The royalist's defence vindicating the King's proceedings in the late warre made against him, clearly discovering, how and by what impostures the incendiaries of these distractions have subverted the knowne law of the land, the Protestant religion, and reduced the people to an unparallel'd slavery.

CHAP. VII. That the King is the onely Supreame Governour, unto whom, all the people of this Nation in point of Soveraignty, and Government are bound to submit themselves.

AGainst this undoubted right of the Kings, these distractions have produced another Treatise of Mr. Pryns likewise pub∣lished by authority of the Commons House, intituled thus.

The Parliament and Kingdom are the Soveraigne power.

Wherein his aime is to perswade the people that the Members of the two Houses, are the supream Governours of this Kingdom, and begins thus.

The High Court of Parliament, and whole Kingdome, which it represents (saith he) may properly be said to be the highest Sove∣raigne power, and above the King, for (saith he) every Court of Ju∣stice;

whose Just resolutions, and every petty Jury, whose upright verdicts oblige the King, may truly be said to be above the Kings person, which it bindes. But the Court of Parliament hath law∣full power to question the Kings Commissions, Patents and Grants, and if illegall against the Kings will, to cancell or repeal them. There∣fore the Parliament hath Soveraign power above the King.

Answer.

Here I deny both his Major and Minor. First, for his Major. Although it is true, that every Just resolution of any Court of Justice, That is, when the Judges legally determine such things as regularly depend before them, in point of Interest bindes the King as well as a Subject, that proves not a Soveraigne power in the Judges. If so, it followeth, that the Judges of the Kings-Bench, the Common Pleas, and of all other Courts of Justice, And (by M. Pryns Argument) every petty Jury too, have (in point of Sove∣raignty) a power above the King, which is most grosly absurd. So that, admit the two Houses a Court of Justice, which they are not, and to have power legally to determine Causes, which they have not; That is nothing to Soveraignty. It is one thing to have po∣wer to make Lawes, another to expound the Law, and to Governe the people is different from both. The first appertaines to the King and the two Houses, the second to the Judges, and the third is the Kings sole right. Neither the making, declaring, or expound∣ing the Law, is any part of Soveraignty. But regulating the peo∣ple, by commanding the Lawes to be observed and executed, pardo∣ning the transgressors thereof, and the like, are true badges of a Supreme Governour: All which are the Kings.

☞sAnd for his Minor, take his meaning to be the true Parliament. That is, the King and the two Houses. And it is false that the two Houses without the King, have power legally to cancell, or make voide any Commission, Patent, or Grant of the Kings: For (as before appeareth) That united body cannot speak or doe any thing but by Act of Parliament. To say the Parliament without the King may make a Law, is as grosse a Contradiction, as to affirme that the King may make an Act without the King.

And his meaning being taken to be the two Houses without the

King; In that sense the Members have herein no power at all, for (as before appeares) they are neither a Parliament, nor a Court of Iustice; and consequently, have not jurisdiction legally to cancell or repeale any Commission, Patent, or Grant of the Kings.

But (saith Master Prin) the King, although he be cheif, yet he is but one Member of the Parliament, and (saith he) the greatest part of any politicke body is of greater power then any one particular Member.

As the Common-Councell is a greater power then the Major, the Chapter then the Dean, the Dean and Chapter then the Bishop, and so the whole Parliament, then the King, for (saith he) in an Oligarchy, Aristocrasie, and Democrasie, That which seemes good to the major part is ratified, although but by one casting voice, As in election of the Knights of the shire, Burgesses, and the Votes in the two Houses. And saith he, by the Lawes of England, The Kings, the Lords and Commons make but one intire Corporation, and so concludes, that the Major part of the Parliament, which in Law (saith he) is the Corpo∣ration, is above the King.

Answer.

There is scarce one word in this discourse but it is false or misap∣plied. It appears before, That the Parliament consists of 3 distinct bodies, viz. the King, the Lords House, and the Commons House, and in making Lawes, (which is all they have to doe) they have but three Voices; yet that which seemes good to the major part of these three, is not ratified: For (as before it appeares) they must all concurre, else no Parliament. It is true, where the Go∣vernment is Aligarchicall, Aristocraticall, or Democraticall, the major part determines the Question. But this is mis-applyed to the businesse in dispute, concerning the Soveraign power; Our Government is Monarchicall. The people of England are not Go∣verned by a Parliament; The use of a Parliament (as before ap∣peares) is onely in some things, when necessity requires, To alter the old, or make new Lawes, wherein the foresaid three bodies, viz. the King, the Lords House, and the Commons House are joyntly trusted.

If Mr. Pryn be asked, what he meanes by the Major part of that Corporation, which he in this place calls the Parliament? His Answer must be one of these, viz. Any two of the aforesaid three bodies, or else, That the King, the Lords, and the Com∣mons promiscuously put together, are to Vote as one Assembly, and the greater number of single voices (not distinguishing the severall bodies) to carry it. Grant the first, And then the King, and either House or both Houses without the King have power to make Lawes. Therefore against that, I suppose both Mr. Pryn, and the Members themselves, will conclude. But the latter it is he intends, for by that, the House of Commons shall obtaine the sole power of making Laws: That Assembly being in number, almost treble to the King and the Lords, And so both King and Peer-age excluded; And that not all, but in effect the Gentry too, for the Burgesses are in number, farre more then all the rest. And (as before appears) these Burgesses not onely may, but by the true intent and meaning of the Law ought to be tradesmen.

