiuing any warning from abroad, but as though he moued and ordered the clocke as well as his owne instruments, he may of himselfe be fitt and ready, iust at that houre to beginne that action; not as if the clocke told him what houre it is, but as if he by gouerning the clocke, made that houre to be, as well as he causeth the action to beginne at that houre. In the first of these manners, the agent is mooued to mooue: but in the second, he mooueth of him∣selfe, without being mooued by any thing else. And in this second way, our soule of her owne nature communicateth her selfe to quantitatiue thinges, and giueth them motion: which followeth out of what we haue already prooued; that a soule, in her owne nature, is the subiect of an infinite knowledge, and therefore is capable of hauing such a generall comprehension, as well of time, and of the course of all other thinges, as of the particular action he is to doe; and consequently, standeth not in neede of a Monitor without her, to direct her when to beginne.

If then it be an impreuaricable law with all bodies, that none what∣soeuer can mooue vnlesse it be mooued by an other; it followeth, that the soule which mooueth, without being stirred or excitated by any thing else, is of a higher race then they; and consequently is immateriall and voyde of Quantity. But lett me not be mistaken in what I come from saying; as though my meaning were, that the soule exerciseth this way of mouing her selfe, and of ordering her actions, whiles she is in the body: for how can she; seeing she is neuer endewed with complete knowledge requisite for any action, neuer fully comprehending all the circumstances of it? But what I intend, is that the nature of the soule, considered in it selfe, is such, as hath a capacity and may reach to this manner of working, (whence I inferre that she is not a body but a spirit) without determining, whether she worke thus in the body, or out of it:3 1.71 that enquiry belongeth not to this place; it will follow by and by.

But for the present, hauing considered vnto what kind of working, the nature of the soule in abstract, is capable of attaining; we will con∣clude this Chapter with reflecting vpon those actions of hers, which fall dayly vnder our remarke, as being exercised in the body. In all of

them we may obserue, that she proceedeth with a certaine vniuersality and indifferency, beyond the practise of all other creatures whatsoeuer: for example, if a man be spoken to, or asked of a hundred seuerall thinges that he neuer thought of before in all his life, he will immediate∣ly shape pertinent replyes, to all that is said, and returne fitting answeres to euery question: as, Whither such a man goeth? How long this staffe is? What colour that mans clothes are of? &c: to all which, and to as many thinges more as you will (so they be within the compasse of his know∣ledge) he straight answereth differently, and to the purpose. Whence it is manifest, that his answeres do not proceed vpon sett gimals or stringes, whereof one being strucke, it moueth the rest in a sett order, (which we haue shewed, is the course in all actions done by beastes) but out of a principle within him, which of it selfe is indifferent to all thinges; and therefore can readily apply it selfe to the answere, according as by the question it is moued: and the like may be obserued in his actions; which he varyeth according to the occasions presented.

I remember how Sir Philip Sidney (the Phoenix of the age he liued in, and the glory of our nation, and the patterne to posterity of a complete, a gallant, and a perfect gentleman) aptly calleth our handes, the instruments of instruments; from Aristotle, who termeth them Organa organorum, or vniuersall instruments, fittly moulded to be employed in any seruice; whereas nature hath to all other creatures appropriated their instruments to determinate actions, but to man, she hath (in these) giuen such, as might be applyed to any kind of worke whatsoeuer: and accordingly we see, that the same kind of bird, still buildeth her neast and breedeth her young ones, in the same way, without any the least variance at all: but men do build their houses as they please, sometimes vpon hils, sometimes in vales, sometimes vnder the earth, and sometimes vpon the toppes of trees: and the manners of breeding or instructing their children, are as diuers, as the customes of nations and townes: and in all other actions, our Masters note it for a property peculiar to man, that he vseth to arriue vnto the same end by diuers meanes; as to transport ourselues to some place we would goe vnto, eyther by water, or by horse, or by coach, or by litter, as we please: whereas we see no such variety in like actions of other liuing creatures.

All which being so, we may conclude, that the soules proceeding eyther to answeres, or to action, argueth cleerely that she hath within her selfe such an indifferency, as is ioyned with a meanes to determine this indifferency: the contrary whereof we see in all corporeall engines; for they haue euery steppe in the whole course of their wayes, chalked out vnto them, by their very framing, (as hath beene amply declared in the first Treatise) and haue the determination of their worke, from end to end sett downe, and giuen them by their artificier and maker: and therefore it is most euident, that the soule can not be a thing composed or framed of materiall and quantitatiue partes, seeing she hath not her

wayes sett downe vnto her, but frameth them of her selfe, according to the accidents that occurre.

4 1.72The same nature of the soule, discouereth it selfe in the quiet procee∣ding of Reason, when it worketh with greatest strength and vigour; as well knowing, that its efficaciousnesse consisteth not in the multitude of partes, which Passion breedeth, but in the well ordering of those it already hath vnder its command. Whereas the strength of Quantity, and the encrease of its strength, consisteth in the multitude of its partes: as will euidently appeare to whom shall consider this point deepely.

5 1.73Thus we have in a summary manner gone through all the operations of those soule, which in the beginning of this latter Treatise, we heaped together as materials, wherewith to rayse an immateriall and spirituall building. Neyther, I hope, will our Reader be offended with vs, for being more succinct and concise in all our discourse concerning our soule, then where we deliuered the doctrine of Bodies: for the difficultnesse of this subiect, and the nicety required to the expressing our conceptions concerning it, wherein (as the Prouerbe is) a haire is to be clouen, would not allow vs that liberty of ranging about, as when we treated of Bodies. What occurreth among them, may be illustrated by examples within their owne orbe, and of their owne pitch; but to desplay the operations of a soule, we can find no instances that are able to reach them; they would rather embroile and darken them: for the exact propriety of wordes, must be strictly and rigorously obserued in them: and the Reader shall penetrate more into the nature and depth of them, by serious meditation and reflection vpon the hintes we haue here giuen, (efficacious enough, I hope, to excite those thoughts he should haue for this purpose, and to steere them the right way) then by much and voluminous reading, or by hearing long and polished discourses of this subiect.

For my part, if what I haue here said, should to any man appeare not sufficient to conuince that our soule is of a spirituall and farre different nature, from all such thinges as in our first Treatise we haue discoursed vpō, and taken for the heades and most generall kindes of Bodies, (vnto which all other particular ones, and their motions may be reduced) I shall become a suitor to him, in entreating him to take this subiect into his handling, where it beginneth to be vnwieldy for mine, and to declare vnto vs, vpon the principles we haue settled in the first Treatise, and vpon considering the nature of a body (which is the first of all our notions) how these particulars we haue reflected vpon in mans actions, can be drawne out of them; for I can find no possible meanes to linke them together: a vast and impenetrable Ocean, lyeth betweene the discoueries we haue made on each side of its shores; which forbiddeth all commerce between them; at the least, on the darke bodies side, which hath not winges to soare into the region of Intellectuall light. By those principles, we haue traced out the course and progresse of all operations

belonging to sense; and how beastes do or may performe all their actions, euen to their most refined and subtilest operations: but beyond thē, we haue not beene able to carry these groundes, nor they vs. Lett him then take the paines to shew vs, by what figures, by what first qualities, by what mixtion of rare and dense partes, an vniuersall apprehension, an euident iudgement, a legitimate consequence is made: and so of the like; as, of a mans determination of himselfe to answere pertinently any question: of his choosing this way before that; &c. Which if he can doe (as I am sure he can not) I shall allow it to be reasō, and not obstinacy, that worketh in his mind, and carryeth him against our doctrine: but if he can not, and that there is no apparence nor possibility (as indeede there is not) that these actions can be effected by the ordering of mate∣riall partes, and yet he will be still vnsatisfyed, without being able to tell why, (for he will be vnwilling to acknowledge, that these abstracted speculations, do not sinke into him, and that nothing can conuince him, but what his senses may be iudges of, and that he may handle, and turne on euery side like a bricke or a tile) and will be still importune with cauillous scrupules, and wilde doubts, that in truth, and at the bottome do signify nothing, we will leaue him to meditate at his leisure vpon what we haue said; whiles we proceed on to what followeth out of this great principle, That our soule is incorporeall and spirituall.

THE NINTH CHAPTER. That our soule is a Substance, and Immortall.

HAuing concluded that our soule is immateriall and indiuisible;1 1.74 to proceed one steppe further, it can not be denyed, but that it is eyther a substance or an accident; if the later, it must be of the nature of the substance whose accident it is; for so we see all accidents are: but in man when his soule is excluded, there is no spirituall substance at all, whereof we haue any notice: and therefore if it be an accident, it must be a corporeall accident, or some accident of a body; as some figure, temperature, harmony, or the like: and consequently, it must be diuisible: but this is contrary to what is proued in the former Chapters: and therefore it can not be a corporeall accident. Neyther can it be a spirituall accident: for vnto what spirituall substance should it belong, when as nothing in man can be suspected to be spirituall, but it selfe. Seeing then that it can be no accident, a substance it must be, and must haue its Existence or Being in it selfe.

Here we haue passed the Rubiton of experimentall knowledge:2 1.75 we are now out of the boundes that experience hath any iurisdiction ouer: and from henceforth, we must in all our searches and conclusions rely

only vpon the single euidence of Reason. And euen this last conclusion we haue beene faine to deduce out of the force of abstracted reasoning vpon what we had gathered before; not by immediate reflection vpon some action we obserue proceeding from a man: yet withall, nature flasheth out by a direct beame, some litle glimmering of the verity of it, to the eye of Reason that is within vs: for as whē we see a clocke mooue, or a mill, or any thing that goeth by many wheeles, if we marke that there are two contrary motions, in two diuers partes of it, we can not think that those contrary motions, do belong to one and the same continued body, but shall presently conclude, that there must be in that engine two seuerall bodies compacted together; so in man, though his body be the first moouer that appeareth vnto vs, yet seeing that in his actions, some effects do shew themselues, which it is impossible should proceed from a body, it is euident, that in him there is some other thing besides that one which we see: and consequently we may conclude, that he is composed of a body and of somewhat else that is not a body: which somewhat else, being the spring from whence those actions flow, that are of a different straine from them that are deriued from the body, must necessarily be a spirituall substance.

3 1.76But whiles we are examining, how farre our present considerations, and short discourses may carry vs, as it were experimentally to confirme this truth, we must not omitt what Auicenna in his booke de Anima & Almahad, and Monsieur des Cartes in his Methode, do presse vpon the same occasion. Thus they say, or to like purpose: if I cast with my selfe, who I am that walke, or speake, or think; or order any thing; my reason will answere me, that although my legges or tōgue were gone, and that I could no longer walke or speake, yet were not I gone, and I should know and see with my vnderstanding, that I were still the very same thing, the same Ego as before. The same as of my tongue or legges, would reason tell me of my eyes, my eares, my smelling, tasting, and feeling, eyther all of them together, or euery one of them single, that were they all gone, still should I remaine: As when in a dreame, (where I vse none of all these) I both am, and know my selfe to be Reason will tell me also, that although I were not nourished, so I were not wasted, (which for the drift of the argument may be supposed) yet still I should continue in Being. Whence it would appeare, that my hart, liuer, lnges, kidneyes, stomacke, mouth, and what other partes of me soeuer, that serue for the nourishment of my body, might be seuered from me, and yet I remaine what I am. Nay, if all the beautifull and ayry fantasmes, which fly about so nimbly in our braine, be nothing else but signes vnto in our soule, of what is without vs; it is euident, that though peraduenture she would not without their seruice, exercise that which by errour we missename Thin∣king; yet the very same soule and thinker might be without them all: and consequently, without braine also; seeing that our braine is but the play∣house and scene, where all these faery maskes are acted: so that in conclu∣sion

Reason assureth vs, that when all body is abstracted in vs, there still remaineth a substāce, a thinker, an Ego, or I, that in it selfe is no whitt dimi∣nished, by being (as I may say) stripped out of the case it was enclosed in.

