The five days debate at Cicero's house in Tusculum between master and sophister.

The Government of the Passions. The Prologue Sect. 1, 2, 3. (Book 4)

Book IV. (Book 4)

SECT. 1. The Ancient Romans, probably not Strangers to Polite Learning, because Borderers upon Greece the Great.

AS in many other Instances, most worthy Brutus, I am wont to admire the Parts and Perfections of our Country-men, so especially in these Studies which they have but of very late time regarded, and brought over from Greece to this State. For whereas from the first Foundation of the City, Divination, Cere∣monies, Common-Councils, Appeals, Court of Senators, Train'd-bands of Horse and Foot, the whole order of the Militia, were, from a Wisdom almost more than Humane, establish'd upon the Regal Constitutions, and some of them upon their Laws; so when the Common-wealth was deli∣ver'd from the Oppression of Tyranny, (p) an ad∣mirable advance, and incredible carriere was made to∣wards

all excellency. Now this is not the proper place to dilate upon the Customs and Ordinances of our Ancestors, upon the Discipline and Temper of our Government; this hath been with some diligence, treated of by us elsewhere; but espe∣cially in those six Books which we have written of a Common-wealth. At the present, when I con∣sider the Study of Arts and Sciences, I meet with many Circumstances whereupon to frame an opi∣nion, that they also were imported hither from abroad, nor invited only, but follow'd also, and cherish'd; for they had almost in sight, Pythagoras, a man excellent and renowned for Wisdom, who was in Italy at the very time when L. Brutus the noble Founder of your honourable Family, set his Country at Liberty. Now the Learning of Py∣thagoras spreading far and near, seems to me to have reach'd even to this State. This is probable to conjecture; so may it be trac'd by some signs. For who can imagine, when there flourish'd In Italy, Greece which was call'd the Great, having very large and powerful States; and the renown of Pythagoras first, and then of the Pythagoreans, was so great in them, that our Country-men should stop their Ears against their most learned Dis∣courses. Nay, I suppose it was from the admira∣tion of the Pythagoreans, that King Numa was re∣puted by those of later Ages, to have been a Py∣thagorean; for they knowing the Discipline and Rules of Pythagoras; and having receiv'd from their Fore-fathers, the Equity and Wisdom of that King; but being ignorant of Chronology, to adjust the Times and Ages proper to each one, by reason of the great Antiquity, thought that he who so much excell'd in Wisdom, was the Auditor of Pythagoras.

(p) An admirable advance.] Spoken like a Common-wealths-man; but how got the rich Lampis an Estate? A small one, saith he, in a great time; and a great one in a small time.

SECT. II. From their skill in Musick, Poetry, and Oratory.

NOW thus much for conjecture; as for the steps of Pythagoreans, although many may be trac'd, yet we shall content our selves with a few, because that is not the proper enquiry on this occasion. For whereas those Philosophers are said to have deliver'd some Symbolical Precepts in Verse; and to have relax'd their minds with suitable Notes of Musick from a serious intention of thought to a staid composure. Cato, a most grave Author, said in his Book of Origens, that this was the Custom at Feasts among the old Romans, that as they sat at Table, they Sung, in order to the sound of the Pipe, the Praises and Atchievements of renowned Persons; from whence it is manifest, both that Songs were compos'd to Tunes and Verses; which thing the twelve Tables farther declare, that Verse was so early in use, in that they make a Prohibi∣tion, that it should not be made to defame another; this also is some Argument of Learning in those days, that Musick plays before the Cushions of the Gods, and the Feasts of the Magistrates, which was a Property of that Education, whereof I am now speaking. In my judgment that Verse of Ap∣pius the Blind, which Panaetius much commends in

an Epistle to (q) Q. Tubero, resembleth the Py∣thagoreans. There are many things more in our Constitutions deriv'd from them, which I pass by, least we should be thought to have horrow'd from others, what we have suppos'd to have invented our selves; but to reduce our Discourse to the Point in hand. In how short a time, how many and how great Poets have arisen? and what Orators? that it may easily appear, that our Country-men could have at∣tain'd to any thing, whensoever they did but set their minds to go about it: But as for other Studies, we shall speak to them elsewhere, if occasion require, and have already often done it.

(q) Qu. Tubero.] Quintus Aelius Tubero was a great Law∣yer, Logician, and skill'd in the Stoick Philosophy.

SECT. III. That Philosophy was of later date with them.

THE Study of Wisdom must have been ancient among our Country-men; yet I do not find whom I could instance in before the Age of Laelius and Scipio. When these were young men, (r) I see that Diogenes the Stoick, and Carneades the Aca∣demick, were sent Embassadors from the Athenians to the Senate; these men not having been employ'd before in any State-Affairs, and being the one a Cyrenian, the other a Babylonian, would certainly never have been taken off from their Sedentary Life and Philosophical Disputations, to be chosen

to that Ministry, had not there been in those very times, in some of the chief Nobility, a studious∣ness after Learning. These having committed to writing other Matters, some the Civil Law, others their own Orations, others the Monuments of their Ancestors, did express the noblest of all Arts, the Do∣ctrine of well living, rather in their Conversation, than writing. Therefore there are scarce any, or very few Treatises in Latin, about this true and excel∣lent Philosophy, which deriving from Socrates, hath still continu'd in the Peripateticks and Stoicks, who say the same thing in other Terms, whilst the Aca∣demicks moderated in their Controversies, whether it were by reason of the importance of their Affairs, and their continual employment, or because they thought the Subject could not be render'd agree∣able to the illiterate Vulgar. So it was, whilst they forbore writing, (s) C. Amafinius became an Au∣thor, whose Books being once publish'd, the Mul∣titude was so wrought upon, that they flock'd in especially to that Sect; whither it were because the Doctrine is so exceeding easie, or because they were allur'd with the soft Charms of Pleasure; or yet, because nothing better was prefer'd, they held fast what they had. Now, after Amafinius, many zeal∣ous Promoters of the same way, writ many pieces, so that they fill'd all Italy; and what is the greatest Argument, that there is no solidity in their Do∣ctrine, its being easily committed to memory, and acceptable to the ignorant; this they count the strength of their Party.

