The five days debate at Cicero's house in Tusculum between master and sophister.

THE CONTENTS Of the First BOOK. Comforts against Death. The Prologue, Sect. 1, 2, 3, 4.

• SECT. I. THAT the Greeks were inferior to the Romans, in most Points of useful know∣ledge. Page 1.
• SECT. II. However Superior in Poetry, Pictures, Musick and Geometry. P. 3.
• SECT. III. Equall'd by them in Oratory; which is encou∣ragement to set upon Philosophy. P. 5.
• SECT. IV. Philosophy joyn'd with Oratory, is more bene∣ficial. P. 6.
• ...

• ... SECT. V. The Position that the Proponent taketh Death to be Evil. P. 8.
• SECT. VI. The local Hell of the Poets to be fictitious. P. 10.
• SECT. VII. They who are not, are not miserable. P. 12.
• SECT. VIII. Nor is dying miserable, but essay'd to be prov'd rather good. P. 14.
• SECT. IX. What Death is. What the Soul, in vulgar opi∣nion. P. 16.
• SECT. X. What it is in the judgment of divers Philosophers. P. 17.
• SECT. XI. Inferences from these different Opinions. P. 19.
• SECT. XII. Arguments for the Souls subsistence after death, from immemorial Tradition, from Funeral Rites, and from the veneration of ancient Heroes. P. 21.
• SECT. XIII. From this, that there is a Tradition of the Superior Gods, having been Men deceas'd. P. 23.
• ...

• ... SECT. XIV. From an innate care of Posterity; Zeal for the State. P. 25.
• SECT. XV—And thirst after Glory. P. 26.
• SECT. XVI. That dead mens Souls abide in Caverns under Earth, is the groundless Fiction of Poets, or imposture of Magicians. P. 28.
• SECT. XVII. That it is more likely they ascend. P. 30.
• SECT. XVIII. Nor vanish. P. 32.
• SECT. XIX. But mount the Sky. P. 33.
• SECT. XX. And thence contemplate Nature. P. 35.
• SECT. XXI. That the Epicureans who plead for Annihilation, have no such reason to triumph in their Scheme of Natural knowledge improved. P. 37.
• SECT. XXII. An immaterial Substance, though invisible, may subsist of it self, as God so the Soul. P. 38.
• SECT. XXIII. Arguments for the immortality of the Soul, from its being the principle of its own Moti∣on. P. 40.
• ...

• ... SECT. XXIV. From the capaciousness of its memory. P. 41.
• SECT. XXV. Corollaries upon the former Arguments, from that of Invention. P. 44.
• SECT. XXVI. From further Endowments. P. 46.
• SECT. XXVII. From its Divine Original. P. 48.
• SECT. XXVIII. From its Faculties. P. 49.
• SECT. XXIX. From its Nature. P. 51.
• SECT. XXX. From the Authority of Socrates and Cato. P. 52.
• SECT. XXXI. From the Sequestring it self from the Body, in Meditation, as in Death. P. 54.
• SECT. XXXII. The Adversaries of the Souls immortality con∣futed. P. 56.
• SECT. XXXIII. The Arguments of Panaetius answer'd. P. 58.
• SECT. XXXIV. Upon Supposition of the Souls mortality, Death is not evil, being a departure from Evils. P. 59.
• ...

• ... SECT. XXXV. Or from uncertain Goods. P. 61.
• SECT. XXXVI. Such as we shall not miss. P. 63.
• SECT. XXXVII. Since it hath not appear'd dreadful even to com∣mon Souldiers. P. 65.
• SECT. XXXVIII. Much less should it hinder promoting the publick Good; but as Death is not terrible, so neither is it amiable. P. 67.
• SECT. XXXIX. The opinion of untimely Death examined. P. 68.
• SECT. XL. We must live in our places undaunted, and when our time is come, dye contented after the ex∣ample of Theramenes. P. 70.
• ... SECT. XLI. Socrates. P. 72.
• SECT. XLII. The Spartans. P. 73.
• SECT. XLIII. And Theodorus the Cyrenian. A digression to the Point of Burial. P. 75.
• SECT. XLIV. Cruelty towards dead Enemies, and lamenting unburied Friends reproved. P. 77.
• SECT. XLV. The Customs of some Savages herein condemn'd; what decency to be observed in interment of the dead. P. 80.
• ...