And now I hope the intelligēt Reader will conceiue I haue performed my promise,4 1.77 and haue shewed the soule of man to be an Immortall substance: for since it is a substance, it hath a Being; and since it is an immateriall substance, it hath a Being of its owne force; without needing a consort body, to helpe it to sustaine its Existence: for to be a substance, is to be the subiect of Existence; and consequently, to be an immateriall substance, is to be a subiect capable of Existence, without the helpe of matter or of Quantity. It can not therefore be required of me, to vse any further industry, to proue such a soule to be immortall: but who will contradict her being so, is obliged to shew that she is mortall: for it followeth in reason, that she will keepe her being, vnlesse by some force she be bereaued of it; it being a rule, that whosoeuer putteth a thing to be, is not bound, for the continuation of that thinges being, to proue that it is not changed: but on the other side, he that auerreth it is changed, is bound to bring in his euidence of a sufficient cause to change it: for to haue a thing remaine, is natures owne dictamen, and followeth out of the causes which gaue it being: but to make an alteration, supposeth a change in the causes; and therefore the obligation of proofe lyeth on that side.

Neuerthelesse,5 1.78 to giue satisfaction to those, who are earnest to see euery article positiuely prooued, we will make that part too our Prouince. Lett vs then remember, that Immortality signifyeth a negation, or a not hauing of Mortality: and that a positiue terme, is required to expresse a change by; since nature teacheth vs, that whatsoeuer is, will remaine with the Being it hath▪ vnlesse it be forced out of it: if then we shew, that Mans soule hath not those groundes in her, which maketh all thinges we see, to be mortall; we must be allowed to haue acquitted ourselues of the charge, of prouing her Immortall. For this end, lett vs looke round about vs, and enquire of all the thinges we meete with, by what meanes they are changed, and come to a periode, and are no more. The pure elements will tell you, that they haue their change, by rarefaction and condensation, and no otherwise: mixed bodies, by alteration of their mixture: small bodies, by the actiuity of the Elements working vpon them; and by the meanes of rarefaction and condensation, entering into their very constitution, and breeding an other temperament, by sepe∣ration of some of their partes, and in their steade mingling others. Plantes, and trees, and other liuing creatures will tell you, that their nourishment, being insinuated through their whole bodies, by subtile pores, and blinde passages, if they either be stopped by any accident, or else be filled with bad nourishment, the mixture of the whole faileth of it selfe, and they come to dye. Those thinges which are violently destroyed, we see are made away, for the most part by diuision; so fire by

diuision destroyeth all that cometh in its way; so liuing creatures are destroyed, by their parting of their bloud from their flesh, or of one member from an other, or by the euaporation or extinction of their naturall heate. In fine, we are sure that all thinges, which within our knowledge loose the ir Being, do so by reason of their Quantity; which by diuision, or by rarefaction, and compression, gaineth some new temperature, that doth not consist with their former temper. After these premisses, I neede say no more: the conclusion displayeth it selfe readily and plainely, without any further trouble; for if our labour hath beene hitherto, to shew that our soule is indiuisible, and that her operations are such as admitt not quantitatiue partes in her; it is cleare, that she can not be mortall, by any of those wayes, whereby we see thinges round about vs to perish.

The like argument we may frame out of locall motion; for seeing that all the alteratiue actions we are acquainted withall, be performed by locall motion, (as is deliuered, both in grosse, and by detaile, in our first Treatise) and that Aristotle, and all vnderstanding Philosophers do agree, there can be no locall motion in an indiuisible thing, (the reason whereof is euident, to whomsoeuer reflecteth vpon the nature of Place, and of locall motion) it is manifest, that there can be no motion to hurt the soule, since she is concluded to be indiuisible.

6 1.79The common argument likewise vsed in this matter, amounteth to the same effect: to witt, that since thinges are destroyed only by their contraries; that thing which hath no contrary, is not subiect to destruc∣tion: (which Principle both Reason and experience, do euery where confirme:) but a humane soule is not subiect to contrariety: and therefore such ••n one can not be destroyed. The truth of the assumption, may be knowne two wayes: first, because all the contrarieties that are found within our cognisance, do arise out of the primary oppo∣sition of Rarity and Density; from which the soule being absolutely free, she likewise is so, from all that groweth out of that roote: and secondly, we may be sure that our soule can receiue no harme from contrariety; since all contraries are so farre from hurting her, as contra∣ry wise, the one helpeth her in the contemplation of the other: and as for contradiction in thoughts, which att different times our soule is capable of admitting, experience teacheth vs, that such thoughts do change in her, without any preiudice to her substance; they being accidents, and hauing their contrariety only betwixt themselues within her, but no opposition at all to her; which only is the contrariety that may haue power to harme her: and therefore, whether soeuer of such contrary thoughts be in the soule, pertaineth no more to her subsistence, then it doth to the subsistence of a body,7 1.80 whether it be here or there, on the right hand, or on the left.

And thus I conceiue my taske is performed; and that I am discharged of my vndertaking to shew the soules Immortality, which importeth no

more, then to shew, that the causes of other thinges mortality, do not reach her. Yet being well persuaded, that my reader will not be offended with the addition of any new light, in this darke subiect; I will striue to discouer (if it be possible) some positiue proofe, or guesse, out of the property and nature of the soule it selfe, why she must remaine, and ••nioy an other life after this. To this end, lett vs cast our eye backe, vpon what hath beene already said, concerning her nature. We found that truth is the naturall perfection of Mans soule; and that she can not be assured of truth naturally, otherwise then by euidence: and therefore it is manifest, that euidence of truth, is the full complete perfection, at which the soule doth ayme. We found also, that the soule is capable of an absolute infinity of truth or euidēce. To these two, we will adde only one thing more, which of it selfe is past question, and therefore needeth no proofe; and then we will deduce our conclusion: and this is, that in a man his soule is a farre nobler, and perfecter part of him, then his body: and therefore, by the rules of nature and of wisedome, his body was made for his soule, and not his soule finally for his body.

These groundes being thus layed, lett vs examine, whether our soule doth in this life arriue to the end she was ordained for, or no: and if she do not then it must follow of necessity, that our body was made but for a passage, by which our soule should be ferried ouer into that state, where she is to attaine vnto that end, for which her nature is framed and fitted: the great skill, and artifice of nature, shewing and assuring vs, that she neuer faileth of compassing her end, euen in her meanest workes: and therefore without doubt would not breake her course in her greatest: whereof man is absolutely the head and chiefe, among all those that we are acquainted with. Now, what the end is, vnto which our soule doth ayme, is euident; since the perfection of euery thing, is the end for which it is made: the perfection then, and end of the soule being euidence; and she being capable of infinite euidence; lett vs enquire, whether in this life she may compasse it or no. To determine this question, lett vs compare infinite euidence, to that euidence, which the greatest and most knowing man that euer liued, hath acquired by the worke of nature alone; or to that euidence, which by aime we may imagine is possible euer to happen vnto any one man to arriue vnto: and balancing them well together, lett vs iudge whether all that any man can know here, is not in respect of what a mans soule is capable of, to be stiled as nothing, and deserueth not the name of euidence, nor to be accounted of that nature: and if our sentence do conclude vpon this, lett vs acknowledge that our soule arriueth not to her perfection, nor enioyeth her end, in this world; and therefore, must haue infaillibly an other habitation in the next world, vnto which nature doth intend her. Experience teacheth vs, that we can not fully comprehend any one of natures workes: and those Philosophers, who in a disciplinable way search into nature, (and there∣fore are called Mathematicians) after they haue written large volumes of some very slender subiect, do euer find, that hey haue left vntouched, an

endlesse abisse of knowledge, for whomsoeuershall please to build vpon their foundations: and that they can neuer arriue neere saying all that may be said of that subiect, though they haue said neuer so much of it. We may not then make difficulty to beleeue, that the wisest and learnedest men in the world, haue reason to professe with the father of Philosophers, that indeede they know nothing▪ And if so, how farre are they from that happinesse and perfection, which consisteth in knowing all thinges? Of which full sea, we neuerthelesse find euen in this low ebbe, that our soule is a channell capable; and is framed a fitt vessell and instrument to receiue it, when the tide shall come in vpon it: which we are sure it can not do, vntill the bankes of our body which hinder it, be broken downe.

8 1.81This last consideration, without doubt, hath added no small corro∣boration to our former proofes; which are so numerous and so cleare, as peraduenture it may appeare superfluous, to say any more to this point: since one conuincing argument establisheth the verity of a conclusion, as efficaciously as a hundred: and therefore Mathematicians vse but one single proofe, in all their propositions; after which other supernumerary ones, would be but tedious Neuerthelesse▪ since all the seuerall wayes, by which we may looke into the nature of our soule (the importantest subiect we can busy our thoughts vpon) can not faile of being pleasing and delightfull to vs, we must not omitt to reflect a litle vpon that great property of our soule, by which she is able to mooue and to worke, without her selfe being mooued or touched. Vnto which adding, that all life consisteth in motion, and that all motion of bodies cometh from some other thing without them; we may euidently conclude, that our soule, who can mooue without receiuing her motiō from abread, hath in her selfe a spring of life; for the which she is not beholding (as bodies are) to some extrinsecall cause, of a nature like vnto her; but only to him, who gaue her to Be what she is. But if she haue such a spring of life within her, it were vnreasonable to imagine, that she dyed vpon the occasion of the death of an other thing, that exerciseth no action of life, but as it is caused by an other.

9 1.82Neyther may we neglect that ordinary consideration, which taketh notice, that our soule maketh vse of propositions of eternall truth; which we haue aboue produced, among our proofes for her being of a spirituall nature; and shall now employ it for the prouing her Immortall: by considering, that the notion of Being, which settleth these proposi∣tions so, as they feare no mutation or shaking by time, is the very roote of the soule; and that which giueth her her nature; and which ••heweth it selfe in all her operations: so that, if from Being, arriueth vnto these propositions, to feare no time; the like must of necessity betide also the substāce of the soule. And thus we see, that her nature is out of the reach of time: that she can comprehend time, and sett it limits: and that she can think of thinges beyond it, and cast about for them. All which are cleare testimonies, that she is free and secure from the all deuouring and

destroying tyranny of that Saturniall Conquerour of the whole world of matter and of Bodies, whose seruant is death.

