Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author.

CHAP. VII.

The second general Virtue, which consists in maintain∣ing of Human Society. Two Parts of it, Justice and Liberality. The first Duty of Justice. All things at first common. The Original of Property. Men are born for the Good, &c. of one another: whence arises the second Duty of Justice. Two sorts of In∣justice, the one of Commission; the other of O∣mission. The Causes of the first sort of Injustice; First, Fear: Secondly, Desire.

OF the other remaining three, a 1.1 that which con∣sists in upholding Society, and keeping up mutual Love and good Nature amongst Mankind, seems of the largest and most diffusive Extent. It comprehends under it these two Parts: First, Ju∣stice, which is much the most glorious and splendid of all Virtues, and alone entitles us to the Name and Appellation of Good Men. And, Secondly, Benefi∣cence, which may also be call'd either Bounty or Li∣berality. Now the first thing that Justice requires of us is this, That no one should do any Hurt to ano∣ther, unless he be necessarily driven upon it for his own Security: b 1.2 and whatever belongs either to all in common, or to particular Persons as their own Proprie∣ty, should not be alter'd, but made use of accord∣ingly. Now no Man can say that he has any thing

c 1.3 his own by a Right of Nature; but either by an ancient immemorial Seizure, as those who first planted uninhabited Countries: Or, secondly, by Conquest, as those who have got things by the Right of the Sword; or else by some Law, Com∣pact, Agreement, or Lot. 'Tis by some of these means, that the People inhabiting d 1.4 Arpinum and Tusculum came to have those Lands, which are now call'd theirs; and e 1.5 the same may be said as to private Mens Estates. However, since at pre∣sent, by some of these ways, each particular Man has his personal Possessions, out of that which by Nature was common to all, 'tis but reason that each should hold what is now his own; which if any one endeavour to take away from him,

f 1.6 he directly breaks in upon common Justice, and violates the Rights of Human Society. But see∣ing (as is excellently said by Plato) we are not Born for our selves alone; but that our native Country, our Friends and Relations, have a just Claim and Title to some part of us; and seeing whatsoever is created on Earth, was meerly design'd (as the Sto∣icks will have it) for the Service of Men; and Men themselves for the Service, Good and Assistance of one another: We g 1.7 certainly in this should be Fol∣lowers of Nature, and second her Intentions; and by producing all that lies within the reach of our Power for the general Interest, by mutually giving and receiving good Turns, by our Knowledge, In∣dustry, Riches, or other means, should endeavour to keep up that Love and Society, that should be amongst Men. Now the great Foundation of Ju∣stice is h 1.8 Faithfulness, which consists in being con∣stantly firm to your Word, and a conscientious per∣formance of all Compacts and Bargains; where∣upon for this once, let us venture to follow the O∣pinion of the Stoicks, those mighty Admirers of De∣rivations, and believe that Fides [Faithfulness] is

so call'd, (tho' perhaps it may seem a little too far fetcht) quia fiat quod dictum est, because what was promis'd is perform'd. The i 1.9 Vice that is opposite to Justice is Injustice, of which there are two sorts; the first consists in the actual doing an Injury to ano∣ther; the second in tamely looking on while he is In∣jur'd, and not helping and defending him, tho' we are able. For he that injuriously falls upon ano∣ther, whether prompted by Rage or other violent Passion, does as 'twere leap at the throat of his Companion; and he that refuses to help him when Injur'd, and to ward off the Wrong, if it lies in his power, is as plainly guilty of Baseness and Injustice, as tho' he had deserted his Father, his Friends, or his native Country. k 1.10 Now that former Injustice, which consists in the wilful and actual Wronging ano∣ther, has oftentimes no other cause but Fear; when he, who designedly does a Man an Injury, is afraid least himself should be forc'd to undergo one, if he does not secure himself by doing it before-hand. But generally speaking, the great source and foun∣tain of all such Injustice is l 1.11 the satisfying some ir∣regular and exorbitant Appetite; and in a more especial manner, the desire of Riches: of which we shall therefore say something in particular.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Which may be call'd Justice in a larger signification of that Word, as it takes in all the Duties Men owe to one ano∣ther, which is the second general Head he mention'd; and comprehends under it Justice strictly so call'd, and Liberality or Kindness one to another; of which he begins to treat, chap. 14.
• b 1.2

  The word deinde doth not denote a second Duty of Ju∣stice, but only the second Part of the first Duty, of, Doing no Wrong. The meaning is, That of things which are com∣mon, he should content himself with his reasonable Share: and those which are appropriate to particular Persons, he should suffer to remain in the State they are without distur∣bance. The word suus signifies here, as in many other pla∣ces, the same thing with proprius.
• c 1.3

  He supposes all things at first to have been common, like the Room in a Theatre, or other such place; and, as in these, he who first gets a Place has a Right to it, and can't be fairly turn'd out of it; so he imagins it to have been in old Time. Not that the Seizure of it self gives a Right, but the tacit Agreement amongst Mankind, That what any Man had first possess'd himself of, should be his own Property. See Grot. De Jure B. & P. Book 2. ch. 2.
• d 1.4

  Cicero himself was born at Arpinum, a mean place in I∣taly; hence, by his Enemies in contempt, call'd Arpinas. He had a noble Country-house at Tusculum, another Town not far from Rome, whither he often retir'd, and where he wrote five Books of Philosophy, thence call'd his Tusculan Questions. He therefore uses the Examples of these two Pla∣ces, because his Son was acquainted with 'em.
• e 1.5

  Descriptio, signifies a Draught of any Land, or the like, in order to every Man's having his due Share: The meaning is, that private Men came to their Estates, by the like sort of Distribution or Allotment, as Towns and Cities did.
• f 1.6

  Quicquid jure possidetur (says Quintil.) injuria aufertur; Whatever any Man is in the rightful Possession of, can't be taken from him without Injustice: Since every one then has a Right to that, which is now his own, tho' 'twere original∣ly common, no one without injuring him can dispossess him of it again.
• g 1.7

  He now comes to the second Duty of Justice, which is, To do all the Good we can; as the first was, To do no Wrong.
• h 1.8

  Justice is the rendring to every Man his due; which no one can do without being true to his Word, and conscien∣tiously performing all Promises, Oaths, Bargains, &c. For he that Promises, &c. to another, makes himself a Debtor of something to him, which he may demand as a kind of Due. 'Tis the business of Faithfulness to see this pay'd; so that Justice is, as 'twere, built upon Faithfulness, as its Ba∣sis and Foundation.
• i 1.9

  Having laid down the two great Duties of Justice, and the Foundation of it; he now proceeds to its opposite Vice, Injustice, (of which there are two sorts) and the Causes of it.
• k 1.10

  The Causes of the first sort of Injustice, viz. Of Com∣mission: First, Fear. Not but that 'tis lawful, if I see ano∣ther taking up a Sword, and plainly perceive he's going to Stab me, to Stab him before-hand to prevent my own Death, if I can't possibly escape any other way. But this must be very certain and apparent; a bare fear or suspicion that ano∣ther designs me an Injury, not being a sufficient Reason why I should do him one.
• l 1.11

  A second Cause of this Injustice, The satisfying some ir∣regular Desire; as, First, That of Money; of which in the next Chapter.