Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author.

TULLY's OFFICES. (Book 2)

The Second Book. (Book 2)

CHAP. I.

What will be the Subject of this Second Book. He ap∣plies himself to the Study of Philosophy, as his great∣est Consolation in the midst of the Publick Cala∣mities of his Country.

WHat those Duties are, Son Mark, which Honesty and Virtue require of us, and how they arise from their several Fountains, is, I think, plain enough from the former Book. I am now in the next place to speak of those others, which wholly regard the Convenience of Life, and are requisite for the Getting and Enjoyment of those things, which serve for our comfortable Sub∣sistence here; such as Interest, Riches, &c. And here I told you, the common Heads of Deliberati∣on were, What is Profitable, and what Unprofitable? And, Of several Profitables, which is more, and which most of all such? a 1.1 Concerning which I shall begin to speak, after I have premis'd but a Word or two,

in Vindication of my self, and my present Under∣taking. For tho' my Books have excited several both to the Reading, and even Writing of Philoso∣phy; b 1.2 yet I am now-and-then apt to be afraid, least some, who are otherwise very Good Men, should hate and despise the very Name of that Stu∣dy; and wonder at me, for bestowing such Por∣tions of my Time and Pains, in so very fruitless and insignificant a manner. To whom I answer, c 1.3 That so long as the Republick was govern'd by those, to whose Care and Management she had intrusted her self, I was ever diligent and employ'd all my Thoughts, for her Good and Preservation. But when d 1.4 one Man had seiz'd of her wholly to him∣self, and there was no place left for my Counsel or Authority: and when I had lost those extraordina∣ry Persons, who had been my Companions in la∣bouring for her Interest: I resolv'd not to sink in∣to Anguish and Despair, which had wholly over-whelm'd me, if I had not resisted 'em; nor to fol∣low such Pleasures or idle Ways of Living, as were improper and unbecoming a Man of Learning. I could heartily wish, had it so pleas'd the Gods, that the Republick had continu'd in its ancient

Condition, and never fall'n into the Hands of e 1.5 those Men, who aren't so much for Changing, as Overturning every thing! I should then, as I did in its flourishing Circumstances, spend my Time ra∣ther in Business, than Writing; and what I did write, would not be things of this Moral Nature, but my Publick Orations, as I have often done. But when the poor State, which had taken up all my Care and Thoughts, and for which I had la∣bour'd with all my Power, was utterly ruin'd and sunk into Nothing, there was quickly no room left for such Orations, either at the Bar, or in the Senate-house: And my active Mind, which had always been employ'd in that kind of Studies, now not being able to lye wholly idle; I thought I could not find out a better way to get rid of those Trou∣bles which oppress'd my Mind, than by return∣ing again to the Studies of Philosophy. I had spent a good part of my time in these, whilst I was young, for the improvement of my Reason: But when I came once to be a Candidate for Places, and devoted my self to the Service of the Publick; I had little time left for Philosophical Enquiries; only so much, as could be spar'd from the Business of my Friends and the State; which was wholly taken up in nothing but Reading, without any Leisure at all for Writing.

CHAP. II.

Some Advantage to be drawn out of Evils. The Com∣mendation and Definitions of Wisdom and Philoso∣phy. 'Tis the only way of obtaining Virtue and Happiness. The Opinion of the Academicks, and why they Dispute against every thing.

HOwever then we have this Advantage, in the midst of all our Miseries and Calamities, that by them we are brought to the Writing of those things, a 1.6 which were not sufficiently known amongst us, tho' nothing in the World more deserves our Knowledge. For what is there, O ye Gods! more desi∣rable than Wisdom? What more excellent and love∣ly in it self? What more useful and becoming for a Man? Or what more worthy of his reasonable Nature? Now those who are busied in the pur∣suit of this, are call'd Philosophers; and the Word Philosophy signifies no more, if you'd take it literally, than a certain Desire and Love for Wisdom: And Wisdom's defin'd by the old Philosophers, The Knowledge of things both b 1.7 Divine and Humane, to∣gether with the Causes upon which they depend: the Study of which whosoever finds fault with, I confess I can't perceive what 'tis he would commend. For what Study is there, that brings so much Quiet and

tisfaction to the Mind, (if these are the things which we long after) as theirs who are always a-search∣ing out something, which may contribute to the Welfare and Happiness of their Lives? Or if it be Virtue and Constancy that we desire, either 'tis this is the Method of obtaining 'em, or else there is not any to be found in the World. To say there's no Art of those weightier Concerns, when none of the most trivial Matters is without Art, becomes only those who Talk without Thinking, and de∣ceive 'emselves in their most important Business: But if there is an Art of attaining Virtue, in what other way we do hope to find it, if this be forsaken, of which I am now speaking. But these things use to be more fully handled, when we excite and per∣suade Men to cultivate Philosophy: which I have endeavour'd to do in another c 1.8 Work. My De∣sign at present was only to shew, why I particular∣ly chose this Study, being thrust from all Business and Concern in the Government. d 1.9 There are o∣thers, and those Men of no small Learning, who object against me, and ask, If I am not inconsistent with my self, who affirm that nothing at all can be known, and yet have discours'd upon several Subjects, and at this very time am laying down Rules and Di∣rections about Duty: I could wish these Persons had understood our Opinions a little more throughly;

e 1.10 for we are not of those, whose Minds are perpe∣tually wandring in Uncertainties, and have nothing whereby to determin their Assents; (for what sort of Mind must a Man needs have, or rather what Life must he needs lead, f 1.11 when he's utterly debar'd from all liberty of Disputing, and observing any re∣gular Conduct in his Actions?) nor yet of those o∣thers, who call some things certain and others un∣certain: but rejecting both these, we say some things are probable and others improbable. Is there any thing then that should hinder me, from approving of that, which I think most probable; and laying aside that, which I think the contrary? Or where's the Inconsistency, if leaving that arrogant Pretence of Demonstrating, I am neither too rash, nor pre∣sumptuous in my Opinions, which of all things in the World are the farthest from Wisdom? Now this is the reason why we Academicks Dispute a∣gainst every thing, because what is probable could not appear, without comparing the Arguments up∣on either side of the Question. But these things are clear'd, I think, accurately enough, in my Books entitled Academical Questions. But you, my Son,

are already engag'd in the Study of g 1.12 a most noble and ancient Philosophy; and have gotten Cratippus for your Master and Instructor, who is hardly in∣ferior to its most glorious Founders: However, I would have you acquainted with h 1.13 our Doctrins, which are very little different from those of your own Sect. But it's high time now to return to our Purpose. i 1.14

CHAP. III.

The Knowledge of Honesty is of greatest Moment. Pro∣fit and Honesty really the same, and distinguisht on∣ly by an Act of the Mind. The customary Opinion to the contrary very pernicious. The Division of things that are profitable, and hurtful to Men. The Good we receive from inanimate Beings owing to Man's Industry.

THere being then, as a 1.15 was before observ'd, five general Heads of Deliberating and Consulting for the finding out our Duty; two of which relate

to what is Honest and Becoming; two to the Uses and Conveniencies of Life, such as Plenty, Power, Riches, &c. and the fifth to the teaching us how we ought to Choose, if any of the former should seem to contradict and run counter to one another: we have gone thro' with that, wherein Honesty is the Question; with which I desire you'd be more especially acquainted. The Point which now comes under Consideration, is what usually goes by the name of Profitable; b 1.16 concerning which, Custom is mightily in the wrong, and by little and little has brought it to such a pass, as to make a Distinction between Profit and Honesty; and settle it as a constant and receiv'd Maxim, That a thing may be Honest with∣out being Profitable; and again may be Profitable with∣out being Honest: the most pernicious Errour, and most destructive of all Goodness, that ever could have crept into the Minds of Men. The greatest however, and most eminent Philosophers, have been always so strict and severe in their Writings, as to make the three Natures of Justice, Profit, and Ho∣nesty, be blended and interwoven together in Reali∣ty, and distinguishable only by an Act of the Mind. For whatever is Just, say they, the same is also Pro∣fitable; and whatever is Honest, the same is also Just; from whence it follows, That whatever is Honest, the same must be also Profitable. Did Peo∣ple but consider this Matter as they ought, they would not, as now they commonly do, admire a crafty and subtle sort of Fellows, and esteem that

Wisdom, which in truth is Roguery. This Errour therefore should wholly be rooted out of the Minds of Men, and all should be taught, That if ever they hope to obtain their Ends, they should not set about it by the ways of Knavery and under∣hand Dealings, but by Justice and Integrity in their Designs and Actions. c 1.17 Now all things that tend to the Good and Preservation of the Life of Man, are either Inanimate, such as Gold, Silver, the Pro∣ductions of the Earth, and other such like; or Ani∣mals, which have natural Powers, Inclinations and Appetites. Of these some are unreasonable and o∣thers reasonable: The unreasonable are Horses, Ox∣en, and other sorts of Cattel; to which we may add Bees, which produce and make something, that contributes to the Convenience of the Life of Men: the reasonable are Gods and Men. The means for procuring the Favour of the Gods, is to live a religious and holy Life: Next to the Gods, there's nothing so capable of contributing to the Happiness and Welfare of Men, as Men themselves. The same Distribution may serve for those things, which tend to the Hurt and Inconvenience of Men. But because 'tis believ'd, That d 1.18 to hurt is incom∣patible with the Divine Nature, the Gods for that reason are excepted here, so that Men are suppos'd, of all things in Nature, to do both the most e 1.19 Ser∣vice

and Disservice to one another. For First, f 1.20 Those things which are call'd Inanimate, are most of 'em owing to the Industry of Men; which we neither could get, if it weren't for their Labour and Art in procuring 'em; nor afterwards use without their Assistance. For where should we have such a Science as Physick; as Navigation or Agricul∣ture? How should we gather and preserve our Corn, and the rest of our Fruits, if it were not for Men? And then how should those Commodi∣ties, which we want, be imported; or those, with which we abound, be exported, if there were not Men to do each of these Works? In like manner, how could Stones be fetch'd out of the Quarries for our necessary Uses? How could Iron, Brass, Gold and Silver, be dug and drawn out from the Bow∣els of the Earth, did not Men set their Hands to work for these Purposes?

CHAP. IV.

Other Conveniencies from inanimate Beings, and un∣reasonable Animals, receiv'd by Mens Industry. The Advantages arising from Mens joyning in Society.

SO Houses, which serve to defend us from the ex∣tremities of Heat and Cold, could neither at first have been made by Mankind; nor afterwards, if by Earth-quake, Tempest, or length of Days, they had fall'n to decay, have been repair'd or re∣built; had not Men, joyn'd together in one com∣mon Society, learnt to beg Help and Assistance of one another. To this Industry of Men we are also indebted for Conveyances of Water, for making new Channels and Arms to Rivers, and for turning the Streams after such a manner, as thereby to water and fatten our Grounds; for throwing up Banks to defend us from the Waves, and making of new Harbors in convenient Places. From all which In∣stances, and a great many others that might easily be produc'd, 'tis abundantly manifest, That the Fruits and Advantages reap'd from those things, which are call'd Inanimate, are entirely owing to Mens Labour and Industry. Secondly, a 1.21 Those we receive from unreasonable Animals, how very little and inconsiderable would they be, if they were not augmented by the same Peoples Industry? For who was it but Men that first discover'd the Uses, to which Beasts in their several kinds might be ser∣viceable? And how at this time could we feed or break them? How could we keep 'em, and get

the most Profit and Advantage by 'em, without the Endeavours and Assistance of the same Men? 'Tis they that destroy us those Creatures which are hurt∣ful, and procure for us those which may be service∣able to us. Why need I mention a b 1.22 multitude of Arts, which are absolutely necessary to our Well∣being here? For what Help or Succour could those that are sick, or what Pleasure those that are heal∣thy find? How could Mankind be supply'd with Victuals, and other Conveniencies or Comforts of Life; if it weren't for that number of Callings in the World, which are wholly design'd to provide 'em of such things? By which Men are brought to live better and more handsomly, and are rais'd to a condition so far above that of unreasonable Animals. Again, Cities could neither have been built nor frequented, without a Community and Society of Men: From hence have arisen all Laws and Customs; the Bounds of Equity and Justice have been settled; and a certain and regular Me∣thod laid down for the Conduct of Mens Lives. This has brought Modesty into request, and fill'd off the natural Roughness of Mens Tempers; has contributed to the greater Security of their Lives, and establish'd such a Commerce and Correspon∣dence among 'em, as by mutual giving and recei∣ving of Benefits, by bartering and changing one Commodity for another, one Convenience for ano∣ther, supplies 'em to the full with whatever they stand in need of.

CHAP. V.

Nothing extraordinary either in War, or Peace, can be done without the help of Men. Nothing the Cause of so much Evil to Men, as they themselves are to one another. What is the Office of Virtue. The whole Business of it consists in three things.

WE dwell much longer, than we needed to do, upon this Subject: For who does not set, which Panaetius has spent many Pages to make out, that neither a General in War, nor a Statesman in Peace, could ever perform any glorious Exploits, or do any notable Service to the Publick, without the concurrence of other Mens Endeavours? To confirm this Assertion, he brings a 1.23 Themistocles, Pe∣ricles, Agesilaus and Alexander; and tells us, that no one of all these, without the assistance of others to support 'em, could ever have atchiev'd such glo∣rious Actions. What he tells us is undoubtedly true, and such a number of Witnesses altogether superfluous. b 1.24 And as Men thus receive most ex∣traordinary Benefits, from agreeing and conspiring to lend mutual Assistance; so we shall find, upon changing the Scene, that there are no Misfortunes or Calamities so great, as those which they bring upon one another. c 1.25 Dicaearchus, a learned and e∣loquent Peripatetick, has written a whole Book

concerning the Destruction of Men; where first having reckon'd up all other Causes of it, such as Inundations, Pestilences, and Famines, and even sudden Incur∣sions of furious wild Beasts, (by which he assures us some whole Nations have been devour'd;) and then placing on the other side Wars, Seditions, and such-like Misfortunes, which Men were the Occa∣sions of; he endeavours to shew at the foot of the Account, that a great many more have been de∣stroy'd by these, than by all other Accidents or Ca∣lamities whatever. This then being indisputably true, That the Goods Men enjoy, and the Evils they suffer, proceed for the most part from Men themselves; I say 'tis the principal Office of Virtue, to procure the Good-liking and Favour of Men, and so to engage their Endeavours and Affections, as to make 'em still ready to do us any Kindness. 'Tis the Business therefore of laborious Callings, to supply us with all the Conveniencies of Life, which may be had from the Use of inanimate Beings, and unreasonable Animals: But to gain the Affections of Men on our side, and beget in them always a readiness and desire to advance our Interest, is a Work that requires the Wisdom and Virtue of the greatest Men. d 1.26 For the whole Work and Exercise of Vir∣tue in general, consists in some one of these three things: The first is a Knowledge, in all we under∣take, of what is agreeable to Truth and Sincerity; what's becoming and suitable to every one's Cha∣racter; what will be the Consequence of such or

such Actions; what are the Materials out of which things are made, and what the Causes that first brought 'em into Being. The second, A restraining the violent Motions and Passions of the Soul, which by the Grecians are termed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and bringing the irregular Inclinations of the Appetite, which by the same are call'd 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, under the Power and Govern∣ment of Reason. The third is a Skilfulness of Ad∣dress in our Carriage, and a winning Demeanour toward the rest of Men, with whom we are joyn'd in one common Society; that so by their help we may be supply'd in abundance, with all those things which our Natures stand in need of; and by the same may be enabled, should any Injury be offer'd us, to keep our selves secure from the Violences of it; and not only so, but to revenge our selves also upon the guilty Person, and inflict such Punishments, as are according to the Rules of Humanity and Ju∣stice.

CHAP. VI.

How far the Power of Fortune over Men reaches. The several Reasons why Men favour any one; or submit to his Authority.

