The five days debate at Cicero's house in Tusculum between master and sophister.

The chief End of Man. The Preamble Sect. 1, 2, 3, 4. (Book 5)

Book V. (Book 5)

SECT. I. The efficacy of Vertue is not to be valu'd by our faint-heartedness.

THIS fifth day, most worthy Brutus, will put an end to our Tusculan Disputations, on which day was debated, that which of all Subjects you most approve; for I perceive by that Book which you writ to me with great exactness, and your many Discourses, that you are zealously of the opinion that Vertue is self∣sufficient to Happiness; which though it be hard to demonstrate, by reason of the many and diverse Tortures by Fortune inflicted; yet is it of such moment, that it deserves all pains to be employ'd, in order to the clearing of it up; since there is no∣thing treated of in all Philosophy, which is more Grave and Gallant to maintain; for whereas that was their Motive, who first apply'd to the Study of Philosophy, to cast all their other business aside,

and put themselves wholly upon searching out the best State of Life; certainly they laid out so much care and pains in that Study, out of hopes to live happily. Now if Vertue have been by them com∣pleatly stated, and if an interest in Vertue be suf∣ficient to happiness of Life, who is there but must think that the Pains in studying Philosophy, was to excellent purpose both laid out by them, and undertaken by us; but if Vertue expos'd to diverse and uncertain hazards, be the handmaid of For∣tune, and not of Power enough to defend it self; I fear we must rather pray for happiness, than aspire to it in any assurance of Vertue. And in truth when I consider within my self those changes wherein Fortune hath greatly exercis'd me; I be∣gin to call this opinion into some question; and at times to dread the weakness and frailty of Mankind; for I fear, as Nature hath given us feeble Bodies, and fasten'd to them both incurable Diseases, and intolerable Pains; so least she have given us Souls also, both jointly sympathizing with bodily Pains, and severally incumber'd with Disquiets and An∣guishes of their own. But herein I correct my self, that I judge of the strength of Vertue, by the softness of others, and perhaps my own, not by Vertue it self. For that, if any such thing there be as Vertue ( (b) which, Brutus, your Uncle put out of doubt) counts all things incident to man beneath it self, and looks down upon the changes of Humane Life with contempt; for, being utterly blameless, it chargeth it self with no other concern, than to preserve its own in∣tegrity. But we both increasing all future Adver∣sities with Fear, and present ones with Vexation, choose rather to condemn Nature, than acknow∣ledge our own Error.

(a) I fear we must rather pray for Happiness, than aspire to it in any assurance of Vertue.] That man was ordain'd to Vertue and Happiness is evident; that our Nature was ori∣ginally perfect, and to act according to it, had been suffi∣cient to the attaining to that end, cannot, I think, justly he deny'd, that our Reasons and Wills are yet the Powers and Faculties by which only we can act as Men. What is said here, I fear we must rather pray for Happiness, than aspire to it in any assurance, is undoubtedly a Proverbial Loquntion to this purpose. We must cry out God help us, and surcease all endeavours of our own; which is unwar∣rantable, as tending to discourage Industry. In a Storm the Pilot must not quit the Stern, nor other Sea-men their Quarter, as they expect the Ship should ever be safe. Since our Nature is deprav'd, could we retrieve lost Perfection, it were not of it self sufficient to the recovery of Happiness, because the non-incurring a new Debt, doth not quit the old Arrear; yet have we grounds of hope, that sincerity of endeavours shall not want acceptance, through another Co∣venant vouchsafed to Man-kind.

(b) Which Brutus, your Uncle.] M. Porcius Cato Uti∣censis, the Brother of Servilia Mother to Brutus.

CHAP. II. Philosophy is the Rule of Life.

BUT the whole correcting both of this fault, and all other our Vices and Misdemeanors is to be fetch'd from Philosophy, into whose bosom our Choice and Affections having guided us from our very Childhood, we after being toss'd with a great Storm, are fled upon these most grievous turns of State, into the same Harbour from whence we had put forth. O Philosophy thou Guide of Life, In∣structress in Vertue, and Correctress of Vices, what

could not only we be, but the very Life of men without thee? thou hast founded Cities; thou hast invited scatter'd men to live in Communities; thou hast link'd them one to another, first in Ha∣bitations, then in Marriages, and then in Commu∣nication by Letters and Words; thou wast the In∣ventress of Laws; thou the Mistress of Manners and Discipline; we fly to thee; seek help from thee; to thee we commit our selves, as formerly in great part, so now entirely and in whole; for one day led well, and according to thy Precepts, is to be prefer'd before an immortality in Vice. Whose succors therefore should we rather make use of than thine, who hast both freely bestow'd on us Tranquillity of Life, and taken away from us the Terror of Death; yet Philosophy is so far from receiving Praise suitable to the Benefits she hath confer'd on man's Life; that she is by the most slighted, nay by many revil'd. O that any one should dare to villifie the Parent of Life, and stain his Conscience with such Parricide! should offer to be so unnatu∣ral and ungrateful, as to accuse her, whom he ought to reverence, although he could not com∣prehend; but this errour, and gross darkness is, in my opinion, cast over the minds of the igno∣rant, because they are not able to look so far back∣wards; nor do think, that they were the Philoso∣phers by whom first the Life of men was civiliz'd. Which thing, though we see to have been most an∣cient, yet we confess the name to be but modern.

SECT. III. The Study of Wisdom of the same standing with man.

FOR as to Wisdom, who can deny it to be an∣cient, not for the thing only, but also the name, which acquir'd this honourable name among the Ancients, from the knowing of Divine and Hu∣mane things; as also the Elements and Causes of every being. Therefore have we receiv'd by Tra∣dition, of those seven, that they were both nam'd and accounted Sages by the Greeks, and wise men by our Country-men; and many Ages before, of (c) Lycurgus, in whose time Homer is said to have been before (d) the building of Rome; and in the Heroical Ages of Ulysses and Nestor, that they both truly were, and were reputed such. Nor would there have been the Tradition that Atlas supported Heaven, nor that (e) Prometheus was fasten'd to Caucasus, nor that (f) Cephus with his Wife, Son in Law, and Daughter, were made Constellations, had not the Divine Knowledge of the Celestial Bodies and Motions rais'd the Fable upon their name; from whom in order descending, all those who sequestred themselves to the Contemplation of Nature, were both accounted and term'd wise, and that name of theirs continu'd down to the Age of Pythagoras, who, as writes (g) Heraclides Pon∣ticus, an Auditor of Plato, and very learned Per∣son, they report to have come to (h) Phlius, and to have had some learned and free Discourse with

Leon Prince of the Phliasians, whose Wit and Elo∣quence Leon admiring, ask'd of him, what Trade he particularly follow'd; who reply'd, that he un∣derstood no Trade, but was a Philosopher; that Leon wondring at the Novelty of the Name, enquir'd who these Philosophers were, and wherein they differ'd from other men; then that Pythagoras answered, he look'd upon the Life of men, to be like that Mart which was held at the Preparation, for the great∣est Games in the Confluence of all Greece. For as at that place some sought for Glory, and the prize of a Garland by bodily Exercises; others were at∣tracted by Profit in buying and selling; but that there was a third sort of them, and that the most ingenuous, who neither sought for applause, nor gain, but come meerly to be Spectators, and be∣held attentively what was perform'd, and how. In like manner we, as in some concourse to a Fair, held without any City, being so come from ano∣ther Life and Nature, into this World, do some of us drudge after Glory, others after Money; that some few there are, who slighting all other things, diligently contemplated the Nature of the Universe; these he call'd Lovers of Wisdom, that is Philoso∣phers; and as in that other case it was most gen∣tile to look on, without any Gain to ones self; so in this Life, that the Contemplation and Know∣ledge of Nature, was to be prefer'd far before all other Studies.

(c) Lycurgus, in whose time Homer is said to have been.] Reputed both to have liv'd about the middle Age between the Destruction of Troy, and the Building of Rome; which time the Alban Kings reign'd upward of three hundred years, as some four hundred.

(d) The Building of Rome.] Which falls into the first year of the seventh Olympiad.

(e) Prometheus fasten'd to Caucasus.] Because he had his Observatory on the top of that Mountain in Asia; and first taught the Assyrians Astronomy; as Atlas in Lybia, the Inventor of the Globe.

(f) Cepheus with his Wife, Son in Law, and Daughter.] Cepheus was King of the Aethiopians, his Wife Cassiopea, Daughter Andromeda, and Son in Law Perseus, all Celestial Constellations.

(g) Heraclides Ponticus.] An eminent Physician relates this in his Treatise upon the Virgin that lay many days breathless, and afterwards return'd to Life.

(h) Phlius.] A City of the Sicyonians near Corinth.

SECT. IV. Pythagoras Founder of the Italian Sect.

NOR was Pythagoras only Inventor of the Name, but also enlarger of the Notion; who having after this Discourse at Phlius, come in∣to Italy, adorn'd that Greece, which was call'd the Great, both in private and publick, with most excellent Arts and Ordinances; about whose Dis∣cipline another occasion of discoursing may per∣haps occur. But, by the ancient Philosophers, down to Socrates numbers and motions were han∣dled, and whence all things were generated, and whether they were resolv'd. Also the magnitudes, distances; courses of the Stars were diligently ob∣serv'd, and the whole Celestial Globe. But Socra∣tes was the first that fetch'd down Philosophy from Heaven, and lodg'd it in Cities, nay introduc'd it into Houses, and oblig'd it to enquire after Life and Manners, what things are Good, and what

Evil. Whose manifold Form of arguing, variety of Subjects, and excellency of Wit, being consecrated by the elegant Records of Plato, hath produc'd many Sects of Dissenting Philosophers: From amongst which, we have especially espous'd that which we think Socrates us'd, to conceal our own opinion, to undeceive others, and in every Dispute to enquire what carried the fairest appearance of Truth. This Custom as Carneades held with great subtilty and copiousness, so have we done both often elsewhere; and lastly in our place at Tuscu∣lum, to dispute after the same Fashion. And as to four days Debate, we have pen'd and sent it to you in the former Books. But on the fifth day, when we had taken our Seats in the same place, it was thus propounded upon what we should Dispute.

SECT. V. The Position holds, that in the Proposers judg∣ment, Vertue alone is not sufficient to Hap∣piness.

S.

I Do not think Vertue to be sufficient to Happiness.

M.

But, truly, my Friend Brutus thinks it is so; whose judgment, without offence to you be it spoken, I far prefer before yours.

S.

I question it not; nor is that the matter now in Debate, what kindness we have for him; but the merit of this, which I said was my opinion; upon which I would have disputed by you.

M.

Why, you say Vertue is not sufficient to Happiness of Life.

S.

I say clearly it is not.

M.

What? is there in Vertue sufficient Interest to live uprightly, honestly, commendably, lastly well.

S.

Undoubtedly there is.

M.

Can you then either choose but call him miserable, who lives ill, or deny that he lives hap∣pily, whom you confess to live well.

S.

Why may I not? for one may live uprightly, honestly, commendably, and in that Sense well even upon the Rack; so you understand by it, what at present I mean by it, Constancy, Gravi∣ty, Courage, Wisdom. These things are put even upon the Rack, (i) whether an happy Life can∣not aspire.

M.

What then doth a happy Life only tarry without Doors, and doth not turn the Prisons Key, when Constancy, Gravity, Wisdom, Fortitude, and the other Vertues are carried away to the Tor∣mentors, and decline neither any Punishment, nor Pain?

S.

You must look out now, if you think to do any good. These Suggestions weigh nothing with me, not only because they are common, but much more, because like some thin Winds they cannot bear Water. So these Stoical Paradoxes are better to tast than to drink. Just so that Quire of Vertues put upon the Rack, sets goodly Representations before the Eyes; so that Happiness of Life seems ready to run after them, nor to endure that they should be left behind her; but when you have ta∣ken off your mind from this Picture, and these Images of Vertues to Reality and Truth; this bare consideration is left, whether a man can be happy as long as he is upon the Rack. Wherefore let that be our present Enquiry, and never fear least

the Vertues should take it amiss, and complain that they were deserted by Happiness of Life. For if no Vertue be without Prudence, Prudence it self per∣ceives this, that all good men are not also Happy; and recounts much of (k) M. Attilius, (l) Qu. Cepio, (m) M. Aquillius; and if Happiness, being deluded by Appearances rather than Realities, would offer to venture upon the Rack; Prudence it self holds it back, and denies that it is any ways compatible with Pain and Torment.

(i) Whether an happy Life cannot aspire.] It is a by∣word charg'd upon Theophrastus; and indeed if hopes did determine with this Life, it were hard to reconcile Blessed∣ness with Torments. But in differing respects, if Blessed∣ness consist in the Favour of God; that Pain which turns to the account of incomparably greater Joy, cannot hinder from the present title to Bliss, and future possession of it; but to say, with Epicurus, that Pain is for the present de∣lightful, contradicts common Sense and Experience.