Then for his particular cases cited for his proof, viz. the Major and Commonalty, the Deane and Chapter, the Bishop, Deane and Chapter, they are all guided by their Charters and foundations, which they ought to pursue; And none of them have power without their head to make any binding Act. viz. The Commonalty without the Major, the Chapter without the Deane, or the Deane and Chapter without the Bishop. And so it is with the Parliament, although both Houses concurre in one opinion, It binds not with∣out the Kings consent. And for the election of the Knights and Burgesses, that is very impertinent to the point in question.

Then M. Pryn saith, That if the King propound a Law, it binds not, unlesse it be consented unto by the Parliament. Ergo, the chiefe legislative power is in the Parliament, not in the King.

Answer.

Here M. Pryn according to his wonted sleight, divides the King and Parliament, making them two things, and ascribing unto the two Houses without the King the name and power of a Parliament: Whereas he knowes neither name, nor power is due to them. And for his Argument it makes more for the King, then for the Mem∣bers.

For (as before it appears) Lawes made by Act of Parliament, although they binde not without the consent of the two Houses, yet they are the Kings Lawes, a 1.1 and by himselfe alone he may dis∣pence with them. Therefore it might properly be concluded, Ergo, the Legislative power is more in the King, then in the Mem∣bers. But for Master Pryns conclusion it is a meere non se∣quitur.

Then saith M. Pryn, Bils for Acts of Parliament are usually a∣greed on before they come to have the Kings assent. And such Bils saith he, the King cannot alter. But if the King send a Bill which he desires to have passed; It must be thrice read, and assented unto by both Houses, who (saith he) have power to reject, alter, or enlarge it as they think fit.

Answer.

This is a grosse juggle, all his words in some sense are true, yet as he intends the vulgar shall apprehend his meaning, nothing is more false: It is true, if the King send unto the Houses a Bill for an Act of Parliament, they may alter the Bill. But that done, untill the King assent unto it so altered, it is no Law. And so when both Houses present a Bill to the King, he may alter it, but his Royall assent makes it not a Law, untill the Houses have consented to it so altered; yet unlesse M. Pryn be understood thus, that when the King sends a Bill to the Members, That they may alter it, and make it what they please; And that new Bill to bind the King without his further consent, he hath said nothing, and that be∣ing his meaning, he hath abused his Reader with a grosse fal∣sity.

Then M. Pryn observes the penning of the Statutes for Subsidies which he sets down thus.

Your Commons Assembled, humbly present your Majesty with the free gift of two intire Subsidies, which we humbly beseech your Majesty to accept. Therefore (saith he) the Commons have the sole power to grant or deny Subsidies. And (saith he) they being the cheif Law-makers in these Acts, by like reason they are so in all other pub∣lick penall Acts.

Answer.

Here M. Pryn affirms, that the Commons House, without King or Lords, may charge the people with Subsidies, And infers there∣upon, that they have the like power in any publick penall Act. But observing his proof, And by the same sleight he may as well main∣taine (even by the Scripture it self) That the Devill, not God, is to be worshiped. It is thus. Perusing the Acts themselves, by which Subsidies are granted, and the words are these, viz. We the Com∣mons humbly present your Majesty with two Subsidies. Thus farre he recites the Act; Then the words follow in this manner, viz. * 1.2 And therefore we humbly beseech your Majesty that it may be en∣acted. And be it enacted by the Kings Majesty, the Lords, Spirituall and Temporall, and the Commons in this present Parliament Assem∣bled, and by authority of the same, that the King shall have two Sub∣sidies. These being the words which makes the Law are left out.

Then saith M. Pryn, Acts of Parliament made in the time of usur∣pers, oblige the right Heires of the Crown, and the people too. There∣fore (saith he) the Legislative power is more in the people, then in the King.

Answer.

It is most false, that all Acts of Parliament made by consent of usurping Kings binde the right Heires to the Crown. But true it is, that some Acts of Parliament made by consent of Ʋsurpers, have been admitted to binde in time of Kings raigning by Just title, which is upon this ground: The Competition for the Crown, may happen to be upon a question doubtfull, And the difference (as in that between York and Lancaster) may continue long, and expe∣rience shewes, That the King in possession (whether by right, or wrong) wants not meanes to declare his Competiter an Usurper. And therefore dangerous it were for the Law to declare all such Acts of Parliament voide. But admit that every Statute made by the consent of an Ʋsurper to be as binding a Law, as any other, How that proves that the Legislative power is more in the Mem∣bers

then in the King, is not intelligible: It rather proves the con∣trary, it shewes there must be a Kings consent, although an usur∣per, else no Law: And if so, stronger it is, when the King reignes by a just Title.

