Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author.

About this Item

Title
Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author.
Author
Cicero, Marcus Tullius.
Publication
London :: Printed for Sam. Buckley ...,
1699.
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Subject terms
Ethics.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A33176.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A33176.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 6, 2024.

Pages

Page 301

CHAP. XXIII.

Several Cases put by Hecaton the Rhodian. Diogenes and Antipater oppose one another. Whether bad Money receiv'd for Good should be put off?

a 1.1 HEcaton proposeth, in his sixth Book of Offices, several Questions such as these which follow: Whether a Good Man, in time of great Scarcity, may refuse to give Victuals to the Servants of his own Family? He discourses indeed upon either side the Question, but at last concludes, That he should rather be guided by his Interest, than Hu∣manity. He demands again, If a Merchant in a Storm be forc'd to throw his Goods over-board, whether of the two should he choose to cast away, a very valuable Horse, or a Servant that's good for nothing? Here Interest, and the saving of his Goods draws one way, and compassion of Human Nature another. Should a Fool in a Shipwrack have gotten a Plank, may a Wise Man take it a∣way from him if he can? He answers, No; be∣cause it would be plainly a piece of Injustice: But what if the Owner of the Ship should come? may not he take it away when it properly belongs to him? No, not at all; no more than he may throw a Man out of the Ship, under the pretence that the Ship belongs to him: For till they are arriv'd whi∣ther the Ship was hired for, it does not more pro∣perly belong to the Owner, than it does to the Passengers by whom it was hired. Suppose two Men, that are equally Wise, should both of 'em in a Shipwrack lay hold of the same Plank; may either of 'em seize upon it forcibly to himself, or

Page 302

should one of them voluntarily yeild it to the other? Let one yield to the other; provided that other will be more serviceable to the Publick, or there is more depending upon his Life and Preservation. But what if these are equal in either of them? Why then there's no more to be said about it, but it must e'en be let alone for Chance to determin, as tho' they should cast Lots, or b 1.2 play at Even and Odd for it. What if a Father should rifle Temples, and dig Passages under-ground into the Treasury? Should the Son discover him to the Publick Ma∣gistrate? No; that were an horrid unnatural Im∣piety: he should rather on the contrary defend his Father, if any one else should pretend to accuse him. But what! ought not the Interest of my Country to be consulted, before that of any one else what∣soever? Yes undeniably; but then it is very much the Interest of your Country, to have Citizens that are dutiful and obedient to their Parents. But if a Father should attempt to make himself King, or any ways endeavour to betray his Country; should a Son in such a case hold his Tongue and Conceal it? In the first place, let him beg of his Father to desist: if that does no good, let him proceed to rebuke and even to threaten him about it: but if at last he perceive that it directly tends to the Ruin of his Country, he should prefer its Safety be∣fore that of his Father. Another of the Questions he proposes is this, Suppose a Good Man to receive, by an oversight, bad Money for good, and after∣wards come to understand that 'tis bad; may he pay it for good, if he owes another any thing? Dio∣genes thinks he may, but Antipater not; whom I rather assent to. Suppose a Man be a selling a Ves∣sel of Wine, which he knows won't keep; is he

Page 303

bound to tell of this? Diogenes thinks he's under no such Obligation; Antipater will have it to be every honest Man's Duty. These are the things, which whether they are Right and one's Duty or not, is often controverted amongst the Stoicks. In selling a Slave is one bound to declare what his Faults are or not? I don't mean those, which un∣less they are told, the Law it self commands he shall be return'd upon our Hands; but his being a Liar, c 1.3 a Filcher, a Player at Dice, or a Drunkard. One's of Opinion we ought to declare 'em, and the other not. Should an ignorant Body sell a quantity of Gold, and suppose it to be Copper; is a good Man oblig'd now to tell him that 'tis Gold; or may he buy for a Penny what is worth a thousand Pence? 'Tis plain enough by this time what my Thoughts are, and wherein consists the Controversie between d 1.4 the foremention'd Philoso∣phers.

Notes

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