WHat a 1.27 Means should be us'd for the gaining, and securing Men firm to our Interests, we shall mention immediately; but we have one Ob∣servation to make before-hand. b 1.28 There's no one but knows that the Power of Fortune is very great, both as to the good, and ill Success of our Actions: for when she favours us, we quickly arrive at our desired Haven; but when she turns against us, we as quickly are Shipwreckt and run A-ground. Now of those Events which depend upon Fortune, there are some which come to pass but extraordinary sel∣dom; such as Storms, Tempests, Shipwrecks, Ru∣ins, Fires, &c. which proceed from inanimate Be∣ings; and from brutish Animals kicks, bites, pushes, &c. all which, as I said, do but rarely happen: But the Overthrows of Armies, as of c 1.29 three but a

while ago, and a great many others at several times; the Deaths of Commanders, as lately of d 1.30 a great and extraordinary Person; the Hatred and Violence of the enrag'd Multitude, and, as a Conse∣quence of that, the Banishments, Flights and utter Undoings of well-deserving Citizens: as also on the other 〈◊〉〈◊〉 prosperous Successes, such as Honours, Commands, Victories, &c. tho' they are all truly fortuitous things, yet they can't succeed either the one way or t'other, without the Assistance and En∣deavours of Men. This being noted, we are now to discourse of those Ways and Methods, whereby Men are drawn and enclin'd to be for us, and to endeavour all they can for our Interest and Advan∣tage: Upon which if we seem to dwell longer than we should do, I desire the Usefulness of the Subject may be consider'd, and then we may possi∣bly be thought too short. e 1.31 Whatsoever then is contributed by Men, toward any one's advancement in Riches, Honours, Power, &c. is always done up∣on some of these Motives: First, That of Kindness, Benevolence, or Good-will; when for some reasons they love any Person. Secondly, Honour or Admi∣ration; when they respect any one for his Virtues, and think he deserves to be highly promoted. Thirdly, Confidence, Trust, or Reliance; when they think they may safely confide in a Man, as one that will certainly take care of their Affairs. Fourth∣ly, Fear, when they stand in any Aw of his Power

and Authority. Fifthly, Hope, when they expect to get something from him; as when Princes or popular Men promise great Donations. And, last of all, Hire, when they are drawn to't by Money or Presents; which is much the most pitiful and sordid Way, as for those on the one hand that are taken by it, so likewise for those that endeavour to make use of it: For 'tis never well when People shall attempt to get that by Money, which ought to be the Reward of Virtue and Merit. However seeing sometimes one must have recourse to this Method as a Refuge, I shall give some Rules for our Direction in the Use of it; but first speak of those, that are more near∣ly related to Virtue and Honesty. f 1.32 In much the same manner, and for several such Reasons, Men submit to the Power and Authority of another: Either because they have a Kindness for him; or have formerly receiv'd some Obligations from him; or respect him for his Worth; or hope they shall get something by it; or fear they shall be forc'd to it, if they don't do it voluntarily; or are drawn by fair Promises and large Donations; or, lastly, (as we see it too often practis'd in our own Republick) are downright hired to it.

CHAP. VII.

A Governour should endeavour to make himself lov'd, and not fear'd. The Fates of several, who have taken the contrary Method.

NOw of all a 1.33 those Methods, which tend to the advancement and maintenance of our Interest, there is none more proper and convenient than Love, and none more improper and inconvenient than Fear. For, as 'tis very well observ'd by Ennius, Whom Men fear, they also hate; and whom they hate, they wish out of the World. But that no force of Power or Greatness whatever, can bear up long a∣gainst a Stream of publick Hate, if it were not suf∣ficiently known before, was of late made appear by an Instance of our own. And not the Murther of that b 1.34 Tyrant only, who by force of Arms op∣pres'd the City, which now most c 1.35 obeys him, when taken out of the World; but the like untimely Ends of most other Tyrants, who have generally been attended by the same ill Fate, is a manifest Token that the Hatred of People is able to min the most absolute Authority: For Obedience proceed∣ing from Fear can't possibly be lasting; whereas that which is the Effect of Love, will be faithful for ever. 'Tis well enough in those, who by open

force have reduc'd any Nation, and accordingly Rule it with an high Hand, if they do sometimes use Rigour and Severity, like Masters towards their Slaves, when there's no other way of holding 'em in Subjection: But for those who are Magi∣strates in a free City, to endeavour to make them∣selves fear'd by the People, is one of the maddest, and most desperate Attempts upon the face of the Earth. For tho' a Man should by his Power and Greatness oppress the Laws, and over-awe Liberty by Terrour and Threatnings, yet still they will find time to recover again, first by the private Resent∣ments of the Citizens, and afterwards by their choo∣sing in secret Consults, some worthier Person to free 'em from the Oppressour. And Liberty, after she has been chain'd up a while, is always more Curst, and bites deeper, than she would otherwise have done if she had never been restrain'd. Let us therefore embrace and adhere to that Method, which is of the most universal Influence, and serves not only to secure us what we have, but moreover to enlarge our Power and Authority: That is in short, Let us rather endeavour to be Lov'd than Fear'd; which is certainly the best way to make us successful as well in our private, as our publick Bu∣siness. For those who desire to have others be afraid of 'em, must needs be afraid of those others in their turns: What, for Instance, shall we imagin of d 1.36 the Elder Dionysius? With what eternal Fears and Apprehensions must he needs be rack'd, when e 1.37 da∣ring

not to venture his Throat to any Razor, he was forc'd even to singe off his Beard with Coals? Or what of f 1.38 Alexander, who was sirnam'd the Phe∣raean? In what Torment, think we, must he per∣petually live? When (as 'tis usually reported of him) he dar'd not so much as to rise from Table, and go to his own Wife Thebe's Chamber, one whom he lov'd with an entire Affection, without a Barbarian, and him (as 'tis said) too a g 1.39 brand∣ed Thracian, to lead the way with his naked Sword? And would always dispatch some of his Guards before him, to search all the Cloaths and Coffers of the Women, for fear least any Weapon might be conceal'd within 'em. O miserable and unhappy Man! who could think a Barbarian, one that carried the Marks of his Condition in his Forehead, would be faithfuller to him than his own Wife. Neither, it seems, was he mistaken in it; for he was afterwards Murther'd h 1.40 by her Procure∣ment, upon suspicion of having to do with someo∣ther Woman. Nor indeed can any Authority, how absolute soever, subsist very long when 'tis

thus generally fear'd: i 1.41 Phalaris himself, who is particularly remarkable for his barbarous Cruelties, may serve for a Witness to this Truth; who was not destroy'd by domestick Treacheries, like that Alexander, whom I just now mention'd; nor yet by some few Men conspiring his Death, like our late Tyrant; but by a general Insurrection of all the Agrigentines falling upon him at once. Again, Did not the Macedonians revolt from k 1.42 Demetrius, and all with one consent march over to Pyrrhus? And when the Lacedaemonians grew Insolent and Tyrannical, did not their Allies upon a suddain forsake 'em, and shew 'emselves idle and uncon∣cern'd Spectators of their Ruin at l 1.43 Leuctra, with∣out ever stirring one Foot to their Assistance?

CHAP. VIII.

The just and gentle Government of the old Romans: When chang'd, and the fatal Consequences of that Change. Caesar and Sylla's unjust Cruelties. One Cause of Civil Wars is Mens hoping to raise 'em∣selves by them. All have occasion for some Friends, tho' not for general Love.

I Much rather choose, upon such a Subject, to bring Instances from Forreign, than our own Nation. However, I can't but observe thus much, That so long as our Empire supported it self, not by Ways of Injustice and Violence, but rather by Actions of Kindness and Gentleness; Wars were un∣dertaken to Protect its Allies or Defend its Honour, and accordingly their Issues were attended with Mercy, or at least no more Rigour than was ab∣solutely necessary. The Senate then was a kind of Port or Refuge, for Princes and Nations to have recouse to in their need; and our Officers and Commanders made it their greatest Glory, to De∣fend their Provinces, and Assist their Allies, with Justice and Fidelity. This City therefore was not then the a 1.44 Empress, so properly as the Protectress of all the World. This Conduct and Method of mana∣ging the State, began by little and little to wear off

before, but utterly vanish'd immediately after the Victory of b 1.45 Sylla; for People began to think nothing could be unjust to their Confederates and Allies, when once they had seen so great Cruelties exercis'd even upon their very Citizens. This Man therefore was in a just Cause, but which was follow'd by a cruel and most unjust Victory: he having had the Boldness and Impudence to say, when in full Mar∣ket he was selling the Goods of some honest and wealthy Men, and whom he himself knew to be Roman Citizens, That he was going to make sale of his own Booty. But there has come c 1.46 one after him, whose Cause was impious, and his Victory yet more scandalous and inhuman: who did not stop at selling of private Mens Estates, but involv'd all our Countries and Provinces together in one com∣mon Calamity. Hence we have seen, after Havock and Devastation made in other Countries, as it were by way of Praelude to the Loss of our own Empire, the City d 1.47 Marseilles drawn along in Triumph; and that very place, without whose Assistance our former Generals never brought Triumph from beyond the Alpes, has now found one that could have so much Impudence, as to Triumph over its own Destruction. I might bring a great many other Examples, of most impious Treatment that hath been shewn towards our Allies; but this single Instance is abundant∣ly sufficient, being one of the basest that was ever

committed before the face of the Sun. The truth on't is we have deserv'd these Misfortunes; for if others had not 'scap'd without Punishment for their Wickedness, this Man could never have arriv'd at that Insolence; who tho' he has left but few Heirs of his Estate, I am afraid will have a great many wicked ones of his Ambition. For as long as some dissolute and profligate Fellows remember that e 1.48 former inhuman Auction, and are in hopes one day of seeing the same again, they'll always be for propagating Civil Dissentions. Thus Publius Sylla, who was so busie in that mention'd, when his Kins∣man was Dictator, was never contented till he had manag'd f 1.49 a worse and more inhuman Auction six and thirty Years after: and g 1.50 another, who was Scribe in that former Dictatorship, in this latter was advanc'd to be Treasurer of the City. By all which 'tis easie enough to perceive, that we are never to hope we shall be free from Civil Wars, when People expect to make their Fortunes by 'em. We have therefore only the Walls of our City re∣maining entire, and even they, as 'twere, expect∣ing to feel the Effects of their abominable Wicked∣ness; but as for the Republick 'tis absolutely sunk into Ruins and Nothing. And all these Misfortunes have fall'n upon us (that I may return to the Sub∣ject which occasion'd this Digression) by our choo∣sing to Govern rather by Fear than Love. What then ought particular Persons to expect, when Ty∣ranny and Oppression could bring all these Evils upon the whole Roman Empire? h 1.51 This then being

so manifestly plain, That Love's a most powerful Mo∣tive to Obedience, but Fear a most weak and dange∣rous one; it follows in the next place that we should discourse of those Means, whereby such a Love, joyn'd with Honour and Confidence, may most easi∣ly be gotten. i 1.52 Now this is what all Men don't equally stand in need of; but each should consider his own way of living, and accordingly judge what's convenientest for him; whether to be belov'd by the generality of Men, or only by some few and select Persons. This however we may lay down for cer∣tain, as a first and most necessary Rule in this case, to procure at least some faithful and sincere Friends, who may have a true Kindness and Esteem for us. k 1.53 As far as this reaches, there's very little difference between even the greatest and meanest of People, and all sorts of 'em are almost equally con∣cern'd to endeavour after it. As for Honour, Glo∣ry, and the general Good-will of all the Citizens, these indeed are things, which aren't alike useful and necessary for all. However for those that have

been able to get 'em, they are very good Helps, as for most other Purposes, so for the obtaining of faithful Friends: But of Friendship I have treated in another Work, which is entitled Laelius.

CHAP. IX.

What the Ingredients of true Glory are. By what Means the Love of the People may be obtain'd. How Men may be brought to place a Confidence in us. Ju∣stice more powerful than Cunning to this End.

LEt us now proceed to discourse of Glory; tho' that too is a Subject, upon which I have a 1.54 two Books already extant; however I shall touch upon it here in short, because 'tis a thing of such Weight and Moment toward the successful Management of the most important Affairs. True and perfect Glory then is always made up of these three In∣gredients: First, The Love and Good-will of the Multitude. Secondly, Their Trusting and Reliance upon a Man. And, Lastly, Their Valuing and Admiring him so, as to think him a Person that really deserves Honour. The Means of getting these three from the Multitude, (to give one short and easie Rule) are very much the same as from particular Persons. However there's another pecu∣liar Way of approaching the People, and gaining Admittance into the Hearts and Affections of all Men in general. b 1.55 Of those three then, which I

just now mention'd, let us first see the Ways of obtaining Love. Now the Love of the People is mov'd by nothing so much, as by Bounty and do∣ing Kindnesses: Next they are pleas'd with an hearty Desire and Inclination toward it, tho' a Man have not wherewithal to exercise it. Thirdly, The very Name and Reputation of having Beneficence and Liberality, Justice and Fidelity, with the rest of those Virtues, which give a kind of Smoothness and Agreeableness to our Conversation, is of very great Efficacy in getting us the Favour and Love of the Multitude: and the reason of it is, because Ho∣nesty and Decorum delight us of themselves, and by their own native Beauties and Excellencies move, and engage the Hearts of all Men: which seeing they appear with more Lustre in the Vir∣tues, which I just now mention'd; it follows that by Nature we must Love those People, in whom we suppose such Virtues to reside. And these are the principal Causes of Men's Loving us: there might, I confess, be some others given, but not of e∣qual Weight and Importance with these. c 1.56 We are to speak in the next place of their Trusting or Confi∣ding in us; for the compassing of which, 'tis necessa∣ry we should be suppos'd to have two Qualifications, viz. Prudence and Justice. d 1.57 For we trust those Men, whom we believe, to understand Matters better than we do; to be wise enough to see things before they are arriv'd, and in the Management of 'em, if any Danger should happen, to be ready at finding out Ways and Expedients, to disentangle 'emselves from the Perplexities of it: in which

Men imagin that all true and profitable Wisdom consists. e 1.58 But when a Man is found really Just and Faithful, that is Good, we place so much Trust and Confidence in such a one, as not to entertain any the least suspicion of Deceit or Injury. To such a Man therefore we think we may wisely, and with a secure Confidence, entrust our Safeties, our Children and our Fortunes. Justice therefore, of these two Virtues, has much the more strong and effectual Tendency, to procure this Credit and Con∣fidence from the People. For that, even without Wisdom, can go a great way toward the obtaining of this End; whereas Wisdom, without that, is unable to do any thing: For the more Shrew'd and Cunning any Person is, the more he's Suspect∣ed and Hated by the World, if he ben't counted Honest and Upright withal. Justice therefore, in conjunction with Wisdom, can make a Man be trusted as far as he pleases: Justice without the o∣ther can do a great deal; but the other without that is of no Force at all.

CHAP. X.

Why he talks of Wisdom and Justice as separate from one another, tho' really there's a mutual Connexion between 'em. What will make Men admire any one. The difference between Despising and having an Ill Opinion of a Man.

a 1.59 SOme Men perhaps will be ready to admire, since 'tis so generally agreed on by Philoso∣phers, and has been so often asserted by me my self, That whoever has one must have all the Virtues; why I should speak of 'em separately now, as tho' it were possible for a Man to have Prudence, with∣out having Justice at the same time. I answer, That the Way of Expression is highly different, ac∣cording to the difference of the Subjects we are treating of; whether they are such as require a Niceness and Subtilty in handling, or be suited to the Capacities of ordinary People. I do but speak here with the Vulgar therefore, when I call one Man Couragious, another Just, and a third Prudent; for in treating upon a Subject which concerns the Peo∣ple, we must make use of common and ordinary Expressions; which is what has been done by Pa∣naetius himself—. But to return to our Purpose: b 1.60 Of the three Ingredients, which we said were re∣quir'd

to the making up of Glory; the third was this, That Men should Admire and Value us so, as to think we are Persons that really deserve Honour. c 1.61 Now generally speaking they are apt to Admire what∣ever they see Great, and beyond their Apprehensi∣ons; and likewise in particulars, if they discover a∣ny Excellency, which they never expected. They Admire those therefore, and extol 'em ev'n to the Skies, in whom (as they think) they have found a∣ny rare and extraodinary Qualities: But as for those others, who have neither Virtue, Spirit, nor Courage in them, these Men they wholly despise and set light by. For they can't be said to despise all those, of whom they entertain but an Ill Opinion. They're far from thinking well of your roguish backbi∣ting, cozening sort of Fellows, who are never unpre∣par'd for the doing Man an Injury: but by no means d 1.62 despise 'em for all that; their Contempt (as was said) lighting only upon those, who neither do Good to themselves, nor others (as we commonly speak;) that is, who spend all their Lives in meer Idleness and Sloth, without ever minding or taking care of any thing. e 1.63 Those, who are esteem'd to excel in Vir∣tue, more especially draw Men to Wonder and Ad∣miration; who keep themselves free, as from all other things that are Base and Unbecoming, so more especially from those sorts of Vices, which the rest of Mankind can't so easily stand against. Pleasures, for instance, are very alluring. and charming Mi∣stresses, which are apt to ensnare the better part of

the Soul, and entice it aside from the Paths of Virtue; and Pain on the contrary racks and tor∣ments us, so that the dread of it carries most Men beyond the Bounds of Reason. Thus again, when Life and Death, Riches and Poverty, are the things in question, there are very few Men but are wholly transported with desire of the one, and abhorrence of the other. When a Man therefore has got such a great and exalted Soul, as that he can look up∣on all these with Indifference; and closely pursues and adheres to Honesty, in whatever Shape she pre∣sents her self; then 'tis that Virtue appears with such a Brightness, as that all the whole World must admire her Beauties.