(r) I see that Diogenes the Stoick, and Carneades the Aca∣demick.] During the interval of the second and third Pu∣nick War, when M. Cato flourish'd at the Bar, and Plautus

was Laureate on the Roman Stage, upon this occasion came the Famous Embassy here mentioned. The Athenians having been exhausted with a Macedonian War, plunder'd Oropus. The Oropians fly for relief to the Protection of the Roman Senate. These commit the cognisance of the whole Cause to the Sicyonians, their Allies who should impose a Fine on the Delinquents. The Atbenians refus'd to give an appearance, but were amerc'd 500 Talents. Hereupon they sent three Philosophers Embassadors to Rome, to obtain from the Senate a release of the Fine impos'd. Besides Diogenes the Stoick, and Catneades the Academick, there came Critolaus the Peripatetick. These Personages, every one very eminent in his way, held severally publick Dispu∣tations in the most remarkable places of Rome, to the great Admiration of their Auditors. The effect of their Em∣bassy was, that they got four hundred Talents of the Fine abated, and the remaining hundred was never levied.

(s) C. Amafinius.] He translated some pieces of Epicu∣rus into dull Latin.

SECT. IV. The Position. That it is probable that a wise man is not free from all Passion.

BUT let every man maintain what is his Sense, for judgments are free; we shall adhere to our old Resolution, not to be ty'd up to the Impositions of any one Sect, to which we must yield our ne∣cessary assent in Philosophy; but shall always en∣quire after what hath most of probability in every Pro∣position; which, as we have done often elsewhere, so did we lately, (t) with great diligence, in our Seat at Tusculum. Having therefore laid down the Disputes of three days, I shall couch the fourth in this Book. For so soon as we were come down

into the lower walk, as we had done the former days, the matter proceeded thus.

M.

Speak any one that hath a mind, what Sub∣ject he would have disputed upon.

S.

I am not of the opinion that a wise man can be free from all Passions of the mind.

M.

That he is from Discontent, you were of the opinion, upon yesterdays Dispute; unless perhaps you assented out of complaisance.

S.

No, in truth, for your Discourse satisfy'd me extreamly well.

M.

You do not therefore think that Discontent is incident to a wise man.

S.

I do not believe it is.

M.

Nay, if that cannot disturb the mind of a wise man, neither can any other. For what? should fear confound him? Why Fear is of those things absent, at which present is Discontent. There∣fore upon removal of Discontent, Fear is also remov'd. There remain two Passions more; excessive Joy, and Lust; if these be not incident to a wise man, the wise man's mind will be always compos'd.

S.

I am clear of that judgment.

M.

Which then had you rather? that we should presently hoyse up Sail, or, as is usual in putting forth out of the Harbour, to row a while.

S.

What do you mean by that? for I do not un∣derstand you.

(t) With great diligence.] Tully promiseth somewhat more than ordinary in this days Discourse, which is very ac∣curate and judicious.

SECT. V. The Method of the ensuing Disputation.

M.

BEcause Chrysippus and the Stoicks, when they Dispute about the Passions, take up much time in the dividing and defining them; for that part of their Discourse is very small, healeth the Soul, and suffers not its affections to grow boister∣ous. On the other side the Peripateticks bring many motives to allay the Heats of the mind; but pass by the pricking Thorns of Divisions and Definiti∣ons. I enquire therefore, whether I should pre∣sently spread the Sails of my Discourse, or should push it on a while before with the Oars of Logi∣cians.

S.

Do this latter, for the whole matter in que∣stion will be more compleat by joyning both means of handling it.

M.

That is indeed the more orderly way of Proceeding; but if any thing shall fall out to be somewhat obscure, you may do well afterwards to enquire about it.

S.

I shall do so; yet you after your usual man∣ner, will deliver those obscure matters plainer than they are deliver'd by the Greeks.

M.

I will use my best endeavours; but there is need of heedful attention, (u) lest all should slip away, if any one thing escape you. Now what the Greeks call Passions, we chuse rather to call Distempers than Diseases; in the opening those, I shall follow the old Description which was first used by Pytha∣goras,

and then by Plato, who divide the Soul into two parts; the one they make rational, the other irrational; in the reasonable part they place Tran∣quillity of mind, that is a gentle and quiet Con∣stancy; in the other the turbulent Commotions both of Anger and Concupiscence, contrary to Reason, and at Enmity with it. Let this therefore be the source of all; yet in the describing of these Passions, we shall make use of the Stoicks Defini∣tions and Devisions, who seem to me to handle this question most judiciously.

(u) Least all should slip away, if any one thing escape you.] As the Notion he lays down of a Passion, is the Sinew of the whole ensuing Argument.

SECT. VI. The Definition of the Passions.

