The five days debate at Cicero's house in Tusculum between master and sophister.

SECT. VIII. Whether Vertue alone be sufficient to Happiness, but not compleat Happiness.

S.

I Wish it indeed, but there is somewhat where∣in I am dissatisfied; for I submit that of the Positions you have made, one is consequent to the other, that as if what thing be honest, that only is good, it followeth that an happy Life is effected by Vertue; so if an happy Life consists in Vertue, nothing is good but Vertue. (n) But your Friend Brutus, upon the Principle of Aristus and Antiochus, hath not the same Sentiment; for he thinks, although there be something else good besides Vertue.

M.

How now? do you think I will speak any thing in opposition to Brutus?

S.

Nay, for that as you please; for it is not my part to direct you.

M.

What then is consequent upon what Sup∣position, refer to another place; for that was a difference between me and Antiochus often, and lately with Aristus, (o) when being General I lodg'd at his House; for I did not think any man could be happy in the midst of Evils; but that a Wise man might be in the midst of Evils, if there were any corporal or external Evils. These things were discours'd, which Antiochus hath also written in many places, that Vertue of it self can effect an happy Life, but not the most happy; then that, most things were denominated from their major

part, although some part of them were wanting, as Strength, Health, Riches, Honour, Glory, which are judg'd by their nature, not their number, in like manner a happy Life, though it were in some part deficient, yet gain'd its name from far the greater part. To examine these things particu∣larly, is not at present very necessary, although to me, they seem to be spoken not over-consist∣ently. For I neither understand what he that is happy needs to make him more happy, (p) (for if he want any thing, he is not happy) and for the deno∣mination and estimate of every thing, from its greater part, sometimes that may be in force so to do, but when they say there are three sorts of Evils, he that is press'd with all Evils, of two of these sorts, so as to have all cross'd in his Estate; a Body oppress'd and worn out with all Diseases; shall we say he wants but a little of an happy Life, not only of one most happy? This is that which Theophrastus could not maintain; for having resolv'd that Stripes, Rackings, Crucifixions, Overthrows of our Coun∣try, Banishments, Losses of Children, had great influence on living ill and miserably, he durst not speak big and loftily, having entertain'd mean and low Sentiments.

(n) But your Friend Brutus, upon the Principle of Aristus and Antiochus.] Tully had before Section 5. check'd his Auditor with the Authority of Brutus, that Vertue was sufficient to render Life happy; therefore there was no other good, he now retorts that Authority upon him; for Bru∣tus having heard Antiochus of Ashketon, and afterwards his Brother Aristus held, that Vertue was not sufficient to ren∣der Life most happy. Antiochus had been Auditor of Philo, but set up a new Academy, which brought in a Syncretism of Stoicks, with Peripateticks; this Tully impugns, and sup∣ports the Person of a rigid Stoick.

(o) When being General, I lodg'd at his House.] In his re∣turn from his Government of Asia, for having there routed a Party of High-land Cilicians, and taken their Town Pin∣denissum, he was by the Army saluted General in the Field, after the old Roman fashion, carried his Lictors with their Bundles garnish'd with Lawrel to Athens homeward, took up his Quarters with Aristus there, and assay'd to enter Rome in Triumph.

(p) For if he want any thing he is not happy.] In this Life, as Vertue is imperfect, so is Happiness incompleat.