CHAP. XI.

Justice, and a Contempt of Riches, are especially Cau∣ses of Mens Admiration. Justice alone procures all the three things, which make up Glory; and how. 'Tis a necessary Virtue for all sorts of People. Even Robbers and Pyrates can't subsist without it. Some Examples to this Purpose.

SUch a Constitution of Soul therefore, as can make a Man despise all a 1.64 these Goods or Evils, begets him a mighty Esteem and Admiration: But especially Justice (which single Virtue serves to give Men the Name and Denomination of Good) seems much the most admirable to the generality of People. And not without Reason; it being b 1.65 im∣possible

for any one to be Just, who is afraid at the approaches of Death, of Pain, of Banishment or Poverty; or prefers c 1.66 those things, which are contrary to these, before the great Duties of Ju∣stice and Honesty. And more particularly yet, Men admire those, whom they find unconcern'd as to the matter of Money; and count them try'd, as it were like Gold in the Fire, who have been able to withstand the Temptations of it. Justice there∣fore of it self is sufficient to procure those three things that are requisite to Glory: In the first place, The Love and Good-will of the People; because of the d 1.67 Kindnesses it shews to very many. Second∣ly, Their Confidence. And Thirdly, Their Admi∣ration, both for the same Reason, viz. Because it neglects and despises those things, which the rest of Men pursue with such Eagerness and Passion. e 1.68 Now, in my Opinion, not only the being in a publick Station, but every Method of Living what∣ever, requires the Helps and Assistances of Men; as for other Designs, so particularly for this, that we may have some familiar Friends to converse with; which 'tis no easie matter for a Man to ob∣tain, without at least the Shew and Reputation of Honesty. From hence it follows, That 'tis necessa∣ry even for those Men themselves, who have with∣drawn

from the World, and chosen the Quiet and Retirements of the Country, to be reputed at least Men of Honesty and Integrity: and that so much the more, because otherwise they'll certainly be counted Dishonest; and then, having nothing of Guard or Defence, they must needs be expos'd to perpetual Injuries. The same Justice also is neces∣sary for those (if ever they hope to succeed in their Business) who Buy, Sell, Lett, Hire, and are con∣cern'd in the Commerce and Affairs of the World: Nay 'tis a thing of such powerful Moment and u∣niversal Influence, as that those who live only up∣on Villanies and Wickedness, can never subsist with∣out something of Justice: For should any Thief steal from another that belong'd to the same Confedera∣cy, he'd immediately be expell'd, as unfit to be a Member even of a Society of Robbers; and should the Leader himself not distribute their Booty, ac∣cording to the Measures of Justice and Honesty, he'd either be murther'd or deserted by his Com∣pany: Nay 'tis said that your Robbers have some certain Statutes, which they are all of 'em bound to observe amongst themselves. f 1.69 Theopompus tells us of a certain Rogue, one g 1.70 Bardylis and Illyrian, that got a great Power by the fame of his Justice in divi∣ding the Prey: and h 1.71 Viriatus the Lusitanian, got a much greater, to whom even some of our Armies

and i 1.72 Generals were forc'd to yield; till at last he was conquer'd by that k 1.73 Caius Laelius, who was sir∣nam'd the Wise, in the time of his Praetorship; who brought down his Courage and Fierceness so low, as to render the War easie for those that came after him. If Justice then be of so great Efficacy, as that it can raise and support even Pirates; of what mighty Force must we suppose it to be, in the midst of Laws, and in a well-constituted Republick?

CHAP. XII.

What made Men at first choose Kings, and make Laws. The justest Men usually made Kings; and why. How to make use of the Glory he hath been discour∣sing of. An excellent Rule of Socrates's. Glory must be founded upon solid Virtue. Whatever is Counterfeit will sometime be discover'd.

a 1.74 'TWas for the sake of enjoying the Benefits of this Justice (the great Use of which we have now been discoursing of) that the Medes heretofore, as we are told by b 1.75 Herodotus, and I am apt to imagin our own Ancestors too, chose always the honestest

Persons for their Kings. For the poorer sort of People, being oppress'd by the richer, had recourse to some one of remakable Virtue, to save and protect 'em from Violence and Injuries: who constituting Measures of Equity and Justice, bound the great∣est to observe 'em as well as the meanest. And that which was the reason for their choosing Kings, in like manner put them upon enacting Laws: For Men have always desired to enjoy such a Right, as all sorts of 'em might have an equal Share in (for otherwise indeed 'twould be no Right at all) which when they could get by the Justice and Honesty of some one Person, they were contented with him, and never look'd any further; but when they could not, they were put upon a necessity of inventing Laws, which could never be partial, but use the same Language to all Ranks and Conditi∣ons. 'Tis very plain therefore, that those Men were usually chosen to be Kings, who were count∣ed by the People Men of Honesty and Integrity: but if they were held Prudent and Wise withal, the People thought there was nothing they might not obtain by their Conduct and Management. By all means therefore let us constantly follow, and stick close to Justice; as for its own sake, (for o∣therwise indeed 'twill not be properly Justice) so for the increase of our Honour and Reputation. c 1.76 Now as 'tis not sufficient for a Man to get Rich∣es, unless he has the Wisdom to dispose of 'em so,

as thereby to furnish out all his Expences; not on∣ly those of his bare Necessities, but those of his Bounty and Liberality too: So neither is it enough for a Man to get d 1.77 Glory, unless he knows how to make Use of it with discretion: Tho' what Socrates says is very excellent to this purpose, That the rea∣diest Way, and, as it were, shortest Cut, to arrive at e 1.78 Glory, is really to be, what one desires to be account∣ed. Those People therefore are highly mistaken, who think of obtaining a solid Reputation, by vain Shews and hypocritical Pretences; by compos'd Countenances and studied Forms of Words: for true Glory takes deep rooting, and grows and flou∣rishes more and more; but that which is only in Shew and meer Outside, quickly decays and withers like Flowers; nor can any thing be lasting that is only Counterfeit. I might bring a great many preg∣nant Examples for the proof of these Assertions; but, for brevity sake, I shall content my self with those of but one single Family. f 1.79 Tiberius Gracchus, the Son of Publius, will always be Prais'd and had in Admiration, as long as there shall any Memori∣als

remain of the Roman Atchievements: But his g 1.80 Sons, on the contrary, were not in their Lives-time approv'd of by good Men; and since their Decease have been number'd among those, who were justly Slain.

CHAP. XIII.

What young Men should do to make 'emselves Known, and taken Notice of in the World. Courage in War the first thing that sets off young Men. Ano∣ther, Temperance, Sobriety, &c. Keeping often Com∣pany with Wise and Good Men another thing that very much Recommends them.

'TIs the Business therefore of those, who desire to get true Glory, strictly to discharge all the Duties of Justice: what those are we have shewn already in the former Book. I shall now proceed to lay down some Directions, a 1.81 How a Man should do to appear before the World what he is in him∣self; tho' that of Socrates is certainly the wisest that can possibly be given, To make sure in the first place,

that he really be in himself, that which he desires to appear before the World. For when a young Gen∣tleman is just come into the Publick, and is already known and remarkable in it; either by the Fame of his Father's Actions (which I think, Son Marcus, may be your Case;) or by any other Means or Ac∣cident whatever; the Eyes of all are immediately upon him, and every one's enquiring after what he does, and how he steers his Life; and, as tho' he were set in the publick View, so none of his Acti∣ons, or so much as his Words can be long kept in secret. But those, who at the beginning and en∣trance of their Lives, by reason of their Meanness, are unknown to the World; as soon as ever they come up to years of Discretion, should set before their Eyes the most honourable Places, and bend all their Studies and honest Endeavours toward the obtaining of 'em: which they ought to do with so much the more boldness, because Men are so far from envying Youth, that they rather encourage and forward 'em in their Progress. The b 1.82 first thing then, that sets a young Man off, and recommends him to the Publick, is Courage and Bravery in Mar∣tial Affairs; by which a great many amongst our Forefathers, who were scarce ever wholly disen∣gag'd from Wars, very nobly distinguish'd and sig∣naliz'd themselves. But you, my Son, have had the misfortune to light upon the times of a Civil War, wherein the c 1.83 one Party was wicked and de∣testable, and the d 1.84 other unfortunate and unsuccess∣ful:

In which however, when Pompey had giv'n you the Command of e 1.85 one Wing, you got much Praise from that great Commander and all his Ar∣my, by your riding, darting and patiently abiding all the Fatigues of War. But as for this piece of your rising Glory, that, and the whole Constitution of the Republick, are both of 'em fall'n to the ground together. But I never design'd so to model this Discourse, as that it should be proper for none but you; but as that it might be applicable to all Men in general: I shall go on therefore to the re∣maining part of it. As then in all things the Fun∣ctions of the Soul are more noble and excellent than those of the Body; so the Effects of our Reason and Understanding are greater, and more powerful as to this Particular, than those of meer Strength. f 1.86 Now of these there is none that can more recom∣mend and adorn a young Man, than Temperance and Sobriety, Duty and Respect to his natural Pa∣rents, Love and Good-nature towards his Friends and Relations. g 1.87 Another good Way for young People to get Known, and have a good Reputati∣on, is often to attend on some Great and Wise Men, who are thought to design for the Good of the Publick: For when they're observ'd to be fre∣quently with such, the People are presently apt to imagin, that they'll be like those Men, whom they choose for their Patterns Thus h 1.88 Pub. Rutilius, when

he was young, had the general Vogue of a very honest Man, and an able Lawyer, because he fre∣quented the House of i 1.89 Mutius. As for k 1.90 Crassus, whilst he was very young, he was not beholden to any one else, but obtain'd of himself everlasting Ho∣nour, by undertaking that l 1.91 noble and glorious Ac∣cusation: when at that term of Years, wherein o∣thers are commended if they begin but to Study and Exercise the Art; (as we have it recorded of the famous Demosthenes) at that Age, I say, did Cras∣sus make it appear, that he could perform that laudably in the open Courts of Justice, which he might without disparagement have been Studying at home.

CHAP. XIV.

Discourse of two sorts. Affability very powerful to ob∣tain Mens Love, &c. But Eloquence much more. Several Occasions of shewing a Man's Eloquence. To Defend more Laudable than to Accuse; but the latter in some cases Honourable enough. Several Ex∣amples of brave Accusations. 'Tis lawful in some cases to Defend the really Guilty; but never to Ac∣cuse the Innocent. The Judges and Advocates Du∣ties. Defending the Accus'd, especially honourable, when 'tis against some powerful Oppressor.

BUt a 1.92 of Speaking or Discourse there are two sorts; the one proper only for common Conversation, the other for Pleadings and Debates in the Publick. Of these two the latter, which is what we call Elo∣quence, is apparently most powerful towards the procurement of Glory; b 1.93 but yet 'tis unexpressible of what Influence Courtesie and Affability are, in the business of obtaining Mens Love and Affections. There are extant Letters of c 1.94 Philip to Alexander, d 1.95 Antipater to Cassander, and e 1.96 Antigonus to Philip;

in which these most Wise and Prudent Princes (for such we are told they really were) advise each his Son to speak kindly to the Multitude, and try to win the Hearts of both them, and the Soldiers, by gentle Words and familiar Appellations. f 1.97 But that other Discourse, which is proper for Pleadings and Harangues in Publick, does oftentimes more and transport the whole Multitude: For when a Man speaks to 'em plausibly and fluently, they are present∣ly rapt in a strange Admiration▪ and can't but con∣clude, as soon as ever they hear him, that he's wi∣ser and more knowing than the rest of Men are. But if there be Modesty joyn'd with the Power and Weight of his Eloquence, there's nothing in the World can more raise their Admiration; and espe∣cially too, if he be a young Man that speaks. Now the Subjects and Occasions, that stand in need of Eloquence, are more than one; and several young Gentlemen, in our own Republick, have made 'emselves eminent in several of 'em: some, for Example, by speaking in the Senate-house, and others by pleading in the Courts of Justice. Of these Ways the latter is most fruitful of Admiration, the Duties of which are only two, Defending and Accusing. 'Tis much more commendable to Defend than to Accuse; however this latter has oftentimes brought Men a considerable Reputation. We men∣tion'd the Example of Crassus but just now, g 1.98 Mar∣cus Antonius, when he was a young Man, did the

same; and nothing got h 1.99 Sulpitius so much Credit for his Eloquence, as his brave Accusation of Caius Norbanus, a very seditious and troublesome Citizen. This nevertheless must be done but seldom, or in∣deed never, unless it be undertaken on the behalf of the Republick, as 'twas by those three whom I just now mention'd: Or secondly, upon the account of some Injury receiv'd, as by the two i 1.100 Luculluses; or else for the sake of those under our Protection, as was formerly done by k 1.101 my self for the Sicilians; and by l 1.102 Julius for the Sardians against Marcus Al∣butius: in like manner m 1.103 Fusius made his Industry be taken notice of, by his accusing of Aquilius. Once then or so, 'tis allowable enough; but by no means often. However, should the Commonwealth call a Man to it, he may do it oftner upon her ac∣count; it being no Disgrace to be often employ'd in taking Vengeance on her Enemies. Yet, even in this Case, 'tis still the best way to be Moderate and Cautious: For he shews himself a Man of a very unnatural and merciless Temper (or rather indeed not a Man at all, but a Savage Monster) who can endure to make it his Business and Employment, to

bring many People into danger of their Lives: Be∣side that 'tis dangerous to the Person himself too; and not only so, but ev'n scandalous and shameful, to get himself the odious Name of An Accuser: which of late was the Fortune n 1.104 of Marcus Brutus, a Per∣son that was sprung of a noble Family, and Son of that Brutus, who was so particularly fam'd for his Skill in the Civil Laws. 'Tis another Rule of Du∣ty more especially to be taken notice of, and which can't be broken without manifest Villany, Never to bring an innocent Person into Danger. For since kind Nature has given us Eloquence, to serve for the Good and Preservation of all Men; what can be more, either Wicked, or Inhuman, than to turn it to the Ruin and Destruction of the o 1.105 best of 'em? 'Tis our Duty then, never to accuse the Innocent: but we need not, on the other hand, make any Con∣science, of speaking sometimes in behalf of the Guil∣ty, provided he ben't wholly Villanous and Abomi∣nable. For this is no more, than what the People desires, than what Custom authorizes, and the com∣mon Bowels of Humanity encline us to. 'Tis the Duty of a Judge, to endeavour after nothing but the real Truth; but an Advocate sometimes may speak up for that, which carries no more than an outward Appearance of it: Which, I think, I should hardly have ventur'd to say, (especially in Writing a Philosophical Discourse) but that I perceive 'twas

the Opinion of Panetius, a Person of as great and considerable Authority, as any among the Stoicks. But Defending is that, which brings the largest Re∣turns both of Glory and Interest; especially if one happen to be Assistant to those, who seem Injur'd and Oppress'd by the Power of some Great One. This was my Fortune, as a great many times, so more especially in my younger Days; when I stood in Defence of Roscius Amerinus, against all the Greatness and Authority of Sylla: and you know the Oration, which I then spoke, is p 1.106 at this time extant.

CHAP. XV.