THIS therefore is Zeno's Definition, that a Dis∣order, which he calls a Passion, is a Commo∣tion of the mind, opposite to right Reason, and contrary to Nature. Some more succinctly, that a Passion is an over-vehement Affection, but they mean it over-vehement when it flys out beyond the due bounds of Natural Constancy. Now they will have the particular Passions to arise from two conceiv'd Goods, and two conceiv'd Evils, and so to be four. From the Goods they judge do spring Lust and Mirth: Mirth is of Goods present; Lust of future. From the Evils, Fear and Discontent. Fear from

future; Discontent from present. For those things which are fear'd, when Imminent; when Incum∣bent produce Discontent. Now Mirth and Lust respect a conceit of Good things. Since Lust upon the appearance of Good, being inveigled and in∣flam'd, is imported after it. Mirth, when it hath once acquir'd what was coveted after, is elevated and exults. For all men naturally pursue, what things appear Good, and avoid the contrary. Wherefore so soon as any object is set before the mind, which carrieth in it some appearance of good Nature it self, pusheth us on to the acquiring of it. When this is manag'd with Constancy and Prudence, such Desire the Stoicks call a Willingness, we may a re∣gular Will; this they think is in the wise man only, which they thus define. A regular Will is that which desireth a thing according to Reason; but that which is hurried on violently, in opposition to Reason, that is Lust and unbridled Concupis∣cence, which is sound in all Fools. In like man∣ner, when we are so affected, as being in the Fru∣ition of some good that falls out to be after two sorts; for when the mind beats gently, and in an even temper according to reason, then it is call'd Joy: but when the Soul is flush'd without cause, and beyond due bounds, that may be call'd trans∣porting, or excessive Mirth; which they thus de∣fine an Elevation of the Mind, without reason. And because, as we naturally affect good, so we naturally decline Evil; which declining, if it be according to reason, should be call'd Caution, and understood to be in the wise man only. But if it be without reason, and with a base and sordid Dejection of Spirit, should be call'd Fear. Fear therefore is a Caution contrary to Reason. As for a present Evil, the wise man hath no concern about it; but

a Fool hath that wherewith men are affected in conceited Evils, and let their Spirits sink, and are Melancholly, not obeying Reason. Therefore this is the first Definition, that Discontent be a dejecti∣on of mind, contrary to Reason, so there are four Passions, three ordinate Affections; because there is no ordinate Affection oppos'd to Discontent.

SECT. VII. The Intellect Accessory to the Passions.

BUT they determine that all these Passions have their Causes, in the judgment and Opinion. Therefore they define them closer, so that it may be understood, not only how culpable they are, but also how much under our Power. Thus Discontent is a fresh opinion of a present Evil, under which it seems our Duty to be dejected and troubled in mind. Mirth a fresh opinion of a present Good, upon which it seems our Duty to be elevated. Fear an opinion of an impending Evil, which seems intolerable. Lust an opinion of an approaching Good, the presence and Fruition of which, would be beneficial to us. Now as to those Opinions and Judgments, which I said were Ingredients of the Passions, they do not say that only the Passions have their subsistence from them, but also the Effects of those Passions; so that Discontent causeth a certain painful remorse. Fear a withdrawing of the Soul, and a kind of flight. Mirth, an extrava∣gant Jolity: Lust an unbridled Concupiscence. Again they interpret that opinion, which we have

inserted into the Definitions above-mention'd, to be a weak assent. But under each of these gene∣ral Passions, there are certain particular ones of the same sort distributed, as under Discontent, En∣vying (for we must serve our selves of a less usual word, in order to the clearness of Explication, since the word Envy, especially in Latin, is taken not only actively, as it refers to him that Envys, but passively as to him that is envy'd for the Odium that is cast upon him,) Emulation, Detraction, Pitty, Anguish, Mourning, Bemoaning, Distress, Sorrow, Lamentation, Anxiety, Uneasiness, Self∣afflicting, Despair, and whatever else be of the same Nature. Again subordinate to Fear, are Sloth, Shame, Terrour, Timorousness, Dismay, Confusion, Distraction, Cowardise; under Plea∣sure, Malice, rejoycing at anothers Mischief, De∣light, Boasting and the like. Under Lust, Anger, Wrath, Hatred, Enmity, Discord, Want, Desire, and the rest of that kind. Now these they define after this manner.

SECT. VIII. The subordinate Passions desin'd. Of Discontent and Fear.

THEY say that Envying is a Discontent, admitted upon anothers good Successes, being no ways prejudicial to him that envieth; for if any one be troubled at the Prosperity of one who hurts him, he is not properly said to Envy; as if Agamemnon should be so at Hectors: But he who is griev'd that

another should enjoy those advantages which are no ways prejudicial to himself, he in truth is envi∣ous. Emulation again hath a twofold importance, so as to be taken both in a good and a bad Sense; for the imitation of Vertue is also call'd Emulation; but we have nothing to do with it here in that ac∣ceptation, for that is praise-worthy. And there is an Emulation, a Discontent, if another enjoy, and one go himself without that which he hath eagerly coveted after. Detraction is now what I would have understood to be Jealousie, a Discontent that another should share in that which one hath eager∣ly coveted. Pitty is a Discontent arising from the Misery of another suffering wrongfully; for no Body is touch'd with pitty, at the punishment of an Assassine or Traytor. Anguish is a sore Discon∣tent. Mourning is a Discontent at the untimely death of one who was dear to us. Bemoaning is a Discontent with Tears. Distress a toilsome Discon∣tent. Grief a tormenting Discontent. Lamenta∣tion a Discontent with wailing. Sollicitude a Dis∣content with pensiveness. Uneasiness a persevering Discontent. Self-afflicting a Discontent with In∣flictions upon the Body. Despair a Discontent with∣out any expectation of better condition. But what are subject to Fear they thus define. Sloth to be a Fear of ensuing Labour. Terrour an astonishing Fear: Whence it cometh to pass, that blushing followeth shame; paleness, and trembling, and gnashing of Teeth, Terrour. Timorousness to be a Fear of approaching Evil. Dismay a Fear that puts the mind besides it self; whence that of En∣nius.

