Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author.

CHAP. XLIII.

The comparing of two Parts of Honesty one with ano∣ther. The Duties of Prudence or finding out Truth, and those of Justice or maintaining Human Society compar'd; and the Preference given to the latter.

ANd thus a 1.1 have I finish'd what I had to say up∣on the first Question, and, I think, sufficiently made it appear, how the particular Instances of Du∣ty are to be drawn from the several Heads of Ho∣nesty. But it often comes to pass, that those very things 'emselves which are Honest, Rival as it were, and come into Competition with one another, so as to make it be another Question, Of two that are Honest, which is the most so? which is a Point not mention'd at all by Panaetius. For the whole of Virtue receiving its Rise from those four Foun∣tains: First, Prudence, or the Knowledge of Truth. Secondly, Justice, or or doing Good to the Com∣munity and Society of Mankind. Thirdly, Forti∣tude, or Greatness of Soul. And, Lastly, Tempe∣rance, or Moderation; it can't but happen, that se∣veral of these must be compar'd together, before we can be able to satisfie our selves, which 'tis our Duty to prefer before which. First then, b 1.2 If

the Duties of Justice, or preserving the Commu∣nity, and those of Prudence, or the Knowledge of Truth, should come into Competition one with another; the former, I think, should take place of the latter, as being more Consonant to the Dictates of Nature, which may easily be prov'd by this fol∣lowing Argument: Suppose a Wise Man to be in such a place, as afforded him all the Conveniencies of Life, and all the Opportunities of Leisure in a∣bundance, so that he might Study and Contem∣plate every thing, that was any ways worthy his Knowledge or Contemplation; yet were he wholly depriv'd of all Company, and had no body ever come near him to be seen, he'd quickly be tired and grow weary of his Life. Again, The Princi∣pal of all the Virtues is that sort of Wisdom which the Greeks call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; (for as for that which they call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and we Prudentia, 'tis a thing of a perfectly different Nature, as being no more than The Skill of discerning what 'tis that we ought, or ought not, to do:) but that sort of Wisdom which I said was the Principal, is, c 1.3 The Knowledge of things both Divine and Human; and so comprehends the Society and Relation of Men with the Gods, and with one another. If then this, as most certainly 'tis, be the greatest Virtue; it follows that the Du∣ties, which flow from Society, must as certainly be the greatest: For the deepest Knowledge and Contemplation of Nature, is but a very lame and imperfect Business, unless it proceed and tend for∣ward to Action: Now the Occasions wherein it can shew it self best, consist in maintaining the In∣terests

of Men, and of consequence belong to the Society of Mankind: from whence it follows, That the Maintaining of this should in reason take place before Learning and Knowledge. d 1.4 Nor is this a∣ny more, than what all good Men shew they judge to be true, by their Actions and Practices: For who's there so wholly addicted to Contemplation and the Study of Nature, as that, if his Country should fall into Danger, while he was in one of his noblest Researches, he would immediately throw all aside, and run to its Relief with all possible speed; nay, tho' he thought he might number the Stars, or take the just Dimensions of the whole World? And the same would he do in case of any Danger to a Friend or a Parent. From all which things it undeniably appears, That the Duties of Knowledge and Searching for Truth, are oblig'd to give way to the Duties of Justice, which consist in upholding Society among Men; than which there is nothing we should be more concern'd for.

Notes

• a 1.1

  He has now done with his four Heads of Honesty, Pru∣dence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance; and shewn the Nature, and laid down some Rules concerning each of 'em; by comparing any of our Actions with which, we may dis∣cover whether they are Honest or Dishonest, agreeable or not agreeable to the Rules of Virtue; which was the first gene∣ral Head of Deliberation he propos'd to speak to. [See chap. 3.] The second was, Of two, which are both Honest, which is to be preferr'd? which he now proceeds to.
• b 1.2

  Of the Duties of Prudence and Justice, which are both apparently good and honest, the latter he proves should take place of the former: i. e. Study and Contemplation, which are Actions of Prudence, ought to be laid aside, if occasion so require, for the sake of doing Good to Mankind, which is a part of Justice.
• c 1.3

  See Note 2. on chap. 2. Book 2.
• d 1.4

  Having prov'd his Assertion by Reasons, he proceeds to shew, That 'tis what the wisest Men in the World have al∣ways thought.