Two sorts of Liberality. Better to help Men by our Labour and Industry, than by our Money. Phillip's Reproof to his Son Alexander to this purpose. The Inconveniencies of the second sort of Liberality. Measures to be observed in it.

a 1.107 HAving given this Account of the particular Duties, which young Men must do for the attainment of Glory; we are next to discourse of Beneficence or Liberality. Of this there are two sorts; the one of which consists in obliging those,

who need it by our Labour and Industry; the other, by our Money. The latter of these two is much the more easie, especially for those who have plentiful Fortunes; but the former, on the other hand, more glorious and magnificent, and more suitable to the Character of a brave and exalted Soul. For tho' there's a Good-will, and generous Readiness to oblige shewn in either; yet in the one Case we are behol∣den to the Chest, in the other to the Virtues and A∣bilities of the Person. Besides, those sort of Kind∣nesses, which are done by the Assistance of Money or the like, within a short space of time, draw their own Fountain dry; so that this Liberality doth, as 'twere, eat out its own Bowels, and the more you have formerly oblig'd in this kind, the fewer you'll be able to oblige for the future. But now, on the other hand, he whose Generosity shews it self in La∣bour, that is, in Virtue and being Active for ano∣ther's good, the more Men he hath formerly shewn himself kind to, the more he'll have ready to assist him ever after: beside that by the Custom of doing good Offices, he gets a kind of Habit, and grows much more expert in the Art of Obliging. Philip the Father of Alexander the Great, reproves his Son sharply in one of his Epistles, for endeavouring to purchase the Good-will of the Macedonians, by gi∣ving 'em Donations; In the name of Wonder, says he, what reason could you have, to hope that those People would ever be faithful to you, whom you your self had Corrupted with Money?

What! do you design to be thought not the King, but only the Steward and Purse-bearer of the Macedonians?

That Steward and Purse-bearer is admirably well said; because 'tis so scandalous a Business for a Prince; and that calling Donations a Corrupting the People, is better yet; for those that receive 'em are perpetually the worse for it, and only made readier to expect the same again. Philip writ this to his Son alone, but it may serve for a Direction to all Men in general I think we may take it for granted there∣fore, that that sort of Bounty, which consists in do∣ing Kindnesses by our Labour and Industry, is more Virtuous and Creditable, can oblige more People, and has more ways of doing it, than that other has. Not but that sometimes a Man should give, nor is this sort of Bounty to be wholly rejected; nay, one ought oftentimes to distribute some part of one's Money to those, who are well-deserving Persons, and stand in need of such Assistance: But still it must be done with b 1.108 great Prudence and Moderation. For some Men have squandered away whole Estates by inconsiderately Giving; which is certainly the foo∣lishest thing in the World; for so a Man disables himself ever after, from doing of that, c 1.109 which he takes most delight in. But the worst thing is this, that Profuseness in Giving is usually accompany'd by unjust Ways of Getting: For when by this means Men have parted with what's their own, they are forc'd to lay hands upon that which is another's. And by this means they miss what is their principal Design, viz. The obtaining Men's Love, by their Bounty and Generosity; for they get more Hatred from those whom they Injure, than Good-will from those whom they hop'd to Oblige by it. We ought not therefore so to Lock up our Riches, as that e∣ven

Liberality it self can't open 'em; nor so to keep 'em open, as if they were common to all Men in general: The best way is, always to observe a due Medium, and give more or less in proportion to our Estates. In fine, we'd do well to remember a Saying, which is now grown so common as to be a Proverb amongst us, Bounty has got no Bottom: For how indeed is it possible, there should ever be any end on't, when those, who are us'd to it, look to receive again; and others, from seeing them, are taught to expect the same?

CHAP. XVI.

Two sorts of Givers. How Liberality and Prodigality differ. What the chief Advantage of Riches. Pub∣lick Shews to the People very foolish. Several Ex∣amples of magnificent Aediles among the Romans.

a 1.110 OF those who give largely, there are two sorts, the one of which are Prodigal, and the other Liberal. The Prodigal are those who consume vast Sums in making publick Feasts, and distributing Portions of Meat to the People: or in providing Gladiators to Fight with one another; or with wild Beasts in the Theatres; or in making Preparation for other such Sports, and Recreations of the Mul∣titude: things that are forgotten in a very short time,

if ever at all thought on, after once they are over. But the Liberal are those, who dispose of their Mo∣ney in Redeeming poor Prisoners; in helping their Friends and Acquaintance out of Debt; in assisting 'em toward the Marrying their Daughters; or put∣ting 'em into some Method of Making, or Encrea∣sing their Fortunes. I admire therefore, what should come into b 1.111 Theophrastus's Head, who in a Book of his, which he wrote concerning Riches, amongst se∣veral noble and excellent things, has been guilty of one very greivous Absurdity: for he runs out migh∣tily in Commendation of Magnificence, and giving publick Shews or Donations to the People; and thinks the Supplying of such Expences as these, the very principal Fruit and Advantage of Riches: But in my Opinion 'tis both a much greater, and more durable Advantage, to be furnish'd with Mo∣ney for these Acts of Bounty, of which I have just now been giving some Instances. But c 1.112 Aristotle, with much more Reason and Judgment, reproves us for not being amaz'd at those Sums, which are daily thrown away to Caress the People:

Should any one (says he) when a City's besieg'd and re∣duc'd to great Streights, give a large Sum of Mo∣ney for a little Cup of Water; People would won∣der and admire at it strangely, and hardly be per∣suaded to believe it at first: but afterwards possibly, upon farther Consideration, would be ready to par∣don it, because 'twas a Case of meer Exigence and

Necessity: But yet we can see, without any thing of Admiration, those vast Charges and infinite Ex∣pences, which Men put themselves to for no Rea∣son in the World; neither for the Relief of any Want or Necessity, nor yet for the Encrease of their Glory and Dignity: And that Pleasure of the Mul∣titude which is principally aim'd at, is of short Continuance; and only tickles and sooths up the Meanest of the People, who themselves will for∣get the Satisfaction they receiv'd, as soon as ever the Shew and Recreation's at an end.

He adds moreover with a great deal of Reason,

That Children indeed and some trifling Women, toge∣ther with Slaves, and the more servile Part of those who are free, might perhaps take a Pleasure in such foolish kind of Pastimes: but that Men of true Prudence, and those who judge of things by the Rules of Reason, can by no means either commend or approve of 'em.

I know 'tis a Cu∣stom in our Republick, and has been from the time of our good Fore-fathers, to expect and demand, even from the soberest Citizens, something that is splendid and magnificent in their d 1.113 Aedileships. Hence e 1.114 Publius Crassus, who was sirnam'd The Weal∣thy, and really was such, in his Office of Aedile was very magnificent and noble in his Entertain∣ments: and f 1.115 Lucius Crassus, a little while after,

was full-out as generous, tho' Collegue of g 1.116 Mucius the most moderate Man living. Next after these came h 1.117 Caius Claudius, the Son of Appius; and a great many others, viz. the i 1.118 Luculli, k 1.119 Hortensius and l 1.120 Silanus. But m 1.121 Publius Lentulus, when I was Cos. exceeded all others that ever went before him: who was afterwards follow'd and copy'd by n 1.122 Scaurus. But of all these Shews, that have been given to please and entertain the People, those of my Friend Pompey were the greatest and most magnificent, o 1.123 exhibited when he was the second time Consul. p 1.124 In all which Cases 'tis easie to see what is my Opinion.

CHAP. XVII.

Expences to please the People allowable in some Cases; and what they are. Some Examples of laudable ones. Upon what one may best lay out his Money in this kind.

NO Man however should be so far moderate, as to draw upon himself the Suspicion of Ava∣rice. a 1.125 Mamercus, a Person of very great Riches, was put by the Consulship for no other Reason, but because he refus'd to be Aedile first. b 1.126 If such things therefore are demanded by the People, and allow'd of, tho' perhaps not desir'd, by good Men, they must ev'n be perform'd; but so as to keep within the compass of your Estate, as I my self did. Nay, tho' they should not be demanded by the People, yet they might wisely enough be presented 'em, upon a Prospect of gaining some more con∣siderable Advantage by it. Thus c 1.127 Orestes of late got a great deal of Credit, by Giving the People a Dinner in the Streets, under the Notion of d 1.128 Pay∣ing his Tenths to Hercules. Nor did any one ever find fault with M. Seius, for selling out Corn

at an easie Rate, in the time of a very great Dearth and Scarcity: for he got himself free from a great and inveterate Hatred of the People, by a Cost, which (considering he was at that time Aedile) was neither dishonest, nor yet extraordinary great: But of all my Friend Milo got the greatest Honour, by purchasing Gladiators for the Defence of the Publick, which was wholly included in my single Safety, and thereby de∣feating the mad and pernicious Attempts of e 1.129 Clodius. Such Charges therefore are not to be shun'd, when ei∣ther they are necessary or very advantagious: but even when they are so, we must still not exceed the due Limits of Mediocrity. Luc. Philippus, the Son of Quin∣tus, an extraordinary ingenious and eminent Man, was wont, I confess, to be making his Brags, That he got all the Honours the Republick could give him, with∣out ever spending one Farthing that way: f 1.130 Caius Curio us'd to say the same: and even I my self have some reason to boast upon this account: for considering the Greatness of the Honours I got, and that too by e∣very one of the Votes, and the very first Years I was

capable of 'em, (which is more then can be said by any one of those two whom I just now mention'd) the Charge of my Aedileship was very inconsiderable. But the best way of laying out Money in this kind, is to repair the City-walls, make Docks, Havens, Aquaeducts and the like; things that may serve to the general Use, and Advantage of the Publick. For tho' things which are present, and given down upon the nail, are more acceptable for a Time; yet the Memory of these will be more lasting, and con∣tinu'd even down to Posterity. I forbear to speak much against Theatres, Portico's, new Temples and the like, out of Respect to my old Friend Pompey: but I find 'em not approv'd of by the famousest Men; particularly not by Panaetius himself, whom I have very much follow'd, but not quite translated in this Work. Neither are they lik'd by Demetrius Phalereus, who blames Pericles, one of the greatest Men amongst all the Grecians, for squandring away such g 1.131 a vast Sum of Money, upon that noble Stru∣cture at the entrance of the Acropolis. But I have spo∣ken sufficiently upon all this Subject, in those Books I have written h 1.132 concerning the Republick. To con∣clude therefore, all such Profusions are generally speaking (I think) to be blam'd; but yet at some∣times, and upon certain Occasions, may be rendred necessary: However even then they must be propor∣tion'd to one's Estate, and kept within the Limits of Reason and Moderation.

CHAP. XVIII.

Liberality to be varied according to the Variety of Circumstances. The Merits of the Receiver especi∣ally to be consider'd. What Acts of Bounty we should more particularly exercise. Measures to be observ'd in Receiving Money. 'Tis profitable sometimes to part with one's Right. When a Man uses an E∣state as he ought. Hospitality deservedly com∣mended.

IN that a 1.133 other sort of Giving, which proceeds from Liberality, we should not keep constantly to one certain Measure; but vary according to the Variety of Circumstances in the Persons that re∣ceive. His Case (for instance) who struggles at present under some pressing Necessity, is different from his, who is well enough to pass, and only de∣sires to improve his Fortune. We should lend our Assistance in the first place to those, who are under the Burden and Weight of some Misfortune; unless they are such as deserve to be miserable: We should be ready however to forward those likewise, who desire only our Helping-hand, not so much to save 'em from being Unfortunate, as to raise 'em to some higher Degrees of Fortune. b 1.134 But here we must

be careful to acquaint our selves thro'ly with the Fitness of the Persons: for that of Ennius is admira∣bly well said,

I take good Actions, when ill apply'd, to become ill ones.

Now that which is given to a truly honest and grateful Person, is paid us in the Acknowledg∣ment he himself makes, and in the Good-will that's got by't from the rest of the World. For nothing's more pleasing to all Mankind, than Bounty bestow'd without Rashness and Precipitancy: and the gene∣rality of Men praise it so much the more, because the Liberality of every great Man, is a common kind of Sanctuary for all that are Needy. We should endeavour therefore, as far as we are able, to oblige many Men by such Acts of Generosity, as may not be forgotten as soon as ever they are over; but be remember'd by the Children and Po∣sterity of the Receivers, in such manner as to lay a Necessity upon 'em of shewing their Gratitude: I say Necessity; for all People hate one, that takes no care of being grateful to his Benefactors, and count him that is such Injurious to themselves; because he discourages Bounty and Liberality, and so is a common Enemy to all the poorer Sort. Be∣sides, this way of Giving, whereby Captives are ransom'd, and the meaner Folk enrich'd, is useful and advantagious to the Publick it self; and has frequently been practic'd by those of our Order, as appears very fully from the Oration of Crassus. That other way therefore of expending Money, which consists in making Shews for the Entertain∣ment of the Vulgar, ought (I think) by no means to be compar'd with this: The one comports well with the Character of a great, and a prudent Person; the other of such as Cajole the People, and look out for

Pleasures to tickle the Fancies of the unstable Multitude. c 1.135 And as 'tis a Duty to be generous in Giving, so is it not to be too rigorous in Demand∣ing; but in every Transaction of Buying, Selling, Letting and Hiring, to behave our selves towards our Neighbours and Chapmen, with all the Fairness and Courtesie imaginable; to let go something of our strict and just Rights, upon certain Occasions; to avoid all Suits and Contentions at Law, as far as can reasonably and fairly be expected; perhaps I might add, And even something farther; for in seve∣ral Cases to deliver up one's Right, is not only generous, but d 1.136 advantagious too. However a Man should have a decent Regard to his Estate and For∣tune; for 'tis not over-reputable to let that be ruin'd by his Easiness and Neglect; and yet on the other hand should carry himself so, as to avoid all Su∣spition of a sordid, mean or avaritious Temper. For 'tis then a Man uses his Money as he ought to do, when he shews himself liberal, without ruin∣ing his Fortune. e 1.137 Theophrastus commends, and with very good Reason, another sort of Bounty, which we call Hospitality: For there's nothing, in my mind, more handsom and becoming, than con∣stantly to have the Houses of Noble Men open, and ready to entertain all Strangers of Fashion; and 'tis no small Credit and Reputation to the Publick,

that Strangers ne're fail to meet with that sort of Bounty, and Liberality in our City. Beside that there's nothing can be more useful for those, who design by honest Means to get an Interest in the World, than to recommend themselves to the E∣steem and Good-liking of foreign Nations, by the help of those People whom they thus entertain. Theophrastus tells us of f 1.138 Cimon the Athenian, that he shew'd his Hospitality even to all his Brethren of the g 1.139 Lacian Tribe; and not only made it his own constant Custom, but also commanded his Bayliffs the same, to keep open House for any one of the Laciadae, that should pass that way.

CHAP. XIX.

The Liberality which consists in doing good Offices for others: Two sorts of it. What sorts of Study afford most Opportunities of it. The Ruin of Civil Law and Eloquence. All Men may do Kindnesses of this Nature if they please. We should be careful of not Offending some, by Obliging others.

a 1.140 I Come now to speak of that other sort of Boun∣ty, which consists not in Giving, but in Labou∣ring for another's Good; and extends it self as to the Republick in general, so to each Member of the City in particular. b 1.141 The Civil Law principally gives us Opportunities of exercising this: For there's nothing more proper to get a Man Interest and Credit in the World, than the Managing the Law-suits of a great many Persons, the assisting 'em with his Advice, and doing for 'em all that he can by his Knowledge, and Skill in that Learning. And therefore I admire the Wisdom of our Ancestors, as for several Reasons, so particularly for this, that the Knowledge and Interpretation of their excellent Civil Law, was counted a matter of the highest Cre∣dit and Reputation among them. This the greatest Men have kept constantly among themselves, till this late sad Disorder and Confusion of every thing: But now the Glory of this sort of Learning, toge∣ther with all Honours and Degrees of Dignity, is utterly ruin'd and fall'n to just Nothing. And to

make the matter still so much the worse; all this has happen'd in the Days of c 1.142 One, who, as he equall'd in Dignity all that have gone before him, so was he far above 'em in the Knowledge of the Laws. This Study then is approv'd of by most People, and puts it in one's power to assist a great many and oblige them by Kindnesses. d 1.143 There's another sort of Knowledge near related to this, the Art, I mean, of Perswasive Speaking, which carries more Majesty and Ornament along with it, and is more pleasing and lik'd of, by the generality of Men. For what is there in the World more ex∣traordinary than Eloquence, whether we consider the Admiration of its Hearers, the Reliance of those who stand in need of its Assistance, or the Good-will procur'd by it from those whom it defends? Our Ancestors therefore held this among the chief of their Civil Professions. Any one then must oblige a great many, and have a large number of Clients and Dependants, who is able to speak well, and willing to take pains, and (as e 1.144 'twas the Custom of our good Fore-fathers) is ready to undertake many Mens Causes, without ever expecting to be reward∣ed for his Trouble. And here I have a fair Oppor∣tunity offer'd me, to bemoan the great Downfal, that I mayn't say the utter Extinction of Eloquence; but that I am afraid I shall seem to complain for my own sake only. However I can't but with some Concern take notice, what a great many excellent Orators we have lost; how few there are arising, whom we can expect any thing from; and how much fewer who are able to perform and do any thing;

and for all that, how many, who are brim full of Im∣pudence and vain Presumption. f 1.145 Now it is not for all, nor indeed very many, to be either skilful Law∣yers, or eloquent Pleaders: However there's no one, if he'd make it his Business, but may do friendly Offices to several People; either by begging some Kindnesses for 'em; or by recommending their Cases to the Judges and Officers; or by being Industrious in promoting their Interests; or lastly, by using his Endeavours with those, who either are able Law∣yers, or eloquent Orators: which whoever shall do, will make a great many be beholden to him, and get himself a general Interest in the World. g 1.146 There is one thing however I would advertise him of, (tho' I think 'tis so obvious, that I hardly need do it) which is to have a care of offending some, whilst he's endeavouring to be serviceable to others. For it often comes to pass, that such do a Diskindness, either to those whom they ought to have oblig'd; or to those who are able to make 'em suffer for it af∣terwards: Which shews Carelesness and Negligence, if done undesignedly; but if designedly, Rashness and Imprudence. And if it should happen that we are forc'd, tho' unwillingly, to disoblige any Person, we must endeavour to excuse it as well as we are able; by shewing the Necessity we lay under of do∣ing so, and how 'twas utterly impossible for us to avoid it: and must be careful and industrious to repair the Injury, by making some reasonable A∣mends for it afterwards.