Then saith Mr. Pryn, The King hath little or no hand in making Laws, His is but assenting thereunto. As (saith he) the forme of pas∣sing Bils import. For (saith he) Bils being passed both Houses, and pre∣sented to the King, his answer is (le Roy le veilt) the Kings wils it.

Answer.

It is the consent which makes the Law, when the Bill is ingrossed, and read in the House: The question by the Speaker is put to the Members, whether it shall be a Law or not, and such as are of o∣pinion to passe it, are directed to say I, and those against it no, and being passed both Houses, it is presented to the King, whose answer if He confirme it, is, le Roy le veilt.

So that if any difference be, the Kings words are more prevalent, for before that, it is but a written piece of parchment, not valid, but by tht Kings words, instantly it hath life, and is become a Law binding the whole Kingdome and people; And this (as before is said) is the Kings Law.

Then Mr. Pryn fals to presidents, which he cals proofs. King Ed. 2. and King R. 2. (saith he) were deposed by the Parliament.

Answer.

The case concerning these two Kings, was thus: Against King Ed. 2. after many distractions in the Kingdome, the Queen His Wife, and other of Her adherents, increased the faction, raised a Rebellion, barbarously tooke the King prisoner, and during His im∣prisonment, without any lawfull authority, or consent of the King, in His name summoned a Parliament; and by force drew him in words to resigne His Crowne unto His Son, afterwards King Ed. 3. and that of King R. 2. was much to the like purpose: He was drawne to resigne His Crowne to H. of Bullingbrooke. Afterwards King Hen. 4. and these two lawfull Kings, being thus injuriously bereft of their Scepters, were shortly after most barbarously murde∣red

too. The whole proceedings of which Acts, all such (Pryn ex∣cepted) as have mentioned them, have condemned the same, not onely to be illegall, but as Acts most wicked and notoriously im∣pious.

But saith Mr. Pryn, Pierce Gaveston and the two Hugh Spencers, were by Parliament banished, the Spencers violently put to death, Humphrey Duke of Gloucester arrested of high Treason at a Parlia∣ment at Berry, and there murdered. That the Earle of Strafford this Parliament lost his head against the Kings will.

Answer.

For the banishment of Gaveston, and the two Spencers, his Ar∣gument is but thus: The King with the assent of the two Houses, made an Act of Parliament to banish them, Ergo, the two Houses without the King have the Soveraigne power of Government. And admit Mr. Pryn hath proved (which he endeavours) that the Members of the two Houses murdered the Duke of Gloucester, and the Spencers, still that proves not the Soveraigne power of govern∣ment to be in the Members.

That example of the late Bishop of Canterbury, I conceive to be a President, far more proper to be cited for this purpose, then the case of the Duke of Gloucester, or the Spencers: For all men know, that Bishop was put to death, by no other authority, then by order of the two Houses; yet this no more proves the Sove∣raigne power to be in the Members, then that murder acted by Felton upon the person of the Duke of Buckingham, proves Felton to be the King of England; For, the Members of the two Hou∣ses, had no more authority to condemne to death the Bishop, then Felton had to kill the Duke. And consequently the murder of the Bishop (whatever his offence was, or however guilty) it ••…••…∣ing done by pretext, and colour of Law, was more horrid.

And for the Earle of Strafford, it was thus. By the Laws of England no man can, or ought to be convict of a crime, but by Act of Parliament, by utlagare, or by triall of his Peeres: That is, if a Lord of the Parliament, by a Jury of Lords, if under that de∣gree, by a Jury of like quality, and being convict, the Judge ought to give no other sentence, but what the knowne Law doth pronounce

for that fact; Now that Earle, by the Members of the Commons House was accused of high Treason. The King thereupon declared His resolution, not to protect him from the tryall, or just sentence of the Law. After this the Members (waving the ordinary pro∣ceedings of the Law) passed a Bill to attaint him of Treason, by Act of Parliament; This Bill was presented to the King, He for some time refused to make it a Law, which peradventure He might be induced unto, by the Bill it selfe: There being a speciall * 1.3 proviso therein, that the Judges shall not condemn any other for the like offences; which might cause the King to be very tender of passing the Act, thereby to condemne a man as a Traytor, for facts passed, which at the time committed was not Treason.

This if duely considered is so far from being evill in the King, as that the whole Kingdome hath thereby great cause to acknowledge his goodnesse: It hereby appears he desired to governe as King, not as a Tyrant, to proceed against offenders according to the knowne Law, not by an arbitrary power. And if some particular persons too much thirsting after Straffords blood, occasioned such things, as might draw the King against His conscience to consent unto that Act, woe be unto them. But however, whether the King passed this Act willingly, or against His will, or whether the Earle of Strafford were guilty or not guilty of Treason. That nothing proves that the Members have Soveraigne power of government above the King.

Thus for Mr. Pryns objections against the Kings right to Sove∣raignty. And that the Members have no authority therein, is fur∣ther proved thus.

1. So long as the people have been governed by a knowne Law, there must have been a Supreame Governour, but we have had the same Law, by which we are now governed, long before the Insti∣tution of the two Houses.