After all these proofes drawne from the nature of the soule it selfe,10 1.83 euery one of them of force to conuince her immortality, I must craue leaue to adde one consideration more, though it seemeth to belong vnto an others haruest, namely to the science of Morals: and it is, that the position of Mortality in the soule, taketh away all morality, and changeth men into beastes; by taking away the ground of all difference in those thinges, which are to gouerne our actions. For supposing that the soule dyeth with the body; and seeing that man hath a compre∣hension or notion of time without end; it is euident, that the spanne of this life, must needes appeare contemptible vnto him, that well consi∣dereth and weigheth it against the other infinite duration: and by conse∣quence, all the goods, and euils which are partes of this life, must needes become as despicable and inconsiderable: so that better or worse in this life, hath not any appearance of difference betweene them; at the least, not enough to make him labour with paine to compasse the one, and eschew the other, and for that end, to crosse his present inclination in any thing, and engage himselfe in any the least difficult taske: and so it would ensue, that if to an vnderstanding man, some course or action were proposed vnto him, as better then that he were going about, or for the instant had a mind vnto▪ he would relish it, as a great marchant, or a Banquier would do, who dealing for Millions, one should presse him with earnestnesse, to make him change his resolued course, for the gaine of a farthing more this way then the other; which being inconsiderable, he would not trouble his head with it, nor stoppe at what he was in hand with. In like manner, whosoeuer is persuaded, that for an infinity of time he shall be nothing, and without sense of all thinges, he scorneth for this litle twinckling of his life, to take any present paines, to be in the next moment well, or to auoyde being ill; since in this case, dying is a secure remedy to any present euill; and he is as ready to dye now, as a hundred yeares hēce; nor can he estime the losse of a hūdred yeares, to be a matter of moment: and therefore he will, without any further guidance or dis∣course, betake himselfe to do whatsoeuer his present inclination beareth him to with most facility; vpō this resolutiō, that if any thing crosse him, he will presētly forgoe his life, as a trifle not worth the keeping: and thus, neyther vertue, nor honour, nor more pleasure then what at the present tickleth him, doth fall into his account: which is the ouerthrow of the whole body of Morality, that is of mans action and nature. But all they who looke into sciences, do crosse that for an erroneous and absurd position, which taketh away the Principles of any science: and conse∣quently, the position of the soules Mortality, is to be esteemed such. There remaineth yet one consideration more, and peraduenture more important, then any we haue yet mentioned, to conuince the soules immortality: which is, that spirituall thinges are in a state of Being. But we

shall not be able to declare this, vntill we haue proceeded a litle further.

THE TENTH CHAPTER. Declaring what the soule of a man, seperated from his body, is: and of her knowledge and manner of working.

1 1.84VNhappy man! how long wilt thou be inquisitiue and curious to thine owne perill? Hast thou not already payed too deare, for thy knowing more then thy share? Or hast thou not heard, that who will prye into maiesty, shall be oppressed by the glory of it? Some are so curious (shall I say) or so ignorant, as to demaund, what a humane soule will be, after she is deliuered from her body: and vnlesse they may see a picture of her, and haue whereby to fansie her, they will not be persuaded, but that all are dreames, which our former discourses haue concluded: as if he, who findeth himselfe dazeled with looking vpon the sunne, had reason to complaine of that glorious body, and not of his owne weake eyes, that can not entertaine so resplendent a light.

Wherefore to frame some conceit of a seperated soule, I will endeauour for their satisfaction, to say some what of her future state. Lett vs then first consider what a Thought is. (I do not meane, that corporeall spiritt, which beateth at our common sense; but that which is within, in the inward soule, whose nature we find by discourse and effects, though we can not see it in it selfe.) To this purpose we may obserue, that if we are to discourse, or to do any thing, we are guided the right way in that subiect we haue in hand, by a multitude of particular thoughts; which are all of them terminated in that discourse or action: and consequently, euery act of our mind, is as it were an actuall rule or direction, for some part of such discourse or action: so that we may conceiue a complete thought (compounded of many particular ones) to be a thing, that ordereth one entire discourse or action of our life.

A thought being thus described, lett vs in the next place trye, if we can make an apprehension, what a science or an art is: as, what the science of Astronomy is; or what the art of playing on the Organes is, when the Astronomer thinketh not of the motions of the heauens, nor the Organist of playing on his instrument: which science and art, do neuerthelesse euen then reside in the Astronomer, and in the Organist▪ and we find, that these are but the resultes of many former complete thoughts; as being those very thoughts in remainder; whatsoeuer this may signify.

Lastly, lett vs conceiue (if we can) a power or capacity to Being: vnto which capacity, if any Being be brought, that it is vnseperably glewed

and riueted vnto it, by its very being a Being: and if any two thinges be brought vnto it, by the vertue of one Being, common to both those thinges, that both of them, by this one being, do become one betwixt themselues, and with this capacity; and that so there is no end or periode of this addition of thinges, by the mediation of Being; but that by linkes and ringes, all the thinges that are in the world, may hang together betwixt themselues, and to this Power▪ if all of them may be brought vnto it by the glew and vertue of being: in such sort as we haue formerly declared, passeth in the soule.

Now lett vs putt this together, and make vp such a thing, as groweth out of the capacity to Being, thus actuated and cleauing to all thinges that any way haue being; and we shall see, that it becometh a whole entire world, ordered and clinging together with as great strength and neces∣sity, as can proceede from the nature of Being, and of contradiction: and our reason will tell vs, that such a thing, if it be actiue, can frame a world, such an one as we liue in, and are a small parcell of, if it haue matter to worke vpon; and can order whatsoeuer hath Being, any way that it is capable of being ordered, to do by it, and to make of it, whatsoeuer can be done by, and made of such matter.

All these conceptions (especially by the assistance of the last) may serue a litle to shadow out a perfect soule: which is, a knowledge, an art, a rule, a direction, of all thinges: and all this by being all thinges, in a degree and straine, proper and peculiar to it selfe: and an vnperfect soule, is a participation of this Idea: that is, a kn••wledge, a rule, and a direction, for as much as it is, and as it attaineth vnto. Now as in our thoughts, it is the corporeall part only which maketh a noise, and a shew outwardly, but the spirituall thought, is no otherwise perceiued then in its effect, in ordering the bodily acts; in like sort, we must not conceiue this know∣ledge to be a motion; but meerely to be a thing or Being, out of which the ordering and mouing of other thinges doth flow; it selfe remaining fixed and immoueable: and because all that is ioyned vnto it, is there riueted by Being, or identification; and that when one thing is an other, the other is againe it; it is impossible that one should exceed the other, and be any thing that is not it: and therefore, in the soule there can be no partes, no accidents, no additions, no appendances, nothing that sticketh to it and is not it: but whatsoeuer is in her, is soule; and the soule, is all that which is within her; so that all that is of her, and all that belongeth vnto her, is nothing but one pure simple substance, peraduenture M••taphysically, or formally diuisible; (in such sort as we haue explicated in the first Trea∣tise, of the diuisibility betweene quantity and substance) but not quanti∣tatiuely, as bodies are diuisible. In fine, substance it is, and nothing but substance; all that is in it, being ioyned and imped into it, by the very nature of Being, which maketh substance. This then, is the substantiall conceite of a humane soule stripped of her body.

Now, to conceiue what proprieties this substance is furnished with;

lett vs reflect vpon the notions we frame of thinges,2 1.85 when we consider them in common: as when we think of a man, of bread, of some parti∣cular vertue, of a vice, or of whatsoeuer else; and lett vs note, how in such, our discourse determineth no place, nor time: nay, if it should, it would marre the discourse; as Logitians shew, when they teach vs, that scienti∣ficall syllogismes can not be made without vniuersall propositions: so that we see, vnlesse these thinges be stripped from Place and Time, they are not according to our meaning: and yet neuerthelesse, we giue them both the name, and the nature of a Thing, or of a substance, or of a liuing Thing, or of whatsoeuer else may by our manner of conceiuing or endeauours, be freed from the subiection of time and Place. Thus then we plainely see, that it is a very different thing, to be, and to be in a Place: and therefore, out of a Thinges being in no Place, it can not be inferred, That it is not; or that it is no substance: nor contrariwise, out of its being, can it be inferred, that it is in a Place: there is no man but of himselfe perceiueth the false consequence of this argument, a thing is, therefore it is hoat, or it is cold: and the reason is, because hoat and cold, are particular accidents of a body; and therefore a body can be without eyther of them. The like proportion is betweene Being in generall, and Being a Body, or Being in a Body: for both these, are particulars in respect of Being: but to be in a Place, is nothing else, but to be in a circumstant Body: and so, what is not in a Body, is not in a Place: therefore, as it were an absurd illation to say, it is, therefore it is in a Body; no lesse is it to say, it is, there∣fore it is somewhere; which is equiualent to, in some Body: and so a great Master (Peraduenture one of the greatest, and iudiciousest that euer haue beene) telleth vs plainely,* 1.86 that of it selfe it is euident, to those who are truly learned, that incorporeall substances are not in Place: and Aristotle teacheth vs, that the Vniuerse is not in Place.

But now to make vse of this discourse, we must intimate what it is we leuell at in it: we direct it to two endes; first, to lead on our thoughts, and to helpe our apprehension, in framing some conception of a spirituall substance, without residence in Place; and to preuēt our fansies checking at such abstraction; since we see that we vse it in our ordinary speech, when we thinke not on it, nor labour for it, in all vniuersall and indefinite termes: next, to trace out an eminent propriety of a seperated soule: namely, that she is no where; and yet (vpon the matter) that she is euery where: that she is bound to no Place, and yet remote from none: that she is able to worke vpon all, without shifting from one to an other, or coming neere any: and that she is free from all, without remoouing or parting from any one.

3 1.87A second propriety, not much vnlike this first, we shall discouer in a seperated soule, if we compare her with time. We haue heretofore expli∣cated, how Time is the motion of the heauens; which giueth vs our motion; which measureth all particular motions; and which compre∣hendeth all bodies, and maketh them awayte his leisure. From the large

empire of this proud commander, a separated soule is free: for although she do consist with time, (that is to say, she is, whiles time is;) yet is ••he not in time; nor doth she in any of her actions, expect time; but she is able to frame time, to spinne or weaue it out of her selfe, and to master it.

All which will appeare manifestly, if we consider what it is to be in time. Aristotle sheweth vs; that, to be comprehended vnder time, or to be in time, is, to be one of those mooueables, whose being consisting in motion, taketh vp but a part of Time; and hath its termes, before, and behind, in time; and is measured by Time; and must expect the flowing of Time, both for Being, and for Action. Now all this manifestly belongeth vnto Bodies, whose both action and being, is subiect to a perpetuall locall motion and alteration: and consequently, a separated soule, who is totally a Being, and hath her whole operation all together (as being nothing but her selfe when we speake of her perfectiue operation;) can not be said to be in time, but is absolutely free from it; though time do glide by her, as it doth by other thinges: and so, all that she knoweth or can do, she doeth and knoweth at once, with one act of the vnder∣standing or rather, she is, (indeede and really) all that: and therefore, she doth not require time to manage or order her thoughts, nor do they succeed one an other, by such vicissitudes as men are forced to thinke of thinges by, because their fansie, and the images in it which beate vpon the soule to mak•• ••er thinke, whiles she is in the body, are corporeall, and therefore, do require time to mooue in, and to giue way to one and other: but she thinketh of all the thinges in the world, and of all that she can thinke of, together and at once; as hereafter we intend to shew.

A third propriety we may conceiue to be in a separated soule▪ by apprehending her to be an Actiuity;4 1.88 which that we may rightly vnderstand, lett vs compare her, in regard of working, with a body: reflecting then vpon the nature of bodies, we shall find, that not any of them will do the functions they are framed for, vnlesse some other thing do stirre them vp, and cause them so to do. As for example; a knife, if it be thrust or pressed, will cutt, otherwise, it will lye still and haue no effect: and as it fareth with a knife, so it doth in the same manner with those bodies, which seeme most to mooue themselues; as vpon a litle conside∣ration, will appeare plainely. A beast seemeth to mooue it selfe: but if we call to minde, what we haue deliuered vpon this subiect in the first Treatise, we shall find that whensoeuer he beginneth to mooue, he eyther perceiueth something by his sense, which causeth his motion, or else he remembreth something that is in his braine, which worketh the like effect. Now if sense presenteth him an obiect that causeth his motion, we see manifestly, that it is an externall cause which maketh him mooue: but if memory do it, we shall find that stirred by some other part; as by the stomacke, or by the heart, which is empty, or heated, or hath receiued some other impression from an other body, so that, sooner or later, we shall discouer an outward moouer. The

like is in naturall motions; as, in heauy thinges, their easy following (if they be sucked) an other way then downewardes, testifyeth that their motion downewardes hath an extrinsecall motor, as is before declared: and not only in these, but throughout, in all other corporeall thinges. So that in a word, all bodies are of this nature, that vnlesse some other thing presse them and alter them, when they are quiett, they remaine so; and haue no actiuity, otherwise then from an extrinsecall moouer: but of the soule, we haue declared the contrary; and that, by its nature, motion may proceed from it, without any mutation in it, or without its receiuing any order, direction, or impulse, from an extrinsecall cause.