• ... SECT. XLVI. Glory after death, should abate the fear of dy∣ing in prosperity. P. 82.
• SECT. XLVII. An Epilogue after the mode of the Greek Rhe∣toricians, who would perswade us that Death is the greatest good that can befall man, and that from Divine Testimonies. P. 84.
• SECT. XLVIII. From those of Demi-gods, Oracles, and Panegy∣rical Commemorations of such as have dy'd for their Country. P. 87.
• SECT. XLIX. The Close of all, applys the substance of the pre∣sent Debate, to the Readers benefit. P. 89.

THE CONTENTS Of the Second BOOK. Patience under Pain. The Proem, Sect, 1, 2, 3, 4.

• SECT. I. THE benefit of Philosophy. P. 92.
• SECT. II. That the Academick Scheme is cautious and modest. P. 95.
• SECT. III. The Epicurean only regarded by its own Fol∣lowers. P. 97.
• SECT. IV. The bad lives of some Teachers only scandal to their Persons, not Doctrines. P. 99.
• ...

• ... SEOT. V. The Position maketh Pain the greatest of all Evils. P. 101.
• SECT. VI. The different Maxims of Philosophers on that Subject. P. 103.
• SECT. VII. Epicurus contradicts himself herein. The Tra∣gical Impatiences of Philoctetes. P. 104.
• ... SECT. VIII. IX. Hercules. P. 106. 108.
• ... SECT. X. Prometheus. P. 109.
• SECT. XI. Digression against the Poets. P. 111.
• SECT. XII. And some Heterodox Philosophers. P. 114.
• SECT. XIII. Pain must not betray us to indecent carriage. P. 115.
• SECT. XIV. Must be oppos'd with Courage. P. 117.
• SECT. XV. Inuring to labour, disposeth to a patient enduring of Pain. P. 120.
• SECT. XVI. XVII. The Power of Exercise. P. 121. 123.
• SECT. XVIII. The force of Reason. P. 126.
• SECT. XIX. The direction of Epicurus impracticable. P. 127.
• ...

• ... SECT. XX. Vertue personated making her Exhortation. p. 129.
• SECT. XXI. The manner of subduing our Passion to Reason. p. 130.
• SECT. XXII. Armour against Impatience. p. 133.
• SECT. XXIII. Faintness of Spirit dishonourable. p. 136.
• SECT. XXIV. Resolution necessary to War. p. 137.
• SECT. XXV.—in Tryals at home. p. 140.
• SECT. XXVI.—and in all laudable Enterprises. p. 142.
• SECT. XXVII. Our Patience must be of equal Temper, as to the Field in Battle, or the Bed of Sickness. p. 144.

THE CONTENTS Of the Third BOOK. The Cure of Discontent. Premis'd in Sect. 1, 2, 3.

• SECT. I. THE Reluctancy of depraved Man against his Souls Cure; with some Causes of his Depravity. p. 148.
• SECT. II. Further Causes of the Depravation of Humane Nature. p. 150.
• SECT. III. That the Soul may have Remedies for its Di∣stempers. p. 151.
• ...

• ... SECT. IV. The Position offers it as a probable opinion, that a Wise man is liable to Discontent. p. 153.
• SECT. V. That men imported by Passions are Mad. p. 154.
• SECT. VI. The absurdity of denying a Wise man all use of the Affections, is declin'd. p. 157.
• SECT. VII. The Position impugn'd by an Argument from the Topick of Fortitude. p. 158.
• SECT. VIII. By another from that of Temperance. p. 160.
• SECT. IX. By an Induction from particular Passions, as of Wrath, Envy. p. 161.
• SECT. X. And Pitty. p. 163.
• SECT. XI. The Cause of Dissatisfaction is a mistake in Judgment. p. 165.
• SECT. XII. The Picture of Discontent in certain unfortunate Princes. p. 167.
• SECT. XIII. We should not despair whatever our Circum∣stances be. p. 169.
• ...