2. It is absolutely necessary that the supreame Governour, be a person constantly permanent and visible, but the Members out of Parliament, are not in being, they are invisible.

3. It is a contradiction to Soveraignty, to be subject to the com∣mands of an other. But the Members are called together, and dis∣solved againe at the Kings pleasure.

4. The Composier of the Members is such: As that, to make them

supreame Governours, tends to the destruction (not to the preser∣vation) of the Kingdome and people. If a woman bring forth a Monster not having the shape of man-kind, our Law a 1.4 judg∣eth it no issue, it is lawfull to kill it, it ought not to be baptized. To have two heads of one body is monstrous, so to have two Kings of one Kingdome, must be destructive to that Nation. But here (which is a far more prodigious monster) we by the Members usur∣pation are governed by two severall distinct bodies, consisting of multitudes without any head. This government is new, there yet never was the like upon the face of the earth. It is not Monar∣chicall, Alligarchicall, Aristocraticall, Democraticall, nor (although the neerest to it) Anarchicall, it is worse then confusion. It can have no proper name, unlesse it be called contradiction: Thus for the negative part, that the two Houses have not the Soveraigne pow∣er, it now rests to shew in whom it is.

And for that these two things are considerable, first, what is the office of the Supreame Governour, secondly, who hath perfor∣med that duty. For the first, all men grant it is to preserve the people in peace, by causing the Laws to be justly distributed, and the like; which have ever been performed by the King of En∣gland for the time being, and by none else. He hath denounced War, proclaimed peace, inhaunced and debaced Coyne, comman∣ded forraigne Coyne to be current here, ordered all forraigne ne∣gotiations; All matters of War, either foraigne or domestick. And so in all civill affaires.

The Judges of the Law authorized by Him; All legall procee∣dings in his name, and by His authority. The Law it selfe called His Law; He hath usually dispensed with Acts of Parliament, at pleasure pardoned transgressours of the Law. To Him appertaines the forfeitures for Treason, and other offences. In a word, He is the sole fountaine of Justice, Mercy, and Honour. And b 1.5 with this constant practise agrees all authorities, histories, and stories: among which, that of the Oath of Supremacy, if there were no more, is sufficient to satisfie all the World, the words are these.

I A. B. do utterly testifie in my conscience that the Kings Highness is the onely Supreame Governour of this Realme, and of all other His Highnesse Realmes, Dominions, and Countries, as well in all Spiritu∣all things, or causes, as Temporall.

Now if the contents of this Oath be true, that is, If the King be the onely Supreame Governour, all the rest of the people, from the highest to the lowest, whether Members, or not Members, are subject unto Him, and persons governed: And as all persons are hereby included, so it extends to all things, both Spirituall and Temporall.

And me thinks it strange, an Englishman should make doubt of the truth of this Oath. It was composed by the Lords and Com∣mons in Parliament, in the time of Queen Elizabeth. And at their suite, by Act a 1.6 of Parliament made high Treason for a Subject to deny to take it; And further enacted, that every Judge of the Law, and other Officer, either Spirituall or Temporall; every per∣son of any profession or calling, before he be enabled to exercise the same, every ward, before he be permitted to sue out his Livery, every one elected Member of the Commons House, before he be permitted to sit or Vote there, shall take this Oath.

Yet the Members of this Parliament would make an evasion out of it, Thus. The Kings Supreamacy (say they) is meant in Cu∣ria, non in Camera, in His Courts, not in His private Capacity. And to speak properly, onely His high Court of Parliament, wherein He is absolutely Supream Head and Governour, from whence there is no appeal. And (say they) if the Parliament may take an Accompt what is done by His Majesty in His inferiour Courts, much more what is done by Him without Authority in any Court. And (say they) It is preached to the people by the Kings Declarations, that by the Supreamacy is meant a power inherent in the Kings Person, without, above, against all His Courts, the Parliament not excepted, whereby (say they) the excellent Lawes are turned into an Arbytrary Go∣vernment.

Answer.

That which the Members in this discourse say, in effect is but thus. The King is Supreame Governour; Yet under the Mem∣bers Government, He hath Authority without appeal to deter∣mine all things, yet hath not power to determine any one thing. To blear the eyes of the Vulgar, they are contented the King shall be called the onely Supream Governour. But the Authority, Power,

and Execution thereof (if we may believe the Members) is their owne. The King and People are herein used, as a Father sometimes deals with his child, telling his little son, the flock of sheep is his; yet the Father shears them, & takes the profits to his own use. Even so are King & People dealt with. They are told bythe Members, that the King by the Supreamacy claimes such a power, As that the Subjects thereby have lost both their Law and Liberty, and would make them believe, that they are by those Members thereunto re∣stored againe.