(k) M. Attilius.] M. Attilius Regulus circumvented by the Carthaginians and overthrown, was sent upon his Parole to the Senate, to treat for the Exchange of Prisoners, which he judging neither honourable nor advantageous disswaded, and to quit his Faith, return'd to endure all the Tortures which the Wit and Malice of the Moor could inslict, all which he suffer'd with unshaken Resolution.

(l) Qu. Caepio.] Qu. Servilius Caepio was Consul the year that Tully was born; and the following year after, an unfor∣tunate Engagement with the Cimbrians, his Commission was taken away, Goods confiscated, and he banish'd at the motion of C. Norbanus Tribune to the disgust of the honest Party.

(m) M. Aquillius.] He conquer'd the Slaves in Sicily, re∣belling under Athenio, and reliev'd that Province, was Con∣sul when Tully was six years old; accus'd by L. Fusius, de∣fended by M. Antony, was absolv'd in consideration of his former good Service.

SECT. VI. Peace of mind ariseth from Vertue alone.

M.

I Am well content you proceed that way, although it is not fair for you to prescribe me what course you would have me take in dis∣puting. But I enquire whether we think there hath been any success, or none in the former days Debates?

S.

Success? assuredly, and that considerable too?

M.

Why then this question is already made out, and almost brought to a final Determination.

S.

How so, I pray?

M.

Because the boisterous motions and tossings of Souls rais'd, and elevated with an inconsiderate Violence, repelling all Reason, leave no room for Happiness of Life; for what man under the dread of Death or Pain; the one of which is often in∣cumbent, the other always impending, can be other than miserable? what if the same Person (as it often falls out) fears, Poverty, Ignominy, Dis∣grace? if Lameness, Blindness? if lastly that which is not only incident to single Persons, but often to mighty Nations, Slavery, can any one who Fears these things be Happy? What, if he not only fear them as future, but also feel and bear them being present? add to the Sum Banishments, Mournings, los••es of Children. He that is broken with Dis∣content upon these occasions, can he choose but come to be most miserable? What too can we say

of him whom we see inflam'd and mad with Lust, raving after all things with insatiable Concupis∣cence, and the more plentifully he swallows down Pleasures on every hand, the more eagerly and with greater Ardour thirsting after them; what can one truly say of him, but that he is most mi∣serable? what of that other lightly exalted, and with empty Mirth both frolicking, and idly trans∣ported; is he not so much the more miserable, as he takes himself to be more happy? Therefore, as these are miserable, so on the contrary are they Happy, whom no Fears alarm, no Troubles fret, no Lusts incense, no vain Mirths melt down, ex∣ulting with transitory Pleasures. As therefore a Calm at Sea is understood, when the least breath of Wind doth not stir the Waves; so is the quiet and peaceful State of the mind beheld, when there is no Passion, upon which it may be discompos'd. Which being so, he that counts the Power of For∣tune, and that esteems all possible accidents of Humane Life to be tolerable; whereupon neither dread nor anguish come near to touch him; and if the same Person covet nothing, be puffed up with no empty Pleasure of the Soul; what reason is there he should not be happy? and if these things are effected by Vertue, what reason is there, why pure Vertue cannot of it self make men happy?

SECT. VII. In Moral Subjects we must dilate on the Proofs.

S.

WHY as for the first, it cannot be deny'd, but they who fear nothing, have no trouble of mind upon them, covet nothing, are not elevated with any inordinate Mirth, must be happy; that therefore I grant you, but as for the other, it is no longer at my disposal, for it hath been concluded upon in the former Debates, that a Wise man is free from all Passion.

M.

Why? then the matter is over, for the que∣stion seems to be fully determin'd.

S.

It doth well nigh to be so.

M.

But that is the way in Mathematicks, not Philosophy, for when Geometricians would de∣monstrate any thing, if there be somewhat in or∣der to prove the matter in question, amongst what they have before demonstrated, that they take for granted and prov'd; they only make out what hath not been propos'd before: Philosophers, what∣ever matter they have in hand, heap up all that which is agreed upon in common, towards the eviction of that matter, however they have been elsewhere debated. Were it not so, why should a Stoick need to say much, if it should be propos'd whether Vertue be sufficient to Happiness of Life; it would be enough for him to answer, he had be∣fore demonstrated, nothing to be good, but what was honest; this being prov'd, it to be consequent that Happiness of Life is contented with Vertue;

and as this is to that, so that to be consequent to this, that if Happiness of Life be contented with Vertue, nothing else is good but what is honest. But they do not proceed after this sort; for their Books of Honesty, and of the chief Good, are apart; and although it be rightly deducible thence, that there is sufficiency in Vertue, to render the Life happy; yet they treat severally of it; for every matter is to be handled by its proper and natural Arguments and Motives; especially one of so great Importance; for you are much mistaken if you think any expression in all Philosophy more glori∣ous, or that there is any promise of Philosophy either more profitable or honourable; for what doth she profess? O wonderful! that she will make good, whoever obeys her Laws, shall always be arm'd against Fortune, shall have all warranties in himself, of a good and happy Life; in a word, shall ever be blessed. But let me advise with my self, what she performs. However in the mean time I much value what she undertakes; for Xerxes being cram'd with all the Bribes and Gifts of Fortune, yet not being contented with Cavalry, nor Infantry, nor multitude of Shipping, nor an infinite quantity of Gold propounded a reward to him that should find out any new Pleasure. Nor was he contented with that, for Lust can never be bounded; I wish we could at any reward invite one to furnish us any Argument, more firmly to be∣lieve this undertaking of Philosophy.

SECT. VIII. Whether Vertue alone be sufficient to Happiness, but not compleat Happiness.

S.

I Wish it indeed, but there is somewhat where∣in I am dissatisfied; for I submit that of the Positions you have made, one is consequent to the other, that as if what thing be honest, that only is good, it followeth that an happy Life is effected by Vertue; so if an happy Life consists in Vertue, nothing is good but Vertue. (n) But your Friend Brutus, upon the Principle of Aristus and Antiochus, hath not the same Sentiment; for he thinks, although there be something else good besides Vertue.

M.

How now? do you think I will speak any thing in opposition to Brutus?

S.

Nay, for that as you please; for it is not my part to direct you.

M.

What then is consequent upon what Sup∣position, refer to another place; for that was a difference between me and Antiochus often, and lately with Aristus, (o) when being General I lodg'd at his House; for I did not think any man could be happy in the midst of Evils; but that a Wise man might be in the midst of Evils, if there were any corporal or external Evils. These things were discours'd, which Antiochus hath also written in many places, that Vertue of it self can effect an happy Life, but not the most happy; then that, most things were denominated from their major

part, although some part of them were wanting, as Strength, Health, Riches, Honour, Glory, which are judg'd by their nature, not their number, in like manner a happy Life, though it were in some part deficient, yet gain'd its name from far the greater part. To examine these things particu∣larly, is not at present very necessary, although to me, they seem to be spoken not over-consist∣ently. For I neither understand what he that is happy needs to make him more happy, (p) (for if he want any thing, he is not happy) and for the deno∣mination and estimate of every thing, from its greater part, sometimes that may be in force so to do, but when they say there are three sorts of Evils, he that is press'd with all Evils, of two of these sorts, so as to have all cross'd in his Estate; a Body oppress'd and worn out with all Diseases; shall we say he wants but a little of an happy Life, not only of one most happy? This is that which Theophrastus could not maintain; for having resolv'd that Stripes, Rackings, Crucifixions, Overthrows of our Coun∣try, Banishments, Losses of Children, had great influence on living ill and miserably, he durst not speak big and loftily, having entertain'd mean and low Sentiments.

(n) But your Friend Brutus, upon the Principle of Aristus and Antiochus.] Tully had before Section 5. check'd his Auditor with the Authority of Brutus, that Vertue was sufficient to render Life happy; therefore there was no other good, he now retorts that Authority upon him; for Bru∣tus having heard Antiochus of Ashketon, and afterwards his Brother Aristus held, that Vertue was not sufficient to ren∣der Life most happy. Antiochus had been Auditor of Philo, but set up a new Academy, which brought in a Syncretism of Stoicks, with Peripateticks; this Tully impugns, and sup∣ports the Person of a rigid Stoick.

(o) When being General, I lodg'd at his House.] In his re∣turn from his Government of Asia, for having there routed a Party of High-land Cilicians, and taken their Town Pin∣denissum, he was by the Army saluted General in the Field, after the old Roman fashion, carried his Lictors with their Bundles garnish'd with Lawrel to Athens homeward, took up his Quarters with Aristus there, and assay'd to enter Rome in Triumph.

(p) For if he want any thing he is not happy.] In this Life, as Vertue is imperfect, so is Happiness incompleat.

SECT. IX. Of the three sorts of Goods.

HOW well, is not the question; sure it is con∣sistently with his Principles. Therefore I am not wont to like a denying the consequent of that, the antecedent whereof you have granted. Now this most elegant and learned of all the Phi∣losophers, is not much censur'd for holding three sorts of Goods; but he is baited by all first, for that Book which he writ of an Happy Life; wherein he brings many Arguments, why a man in Torture, and upon the Cross, cannot be Happy; in the same Book he is also reputed to say, that Happiness of Life, cannot come upon the Wheel. He no where saith that in Terms, but what he saith amounts to as much. Can I then, after I have granted one, that bodily Pains are Evils, that Shipwracks of Estate are Evils; can I be angry with that man, for saying that all good men are not Happy, when all good men are liable to those things which he accounts Evils? the same Theo∣phrastus

is further harass'd, both by the Books, and Disputations of all the Philosophers for quoting that Sentence in his Callisthenes.

Fortune, not Wisdom, guide the Life of man.

They say never came more lasche word out of the mouth of Philosopher; and true it is, what they say, yet I do not understand how any thing could have been more consistent; for if there are so many good things belonging to the Body, so many extrinsick to it, all under the Power of chance and Fortune, is it not naturally consequent upon this Principle, that Fortune, who is Mistress both of external Circumstances, and corporal endow∣ments, should have a larger Empire, than Hu∣mane Counsels? or had we better imitate Epicurus? who oftentimes speaks many excellent things, but careth not how agreeable they are, or consistent with his Principles. He commends a slender Diet: Done like a Philosopher; but if Socrates or Anti∣sthenes had said it, not he who maintains Pleasure to be the chiefest Good. He saith none can live plea∣santly, unless he live also honestly, wisely, justly. No word can be more Grave and becoming a Philoso∣pher, unless the same man did make Pleasure the end of his Honesty, Wisdom, and Justice. What can be better said, than that Fortune hath little dealing with a Wise man? but doth he say so, who having affirm'd Pain to be not only the greatest, but also the only Evil, may be seiz'd upon with the sharpest Pains all his Body over at that very time when he is in his highest Rants against For∣tune? The same too saith Metrodorus, and in bet∣ter words yet. Fortune, I have prevented you, and barricado'd up all the Avenues, that you can no ways

attack me. Excellently well had (q) Aristo the Cian, or the Stoick Zeno said it, who accounted nothing Evil, but what was Dishonest. But you Me∣trodorus, who have buried all your Good in Back and Belly, having defin'd the chief Good to consist in a firm Constitution of Body, and a strong Pre∣sumption of its continuance, have you bar'd up the Avenues against Fortune? which way? for you may in a Moment be strip'd of that your Good.

(q) Aristo the Cian.] Of Ceos Isle. He held all things beside Vertue and Vice indifferent.

SECT. X. The Peripateticks accus'd of inconsistency, but Epicurus much more.

