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CHAP. XII.
The Opinion, that a thing may be Profitable, tho' 'tis not Honest, very pernicious. A Case put, wherein 'tis doubted, Whether that, which seems to be Profitable, be Honest or no. The Arguments on either side, of two Philosophers, differing in their Opinions. The Difference between to Conceal, and not to Tell. The Society of Mankind, how far it obliges.
LEt us lay down this therefore as a standing Max∣im, That whatever is Dishonest can never be Pro∣fitable: no, not tho' we should arrive at the full posses∣sion of all those Advantages, which we propos'd to ob∣tain by it. Nay, this very Persuasion, That a thing may be Profitable, tho' 'tis Base and Dishonest, is one of the greatest Misfortunes and Calamities, that could ever have happen'd to the Life of Man. a 1.1 But there often fall out (as was before observ'd) some peculiar Cases, wherein that which is Honest has a seeming Repugnance with that which is Pro∣fitable; so that it requires some farther Considera∣tion, to know whether this Repugnance be certain and real, or whether they mayn't be brought to a fair Agreement. To this Head belong such Exam∣ples as these: Suppose we, for Instance, an honest Merchant, when Corn was scarce and extreamly dear at Rhodes, to bring a large quantity thither from Alexandria; and withal to know, That a great many Ships, well laden with Corn, were in their way thither from the same City: Should he tell this now to the People of Rhodes, or say nothing