Dismay all wisdom from my Soul expells.

Confusion a Fear following, and as it were atten∣dant on Dismay. Distraction, a Fear that breaks all the Measures we had taken. Dread, a perse∣vering Fear.

SECT. IX.—of Pleasure and Lust.

AGAIN, the particular Branches from Plea∣sure they thus describe; that Malice should be a Pleasure taken in anothers harm, without any advantage to onesself. Delight, a Pleasure charm∣ing the mind, with the sweetness of the hearing; and such as is that of the Ears, such are those of the Eyes, the Touching, the Scent, and Tast; which are all of one kind, as it were Pleasures melted down to gratifie the Soul. Boasting is a Pleasure naturally Impertinent, and which exalts it self with some Insolence. But what Passions are subjected to Lust, they thus define; so that Anger is a Lust of punishing him who appears to have injur'd us Wrath is Anger breaking forth, and newly arisen which is in Greek call'd Heat. Hatred is an invete∣rate Anger. Enmity, an Anger watching the time of taking Revenge. Heart-burning is a deadly feud conceiv'd with inward rancor of Spirit. Worldli∣ness, an insatiable Lust. Expectation, a Lust of see∣ing one who is not yet come. They further di∣stinguish this, that Lust is of those things which are affirm'd of one or more (which the Logicians call Predicates) as having Riches, bearing Offices Want is a Lust after the things themselves, as Mony

as Honours. Again they say the Spring of all Passions is Intemperance, which is a defection from the whole Understanding, and from right Reason. At such Aversion to the Orders of Reason, that its Affections can by no means be regulated nor re∣strain'd. As Temperance therefore moderates the Affections, and causeth them to obey right Rea∣son; so its opposite habit Intemperance Fires, Con∣founds, puts into an Uproar the whole State of the Mind; therefore both Discontents and Fears, and all the other Passions take their Rise from it.

CHAP. X. The Original of the Distempers of the Soul.

AS therefore, when the Blood is corrupted, or Phlegm abounds, or Choler in the Body, Diseases and Indispositions are ingender'd. So the medley of perverse Opinions, and their opposition one to another, rob the Soul of its Health, and afflict it with Diseases. Now from the Passions first Diseases, as they so call them, are contracted, and those Ha∣bits which are contrary to those Diseases, as having a deprav'd Aversion and Distast for certain things. Then Indispositions, which are call'd by the Stoicks Infirmities; and also contrary Aversions oppos'd to them. Upon this place too much Pains is taken by the Stoicks, and especially Chrysippus, it setting forth the resemblance between the Diseases of the Body, and those of the Soul; waving which Dis∣course, not at all necessary, let us dispatch those things wherein the Matter consists. Be it therefore

adverted, that whilst Opinions toss about, as they are inconstant and impetuous, Passion is still in motion. But when this boiling and tumult of the Soul hath fermented, and as it were, shed it self into the Veins and Marrow, then breaks forth both the Disease and Indisposition, and those Aversions which are contrary to those Diseases and Indispo∣sitions.

SECT. XI. The Nature of Passion and Antipathy.

THESE things which I am speaking of, differ from one another in Speculation, but in re∣ality are link'd together, and arise from Lust and Mirth; for when Mony is coveted, and Reason not presently apply'd, as a kind of Socratick Medicim, to cure that coveting; the Infection sinks into the Veins, and cleaves to the Vitals; and breaks forth into a Disease, and Indisposition of mind; which being grown old, cannot be pluck'd out; and the name of the Disease is Covetousness; and other Diseases in like manner, as Vain-glory, as multi∣plying Wives, or, as the Greeks have it, Love of Women; and other Diseases and Indispositions of mind, do in like manner arise; but those which are contrary to these, they are thought to spring from Fear, as Hatred of Women, such as was in the Woman-hater; as Hatred of all Mankind, which we have heard was in Timon sir-nam'd the Man-hater, as is Inhospitality. All which Indis∣positions of Mind, spring from a certain Fear of

those things which men avoid and hate. Now they define an Indisposition of Mind, a strong conceit cleaving to the Soul, and deeply rooted in it, about a thing not truly desir'd, as though it were greatly to be desir'd. But as to that which ariseth from Aversion, they thus define it to be a strong conceit, cleaving to the Soul, and deeply rooted in it, about a thing not truly to be avoided, as though it were to be avoided. Now this conceit is an Opinion that one knows, what he doth not know. But under this Indisposition, such like Ha∣bits are compris'd, Covetousness, Ambition, im∣moderate Love of Women, Wrangling, Liquorish∣ness, excess of Wine, Daintiness, and any other such-like things. Now Covetousness is a strong conceit about Mony, as though it were greatly to be desir'd, cleaving to the Soul, and deeply root∣ed in it; so the Definition of other such Distempers is of like Form. Again the Definitions of Aver∣sions are of such sort, as that Inhospitality is a strong conceit, that a Stranger should be greatly avoid∣ed, which conceit cleaveth to the Soul, and is deeply implanted in it. In like manner is also de∣fin'd, Hatred of Women, as in Hippolitus; and of all Mankind, as in Timon.

SECT. XII. The Analogy between the Sickness of the Soul and Body in ill habit.