YET unwary men are taken with these Flashes; and by means of such fine Speeches, multi∣tudes of Disciples are drawn after them. But it is the part of a subtle Disputant, not to regard what any one says, but what he should say. As in that very Tenet which we have undertaken in this Dis∣pute, we would have all good men to be always happy. What I mean by good men is manifest, for we call men accomplish'd and adorn'd with all Vertues, sometimes Wise and sometimes Good men. Who are to be call'd happy, let us consider. I indeed think these who are possess'd of Goods, without any Evil added thereto. Nor is there any other No∣tion

couch'd under this word, when we say a Happy man, but an Accumulation of all Goods, without the mixture of any Evils. Vertue cannot attain to this, if there be any thing good besides it self. For there will press in a throng of Evils, if we count these Evils, Poverty, obscurity of Parentage, Low∣ness, Destitution, loss of Friends and Relations, grievous Pains of Body, decay in Health, Maims, Blindness, Destruction of ones Country, Banish∣ment, Slavery. Lastly, a Wise man may be in these so many and so great Evils, and those many more which may happen; for chance inflicts them, which may fall foul on a Wise man. But if these things are Evil, who can warrant that a Wise man shall always be happy, when he may be even un∣der all these at one time? Therefore I do not easily yield it to my Friend Brutus, (s) nor the Teachers of us both, (t) nor those Ancients, Aristotle; Speu∣sippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, that having taken the things above-recounted for Evils, they should yet hold a Wise man to be always happy. But if they be taken with this plausible and specious Privi∣ledge, fitting to be claim'd by Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, let them be contented to despise Strength, Health, Beauty, Riches, Honours, Wealth, with the Lustre of which, they are so much dazled, and ut∣terly to slight their Contraries. Then may they pro∣claim with the most loud Voice, that they are nei∣ther terrify'd at the insults of Fortue, nor the dis∣pleasure of the Multitude, nor Pain, nor Poverty; and that all their Dependencies are on themselves; nor is there any thing without the Power of their own choice, which they reckon for good. Nor can it any ways be granted, that one Person should speak after this rate, suitable to some great and losty Spirit; and withall, account for Good

and Evil, the same things which the Vulgar doth, Epicurus proselyted with this glorious Doctrine, sets up; and his Wise man, in good time, must be ever Happy. He is taken with the Dignity of this Asser∣tion, but would never say so, if he were true to himself; for what is less agreeable, than that he who saith Pain is either the greatest or only Evil, should likewise hold, that a Wise man, when he is rack'd with Pain, should say, Oh! how sweet this is? Therefore Philosophers are not to be estimated by some single expression, but by the constant Tenor and Analogy of their Doctrines.

(r) We would have all good men to be always Happy.] That is in a State of Happiness in every condition; having a Title to the paternal Providence of God upon his Promise. Had man persevered in Primitive Righteousness; his Body would have been passible, and the operativeness of external Agents no less efficacious; so that his security must have been in the Divine Protection from harmful Casualties, and supply of needful Enjoyments. When there is argu'd from perfect Vertue, to compleat Happiness, the Divine Favour and Bounty must necessarily be included; for when we say Ver∣tue is its own reward, it is not intended that the Vertuous have their Labours for their Pains. Complacency of mind in fulfilling a Law, ariseth from the Sense of our having pro∣moted the ends of it in mutual Preservation; and conse∣quently our own; or in having acquir'd the good Graces of the Law-giver by Obedience; but to solve the doubt, why ever it should go ill with the Good, as it is often seen to do; we must partly discount for the Defects of Goodness here, and consider temporary Evils in such, order'd for the bettering of the mind.

(s) Nor the Teachers of us both.] Antiochus and Aristus.

(t) Nor those Ancients, Aristotle.] These were Doctors of the Peripatetick Chair. Aristotle considering that man is made up of Soul and Body, which requires Necessaries and Conveniencies of Life, when he was in quest of the Good of Man, concluded it to be conjunctly in the Mind, together with the Body and external Circumstances. Health and

competent subsistence all men desire, and Aristotle defineth that to be good, which all men desire. To undervalue the Benefits of God, who is Good and doth Good, restrains Prayer, and suppresses Gratitude; as in the Tenet of Aristo holding all other things, besides Vertue, indifferent; but how then can the good man ensure his Happiness? These Goods he pursues ordinately, useth with Moderation, and wants without Impatience; he can be no otherwise self∣dependent, than by linking his Will to the ever-blessed Will of a Superior Wisdom. Zeno deny'd bodily Inflictions and Misfortunes to be evil, from ignorance of their being Pe∣nalties for the Violation of the Divine Law; but to the truly Good their Nature is chang'd, their Evil taken away, and they made serviceable for Good.

SECT. XI. That the Stoicks cavil about Words.

S.

YOU induce me to give you my assent; but take heed least your consistency too be not questionable.

M.

How so?

S.

Because I have lately read over your fourth Book, about the several Opinions concerning the chief Good; in that, disputing against Cato, you seem'd to me to endeavour to shew what I ex∣treamly like, that there is no difference between Zeno and the Peripateticks, but a novelty of Terms. If this be so, what reason is there, but if Zeno thinks it reasonable, that there is in Vertue, suffi∣ciency to Happiness of Life, the Peripateticks may say the same? for, I think, reality, not words, ought to be regarded.

M.

Why, you take of me a Bill under Hand and Seal, and call Witnesses to what I said or writ at any time. Deal so with others who Dispute un∣der Articles subscribed; we live from hand to mouth, whatsoever smites us with an appearance of Truth, that we allow. Therefore we only are free; but since we spoke a little before of con∣sistency, I do not think it to be at this time the enquiry whether that which Zeno and his Auditor Aristo held be true, that only which is Honest to be good; but, if it were so, then to place the whole Happiness of Life in Vertue alone. Where∣fore let us yield this to Brutus, that a Wise man is always happy; how agreeable it is to his Prin∣ciples, he must look to that. What man is more worthy the Glory of this Assertion? Yet let us hold that the same Wise man is most Happy, al∣though Zeno of Cittium, a certain Forreigner, and ignoble, but Forger of Terms, seems to have wrought himself slily into the ancient Philo∣sophy.

SECT. XII. That nothing should be call'd Good but Vertue, is vindicated to have been the Tenet of So∣crates.

THE Gravity of this Opinion, is to be fetch'd from the Authority of Plato; in whom often∣times this expression is found, that nothing is to be call'd Good but Vertue, as in his Dialogue call'd Gorgias. Socrates, when he had been ask'd whether he did not think Archelaus the Son of Per∣diccas, who was then accounted most Fortunate, to be Happy; I cannot tell, saith he, for I never spoke with the Man. What of that? can you come no other way to know it? No other; then you cannot tell of the Great King of Persia, whether he be Happy? Can I do it, when I know not how he is for Learning, how for Justice? What? do you think Happiness of Life consists in that? I am clear of the mind, that the Good are Happy, the Wicked Miserable. Is Archelaus then miserable? Certainly, if he be unjust. Do you not think he places the whole of an Happy Life, in Vertue alone? But what saith he in his Funeral Dialogue? The man who hath all the necessaries to Happiness of Life, bound up in himself, so that they are not suspended on the good or bad success of any other; and he by that means constrain'd to waver, hath the best course of Life ensur'd. This is that Moderate, this that Valiant, this that Wise man; this, if Riches, if Children increase or fail, will still observe the old Proverb, neither to be ex∣cessive

in Joy nor Sorrow; because all his Interests are depending on his own Soul.

SECT. XIII. Nature hath produc'd all things perfect in them∣selves.

FROM this therefore, as it were Holy and Ve∣nerable Fountain of Plato, shall our whole ensuing Discourse take its source. And now whence can we more orderly begin, than from Nature our common Parent, who hath taken care that all her Productions, not only the living Crea∣ture, but also the very Plant which so Springs from the Earth, as to abide firm on its Stock and Root, (u) should be every one in their respective kind perfect. Therefore both Trees and Vines, and those Plants which are lower, nor can advance themselves to any height from the Earth, some of them are ever Green, others stand bare all Winter, but warm'd in the Spring, shoot forth Leaves afresh; nor is there any one which hath not such an inward Vegetation, that it bears either Blossoms, or Fruits, or Berries with Seeds lock'd up in all, after their proper kind. So that every thing in all, as far as in them lyes, if no external Violence im∣peach, are perfect. The Power of Nature may yet more easily be discern'd in Brutes, because Sense is given them by Nature; for she design'd some of these Creatures for Swimming, which were to be Inhabitants of the Water; others for flying, which were to sport in the open Air; some

to creep, others to go; and of these last, some to range alone, others to herd together; some wild, and others tame: Lastly, some to dwell in holes and caverns under ground. Now every one of these having its proper work allotted, cannot pass over into the life of another Creature, but abides in the Ordinance of its own Nature. And as one advantage is given by Nature to one Beast, and another to another, which peculiar it holds fast, nor swerves from it; so hath man somewhat far more excellent; (although those things may be said to excell, which admit of some comparison;) but the Soul of man being deriv'd from the Divine Spirit, with all Humility be it spoken, (w) can be compar'd with no other thing, but God himself. This therefore, if it be cultivated, and if its sight be kept pure, so as not to be blinded with Errors, becomes a perfect understanding, that is, right Reason, which is the same as Vertue. And if every thing be Happy, which wants nothing, and which is in its own kind ac∣complish'd to the highest; and this be the property of Vertue; in truth all vertuous Persons are Happy. And in this Point, I and Brutus are agreed; so also is Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemo. But in my opinion they are also most happy; for what doth he want to an Happy Life, who hath Assu∣rance of his Goods? or how can he be Happy, who hath no Assurance of them?

(u) Should be every one in their respective kind perfect.] A Testimony to the original goodness of all things in their Creation.

(w) Can be compar'd with no other thing but God himself.] The Divine Original, and incomparable Excellency of the Soul, is here acknowledg'd, which the whole World can∣not countervail.

SECT. XIV. The Perfection of man is properly in his mind.

BUT he must needs have no Assurance, who di∣vides his Goods into three parts. For how can he rely either upon firmness of Body, or sted∣fastness of Fortune? But none can be Happy, unless in the enjoyment of a stedfast, fix'd, and permanent good. Now what of those mention'd, is of such Nature? so that the Saying of that Spartan, seems very apposite to such men, who when (x) a cer∣tain Merchant brag'd that he had many Ventures to all Ports, whither men traded, reply'd, I do not in truth envy that Fortune which is tack'd upon Cables. Is it any question, but that (y) nothing is to be taken into the number of those things which con∣stitute a Happy Life, that can be lost? for nothing that is the ingredient of an Happy Life, must nei∣ther fade, nor be destroy'd, nor decay. For he who shall fear the losing any of them, can never be Happy; for we would have him who is to be Happy safe, impregnable, fortified, and provided, not so as to be without much Fear, but any at all. For as he is call'd Innocent, not who is slightly harmful, but wholly harmless; so is he to be held undaunted, not who Fears little, but who is wholly fearless; for what is Fortitude else, but a dispositi∣on of mind, both firm in confronting danger, and sustaining Labour and Pain; as also free from all Fear? Now these things to be sure, could not be so, unless all goodness consisted in honesty alone.

Since how can any man have that most blessed and desirable Security (I call now Security a Free∣dom from Disquiet, wherein Happiness of Life con∣sists) who is either under a multitude of Evils, or liable to be so? Further, how can he be brave and gallant, and slighting all the possible Contingencies of Humane Life, such as we would have our Wise man be, unless he should think all his sufficiency lodg'd in himself? Could the Lacedemonians demand of Philip, menacing by Letters, that he would hin∣der all their attempts, whether he would hinder them also from dying; and shall not the man whom we seek, be much easier found so minded, than a whole State? What? and if Temperance, which is the Governess of all Passions, be added to this Forti∣tude whereof we are speaking? What can he want to Happiness of Life, whom Fortitude rescues from Discontent and Fear; and Temperance reclaimeth from Lust, nor suffers to be transported with ex∣travagant Mirth? I would shew that Vertue works these effects, had they not been made out in the former days Debates.

(x) A certain Merchant.] Lampis the Aeginete a part∣owner in many Ships. Merchants count it Wisdom not to venture too much in one Bottom, but divide the hazard of the Seas.

(y) Nothing is to be taken into the number of those things which constitute a happy Life that can be lost.] Cleanthes de∣ny'd falling away from Vertue: Chrysippus affirm'd it. Con∣firmation in goodness may produce Assurance, but never will security or carelessness; a freedom from servile but not watchful Fear.

SECT. XV. That only what is Honest is Good.

NOW since the Disturbances of the Soul ren∣der the Life miserable, but the composure of them happy; and there is a double rank of Passions; in that, Discontent and Fear are termi∣nated on Evils conceiv'd; but excessive Mirth and Lust arise from the misapprehension of good things, since all are inconsistent with Advice and Reason, if you shall see any one clear, emanci∣pated, free from these emotions so vehement, so discordant one with the other, and so distracting, can you make any question of calling him Happy? But the Wise man is always so dispos'd, therefore the Wise man is always Happy. Further every thing that is good is joyous, and what is joyous, is to be proclaim'd and avow'd; and what is so, is also to be glory'd in; but if it be glorious, to be sure it must be praise-worthy; but what is praise-worthy, is also truly honourable; what therefore is good is honourable. But what those men reckon for Goods, they do not themselves say they are honourable. That only therefore is good which is honourable, from whence is concluded, that Happiness of Life consists in Honesty only; which is, the true Honour. Those things are therefore not to be call'd nor counted good things, in which a man may abound, and yet be most miserable. Do you make any question, but that one exceeding in Health, Strength, Beauty, sound and quick Senses;

add further if you please, Activity, and Swiftness; throw in Riches, Honours, Commands, Interest, Glory; if the Possessor of all this be unjust, intem∣perate, timorous, stupid and senseless, will you make any question of calling him miserable? what sort of Goods then are they which a man may have, and yet be most miserable? Let us consider therefore, whether, as an Heap must consist of single Corns of the same Grain, so an Happy Life must not of parts similar to it self. If this be so, then is Happiness to be an Aggregation of those Goods only which are Honest, if there be any mixture of Dissimilars, Honesty can never deno∣minate the Sum total; which being substracted, what Happiness can be understood remaining? for whatever that be, which is good, that is de∣sirable; and what is desirable, is to be sure to be approv'd; and what you approve, is to be ac∣counted agreeable and welcome; therefore also is respect to be born to it, which being so, it must needs be commendable; therefore all good is commendable; from whence is concluded, that what is honourable, that only is good. Which unless we maintain, there will be many things which will pretend to the title of Good.