5 1.89So that, now summing vp together, all we haue said vpon this occasion, we find a soule exempted from the body, to be; An indiuisible substance, exempted from place and time, yet present to both: an actuall and present knowledge of all thinges that may be knowne: and a skill or rule, euen by what it selfe is, to all thinges whatsoeuer. This she is, if she be perfect: but if she be imperfect; then, is she all this to the proportion of her groweth, (if so I may say) and she is powerfull according to the measure of her knowledge, and of her will. So that in fine, a seperated soule, is of a nature to haue, and to know, and to gouerne all thinges.

6 1.90I may reasonably suspect, that my saying how imperfect soules are rules to the proportion of their groweth, may hau•• occasioned great reflexion, and may haue bredd some trouble in the curious and heedefull reader. I confesse this expression was deliuered by me, only to free my selfe for the present from the labour of shewing what knowledge euery seperated soule hath: but vpon second thoughts, I find that such sliding ouer this difficult point will not serue my turne, nor saue me the paines of vntying this knott: for vnlesse I explicate what I meane by that speech, I shall leaue my Reader in great doubt and anxiety; which to free him from, I must wade a litle further in this question of the extent of a sepe∣rated soules knowledge, into which, I haue thus, vpon the by, engaged my selfe: but lett him first be aduertised, that I do not here meddle, with what a seperated soule may know by reuelation, or by supernaturall meanes: but that I do only tracke out her naturall pathes; and do guesse at what she is, or knoweth, by that light which her conuersation in her body affordeth vs.

Our entrance into this matter must be, to consider what mutation in respect of knowledge, a soules first change out of her body, maketh in her; for it is not vnlikely, but that nature may some way enlighten vs so farre, as to lett vs vnderstand what must follow out of the negation of the bodies consorteshippe, added vnto what we know of her and other workes in this world. This then first occurreth that surely she can not choose but still know in that state, all that she did know whiles she was in the body; since we are certaine that the body hath no part in that which is true knowledge: as is aboue declared, when we shewed; first, that all

true knowledge is respectiue; secondly, that the first impressions of the fansie, do not reach to the interiour soule; and lastly, that she worketh by much more, then what hath any actuall correspondence in the fansie, and that all thinges are vnited to her by the force of Being: from which last, it followeth that all thinges she knoweth, are her selfe; and she, is, all that she knoweth: wherefore, if she keepeth her selfe and her owne Being, she must needes keepe the knowledge of all that she knew in this world.

Next, she must vndoubtedly know then somewhat more, then she knew in the body;7 1.91 for seeing that out of the thinges she already knoweth, others will follow by the meere ordering and connexion of them; and that the soules proper worke, is to order thinges: we can not doubt, but that, both the thinges she knoweth in this world, must of necessity be ordered in her to the best aduan∣tage; and likewise, that all that, will be knowne, which wanteth no other cause for the knowing of it, but the ordering of these thinges: for if the nature of a thing, were order, who can doubt but what were putt into that thing, were putt into order? Now, that the nature of the soule is such, we collect easily; for seeing that all order proceedeth from her, it must be acknowledged that order is first in her: but what is in her, is her nature: her nature then, is order; and what is in her, is ordered. In saying of which, I do not meane that there is such an order betweene the notions of a seperated soule, as is betweene materiall thinges, that are ordered by the soule whiles she is in the body; for seeing that the soule is adaequate cause of such order; (that is to say, a cause which can make any an such, and the whole kind of it;) it followeth, that such order is not in her; for if it were, she would be cause of her selfe, or of her owne partes. Order therefore, in her, must signify a thing more eminēt, thē such infe∣riour order, in which resideth the power of making that inferiour order: and this is nothing else, but the cōnexion of her notions by the necessity of Being; which we haue oftē explicated. And out of this eminēt or supe∣riour kind of order, our conclusion followeth no lesse then if the infe∣riour order which we see in our fansies, whiles our soule is in our Body, did reside in our interiour soule; for, it is the necessity of identification, which doth the effect, and maketh the soule know; and the order of fantasmes, is but a precedent condition in the bodily Agent, that it may worke vpon the soule; and if more fantasmes then one could be together, this order would not be necessary.

Out of this, a notable and a vast conclusion, manifestly followeth: to witt, that if a soule, can know any one thing more when she is out the body, then what she did know whiles she was in the body; without any manner of doubt, she knoweth all that can be drawne, and forced out of those knowledges, which she had in her body. How much this is, and how farre it will reach, I am affraide to speake: only I entreate Mathe∣maticians, and such as are acquainted with the manner how sciences proceed; to consider how some of their definitions are made: to witt by

composing together sundry knowne termes, and giuing a new name to the compound that resulteth out of them: wherefore cleare it is, that out of fewer notions had at the first, the soule can make many more: and the more she hath, or maketh, the more she can multiply. Againe, the maximes, which are necessary to be added vnto the definitions for gaining of knowledge, we see are also compounded of ordinary and knowne termes; so that a seperated soule, can want neyther the Defini∣tions, nor the Maximes, out of which the bookes of sciences are composed: and therefore, neyther can the sciences themselues be wanting vnto her. Now if we consider, that in the same fashion as demonstrations are made, and knowledge is acquired in one science, by the same meanes, there is a transcendence from science to science: and that there is a connexion among all the sciences, which fall into the consideration of man, and indeede among all, at the least corporeall thinges; (for of spiri∣tuall thinges, we can not so assuredly affirme it; although their perfection may persuade vs, that there is rather a greater connexion among them, then among corporeall thinges) it will follow, that a soule which hath but any indifferent knowledge in this world, shall be replenished with all knowledge in the next.

But how much is this indifferent knowledge, that for this purpose is required in this world? Vpon mature consideration of this point, it is true, I find it absolutely necessary, that the soule must haue here so much knowledge, as to be able to determine that some one thing, which hath connexion with all the rest, is in such a time: but then, why out of this very conception, she should not be able to clymbe vp by degrees, to the knowledge of all other thinges whatsoeuer (since there is a connexion betweene that, and all the rest, and no vntransible gappe, or Chaos to seuer them) I professe I do not see. Which if it be so, then the soule of an abortiue in his mothers wombe, if he once arriue to haue sense, and from it, to receiue any impression in his soule, may for ought I know, or can suspect to the contrary, be endewed in the next world with as much knowledge, as the soule of the greatest Clerke that euer liued: and if an abortiue do not arriue so farre, as to the knowledge of some one thing, I know no reason, why we should belieue it arriued to the nature of man.

Whence it followeth, that this amplitude of knowledge, is common to all humane soules, (of what pitch soeuer they seeme to bee here) when they are seperated from their bodies: as also, that if any errour haue crept into a mans iudgement, during this life, whether it be of some vniuersall conclusion, or of some particular thing, all such will be abolished then, by the truth appearing on the opposite side; sithence two contradictory iudgements, can not possesse our soule together: as euen in this world, as well experience, as reason teacheth vs.

But vnawares I haue engulfed my selfe into a sea of contradiction, from no meane aduersaries: for Alexander Aphrodiseus, Pomponatius,

and the learnedest of the Peripatetike schoole,8 1.92 will all of them rise vp in maine opposition against this doctrine of mine: shewing how in the body, all our soules knowledge is made, by the working of our fansie; and that there is no act of our soule, without speculation of fantasmes residing in our memory: therefore, seeing that when our body is gone, all those litle bodies of fantasmes are gone with it; what signe is there, that any operation can remaine? And hence they inferre, that seeing euery substance hath its Being for its operations sake, and by consequence were vaine and superfluous in the world, if it could not enioy and exercise its operation; there is no necessity or end, why the soule of a man should suruiue his body: and consequently, there is no reason to imagine other, then that it perisheth when the man dyeth. This is the substance of their argument; which indeede is nothing else, but to guesse without ground, or rather against all ground: but howsoeuer, this comfort I haue, that I haue to do with Peripatetikes; men that will heare and answere reason: and to such I addresse my speech.

To ioyne issue then with them, and to encounter them with their owne weapons, lett vs call to minde, what Aristotle holdeth light to be. He saith, that it is a suddaine and momentary emanation of what it is, following the precedent motion of some body, but without motion in it selfe. As for example: when the sunne cometh into our horizon, (saith he) the illumination of the horizon, is an effect in an instant, following from the motion which the sunne had, since his setting in the other hemisphere, vntill he appeare there againe: so that (according to him) the way of making this light, is the sunnes locall motion; but the effect of the being enlightened, is a thing of a very different nature, done without beginning, and continuing vntill the sunne departe againe from our horizon. And as he explicateth this action of illumination, in the same manner, doth he the actions of sense and of vnderstanding. Vpon all which I vrge, that no Peripatetike will deny me, but that as in euery particular sensation or thinking, there precedeth a corporeall motion, out of which it ensueth, so this generall motion, which we call the life of Man, precedeth that twinkle or moment, in which she becometh an absolute spiritt, or inhabitant of the next world. Wherefore it can not be said, that we introduce a doctrine aliene from the Peripatetike way of Philosophising, if we putt a momentary effect of motion (according to their phrase of speaking) to follow out of the course of mans life; since they putt diuers such effects, to follow out of particular partes of it.

Now, this momentary change, or what they please to call it, is that which maketh at one blow, all this knowledge we speake of: for, if we remember that knowledge is not a doing or a motion, but a Being; as is agreed betweene the Peripatetikes and vs; they can not, for the conti∣nuing it, require instruments and motors: for they are necessary only for change, not for Being. Now, all this mighty change, which is made at the soules deliuery, we conceiue followeth precisely out of the change of

her Being: for seeing it is supposed, that her Being was before in a body, but is now out of a body; it must of necessity follow, that all impediments, which grew out of her being in a body, must be taken away by her being freed from it. Among which impediments, one is, that time is then required betwixt her knowledge of one thing, and her knowledge of an other thing; and so her capacity, that of it selfe is infinite, becometh confined to that small multitude of obiects, which the diuision and straightnesse of time giueth way vnto. Now that, which length of time could in part worke in the body, the same is entirely done in a moment, by the changing of her manner of Being: for by taking away the bondes, by which she was enthralled in the body, and was kept in, to apprehend but according to the measure of the body, and was constrained to be, and to enioy her selfe (as it were) but at the bodies permission; she is putt in free possession of her selfe, and of all that is in her. And this is nothing else, but to haue that large know∣ledge, we haue spoken of▪ for her knowing all that, is no other thing but her being her selfe perfectly. Which will appeare euident, if we consider that her nature is, to be a Knower, and that knowledge is nothing else but a Being of the obiect in the Knower; for thence it followeth, that to know all thinges is naught else then to be all thinges: since then, we concluded by our former discourse, that all thinges were to be gathered out of any one; it is cleare that to be perfectly her selfe, and any one thing, is in truth to know all thinges.

And thus we see, that for the soules enioying all this knowledge when she is out of the body, she needeth no obiects without her, no phantasmes, no instruments, no helpes; but that all that is requisite, is cōtained absolutely in her being her selfe perfectly. And so we retort our Aduersaries obiection on themselues; by representing to them, that since in their owne doctrine, they require no body nor instruments, for that precise action which they call vnderstanding: it is without all ground, for them to require bodies and instruments in the next life, that the soule may there be that, which, they acnowledge she is in her body without any such helpes.