NOW that I may come to the resemblance of Bodily Health, with the right State of the Soul. And we may make that Comparison, though less tri••ely than the Stoicks use to do; some are more inclinable to one Disease, and others to ano∣ther, (therefore we call some Scorbutical, others Gouty, not that they are always in the Fit, but are often so) some to Fear, others to some other Passion. Whereupon carefulness is nam'd to be in some men, when they are call'd careful or worldly men; in others Hastiness, which differs from An∣ger; and it is one thing to be Hasty, another to be Angry; for neither are all those careful men, who have sometimes Care upon them; nor have all careful men at all times Care upon them; as there is difference between being Drunk, and be∣ing a Drunkard; and it is one thing to be a Bully, another a Suitor. Thus this Propension of some to one Disease, others to another, is of large extent; for it is applicable to all Passions; it is also appa∣rent in many Vices; but the Notion hath not a di∣stinct Denomination: Therefore men are stil'd both Envious, and Malitious, and Dirty, and Timor∣ous, and Compassionate, because they are in∣clinable to such Passions, not because they are always actually imported by them. This prone∣ness therefore of every man to his respective

Humour, peculiar to his Complexion, from re∣semblance of the Body, is nam'd an Indisposition in such Sense as it may be meant a proneness to Distemper; but this, in good things, may be nam'd easiness. Since some are more ready to one good Quality, and others to another; in bad things a proneness; to connote a Propension to fall; in indifferent things it may have the former name. Now as in the Body there is a Disease, an Indisposition, and a Blemish; so also in the Soul.

SECT. XIII. The Similitude between soundness and unsound∣ness of Body and Soul.

THEY call a Disease, a Corruption of the whole Mass. An Indisposition, a Disease with Infirmity. A Blemish, a Disproportion in the order of the Parts of the Body, from whence arise a crookedness of Limbs, Dislocation, Deformity. So that the formet two, Disease and Indisposition, grow from the Concussion and Disturbance of the Health of the whole Body. But a Blemish, with∣out the Impeachment of Health, is discernable of it self; but in the Soul, we can distinguish the Dis∣ease from the Indisposition, by thought only. But the Blemish of the Soul is an Habit or Quality of a Mind wavering all its Life, and at Discord with it self; so it cometh to pass, that in the one, Dis∣ease and Indisposition, is caused by Corruption of Opinions; in the other by Inconstancy and Oppo∣sition; for every Blemish hath not incongruous Parts, as

that of those who are not far remov'd from Perfection. It is indeed a Quality jarring with it self, so far as it is short of Perfection, but not dislocated nor crooked. Now Diseases and Indispositions are Parts of being blemish'd. But whether Passions be parts of it, is a question; for Blemishes are Perma∣nent Qualities, but Passions moving ones, so that they cannot be parts of the Permanent Qualities. And as the resemblance of the Body approacheth the Nature of the Soul in bad, so also in good Qua∣lities; for Bodily Excellencies are Beauty, Strength, Health, a good Constitution, Swiftness, the like are also in the Soul. That Temper of the Body, wherein the parts of the Body hold a right Cor∣respondence, is a State of Health; so is it call'd soundness of mind, when its Judgments and Opi∣nions thereof, are at accord one with annother; and that is the Vertue of the Soul, which some call Temperance it self; others a Quality obeying the Rules of Temperance, and consequent upon it, nor having any particular Denomination of its own; but whether it be this, or that, they say it is found in the wise man only. Though there be a certain soundness of mind, whereof an unwise man is also capable, when he hath been distracted, and cured by the Physicians. And as there is a just Simmetry of parts, together with a freshness of colour, and that is call'd Beauty; so in the Soul, an even Temper and Constancy of Opinions and Judgments, with Resolution and Stedfastness; following upon Vertue, or making up the very Nature of it, is call'd its Beauty. Likewise from a Similitude to the Strength of the Body, its Sinews and Activity; the Strength of the Soul is nam'd in like Terms. Again the Swiftness of the Body is ham'd Celerity; Wit hath also a like Commenda∣tion

for quickness, when the mind can dispatch much bus'ness in a short time.

SECT. XIV. Their Dissimilitude.

THERE is the Dissimilitude between Souls and Bodies, that Souls in their full strength, cannot fall into Sickness, Bodies may. But the Disorders of Bodies may happen without any fault; of Souls, cannot so. All whose Diseases and Passions arise from a Disobedience to Reason; and consequently are to be found in men only; for Beasts do somewhat analogous, but fall not into Passions. There is again this difference between the acute and the dull Wits; (a) as the Corinthian Brass, in reference to Rust; so they fall into a Distemper slower, and are recover'd sooner; but it is not so with dull Persons. Nor in truth does the mind of the ingenuous fall into every Disease and Passion; for it doth not in∣to many Brutish and Salvage ones; but some there be, that carry an appearance at the first sight of Humanity and Tenderness, as Compassion, Trou∣ble, Fear. Now Indispositions and Diseases are thought to be remov'd with more difficulty, than are those greatest Vices, which are contrary to the Cardinal Vertues; for whilst the Diseases abide, the Vices cannot be taken away; because those are not so speedily cur'd, as these are remov'd. You have what the Stoicks accurately Dispute con∣cerning the Passions, (b) which they call Logick, because it is argu'd with much Subtilty; now since

our Discourse is gotten, as it were, clear from among those lurking Rocks; we will stand a direct course in the rest of our Disputation, if we have deliver'd these things with sufficient plainness, in regard of the obscurity of the matter.

(a) As the Corinthian Brass.] This rich Metal, famous in Antiquity, is said to have been a Compound of Copper, Silver, Gold, melted down into one, at first casually when the Romans burnt Corinth.

(b) Which they call Logick.] He reflects upon the large and improper use of that Term, in a Subject really belong∣ing to Morals.

SECT. XV. The Cure of the Souls Infirmities.

S.

YOU have sufficiently; but if any thing stand in need of further Examination, we will enquire about it elsewhere; now we expect the Soul you mention'd, and the shaping your course.

M.