SECT. XVI. Such as is the Disposition of Mind, such is the Life.

TO wave Riches, which I do not reckon among good things, since any one never so unwor∣thy may have them. But (z) what is good, that every one cannot have. To pass by Nobility and popular Fame, rais'd by the consent of Fools and Knaves. These petty Advantages must be call'd good things, white Teeth, black Eyes, a fresh Colour, and those Graces which Anticlea com∣mends, as she washes the Feet of Ulysses.

Softness of Skin, and gentleness of Speech.

If we must call these Goods, what will there be sounding more reverend or lofty in the Gravity of a Philosopher, than in the Opinion of the Vulgar, and croud of Fools? But yet the Stoicks call the same things advantageous and preferrible, which these term Good. They do indeed so style them, but do not esteem them perfective of Happiness of Life. But the other think, that without these, not Happy; or if it be, yet will not allow it most Happy. But we would have it to be most Happy; and that is concluded by us, from that Pile of In∣ferences by Socrates. For thus did that Prince of Philosophers argue. Such as is a mans Disposition of Soul, such is the man; and as is the man, such his Dis∣course; again his Facts are like his Discourse, and Life

like his Facts. But the Disposition in a good man, is commen∣dable; therefore so is a good man's Life too; thereupon hon∣ourable too, or honest, because commendable; from whence is infer'd, that the Life of the Good is Happy. For I appeal to Gods and men, is it not enough evidenc'd by our former Debates; or have we discours'd for diver∣sion only and pastime, that a Wise man is always free from every inordinate commotion of Spirit, which I call Passion? that there is always in his mind an undisturb'd Peace. Therefore a tempe∣rate constant man, without Fear, without Dis∣content, without any Jollity, without Lust, can he be other than Happy? But a wise man is always such, therefore always Happy. Now how can a good man choose, but make what is com∣mendable, the ultimate end of all his Thoughts and Actions? but he makes Happiness of Life the ultimate end of all: Therefore Happiness of Life is commendable; but there can be nothing commendable without Vertue; therefore Happiness of Life is per∣fected by Vertue only.

(z) What is good that every one cannot have.] Under∣stand this in a complex Sense; the Fool cannot at the same time have Prudence; the Oppressor, Justice; the Coward, Fortitude; the Luxurious, Temperance.

SECT. XVII. Only what may be gloried in is good.

NOW the same is thus further concluded. Neither is there any thing to be proclaim'd or boasted of in a miserable Life, nor in that which is neither miserable nor happy; but there is in some Life somewhat to be proclaim'd, gloried in, and openly avow'd; as Epaminondas;

(a) Under our conduct Spartas Pride is shav'd.

As Africanus;

From farthest East, beyond the Scythian Tracts, None may compare with Scipio's mighty Acts.

Now if a Life be Happy, it is to be avow'd, proclaim'd and glory'd in; for there is nothing else to be proclaim'd and glory'd in. Upon these Premises you know what follows; and in truth unless that Life be Happy, which is also Honest, there must needs be somewhat better than a Happy Life; for what is Honest, they will certainly con∣fess to be better; so will somewhat come to be better than an Happy Life, which is the greatest Absurdity can be spoken. What? when they con∣fess, that vitiousness is sufficient to render the Life unhappy; must not it be confess'd, that Vertue hath the same Power to render it Happy; for contrary causes produce contrary effects. In this

place, I enquire, what imports that Ballance of Critolaus? Who having cast the goods of the mind into one Scale; those of the Body and Fortune into the other, thinks that the Scale of former good does so far out∣weigh, that it would fetch up Sea and Land if it were thrown in to the opposite towards making even weight.

(a) Under our conduct Spartas Pride is shav'd.] Part of the Epitaph on Epaminondas, who had over-run Sparta for five hundred years untouch'd. As a Virgin led into Capti∣vity, and shav'd for Bondage; he Peopled Messina with a Colony, Fortify'd Thebes, and left Greece in full Freedom.

SECT. XVIII. The same was also maintain'd by the more reso∣lute Peripateticks.

WHAT then debars either him, or Xenocrates also, the gravest of Philosophers extolling Vertue, and depressing all other things, so much as to vilifie them, from placing not only an Happy, but also most Happy Life, in Vertue? which un∣less it hold good, an utter ruine of the Vertues will ensue; for to whom trouble is incident, Fear must be so likewise of necessity; for Fear is the anxious expectation of future Trouble; and he to whom Fear, there is also incident Irresolution, Timor∣ousness, Consternation, Cowardise, and by con∣sequent for the man sometimes to be conquer'd, nor to think himself concern'd in that admonition of Atreus.

So live resolv'd, as to be vanquish'd soorn.

But the man here suppos'd will be conquer'd, as I said, nor conquer'd only, but also enslav'd; whereas we would have Vertue to be always free, al∣ways unvanquish'd; which Properties, if they be not granted, Vertue is taken away; but if Vertue have force enough to Goodness of Life; she hath also enough to Happiness; for to be sure there is in Vertue, force enough for our living valiantly; and if valiantly, then with gallantry of Spirit, so as never to be dismay'd at any thing, but always remain invincible. It follows that it knows no re∣morse, no want, no controul: Consequently that it abound in all things, live absolute and prosper∣ously; therefore happily. Now Vertue hath force enough to our living valiantly; therefore also hath it enough to our living happily. For as Folly, although it hath obtain'd what it lusted after, yet never thinks it hath gotten enough; so Wisdom is always content with what it hath, and never repineth at its own condition.

SECT. XIX. The Dissimilitude between Vertue and Vice, exemplified in the former Troubles.

DO you think any comparison to be made between (b) the one Consulship of C. Lae∣lius, and that after a repulse (if, when a wise and good man, such as he was, is repuls'd in an Electi∣on,

the People do not rather miss of a good Ma∣gistrate, than he of a good People,) but yet, which had you rather be, if it were at your Choice, once Consul as Laelius, or (c) four times as Cinna? I make no question what you would answer; there∣fore I consider to whom I put the case. I would not ask every body the same question; for ano∣ther perhaps would answer that he not only pre∣fer'd the four Consulships before the one, but one day of Cinna, before the whole Ages of many and brave men. Laelius, if he had laid his least Finger on any one, should have suffer'd for it; but Cinna com∣manded to Behead his Fellow-Consul Cn. Octavius, P. Crassus, L. Caesar, Principal of the Nobility, men of try'd Abilities both in Peace and War. M. An∣tony the most Eloquent of all that I ever heard. C. Caesar who seem'd to me a Pattern of Courtesie, Wit, Good Nature, Facetiousness. Was he there∣fore happy who slew these? On the contrary, I take him to be therefore miserable, not only be∣cause he did it, but also because he had order'd the matter, so as to have Authority to do it; though no body hath Authority to sin; but we speak improperly through a vulgar abuse of Lan∣guage, for we say a man doth that by Authority, which he can do without being call'd to an ac∣count for so doing. Pray was C. Marius then hap∣pier, when he (d) communicated the Glory of his Cimbrick Victory with Catulus, almost another Laelius (for I take him to have been most like the other) or when being Conqueror in a Civil War, upon the Humble Petition of the Relations of Ca∣tulus; he answer'd in Anger not once, but often, He must dye; wherein more Happy was he who submitted to that execrable word, than he who gave so wicked an order. For as it is better to re∣ceive,

than do an Injury; So is it to go a little way to meet death near approaching, as Catulus did; then what did Marius by the murther of such a Personage, (e) to deface his six Consulships, and pollute his dying Conscience.

(b)The one Consulship of O Laelius.] With L. Cornelius Scipio, an Eloquent and wise man.

(c) Four times as Cinna.] A bloody, leud, and violent Magistrate, when hindred by his Fellow Consul Cnaeus Octa∣vius, from passing unduly some pernicious Laws, he fled Rome, freed Slaves, and call'd home C. Marius from Africa with other Randiti, storm'd Rome, cut off the Head of his Fellow-Consul, and expos'd it upon the Rostra, or Pleading-place. P. Crassus Father and Son were slain, with C. Julius Caesar, and Lucius his Brother; this latter was so facetious, that with his Discourse he so charm'd the Souldiers, sent to kill Mark Antony the Orator, that they put up their drawn Swords till Annius a Colonel fell on him, and brought his Head to Marius, which he joyfully receiv'd, set on his Table in a Feast, and stuck it afterwards on the Rostra. Cinnd in his Fourth Consulship was ston'd by his Souldiers at Ancona for his Cruelty. C. Julius Caesar married his Daughter Cornelia.

(d) Communicated the Glory of his Cimbrick Victory with Catulus.] In Venice near the Addis, Marius and Catulus fought, the Cimbrians took 60000. and slew about 120000. when his Colleague quitted the Honour of the day to him; so that two Triumphs were decreed him alone; he took in Catulus with him to partake of the Honour. Afterwards he fell out with him, and without hearkening to any Inter∣cessors, oblig'd him to dye, which he did, locking himself up into a Chamber, newly plaister'd over with green Lime, and so departed.

(e) To deface his six Consulships.] This was acted in his sixth Consulship; the following January he was chosen a seventh time Consul and soon dy'd.

SECT. XX. The ugliness of Usarpation in Dionysius the Elder; with his Fears.

EIGHT and thirty years was Dionysius Tyrant over the Syracusans, having usurp'd the Go∣vernment at five and twenty year old. He held in Servitude a City of incomparable Beauty, and a State of great Wealth and Alliances. Now we have receiv'd from good Authors concerning him, thus recorded, that he was of singular temperance in his Diet, exceeding Politick and Industrious in carrying on business; and yet for all that, of a Nature very malitious and unjust, whence he must needs seem to all that consider truth narrowly, most miserable; for what things he had eagerly coveted after, he did not then obtain, even when he thought himself Soveraign Lord of all. He having been born of creditable Parents, and such as were of good Quality, (though different Authors write differently as to that Point) and abounding in Companions of old acquaintance, and Relati∣ons near to him; also having some Youths joyn'd in Love to him, after the manner of Greece, trusted not any of them; but took for his Life-Guard those whom he had pick'd out from the Servants of wealthy Citizens, and had himself taken from them the name of Servitude; some Forreigners too, and Salvage Barbarians. So through an un∣just affectation of Dominion, he did in a manner Imprison himself. Nay farther, lest he should

entrust his Throat with the Barber, he made his own Daughters learn to Trim. Thus did the Royal Virgins, like Women-Shavers, of a sordid and servile Trade, Trim and Shave their Father, and yet when they came to be of Age, he took from their hands too the Razor, and brought up a Practice of their singeing his Beard and Locks with burning Wall-nut-shells. He also having two Wives (f) Aristomache his own Country-woman, (g) and Doris of Ocri, he so by night consorted with them, that he had all places spy'd and search'd before, and having contriv'd a broad. Trench round about the Bed in his Presence Chamber, and laid a wooden Bridge for a Passage over that Trench, which too he drew up when he had look'd his Chamber Doors. He also not daring to stand on the common Pulpits, was wont to Harangue the People from the top of a Tower. The same Person having a mind to play at Ball (for he delighted much in that sport) and strip'd of his Vest, is said to have deliver'd his Sword to a Page whom he lov'd. Hereupon when a certain intimate Friend of his had said in jest, Assuredly you trust your Life with him; and the Youth had smil'd at it, he com∣manded both to be slain, the one because he had shew'd the way of killing him, and the other be∣cause he had approved that notice with a smile; at which action he was so afflicted, that nothing in his Life ever more troubled him; for he had kill'd his beloved Boy.

(f) Aristomache his own Country-woman.] Daughter of Hipparinus, and Sister of Dion.

(g) And Doris the Locrian.] Mother of Dionysius the younger.

SECT. XXI. Demonstrated to his Court-flatterer.

