Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author.

CHAP. XIX.

Courage is not truely a Virtue, unless it be accompany'd with Justice, Truth, &c. An excellent Definition of it giv'n by the Stoicks. An admirable Saying of Plato to the same purpose. Men of great Souls are apt to be Ungovernable and Ambitious; which prompts 'em to Injustice. A Man of a truly noble Spirit never Injures another, but Protects from In∣juries; scorns Applause, and the Voice of the igno∣rant Multitude.

BUt that sort of a 1.1 Courage which is seen in the Dangers and Fatigues of War, unless a Man be govern'd by the Rules of Justice, and fight for the Safety and Good of the Publick, and not for particular Ends of his own, is altogether blamable; and so far from being a part of true Virtue, that 'tis indeed a piece of the most barbarous Inhuma∣nity. Fortitude therefore is very well defin'd by the Stoick Philosophers, when they call it, b 1.2 A Vir∣tue contending for Justice and Honesty. No man therefore by Baseness and Treachery has ever got the Name and Reputation of true Courage; for no∣thing can ever be Virtuous or Credible, that is not Just. To which purpose, that of Plato was admi∣rably well said,

As that sort of Knowledge, which is not directed by the Rules of Justice,

ought rather to have the Name of Design and Subtilty, than Wisdom and Prudence; just so that bold and adventurous Mind, which is hurried by the Stream of its own Passions, and not for the Good and Advantage of the Publick, should ra∣ther have the Name of Fool-hardy and Daring, than Valiant and Couragious.

The first thing therefore I'd have in a truely couragious Man, is, c 1.3 That he be a Follower of Goodness and fair Dealing, of Truth and Sincerity; which are principal and constituent parts of Justice. But here 'tis one very unhappy thing, that most times these great and exalted Minds are naturally ungovernable and de∣sirous of Rule: So that what Plato observ'd of the Spartans, That all their Customs had no other Aim, but to get the Superiority, may fitly enough be ap∣ply'd to these Persons: for the more any Man has of this Greatness of Soul, the more eager he is of being a Sharer in the Government, or rather of obtaining it wholly to himself: And 'tis no easie matter to be fair and equitable in all one's Actions, (which is the proper and peculiar Office of Justice) while one is en∣deavouring to make himself uppermost. From hence it comes to pass, that they'll never be conquer'd in any Debates, or over-rul'd by the Laws and Con∣stitutions

of the Publick; but make it their busi∣ness by Factions and Bribery to get a strong Party and Interest in the Republick; and rather choose to be Uppermost by Force and Injustice, than E∣qual to others by fair and upright Dealing. But the difficulty of it can only serve to make it more Honourable, d 1.4 but never its contrary more Excusa∣ble: For no sort of Case or Circumstance whatever, can excuse any Man for being guilty of Injustice. Those are therefore your truly brave and couragi∣ous Men, not who Rob, Plunder and Injure others, but those who Secure and Protect 'em from Injuries. But that Greatness of Mind, which is truly such, and under the direction of Wisdom and Prudence, makes that Honour and Credit, which we natural∣ly desire, not consist in the outward imaginary Ap∣plause, but in the real intrinsick Goodness of its Actions; and is not so eager of appearing to be greater and better than others, as of really being so. For he that is so mean as to depend upon the giddy and ignorant Multitude, ought never to be account∣ed of a truly great and exalted Spirit: Besides that, there's nothing so easily draws Men to Acts of In∣justice, as a Loftiness of Mind, when joyn'd with this foolish Desire of Applause. e 1.5 This is indeed a

very dangerous Place, and requires our greatest Concern and Watchfulness; because you shall hard∣ly find any Man, that, when he has gone thro' La∣bours and Difficulties, does not expect this Ho∣nour and Applause, as a kind of Reward for his Courage and Atchievements.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Fighting stoutly, and undergoing Dangers, is not enough to give a Man the Name and Reputation of Valour, unless he do it in a good Cause, by fair means, &c.
• b 1.2

  'Tis not true Courage therefore to be bold in Sinning; nor is a sign of a faint-hearted Spirit, to be afraid of com∣mitting what indeed is a Fault: There are some things (as Aristotle well observes) which a Man of true Courage ought to fear, and 'tis a shame for him not so do it. 'Twere well if this could be consider'd by some Men, who think it a brave and heroick piece of Greatness, to live in open Defiance of the Laws, and let the World see they arn't afraid of the Gallows: who defie Heaven out of a meer Bravado, and af∣front the Almighty, that they mayn't seem such Cowards as to be afraid of Hell. The truth on't is, there's hardly any thing occasions more Evil in the World, than Men's having false Notions of this Virtue; and would they but take this Definition along with 'em, they would not talk so much of being Couragious in Wickedness, nor call others, Men of low, mean and pitiful Souls for being afraid of Sinning.
• c 1.3

  These Words must be taken in a limited Sence, not as tho' Cunning and Stratagem were unlawful, but only as ex∣clusive of Perfidiousness and Treachery.
• d 1.4

  I have added these Words to my Author, because the Sence seems plainly to require 'em, or something like 'em. He had just been saying, That Men of great Souls are natu∣rally apt to run into Jnjustice, for the raising of their For∣tunes; and that 'tis very difficult for 'em not to do so: But fearing lest this should be urg'd as an Excuse for 'em, he takes care to prevent it by saying, That the Difficulty of it enhances the Credit; and then adds, Nullum est enim, &c. which words seem to give a Reason why the Difficulty of adhering to Justice in this case, will by no means serve to ex∣cuse Injustice: For, says he, no sort of Case, &c.
• e 1.5

  That is, He that has gotten this Loftiness of Mind, is in very great danger of being desirous of Applause, (very few being otherwise) and by consequence, of falling into Inju∣stice: and therefore he ought to be the more careful as to this particular.