Since we both have in our places, and of∣ten must speak about Vertue (for most questions which concern Life and Manners, are deriv'd from Vertue as their Fountain) since then Vertue is a Quality of the mind constant and uniform, making those commendable in whom it is; and is it self upon its own account commendable, abstracting from any profit thence to grow; from it do proceed honest In∣tentions, Expressions, Action, and all right Rea∣son; although Vertue it self may most compendi∣ously be call'd right Reason. The opposite then of

this Vertue, is Vitiousness, for I had rather so call it, than Malice, for Malice, in Latin, is the name of a certain Vice; Vitiousness of all. From hence are gather'd the Passions, which are, as we said a little before, boisterous and violent Motions of Souls, averse to Reason, and the greatest Enemies of the Understandidg, and the quiet of Life. For they bear in upon us anxious and bitter Troubles, and afflict and disable our Souls with Fear. The same in∣flame us with too eager Desire, which we call sometimes Coneupiscence, and sometimes Lust; an unruliness of Mind, set at the greatest distance from Temper and Moderation; which if it have at any time obtain'd what was lusted after, then doth it bring a cheerfulness; so that its whole work appears to be empty and unprofitable, according to his judgment who thinks immoderate Pleasure of the Mind, to be the greatest Errour. The Cure therefore, of these Evils, lyes in Vertue only.

SECT. XVI. Especially to be in Moderation.

NOW what is not only more pittiful, but also more ugly and odious, than a man in Ad∣versity abandon'd to grief, and no ways moving to help himself? To which Misery he is next Neigh∣bour, who fears any approaching Evil, and with∣out coming to some Resolution, is lost in endless Debates: which Oppression of Evil, the Poets signifie when they make a ponderous Stone hang∣ing over the Head of Tantalus in Hell, for his Im∣pieties,

the ungovernableness of his Spirit, and his irreverent Speeches against the Deity; that is a punishment common to all Folly: For there is al∣ways impending over all whose heart is harden'd against the advice of Reason, some such Terrour. Now as these are Consumptive Passions of the Mind, I mean Discontent and Fear; so those pleasanter Concupiscence, always greedily desiring somewhat, and empty Mirth, that is, extravagant Jollity, do not much differ from madness. From whence is understood, what temper of mind he is of, whom, at times, we call Moderate or Modest, Grave, So∣ber, and Constant; sometimes we love to rank these Names under the Notion of Frugality or Honesty, as its general Head; because unless these Vertues were comprehended under that Term, that saying would never have been so common, as that it is now past into a Proverb; that a Frugal, or honest, man doth all things well; which very Character, when the Stoicks attribute to their wise man, we take it for a meer Rant and Bravado.

SECT. XVII. This Moderation to be peculiar to the wise man.

HE therefore, call him by what name you will, who through Moderation and Constancy, hath quiet of mind, and is at Peace with himself; so as neither to fret out of Discontent, nor to be confounded with Fear, who neither is inflam'd with an impatient longing after any thing, nor ra∣vish'd out of himself into the Fools Paradice of an empty Mirth; this is the wise man, after whom we are in quest; this the Happy man, to whom no occurrent of Life can seem either so afflictive, as to deject his Spirit, or so satisfactory as to elate it; for what, in this transitory Scene of Mortality, can he judge great, who hath Eternity in prospect, and under Survey the extent of the Universe? Can any thing, I pray, either in Humane Policys, or in this span of Life, seem great to a wise man, who so stands always upon his guard, that nothing new, nothing unexpected can befall him; nothing against which he is not already provided; and who still walks with such Vigilance and Circumspection, that he always provides himself a retreat and Sanctu∣ary, of living without disquiet and perplexity, so that whatever change, Fortune shall bring upon him, he may bear it readily and with ease. He that shall do this, will not only be free from Dis∣content, but also from all other inordinate Affecti∣ons. Now this dispassionate mind renders men per∣fectly

and compleatly Happy; whereas if that be di∣sturb'd and withdrawn from right and stedfast Reason, it loseth not only its Constancy, but also its Health. Wherefore the Opinion and Doctrin of the Peripateticks must be counted Lasche and Effeminate, who maintain the Passions to be ne∣cessary, but prefix certain bounds, beyond which they must not pass. Will you prescribe bounds to Vice or is it no Vice to disobey Reason? or doth n•• Reason sufficiently dictate that not to be good which you either eagerly covet, or grow haught upon the Acquisition of it? nor that again to be evil under the weight of which you either ly•• over-whelm'd, or are ready to run distracted, le•••• you should be over-whelm'd by it; and that a•••• those accidents come to be either over-sad, o•• over-joyous through mistake in Opinion; which misapprehension of it, abate in Fools upon leng•••• of time, so that the object continuing the same yet they bear it in one sort, when it is become old and in another, whilst it was yet fresh, that it should not at all affect the Wise. Now what can those bounds be? for let us enquire after the bounds of Grief, upon which subject the most labour is laid out. It is Recorded in Fannius, (c) that P. Ra∣tilius laid to heart his Brothers repulse when he stood to be Consul. But he is judg'd to have ex∣ceeded due bounds, for he so far resented it, a•• that it cost him his Life; he should therefore have bore it more moderately. Suppose, then, he had taken that with Moderation, and upon it, the death of Children had fallen in, a new Grief would have arisen, but that moderate; yet the Addition would have been great: what, if, upon that, had follow'd grievous Pains of Body, if loss of Estate if Blindness, if Banishment, if, upon every parti∣cular

Misfortune, Griefs were to be added, the Sum would be inflam'd, so as to become intoler∣able.

(c) That P. Rutilius laid to heart.] P. Rutilius a man of exemplary Conversation, stood against Scaurus, and lost the Consulship; his Brother at that time labouring under some slight Distemper, laid it so much to heart, that it heighten'd his Disease, of which he dy'd.