Whereas all but naturalls may now discerne, That whilst the King, together with the name, enjoyed both the Power and Exe∣cution of the Supreamacy, The people were a free Subject; And that by this usurpation upon the King, They are inslaved. For, the Supreamacy is in the Kings Person; But by it He neither hath, nor claimes an unlimited power. The People are Governed under Him, but that Government is directed by a known Law, of which Law b 1.7 the King is not Judge, nor can He, by Himselfe alone alter that Law. Now whilst the Supreamacy, the Power to Judge the Law, and Authority to make new Lawes, are kept in severall hands, the known Law is preserved, but united, it is vanished, instantly there∣upon, and Arbytrary and Tyrannicall power is introduced. For example, the Members condemne a Subject to die, they confiscate his estate to their own use, and (without appeal) have power to Judge the Law thereupon. This granted, clear it is, the Will of the Members is the Law; they are hereby Judge, Party, and Witnesse. It were fruitlesse for that condemned person (although guiltlesse) to urge his innocency of the Fact, or to dispute the Law upon that Fact, with them who have condemned him. And (as the Mem∣bers tell us) there is none else to appeal unto; It is therefore to be feared, the greater Estate the Delinquent hath, or the more spleen some Members bear to his person, the more Capitall is his offence. So that it is the Members, not the King, who claime a power in their owne persons, without, above, against all Courts of Justice, The Parliament it self not excepted; Our excellent Lawes are by them destroyed, and turned into their own Arbitrary power. And thus the people are enslaved by a distinction, never heard of, or thought on before this Parliament, the aforesaid two Spencers onely excepted: It is true, they having committed acts of Trea∣son

to colour their proceedings, divulged an opinion suitable to this; they pretended that the Oath of Allegeance was more in re∣spect of the Crown, then the Kings Person; That the King might be removed, and the people ought to governe: But those opinions are condemned as damnable & execrable, by two Acts a 1.8 of Parliament. One called exilium Henrici de Spencer. And the other made 1 Ed. 3.

But that this of the Members, and that of the Spencers, are meere fictions and delusions to gull the people, is evident both by Authorities of Law, and the common practice of the King∣dome. It is resolved in Calvins case (which therein agrees with the whole current of our Law-bookes) that Allegeance is due onely to the King. b 1.9 That theKing hath two Capacities, one of a na∣tural body descended of the Royal Blood, & this is subject to death and infirmities: The other a politick body, and in that, immortall, invisible, not subject to non-age, &c. That the King having but one person, and severall capacities; It was resolved, Allege∣ance is due to his naturall Capacity. And consequently, the Sove∣raigne power of Government inherently in his person. By the d 1.10 common Law of the Land, Treason is to kill, or endeavour to kill the King, His consort the Queen, or the Prince. Therefore it is the naturall body the Law lookes upon, for e 1.11 the politick body cannot die. Besides, neither the Queen, nor the Prince hath a politick Capacity. g 1.12 If the King die during a Parliament, ipso facto the Parliament is dissolved. Therefore Soveraignty is not vir∣tually in the two Houses. By the Kings f 1.13 death, (untill a late Sta∣tute made therein) all suites in Law, even between party and party, were discontinued. And at this day, the Chancellor, g 1.14 the Keeper of the Great Seal, the Judges, the Sheriffes of Counties, Justices of Peace, and other Officers, by his death are void, which could not be, if Soveraigne power were not in the naturall person of the King, or if that Authority were virtually in the Members. The Law of the Land saith, that Allegeance is due from the Subject to the King, so soon as he is born, h 1.15 therefore he is called Subditus natus. And so both Soveraignty and Allegeance inherently, and by birth-right, the one in the person of the King, and the other in the person of the Subject: And this duty is reciprocall. The King k 1.16 ex Officio, as King is obliged to protect the people: And the Subject in duty is bound to obey their Soveraign, for n 1.17 protectio trahit sub∣jectionem,

& subjectio protectionem. There be two sorts of Homage, viz. m 1.18 Homagium Ligeum, & homagium feudale. The first being Allegeance, is due onely to the Kings Person; And therefore our Law saith, it is inherent inseparable, and cannot be respited. But the latter being due by reason of the tenure of Land, a Writ lies to respite it. Besides, a body politick can neither doe, nor receive Ho∣mage; It cannot be done, but to the naturall person of a man.

The Lords and Commons, 10 Jacobi made this recognition, viz. * 1.19 Albeit within few houres after the death of Queen Elizabeth, we de∣clared your Majesty our onely and rightfull Leige Lord and Sove∣raigne; Yet as we cannot doe it too often, or enough; So it cannot be more fit then in this High Court of Parliament, where the whole Kingdome in person, or by representation is present, upon the knees of our hearts, to agnize our most constant Faith, Obedience and Loyalty to your Majesty, & your Royall Progeny, humbly beseeching it may be (as a Memoriall to all Posterity) recorded in Parliament, and enacted by the same, that we recognize and acknowledge, that immediately upon the death of Queen Elizabeth the Imperiall Crown of this Realme, did by inherent birth-right and lawfull and undoubted suc∣cession descend and come to your Majesty. And that by Lawfull right and discent under one Imperiall Crowne your Majesty is of England, Scotland, France and Ireland King; And thereunto we most humbly and faithfully submit and oblige our selves, our heires and posterities for ever untill the last drop of our bloods be spent; And beseech your Majesty to accept the same as the first fruits of our Loyalty to your Majesty and Royall Progeny and Posterity for ever; Which if your Majesty will adorne with your Royall Assent, (without which it nei∣ther can be compleat, nor remaine to all Posterity) we shall adde this to the rest of your Majesties inestimable benefits.