CHAP. XX.

Men are readier to assist one that's Wealthy and Great than one that is Poor and Honest. Reasons why they ought to do the contrary. The Evil Effects of Mens Love of Riches. Never to do an Injury to one, for the sake of Obliging another.

NOw a 1.147 whenever we do a Kindness or Friendly Office to another, we usually regard one of these two Things, viz. Either the Honesty, or the Greatness of the Person. 'Tis easily said, and eve∣ry one's ready enough to profess, That in placing their Favours, they have much more Respect to the Merits of the Person, than to his Fortune in the World. This is very fairly and honestly spoken: but yet I'd be glad to be shewn that Man, who is more willing to Help one that's Honest and Poor, than to get the Favour of one that is Wealthy and Powerful. For who is not readiest to be service∣able to those, from whom he expects the most speedy Requital? But People would do well to con∣sider more throughly the Natures of things: For tho' a poor Man, 'tis true, can't make a Requital, yet if he's honest, he will acknowledge the Obliga∣tion: And 'twas no unhandsom Saying, whoever was the Author of it,

That in Case of a Debt, the Man who acknowledges it doth not thereby pay it; and the Man who pays it does no longer acknow∣ledge

it: But in Case of an Obligation, both he who returns it still continues to acknowledge it, and he who acknowledges it thereby sufficiently returns it.

But now those, on the contrary, who value themselves upon their Riches, Honours and flourish∣ing Condition, will scorn to acknowledge they're oblig'd for any Kindness; nay, will think they vouchsafe you a signal Favour, even whilst you are doing 'em some considerable Service; and will always be jealous and suspicious over you, as tho' you demanded and expected something from 'em: But to have it ever said they were defended by you, or to be number'd among your Dependants or Cli∣ents, is as insupportable to 'em as even Death it self. Whereas your mean Person, when any one does him a friendly Office, considers 'twas done out of Res∣pect to himself, and not out of Regard to his For∣tune or Condition; and endeavours to shew him∣self sensible of the Obligation, not to him only who has done him the Kindness, but (as standing in need of some other Mens Assistance) to those others also, from whom he hopes for the like. And if he should chance to do another any Service, he does not en∣deavour to cry up and magnifie it, but rather to lessen it as much as he is able. Another thing worth the considering is this, That if you defend one that's wealthy and powerful, the Obligation remains in the Person himself, or perhaps just his Children; but if you protect one that's needy and forsaken, provided withal he be virtuous and mo∣dest, all the lower sort of People immediately that aren't wicked (which is no inconsiderable part of the Multitude) will look upon you as their Safe-guard and Protection. Upon all which Accounts I am wholly of Opinion, That a Kindness is better be∣stow'd upon an honest, than 'tis upon a wealthy and fortunate Person. We should endeavour, 'tis true,

to the utmost of our power, to be serviceable to all Men of whatsoever Condition: But if their should happen a Competition between 'em, I am clearly for following Themistocles's Advice, who being once ask'd, How he'd Marry his Daughter, whether to one that was Poor, but Honest; or to one that was Rich, but of an ill Reputation? made Answer, I'd rather have a Man without an Estate, than have an Estate with∣out a Man. But the mighty Respect, which is paid to Riches, has wholly deprav'd and corrupted our Manners. And yet what does it signifie to any one of us, that such or such a Person has got a plenti∣ful Fortune? Perhaps it may be useful to him that has it; tho' not so neither always: But allowing it to be so: Suppose he has got the World more at his Command; yet how (I'd fain know) is he ever the honester for it? b 1.148 But and if a Man be Honest, as well as Wealthy, tho' I would not have him helpt for the sake of his Riches, yet I would not have him hindred upon their account neither: But in every case have it fairly consider'd, not how Wealthy and Great, but how Good and Deserving a Person he is. c 1.149 I shall conclude this Head with only one Rule more, which is, Never for the sake of doing any one a Kindness, to venture upon that which is unjust in it self, or injurious to a third Person. For no Cre∣dit or Esteem can be solid and durable, unless built upon the Foundations of Justice and Honesty; with∣out which nothing can be virtuous or commend∣able.

CHAP. XXI.

Two sorts of that Bounty, which relates to the Publick. Nothing to be done for the sake of the Members in particular, which may any ways damage the Publick in general. The first Duty of the Governours of a State, to secure each Particular in the Possession of his own. Levelling all Estates very destructive. Why Men first built Cities. Not to burden the Peo∣ple with Taxes, a second Duty. A third, To fur∣nish the People with Necessaries. Covetousness in a Governour pernicious to any State. The unhappy Effects of it in the Roman Empire.

a 1.150 HAving thus discours'd of the one sort of Kind∣nesses, which are done to particular Members of the City; we are now in the next place to speak of those others, which are done to them all, and to the Commonwealth in general. Now these again are of two sorts, The one more immediate∣ly relating to the Community; the other reaching down to each Member in particular; which latter, of the two is more grateful and acceptable. We should shew our Beneficence, as far as we are able, in both these Ways; but especially in this latter, which relates to each one of the particular Members:

In which however one Caution must be observ'd, That nothing be done in behalf of Particulars, but that which is useful, or at least not prejudicial, to the Commonwealth in general. b 1.151 C. Gracchus, for Instance, made a large Distribution of Corn to the People; and the Effect of it was, that the Treasury was exhausted by it. c 1.152 Marcus Octavius made one that was moderate, which was a Kindness to the Multitude, and no ways a Burthen or Grievance to the State; and accordingly both the Publick, and all the Members of the City receiv'd Benefit from it. d 1.153 But the principal thing for a Governour to take care of, is, That each Individual be kept in the quiet Possession of his own, and That private Men ben't e 1.154 dispossessed of their Lands, under a Pretence of taking Care of the Publick. For No∣thing's more destructive to the Peace of any King∣dom, than to bring in a new Distribution of Estates, which was attempted by f 1.155 Philip, in the Time of his Tribuneship: However he quickly gave over his Design, and did not persist stubbornly in Defence of it, as soon as he found it was so vigorously op∣pos'd: But in his publick Speeches and Haran∣gues to the People, among a great many things to obtain their Favour, he was heard to say one of very dangerous Consequence, That the whole City had not Two Thousand Men in it, that were Masters of Estates: A very pernicious

and desperate Saying, directly tending to bring all things to a Level; which is the greatest Misfortune that can befal any People. For to what end were Cities and Commonwealths establish'd, but that e∣very one might be safer and securer, in the Enjoy∣ment of his own? For tho' Men by Nature are sociable Creatures, yet 'twas the Desire of Preser∣ving what they had, that first put 'em upon build∣ing of Cities for a Refuge. g 1.156 'Tis a Second Duty of the Governours of a State, to see that the Peo∣ple ben't forc'd to pay Taxes; as they often were in our Fore-fathers time, partly because they were always in War, and partly by reason of the Low∣ness of the Treasury. This is an Inconvenience, which ought, as far as possible, to be provided a∣gainst before-hand: But if any State should be un∣der such Circumstances, as that it must be forc'd to make use of this Expedient, (I say any State, be∣cause I'm unwilling to suppose so unhappy a thing of our own; beside that I speak here of all of 'em in general) but if, I say, any State should be brought to such a Pinch, due Care must be taken to let the People know, That 'tis absolutely necessary as Affairs now stand, and that otherwise they must needs be inevita∣bly ruin'd. h 1.157 Again, 'Tis yet further requir'd of those Men, who Govern and Preside in a Commonwealth, to see that it be furnish'd with all the Conveniencies and Necessaries of Life. To tell what these are, and how to be provided, would be altogether needless in this place, since 'tis sufficiently known already; I only thought fit just to touch upon it by the Bye. i 1.158 But in all kinds of Business, and managing Affairs

of a publick Nature, there's nothing more necessa∣ry, than always to keep one's self clear and untaint∣ed, so as not to lye under the least suspicion of Ava∣rice. I could heartily wish, (said k 1.159 Caius Pontius the Samnite) that Fortune had reserv'd me to those Times, and that it had been my fate to be then born, whenever the Romans shall begin to take Bribes; I should quickly have put an end to their flourishing Empire. Truly he must have waited a pretty ma∣ny Ages; for that's a kind of Evil, which but late∣ly has begun to infest this Republick. If Pontius therefore were so great a Man as he pretended to be, I am very well satisfy'd with his being born when he was; and not in those times, which have lately happen'd. 'Tis not yet an Hundred and Ten Years ago, since l 1.160 Lucius Piso got a Law to be en∣acted against the Corruption of Magistrates, where∣as there had never been any one before. But since that time there have been so m 1.161 many Laws, and still ev'ry new one more severe than the for∣mer; so many Persons accus'd and condemn'd; such n 1.162 a War stirr'd up in the Bowels of Italy, by those who were afraid of being brought to Punish∣ment;

such shameful Extortion and Pillaging our Allies, by those who have defied all Laws and Courts of Justice; that we're rather beholden to the Weakness of others, than our own Strength or Virtues, that we are not utterly ruin'd.

CHAP. XXII.

Examples of Contempt of Money among the ancient Romans. The Danger, &c. of the opposite Vice. The Honour gotten by this Virtue. The Danger, Folly, &c. of the Project of Levelling Estates.

PAnaetius highly commends a 1.163 Africanus, for his be∣ing uncorrupt as to the matter of Money. 'Tis a Virtue that very well deserv'd his Commendation: but I think there were others in that great Person, which deserv'd it much more: to be untainted with Money being not so properly a Virtue of that Man, as of those Times in general. b 1.164 Paulus Aemilius had all the Wealth of Macedonia in his Power, which amounted to almost an infinite Value: so that he brought such a Sum into the Treasury, as that the single Booty of that one General superseded the Necessity of all Taxes for the future: and yet he brought nothing into his own House, but the eter∣nal

Memory of his Name and Atchievements. c 1.165 Africanus follow'd the Example of his Father, and return'd nothing richer from the Overthrow of Car∣thage. So Mummius, who was afterwards his Part∣ner in the Censorship; did he make himself ever a far∣thing the Wealthier, by razing d 1.166 one of the wealthi∣est Cities in the World? No; he rather chose to make Italy fine with the Spoils of his Enemies, than his own House; tho' in my Opinion the Fineness of Italy reflects a bright Lustre upon his own House too. There is no Vice then (that I may return to the Subject, from which I have digress'd) more detestable than Avarice; more especially in Great Men, and such as bear Sway in the Government of a State. For 'tis not only mean for a Man to make a Prey and Advantage of the Commonwealth, but even impious and abominable. That Oracle therefore of the Pythian Apollo's, That nothing but Avarice should be the Ruine of Sparta, doth not seem design'd for the Lacedaemonians only, but for every wealthy and flourishing Nation. e 1.167 And as Avarice is thus very destructive to a State; so to appear Up∣right and Regardless of Money, is the certainest Me∣thod those in Power can make use of, for procuring the Love and Good-liking of the People. But those, who, designing to curry their Favour, attempt new Laws about the Levelling Estates, so as to force

the right Owners from their lawful Possessions; or propose to make Creditors remit all the Debts, which in Justice are due to 'em; f 1.168 plainly undermine the two principal Pillars and Supports of the Go∣vernment: In the first place, Concord and Unity among the Citizens, which can never be kept up, whilst some are depriv'd of what is justly their Due, and others discharg'd from the necessity of Payment. Secondly, Justice, which immediately must sink in∣to Ruins and Nothing, if Men can't be secur'd in the Possession of what's their own: For that (as we before remark d) is the chief End and Aim of Men's gathering into Societies, and building of Ci∣ties, that each one might freely enjoy what's his Right, without any danger or fear of being de∣priv'd on't. g 1.169 Beside this, the Authors of these per∣nicious Designs never get that Good-will, which they propose, from their Citizens: For, as for those Men, who are Losers by the Bargain, 'tis certain that they'll be their Enemies for it; and those, who are Gainers, will besure to pretend that they never desir'd it: especially in the Business of having Debts forgiven; there ev'ry one dissembles how glad he is of it, for fear it should be thought that he was not able to pay 'em. But those Men, to whom such Designs are prejudicial, will hardly forget 'em, but shew a perpetual Grudge and Resentment. And tho' the number of those, who are thus wickedly Befriended, be greater than of those, who are in∣juriously

Rob'd; yet it doth not follow, that there∣fore they are more Powerful: for 'tis not the Num∣ber, but the Quality of the Persons, that must car∣ry it in this Case. h 1.170 Besides, what Reason or E∣quity is there, when Estates have been held for a great many Years, or perhaps Ages, that the right∣ful Owners should be thrust out from 'em, and o∣thers, that never had any, should come and possess them?

CHAP. XXIII.

Several Examples of the unhappy Effects of taking a∣way Mens Estates, in order to bring things to a Level. The wise Conduct of Aratus the Sicyoni∣an in doing the contrary. What a Magistrate's Duty in such Cases is.

FOr such kind of partial, injurious Proceedings, a 1.171 the Spartans once banish'd b 1.172 Lysander, one of their c 1.173 Ephori; and put to Death d 1.174 Agis their

King for the same Reason: an Action unheard of before in that City. This was succeeded by such grievous Contentions and Discords in the State, as that Tyranny and Oppression got the upper-hand a∣mongst 'em; the Nobles were banish'd from their Native Country; and the best constituted Repub∣lick upon the face of the Earth was utterly dissolv'd, and brought into Confusion. Nor did this Mischief end with the Spartans only, but, like a Contagion, spreading it self farther, involv'd all Greece in the same Miseries and Calamities. Pray what was it ruin'd our own two Gracchi, Sons of the famous Tiberius Gracchus, and Grandsons of e 1.175 Africanus, but only these Controversies about Levelling Estates? f 1.176 Ara∣tus the Sicyonian is deservedly commended as much on the other hand: He, when his County, for fif∣ty Years together, had been greatly oppress'd and over-run by Tyrants, went secretly one Night from Argos to Sicyon, and made himself Master of the City by Surpize; and unexpectedly falling upon Nicocles the then Tyrant, he put him to flight. This being done, he recall'd six Hundred of the wealthi∣est Citizens, who had all been formerly banish'd by the Tyrants, and by this his arrival delivered the City from Slavery and Oppression. But he after∣wards found 'twould be a great deal of trouble, to settle the Business of their Estates and Possessions; for he thought on the one hand 'twas very unrea∣sonable, that those Men, whom he had restor'd,

should Want, whilst others enjoy'd what in Equity was theirs: and yet it seem'd hard on t'other side, that Men should be thrust out of those Possessions, which now they had held for these fifty Years: if more especially 'twere withal consider'd, That it could not but happen in so long a time, that they must have gone, a great part of 'em, from one to another, either by Inheritance, Purchase, Dowry, or the like; and therefore were possest by the present Incumbents, without their having injur'd the rightful Proprietors. Upon these Considerations he judg'd it necessary, both to bear with the latter in the Enjoyment of what they had, and yet to Satisfie the former, whom it justly belong'd to. And finding a large Sum of Money was requisite, to settle this Business as it ought to be; he told 'em he had occasions to go to g 1.177 Alexandria, and order'd they should not con∣cern 'emselves about it, till his return. He goes accordingly with all possible speed to his old Friend h 1.178 Ptolomy, who at that time was reigning in Alex∣andria, being second King after the Founding of that City. Having told him his Design of settling Li∣berty in his Country, and the Reasons that put him upon undertaking of that Voyage, he quickly ob∣tain'd of that wealthy Prince, to supply him with a quantity of Money for his Assistance. With this he immediately returns to Sicyon, and choosing out fifteen o'th' principal Citizens, to help him with their Counsel upon this occasion; he heard both

the Causes of those who possess'd what had belong'd to others, and of those who had lost what had been formerly their own. At last he so manag'd the whole Business, as that, the Estates being set at their true Values, i 1.179 some were persuaded to part with what they had, and take an Equivalent in Money for it: and k 1.180 others to neglect the Recovery of their own, and rest themselves content with be∣ing pay'd its full Value. By this means the Con∣troversie was fairly determin'd, and all went Home satisfy'd without Grudging or Complaining. Here was a great and extraordinary Man now! Here was one, that deserv'd to have been born in our Republick! This is the true way of Dealing with Citizens; and not (as hath been practis'd amongst us l 1.181 twice) to make sale of their Goods in the pub∣lick Markets, and have them cry'd by the Voice of the Common Cryer. But this famous Grecian (as was the Duty of a wise and extraordinary Person) thought it became him to provide alike for all: And indeed every Magistrate, who proceeds upon Prin∣ciples of Reason and Prudence, will always take care not to make any Difference between the Interests of his People; but will govern them all by the same Rule and Standard of Justice and Equity. Here's one Man shall dwell in what belongs to another: What Reason is there, I beseech you, for this; that when I have bought, built, repair'd, and laid out a great deal of Money, another should come and injoy all the Fruits of it, in spite of my Teeth?