SECT. XVIII. The object of this Moderation must not be Vice.

HE therefore, that would look to set bounds to Vice, doth just as if he should fling himself down (d) the Cliff of Leucas, and think to stop when he pleas'd; for as he cannot do that, so neither can a mind disturb'd and imported, re∣strain it self, nor stay at what degree of Passion it will; for what things are pernicious in their growth, the same are vitious in their Original. Now Discon∣tent and the other Passions, to be sure, when heighten'd, are great Pests; therefore, so soon as admitted, have in them somewhat strongly Pesti∣lential, for these push themselves forward, when once the hold of Reason is left; and the very weak∣ness still feeds its own humour growing upon it self, till it is unawares carried adrift by the strength of its cur∣rent, into the main Ocean, nor finds any ground for Ancourage. So that it imports nothing, as to any difference, whether they approve moderate Passi∣ons, or moderate Injustice, moderate Cowardise,

moderate Intemperance; for he that sets bounds to Vices, in part admits those Vices. Which, as it is of it self detestable, so draws it the more inconve∣nience with it, because they stand on slippery ground, and being once put in motion, tumble down hill, and can by no means be staid.

(d) The Cliff of Leucas.] This was a steep Rock in Epi∣rus, from whence Cephalus and Sappho are said to have slung themselves into the Sea.

SECT. XIX. The Peripateticks Opinion about moderating the Passions, of Anger and Lust.

WHAT say we to this, that these Peripateticks affirm those Passions which we think should be extirpated, not only to be natural, but also for good ends to be by nature given us? for thus they proceed. First they give great Commendations of Anger, call it the Whetstone of Valour, and say that the Charges of men in Fury, both upon an Enemy and a Seditious Citizen, are much more vigorous, but slight the petty Reasonings of those who move upon such Considerations; it is right or wrong to do thus or thus; meet it is, that we haz∣ard life for our Laws, our Liberties, our Country; these Reflexions are powerless and ineffectual, un∣less Valour be inflam'd by Wrath; nor do they li∣mit this Maxim to Military men only; but think there can be no strict Discipline, without some roughness

of a cholerick Humour: In a word, they take him for no good Lawyer, who not only in impeaching, but even in defending, doth not reflect upon his Adversary with some smartness of resentment. Nay though in truth he feel no Passion, yet they think it should be counterfeited in words and ge∣sture, that so the action of the Orator may in∣cense the Auditor. Lastly they account him no man who cannot be angry; and that which we call Gentleness, they represent under the ill name of Softness. Nor do they praise this Lust alone, (for Anger is, as I lately defin'd it, a Lust of Re∣venge) but also say, that Lust in general, or ea∣gerness of Affection, was to good Purposes, by Nature given us; for no man can atchieve any brave Action, who hath not a strong Inclination towards it. Themistocles walk'd about the Streets in the Night, being not able to sleep; and being ask'd what was the matter, reply'd, that the Tro∣phies of Meltiades would not let him take his natural rest; who hath not heard of the late settings up and early risings of Demosthenes; who said it went to his heart if he were at any time prevented by the in∣dustry of Artificers at their work before break of day. Lastly the most eminent Philosophers could never have made such advance in their Studies, without an eager Passion after Wisdom. We are inform'd that Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato travel'd into re∣motest Regions; for they resolv'd to visit those places wheresoever any thing was to be learn'd. Do we ima∣gine it accountable, why they should undertake this without an ardency of Affection, to have been the Principle by which they were acted in their Enquiries?

SECT. XX. —and Discontent.

NAY Discontent it self, which we have declar'd is to be shun'd as an harmful and Savage Beast, they say was ordain'd by Nature to singu∣lar Advantages, that so men might be made sen∣sible of their Faults, when they are chasten'd, re∣prov'd, and put to shame for them; since those wh•• are insensible of ignominy and disgrace, seem in a s•••• incorrigible and abandon'd to the full sway of their ••••controul'd Vices. Better is it to have remorses •••• Conscience; whence is that reparty in Afrani••••, morally said, and answerable to the use of com∣mon Conversation; for when the Prodigal Son had said, Oh me!—the strict Father subjoyns.

Grieve he, though grieve for what he please.

They add that the other parts of Sorrow a•••• useful. Pitty towards moving to succour, and re••••∣ving the Distresses of good men in Adversity. N•••• that Emulation and Detraction, are not useless when a man either sees that he hath not the same advan∣tages with another, or that another hath the same with him. But if one should take away Fear, tha•• all diligence would be taken out of man's Life which is the greatest in them who stand in awe o•• our Laws, of Magistrates, of Poverty, of Igno∣miny, of Death; yet they argue so, as to confe•••• that these affections are to be retrench'd; but say

they neither can nor ought to be wholly rooted out; so that they hold a mean to be best in almost all things. Now when they thus explain these things, do they in your opinion speak nothing to the purpose, or something?

S.

In my judgment truly they speak somewhat, and therefore I am in expectation what you have to rejoyn upon it.

SECT. XXI. Against this Moderation is oppos'd the Stoicks Definition of them.

M.

