Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author.

CHAP. X.

Why he talks of Wisdom and Justice as separate from one another, tho' really there's a mutual Connexion between 'em. What will make Men admire any one. The difference between Despising and having an Ill Opinion of a Man.

a 1.1 SOme Men perhaps will be ready to admire, since 'tis so generally agreed on by Philoso∣phers, and has been so often asserted by me my self, That whoever has one must have all the Virtues; why I should speak of 'em separately now, as tho' it were possible for a Man to have Prudence, with∣out having Justice at the same time. I answer, That the Way of Expression is highly different, ac∣cording to the difference of the Subjects we are treating of; whether they are such as require a Niceness and Subtilty in handling, or be suited to the Capacities of ordinary People. I do but speak here with the Vulgar therefore, when I call one Man Couragious, another Just, and a third Prudent; for in treating upon a Subject which concerns the Peo∣ple, we must make use of common and ordinary Expressions; which is what has been done by Pa∣naetius himself—. But to return to our Purpose: b 1.2 Of the three Ingredients, which we said were re∣quir'd

to the making up of Glory; the third was this, That Men should Admire and Value us so, as to think we are Persons that really deserve Honour. c 1.3 Now generally speaking they are apt to Admire what∣ever they see Great, and beyond their Apprehensi∣ons; and likewise in particulars, if they discover a∣ny Excellency, which they never expected. They Admire those therefore, and extol 'em ev'n to the Skies, in whom (as they think) they have found a∣ny rare and extraodinary Qualities: But as for those others, who have neither Virtue, Spirit, nor Courage in them, these Men they wholly despise and set light by. For they can't be said to despise all those, of whom they entertain but an Ill Opinion. They're far from thinking well of your roguish backbi∣ting, cozening sort of Fellows, who are never unpre∣par'd for the doing Man an Injury: but by no means d 1.4 despise 'em for all that; their Contempt (as was said) lighting only upon those, who neither do Good to themselves, nor others (as we commonly speak;) that is, who spend all their Lives in meer Idleness and Sloth, without ever minding or taking care of any thing. e 1.5 Those, who are esteem'd to excel in Vir∣tue, more especially draw Men to Wonder and Ad∣miration; who keep themselves free, as from all other things that are Base and Unbecoming, so more especially from those sorts of Vices, which the rest of Mankind can't so easily stand against. Pleasures, for instance, are very alluring. and charming Mi∣stresses, which are apt to ensnare the better part of

the Soul, and entice it aside from the Paths of Virtue; and Pain on the contrary racks and tor∣ments us, so that the dread of it carries most Men beyond the Bounds of Reason. Thus again, when Life and Death, Riches and Poverty, are the things in question, there are very few Men but are wholly transported with desire of the one, and abhorrence of the other. When a Man therefore has got such a great and exalted Soul, as that he can look up∣on all these with Indifference; and closely pursues and adheres to Honesty, in whatever Shape she pre∣sents her self; then 'tis that Virtue appears with such a Brightness, as that all the whole World must admire her Beauties.

Notes

• a 1.1

  In the former Chapter he mention'd Prudence and Ju∣stice as separate from one another, whereupon 'tis objected, That he talks Unphilosophically; all the Philosophers (and himself too) having maintain'd, that the Virtues are all con∣nected and link'd together, and can't be separated from one another. This Objection, with his Answer to it, occasions this short Digression. See Note ^c on chap. 5. Book 1.
• b 1.2

  He has shewn how the two first Ingredients of true Glo∣ry, viz. the Love and Confidence of the Multitude, are to be obtain'd: here he proceeds to the third, Their Admiring, &c.
• c 1.3

  The Extraordinariness of any thing, the first Cause of Mens Admiration.
• d 1.4

  But rather are afraid of 'em, lest they should do 'em some Injury, or other.
• e 1.5

  A more particular Cause of Admiration, is extraordinary Virtue: especially resisting Pleasure and Pain, which most Men are apt to be conquer'd by: which is Courage or Great∣ness of Soul.