And as for that axiome or experience, that the soule doth not vnderstand, vnlesse she speculate phantasmes: as on the one side I yield to it, and confesse the experience, after the best and seriousest tryall I could make of it; so on the other side, when I examine the matter to the bottome, I find that it cometh not home to our aduersaries intention. For as when we looke vpon a thing, we conceiue we worke vpon that thing, whereas in truth we do but sett our selues in such a position that the thing seene may worke vpon vs: in like manner our looking vpon the phantasmes in our braine, is not our soules action vpon them, but it is our letting them beate at our common sense; that is, our letting them worke vpon our soule. The effect whereof is, that eyther oursoule is bettered in her selfe, as when we study and contemplate: or else, that she

bettereth something without vs, as when by this thinking, we order any action.

But, if they will haue this Axiome auayle them, they should shew that the soule is not of her selfe a knowledge; which if they be able to do, euen then when to our thinking, she seemeth not so much as to thinke, we will yield they haue reason: but that will be impossible to them to do▪ for she is alwayes, of her selfe, a knowledge, though in the body sh•• ••eu•••• expresseth so much, but when she is putt to it. Or else they should sh••w▪ that this knowledge which the soule is of her selfe, will not by changing the manner of her Existence, become an actuall knowledge, insteed of the habituall knowledge which now appeareth in her.

But as these Aristotelians embrace and sticke to one▪ Axiome of their Patrone;9 1.93 so they forgoe and preuaricate against an other for as it is Aristotles doctrine, that a substance is for its operation, and were in vaine and superfluous if it could not practise it; so likewise is it his confessed doctrine, that Matter is for its forme, and not the forme, for the 〈◊〉〈◊〉. And yet these men pretend that the soule, serueth for nothing 〈…〉〈…〉 gouerning of the body: whereas contrawise, both all. 〈…〉〈…〉 doctrine, and common sense conuinceth, that the body must 〈…〉〈…〉 soule. Which if it be, nothing can be more consentaneous to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 then to conceiue that the durance which the soule hath in the 〈…〉〈…〉 assigned her, to worke and moulde in her the future state, which 〈…〉〈…〉 haue after this life: and that no more operations are to be expected from her after this life, but insteed of them, a settled state of Being; seeing that▪ euen in this life, according to Aristotles doctrine, the proper operations of the soule are but certaine Beings: so that we may conclude, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a soule were growne to the perfection, which her nature is capable of the would be nothing else but a constant Being, neuer changing from the happenesse of the best Being.

And although the texts of Aristotle which remaine vnto vs, be vncer∣taine (peraduenture, not so much because they were originally such▪ in themselues, as through the mingling of some comments into the body of the text;) yet if we had his booke which he wrote of the soule vpon the death of his frend Eudemus, it is very likely we should there see his euident assertion of her Immortality; since it had beene very imper∣tinent to take occasion vpon a frends death to write of the soule, if he intended to conclude, that of a dead man there were no soule.

Out of this discourse it appeareth,10 1.94 how those actions which we exercise in this life, are to be vnderstood, when we heare them attributed to the next: for to think that they are to be taken in their direct plaine meaning and in that way, in which they are performed in this world; were a great simplicity, and were to imagine a likenesse betweene bodies and spirits. We must therefore eleuate our mindes, when we would penetrate into the true meaning of such expressions, and consider how all the actions of our soule are eminently comprehended in the vniuersality of know∣ledge

we haue already explicated. And so, the Apprehensions, iudgements, discourses, reflections, talkings together, and all other such actions of ours, when they are attributed to separated soules, are but inadaequate names and representations of their instantaneall sight of all thinges, for, in that, they can not choose, but see others mindes, which is that we call talking; and likewise their owne▪ which we call reflexion: the rest are plaine partes, and are plainely contained in knowledge; discourse being but the falling into it; iudgement the principles of it; and single apprehensions the cōponents of iudgements: then for such actions as are the beginning of operatiō, there can be no doubt but that they are like∣wise to be found, and are resumed, in the same Vniuersality; as, loue of good, consultation, resolution, prudentiall election, and the first motion; for who knoweth all thinges, can not choose but know what is good, and that good, is to be prosecuted: and who seeth completely all the meanes of effecting and attaining to his intended good; hath already consulted and resolued of the best: and who vnderstandeth perfectly the matter he is to worke vpon, hath already made his prudentiall election: so that there remaineth nothing more to be done, but to giue the first impulse.

And thus you see, that this vniuersality of knowledge in the soule, comprehendeth all,11 1.95 is all, performeth all; and no imaginable good or happinesse, is out of her reach. A noble creature, and not to be cast away vpon such trash as most men employ their thoughts in. Vpon whom it is now time to reflect; and to consider, what effects the diuers manners of liuing in this world, do worke vpon her in the next; if first we acquitt ourselues of a promise we made at the end of the last Chapter. For it being now amply declared, that the state of a soule exempted from her body, is a state of pure being; it followeth manifestly, that there is neyther Action nor Passion in that state: which being so, it is beyond all opposition that the soule can not dye: for it is euident that all corruption, must come from the action of an other thing, vpon that which is corrupted; and therefore that thing must be capable of being made better and of being made worse. Now then, if a separated soule be in a finall state, where she can neyther be bettered, or worsened, (as she must be, if she be such a thing, as we haue declared) it followeth that she can not possibly loose the Being which she hath: and sithence her passage out of the body, doth not change her nature, but only her state; it is cleare, that she is of the same nature, euen in the body: though in this her durance, she be subiect to be forged (as it were) by the hammers of corporeall obiects beating vpon her; yet so, that of her selfe she still is what she is. And therefore as soone as she is out of the passible oore, in which she suffereth by reason of that oore, she presently becometh impassible, as being purely of her owne nature, a fixed substance, that is, a pure Being. Both which states of the soule, may in some sort be adūbrated by what we see passeth in the coppelling of a fixed mettall; for as long as any lead, or drosse, or allay remaineth with it, it continueth melted, flowing, and in

motion vnder the muffle: but as soone as they are parted from it, and that it is become pure, without any mixture, and singly it selfe, it contracteth it selfe to a narrower roome, and at that very instant, ceaseth from all motion, groweth hard, permanent, resistent vnto all operations of fire, and suffereth no change or diminution in its substance by any outward violence we can vse vnto it.

THE ELEVENTH CHAPTER. Shewing what effects, the diuers manners of liuing in this world, do cause in a soule, after she is separated from her body.

ONe thing,1 1.96 may peraduenture seeme of hard digestion in our past discourse; and it is, that out of the groundes we haue layed, it seemeth to follow that all soules will haue an equality; since we haue concluded, that the greatest shall see or know no more then the least: and indeed, there appeareth no cause why this great and noble creature, should lye imprisoned in the obscure dungeon of noysome flesh; if in the first instant, in which it hath its first knowledge, it hath then already gained all whatsoeuer it is capable of gaining in the whole progresse of a long life afterwardes. Truly, the Platonike Philo∣sophers (who are persuaded that a humane soule doth not profitt in this life, nor that she acquired any knowledge here; as being of her selfe completely perfect; and that all our discourses, are but her remembringes of what she had forgotten) will find themselues ill bestedd to render a Philosophicall and sufficient cause of her being locked into a body: for to putt forgettfulnesse in a pure spiritt; so palpable an effect of corporeity, and so great a corruption, in respect of a creature whose nature is, to know of it selfe, is an vnsufferable errour. Besides, when they tell vs, that she can not be changed, because all change would preiudice the spirituall nature, which they attribute to her; but that well she may be warned and excitated by being in a body; they meerely trifle: for eyther there is some true mutation made in her by that which they call a warning, or there is not; if there be not, how becometh it a warning to her? Or what is it more to her then if a straw were wagged at the Antipodes? But if there be some mutation (be it neuer so litle) made in her by a corporeall motion; what should hinder, why she may not by meanes of her body, attaine vnto science she neuer had; as well as by it receiue any the least intrinsecall mutation whatsoeuer? For if once we admitt any mutability in her from any corporeall motion, it is farre more conformable vnto reason to suppose it in regard of that which is her naturall perfection, and of that, which by her operations we see she hath immediately after such corporeall motions, and whereof before them there appeared in her no markes at all; then to

suppose it in regard of a darke intimation, of which we neyther know, it is nor how it is performed. Surely, no Rationall Philosopher seeing a thing, whose nature is to know, haue a being, whereas formerly it existed not; and obseruing, how that thing by little and little giueth signes of more and more knowledge, can doubt but that as she could be changed from not being to being; so, may she likewise be changed from lesse knowing, to more knowing.

2 1.97This then being irrefragably settled, that in the body she doth encrease in knowledge: lett vs come to our difficulty and examine what this encrease in the body auaileth her; seeing that as soone as she parteth from it, she shall of her owne nature enioy, and be replenished with the knowledge of all thinges: why should she laboriously striue to anticipate the getting of a few droppes, which but encrease her thirst and anxiety; when hauing but a litle patience, she shall at one full and euerlasting draught drinke vp the whole sea of it? We know that the soule is a thing, made proportionably to the making of its body; seeing, it is the bodies compartener: and we haue concluded, that whiles it is in the body, it acquireth perfection in that way, which the nature of it is capable of; that is, in knowledge: as the body acquireth perfection its way; which is, in strēgth and agility. Now then, lett vs cōpare the proceedinges of the one, with those of the other substance; and peraduenture we may gaine some light, to discerne what aduantage it may proue vnto a soule, to remaine long in its body, if it make right vse of its dwelling there. Lett vs cōsider the body of a man, well and exactly shaped in all his members; yet, if he neuer vse care, nor paines to exercise those well framed limbes of his; he will want much of those corporeall perfections, which others will haue, who employ them sedulously. Though his legges, armes, and handes, be of an exact symmetry; yet he will not be able to runne, to wrestle, or to throw a dart, with those who labour to perfect themselues in such exercises: though his fingers be neuer so neately moulded or composed to all aduantages of quicke and smart motion; yet if he neuer learned and practised on the lute, he will not be able with them to make any musike vpon that instrument, euen after he seeth plainely, and compre∣hendeth fully all that the cunningest Lutenist doth; nether will he be able to playe, as he doth with his fingers, which of themselues are perad∣uenture lesse apt for those voluble motions then his are. That which maketh a man dexterous in any of these artes, or in any other operations proper to any of the partes or limbes of his body, is the often repetitions of the same actes; which do amend, and perfect those limbes in their motions, and which make them fitt and ready for the actions they are designed vnto.

In the same manner it fareth with the soule; who••e essence is that which she knoweth: her seuerall knowledges may be compared, to armes, handes, fingers, legges, thighes, &c, in a body: and all her know∣ledges taken together, do compose (as I may say) and make her vp, what she is. Now, those limbes of hers, though they be, when they are at the

worst, entire, and well shaped in bulke (to vse the comparison of bodies;) yt they are susceptible of further perfection, as our corporeall limbes ae, by often and orderly vsage of them. When we iterate our acts of our vnderstanding any obiect, the second act is of the same nature, as she first, the third, as the second, and so, of the rest: euery one of which perfecteth the vnderstanding of that thing, and of all that dependeth vpon the knowledge of it, and maketh it become more vigorous and strong; euen the often throwing of a boule at the same marke, begetteth still more and more strength and iustnesse in the arme that deliuereth it: for, it can not be denyed but that the same cause which maketh any thing, must of necessity perfect and strengthen it, by repeating its force and stroakes. We may then conclude that the knowledge of our soule, (which is indeed her selfe) will be in the next life more perfect and strong, or more slacke and weake, according as in this life she hath often and vigorously, or faintly and seldome, busied her selfe about those thinges which begett such knowledge.