Is not this plainly to take away from one that which justly belongs to him, and give to another what he has nothing of Right to? As for the Pro∣ject of Forgiving Debts, I can see no Reason in the World for it, unless it be Reason, that another should buy Land with my Money, and that he should have the Land, but I never have my Mo∣ney.

CHAP. XXIV.

Care should be taken to prevent Peoples running too much into Debt. Faith the Cement of Publick So∣ciety. Cicero's Conduct in his Consulship about the matter of Debts. The Duties of a good Magistrate. How one's Health and Estate are to be taken care of.

a 1.182 CAre ought therefore to be taken before-hand (which 'tis easie to do by a great many ways) to keep People from running so much into Debt, as may bring any Damage or Inconvenience to the Publick: and not, when they are in, to make the Creditors lose what's their own, and let the Debtors gain what in Justice is another's: For no∣thing so cements, and holds together in Union all the parts of a Society, as Faith or Credit; which can never be kept up, unless Men are under some force and necessity of honestly Paying what they owe to one another. This Design of having Debt∣ors excus'd from Payment, b 1.183 was never attempted

with greater eagerness, than whilst I was Consul: Men of all Ranks and Degrees in the State, took up Arms and form'd Camps for the bringing it about; whose Endeavours I resisted with so much vigour, as that the Republick was quickly deliver'd from so per∣nicious an Evil. There never were known greater Debts in the City, nor ever more easily and faithful∣ly paid: and pray what was the Reason of all this? Why because when their Hopes of Defrauding were cut off, they found 'emselves under a Necessity of Payment. 'Tis true there is c 1.184 one, who has since been a Conquerer, (tho' then he was conquer'd by my Vigilance) that has d 1.185 found out Means to effect these Designs, at a time when they'd bring him e 1.186 no manner of Advantage; but such an Inclination had that Man to Villany, that the bare Doing of it was a Pleasure to him, without any other Invitation in the World. The Sum then of what has been said is this, That such as design for the good of the Re∣publick, must be sure to avoid this sort of Libera∣lity, which takes away from one what it gives to a∣nother; and must constantly make it their principal Care, to uphold each Member in his proper Rights, according to the Principles of Justice and Equity; so as neither to suffer the poorer sort of People to be wrong'd or oppress'd, by reason of their Pover∣ty; nor the richer to be hindred from keeping or demanding what's justly their own, by the Envy of the others: and in fine must apply their most

earnest Endeavours, whether in War or Peace, to encrease the Power, and enlarge the Bounds and Revenues of the Republick. These are the Duties and Exercises of great Men: These are the things which were practic'd by our Ancestors; and who∣ever goes on to perform the same, will not only bring great Advantage to the Republick, but gain a mighty Interest and Reputation to himself. f 1.187 In these Rules of Duty relating to things profitable, g 1.188 Antipater the Tyrian, a Stoick Philosopher, who lately dy'd at Athens, thinks that two things have been omitted by Panaetius: First, The care of get∣ting or preserving one's Health. And, Secondly, Of an Estate. I believe that great Philosopher might omit 'em on purpose, because they are so easie and obvious to every one: however 'tis certain they

are both of 'em profitable. h 1.189 Now Health is pre∣serv'd by considering the peculiar Temper of one's Body, and observing what agrees or does not agree with it; by Temperance and Moderation in Meats and Drinks, and other things relating to the wel∣fare of the Body; by forbearance and abstinence as to the matter of Pleasures; and lastly, by the Skill of Physicians, and the like. i 1.190 An Estate should be gotten by nothing that's any ways Scandalous or Dishonest; preserv'd by Diligence and prudent Ma∣nagement; and lastly, by the same means better'd and augmented. But this whole Subject is excellent∣ly handled by k 1.191 Xenophon the Socratick, in his Book of O Economicks; which I formerly translated from the Greek into Latin, when much about as old as you are at present.

CHAP. XXV.

The Comparing of things Profitable one with another. An Answer of Cato's upon this Head. Who are best able to teach how to get Estates.

THe a 1.192 fourth chief Head we propos'd to speak of, was the Comparing things Profitable one with

another; which is oftentimes necessary, however neglected or forgotten by Panaetius. For we use to compare either the Goods of the Body with those of Fortune; or these back again with those of the Bo∣dy; or lastly, those both of the one and the other a∣mongst 'emselves. First, The Goods of the Body are compar'd with those of Fortune, as, 'Tis more eligible, suppose, to be Healthy than Rich. Secondly, These back again with those of the Body, as, 'Tis better to be Rich, than of a robust Constitution. Thirdly, Those of the Body with one another, as Health is preferable to Pleasure, or Strength to Activity. And Lastly, Those of Fortune with one another, as if Glory should be preferr'd before Riches, or an Estate in the City before another in the Country. To this latter sort of Comparing may be referr'd that An∣swer of the Senior Cato's, who being once ask'd, What he conceiv'd most Profitable in the Manage∣ment of an Estate? said, To Feed Cattle well. And what the second? To Feed Cattle pretty well. And what the third? To Feed Cattle, tho' but ill. And what the fourth? To Till the Ground. And then the Enquirer proceeding still to ask, Pray what do you think of letting Money out to Usury? Pray what do I think, replies Cato, of killing a Man? From what has been said, and a great deal more, that might easily be added, 'tis sufficiently manifest, That Profits are often compar'd with one another; and that we had Reason sufficient on our side, in making this a fourth Head for the finding out our Duty. But as for the Business of getting an Estate, and placing out Money to the best Advantage, and I wish I might add of applying to the best Uses, there are certain b 1.193 honest Men who attend at the

Exchange, that can better inform you than any of the Philosophers, that dispute in the Schools. 'Tis worth while however to know these things, because they relate to the Business of Profit, which has made up the Subject of all this Book. Let us now pass on to what remains behind.

The End of the Second Book.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Having propos'd the Subject, about which he is to treat in this Book, he defers discoursing of it, till he has answer'd two Objections made against him, for this sort of Writing.
• b 1.2

  The first Objection against him is, That he spent too much Time, and took too much Pains, in such a fruitless Study, as that of Philosophy. For the Romans being a rough and ambitious People, minded nothing before those Times, but the Arts of War, and encreasing the Glory of their Em∣pire. As for Philosophy, &c. 'twas counted fit for none almost but Pedants, and (as they us'd to call 'em) the tri∣fling, insignificant Grecians. Tu regere imperia populos, &c. was their Maxim.
• c 1.3

  He excuses himself for spending his Time in this idle manner, by shewing what he had formerly done for the sake of the Commonwealth, and how desirous he is of do∣ing the same again, if the Times would permit him.
• d 1.4

  Julius Caesar, who having conquer'd Pompey the Great, got the whole Power of Rome into his Hands.
• e 1.5

  Not only Caesar, but Mark Anthony and his Adherents; who, after the Murder of Caesar, endeavour'd to get the sole Power to himself. See his Life in Plut.
• a 1.6

  The Romans receiv'd their Philosophy from the Greeks, and did not begin to cultivate it to any purpose, till Cicero's time.
• b 1.7

  By Divine things they meant God, and his Nature; to∣gether with the World and Bodies in it, which are the Work of God. By things Human the Nature of Man, both as to his Body and Soul, together with the good or ill Use he may make of either; viz. Virtue and Vice: As also the Relation he stands in toward God, and other Men, with the several Duties resulting from it. See Lips. Stoic. Philos. Book 2. §. 7.
• c 1.8

  His Book entitled Hortensius; because in it he brought in Hortensius condemning, whilst he himself commended Philo∣sophy. 'Tis now all lost except some few Fragments.
• d 1.9

  He proceeds to the second Exception made against him, which is this; Cicero being (as before was observ'd) of the Academick Sect, who deny there is any such thing as Cer∣tainty, How (say they) can you pretend to give Rules of Du∣ty, when 'tis a settled Maxim of your Sects, That nothing can be known? Is not this to contradict your own Principle? Or will you say, That you don't know the Truth of your own Rules?
• e 1.10

  He answers, That he is not one of those, who doubt of every thing, viz. the Scepticks or Aporeticks, Followers of Pyrrho, who held, That all things were equally probable, and nothing could have so much said for it, but that as much might be said against it, and accordingly doubted of every thing in the World. But Cicero's of a middle Opinion between these and the Dogmaticks (who hold some things to be certain and others uncertain) and maintains that some things are extream∣ly probable (tho' not absolutely certain) and others highly improbable; which is the Opinion of the Academicks, as di∣stinguish'd from pure Scepticks. Tho' therefore he won't say his Rules are certain, yet he thinks 'em so very probable, as that no wise Man can deny his Assent to 'em.
• f 1.11

  Which was the Case of the Scepticks; For what Dispu∣ting can there be with them, who won't allow one thing more probable than another; when all Dispute must suppose that some things are probable and true, and from them make out the Matter in question? Or what regular Conduct can he observe in his Life, who doubts whether he sees, hears, or feels any thing, or not? Therefore Quintil. with very good Reason, excludes Pyrrho from medling with Eloquence, Cui judices esse (says he) apud quos verba faciat, &c. non lique∣bit: For he must doubt (if he Act according to his Principles) whether there be any Judge for him to speak to, any Criminal to defend, &c.
• g 1.12

  The Peripatetick, of which Sect Cratippus, his Son's Master, was.
• h 1.13

  The Academick.
• i 1.14

  See Book 1. chap. 1.
• a 1.15

  In Book 1. at the end of chap. 3.
• b 1.16

  Being to Discourse in this Book about Profit, the first thing he takes care of is, to settle the true Notion of Profit, and root out of Mens Minds a pernicious Errour, which they have got concerning it. He asserts therefore, and proves by the Authority of the greatest Philosophers, That nothing can be Profitable, which is not Honest. See Book 1. chap. 3. Note ^f.
• c 1.17

  Having shewn, That nothing can be Profitable which is not Honest; he now enumerates the several sorts of things, which may be profitable for us; so that, when we know what is Best, and what is Worst for us, we may endeavour to obtain the one, and avoid the other.
• d 1.18

  Because the Gods being by Nature good and kind, if they should harm Men, they would act contrary to their own Natures. See Lips. Phisiolog. Stoic. Book 1. chap. 10.
• e 1.19

  The words, Et prodesse, not being found in several Ma∣nuscripts, have been excluded the late Editions; but (I think) without sufficient Reason: For this is not a Conclusion from the last Words only, but the whole Sence foregoing; viz. That Men do most Good, except only the Gods; and most Harm of all, the Gods not doing any: From whence it fol∣lows, That Men do the most Good, and most Harm, taken both together, of any thing, to one another. Beside the words fol∣lowing begin to reckon up the several Goods, which Men do to one another; which being brought in with an enim, for, ought to be a Proof of what immediately forgoes, viz. That Men do the greatest Service as well as Disservice, &c.
• f 1.20

  Being to shew, That Men do the most Good to one another; he begins with inanimate things, and shews that the Service we receive from them is owing to Men.
• a 1.21

  Having shewn, That the Advantage they reap from ina∣nimate Beings is owing to Men; he proceeds to shew the same of unreasonable Animals.
• b 1.22

  Several other things, such as Arts and useful Inventions. Civil Society, &c. whereby Men are serviceable and do good to one another.
• a 1.23

  Several of the greatest Generals and Statesmen amongst the Ancients.
• b 1.24

  Having thus made it appear, That Men do, plurimum pr••∣desse, do the greatest Good to one another; [See Not. 4. on ch. 3.] he is now going to shew, That they do the greatest Mis∣chief too.
• c 1.25

  Born at Messene, a City in Sicily, Schollar of Aristotle. He was also an eminent Orator, and Geometrician. He left several Works behind him, which are all lost.
• d 1.26

  He proves what he just now said, That it requires Wis∣dom, &c. For, says he, the whole Work and Exercise of Virtue consists in one of these three things: 1. The Im∣provement of our Reason and Understanding; which is the Work of Prudence, and the intellectual Virtues. 2. To go∣vern and restrain the Passions, and keep the sensual Appetite in subjection to Reason; which Temperance and the Moral Virtues do. 3. To gain the Affections of Men, so as to make 'em promote our Interest; which any of the former may help to do. Thus Wisdom or Knowledge, for Instance, perfect the Understanding, and are proper to beget in Men Confi∣dence or Reliance on us. [See chap. 9.] So Justice, and Greatness of Soul, moderate the Passions and Inclinations; and also make Men love, respect, and honour us. See chap. 9, 10, 11, &c.
• a 1.27

  Men doing us the most Good and most Evil, (as is shewn) it follows that those are the profitablest Actions, which en∣gage Men to be of our side, and to do all the Good they can, and keep from us all the Evil: What these are he proceeds now to shew; only observing one thing by the way.
• b 1.28

  It might have been objected, That the good or ill Success of our Actions depends upon Fortune, and not Men's Assistance; which therefore why should we endeavour to procure? To obviate this he observes, That the most and greatest of what we call fortuitous Accidents, could never have fall'n out with∣out Men's Assistance, notwithstanding that usually they are said to come from Fortune: Such are Victories; Overthrows, &c.
• c 1.29

  That of Pompey the Great in the Pharsalian Field; his ••ldest Son's at Munda in Spain; and Juba and Scipio's in A∣••ick; all defeated by Caesar. See his Commentaries.
• d 1.30

  Viz. Pompey the Great, who after his Defeat at Pharsa∣lia, flying into Aegypt, was there treacherously Murder'd: Princeps Romani nominis, imperio arbitrio{que} Aegyptii manci∣pii, jugulatus est. See Vell. Paterc. Book 2. chap. 58.
• e 1.31

  He lays down six things, or Principles of Action in Men, which make one Man endeavour to be Profitable to another, as, Love, Honour, &c. and shews which of 'em are conve∣nient, and which not; and by what Virtues we may gain each of 'em.
• f 1.32

  He brings in this, because he designs to Discourse not only about private Persons, How they should get others to be serviceable to 'em; but of Governours also of a State or Commonwealth, How they should do to make their Subjects and Allies be firm to their Interests.
• a 1.33

  He begins with the first Ground of Mens being service∣able and obedient to us, Love; to which he adds its Opposite, Fear; and comparing 'em one with another, rejects the lat∣ter as a very unsafe and inconvenient one, and magnifies the former.
• b 1.34

  Jul. Caesar, who was assassinated in the Senate-house. See Sueton. and Plut.
• c 1.35

  By adhering to Mark Anthony, and others, who pre∣tended to be Revengers of his Death; endeavouring to fire the Houses, &c. of the Conspirators, &c. See the fore-ci∣ted Authors.
• d 1.36

  A Tyrant of Syracuse, Son of one Hermocrates. He seiz'd upon the Government at twenty five Years old, about the Year of Rome 447. [See our Author's Tuse. Quest.] His Son of the same Name succeeded him in his Tyranny; but was expell'd for it by Dion. See Plut. Life of Dion.
• e 1.37