By this we see, that this Kings Father by inherent birth-right, had the Soveraigne power of Government; That the Lords and Commons in Parliament, did not onely submit thereunto, but at their humble suite, by Act of Parliament, obliged themselves, their heires, and posterities for ever, even to the spending of their last drop of blood, to preserve Him and His Posterity therein. But to insist upon particulars of this nature, were too tedious: There is no o∣ther Language to be found, from the beginning of this Parliament, up to the Romane conquest. Every Statute, booke of Law, History, * 1.20

and the constant practice of the Kingdome herein concurs. Nei∣ther tongue, nor pen, untill these Antipodes, the Members (who belch nothing but contradictions to truth, justice, and honesty) ever made other expressions. But the juggle is now (even by the vul∣gar) clearly discovered, and found to be too slight an Hocus Pocus trick to gaine three Kingdomes.

But it is visible to the world: The Members use the word (King) as they do the name of God himself, either for their owne advantage, or to gull the people, which (amongst infinite other particulars) by their various proceedings concerning the Kings Soveraigne power, it is manifest.

First, by their foresaid Declaration in words they ascribe unto the King a greater power then he either hath, or challengeth: He is (say they) absolutely Supreame head and Governour. And this in all things, and that finall too, for (say they) from him there is no ap∣peale. But even by the same Instrument they tell us, that this Sove∣raignty is not in the Kings person, but totally in the Members of the two Houses.

And after their preaching of this doctrine, and exercising the Kings office for some years, then they tooke the boldnesse in plaine tearmes to tell us, they would have no King, that they themselves would (without their Soveraigne) governe the Kingdome.

But herein they catched themselves, for instantly thereupon the people plainely discerned their intention even from the first, they were by this Vote satisfied, that the Members aime was not for the publicke, but for their owne private, to subvert the knowne Law, and to reduce the people to the slavery of an everlasting ar∣bitrary, and tyrannicall power under their equals.

The Subjects of England upon this Vote unanimously, even through the whole Kingdome, (as if they were at one instant ge∣nerally inspired) make their Protestation against these usurpers. They cry out, and call for their leige Lord their King: They re∣solve to submit unto no other government, then by our ancient and knowne Laws, which the Members perceiving they returned to their owne vomit, and thinking to deceive the people with a new sleight, do now againe begin to word it for a King, and Vote thus.

That this Nation shall be Governed by King, Lords, and Commons.

Which is as perfect a juggle, as that whereby they Declared the Kings power to be virtually in themselves.

If those Votes binde, it followeth, that we neither have nor can have (otherwise then at the Members will) either King, Law, or Government. Their last Vote (in words) seemes (in some sort) to set up a King; But for any thing we know, before the next new Moon, the Members may fancy to themselves the same motives as formerly, and Vote Him quite downe againe; So that (admitting this power in the Members, to set up and pull downe, to Vote, and u••-Vote) it is indifferent both to King and people, whether to have a Statue, and call it King, or a King by the Members Vote.

Then for the Vote it selfe, (admitting the Members to have au∣thority by their Votes to alter the Law, which they have not) it is in it selfe most grosse; We must, say they, be governed by King, Lords, and Commons; But what power is hereby intended for the King, non constat. By the next Vote the Members may declare, they meant hereby, that the King shall not have any authority in his owne person, but still judge the Soveraigne power (as formerly they did) to be virtually in themselves. And if so, it only differs in words from that Vote, whereby they resolved to have no King: In substance it is one and the same.

And if the Members mean (as the words seeme to import) that the power of Government shall be in the King, Lords, and Commons, joyntly, and that this Vote, be so far binding, as to set∣tle that government for ever, (which is in it selfe inconsistent with that arbitrary power, they now even by this very Vote assume) it is likewise in it selfe most absurd: It is true, that we having a knowne Law, whereby we are protected in our persons, lives, and estates, to have this Law unalterable, otherwise then by the joynt concurrence of the King and two Houses, is a constitution beneficiall for the Kingdome; but in point of Government, it is a Composier, not onely improper, but destructive to the whole Nation. In every Common-wealth accidents frequently happen, which of necessity require things to be done, yet if not acted with secrecy, hazards the ruine of the people. For example. The King hath intelligence that a forraigne Nation is prepared, and resolved to invade this Kingdome: Hereupon (with great care and secrecy) a designe is laid, to surprize the enemy: In this case, for the King, at the same

time, to proclaime his plot, not onely frustrates his designe, but endangers the destruction of the whole Kingdome.

Now admit the King, Lords, and Commons jointly to have the power of Government, and it is impossible whatever the designe be (although the publishing thereof unavoidably destroy both Nation and people) to keep it secret.