THUS are the Lusts of such as give way to their Passions, distracted into contrary parts. Whilst you obey one, you must Rebel against the other; although this Tyrant past Sentence himself how happy he was; for when one of his Parasites, Da∣mocles, in Discourse with him, fell on magnifying his Wealth, Strength, Majesty of Dominion, Plenty of Estate, Sumptuousness of Royal Palace; Will you then, answers he, Damocles, since you are so taken with this Life, your self tast of it, and make a proof of my Fortune? upon his replying, that he would with all his heart, he commanded him to be seated on a Golden Couch, with a rich Cover∣let, a Tapestry Carpet, Embroider'd with curious Figures, in Silks of divers Colours; furnish'd also several Side-boards with Plate, and Vessels of en∣graven Gold; then order'd Boys of the most ex∣quisite Beauty, to attend at Table, and diligently watching to run at his least beck: There were pre∣tious Oyntments, Garlands, Odours were fuming, the Table piled up with most choice Dishes. Da∣mocles thought himself in a Fortunate condition; in the midst of this entertainment, he commanded a drawn Sword fasten'd by a single Horse-hair, to be let down the Ceiling, so as to point at the head of this happy man; so that he could not fix his eyes on those fair Servitors; nor the excellent Workmanship of the Plate; nor reach his hand to

the Table; his very Garlands were ready to drop off his Head: In a word, he beg'd of the Tyrant, leave to be gone, for he was unwilling to be any longer happy. Do you think that Dionysius did not plainly enough declare, that nothing could be happy to the man, who had always some terror impending over him? (h) Now he had put it out of his power, to return to Justice, and restore his Citizens their Laws and Liberties; for whilst he was young in his inconsiderate Age, he had entangled himself in such miscarriages, and committed those enormities, that he could not be safe, had he gone about to be honest.

(h) Now he had put it out of his Power to return to Justice.] An oblique intimation to Caesar, of the expedience of time∣ly restoring his Country to Liberty.

SECT. XXII.—and in the consequent of those Fears, want of Friends.

BUT how much he wanted Friends, whose faithfulness he fear'd, he declar'd (i) in that pair of Pythagoreans; for when he had taken one of them surety for the other, bound body for body, and the other, to release his Security, had pre∣sented himself at the appointed hour of Execution, I wish, saith he, I might be admitted with you, to make up the Pair of Royal Friends. What a misery must it needs be, to want the Conversation of Friends,

Society at Meals, and even familiar Discourse? especially to one a Scholar from a Child, and bred up to ingenuous Arts; particularly as we have by Tradition very Musical; (k) a Tragick Poet; How good, is nothing to the purpose; for in that sort of Pretenders, I know not how it cometh to pass, more than in others, every one thinks his own a Beauty. I never knew Poet yet (and I was acquainted with Aqui∣nius) but he thought himself the best. So stands the case, you like yours, and I mine. But to return to Dionysius, he was debar'd all civil and free Con∣verse. He spent his time with Vagrants, with Rogues, with Barbarians; he thought no man, who either deserv'd freedom, or had a desire to be free, could be Friend to him. I will not there∣fore now compare with his Life, than which I can imagine nothing more tormenting, wretched, de∣testable, the Life of Plato, or Archytas, learned and truly wise men.

(i) In that Pair of Pythagoreans.] Damon and Pythias.

(k) A Tragick Poet; how good, is nothing to the purpose.] Dionysius the Elder was Musical, and Patron of Philoxenus the Harper. He was much addicted to write Tragedies, but unhappy that way, for he obscur'd his style, with far fetch'd and frigid Humours and Expressions, yet angry with those who past a true censure on them. Twice his Poems were exploded at the Olympiack Games; a third time they came off with approbation, at the news of which, he is said to have dy'd for joy.

SECT. XXIII. The praise of a vertuous Life, in Archimedes and the Philosophers.

I WILL raise up from the Dust, and compass a mean Mechanick of the same City, who liv'd many years after Archimedes. Whose Tomb, un∣known to the Syracusians, who deny'd that there was any such, I being Questor, search'd out, as it was overgrown and invested with Briars and Brambles; for I held in memory some Verses which I had been inform'd were ingrav'd on his Monument. These declared that on the top of his Tomb, was a Sphear erected with a Cylinder; when I had view'd all about (for at the Agragian Port, is a great number of Sepulchers) I spy'd a Pillar somewhat rais'd above the Bushes, (l) on which was the Figure of a Sphear and Cylinder. Then I presently told the Syracusians (at that time the chief of the Town were with me) that I thought that was the thing I look'd for; divers with Hand-Bills were sent in, who clear'd the place; when an open way was made, we came to the Front of the Base; there appear'd an Epigram, the latter part of the Verses, to almost half, being perish'd. So that noble City of Greece, and heretofore very learned, had not known the Monument of her most ingenious Citizen, had she not learn'd it (m) of a poor Arpinate. But let my Discourse re∣turn, from whence it hath digress'd; for who is there that hath any acquaintance with the Muses,

that is, with Humanity and Learning, who had not rather be this Mathematician, than that Ty∣rant? If we look into their manner of Life and Employment, the mind of one was improv'd by working, and searching out Proportions, with the delight of invention, which is the sweetest repast of Souls: The others fed with Carnage and Injuries, with Fears both by day and by night. Come on, compare Democritus, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras; what Kingdoms, what Wealth will you prefer before their Studies and Delights? for what is the best part in man, therein must that best thing of all for man, which you enquire after, of necessity be seated. Now what is there in man, better than an ingenuous and sound mind? The good of that therefore must we enjoy, if we would be happy; but the good of the mind is Vertue; therefore a happy Life must of necessity be compriz'd in that. Hence all things which are good, honest, honour∣able (as I said above, but that same seems that it ought to be more largely said) are full of joys. Now seeing it is plain, that a happy Life is made up of continual and compleat joys, it follows that it ariseth from honesty.

(l) On which was the Figure of a Sphear and Cylinder.] On which he had written so accurately.

(m) Of a poor Arpinate.] Tully was born at Arpinum a Corporation Famous before only for the Birth of Marius, a stout but illiterate Commander.

SECT. XXIV. The Exercise of a Wise man in Contemplation of Nature.

BUT lest we should only touch in words, upon those things which we ought to shew; there are some, as it were, motives to be laid down by us, which should more invite us to knowledge and understanding; for let us presume on some Per∣son, excelling in the best Arts; and let him, for a while, be fancied in our Mind and Thought. First, he must needs be of an excellent Wit; for Vertue doth not in all likelyhood consort with dull Souls. Then must he have a forward inclination to the search of truth; from whence ariseth (n) that three-fold issue of the Soul; the one in knowledge of the World, and explaining of Nature; a second in the description of what is to be desir'd, what avoided; the third in judging what is consequent to what, and what repugnant; wherein consists both all the subtilty of disputing, and truth of judging. What joy then, I pray, must needs possess the wise mans mind, dwelling and lodging with these Entertain∣ments? and when he shall behold the Motions and Revolutions of the whole Firmament, and shall see innumerable Stars sticking in their Orb, agree with its own motion, fix'd in their due distances. Other seven, each to keep their courses much dif∣fering in height or lowness, whose wide motions yet limit certain bounded and order'd Posts of their Race. It was the Observation of these that incited

and minded those Ancients to enquire farther. Thence arose that (o) search of the Principles, and as it were Seeds whence all things had their Original, Generation, Composition; and what is the Rise, what Life, what Death, and what the Change or Conversion from one into another, of every kind with or without Sense, dumb or speak∣ing; whence is the Earth, and by what weights pois'd; in what caverns it sustains the Seas; whe∣ther all things born down by their Gravity, do al∣ways tend to the middle place of the World, which is also the lowest in a round Figure.

(n) That three-fold issue of the Soul.] Physicks, Ethicks, and Logick.

(o) Search of the Principles, and as it were, Seeds whence all things had their Original.] The Creation of the World, in its order, could not have been discover'd, unless it had been from above revealed; for how could Adam come to understand what had past in the Vigils of his Production, into Being without a Divine Tradition; but the old Sages beheld the order of Causes in Generation, and found Matter and Form to concur, when there was a vacancy, to the pro∣ducing any new compound.

SECT. XXV. Good Manners, right Reasoning, and discharge of his place.

WHILST he considers these things, and medi∣tates on them day and night, there ariseth that knowledge enjoyn'd by the God at Delphi,

that the Spirit knows it self to have put off former Vices, and experiments that it is ally'd to the Divine Spirit, and thereupon is fill'd with insatiable Joy. For the very Contemplation of the Power and Nature of the Deity, and enkindleth a desire of imitating that Eternity; nor doth it think it self confin'd to this shortness of Life, when it beholds the Causes of all Events depending one upon another, and all of them link'd together with necessity; which as they flow from eternal Duration to eternal, yet a Wisdom and Spirit doth conduct. Stedfastly be∣holding these things, and looking upwards, or ra∣ther looking round on all the Parts and Extremi∣ties, with what calmness of mind again doth he consider the Contingencies of Hurnane Life and things here below? Hence ariseth that knowledge of Vertue; the general and particular Vertues sprout forth; there is found out, what is that chief∣est amongst Goods which Nature aims at, what the utmost amongst Evils, whereinto all Duties are to be resolv'd, what order of leading our Life to be chosen. These and such-like things being search'd out, it is firmly prov'd which we chiefly drive at in this Dispute, that Vertue is self-sufficient to happiness of Life. A third branch remains, the method and skill of disputing, which is diffus'd, and spreads through all the Parts of Wisdom. This defines Notions, divides the general into its parts, conjoyns consequent means of proof, infers regu∣lar Conclusions. From which as the highest use∣fulness ariseth towards examining Matters; so doth also the most ingenuous delight, and worthy of Wisdom. But these are the Improvements of lei∣sure; pass the same wise man to manage the pu∣blick; what can be more serviceable than he, when he beholds the Interest of his Country to be bound

up in his Prudence; out of Justice he converts nothing of the publick to his private use; exer∣cises so many others, and such various Vertues? Joyn hereto the benefit of Friendships, wherein as all the Counsel agreeing, and almost conspiring in the conduct of Life, hath been plac'd by the Learned; so is there singular delight in dayly re∣spect and Conversation. What, I pray, doth this Life lack to make it more Happy? To this Estate fill'd up with so many and so great Joys, Fortune it self must needs submit. Now if it be Happy to rejoyce in such Goods of the Mind, that is, Ver∣tues; and all wise men constantly feel such Joys; we must of necessity confess, that all wise men are Happy.

SECT. XXVI. The wise man is Happy in Adversity.

S.

WHAT? under Tortures and Racking.

M.

Do you think I mean under a Chaplet of Violets and Roses? Shall Epicurus, who is only a Philosopher in Masquerade, and assumes that Title to himself; shall he be allow'd to say, what yet he doth with my applause, as the matter now stands, that there is no time of a wise man, although whilst he is burning, wrack'd, cut, but wherein he may cry out, Now nothing do I value this? especially when he defines all Evil by Pain, Good by Pleasure; laughs at this our Honesty, as baseness; and teaches us to be a company of Can∣ters, that set up for a parcel of idle School-Gib∣brish,

not having any other true Interest, but in what feels smooth or rough in the Body. Shall he then, as I said, not much differing in judgment from Beasts, be allow'd to forget himself, and then to brave Fortune, when as his whole, both Good and Evil, is in the Power of Fortune? then call him∣self Happy in the greatest racking and torture, when he hath laid it down for a Principle, that Pain is not only the chiefest, but the only Evil; and that not having provided himself of those supports, to the bearing up under Pain; such as are Reso∣lution of Mind, Fear of Baseness, Exercise and Ha∣bit of Patience, Precepts of Fortitude, manly Hardiness; but saith, he rests himself on the bare remembrance of past Pleasures; just as if one swel∣tring, when he is ready to faint away with the excess of heat, would call to mind, that he had been (p) in our Manner of Arpinum, refresh'd with the Breezes from the cool Streams that run about it; for I do not see how past Pleasures can asswage present Evils; but when he saith that a wise man is always Happy, who could say no such thing, if he would be true to himself; what should they do, who think nothing desirable, nothing to be rank'd amongst Goods, which is abstracted from Honesty? If my word may pass, even the Peripateticks and old Academicks should at length leave their lisping, and without more mincing the matter, take courage to speak plain, and with an intelligible voice, that Happiness of Life can enter into (q) Phalaris his Bull.

(p) In our Manner of Arpinum, refresh'd with the Breezes from the cold Streams that run about it.] In Cicero's Arpinum were two Rivers, Fibrenus and another, where the Marian Oak stood; a pertinent and pleasant Similitude.

(q) Phalaris his Bull.] When Phalaris rul'd in Sicily, with rigor he put many to diverse Tortures. Upon this Perillus thinking to gratifie the Tyrants cruel Humour, in∣vented a Brazen Bull hollow, and with a Trap-door to let in the Sufferers, then having shut it again, to kindle a gentle Fire, and so the Brass heating, the Person also roar'd out into bellowings, as of a true Bull; the Tyrant made the first experiment upon the Artist; it is put Metonymically for any exquisite Torture.

SECT. XXVII. Objection from Pain against the self-sufficiency of Vertue answered.