  His Barber one day happening to say, That his Life was in his Hands, he caus'd him to be murder'd, and made his Daughters shave him for some time. But afterwards su∣specting even them too, he us'd singing, as the safest way he could think of.
• f 1.38

  See chap. 30. Book 1. He by his savage Cruelties and In∣justice, made all the World hate him. The Thessalians beg'd Aid of the Thebans against him, who sent their General Pe∣lopidas several times; whom he by Treachery got into his Power, and kept Prisoner a good while.
• g 1.39

  The Thracians were counted some of the savagest Bar∣barians, and ordinarily made use of by Tyrants in those times, as the fittest Executioners of their bloody Designs. To be mark'd on the Forehead was a token of Honor amongst them, as it was of Disgrace and Slavery amongst others. But Cic. here seems to speak of this Man, as a Slave or Vil∣lain: 'tis probable therefore he might be a Thracian Slave, and mark'd as such, after he came into Greece.
• h 1.40

  She persuading her three Brothers to it, who according∣ly flew him in his Bed. See Plut. Life of Pelopidas.
• i 1.41

  A noted Tyrant of Agrigentum in Sicily, Son of Laoda∣mas, Born at Astypalea, but expell'd his own Country. He is remarkable for his Cruelty, particularly for a brazen Bull, in which he us'd to torture those, whom he had a mind to get rid of. He is said however to have lov'd Learning and learned Men. There is still extant a Book of Epistles under his Name.
• k 1.42

  Sirnam'd Poliorcetes, a King of Macedonia, Son of An∣tigonus, one of Alexander the Great's Captains. By his Pride and Insolence he made the Macedonians desert him, and go over to Pyrrhus. See his Life in Plutarch.
• l 1.43

  A Town in Baeotia, where the Lacedaemonians were en∣tirely routed by the Thebans, under the Conduct of their brave Leader Epaminondas. See chap. 24. Book 1.
• a 1.44

  Patrocinium verius quam imperium. 'Twas the Duty of a Patron to Protect and Defend, not to Rule over his Cli∣ents: and one was never the less free, because he was under the Patronage of another, but only the more safe, as being protected by him. In like manner one Nation might be un∣der, and (as 'twere) the Client of another, and yet be a Free Nation for all that. Whence there's a difference in Roman Authors, betwixt in fide esse, and in ditione esse pop. Roman. The latter denoting a loss of Liberty; the former only some sort of Inferiority and Homage.
• b 1.45

  Luc. Sylla the Dictator. He took up Arms against Mari∣us, and defended the Cause of the Nobility against the Com∣mons, in a bloody Civil War: but after his Victory was in∣humanly Cruel. See his Life at large in Plut.
• c 1.46

  He means Julius Caesar.
• d 1.47

  A City in France, which had always taken part with the Romans, in all their Wars on that side. But declaring for Pompey in the Civil War, 'twas sack'd by Caesar; who carry'd along a Figure of it (as was their usual Custom) with him in Triumph.
• e 1.48

  When Lucius Sylla sold the Goods of the Roman Citizens, whom he had Out-law'd, and caus'd to be Slain.
• f 1.49

  When Caesar sold the Goods of those, who had been of Pompey's Party.
• g 1.50

  One Cornelius, mention'd by Salust in Lepidus the Con∣sul's Speech against Sylla.
• h 1.51

  Having shewn how convenient Love, and how inconve∣nient Fear is, for the advancement of our Interest; it re∣mains that he should shew how the former may be obtain'd. To it he joyns Honour and Confidence; the second and third Means mention'd Chap. 6. which three together make up true and perfect Glory. See the next Chapter.
• i 1.52

  Before he enquires how this Love is to be gotten, he di∣vides it (if I may so say) into Love of Friendship, which con∣sists in having some few good Friends; and this he says all, whether great or mean, are almost equally concern'd to get; and general Love, which consists in the Kindness and gene∣ral Good-will of all the Citizens; and this is necessary but to some few. Of the former he has spoken in his Laelius or of Friendship; and therefore passes it by here. The latter he gives some Rules about here, as making up, together with Confidence and Admiration, true and perfect Glory.
• k 1.53

  That is, Tho' all don't stand in need of the general Love and Good-will of the Citizens, yet particular and pri∣vate Friends are as useful to the Meanest, as to the Great and more Powerful.
• a 1.54

  They are both lost. He mentions them two or three times in his Epistles to Atticus.
• b 1.55

  He Discourses in order of the Ways how to obtain these three, and first Love: the Means of gaining which are Li∣berality, a generous Disposition, &c.
• c 1.56

  Secondly, How Men are brought to confide and trust in us, which is the second part of true Glory. The two great Means are Justice, and Prudence, or Knowledge of Business: of these Justice is the chief.
• d 1.57

  How Prudence makes Men confide in us.
• e 1.58

  How Justice makes Men confide in us.
• a 1.59

  In the former Chapter he mention'd Prudence and Ju∣stice as separate from one another, whereupon 'tis objected, That he talks Unphilosophically; all the Philosophers (and himself too) having maintain'd, that the Virtues are all con∣nected and link'd together, and can't be separated from one another. This Objection, with his Answer to it, occasions this short Digression. See Note ^c on chap. 5. Book 1.
• b 1.60

  He has shewn how the two first Ingredients of true Glo∣ry, viz. the Love and Confidence of the Multitude, are to be obtain'd: here he proceeds to the third, Their Admiring, &c.
• c 1.61

  The Extraordinariness of any thing, the first Cause of Mens Admiration.
• d 1.62

  But rather are afraid of 'em, lest they should do 'em some Injury, or other.
• e 1.63

  A more particular Cause of Admiration, is extraordinary Virtue: especially resisting Pleasure and Pain, which most Men are apt to be conquer'd by: which is Courage or Great∣ness of Soul.
• a 1.64

  Those mention'd in the last Chapter, Pleasure and Pain, Riches and Poverty, &c.
• b 1.65

  For 'tis but clapping a Pistol, or the like to such a Man's Breast, and he'll betray his Friend or Country, break his Word, or any thing in the World, rather than loose his be∣lov'd Life; and consequently can't be resolutely Just.
• c 1.66

  Viz. Life, Pleasure, Riches, &c.
• d 1.67

  He takes Justice in the larger Sence here, so as to com∣prehend Bounty and Liberality. See Note ^a on chap. 7. Book 1.
• e 1.68

  Having shewn how necessary Justice is, for those who live in the Eye of the World, and endeavour to get true and perfect Glory; he's now going to shew, That 'tis necessary also for all sorts of Men, viz. Those of Privacy and Retire∣ment; those of Trade and Commerce in the World; nay for even Thieves and Pirates.
• f 1.69

  A famous Greek Historian, born in the Isle Chios, and Schollar of Isocrates, who us'd to say, That he was forc'd to use a Spurr to Ephorus, and a Bridle to Theopompus. He is highly commended by several of the Ancients. Corn. Nepos accuses him of Ill-nature in his Characters of Men. He left several Works, which are lost.
• g 1.70

  He was afterwards conquer'd by Phillip, Son of Amyn∣tas, King of Macedonia. Pyrrhus the famous King of Epi∣rus Married his Daughter.
• h 1.71

  A Man of very great Cunning and Valour; he was first a Huntsman, afterwards a General of a formidable Army. See Florus, Paterc. &c.
• i 1.72

  C. Plautius and M. Vitellius, or (as others say) Claudius Unimanus, the Praetors. At last Servilius Caepio got him treacherously murther'd.
• k 1.73

  The same, whom he brings in speaking in his Book De Amicitia.
• a 1.74

  He still goes on in his Commendation of Justice, and tells us, That Kings heretofore were chosen according to their Characters for Justice and Integrity.
• b 1.75

  The first of any great note among the Greek Historians, very well known by his Works, which are still extant in nine Books; which for their Sweetness and Elegance are deserved∣ly call'd by the names of the Nine Muses.
• c 1.76

  He has shewn what these Virtues are, which make the People Love, &c. But as 'tis not enough for a Man to get Riches, unless he knows how to make use of 'em too: So, after we have gotten the Virtues he has mention'd, the next thing that comes to be consider'd is, How we should use 'em, so as to be remarkable in the World; and let People see, by our Pactice and Exercise in some sort of Life, that we are such Persons, as deserve their Love, Confidence and Admiration. For these Virtues themselves are only the Ground-work or Foundations, as it were, of perfect Glory; and we know Foundations are laid in the Earth, and require something else to be Built upon 'em, before they are taken notice of in the Eye of the World. Here he puts in, by way of Caution, a Saying of Socrates, That we make sure in the first place, that we really are such, &c.
• d 1.77

  By Glory here he understands the Virtues of Justice, &c. which he has just been discoursing of, as the Foundations of true Glory.
• e 1.78

  Outward Glory, not the Virtues themselves.
• f 1.79

  A Noble, Wise and Valiant Roman, who was twice Cof. and as often triumph'd; and at last was made Censor, in which Office by his Wisdom and Prudence he sav'd the Re∣publick. [See Cic. de Orat. 1. 9.] He marry'd Cornelia, the Daughter of the Elder Africanus, by whom he had the two Gracchi.
• g 1.80

  Tib. and Caius Gracchus, two eloquent and ingenious young Men: but for attempting to make Laws pernicious to the State, about equally dividing Lands, &c. they were both Slain; the former by Scipio Nasica, and the latter by Opimi∣us the Cos. See Paterc. Book 2. ch. 2, 3, 6, 7. and their Lives in Plut.
• a 1.81

  His Design is to shew, What Methods a young Man, who is just coming into the World (supposing he has laid a Foun∣dation of Virtue) had best enter upon, that he may make himself Known, and taken Notice of among his Citizens, that so his Virtues mayn't lye hid and conceal'd. In order to which he distinguishes young Men, into those who are re∣markable already upon their Ancestors account, &c. and those who are unknown and obscure. They must both take to some honourable Way of Life, so as to signalize their Va∣lour, Honesty, &c.
• b 1.82

  Courage in the Wars, the first thing that makes a young Man become Remarkable.
• c 1.83

  That of Julius Caesar.
• d 1.84

  That of Pompey the Great.
• e 1.85

  Each Body of Foot consisting of two Legions, had two Troops of Horse to support it, one on the right and t'other on the left. Cicero's Son commanded one of these, being call'd Wings.
• f 1.86

  Of the Virtues that don't require Strength of Body, Tem∣perance, &c. most recommend a young Man.
• g 1.87

  A third thing that recommends young Men is, keeping frequent Company with those that are Wise, and Lovers of their Country.
• h 1.88

  P. Rutilius Rufus, a noble Roman, Cos. together with Cn. Mallius. He was Schollar of Panaetius, [See Book 3. chap. 3.] a great lover of Learning, and very well skill'd in Phi∣losophy and the Civil Laws. Cicero in his first Book de Ora∣tore calls him, Exemplum innocentiae: and Vell. Paterc. Book 2. chap. 13. Virum non sui tantum seculi, sed omnis aevi optimum. However he was accus'd by the Malice of some Men, and con∣demn'd of Extortion, and accordingly Banish'd. Of which see the fore-cited places.
• i 1.89

  P. Mutius Scaevola, a noble Roman, famous for his Know∣ledge of the Civil Laws, and withal an eloquent Speaker; therefore call'd by our Author, Jurisperitorum disertissimus. He was Cos. with Calpurnius Piso, about the Year of Rome 620, when Tib. Gracchus rais'd his Sedition: and afterwards made Pontifex maximus.
• k 1.90

  Lucius Crassus, the famous Orator, whom he mention'd Book 1. chap. 30.
• l 1.91

  Of C. Carbo a very eloquent Man, who had been Tri∣bune and Consul; whom Crassus, at the Age of nineteen Years, (when others begin but to study Eloquence) publickly ac∣cus'd and got condemn'd, so that he poyson'd himself.
• a 1.92

  Having ended the last Chapter with Crassus's Accusation of Carbo, and the Credit he got by it: this easily brings him to another thing, that recommends young Men, and makes 'em be taken notice of, viz. Their Discourse. This he di∣vides into two sorts, and speaks upon 'em severally.
• b 1.93

  Of the first sort of Discourse, viz. That of common Conversation; and its Power.
• c 1.94

  Son of Amyntas, Father of Alexander the Great.
• d 1.95

  A Soldier of Philip's, left Governour of Macedonia by Alexander, when he invaded Persia: At last he Poyson'd Alexander, by his Son Cassander's means. See Quint. Cur∣tius.
• e 1.96

  A King of Macedonia, not Father, but only first Guardi∣an, and afterwards Father-in-law to Philip, who was Son of Demetrius, King of Macedonia and Epirus.
• f 1.97

  The second sort of Discourse, viz. Eloquence: of which he speaks pretty largely, and gives some Rules about Ac∣cusations, relating to their Lawfulness, Frequency, &c.
• g 1.98

  Grandfather to Mark Anthony the Triumvir; whom he brings in speaking in his de Oratore; a very eloquent Per∣son, as appears from the great Praises he there gives him. He was Cos. and Censor, call'd by V. Patercul. Princeps Civi∣tatis & Eloquentiae. He was afterwards kill'd by the Com∣mand of Marius and Cinna. The Person, by whose Accu∣sation he gain'd this Credit, was Cn. Papirius Carbo.
• h 1.99

  One of the Interlocutors in his de Oratore, and there commended for an excellent Speaker. He accus'd Norbanus, whom Anthony defended. [See de Orat. 2. 28.] He was Tribune of the People, and joyning with Marius against Syl∣la, was slain by Sylla's Order. Vell. Paterc.
• i 1.100

  Lucius and Marcus, who accus'd Servilius the Augur, because he before had accus'd their Father.
• k 1.101

  In his Orations against Verres.
• l 1.102

  I have follow'd the Correction of Langius, Manut. &c. who would have it read Pro Sardis in or Contra Albutium Julius. Vid. Ed. Graevii.
• m 1.103

  He mentions this Accusation in his Brutus, where he says Fusius got a great deal of Credit by it. Anthony the famous Orator defended Aquilius, and to move the Judges to Pity, pull'd open his Cloaths, and shew'd them his honoura∣ble Wounds in his Breast. Aquilius was Cos. with Marius, An. Urb. Cond. 652. and accus'd of Bribery or Extortion. Mul∣tis avaritiae criminibus, testimoniis{que} convictus, Cic. Orat. pro Flac.
• n 1.104

  He mentions both Father and Son in his de Oratore, the one for an excellent Lawyer, who wrote several Books; and the Son for a loose Debauchee. And in his Brutus he calls the Father an excellent Man, and very skilful of the Law; but the Son a Disgrace to his Family, &c.
• o 1.105

  Viz. Those that are innocent.
• p 1.106

  'Tis the second of his Orations as now printed.
• a 1.107

  Chap. 6. he laid down six things, as Reasons or Motives of Mens being profitable to us: Of these he rejected Fear, as a very dangerous and inconvenient one. Good-will, Ho∣nour or Admiration, and Confidence, all which three go to make up true Glory, he hath already discours'd of, and shewn by what Virtues they are to be obtain'd. There re∣main therefore only two more, viz. Hope, when Princes, &c. promise great Donations; and Hire, when Money is given. Both these he comprehends here under Beneficence or Libera∣lity, and shews what sort of Donations are useful, and in what Measure, and in what particular Cases, &c. And first he divides Beneficence into two forts, of which he prefers the former for several Reasons.
• b 1.108

  The word Diligentia in this place properly signifies, the making a Choice and Distinction between Persons.
• c 1.109

  Viz. Shewing his Bounty and Generosity in Giving; be∣cause he has given away all already.
• a 1.110

  Having given his Reasons, why the first sort of Benefi∣cence, which consists in obliging Men by our Labour and In∣dustry, is preferable to the second, which does it by Money; he begins in this Chap. to discourse of the latter, and divides those that use it (the Largi as he speaks) into two sorts, the one Predigal, and the other Liberal, in the proper and strict Sence of that Word. He begins with the first, and discourses of it to Chap. 18. where he comes to the second, the Liberal.
• b 1.111

  The same that he mention'd Book 1. ch. 1. his Book here mention'd is now quite lost, but 'tis quoted by Diogenes La∣ertius.
• c 1.112

  Nothing of this here quoted is to be found in any of the Works of Aristotle now extant; which makes the learned Ma∣retus think, that it ought to be read Aristo, who was a Stoick Philosopher, mention'd by Seneca in his 29th Epist. and who (as we learn from Plutarch) wrote a Book upon the Subject of Riches.
• d 1.113