Now those thinges which men bestow their paines to know,3 1.98 we see are of two kindes: for some thirst after the knowledge of nature, and of the variety of thinges, which eyther their senses, or their discourse, tell them of: but others looke no higher then to haue an insight into humane action, or to gaine skill in some art, whereby they may acquire meanes to liue. These later curiosities, are but of particulars; that is, of some one, or few species, or kindes, whose common that comprehendeth them, falleth within the reach of euery vulgar capacity; and conse∣quently, the thinges which depend vpon them, are low, meane, and contemptible: whereas, the beauty, vastnesse, and excellency of the others, is so much beyond them, as they can be brought into no proportion to one an other. Now then, if we consider, what aduantage the one sort of these men, will in the next world haue ouer the other; we shall find, that they who spend their life here in the study and contem∣plation of the first noble obiects, will, in the next, haue their vniuersall knowledge (that is their soule) strong and perfect: whiles the others, that played away their thoughts and time vpon trifles, and seldome raysed their, mindes aboue the pitch of sense, will be fainte through their former laizinesse, like bodies benummed with the palsey, and sickely through their ill dyett; as when a well shaped virgin, that hauing fed vpon trash insteed of nourishing meates, languisheth vnder a wearisome burthen of the greene sickenesse.

To make this point yet more cleare,4 1.99 we may consider how the thinges which we gaine knowledge of, do affect vs vnder the title of good and conuenient, in two seuerall manners. The one is, when the appearance of good, in the abstracted nature of it, and after examination of all circum∣stances, carryeth our hart to the desire of the thing, that appeareth so vnto vs: the other is▪ when the semblance of good to our owne particular persons without casting any further, or questioning whether any other

regard may not make it preiudiciall, doth cause in vs a longing for the thing wherein such semblance shineth. Now, for the most part the know∣ledges which spring out of the later obiects, are more cultiuated by vs, then those which arise out of the other; partly by reason of their frequēt occurring, eyther through necessity, or through iudgement; and partly, by the addition which passion giueth to the impressions they make vpon vs: for passion multiplyeth the thoughts of such thinges, more then of any others, if reason do not crosse and suppresse her tumultuary motions, which in most men, she doth not. The soules then of such persons, as giuing way to their passion, do in this life busie themselues about such thinges as appeare good to their owne persons, and cast no further, must needes decede from their bodies, vnequally builded, (if that expression may be permitted me;) and will be like a lame vnwieldy body, in which the principall limbes are not able to gouerne and moue the others; because those principall ones are fainte, through want of spirits and exercise; and the others are ouergrowne with hidropicall and nociue humours. The reason whereof is that in such soules their iudgements will be disproportioned to one an other, one of them being vnduely stronger then the other. What effect this worketh in regard of knowledge, we haue already declared, and no lesse will it haue in respect of action: for suppose two iudgements to be vnequall, and such, as in the action one contradicteth the other; for example, lett one of my iudgements be, that it is good for me to eate because I am hungry; and lett the other be, that it is good for me to study, because I am shortly to giue an account of my selfe: if the one iudgement be stronger then the other, as if that of eating be stronger then that of studying; it importeth not that there be more reason (all circumstances considered) for studying: because, reasons, do moue to action according to the measure in which the resolution that is taken vpon them, is strong or weake; and therefore, my action will follow the strongest iudgement, and I shall leaue my booke to goe to my dinner.

Now, to apply this to the state of a separated soule; we are to remember how the spirituall iudgements, which she collected in the body, do remaine in her after she is diuested of it: and likewise, we are to consider, how all her proceeding in that state, is built, not vpon passion, or any bodily causes or dispositions; but meerely vpon the quality and force of those spirituall iudgements: and then, it euidently followeth, that if there were any such action in the next life, the pure soule would apply it selfe therevnto, according to the proportion of her iudgements, and as they are graduated and qualifyed. It is true, there is no such action remaining in the next life; yet neuerthelesse there remaineth in the soule a dispo∣sition and a promptitude to such action: and if we will frame a right apprehension of a separated soule, we must conceite her to be of such a nature (for then all is nature with her, as hereafter we shall discourse,) as if

she were a thing made for action in that proportion and efficacity, which the quartering of her by this variety of iudgements doth afford; that is that she is, so much the more fitt for one action then for an other, (were she to proceed to action,) as the iudgement of the goodnesse of one of these actions is stronger in her, then the iudgement of the others goodnesse, which is in effect, by how much the one is more cultiuated then the other. And out of this we may conclude, that what motions do follow in a man, out of discourse, the like will in a separated soule, follow out of her spirituall iudgements. So that as he is ioyed, if he do possesse his desired good; and is discontented and displeased, if he misse of it; and seizeth greedily vpon it when it is present to him, and then cleaueth fast vnto it, and whiles he wanteth it, no other good affecteth him, but he is still longing after that Masterwish of his heart: the like in euery regard, but much more vehemently, befalleth vnto a separated soule. So that in fine she will be happy, or miserable, according as she hath built vp her selfe, by her spirituall iudgements and affections in this life. If know∣ledge, and intellectuall obiects be the goods she thirsteth after, what can be happier then she, when she possesseth the fullnesse of all that can be desired in that kind? But if in this world a man settleth his hart cōstantly vpon any transito••y end; as vpon wealth, corporeall delights, honour, power, and the like, (which are too short breathed attendants to follow him so long a iourney as into the next;) then, all the powe•• of his soule, euen after she hath left her body, will be still longing after that deare I∣doll of her affections; and for the want of it, she will not value the great knowledge she shall then be imbued withall, nor care for any other good she possesseth like a man who being sorrounded, with a full sea, and swolne tide of all specious obiects that may please and delight him, hath by vnlucky chance suffered his violent affections, and his impotent desires to be entangled in some meane loue, that eyther neglecteth him, or he is hindered from enioying; and thereby, that litle droppe of gall, or rather that priuation of a meane contentment (which truly in it selfe, is nothing) infecteth and poisoneth the whole draught of happynesse that but for this, would swell him vp to the height of his wishes.

But no comparisons of sorrowes,5 1.100 or anguishes in this life (where our earthy dwelling doth so clogge, and allay, and dull the sense of our soule, which only feeleth and relisheth eyther delight or woe) can arriue to shadow out the misery of a separated soule so affected; whose straines are so excessiuely vehement, and whose nature is a pure actiuity, and her selfe, all sense, all knowledge. It is true, I confesse that in a man, such motions do in part proceed from passion: and therefore, I will allow, that so much of them, as haue their origine meerely and only from∣thence, shall dye with the body, and shall not haue made any impression in the separated soule: but besides the streame of passion we may in such motions obserue also, the worke of reason, for she, both approueth and employeth her powers, to compasse and gaine what the other

presenteth; and by legitimate discourse, draweth consequences out of that principle or iudgement, which maketh the byas, it then leaneth vnto: and these, are vndenyable effects of a spirituall iudgement settled in the soule. And therefore, as farre as these motions proceed from spirituall iudgements, so farre, it is cleare they must remaine in the sepa∣rated soule.

Peraduenture, what I haue said, may be lyable to a mistake; as though I conceiued that these spirituall iudgements are made in the soule according to right reason, and to legitimate discourse: whereas, I meane nothing lesse; but esteeming an ouerstrong iudgement in the seperated soule, to be proportionable vnto a passion in the body; I conceite that as passion settleth reason on worke to find out meanes, whereby she may arriue vnto her endes; so in like manner, may this iudgement sett reason on floate, with those actes whi••h follow conse∣quently vpon it (though inconsequent to the whole body of reason:) because the disorder there, is, in the excesse of this iudgemēt ouer others, whose force (according to nature) ought to be greater then it. So that, if we would frame a conception of a disordered soule, when it is out of the body; we may imagine it correspondent to a body, whose one part were bigger then could stand in proportion with an other: as, if the hand (to vse the example we brought before) were greater then the arme could manage, or the foote were larger and heauyer, then the legge and thigh could wield: vnto which adde that euery part were actiue and working of it selfe; so as, though it could not be gouerned, yet would it conti∣nually haue its owne operation, which would be contrary to the operation of the arme, or of the legge, and consequently, it would euer be tending to incompossible operations: and by that meanes, both one member would alwayes disagree from the other, and neyther of them attaine any effect at all; not vnlike to the fansie of the Poets, who fained a monster, which they termed Scylla, whose inferiour partes, were a company of dogges, euer snarling and quarrelling among them∣selues; and yet were vnseuerable from one an other, as being compartes of the same substance.

But to declare this important doctrine more dogmatically; lett vs consider that of necessity a disordered soule hath these following iudgements settled in her. Namely, that she is not well; that she can not be well without her desired good; that it is impossible for her to compasse that good; and lastly, that this state she is in, is by all meanes possible to be auoyded; not, by changing her iudgement (for that is her selfe) but by procuring the satisfaction she desireth; and this with all the power, and totall inclination of her actiuity and possibility. This then, being the temper of a disordered separated soule, it is easy to conceiue, what a sad condition such an one remaineth then in; which is infinitely more, then any affliction that can happen to a man in this world: for since, euen here, all our ioyes, and griefes, do proceed from our soule; we

must needes allow, that when she shall be free from the burthen of her body (which doth exceedingly impeach, and limitt her operations, and actiuity) all her actions will be then farre greater and more efficacious.

But because this point is of highest consequence,6 1.101 we may not slightly passe it ouer; but we will endeauour, if we can, to discouer the wonderfull efficacity and force of a separated soules operations; that from thence we may the better collect, how great her happenesse or misery will be in the next life. Lett vs then consider, how an act or iudgement of the soule, may be more forcible, eyther by it selfe, or by the multiplication of such helpes, as do concurre with it. To beginne with considering the act in it selfe, we know that the certainest way to measure the strength of it, is to take a suruey of the force which sheweth it selfe in its effect: for they being relatiues to one an other, each of them discouereth the others nature. Now, this we will do after our ordinary manner, by comparing the spirituall effects issuing from a iudgement in the soule, to materiall effects proceeding from the operations and motions of bodies. In these we may obserue three thinges, by which we may estimate their effica∣ciousnesse: some actions dure a longer time; others, take vp a greater place; and others againe, worke the like effect in a greater place, and in a shorter time: which last sort, of all others, do proceed from the most powerfull, and most forcible agents. If then in these considerations, we compare a separated soule to a body; what an infinity of strength and efficacity, will the meanest of those pure substances haue, beyond the most powerfull and actiue body that can be imagined in nature? For we haue already shewed, how a separated soule comprehendeth at once, all place, and all times: so that, her actiuity requireth no application to place or time; but, she is, of her selfe, mistresse of both, comprehending all quantity whatsoeuer, in an indiuisible apprehension; and ranking all the partes of motion, in their complete order; and knowing at once, what is to happen in euery one of them. On the other side; an incorporated soule, by reason of her being confined to the vse of her senses, can looke vpon but one single definite place, or time, at once; and needeth a long chaine of many discourses, to comprehend all the circumstances of any one action: and yet after all, how short she is of comprehending all? So that comparing the one of these with the other, it is euident, that in respect of time and place; and in respect of any one singular action; the proportion of a separated soule, to one in the body, is as all time, or all place, in respect of any one piece, or least parcell of them; or as the entire absolute comprehender of all time and all place, is to the discouerer of a small measure of them. For whatsoeuer a soule willeth in that state, she willeth it for the whole extent of her duration; because she is then out of the state or capacity of changing: and wisheth for whatsoeuer she wisheth, as for her absolute good; and therefore employeth the whole force of her iudgement, vpon euery particular wish. Likewise the eminency which a separated soule hath ouer place, is also then entirely

employed vpon euery particular wish of hers; since in that state there is no variety of place left vnto her, to wish for such good in one place, and to refuse it in an other; as, whiles she is in the body happeneth to euery thing she desireth. Wherefore, whatsoeuer she then wisheth for, she wisheth for it according to her comparison vnto place: that is to say; that as such a soule hath a power to worke at the same time in all place by the absolute comprehension, which she hath of place in abstract: so euery wish of that soule, if it were concerning a thing to be made in place, were able to make it in all places; through the excessiue force and efficacy which she employeth vpon euery particular wish. The third effect by which among bodies we gather the vigour, and energy of the cause that produceth it, (to witt, the doing of the like action, in a lesser time, and in a larger extent,) is but a combination of the two former: and therefore, it requireth no further particular insistance vpon it, to shew, that likewise in this, the proportion of a separated to an incorporated soule, must needes be the selfe same as in the others; seeing that a sepa∣rated soules actiuity, is vpon all place in an indiuisible of time.

