Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author.

CHAP. II.

The Reasons why he Writes upon this Subject. The ge∣neral Use and Importance of it. All Philosophers have handled it; tho' some, by their false Notions of Happiness and Misery, utterly pervert it. What Sects they are, that have a Right to lay down any Rules or Precepts concerning it. He designs in this Work to follow the Stoicks principally. The Subject of a Discourse ought first to be defin'd, before we be∣gin to say any thing upon it.

BUt having resolv'd to write some thing at pre∣sent, and a great many others hereafter to you, I thought I could begin upon no better Argument, than that which is fittest for your Age, and most becoming my Authority as a Father: For, of all those useful and important Subjects, which Philo∣sophers have handled so largely and accurately, the Precepts they have deliver'd about a 1.1 Offices or Du∣ties, seem of the largest extent and comprehension: For they take in every part of our Lives, so that whatever we go about, whether of publick or pri∣vate Affairs, whether at home or abroad, whether consider'd barely by our selves, or as we stand in relation to other People, we lye constantly under an Obligation to some Duties; and, as all the Vir∣tue

and Credit of our Lives proceeds from the due Discharge of This, so all the Baseness and Turpi∣tude of 'em results from the Non-observance of It. Now, tho' this be a Subject which all Philosophers have busied themselves about, (for, who ever dar'd to assume that Name without laying down some Instructions about Duty?) yet have some b 1.2 Sects of 'em given such accounts of Man's Happiness and Misery, as destroy the very Being of Virtue and Honesty. For he that makes any thing his chiefest Good, wherein Justice or Virtue does not bear a part, and sets up Profit, not Honesty for the Mea∣sure of his Happiness; as long as he acts in con∣formity with his own Principles, and is not over∣rul'd by meer Dictates of Reason and Humanity, can never do the Offices of Friendship, Justice or Liberality. Nor can he be ever a Man of Courage, who thinks that Pain is the greatest Evil; or he of Temperance, who imagins Pleasure to be the Sovereign Good. Which things are all so obvious and plain, that one would think they could never stand in need of a Dispute: however, I have large∣ly

discours'd upon them in c 1.3 another Work. These Sects therefore, unless they are resolv'd to be in∣consistent with themselves, ought wholly to abstain from speaking any thing about Duties: Nor in∣deed can any constant, unalterable, d 1.4 rational Rules of them at all be given, unless it be by those who go upon this Principle, e 1.5 That 'tis Virtue a∣lone, or at least That chiefly, which ought to be de∣sir'd for its own sake. So that only the f 1.6 Stoicks, g 1.7 Academicks and h 1.8 Peripateticks, have a Right to lay down any Rules upon this Subject: For as to the Opinion of i 1.9 Aristo, Pyrrho and Herillus, that has been exploded a good while ago; who might have claim'd a Priviledge to treat about Duties, as well as the former three, had they but left a possibility

of Chusing, and allow'd at least so much Difference between things, as to put us into a capacity of find∣ing out our Duty, and distinguishing it from that, which is not so. I shall k 1.10 follow therefore at this time, and on this Subject more especially the Sto∣icks; not as a bare Translator of them, but (accor∣ding to my usual Custom) shall take out of their Stores so much, and after such a manner, as in my own Judgment I shall think most convenient. See∣ing then the whole of our following Discourse is design'd to be about Offices or Duties, I think 'twill be necessary for me in the first place, to l 1.11 determin and fix the Signification of the word Office, which I

can't but admire to find omitted by m 1.12 Panaetius: for every clear and rational Discourse upon any Sub∣ject, ought first to begin with an Explication of that Subject, that so we may have a distinct Con∣ception of what we are afterwards to discourse a∣bout.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Officium in our Author, which I beg leave to render either Office or Duty, signifies especially two things; Some∣times the Duty or Obligation it self, as when he says, Pere∣grini Officium est, 'Tis the Duty of a Stranger, i. e. He is oblig'd to do so, or so, &c. At other times, the Action whereby that Duty is perform'd, as when he divides Offi∣cia, Virtues, into media and perfecta, ordinary and compleat ones: so Officia Justitiae, liberalitatis, &c. are the Actions of those Virtues; which may be worth observing thro' the whole Work.
• b 1.2