  An Office in Rome, which required their taking care of the publick Buildings, Temples, &c. as also the publick Games on any solemn Occasion, Plays, and the like. 'Twas usually counted the first Step toward other Offices; into which the People chose Men, according to their good or ill Behaviour in this. Hence they usually spar'd no Pains, Charges, &c. so as they could but please the Multitude.
• e 1.114

  A noble Roman, sirnam'd Mucianus, because adopted in∣to the Family of the Crassi, from that of the Mucii. He was the first that gave the People a Fight of Elephants in his Aedile∣ship. He was afterwards Cos. and Pontifex Maximus.
• f 1.115

  The famous Orator, mention'd before.
• g 1.116

  The Augur, who married the Daughter of the Wise Lae∣lius: mention'd by our Author in the beginning of his De A∣micitia.
• h 1.117

  Sirnam'd Pulcher; he first had their Scenes in the Theatre painted, whereas before they were bare Boards.
• i 1.118

  The two Brothers Luc. and Mar. who were both Aediles together, and made the Scenes to turn round, and so often whereas before they were fixt and unalterable.
• k 1.119

  The famouseft Roman Orator next to Cicero, and often his Opponent; Consul six Years before him. See his Death excellently lamented at the beginning of our Author's Brutus.
• l 1.120

  D. Junius Silanus, who was Consul next after Cicero, with L. Licinius Muraena.
• m 1.121

  Sirnam'd Spinther, Cos. six Years after Cicero, whom he recall'd from his Banishment. To him is written the first Book of his Familiar Epistles. He was the first that wore a Purple Gown double dy'd, and made the Vela or Curtains in the Theatre of fine Cypress Linnen.
• n 1.122

  He built a noble Theatre, with vast Pillars of fine Mar∣ble, and was so profuse in his Aedileship, that Pliny says, he utterly ruin'd the Roman Moderation, and that Sylla did more Harm by encouraging his Prodigalities, than he did by all his Murders and Cruelties.
• o 1.123

  He brought Lyons, Panthers, and Elephants in vast num∣bers to Fight before the People.
• p 1.124

  See the latter end of the next Chap.
• a 1.125

  A Name of the Emilian Family. Mamercus Aemilius Le∣pidus was Cos. with D. Brutus, An. U. C. 676. 'Tis uncertain whether he be meant here, or not.
• b 1.126

  When, and how far such sorts of Giving are allowable.
• c 1.127

  A Sirname of the Aurelian Family. This is Cn. Aufidi∣us Orestes, so call'd because he was adopted by Cn. Aufidius, [Cic. pro domo, ch. 18.] He was afterwards Cos. with Corn. Lentul•••• Sura, An. U. C. 682.
• d 1.128

  'Twas a Custom among the Romans, upon any great Undertaking, to Vow the Tenth of their Income to some God, to make him prosper 'em in their Undertakings. O∣restes, under Pretence of Paying this to Hercules, gave a great deal of Victuals to all the People in publick, that so he might gain their Favour.
• e 1.129

  Clodius was a vile and profligate Fellow, a great Enemy to Cicero, whom in his Tribuneship he got banisht, [See Ci∣cero's Life in Plut.] but Milo, being Tribune the Year fol∣lowing, endeavour'd to bring back Cicero again. Clodius violently oppos'd it; and getting together some of his own Gang, and a parcel of Gladiators, fell upon the People as they assembled about it, and shew several. Milo, on the other side, bought Gladiators to defend Cicero, and in him (as he says) the Republick it self. This is that Milo, who afterwards kil∣led this Clodius; for which being accus'd, he was defended by our Author in that incomparable Oration, which is still ex∣tant.
• f 1.130

  An excellent Roman, Cos. with Cn. Octavius, the Year of Rome 677; a good Man, and a Lover of Virtue, as well as Learning. He was also a very good Orator, and is often mention'd by our Author. His Son was that Curio, who was Tribune of the People, and the grand Incendiary in the Civil War between Caesar and Pompey.
• g 1.131

  Above two thousand Talents: This is that entrance to their ancient Tower call'd Acropolis and (because under the Protecti∣on of Pallas) Glaucopia, so often mention'd by ancient Writers. It had five noble Doors, was cover'd with curious white Stone, and was five Years in building. See Meurs. Cecropia.
• h 1.132

  This Work was in ten Books: but 'tis now all lost ex∣cept some few Fragments, of which Scipio's Dream is much the largest, as making a good part of the sixth Book.
• a 1.133

  He has done with the first sort of Giving largely, viz. Prodigality; which he thinks generally blamable, but in some Cases excusable. He comes now to the Second, Libe∣rality, which is seen not only in Giving, but in Receiving too. He begins with Giving; concerning which his first Rule is, That we should consider the Circumstances of the Person we give to.
• b 1.134

  Secondly, In Giving we should consider the Person's Deserts: For Kindnesses bestow'd upon those, who don't deserve, but will make ill use of 'em, are indeed no Kindnesses. We should make honest Men the Objects of our Bounty in this kind.
• c 1.135

  Having given some Rules for the liberal Man's direction in Giving or Spending; he proceeds in this place to do the same about Receiving; in which he would have him not be too rigorous, but courteous, complying, &c.
• d 1.136

  'Tis no small part of Prudence, to know when to lose; it hapning sometimes, and upon some Occasions, that 'tis the best way to act against one's present Interest, and by omit∣ting a less Advantage, to gain a greater afterwards. Pecuni∣am in loco negligere, says Terence, maximum interdum est lu∣crum.
• e 1.137

  One particular sort of Bounty, which he thinks fit just to bring in here, is Hospitality. This he recommends as a thing handsom, and becoming in any City, and advantagious to get a Man Interest, and make him known among Strangers.
• f 1.138

  The Son of Miltiades, a famous Athenian General, who beat their Enemies both at Sea and Land the same Day: He was particularly fam'd for his Bounty and Hospitality. See his Life in Plut. and Corn. Nep.
• g 1.139

  There were one hundred seventy four distinct Tribes or Peoples in Attica, one of which was call'd the Lacian, and the Men who were of it, Laciadae. Cimon was one of these, and kept constantly open House for all those of his Tribe. See Meursius de Pop. Attic.
• a 1.140

  He begins here with the second, and as he thinks [See Chap. 15.] much better sort of Beneficence, which consists in doing Kindnesses for others by our Labour and Industry. These Kindnesses may be either done to particular Persons, or to the Republick in general: and first of the former.
• b 1.141

  The first thing that puts a Man in a Capacity of serving a great many People, is the Civil Laws; the Knowledge of which he highly commends.
• c 1.142

  He means Ser. Sulpitius, one of the most eminent among the Romans for his Skill in the Civil Laws.
• d 1.143

  A second thing which enables Men to assist others this way, is Eloquence.
• e 1.144

  There was even a Law among the Romans, entitul'd, Cin∣cia de donis & muneribus, forbidding to take Money, &c. for Defending another's Cause.
• f 1.145

  A third Way of doing People Kindnesses is, if we aren't our selves able to manage their Causes, by recommending 'em to the Judges, to those that are skill'd in Law, &c.
• g 1.146

  He puts in a Caution or two about these Rules, viz. That whilst we oblige one, we take care not to disoblige others, &c.
• a 1.147

  Having shewn what those things are, which put us into a Capacity of Helping others, viz. Eloquence, Civil Law, &c. and lay'd down a Rule or two for our Direction in doing it; he proceeds to enquire, on whom we ought especially to bestow our Kindnesses; where he puts the Question, Whether 'tis better to assist a Rich and Great, or a Poor and Honest Man? and argues for the latter; because a poor Man will be more grateful, &c.
• b 1.148

  He gives this by way of Caution, tho' he would not have a Man assisted for being Rich, he would not have his Rich∣es be an hindrance to him neither, provided he be otherwise an honest and good Man.
• c 1.149

  The last Rule to be observ'd in this sort of Liberality.
• a 1.150

  Chap. 19. He divided that Beneficence, which consists in do∣ing Kindnesses by our Labour, &c. into two Parts: He has done with the former, which respects Particulars, and comes now to the latter, which respects the State in general. This he again divides into two sorts, some terminating in the State, consider'd abstractedly by it self; others in all the particular Members of it. About the latter he immediately gives us one Direction, never to do any thing for the sake of Particulars, which may any ways be prejudicial to the Whole in general. Under the for∣mer he comprehends the Duties of those that are Governours, and principal Magistrates in the Republick: concerning which he discourses very largely.
• b 1.151

  See ch. 12. of this Book.
• c 1.152

  He was Tribune of the People together with Tib. Grac∣chus, and resisted him very much, in his pernicious Attempts, and was therefore by him depriv'd of his Office. What Acti∣on of his our Author here means is uncertain.
• d 1.153

  The first Duty of those, who are Governours of a State, to keep every Man in the peaceful Possession of what is his own.
• e 1.154

  Which would have been done by the two Gracchi, by their equal Distribution of Lands.
• f 1.155

  Luc. Marcius Philippus, See ch. 30. Book 3.
• g 1.156

  A second Duty of a good Governour, Not to burthen, &c.
• h 1.157

  To provide Necessaries for the Support of the People, a third Duty of a Governour.
• i 1.158

  A fourth Duty is, To be free from even any Suspicion of Avarice.
• k 1.159

  He was the Samnite General, when the Peace was made with them at the Passage of Caudium, to the great Disgrace and Shame of the Romans. See Livy, Book 9. chap. 1.
• l 1.160

  L. Calpurnius Piso, the first of those who were sirnam'd Frugi, Tribune of the People when Censorinus and Manilius were Consuls, about An. U. C. 603, Author of the Lex Cal∣purnia de pecuni••s repetundis.
• m 1.161

  Junia, Servilia, Acilia, &c. vide Calv. de Leg.
• n 1.162

  He means that which was call'd the Social War, of which he only brings one, and that a very remote Cause. Livius Drusus, Tribune of the People, amongst several Laws about the Freedom of all Italy, propos'd that all those, who were suspected of Bribery, should be made to answer for it. Here∣upon the Senators, who were pretty Guilty, misliking this one, oppos'd and hindred all his other Laws. This made the Italian Nations, who thought to have been made Free of Rome, but by this Means were frustrated, rise up in Arms a∣gainst the Romans, upon which ensued the Social or Italian War; of which see the Historians.
• a 1.163

  The second Scipio of that Name, who raz'd Carthage and Namantia; and was Scholar to Panaetius.
• b 1.164

  He conquer'd Perseus King of Macedonia, and led him in Triumph; thereby putting an End to the second Mace∣donian War, and that Empire together. See his Life in Plut.
• c 1.165

  The same that was just now mention'd. He was Son of Paullus, but adopted by Scipio.
• d 1.166

  Corinth, which was raz'd by Mummius the same Year that Carthage was by Scipio. See Paterc. Book 1. chap. 12. where the two Generals are very handsomly compar'd toge∣ther.
• e 1.167

  He has told us by Precept, and from the Examples of the greatest Men, That Governours of a State should be free from Covetousness, and regardless of Money. Here he adds, That nothing so much recommends 'em to the Good-liking of the People as that Virtue: Which brings him to discourse of a foolish Method, that some Men have taken to this purpose, viz. A Design of bringing all Estates to an Equality, and making all Creditors remit their Debts; which he shews to be unsafe, unreasonable, &c.
• f 1.168

  First, He shews 'tis destructive to a State, by ruining Concord and Justice, which are the Supports of it.
• g 1.169

  Secondly, 'Tis foolish; for it does not procure 'em that Good-liking of the People, which they thought to get by it.
• h 1.170

  Thirdly, 'Tis very unjust and unreasonable.
• a 1.171

  Having shewn how pernicious, foolish, &c. these Designs are; he gives here some Examples of their unhappy Effects; and of the good ones of the contrary Practice.
• b 1.172

  Not their famous General Lysander, Son of Aristarcly∣tus, who beat the Athenians, &c. but another, Son of one Olbis, made Ephore by King Agis, and his Assistant in his Designs.
• c 1.173

  The Word signifies Inspectors or Overseers: They were Officers among the Spartans, usually five in number, much like the Tribunes in Rome, who restrain'd the Power and Greatness of their Kings; so that Appeals were allow'd from the Kings to them, as in Rome from the Consuls to the Tribunes.
• d 1.174

  The third King of Sparta of that Name, Son of Euda∣midas, and sixth in Descent from the famous Agesilaus: who for endeavouring to alter the then present State of things, and bring in some obsolete Laws of Lycurgus, about dividing Lands into equal Portions, &c. was murder'd by the contrary Faction. See his Life and Death in Plut.
• e 1.175

  The Elder, whose Daughter Cornelia was married to Sem∣pronius Gracchus, and had those two Sons by him.
• f 1.176

  A noble Man of Sicyon, a City in Peloponnesus, Son of one Clinias: His Father being kill'd by the treachery of A∣bantidas, he was forc'd to fly to Argos at six Years old. Af∣terwards, at about the Age of Twenty, he took the City a∣gain by Surprize, made Nicocles the then Tyrant fly, and settl'd Peace and Unity amongst his Citizens. His Life is written by Plut.
• g 1.177

  The capital City of Aegypt, and Seat of their Kings, built by Alexander the Great, in his return from visiting the Temple of Jupiter Hammon.
• h 1.178

  Sirnam'd Philadelphus, the Founder of the famous A∣lexandrian Library. He was Son of that Ptolomy, who was Alexander the Great's Captain, and who got Aegypt to him∣self after the Death of that Prince.
• i 1.179

  Viz. Of the present Incumbents, who possess'd those Lands, which originally belong'd to others.
• k 1.180

  Viz. Of those who had been outed of their Lands by the Tyrants.
• l 1.181

  First under Sylla the Dictator, and afterwards under Caesar.
• a 1.182

  Since the Design of making Creditors Forgive all Debts, is so very pernicious, &c. 'tis one great Business of a good Governour, to prevent Peoples running too much into Debt; which may be done several Ways.
• b 1.183

  In the Conspiracy of Catiline. See chap. 22. Book 1.
• c 1.184

  He means Caesar, who being over head and ears in Debt, was suspected in Catiline's time, to favour his wicked Designs under-hand; and so may be said to have been conquer'd by Cicero, when he ruin'd Catiline.
• d 1.185

  He made the Creditors lose not all, but only a fourth part of their Due.
• e 1.186

  Because he was then got free from Debt by other Ways; and so had no occasion to make use of this, upon his own Account.
• f 1.187

  He has now done with his first Head propos'd in this Book, viz. Whether an Action be profitable or not? In which, af∣ter having shewn, That Men are able to bring the most Pro∣fit to us, he gives some Directions about how we should en∣gage Men to be of our side, and so do us all the Service that lies in their Power. He should now proceed to the second Head propos'd to be the Subject of this Book; but because Antipater thought the former not perfect, because two ma∣terial things were omitted in it, viz. The Care of our Health, and Estate; he therefore; before he leaves this Head, adds a word or two about each of these.
• g 1.188

  There were two or three Stoicks of that Name; The one of Tarsus, call'd Tarsensis, Scholar to Diogenes Babylonius, and Master of Panaetius. He is mention'd ch. 12. of the next Book. Another about the same time (or as others think the same Man by another name) call'd Sidonius, a familiar Ac∣quaintance of L. Crassus, an Historian and Poet, famous for making Hexameter Verses extempore, [See Cic. and Quintil.] of whom we have several Epigrams still extant in the Greek Anthologia. He's said to have had a Fever every Year on his Birth-day, of which at last he dy'd. The third a Tyrian here mention'd, an Acquaintance of Cicero's, and particularly fa∣miliar with Cato Uticensis, whom he Instructed in Morality and Politicks.
• h 1.189

  How the Health of the Body is to be maintain'd.
• i 1.190

  How an Estate should be gotten, kept, &c.
• k 1.191

  A famous Athenian, Son of one Gryllus, and Scholar of Socrates; a valiant and wise Captain, as well as an eminent Philosopher and Historian. His Works are most of 'em ex∣tant to this day: the native Simplicity, Purity, and especial∣ly Sweetness of which, have justly got him the name of the Athenian Bee. The Translation Cicero here mentions is lost, except some Fragments.
• a 1.192

  He comes now to the second Head to be treated on in this Book, viz. Of two that are Profitable which is most so? Which he but just touches upon, and shews that 'twas requi∣site to add this Head to the three of Panaetius.
• b 1.193

  So he calls by way of Derision the Bankers, Changers, &c. who frequented the Janus, a Street in Rome of that name, very noted and eminent for such sort of People. The upper part of it was called Janus Summus, the middle Ja∣nus Medius, and the lower Janus Imus.