First, for the Lords: The Members sit and Vote in that House (of what capacity, or disposition soever) by descent: and experience shewes, that wise men (although Lords too) sometimes beget fooles, Honest men, knaves, and Loyall men, Traytors. And for the Commons House, he who examines his owne Country (be it in any part of the Realme) I am confident will find, the greater number of those, elected Knights, and Burgesses, unfit for Statesmen or Privy Councellors: Nor is it possible, that the multitude (if they had authority to make such elections which they have not) should make choice of apt persons to governe the Kingdome: Then ad∣ding hereunto the number of those Members, amounting unto seven hundred or more, and doubtlesse (in point of secrecy) to pro∣claime it at the market Crosse, and to advise with them, is one and the same thing.

But admit every Member a perfect Statesman, the composier of that Body consisting of the King, Lords, and Commons, is such, as not onely renders them incapable to governe the Realme, but is in it selfe so pernitious to the Common-wealth, as that it is im∣possible for the Divel himselfe to invent (unlesse it be that the two Houses without the King) a plat-forme more apt to introduce confusion, both to Church and State.

When a Capitall or Criminall offender is convict, the knowne Law in point of punishment doth not distinguish of persons: The Judge (whether the offender be capable of pardon or not) must give sentence (according to the nature and quality of the offence) upon every one alike: He hath not power either to pardon, or mitigate the punishment; That is the office of the Su∣preame Magistrate: Then, what a Tyrannicall constitution it were, that the King shall not have power to distribute mercy, untill the major part of the two Houses have Voted it, common experience makes it easie to judge.

And on the other side, if the King without that joynt consent,

hath not authority to punish offenders: It will be very difficult to bring the most horrid malefactors to triall, be the offence Treason, Murder, Sacriledge, or any other crime, how execrable soever, whilst either House doth omit or refuse to Vote it so, no punish∣ment: An infallible way (I confesse) it is to embolden themselves, and all others their adherents to perpetrate all wickednesse under the Sun.

If a dispute happen, whether to make War, or to proclaime Peace, to fight, or not to fight an enemy, and the like, it cannot be expected, but that those three bodies shall (even to the ruine of the Nation) irreconcileably differ in opinion. But it were endlesse to insist upon particulars of this nature, the calamities which have befallen us by the Members arrogating the Soveraigne power of Government, and which daily must ensue, whilst they either con∣tinue that usurpation, or shall be suffered in point of Government, to share with the King, words cannot expresse.

Suppose three single persons, had jointly the Soveraigne power of government, no man can imagine, but that they would (even in matters of greatest weight and perill) sterne severall wayes: But in point of Government to adde unto the King, the Members of the two Houses make it a composier far more preposterous, and ab∣surd: And consequently to submit to that Vote, to be governed by King, Lords, and Commons, (although it be admitted the Mem∣bers intend it a joynt power) were no other, then to introduce contradictions, distractions, and confusion.

Besides, by setling the government in King, Lords, and Com∣mons, ipso facto, the knowne Law is subverted, and an arbitrary power introduced; for, as before appears, they who have the Government, and also power to make new, and change the old Law, cannot be guided but by their owne will: Whereas, by observing the constitutions of the Realme, in submitting to the King alone, for matter of Government, unto the King, and the two Houses joyntlie, for making new Laws, or altering the old, and unto the lawfull Judges of the Realme, to expound and declare the Law, all arbitrary power is avoided.

And the King for his assistance in matters of Government, hath (by the Laws of England) three sorts of Councellors, viz. His Great Councell, His Privy Councell, and His Learned Councell.

The first is properly the Prelates and Peeres of the Realme, which (besides infinite other testimonies) is proved by the Writ of Sum∣mons to every Parliament. The words are these, viz.

Rex Vicecomiti, &c. Quia de advisamento & assensu Concilii nostri, &c. quoddam Parliamentum nostrum apud, &c. 1. die, &c. teneri ordinavimus, & ibidem cum Prelatis, Magnatibus & Proce∣ribus dicti Regni nostri colloquium habere & tract. Tibi precipimus, &c. duos Milites, &c. venire facias, ita quod iidem Milites plenam & sufficientem potestatem pro••se & Cōmunitate Commitat. predict', &c. habeant, ad faciendum & consentiendum his quae tunc ibidem de com∣mun•• concilio dicti Regni nostri (favente Deo) contigerint ordinari su∣antedictis.

And the Sheriffs returne is thus, viz.

Virtute istius brevis eligi feci duos Milites, viz. A. B. qui ple∣nam & sufficientem potestatem, &c. habent ad faciendum & con∣sentiendum iis quae, &c. de communi concilio Regni Angliae ordinari contigerint.

Thus it is manifest, that it is the Prelates and Peeres, (who have as∣sistants unto them the Judges, and others of the Kings learned Councell, and the Masters of the Chancery) whom the King ad∣viseth with as His great Councell: It is the office of the Commons (as likewise by this Writ appears) to do and consent unto such things, as the King, the Prelates, and Peeres agree upon.

The second, are such as the King makes choice of to advise Him in matters of State, and are sworne to secrecy; And the third are the Judges of the Realme, and others of the Long Robe, whom the King elects, and are sworne to advise Him in matters of Law.

Now whilst these Councellors keepe within their owne bounds, and faithfully performe their severall duties, the known Law is pre∣served, and so every one protected: But when they extend beyond their bounds, confusion ensueth.