FOR allow there be three sorts of Goods, that we may at length get clear of the Snares of the Stoicks; more of which I understand that I have us'd, than I am wont to do; allow them, I say, for sorts of Goods; so those of the Body, and of the Estate, couch on the ground, and be only term'd Good, because they are to be accepted; but those other Divine ones, let them spread far and near, and mount up to Heaven; so that he who hath acquir'd them, why should I call him Happy only, and not also most Happy? But will a wise man dread Pain? for that is the greatest Adversary to this opinion; for we seem enough fortified and prepared by the former days Disputes against our own Death, and that of our Friends; as also against Discontent, and the other Passions of the Mind. Pain seems to be the most violent Adversary against Vertue, that thrusts out his burning Torches at us; that threatens to vanquish

Fortitude, Magnanimity, and Patience. Shall Vertue then fall under this? Shall the Blessed Life of a Wife and Constant man render to this. Good Gods! how base were that? Spartan Children torn with smarting Lashes, never give a groan. We have seen our selves, at Lacedaemon, Multitudes of young men Box, Kick, Scratch, Bite, with in∣credible earnestness, so as to fall down dead, be∣fore they would confess themselves worsted. What Barbarous Land is more wast or wild, than India? yet in that Nation, those who are counted wise men live naked, and endure the Snows and Win∣ter violence of Caucasus without Pain; and when they turn themselves to the Flame, are scorch'd without groaning. Nay (r) the Indian Women, when the Husband of any of them is dead, enter into Contest and Tryal, which of them he lov'd best, for they are wont to be many Wives to one man; she that gets the better, joyful and attended by her Friends, is laid by her Husband on the Funeral Pile; the other that lost, goes away sorrowful. Custom could never vanquish Nature, for that is always invincible. But we have emasculated our Spirit with Shade, Delicacies, Ease, Niceness, Sloth, and debauched our Judgment with Mistakes, and bad Presidents. Who knows not the Aegyptians Pra∣ctice? whose minds being prepossess'd with cor∣rupt Errors, would endure any the most exquisite Torment, rather than violate (s) an Ibis, (t) or Asp, or Cat, or Dog, or Crocodile; and if una∣wares they do any such thing, they are content to undergo any Punishment that shall be inflicted on them. I speak hitherto of Men. What do Beasts? do not they endure Cold, and Hunger, Running and Ranging over Mountains and thorough Woods? do they not so Fight, to protect their Young, as to

receive Wounds? fear no Charges, no Blows? I wave that ambitious men abide and suffer for Honors sake; what the vain-glorious, for Praise; what the Amorous, for Lust. The World is full of Instances.

(r) The Indian Women.] In the Camp of Eumenes there fell out an admirable Instance, and very much different from the Grecian Practice. Cetrus, one of the Indian Captains, having fought bravely, fell in the Battle, and left two Wives behind him. Now it had been an old Custom in India, that young Men and Maids married, without asking their Parents Consent, but as they fancied one another. This rash judg∣ment of Youth, was often follow'd with speedy Repentance; so that many Women were debauch'd, and fell in Love with others, but finding no colour of leaving them, begun to take them out of the way. India is a Country stor'd with many Simples and Drugs of such a deletory Nature, as some of them kill instantly if the Dish or Cup be but touch'd with them. This Practice of poysoning prevail'd, and many men were thus taken off; nor could any rigor of Justice de∣ter the rest from the like attempts. At length a Law was made, that such Women as surviv'd their Husbands, and had no Children, nor were with Child, should be burnt; which if they refus'd, they should not Marry again, but be for ever excommunicated, as impious. This quite alter'd their Inclinations, for the greatness of the Disgrace, made them contented to dye rather, and they both grew tender in Preservation of their Husbands Life, as their own; and also took a Glory to be Consorts with him in death. As it fell out at this time, for the Law being express, that one must be burnt with her slain Husband, both of them pre∣sented themselves at his Funeral, standing for the Partner∣ship with him in death, as for a glorious prize. A Council of War was call'd; here the latter Wife alledg'd, that the former was by her Belly debar'd from dying in the express terms of the Law. But the other pleaded that she ought to have the priority of Honour, as she had of time; for in all other Instances the Elder have in Matters of Priviledge, title to precedency. The Souldiers being inform'd by a Jury of Women, that the Elder was indeed with Child, gave

the cause for the Younger. Upon which, she that was cast, with loud shrieks went out of the Court, her attire and hair torn, as at the hearing of some doleful news. But the other, joyful for having carried the day, was dress'd up by her acquaintance, with Ribbins and rich attire; then led to the Funeral Pile, as to a Wedding, by her nearest kindred, who, as they went, sung the praises of her Vertue. When they were come to the Stake, she divested her self, and di∣stributed her Ornaments amongst her Friends and Acquain∣tance, as a Token of her last Affections. Thus was her attire; many Rings on her Fingers glistering with pretious Stones of diverse sorts; on her Head a Sky of Golden Stars, set with radiant Sparks of several Gems; about her Neck many Neck-laces of Pearl, increasing in size each above the other; at last having taken leave of all her acquaintance, she was by her Brother help'd up the Pile, where, to the admiration of all that had come from the parts round about to the sight, she ended her Life in an heroical manner; for the whole Army march'd in Arms thrice round the Funeral Pile, before Fire was put to it; and she lying down by her Husbands side, when the heat grew more and more power∣fully sensible, let no voice pass which might discover any meanness of Spirit; so that the Spectators some were touch'd with Compassion; others magnified her beyond any mea∣sure. But most of the Greeks thought it an inhumane and cruel Law.

(s) An Ibis.] A Bird that kills up Serpents.

(t) An Asp.] A venomous Creature which casts into a deadly sleep; with this Cleapatra made her self away after the Actian disgrace.

SECT. XXVIII. The wise man is happy though he be in Tor∣ments.

BUT our Discourse must keep within bounds, and return thither where it turn'd out of the way. Happiness will, will, I tell you, go into Torments; nor having accompanied Justice, Tem∣perance, and especially Fortitude, Magnanimity, Patience, when it shall see the Tormentors Face, will it stop; and when all the Vertues go with an undaunted mind to Torture, will she stand (as I said) without the Prison doors, and not step over the threshold? for what would be more scandal∣ous, more ugly, than her left alone and sever'd from her most beautiful train of Companions, (u) which yet is no ways possible; for neither can the Vertues hold together without happiness of Life, nor that without the Vertues. Therefore they will not suffer her to lag behind, but will hurry her along with them, to whatever pain and torture they shall be led; for it is the property of (w) a wise man, to do nothing to be repented of, nothing upon constraint, all things nobly, constantly, gravely, honestly; to expect nothing, as presum'd certain; to admire nothing when it is befallen, as that it should seem to have happen'd new and unexpected; to bring all things to the Bar of his discretion, and stand to the awards of his own judgment: what can be more happy than this, cannot enter into my mind; I acknowledge, indeed, the inference of the Stoicks

is plain; who having held the chiefest of Goods to be agreement with Nature, and living up suitably to it; this being in the wise man not only as to Duty, but also Power; it must necessarily follow, that in whose Power is the chiefest Good, in the same is also happiness of Life; so that a wise man's Life is always happy. Thus you have what I think is spoken of a happy Life most resolutely; and as the matter stands here, unless you can tell us any thing better, most truly too.

(u) Which yet is no ways possible.] Vertue and Blessed∣ness are inseparable Companions.

(w) A wise man to do nothing to be repented of.] Take it in a compound sense; for Wisdom is not to be repented of, but in a State of Imperfection, Repentance is Wisdom re∣cover'd; nor dishonourable, for upon it God also repents of Punishment.

SECT. XXIX. Whether the Peripateticks may consistently to themselves hold what the Stoicks do.

S.

BETTER I can tell nothing, but I would will∣ingly beg the favour of you, if it be not too much trouble, because you are not under engage∣ments to any certain Sect, but cull out of all, what∣ever works upon you, with any apperance of truth, whereas you seem'd a little before to exhort the Peripateticks and old Academy, that they would take the boldness to say freely without biting in their words, that wise men are always most happy,

I would fain learn of you, how you think it com∣porting with their Principle so to say; for much hath been said by you against their opinion, and concluded after the Stoicks way of arguing.

M.

Use we therefore our liberty, which we on∣ly can use in Philosophy, whose discourse judges nothing it self, but argues on all sides, that it may of it self, without the shelter of any ones Autho∣rity, be judg'd by others. And since you seem to be wishing this, that whatsoever be the opinion of dissenting Philosophers, about the several chief Goods, yet Vertue hath in it self sufficient Power, to the securing of an happy Life; which we have been inform'd Carneades was wont to maintain; but he did it as against the Stoicks, whom he did always most earnestly confute, and against whose Doctrine his Wit broke forth into Heats. We will do the same thing, but calmly; for if the Stoicks have rightly set the bounds of things good, the matter is at an end; the wise man must of necessity be always happy, but let us enquire into every opinion of the rest; if it be possible, that this excellent, as it were, Sanction of an happy Life, may agree with all their Judgments.

SECT. XXX. The different Opinions about the chief Good.

NOW these Opinions about the Supream good, have, as I suppose, been kept and main∣tain'd: First, four single ones; that Nothing is Good but what is Honest, as the Stoick; that Nothing

is Good but Pleasure, as Epicurus; that Nothing is Good but freedom from Pain, as (x) Hierom; that Nothing is Good but to enjoy the prime Goods of Nature, either all, or the greatest, as Carneades disputed it against the Stoicks. These then are single, the fol∣lowing are mix'd. The three sorts of Goods, the greatest of the Soul; the next of the Body; exter∣nal, the third, as the Peripateticks; nor held the ancient Academicks much otherwise. Pleasure with Honesty Clitomachus and Calliphon coupled; but Free∣dom from Pain (y) Diodorus, the Peripatetick, joyn'd to Honesty. These are the Opinions which held their Station any time; for those of (z) Aristo, (a) Pyrrho, (b) Herillus, and some others, are vanish'd away. What claim these can make out, let us consider, omitting the Stoicks, whose opini∣on I seem already to have enough defended. And indeed the cause of the Peripateticks is open'd, ex∣cept Theophrastus, and if any of his Followers do very weakly dread and shrink from Pain; the rest may do what they usually do, magnifie the Gra∣vity and Dignity of Vertue; and when they have extoll'd it to Heaven, that which such Eloquent men are wont copiously to do, it is easie to run down, and undervalue all other things in compa∣rison thereto; for it is not free for them who hold that praise is to be sought with Pain, to deny them to be happy, who have acquir'd it; since though they are in some Evils, yet this name of happy hath a great length and breadth.

(x) Hierom.] Of Rhodes.

(y) Diodorus.] Surnam'd Cronus.

(z) Aristo.] He held besides Vice and Vertue all to be in∣different.

(a) Pyrrho.] He taught Nothing could be known.

(b) Herillus.] His Tenet, that Knowledge is the chiefest Good.

SECT. XXXI. The denomination of the whole is from the greater part.

FOR as Merchandize is said to be gainful, Hus∣bandry fruitful, not if the one be always free from any loss, the other always from any injury of the Weather; but if for far the more part there prove good success in both; so Life, not only if it be cram'd with Goods on every side, but if in much the greater and more important part Goods do preponderate, it may rightly be call'd happy. Happiness of Life therefore, in these mens Scheme, will follow Vertue even to Punishment, and enter with it into the Bull, upon the warrant of Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemo; nor will be corrupt∣ed by small blandishments to forsake it. The same will be the judgment of Calliphon and Diodorus, both of which so embraces honesty, that he esteems all things which are without it, to be set behind it, and at a great distance too. The rest seem to be harder beset; yet they save themselves ashore. Epicure, Hierom, and if there be any that care to defend that Eloquent Carneades; for there is none but thinks the Soul judge of these Goods, and in∣structs it how it, may be able to contemn those things which seem good or evil. For what you take to be the case of Epicurus, the same will be that of Hierom and Carneades, and in truth all the

rest; for who is not sufficiently provided against Death or Pain? Begin we at him, if you please, whom we call Lasche, and voluptuary. What? do you take him to fear Death, or Pain? who calls that day, wherein he is a dying, blessed; and being in very great Pains, yet silences them with the memory and recalling to mind of his In∣ventions▪ nor doth he this in such manner, as that he might be thought to bolt forth some extemporary flash, for this is his Sentiment about death, that when the living Creature is dissolv'd, all Sense is abolish'd; but what is without Sense nothing con∣cerns us. About Pain also he hath certain Rules, which he follows; for he comforts their greatness, with the being short; and their length, with the being light. What I pray? those big speakers, are they better provided than Epicurus, against these two, which give the greatest anguish? Do not Epi∣curus and the rest of the Philosophers seem suffici∣ently prepar'd for those other Evils reputed? Who dreads not Poverty? yet so doth not any of the Philosophers.

SECT. XXXII. and in 33, 34, 35. A Plea for Poverty.