Therefore, to shutt vp this point; there remaineth only for vs to consider, what addition may be made vnto the efficacity of a iudgement, by the concurrence of other extrinsecall helpes. We see that when an vnderstanding man will settle any iudgement, or conclusion in his mind, he weigheth throughly all that followeth out of such a iudgement; and considereth likewise all the antecedents that lead him vnto it: and if after due reflection, and examination, of whatsoeuer concerneth that conclusion, which he is establishing in his mind, he findeth nothing to crosse it, but that euery particular and circumstance goeth smoothly along with it, and strengtheneth it; he is then satisfyed, and quiett in his thoughts, and yieldeth a full assent therevnto: which assent is the stronger, by how many the more concurrent testimonyes he hath for it. And although he should haue a perfect demonstration or sight of the thing in it selfe, yet euery one of the other extrinsecall proofes, being as it were a new persuasion, hath in it a further vigour to strengthen and content his mind in the forehad demonstration: for, if euery one of these be in it selfe sufficient to make the thing euident; it can not happen that any one of them, should hinder the others: but contrariwise, euery one of them, must needes coucurre with all the rest, to the effectuall quieting of his vnderstanding, in its assent, to that iudgement. Now then, according to this rate, lett vs calculate, (if we can) what concurrence of proofes and wittnesses a separated soule will haue to settle and strengthen her in euery one of her iudgemēts. We know, that all verities are chained, and connected one to an other; and that there is no true conclusion so farre remote from any other, but may by more, or lesse consequences and discourses, be deduced euidently out of it: it followeth then that in the abstracted soule, where all such consequences are ready drawne, and seene in themselues without extension of time, or

employing of paines to collect them▪ euery particular verity, beareth testimony to any other: so that euery one of them is beleeued, and worketh in the force and vertue of all. Out of which it is manifest, that euery iudgement in such a separated soule, hath an infinite strength and efficacity ouer any made by an embodyed one.

To summe all vp in a few wordes: we find three rootes of infinity in euery action of a separated soule, in respect of one in the body: first, the freedome of her essence or substance in it selfe: next, that quality of hers, by which she comprehendeth place and time; that is, all permanent and successiue quantity: and lastly, the concurrence of infinite knowledges to euery action of hers. Hauing then this measure in our handes, lett vs apply it to a well ordered, and to a disordered soule passing out of this world: lett vs consider the one of them, sett vpon those goodes, which she shall there haue present and shall fully enioy: the other, languishing after, and pining away for those, which are impossible for her euer to obtaine. What ioy, what content, what exultation of mind, in any liuing man, can be conceiued so great, as to be compared with the happinesse of one of these soules? And what griefe, what discontent, what misery, can be like the others?

These are the different effects,7 1.102 which the diuers manners of liuing in this world, do cause in soules after they are deliuered from their bodies: out of which, and out of the discourse that hath discouered these effects vnto vs, we see a cleare resolution of that so maine and agitated question among the Philosophers, why a rationall soule is imprisoned in a grosse body of flesh and bloud? In truth, the question is an illegitimate one; as supposing a false ground: for, the soules being in the body, is not an imprisonnement of a thing that was existent before the soule and body mett together; but her being there, is the naturall course of beginning that, which can no other way come into the listes of nature: for should a soule, by the course of nature, obtaine her first being without a body, eyther she would in the first instant of her being, be perfect in know∣ledge, or she would not: if she were, then would she be a perfect and complete immateriall substance, not a soule; whose nature is to be a compartner to the body, and to acquire her perfection by the mediation and seruice of corporeall senses: but if she were not perfect in science, but were only a capacity therevnto, and like vnto white paper, in which nothing were yet w••••tten; then, vnlesse she were putt in a body, she could neuer arriue to know any thing, because motion and alteration are effects peculiar to bodies: therefore, it must be agreed, that she is naturally designed to be in a body: but her being in a body, is her being one thing with the body, she is said to be in: and so she is one part of a whole, which from its weaker part is determined to be a body.

Againe, seeing that the matter of any thing, is to be prepared, before the end is prepared, for which that matter is to serue; according to that Axiome, Quod est primum in intentione, est vltimum in executione:

we may not deny, but that the body is in being, some time before the soule: or at the least, that it existeth as soone as she doth: and therefore, it appeareth wholy vnreasonable, to say, that the soule was first made out of the body, and was afterwardes thrust into it; seeing that the body was prepared for the soule before, or at the least, as soone as she had any beginning: and so we may conclude, that of necessity the soule must be begunne, layed, hatched, and perfected in the body.

And although it be true, that such soules, as are separated from their bodies, in the first instant of their being there, are notwithstanding imbued with the knowledge of all thinges; yet is not their longer abode therein vaine: not only, because thereby the species is multiplyed; (for nature is not content with barely doing that, without addition of some good to the soule it selfe) but as well for the wonderfull, and I may say infinite aduantage, that may thereby accrew to the soule, if she make right vse of it: for, as any act of the abstracted soule is infinite, in compa∣rison of the acts which men exercise in this life, (according to what we haue already shewed) so by consequence, must any encrease of it, be likewise infinite: and therefore we may conclude, that a long life well spent, is the greatest and most excellent guift, which nature can bestow vpon a man.

The vnwary reader may perhapps haue difficulty, at our often repeating of the infelicity of a miserable soule;8 1.103 since we say, that it proceedeth out of the iudgements, she had formerly made in this life; which without all doubt were false ones: and neuerthelesse, it is euident, that no false iudgements, can remaine in a soule, after she is sepa∣rated from her body; as we haue aboue determined. How then can a soules iudgements, be the cause of her misery? But the more heedefull reader, will haue noted, that the misery which we putt in a soule, proceedeth out of the inequality, not out of the falsity, of her iudgements: for if a man be inclined to a lesser good, more then to a greater, he will in action betake himselfe to the lesser good, and desert the greater, (wherein, neyther iudgemēt is false, nor eyther inclination is naught) meerely out of the improportion of the two inclinations or iudgements to their obiects: for that a soule may be duely ordered, and in a state of being well, she must haue a lesser inclination to a lesse good, and a greater inclination to a greater good: and in pure spirits, these inclina∣tions are nothing else, but the strength of their iudgements: which iudgements in soules, whiles they are in their bodies, are made by the repetition of more acts from stronger causes, or in more fauourable circumstances. And so it appeareth, how without any falsity in any iudgement, a soule may become miserable, by her conuersation in this world; where all her inclinations generally are good, vnlesse the dispro∣portion of them, do make them bad.

THE TWELFTH CHAPTER. Of the perseuerance of a soule, in the state she findeth her selfe in, at her first separation from her body.

THus we haue brought mans soule,1 1.104 out of the body she liued in here, and by which she conuersed, and had commerce with the other partes of this world: and we haue assigned her, her first array and stole, with which she may be seene in the next world: so that now there remaineth only for vs to consider, what shall betide her afterwardes; and whether any change may happen to her, and be made in her, after the first instant of her being a pure spiritt, separated from all consortshippe with materiall substances. To determine this point the more clearely, lett vs call to minde, an axiome that Aristotle giueth vs in his logike; which teacheth vs, That as it is true, if the effect be, there is a cause; so likewise it is most true, that if the cause be in act, or causing, the effect must also be. Which Axiome may be vnderstood two wayes: the one, that if the cause hath its effect, then the effect also is: and this is no great mystery; or for it, are any thankes due to the teacher; it being but a repetition, and saying ouer againe of the same thing. The other way is, that if the cause be perfect in the nature of being a cause, then the effect is: which is as much as to say, that if nothing be wāting to the cause, abstracting precisely from the effect; then neyther is the effect wanting. And this is the meaning of Aristotles Axiome: of the truth and euidence whereof in this sense, if any man should make the least doubt, it were easy to euince it: as thus; if nothing be wanting but the effect, and yet the effect doth not immediately follow, it must needes be, that it can not follow at all; for if it can, and doth not, then something more must be done to make it follow: which is against the supposition, that nothing was wanting but the effect; for that which is to be done, was wanting. To say, it will follow without any change, is senselesse: for if it follow without change, it followeth out of this, which is already putt: but if it do follow out of this which is precisely putt, then it followeth, against the suppo∣sition, which was, that it did not follow although this were putt.

This then being euident,2 1.105 lett vs apply it to our purpose; and lett vs putt three or more thinges, namely A. B. C. and D: whereof none can worke otherwise, then in an instant or indiuisibly: and I say, that what∣soeuer these foure thinges are able to do, without respect to any other thing besides them, is completely done in the first instant of their being putt: and if they remayne for all eternity, without communication or respect to any other thing, there shall neuer be any innouation in any of them, or any further working among them: but they will alwayes

remayne immutable, in the same state they were in, at the very first instant of their being putt: for whatsoeuer A can doe, in the first instant, is in that first instant actually done; because he worketh indiuisibly: and what can be done precisely by A, and by his action ioyned to B; doth precisely follow out of A, and his action, and out of B, and his action, if B haue any action independent of A: and because all these are in the same instant, whatsoeuer followeth precisely out of these, and out of any thing else that is in the same instant, and that worketh indiuisibly as they do; is necessarily done in that very instant: but all the actions of C and D, and of whatsoeuer by reflection from them may be done by A and B, being all of them indiuisible, and following precisely out of some of the forenamed actions; they do follow out of thinges being in this instant: and because they are indiuisible, they may be in this instant: and therefore, all is done in this instant. Now, supposing all to be done that can be done by them in this instant; and that nothing can follow from them, vnlesse it follow precisely out of what is in this instant; and that it is all indiuisible: it followeth clearely, that whatsoeuer (concerning them) is not in this instant, can neuer be.

3 1.106These two conclusions being thus demonstrated; lett vs in the next place determine, how all actions of pure spirits, which haue no respect to bodies, must of necessity be indiuisible; that is, must include no conti∣nuate succession: by which, I meane such a succession, as may be deuided into partes without end: for if we looke well into it, we shall find, that a continuate succession can not be a thing, which hath in it selfe a Being: and the reason is, because the essence of such a succession, consisteth in hauing some of its partes already passed, and others of them yet to come: but on the other side, it is euident, that no such thing can be, whose essentiall ingredients are not it selfe: and therefore it followeth euidently, that such a thing as we call succession, can haue no being in it selfe: seeing that one essentiall part of it, neuer is with the other: there∣fore, such a succession, must haue its being in some permanent thing, which must be diuisible; for that is essentially required in succession: but permanent diuisibility is that which we call Biggenesse or Quantity; from which pure spirits are free: and therefore, it is most euident, that all their actions in respect of themselues, are absolutely indiuisible.

