Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author.

CHAP. XXIX.

He answers the first part of the Arguments brought a∣gainst Regulus. The Sacredness of an Oath. The Divinity of Faith. Pain none, or at least not the greatest Evil. Dishonesty the greatest, if not on∣ly Evil. Faith to be kept even with those who are Treacherous. Oaths made to Enemies should be kept. Not so those made to Pirates, and why. What 'tis to Forswear one's self. The Form of Oaths among the Romans. Laws of War to be kept in∣violable.

a 1.1 FIrst then they say, He could fear no Harm from the Anger of Jupiter, who neither can be Angry, nor do Harm to any body. This proves as strongly a∣gainst all Oaths in general, as it does in particular against this of Regulus. But the thing to be consi∣der'd in Peoples taking of Oaths, is not what Dan∣ger they are in, shou'd they break 'em; but what a sacred and powerful Obligation is laid upon 'em. For every Oath is a religious Affirmation; and whatever is promis'd after such a manner, as it were calling God for a Witness to your Words, ought certainly to be perform'd. For now Faith and Ju∣stice require it of us, and not any Fear of that An∣ger of the Gods, which is not incident to their Di∣vine Natures. That Faith I mean, of which Enni∣us has got these incomparable words:

O Faith All-glorious and Divine! In lofty Temples fit to shine;

Ev'n b 1.2 Jove himself by thee doth Swear!

Whosoever therefore doth not perform his Oath, af∣fronts the c 1.3 Deity of that Divine Faith, which was (as Cato in his Speech informs us) set up by our Fa∣thers in the Capitol it self, even next to the Statue of the great God Jupiter. d 1.4 But, secondly, they tell us, Supposing Jupiter had been Angry with Regulus, he could not have brought any Evil upon him, greater than what Regulus brought upon himself. This, I confess, would be very true, if there was no other Evil but only Pain: But that is so far from being the greatest Evil, that, if we may credit some of the e 1.5 chief Philosophers, it is not so much as any Evil at all: Among whom, I pray you, let Regulus be counted of no small Authority; if I may'nt rather say of the greatest and most weighty: For what greater Testimony can any one desire, than that of a principal Man among the Romans; who rather than be wanting in any point of his Duty, chose to undergo the most exquisite Torments? f 1.6 But of two Evils, say they, always choose the least: That is, in plain words, Rather be a Rogue than undergo any Calamity. Can any Calamity then be greater, than that of Baseness and Injustice? For if even the Filth and Deformity of the Body be loathsome and

offensive; how much more so must that of the Mind needs be, when 'tis cover'd and polluted with Shame and Dishonesty? Those Philosophers therefore, who discourse of these things with most Closeness and Severity, venture bodly to affirm, That nothing is Evil but only what's Dishonest: and even those themselves, who do it more loosly, yet al∣ways acknowledge, That 'tis the greatest however of all Evils. g 1.7 That Saying of the Poet's indeed is good, I neither am, nor have been tied by Oath to a treache∣rous Deceiver; but 'tis therefore so, because when Atreus was brought upon the Stage, he was to make him speak that, which was suitable to his Charact∣er. But if once they begin to lay down this for a Maxim, That Faith, when given to those who are trea∣rous, is not to be kept; they had best have a care, that this be not made a Refuge and Cover for Per∣jury. h 1.8 As for his Oaths being made to an Enemy; even War it self has Laws that belong to it; and Faith, except in some very few cases, is always to be kept even with our greatest Adversaries. For whatever you swear, for Example, in such a manner, as that i 1.9 your Conscience tells you it ought to be done, you are bound most inviolably to perform it: But where it is otherwise, you don't lie under any such Obligation; and are not perjur'd, tho' you should not perform it. Suppose, for the purpose, you had sworn to a Pirate, That you would pay him such

a Sum, if he'd spare your Life; it would not be Perjury, tho' you should not pay it him. k 1.10 For a Pirate is by no means a lawful Adversary, but ra∣ther a common Pest and Enemy of Mankind; so that no one's oblig'd to keep his Faith or Oath with him. For to Swear to a thing, and yet not perform it, is not immediately to Forswear one's self: But then a Man is properly said to be Perjur'd, when he Swears l 1.11 upon his Conscience (as our Form runs) to do such and such things, and yet does not do them. For that of Euripides may be said in m 1.12 some Cases to be very good, My Tongue indeed Swore, but my Conscience did not Assent. But had Regulus, in his Case, done any thing contrary to the Laws, and Conditions, that are kept between Enemies, it had been down-right Perjury. For the Carthagi∣nians, with whom he had then to do, were a law∣ful

Adversary, between whom and us there is all n 1.13 the Fecial, and several other Laws that are com∣mon to Nations. For had it been otherwise, 'tis certain the Senate would never have deliver'd up some o 1.14 eminent Persons in Chains to their Enemies.

Notes

• a 1.1

  He begins with answering the first Argument brought against Regulus; and shews what is to be regarded when People take Oaths.
• b 1.2

  Men and the inferiour Gods might swear by Jupiter, who was above them; but Jupiter himself could swear by none, but the inviolable Faith of his Word and Promises.
• c 1.3

  The Heathens made Deities almost of every thing, viz. Faith, Concord, Luck, &c.
• d 1.4

  He comes to answer the second Argument against Re∣gulus.
• e 1.5

  The Stoicks, who (as was before observ'd) allow'd no∣thing to be Evil, but what concern'd the Soul and Consci∣ence; calling the Calamities of the Body or Fortune, such as Pain or Poverty, indifferent things.
• f 1.6

  The third Argument against him, answer'd.
• g 1.7

  The fourth Argument, taken out of Accius's Tragedy of Atreus, answer'd.
• h 1.8

  Answer to the fifth Argument, His Oaths being made to an Enemy.
• i 1.9

  So I understand the words, Ut mens conciperet, &c. not as tho' it were Mens deferentis; for I am not bound to perform whatever I Swear, according to the Mind of him that gives the Oath; for it may be unlawful, or the like. Beside 'tis unreasonable to interpret Oaths, just according to the Mind of the Imposer: He may have his private Meanings, &c. as well as the Receiver. See upon this whole Subject Sanderf. Grotius, &c.
• k 1.10

  Grotius does not like this Decision of Gicero's: because in an Oath we are not only to consider the Person's Right whom we Swear to; but God also, by whom we Swear. 'Tis true, the Pirate can demand nothing in this case, but the Majesty of God, by whom I swore, lays an Obligation of Per∣formance upon me. But Pufendorf de Jur. N. & G. Book 4. chap. 2. §. 9. seems rather to favour our Author's Opini∣on.
• l 1.11

  That's the meaning of Ex Animi sententia, and not with design of Obliging your self. Oaths would signifie just no∣thing at all, if they oblig'd no further, than People design'd to be oblig'd by them. 'Twas the Form of Oaths among the Romans, Do you Swear such a thing is so or so, Ex Animi tui sententia? which words signifie either according to your Mind, or upon your Conscience. Hence that Jest which our Author quotes in his de Orat. Cato the Censor ask'd a Man, Have you a Wife or not, Ex Animi tui sententia? meaning, upon your Conscience or Oath: To which he answers, Non qui∣dem ex Animi mei sententia; meaning, Not according to my Mind or Liking.
• m 1.12

  When, for Example, a Man only reads or repeats the words of an Oath, or the like. See Grot. Book 2. chap. 13. §. 2.
• n 1.13

  See chap. 11. Book 1.
• o 1.14

  Generals, who had made Leagues with the Enemy, without Power from the Senate and People.