• ... SECT. XIV. Meditation on possible Mishaps abates their Evil when come. p. 170.
• SECT. XV. Is also ground of Constancy. p. 172.
• SECT. XVI. The contrary Tenet of Epicurus and his Fol∣lowers. p. 174.
• SECT. XVII. The true Remedy assign'd. p. 175.
• SECT. XVIII. And verified in the Case of Thyestes, Aeetes, Telamon. p. 177.
• SECT. XIX. And Andromache. p. 180.
• SECT. XX. Epicurus prov'd inconstant to his own Princi∣ples. p. 182.
• SECT. XXI. The stoutness of the Epicureans taken down. p. 184.
• SECT. XXII. The judgment of the Cyrenian Sect, how far al∣lowable. p. 185.
• SECT. XXIII. Forecast of possible Calamities is needful. p. 187.
• SECT. XXIV. The use of Presidents. p. 189.
• ...

• ... SECT. XXV. The Cavil, that the common condition of Mor∣tality, is ineffectual in point of Comfort, ex∣amin'd. p. 191.
• SECT. XXVI. Trouble of mind to be a Duty, is a mistake. p. 192.
• SECT. XXVII. Farther illustrated. p. 194.
• SECT. XXVIII. That mistake rectify'd by Consideration, that our Sorrow availeth nothing. p. 196.
• SECT. XXIX. That the matter of our disquiet is by misap∣prehension, aggravated beyond its own Na∣ture. p. 199.
• SECT. XXX. That Motives of Consolation too often prove ineffectual, proceeds not from defect in them, but our own Indisposition. p. 201.
• SECT. XXXI. Directory for Comforters, as to the Season. p. 203.
• SECT. XXXII.—the Method. p. 204.
• SECT. XXXIII. That it is a Duty not to be swallow'd up of Grief. p. 205.
• ...

• ... SECT. XXXIV. A Passage clear'd to the Remedies of Dis∣quiet arising from the particular Passions. p. 207.

THE CONTENTS Of the Fourth BOOK. The Government of the Passions. The Preface, Sect. 1, 2, 3.

• SECT. I. THE ancient Romans, probably not Strangers to polite Learning, because Borderers upon Greece the Great. p. 209.
• SECT. II. Because acquainted with Musick, Poetry, and Oratory. p. 211.
• SECT. III. But Philosophy was of later date with the Ro∣mans. p. 212.
• ...

• ... SECT. IV. The Position. That it is probable th•••• a wise man is not free from all Passion. p. 214.
• SECT. V. The method of the ensuing Disputation. p. 216.
• SECT. VI. The Definition of the Passions in general. p. 217.
• SECT. VII. The Intellect to be accessary to the Passions. p. 219.
• SECT. VIII. The subordinate Passions defin'd; those under Discontent and Fear. p. 220.
• SECT. IX. Those under Pleasure and Lust. p. 222.
• SECT. X. The Original of the Souls Distempers. p. 223.
• SECT. XI. The Cause of Passion and Antipathy. p. 224.
• SECT. XII. The Analogy between the Souls and Bodies Sick∣ness in ill habits. p. 226.
• SECT. XIII. The Similitude between Soundness and Unsound∣ness of Body and Soul. p. 227.
• SECT. XIV. Their Dissimilitude. p. 229.
• SECT. XV. The Cure of the Souls Infirmities. p. 230.
• ...

• ... SECT. XVI.—Especially to be in Moderation. p. 231.
• SECT. XVII. This Moderation to be peculiar to the wise man. p. 233.
• SECT. XVIII. That the object of this Moderation, must not be Vice. p. 235.
• SECT. XIX. The Peripateticks opinion about moderating the Passions—of Anger and Lust. p. 236.
• SECT. XX—And Discontent. p. 238.
• SECT. XXI. Against this moderation is oppos'd the Stoicks definition of the Passions. p. 239.
• SECT. XXII. That magnanimity is not the product of Anger. p. 240.
• SECT. XXIII.—but Reason. p. 242.
• SECT. XXIV. This use of Anger confuted. p. 243.
• SECT. XXV. The Indignation of Orators, Displeasure of Pa∣rents, and other Governors, regular. p. 245.
• SECT. XXVI. The pretended benefit of the other Passions dis∣prov'd. p. 246.
• SECT. XXVII. Whence the Remedies of other Prailties are to be drawn. p. 248.
• ...