4 1.107Now, to make vse of this doctrine to our intent: we say, that since our soule, when it is separated from our body, is a pure spiritt or vnderstanding; and that all her actions are indiuisible; and that all actiōs of other spirits vpō her must likewise be such; and by cōsequence, that there can be no continuate succession of action among them: we must of necessity conclude, that according to the priuate nature of the soule, and according to the common notion of spirituall thinges; there can be no change made in her, after the first instant of her parting from her body: but, what happinesse or misery betideth her in that instant, continueth with her for all eternity. Yet is it not my mind to say, that by

the course of the vniuersall resolutions, from which she is not wholy exempt, and from supernaturall administration of corporeall thinges, there may not result some change in her. But the consideration of that matter, I remitt to those treatises, vnto which it belongeth; as not depending, nor ensuing from the particular nature of the soule: and therefore, not falling vnder our discussion in this place.

This same conclusion may be proued by an other argument, besides this which we haue now vsed: and it is this. Whatsoeuer worketh purely by vnderstanding and minde, can not be changed in its operations, vnlesse its vnderstanding or minde be altered: but this can not happen, vnlesse eyther it learne somewhat, it knew not before; or forgetting a foreknowne truth, it beginne afterwardes to thinke a falsity. This second part, is impossible, as we haue already shewed, when we proued that falsehood could haue no admittance into a separated soule: and the former is as impossible; it being likewise proued, that at her first instant of her separation, she knoweth all thinges: wherefore, we may hence confi∣dently conclude, that no change of minde, (that is no change at all) can happen to an abstracted soule.

And thus,5 1.108 by discourse, we may arriue, to quitt ourselues easily of that famous obiection, so much pestering Christian Religion; how God, can in iustice impose eternall paines vpon a soule, for one sinne, acted in a short space of time. For we see, it followeth by the necessary course of nature, that if a man dye in a disorderly affection to any thing, as to his chiefe good, he eternally remaineth by the necessity of his owne nature, in the same affection: and there is no imparity, that to eternall sinne, there should be imposed eternall punishment.

Notes

• 1 1.1

  What is a right apprehension of a thing.
• 2 1.2

  The very thing it selfe is truly in his vnder∣standing who rightly appre∣hendeth it.
• 3 1.3

  The Appre∣hension of things cōming vnto vs by our senses, are resol∣uable into other more simple appre∣hensions.
• 4 1.4

  The apprehen∣sion of a Being is the most simple and Basis of all the rest.
• 5 1.5

  Th•• apprehen∣sion of a thing is in next degree to that of Being, and it is the Basis of all the subsequēt ones.
• 6 1.6

  The apprehen∣sion of things knowne to vs by our senses, doth consist in certaine respects betwixt too things.
• 7 1.7

  Respect or re∣lation hath not really any for∣mall being, but only in the apprehension of man.
• 8 1.8

  That Existence or being is the proper affectiō of man: and that mans soule is a comparing power.
• 9 1.9

  A thing by coming into the vnderstan∣ding of man, looseth nothing of its owne peculiar nature.
• 10 1.10

  A multitude of things may be vnited in mans vnder∣stāding without being mingled or comfounded together.
• 11 1.11

  Of abstracted and concrete termes.
• 12 1.12

  Of vniuersal notions.
• 13 1.13

  Of apprehen∣ding a multi∣tude vnder o••e notion.
• 14 1.14

  The power of the vnderstan∣ding reacheth as farre as the extent of being.
• 1 1.15

  How a iudge∣ment is made by the vnder∣standing.
• 2 1.16

  That two or more appre∣hensions are identifyed in the soule by vniting them in the stock of being.
• 3 1.17

  How the notiōs of a substantiue and an adiec∣tiue, are vnited in the soule, by the common stocke of being.
• 4 1.18

  That a settled iudgement becometh a part of our soule.
• 5 1.19

  How the Soule commeth to deeme or settle a iudgement.
• 6 1.20

  How opinion is begotten in the vnderstanding.
• 7 1.21

  How faith is begotten in the vnderstanding.
• 8 1.22

  Why truth is the perfection of a reasonable soule: and why it is not found in simple apprehensions as well as in Enuntiations.
• 9 1.23

  What is a solid iudgement, and what a slight one.
• 10 1.24

  What is an acute iudge∣ment, and what a dull one.
• 11 1.25

  In what consis∣teth quicknesse and Cleare∣nesse of iudge∣ment: and there oposite vices.
• 1 1.26

  How discourse smade.
• 2 1.27

  Of the figures and moodes of Syllogismes.
• 3 1.28

  That the life of man as man, doth consist in discourse, and of the vast extent of it.
• * 1.29

  Dialo: de mundo.
• 4 1.30

  Of humane actions, and of those that con∣cerne our∣selues.
• 5 1.31

  Of humane actions as they concerne our neighbours.
• 6 1.32

  Of Logike.
• 7 1.33

  Of Grammar.
• 8 1.34

  Of Rheto∣rike.
• 9 1.35

  Of Poetry.
• 10 1.36

  Of the Power of speaking.
• 11 1.37

  Of arts that concerne dumbe and insensible creatutes▪
• 12 1.38

  Of Arithme∣tike.
• 13 1.39

  Of Prudence.
• 14 1.40

  Obseruations vpon what hath beene said in this Chapter.
• 1 1.41

  That humane actions proceed from two seue∣rall princi∣ples, vnder∣standing and sense.
• 2 1.42

  How our generall and inbred maximes doe concurre to humane actiō.
• 3 1.43

  That the rules and maximes of arts doe worke positiue∣ly in vs though we thinke not of them.
• 4 1.44

  How the vn∣destāding doth cast about when it wanteth suf∣ficient grounds for action.
• 5 1.45

  How reason doth rule ouer sense and passion.
• 6 1.46

  How we recall our thoughts from distrac∣tions.
• 7 1.47

  How reason is sometimes ouercome by sense and passion.
• 1 1.48

  The cōnection of the subse∣quent Chapters with the prece∣dent.
• 2 1.49

  The inexistēce of corporeall thinges in the soule by the power of apprehension, doth proue her to be immate∣riall.
• 3 1.50

  The notion of being, which is innate in the soule, doth proue the same.
• 4 1.51

  The same is proued by the notion of respects.
• 5 1.52

  That corpo∣reall thinges are spiritualized in the vnderstan∣ding by meanes of the soules working in and by respects.
• 6 1.53

  That the abstracting of notions from all particular and indiuiduall accidents, doth proue the immaterialitie of the soule.
• 7 1.54

  That the vni∣uersalitie of abstracted notions doth proue the same.
• 8 1.55

  That collectiue apprehensions do proue the same.
• 9 1.56

  The operations of the soule drawing all∣ways from mul∣titude to vnitie, do proue the same.
• 10 1.57

  The difference betwixt the notion of a thing in our vnderstanding, and the impres∣sion that correspondeth to the same thing in our fansie, doth proue the same.
• 11 1.58

  The apprehen∣siō of negatiōs and priuations do proue the same.
• 1 1.59

  The manner of iudging or deeming by apprehending two thinges to be identified, doth proue the soule to be immateriall.
• 2 1.60

  The same is proued by the manner of apprehending opposition in a negatiue iudge∣ment.
• 3 1.61

  That thinges in themselues opposite to one an other hauing no opposition in the soule, doth proue the same.
• 4 1.62

  That the first truthes are identified to the soule.
• 5 1.63

  That the soule hath an infinite capacitie, and consequently is immateriall.
• 6 1.64

  That the oppo∣sition of con∣tradictory pro∣positions in the Soule doth proue her immaterialitie.
• 7 1.65

  How proposi∣tions of eternall truth, do proue the immateria∣litie of the soule.
• 1 1.66

  That in dis∣coursing the soule cōtaineth more in it at the same time then is in the fantasie, which prooueth her to be immate∣riall.
• 2 1.67

  That the nature of discourse doth prooue the soule to be ordered to infi∣nite know∣ledge, and consequētly to be immateriall.
• 3 1.68

  That the most naturall obiects of the soule are immateriall, and conse∣quently the soule her selfe in such.
• 1 1.69

  That the soules being a power to order thinges proueth her to be immateriall.
• 2 1.70

  That the soules being able to mooue without being mooued, doth prooue her to be immateriall.
• 3 1.71

  That the soules proceeding to action with an vniuersality, and indifferen∣cy doth prooue the same.
• 4 1.72

  That the quiet proceeding of reason doth prooue the same.
• 5 1.73

  A conclusion of what hath beene said he∣therto in this second Trea∣tise.
• 1 1.74

  That Mans Soule is a substance.
• 2 1.75

  That man is compounded of some other substance besi∣des his body.
• 3 1.76

  That the soule doth subsist of it selfe inde∣pendently of the body.
• 4 1.77

  Two other arguments to prooue the same: one posi∣tiue, the other negatiue.
• 5 1.78

  The same is prooued because the soule can not be obnoxi∣ous to the cause of mortality.
• 6 1.79

  The same is prooued be∣cause the soule hath no con∣trary.
• 7 1.80

  The same is prooued from the end for which the soule was created.
• 8 1.81

  The same is prooued because she can mooue without being mooued.
• 9 1.82

  The same is prooued from her manner of operation which is grounded in being.
• 10 1.83

  Lastly it is prooued from the science of Morality, the principles whereof would be destroied if the soule were mortall.
• 1 1.84

  That the soule is one simple knowing act which is a pure substance and nothing but substance.
• 2 1.85

  That a sepe∣rated soule is in no place, and yet is not absēt from any place.
• * 1.86

  Boetius.
• 3 1.87

  That a sepe∣rated soule is not in time nor subiect to it.
• 4 1.88

  That the soule is an actiue substance, and all in it is acti∣uitie.
• 5 1.89

  A description of the soule.
• 6 1.90

  That a sepe∣rated soule knoweth all that which she knew whilst she was in her bodie.
• 7 1.91

  That the least knowledge which the soule acquireth in her bodie of anie one thing doth cause in her, when she is seperated from her bodie a compleat knowledge of all thing•• what∣soeuer.
• 8 1.92

  An answere to the obiections of some Peri∣patetikes who maintaine the soule to perish with the body.
• 9 1.93

  The former Peripate••icke•• refuted out of Aristotle.
• 10 1.94

  The operations of a seperated soule compared to her opera∣tions in her bodie.
• 11 1.95

  That a sepa∣rated soule is in a state of pure being, and consequently immortall.
• 1 1.96

  That a soule in this life is subiect to mutation, and may be per∣fected in know∣ledge.
• 2 1.97

  That the know∣ledges which a so••le getteth in this life will make her knowledge in the next life more perfect, and firme.
• 3 1.98

  That the soules of mē addicted to science whilst they liued here are more per∣fect in the next world then the soules of vnle∣arned men.
• 4 1.99

  That those soules which embrace vertue in this world will be most perfect in the next, and those which embrace vice most mise∣rable.
• 5 1.100

  The state of a vicious soule in the next life.
• 6 1.101

  The fundamen∣tall reason why as well happi∣nesse as miserie is so excessiue in the next life.
• 7 1.102

  The reason why mans soule requireth to be in a body, and to liue for some space of time ioyned with it.
• 8 1.103

  That the mise∣ry of the soule in the next world, procee∣deth out of inequality, and not out of falsity of her iudgements.
• 1 1.104

  The expli∣cation, and proofe of that maxime, that, if the cause be i•• act, the effect must also b••.
• 2 1.105

  The effects of all such agēts as worke instan∣taneously, ar•• complete in the first instant that the agents are putt.
• 3 1.106

  All pure spirits do worke in∣stantaneously.
• 4 1.107

  That a soule separated from her body can not suffer any change after the first instant of her separa∣tion.
• 5 1.108

  That temporall sinnes are iustly punished with eternall pain••s.