Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author.

About this Item

Title
Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author.
Author
Cicero, Marcus Tullius.
Publication
London :: Printed for Sam. Buckley ...,
1699.
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Subject terms
Ethics.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A33176.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A33176.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 7, 2024.

Pages

Page 269

CHAP. XII.

The Opinion, that a thing may be Profitable, tho' 'tis not Honest, very pernicious. A Case put, wherein 'tis doubted, Whether that, which seems to be Profitable, be Honest or no. The Arguments on either side, of two Philosophers, differing in their Opinions. The Difference between to Conceal, and not to Tell. The Society of Mankind, how far it obliges.

LEt us lay down this therefore as a standing Max∣im, That whatever is Dishonest can never be Pro∣fitable: no, not tho' we should arrive at the full posses∣sion of all those Advantages, which we propos'd to ob∣tain by it. Nay, this very Persuasion, That a thing may be Profitable, tho' 'tis Base and Dishonest, is one of the greatest Misfortunes and Calamities, that could ever have happen'd to the Life of Man. a 1.1 But there often fall out (as was before observ'd) some peculiar Cases, wherein that which is Honest has a seeming Repugnance with that which is Pro∣fitable; so that it requires some farther Considera∣tion, to know whether this Repugnance be certain and real, or whether they mayn't be brought to a fair Agreement. To this Head belong such Exam∣ples as these: Suppose we, for Instance, an honest Merchant, when Corn was scarce and extreamly dear at Rhodes, to bring a large quantity thither from Alexandria; and withal to know, That a great many Ships, well laden with Corn, were in their way thither from the same City: Should he tell this now to the People of Rhodes, or say nothing

Page 270

of it, but sell his own Corn at the best Rates he could? We suppose him a Virtuous and Honest Man, and don't here discourse of the Deliberation of one, that would hold his peace if he thought 'twere Dishonest; but of one, that doubts whether it be Dishonest, or not. In such sort of Cases b 1.2 Di∣ogenes the Babylonian, a Man of great Credit and Note among the Stoicks, is of one Opinion; and Antipater his Scholar, an extraordinary smart and ingenious Man, of just the contrary. Antipater would have every thing be plainly told, that so the Buyer might be ignorant of nothing in what he buys, that the Seller himself knows of: Diogenes thinks it enough in the Seller, to tell the Faults of his Goods as far as the Laws require it; and, as for the rest, tho' to use no Cozening, yet, since he's come with design to sell 'em, to get as much Mo∣ney for 'em as ever he can. Here, may the Mer∣chant say, I have brought my Corn; I have expos'd it to sale; and sell it no dearer than other People do; (nay perhaps he'll say cheaper, there being now a great∣er quantity, than there was before) and pray where is now the Wrong I have done to any Body? Antipater argues upon a different Principle: What say you, (quoth he) are not you oblig'd to do Good to Man∣kind; and be serviceable to the Society of all Men in general? c 1.3 Were not you born under such an Obligati∣on? And had not you such Principles ingrafted into you by Nature, which 'tis always your Duty to follow and

Page 271

obey, that your single Interest should be the same with that of all Men; and again that of all Men should be the same with yours? And will you, this notwith∣standing, conceal from the People what Plenty there is a-coming, the knowledge of which might be of so great Use and Advantage to 'em? Diogenes perhaps will reply upon him thus: 'Tis one thing to conceal, and another not to tell; nor can I be said to conceal from you now, tho' I don't tell you, what the Nature and Essence of the Gods is, and what the Happiness or chief Good of Men; things which 'twould do one much more Kindness to know, than that Quantities of Corn are like to be here shortly. But if any thing be Profitable for you to hear, 'tis none of my Duty to come and tell it you immediately. Nay but you'll find that it is your Duty, (may the other reply) if you'll piease but to remember, That there's such a kind of thing, as a mu∣tual Relation, and Society amongst all Men. Well, I do remember it; (may the other reply again) but, I pray you, is that Society of such a Nature, as that no Man, who lives in it, must have any thing that's his own? If this be so, then there's no more selling, but we must e'en give every thing away that we have.

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