Absurd it were for a sick man (concerning his Cure) to advise with a Lawyer, or for any one in point of Law, to take advise of a Phy∣sitian. So for the Privy Councellors, to judge the Law, for the Judges to determine matter of State. And the like holds with the Members of the two Houses: They are neither qualified, nor have

Commission either to intermeddle with the Law, or the affaires of State, otherwise then the King shall thinke fit to intrust them, by asking them their advise, wherein they are onely to deliver their opinions, not to controle.

Therefore when the two Houses have passed a Bill for a new Law, and have presented it to the King, they have performed their duty, it then rests in the King, whether to make it a Law, or not, wherein it may be necessary for Him to take the advise of His Pri∣vy Councell, His learned Councell, or of both. And I conceive that may be the reason, why Kings have used to answer Bils (which they passe not) by these words, le Roy, le veili. By these words of the Writ, viz. Quia de advisamento & assensu consilii nostri, &c. quoddam Parliamentum nostrum, &c. teneri ordinavi∣mus, &c. It appears that the King depends upon His Councell, in calling Parliaments, which oftentimes is occasioned upon State-affaires, such as requires the assembling of a Parliament, yet not safe to reveale those reasons to the Parliament men: And so the King, by advise of His Privy Councell, or His learned Councell, may, and oftentimes doth reject Bils presented unto Him by both Houses, and yet not convenient to render His reasons to that mul∣titude.

Therefore clear it is, the men at Westminster have extended be∣yond their Commission, and so all these Votes are absolutely invalid, not binding either King or people. The King notwithstanding these Votes, is, or whatever the Members shall, or can Vote, will and must be our only Supreame Governour. And consequently these men at Westminster, by breaking their bounds, are themselves guil∣ty of those things, which in and by their declarations to the peo∣ple, they grossely and falsely aspersed their King with: They have and do arrogate (to use their owne words,) an arbitrary power without, above, against all the Courts of Justice, the Parliament it selfe not excepted. And thereby the knowne Law is subverted, and consequently, they are most palpably guilty of that crime, for which they themselves condemned as a Traytor the late Earle of Strafford, but for attempting to do, and that upon a slender proof too.

Upon the whole matter it may with as much justice & sense be said, that there was yet never one King of England, as to question whe∣ther

the King for time being hath inherently in His person the So∣veraigne power of Government. But that man who hath taken consideration hereof, and yet so absurdly peevish as to remaine unsa∣tisfied of the Kings right herein, the whole world must judge Him worse then out of his wits to give it unto the Members. Suppose the Steward of a Lord or Commoner, to claime property in the estate of his Master, I presume the Houses would account him an unjust Judge, who should determine the case on the Stewards be∣halfe, upon his owne testimony. So here the Members challenge not onely the Soveraignty due unto their Leige Lord, and King, but an authority arbitrary, over King and people, wherein they have not the least colour of proof, more then their owne affirmation. Be∣sides, when a witnesse (although not a party) contradicts himselfe, his testimony becomes invalid: But the Members solemnly upon their Oathes even this Parliament, have declared the King their on∣ly Supreame Governour, wherein they swore not for themselves, but on anothers behalfe, that is, for the Kings Interest: So that e∣very prudent man in common sense and reason, ought to be∣leeve, that which these men have thus sworne for the King; And absolutely to reject this their affirmation contrary to that Oath, and for their owne advantage. And so I conclude this point con∣curring with the Lords and Commons 1 Jacobi, that the Imperiall Crowne of this Realme, is, by inherent birth-right, descended and come to this our King Charls. And that (according to the Oathes of these Members and their predecessors in former Parliaments) he is our onely Supreame Governour.

In the next place it is shewed that the Militia of the Kingdom is in the King.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Coke 7. fo. 36. 37.
• * 1.2

  Vide the Acts.
• * 1.3

  Vid. the Act.
• a 1.4

  Coke fo. 8. 35.
• b 1.5

  Coke pref. 4 part fo. 1. Co. Caudries case fo. 8. Stat. 16. R. 2. cap. 5. 24 H. 8. c. 12. D. & Stu. f. 43. Dyer 29. Co. 11. 90, 93. Bract. lib. 1. ca. 8. fo. 5, 6. And infinite other bookes.
• a 1.6

  1 Eliz. c. 1. 5. El. c. 1.
• b 1.7

  Cok. Pref. 4. report.
• a 1.8

  Cok. Calvins case. fol. 11.
• b 1.9

  Cal. case. fo. 10
• d 1.10

  Statute 25. E. 3.
• e 1.11

  Cal. case. fo. 10
• g 1.12

  Cok. 4. part instit fol. 46.
• f 1.13

  Cok. 7. fol. 30.
• g 1.14

  Cok. 7. fol. 30.
• h 1.15

  Cal. case. fol. 5. fol. 7. 10.
• k 1.16

  Cok. 2. fol. 15. Cal. case. fol. 5.
• n 1.17

  Cal. case. fol. 5.
• m 1.18

  Cal. case. fol. 7. a. b.
• * 1.19

  3 Jaco. c. 1.
• * 1.20

  33 H. 8. c. 21.