NAY, even he himself, with how little was he contented? None hath said more of a slen∣der Diet; for the things which occasion a coveting after Money; as to have a constant supply for Love, for Ambition, for daily Expences, when he preserveth himself from all those things, what great

need hath he for Money, or rather why should he at all regard it? Could Anacharsis the Scythian have no value for Money, and cannot our Country Philosophers do the same. A Letter of his goeth about in these words. Anacharsis to Hanno Greet∣ing. My Cloaths is a Scythian Pelt; Shooes, the soles of my Feet; Bed, the Ground; Dainties, a good Sto∣mach; Diet, Milk, Cheese, Flesh. Wherefore you may come over to me, as being at leisure. But those Presents of yours, wherein you display your magnificence, offer either your own Carthaginians, or the immortal Gods. Almost all Philosophers of all Perswasions could be thus minded, except those whom deprav'd Nature, had perverted from right Reason. Socrates at a Show, when a great quantity of Gold and Silver was carried by, said, How many things are there that I do not lack! Xenocrates, when Ambassadors from Alexander had brought him fifty Talents, which was a very great sum in those times, espe∣cially at Athens, carried their Excellencies along with him into the Academy to Supper; provided no exceedings, but set before them a bare Colledge-Commons. The next day when they ask'd him, whom he would order to have the Money drawn over to him: What? saith he, did you not understand by yesterdays short meal, that I need no Money. At this when he saw them look somewhat dissatisfied, he took (c) a hundred Pounds (d) of it, lest he should seem to slight their Masters liberality. But Diogenes more bluntly yet, as a Cynick, when Alex∣ander ask'd him, wherein he could serve him; At present, saith he, a little out of my Sun. He had, it seems, hinder'd his basking. He it was, who us'd to dispute, how much he surpass'd in Life and For∣tunes, the great King of Persia: That he wanted nothing; the other would never have enough; he lack'd

not the others Pleasures wherewith he could never be sa∣tisfied; the other could no ways attain to his satisfactions.

(c) A hundred Pounds.] A Drachma is valuable, against the Denarius, about eight pence. A Mina, 100 Drachmas, 30 Minae, 300 Drachmae.

(d) Of it▪] Of the 50. Talents, a Talent was the Greater.

• 80. Minae.
• 266. l. 13. s. 4. d.

The Lesser

• 60. m.
• 200. l.

50

• lesser T. 10000 l.
• gr. T. 13333 l. 6. s. 8. d.

SECT. XXXIII. That Pleasures may be purchas'd at an easie rate.

YOU see, I presume, how Epicurus hath divided the sorts of Desires, perhaps not over cun∣ningly, yet usefully; that they are, part, natural and necessary; part, natural and not necessary; part, neither; that the necessary may be satisfy'd with next to nothing, for the Riches of Nature are low-priz'd; that the second sort is neither difficult to compass, nor to refrain. The third because they are wholly empty, and do not concern not only necessity, but so much as Nature, he thought were wholly to be cashiered. Upon this Head much is disputed by the Epicureans, and these Plea∣sures are in particular depress'd; which in the ge∣neral they do not dis-esteem; but they are straight∣en'd for matter; for they tell us that obscene Plea∣sures also, upon which they hold much discourse, are easie, common, and at hand; and they think them if Nature require, not to be measur'd by

their Birth, or Quality, or Rank; but their Beau∣ty, Age, and Shape; and that it is no hard mat∣ter to abstain from them, if either Health, or Busi∣ness, or Reputation require; and in the whole, that this sort of Pleasures is desirable, if it do no hurt; that it never doth good. And this whole Lesson about Pleasure, he hath so laid down, that he thinks Pleasure of it self, because it is Pleasure always desirable, and to be pursu'd; and by the same reason, Pain upon that very account, because it is Pain, always to be avoided. Therefore that a wise man would still hold this Ballance, to avoid Pleasure, if it would work greater Pain; and to embrace Pain, working a greater Pleasure; and that all delights, however they are judg'd, by bo∣dily Sense, yet are resolv'd into the mind. Where∣fore the Body rejoyceth only so long as it feels the present Pleasure; the Soul both perceives the pre∣sent together with the Body, and foreseeth it com∣ing; nor suffers it to depart when past. Thus that there will always be close and uninterrupted Plea∣sures in the wise man; when the memory of those enjoy'd, is continu'd with the expectation of those hoped for. Arguments also of like Nature are ap∣ply'd to Diet. There the magnificence and sump∣tuousness of Feasting is decry'd, because Nature is contented with small Provision.

SECT. XXXIV. Examples of a light Diet in the Lacedemoni∣ans and Persians.

NOW who doth not see that all these things are season'd by the appetite? Darius, upon a flight, having drank Water, and troubled and stain'd with the Corpse of the slain, said, He had not made a more pleasant draught. He never, it seems, had been a dry when he drunk: Nor had Ptolomy been a hun∣gry when he eat; for on a time, in his Progress through Egypt, his Courtiers and Purveyance not being yet come up, when Houshold-Bread in a Country-Cottage was brought him: No Royal Cates ever went down with greater Gust than that Bread. They report of Socrates, when he was walking very earnestly too late in the Evening, and was ask'd why he did so, that he reply'd, He was going to Market to buy him a Stomach to his Supper. What? do we not see the Commons of the Lacede∣monians in their Hall? where when the Tyrant Dio∣nysius had supp'd, he said, He did not like their black Broth, which was the prime Dish of the Table to which he was invited: Then the Cook reply'd, No wonder, Sir, for you had not the proper seasoning. What is that, saith he, I pray? Hard hunting, sweat, race from Eurotas, hunger, thirst. For the Lacedemo∣nian Feasts have these Sawces; and this may be un∣derstood, not only from the Custom of men, but also from Beasts. These, if you put any Fodder to them, so it be not improper to their Nature,

they are contented with it, and look no further. Some whole States train'd up by the mode of their Country, love Parsimony. The Fare of the Per∣sians is describ'd by Xenophon, who saith of them, that they eat nothing with their Bread but Cresses. Although if Nature do require some more grateful repast, how many things grow out of the Earth, and upon Trees, both of easie purchase, and ad∣mirable relish: Joyn hereto that dry Constitution which follows upon this spare Diet; compare with them the other sweating, belching, cram'd with Feasting, like stall'd Oxen; you will soon under∣stand, that they who most follow after Pleasure, are the farthest from taking it; and that the delight of all enjoyments, is in the appetite, not satiety.

SECT. XXXV.—in the Academy.

THEY relate of Timothy the Athenian, and prime Noble-man in that State, that having supp'd with Plato, he was greatly taken with the enter∣tainment, and seeing him on the morrow, said, your Suppers not only please at the present, but also do much good the next day. Whereas we have not the free and clear use of our understand∣ing, when we are stuffed with Meat and Drink. There is an excellent Epistle of Plato's to Dions Re∣lations, wherein is written to this effect, almost in the very words. When I was come thither, that Life which was cry'd up for happy, full of Italian and Sy∣racusian Feasts; no ways agreed with me, twice a day

to be gorg'd, never to lye single; and other Consequents of such a Life; wherein no man will ever he made wise, and sober much less. For what Nature can ever be of such an admirable Temper? How then can a Life be pleasant, where there is neither Prudence nor Sobriety? whence the Error of (e) Sardana∣palus, the most wealthy King of Syria, is discerna∣ble; who commanded it to be engrav'd on his Mo∣nument.

This have I, what I eat, and what did sate My greedy Lust; farewel both Wealth and State!

What else, saith Aristotle, would one write upon a Beasts Sepulcher, and not a Kings? He saith he hath now he is dead, what, whilst he was alive, he had no longer than during the enjoyment; why then should Riches be wanted, or wherein doth not Po∣verty suffer us to be happy? In Images, I warrant, Pictures, Plays. If any one be taken with these, do not mean men more enjoy them, than they who have the greatest store of them? for there is in our City abundance of all such things belonging to the Publick, and expos'd. Those which private men have, are neither so many, and they seldom see them, only when they come into their Country Houses. And then too, fell some remorses, when they call to mind (f) how they came by them. The day would fail, if I should go about to make an Apo∣logy for Poverty; since the matter is plain, and Nature it self minds us every day, how few things she wants, how small, how cheap.

(e) Sardanapalus.] He was the last King of Assyria, overthrown by Arbaces the Mede: at Anchiale was a Monu∣ment erected for him, on a Marble Base the Statue of a Man in Brass, with his right Thumb apply'd to his middle Finger; underneath was insorib'd;

Sardanapalus, Son of Anacyndaraxes, built Anchiale and Tarsus in one day. Stranger, do you eat, drink and play, for all else is not worth this.

The posture above is of one giving a fillip.

(f) How they came by them.] The Villas of Noble-men were garnish'd with these Rarities from the Pillage of the Provinces in the time of their own, or their Ancestors Go∣vernment.

SECT. XXXVI. A Defence of obscurity in Birth and Condition.

SHALL then obscurity, or meanness, or even falling under the displeasure of the People; hinder a wise man from being Happy? Consider, whether this courting of the Vulgar, and that glory which is eagerly pursu'd, have not in it more trouble than Pleasure. Sure our Demosthenes was weak, who declar'd himself pleas'd with the whis∣pering of a Woman, bearing a Tankard, as is the fashion in Greece, and rounding her Fellow in the Ear, There goeth the great Demosthenes. What can be more vain than this? yet how brave an Orator? but he knew, it appears, to speak to others, had not had much Communication with himself. We must therefore be inform'd, that neither is popular glory of it self to be affected, nor obscurity dread∣ed.

I came to Athens, saith Democritus, and no body took notice of me. Constant and Grave man, who glories that he escap'd Glory! Do Pipers and Fidlers play Tunes after their own, not the judg∣ment of the Multitude; and shall a wise man, Ma∣ster of a far nobler Science, enquire not what is agreeable to Honor and Conscience, but what humours the Mobile? Can there be any greater Folly, than (g) to idolize them joyntly, whom severally you look upon with contempt, as Me∣chanicks and illiterate? No, the man mention'd will despise our Ambitions and Weaknesses; and reject the Honors of the People, though freely offer'd him; but we know not to contemn them, before we find cause to repent of our fondness of them. There is in Heraclitus the Naturalist, about Hermodorus the prime man of the Ephesians: He saith the Ephesians deserv'd to be all executed, be∣cause when they banish'd Hermodore out of their Country, they spoke thus, We will have no man among us more excellent than another; but if any such there be, let them go elsewhere, and live among others. (h) Is not this so in all Common-wealths? Do they not hate all eminency in Vertue? What of Aristides (for (i) I had rather bring Instances of the Greeks, than our own) was he not, for that very reason, driven out of his Country, because he was righteous above the common level? How great troubles therefore do they miss, who enter into no engagements with the People? for what is sweeter than Retirement and Study? That Study; I mean, whereby we understand the infinity of the Universe and Nature; and in this visible World, Heaven, Earth, and Seas.

(g) To idolize them joyntly, whom severally you look upon with contempt.] When Alcibiades appear'd timorous, and loth to speak in the Popular Assembly, Socrates encourag'd him after this manner. Do you think that Cobler (and call'd him by his name) should put you in awe? neither that Porter? nor the third a Dray-man? Why then, nor the People of Athens.

(h) Is not this so in all Common-wealths? do they not hate all eminency in Vertue?) A Lesson worthy to be consider'd by all Republicans and petty Statists.

(i) I had rather bring Instances in the Greeks, than our own.] This Parenthesis insinuates the Roman ingratitude to himself; as formerly to Camillus, Aquilius, Rutilius; but with great generosity he passes over the unkindness of his Country-men, and delights not to aggravate the publick Failings.

SECT. XXXVII. Supports under Banishment.

AFTER contempt therefore of Honour, con∣tempt also of Money, what remains to be dreaded? Banishment, I warrant, which is count∣ed amongst the greatest Evils. If that be evil up∣on account of the Peoples displeasure, how much that is to be slighted, hath been shew'd a little be∣fore. But if it is miserable to be absent from ones Country; all the Provinces are full of miserable Persons, for very few return out of them into their own Land. Ay, but the banish'd forseit their Estates. What then? Is not enough said of bear∣ing Poverty with Patience. Indeed for Banish∣ment, if you look upon the Nature of things, and not the discredit of the name; how much doth it

differ from taking up our constant abode in a for∣reign Country; yet so have the most noble Philo∣sophers spent their whole Ages. (k) Xenocrates, (l) Crantor, (m) Arcesilas, (n) Lacydas, (o) Ari∣stotle, (p) Theophrastus, (q) Zeno, (r) Cleanthes, (s) Chrysippus, (t) Antipater, (u) Carneades, (w) Pa∣naetius, (x) Clitomachus, (y) Philo, (z) Antiochus, (a) Posidonius, innumerable others, who having once gone out of their Country, never return'd home again; but they did it without disgrace. Can disgrace take impression on a wise man (for this whole discourse is about the wise man) whom it can never justly befall; for we should not com∣fort him who is justly banish'd. Lastly, in all cases they have the easiest expedient, who determine all the events of Life to Pleasure; so that, wheresoever that is to be had, they can there live happily. Wherefore (b) to every Scheme that word of Teu∣cer is appliable.