• ... SECT. XXVIII. The most certain method of Cure, is to convince that all Passions are of themselves culpable. p. 249.
• SECT. XXIX. Laying open the Changes common to our conditi∣on, allays excessive Grief. p. 251.
• SECT. XXX. The like Remedy of Fear. p. 252.
• SECT. XXXI. The difference between Mirth and Joy. p. 253.
• SECT. XXXII. The scandalousness of Mirth and Lust. p. 255.
• SECT. XXXIII. Inordinate Love tax'd in Poets. p. 256.
• SECT. XXXIV. But more in Philosophers. p. 257.
• SECT. XXXV. The Remedy of Love. p. 259.
• SECT. XXXVI—Of Anger. p. 260.
• SECT. XXXVII. The Cause of Passions, an opinion that they are our Duty. p. 262.
• SECT. XXXVIII. The Cure of them in rectifying that mistake. p. 264.

THE CONTENTS Of the Fifth BOOK. The chief End of Man. The Preamble Sect. 1, 2, 3, 4.

• SECT. I. THE efficacy of Vertue is not to be valu'd by our faint-heartedness. p. 266.
• SECT. II. Philosophy is the Rule of Life. p. 268.
• SECT. III. The Study of Wisdom is of the same standing with man. p. 270.
• SECT. IV. Pythagoras was Founder of the Italian Sect. p. 272.
• ...

• ... SECT. V. The Position holds, that in the Proponents judg∣ment, Vertue alone is not sufficient to Hap∣piness. p. 273.
• SECT. VI. Peace of mind ariseth from Vertue alone. p. 276.
• SECT. VII. In Moral Subjects we must dilate on the Proofs. p. 278.
• SECT. VIII. Whether Vertue alone be sufficient to render one happy, but not most happy. p. 280.
• SECT. IX. Of the three sorts of Goods. p. 282.
• SECT. X. The Peripateticks accus'd of inconsistency, but Epicurus much more. p. 284.
• SECT. XI. That the Stoicks cavil about words. p. 287.
• SECT. XII. That nothing should be called good but Vertue, is vindicated to have been the Tenet of So∣crates. p. 289.
• SECT. XIII. That Nature hath produced all things perfect in themselves. p. 290.
• SECT. XIV. The Perfection of man is properly in his mind. p. 292.
• ...

• ... SECT. XV. That only what is Honest is Good. p. 294.
• SECT. XVI. Such as is the disposition of mind, such is the Life. p. 296.
• SECT. XVII. Only what may be gloried in is good. p. 298.
• SECT. XVIII. The same was also maintain'd by the more reso∣lute Peripateticks. p. 299.
• SECT. XIX. The Dissimilitude between Vertue and Vice, ex∣emplified in the Troubles in Cicero's Touth. p. 300.
• SECT. XX. The ugliness of Usurpation represented in Dio∣nysius the Elder; by his Fears. p. 303.
• SECT. XXI. Demonstrated to his Court-flatterer. p. 305.
• SECT. XXII. And by the consequent of those Fears, his want of Friends. p. 306.
• SECT. XXIII. The praise of a vertuous Life, in Archimedes and the Philosophers. p. 308.
• SECT. XXIV. The Exercise of a Wise man is Contemplation of Nature. p. 310.
• ...

• ... SECT. XXV. Good Manners, right Reasoning, discharge of his place, just Government. p. 311.
• SECT. XXVI. The wise man is happy, though in Adversity. p. 313.
• SECT. XXVII. Objection from Pain against the self-sufficiency of Vertue answer'd. p. 315.
• SECT. XXVIII. The wise man is happy, though he be on the Rack. p. 319.
• SECT. XXIX. Whether the Peripateticks may consistently with themselves hold what the Stoicks do. p. 320.
• SECT. XXX. The different Opinions about the chief Good. p. 321.
• SECT. XXXI. The denomination of the whole is from the greater part. p. 323.
• SECT. XXXII. and in 33, 34, 35. A Plea for Poverty. p. 324.
• SECT. XXXIII. That Pleasures may be purchas'd at an easie rate. p. 326.
• SECT. XXXIV. Examples of a light Diet in the Lacedemoni∣ans and Persians. p. 328.
• SECT. XXXV—And in the Academy. p. 329.
• ...

• ... SECT. XXXVI. A Defence of obscurity in Birth and Condition. p. 331.
• SECT. XXXVII. Supports under Banishment. p. 333.
• SECT. XXXVIII & XXXIX. Blindness. p. 336, 338.
• SECT. XL. Deafness. p. 340.
• SECT. XLI. That it is an opinion, almost universally, held by the Philosophers, that wise men are always happy. p. 342.

The End of the Contents.