  He means chiefly the Epicureans, who made Man's Happiness to consist in Pleasure, and his Misery in Pain, which is indeed to subvert the very Foundations of Honesty. For seeing there is nothing that Men will not do, for the obtaining their chief Good, and avoiding the greatest Evil; it necessarily follows, that (as long as they act consistently with their Principles) these Men will betray their Friends, break their Oaths, or do any thing in the World, rather than forego any Pleasure, or endure any Pain. Therefore he has reason to say, They can never do the Duties of Friend∣ship, &c. For certainly, if I count Pleasure my greatest Good, I shall rather part with my Honesty than that; and if I reckon Pain the greatest of Evils, I'll rather lose a Friend, be Unmerciful, or Unjust, than ever undergo it. The same may be said of those that place their Happiness in Ri∣ches, Honours, &c. and their Misery in the contrary. See Tusc. Quest. 2. 6.
• c 1.3

  His Books De finibus Bonorum & Malorum.
• d 1.4

  'Tis a Stoical Principle, That the Happiness of Man con∣sists in acting agreeably to his Nature; by Nature, under∣standing nothing else but Right Reason, whereby Man is di∣stinguish'd from all other Creatures. By conjuncta naturae, therefore in this place, I suppose he means, such as are a∣greeable to the Dictates and Rules of Right Reason, i. e. Rational.
• e 1.5

  For if any thing else may be desir'd more than Virtue, I may part with my Virtue for obtaining of it; and by con∣sequence can't observe any settled, unalterable Rules of Du∣ty.
• f 1.6

  Who held that nothing was good or desirable for its own sake, but Virtue or Honesty.
• g 1.7

  Who deny'd there was any such thing as Certainty, and were not tied to any particular Opinions, but always follow'd what appear'd most probable; tho' generally in∣clining to the Peripateticks. See Book 2. ch. 2. Book 3. ch. 4.
• h 1.8

  Who held that Virtue was the chief, and abundantly most desirable Good, [See Book 3. ch. 3.] but yet allow'd the Name of Good to some other things, viz. Riches, Friends, Health, &c. which the Stoicks did not.
• i 1.9

  These three Philosophers were of different Opinions a∣bout Man's Happiness; Aristo and Pyrrho making it consist in Virtue alone, with a perfect indifference as to every thing else, such as Health, Riches, Honours, &c. [See Cicer. de Fin. Book 4. ch. 16. Acad. Quest. Book 4. ch. 42.] Herillus made it to consist in Knowledge, with a like indifference. Tho' they did disagree therefore in their Notions of Hap∣piness, yet they were all agreed in what Cicero here taxes them with, viz. taking away all delectus rerum, difference, or power of Chusing, between things: by which means they left no aditus (as he speaks) ad inventionem Officii, no way of finding out what is our Duty. For how can that Pru∣dence which is seen in wisely chusing one thing before ano∣ther, have any place, if all things are equally in themselves indifferent? And if there be no difference between Sick∣ness and Health, Riches and Poverty, and 'tis as good for a Man to be in one, as the other of these, this takes away all obligation of assisting those, who are in Sickness or Want; seeing, according to this Opinion, they are not any wise in a worse condition, than the Healthy or Rich: and by consequence all Justice, Charity, Bounty, &c. must fall to the Ground. This is what Cicero often objects to them, That they did Virtutem ipsam, quam amplexabantur, tollere; take away and ruin, by just consequence, that Virtue, in which their Opinion made Happiness to consist. See Cic. de Fin. Book 2. ch. 13. and several other places.
• k 1.10

  For being an Academick, he was not tied to any Set of Opinions, but allow'd to chuse that, which he thought most probable; whether Stoick, Peripatetick, or any other.
• l 1.11

  The word definire does not necessarily signifie to de∣fine, in the strict acceptation of that word; but in a lar∣ger sence, to set bounds to the meaning and signification of any word.
• m 1.12

  An eminent Stoick, Scholar of Antipater Tarsensis or Sidonius. He writ three Books concerning Offices, which Cicero follows in this Work. He was a Rhodian by birth, and greatly admir'd for his Learning and Wisdom by the second Africanus, and the wise Laelius, &c. Gicero often makes honourable mention of him, calling him. One of the greatest of all the Stoicks, and worthy of that Familiarity with those two great Men.