Our Country is, where we live well.

Socrates being ask'd, what Country-man he styl'd himself; replys, a Cosmopolite; for he thought him∣self Native and Denizen of the whole World. What did T. Albutius? did he not, with great content, follow his Studies in Banishment at Athens? which misfortune yet had not befallen him, had he liv'd quietly in the State, and follow'd the Rules of Epicurus. Now wherein was Epicurus happier, be∣cause he liv'd in his own Country, (c) than Me∣trodorus, because at Athens? or had Plato advantage over Xenocrates, or Polemo over Arcesilas, as to be∣ing the more happy? But what is that State to be valu'd, out of which good and wise men are chas'd? (d) Demaratus indeed, the Father of our King Tar∣quin,

because he could not bear the Tyrant Cypsi∣lus, fled from Corinth to Tarquinii, and there settled his Estate, and begot Children. Was it foolish in him to prefer Liberty abroad, before slavery at home?

(k) Xenocrates.] Of Chalcedon.

(l) Crantor.] Of Soli.

(m) Arcesilass] Of Pitana in Aeolia.

(n)Lacydas.] A Cyrenian.

(o) Aristotle.] Of Stagira, Professor in Athens, dy'd at Chalcis.

(p) Theophrastus.] Of Eresus in Lesbos.

(q) Zeno.] Of Cittium in Cyprus.

(r) Cleanthes.] Of Assos.

(s) Chrysippus.] Of Soli.

(t)Antipater.] Of Tarsus.

(u) Carneades.] A Cyrenian.

(w) Panaetius.] A Rhodian.

(x) Clitomachus.] A Carthaginian.

(y) Philo.]

(z) Antiochus.] Of Ashkelon.

(a) Posidonius.] Born at Apamea in Syria, chose to be call'd Rhodian from the Isle where he was Student, Professor and Governor.

(b) To every Scheme.] Origen against Celsus censuring the narrowness of some who confine their Charity to their own Party, that is, in truth, build up themselves, prefers the good nature of Chrysippus, who in his Treatise of curing the Passions, calculates his advice to the several Philosophers, upon supposition of their respective Principles.

(c) Than Metrodorus.] Born at Chios.

(d) Demaratus indeed, the Father of our King Tarquin.] Surnam'd Priscus.

SECT. XXXVIII & XXXIX.—Blindness.

FUrthermore, the Commotions of the Soul, Anxie∣ties, and Discontents are buried in Oblivion, when our minds are fetch'd off to Pleasure. Wherefore Epi∣curus did not without cause, take the boldness to say, that a wise man had always a greater por∣tion of good things, because he was always in Plea∣sures. Whence he thinks that to be prov'd which is our question, that a wise man is always happy.

S.

What? though he want the Sense of Eyes, of Ears?

M.

Yes, for he slights those very things. Since first that same horrible blindness, what Pleasures, I pray, doth it want? whereas some do even dis∣pute, that the other Pleasures are lodg'd in the Senses themselves, but what are perceiv'd by sight, do not act in any pleasing of the Eyes; as the ob∣jects of Tast, Smell, Feeling, Hearing, act on that very Organ, which is their proper Sensory. (e) No such thing is done in the Eyes. The Soul receives what we see. Now we may many and diverse ways have delights of the mind, without making any use of any Eye-sight. I speak as to the Scholar, and ingenuous Artist, whose Life is Contempla∣tion. For the wise man's Study doth not use to call the Eyes in as assistants in the Prosecution of his search. And if the Night take not away an happy Life, why should a Day like to Night take it away? For that saying of Antipater the Cyrenaick, is a little

towards merry, but yet may admit an ingenuous Sense. When the Ladies mourn'd over his dark∣ness, saith he, What do you mean? Do you think there is no pleasure in the dark? (f) Appius the ancient, who was many years blind, we understand both by the Offices which he bore, and his Actions, that he was in that his Circumstance, wanting to the Duties neither of his publick, nor private Capa∣city. We have also heard that the House of C. Drusus was fill'd with Clients, when they that could not see their own business, took a Blind man for their guide.

(e)No such thing is done in the Eyes.] He favours the opinion, that Vision is effected, not by reception of Species, but emission of Rays.

(f) Appius the Blind.] Appius Claudius was Censor, an active Magistrate, who pav'd the Way to Brundisium, call'd the Appian way; and brought in an Aquaduct into the City. When he was blind, he gave his Vote in the Senate, and over-rul'd the question of not receiving the Prisoners taken by Pyrrhus, nor making Peace with him.

SECT. XXXIX.

WHEN we were Children, Cn. Aufidius, who had been Pretor, gave his Vote in the Se∣nate, nor deny'd his Friends Chamber-Counsel, wrote a Greek History, and was clear sighted in Learning. Diodotus the Stoick liv'd many years at our House blind. Now he, what would be hardly credible, exercis'd himself in Philosophy, rather much more diligently than before, plaid on Mu∣sical Instruments, after the Pythagorean usage, had Books read to him day and night; in which Studies he needed not Eyes. Above all this, what scarce seems possible without Eyes, he supported the Office of a Geometry Lecture, directing his Scholars by word of mouth, from what Point, to what Point they should draw every Line. They report of (g) Asclepiades a not obscure Ereirian Philosopher, when one ask'd what alteration Blindness had brought upon him; that he should answer, To carry one Servant more about with him; for as even the ex∣treamest Poverty would be tolerable, if one might (h) what some Greeks do every day; so Blindness could easily be born, if it have sufficient Succors against its Infirmities. Democritus having lost his Eyes, could not distinguish, I grant, between white and black; but now, good and evil, just and unjust, honourable and base, profitable and disprofitable, great and small he could; and with∣out variety of colours, might live happily; with∣out discerning of Natures could not. Nay this man thought that the intention of his mind was ra∣ther

distracted by the sight of his Eyes; and where∣as others oftentimes could not see what block lay in their ways, he rang'd over all infinity, so that no extream could set bounds to his further ad∣vance. There is a Tradition too, that Homer was Blind. But we see his Picture more like than Poem. What Country, what Coast, what place of Grcece, what sort of Subject, what Skirmish, what pitch'd Field, what Gally, what motion of Men, what of Beasts, is not so drawn to the Life, as that he hath brought us to see, what himself saw not? What then, do we think, could either Homer, or any other Scholar, ever want to com∣pleat the delight and pleasure of the Soul? or if the Matter were not so, would Anaxagoras, or this very Democritus, have left their Lands and Estates, and have given up themselves, with their whole Soul, to this Divine delight of learning and en∣quiring. Therefore the Poets never bring in Tire∣sias the Sooth-sayer, whom they feign to be a wise man, bemoaning his Blindness. But now (i) Ho∣mer having fram'd Polyphemus of an inhumane and savage Character, makes him to hold discourse with his Ram, and praise its Fortunes that it could go whether it would, and graze upon what it would. He, indeed, did it well; for the Cyclops himself was never a whit wiser than his Ram.

(g) Asclepiades, a not obscure Eretrain Philosopher.] This is distinguish'd from Asclepiades the Prusian, that eminent Physician.

(h) The extreamest Poverty would be tolerable, if one might, what some Greeks do every day.] This general Reflection is more pregnant than any special charge; whether it mean servile Flattery, ill Practices, or sordid Employments for Gain.

(i) Homer having fram'd Polyphemus.] See his Odysseis, Book 9. by Ogilby or Hobbs.

SECT. XL. Deafness.

BUT what evil is there in Deafness? M. Crassus was thick of hearing, but another thing had more trouble in it, (k) that he heard ill; though, as I thought, wrongfully. (l) Our Epicureans can∣not speak Greek; nor the Greek Epicureans Latin; therefore these are to each other, in regard of their respective Languages Deaf; and we are all so in those Tongues, that we do not understand which are innumerable; we are in truth Deaf. But they do not hear the voice of the Harper; neither do they the screaking of the Saw, when it is in whet∣ting; nor the grunting of the Swine, when its throat is cutting; nor the roaring of the Sea, when they desire to take rest. And if, perchance, Mu∣sick delights them, first they ought to consider, that many wise men have liv'd happy, before Airs were ever compos'd; then that much greater Pleasure is taken in reading, than hearing Songs. Then as a little before we turn'd over the Blind to the Pleasures of the Ears, so may we the Deaf, to that of the Eyes; for he that can speak with him∣self; will not much need the Discourse of another. Put case that all Evils were heap'd on one man, so that he were both Blind and Deaf; further, op∣press'd with most sharp Pains of the Body; which first of themselves use to dispatch the man; but if,

perchance, they be drill'd out to any length of time, and yet torment so violently, that we should not see reason enough to endure them any longer; good Gods! (m) why do we make much diffi∣culty? for the Harbor is at hand, death upon the spot, an eternal receptacle into a State of insen∣sibility. (n) Theodorus said to Lysimachus, threat∣ning him with death, you have, indeed, rais'd your self to great advancement, if you can compare in power with a Spanish Fly. Paul, when King Perses peti∣tion'd him not to be led in Triumph, reply'd, That is in your own Power. Much hath been said of death the first day, when the Debate was expresly concerning death; and not a little, the second, when the Subject was about Pain; he that can re∣member that, is in no great danger of not think∣ing death either to be desir'd, or at least not to be fear'd.

(k) That he heard ill.] M. Crassus the Triumvir, one of the three Keepers of the Liberty of Rome, with Pompey and Julius Caesar; he certainly lay under a flagrant infamy of unsatiable Covetousness, both at home, and with the Per∣sians. On this account Tully inveighs against him in his last Paradox. He was also brought into some suspicion in the matter of Catiline, but there compurg'd by him; and per∣haps he doth the like here, only in point of disaffection to the Government, in his time establish'd.

(l) Our Epicureans.] A colour or facetious Argument, taken to expose that Sect.

(m) Why do we make much difficulty?] A Stoical case to favour impatience in Pain.

(n) Theodorus.] Call'd Atheist, was sent Embassador by Ptolomy to Lysimachus King of Thrace, where speaking reso∣lutely, he was threat'ned by him, who was of a cholerick Temper; when he bid him come no more into his presence; he reply'd, he would not, unless Ptolomy sent him again. Some of the Fathers count him falsly traduc'd of Atheism,

because he disallow'd the worship of the Greeks; and being a Cyrenian, and known to Ptolomy, he might have acquain∣tance with the Alexandrian Jews.

SECT. XLI. That it is an opinion, almost universally, held by the Philosophers, that wise men are always happy.

THAT order seems, in my judgment, fit to be observ'd in Life, which is enjoyn'd in the treats of the Greeks, either drink or be gone. And reason good, for either let a man enjoy the plea∣sure of taking his Cup with others, or let him time∣ly withdraw, lest, he being sober, be fallen upon by the rest in a drunken Fit. So should a man avoid, by retiring, what injuries of Fortune he cannot sustain. These same directions of Epicurus, repeats Hierom word for word. Now if those Phi∣losophers, who are of the opinion, that vertue of it self is of no consideration; all that we call honest and praise-worthy, they say to be meer Jargon, and a pure Rant; yet if these judge the wise man to be always happy; what, I pray, do you think should the Philosophers descended from Socrates and Plato do? some of which, say there is so great excellency in the goods of the mind, that those of the Body and external ones, are eclips'd by them; others do not so much as count them goods; place all their advantages in their mind. Which Controversie of theirs, Carneades was wont to moderate, as an Umpire to which both Parties refer'd their Cause

to be compromis'd. For whereas what things the Peripateticks think goods, the Stoicks count the same Conveniencies, and yet the Peripateticks do not at∣tribute more to Riches, Health, and other things of like Nature; then the Stoicks, since they were to be weigh'd by reality, not words, he deny'd there was any just cause of Dissention. Wherefore let the Philosophers of other Perswasions, look to it, how they can gain this Point. Yet I am pleas'd that they make a profession beseeming Philoso∣phers, about wise mens title to living in perpetual happiness. But since we must be going to mor∣row, let us comprise in memory these five days Debates. And to say the truth, I think I shall draw them up in writing (for upon what can we better employ (o) this leisure, such as it is?) and we will send these other five Books to our Friend Bru∣tus, by whom we have not only been invited to the making Philosophical Treatises, (p) but also provok'd. Wherein how much we shall profit others, we cannot easily tell; but for our own most bitter griefs, and various disquiets, charging us on every side, no other relief could be found.

(o) This leisure, such as it is.] Spoken with some Sto∣mach for his being at that time in Prudence, oblig'd to com∣pound for his safety by retirement from his honourable Em∣ploiments.

(p) But also provok'd.] By example; and the address of his Book upon alike Subject.

FINIS.