I MAY perchance, light upon some rejoyn∣der, but take this first. Do you not ob∣serve what great modesty the Academicks use? for they speak directly what concerns the Matter. The Peripateticks are answered by the Stoicks. Let them even play their prize for me; who have no farther Obligation, than to enquire upon whither side lyeth the greatest appearance of truth. What is there then occurring in this question, that so somewhat probable may be apprehended in it, be∣yond which, humane understanding cannot ad∣vance? The Definition of a Passion, which I think Zeno hath rightly made, for thus he defineth it; that a Passion is an irrational and preternatural commotion of the mind; or more concisely, that a Passion is an over-vehement affection; but that should be understood to be over-vehement, which flys out beyond the due bounds of natural Constancy. What can I except against these Definitions? Now

these are terms of sober and subtle Disputants, those other Rhetorical flourishes, to talk of Ardencies of Spirit, and Whet-stones of Valour. Cannot indeed a brave man, unless he come to be chaf'd, do bravely? that is Fencer like, although we often see, even in them a constancy of mind. They parly, approach, complain, demand somewhat, so that they seem rather to be good Friends than angry; but allow in men of that Profession, there be some Pacideianus, so minded, as Lucilius re∣lates?

I'll be his death, saith he, pray how? I'll tell ye; I'll stick my cold Iron in his Breast, Legs, Belly; Though, to come at him, I his Steel devour; I hate him; fight in wrath, long ev'ry hour, 'Till hand in Hilt one of us be engag'd, With heat and spight I am so far enrag'd.

CHAP. XXII. That magnanimity is not the Product of Anger.

BUT now without any of this Fencer-like Fury, we see (e) Ajax in Homer marching with much cheerfulness when he was to fight in the sin∣gle Combat with Hector, whose very gate, when he had put on his Armour, brought joy to his own Party, and terrour to his Enemies; insomuch as Hector himself trembled at the very heart, as it is in Homer, and repented that he had challeng'd him to the Duel. Now these having, before they en∣gag'd, parly'd one with the other gently and In∣quiet,

did nothing, no not in the Combat, wrath∣fully or in rage. I do not imagine that (f) even Torquatus, he who first won that Sir-name, was angry when he pull'd the Chain from the Galls Neck. Nor (g) Marcellus at Clastidium was therefore valiant, because he was in a Passion; as to Africanus, he is better known to us, as being fresher in Memory; I durst venture to take my Oath for him that he was not angry when he protected with the Interposition of his Shield, M. Halienus the Palignian in the Battle, and stuck his Sword into the Enemies Breast. As to L. Bru∣tus I must demur, whether it might not be out of an infinite hatred of the Tyrant, that he charg'd Aruns the more furiously; for I see that they were both dispatch'd by an interchangeable pass upon each other. Why do you then call in anger hither? Hath Valour no Efforts of its own, unless it turn out∣ragious? What say we to Hercules, whom the very Valour, which you call Wrath, exalted to Heaven? do you think he was angry when he encountred the Erymanthian Boar, or Nemeaean Lyon? or was Theseus angry when he caught the Marathonian Bull by the Horns; Look well to it, whether Fortitude be not far from being outragious; and Wrath wholly compos'd of levity; for that is no Fortitude, which is destitute of Reason.

(e) Ajax in Homer.] Iliad. 7.

(f) Even Torquatus.] Manlius slew a Champion of the Gauls, and spoil'd him of his Gold Chain, which he put about his own neck, and left the name of Torquati to that Branch of the Manlian Family.

(g) Marcellus at Clastidium.] He slew Britomar a Gaulish King at Clastidium a Town upon the Po; and dedicated the third Royal Spoils to Feretrian Iupiter.

SECT. XXIII.—but Reason.

THE World must be despis'd, Death slighted, all Pains and Labours reputed tolerable; when these things are our determinate Judgment and Sense; then is that stout and stedfast Forti∣tude; unless perchance we suspect, that what∣soever is done with earnestness, vigour, and cou∣rage, is done in anger; in my judgment even Scipio that High Priest, who verify'd the Stoical Pa∣radox, that a wise man is never angry, was not angry with Tib. Gracchus; then when he left the Consul sick, and being himself but a private Per∣son, charg'd them whosoever tender'd the safety of the Government, in the Consuls name to follow him; I know not whether we did any thing vali∣antly in our Government; if we did any thing, we are sure we did it not in anger. Is any thing liker Madness than Anger? which Ennius fitly called, the beginning of Madness. The Colour, Voice, Eyes, Breath, violence of Words and Actions, what Evi∣dence do they give of ones being in his Wits? what is more ugly than Achilles in Homer? what than Agamemnon in his Brawl? for as for Ajax, An∣ger brought him to Phrensie and Death. Forti∣tude therefore needs not anger for its assistant; it is enough furnish'd, arm'd, provided of it self; for by the same reason one might say, that Drunken∣ness were serviceable to Fortitude; and that Mad∣ness were so too; because both Mad and Drunk,

men do often many things with much vehemency. Ajax was always valiant, but most valiant in his Phrensie.

Who did a brave Act, when the Greeks gave way, He check'd the Foe, and raving sav'd the day.

SECT. XXIV. This use of Anger confuted.

LET us therefore say, that Madness is useful; examine well the Definition of Fortitude, you will perceive that it stands not in need of Wrath. Fortitude therefore is a Disposition of the mind, submitting to the Supream Law, in a pa∣tient enduring what it inflicts on us, or the pre∣serving a steady judgment in the undergoing and repelling those things which seem terrible; or the knowledge of sustaining; or wholly slighting things terrible; and contrary to our Natures, preserving a stedfast judgment concerning them: or shorter, as Chrysippus; for the former Definitions were (h) of Sphaerus, one who had a singular good fa∣culty in defining, as the Stoicks think; for they are all in a manner alike; but they declare the com∣mon Notions one more than another. How then doth Chrysippus define it? Fortitude is, saith he, the Knowledge of enduring things, or a Disposition of mind in suffering and persevering to bear, in obe∣dience to the Supream Law, without Fear. We may inveigh against these men as much as we will, as Carneades was wont to do; I fear they will prove

the only Philosophers. For which, of all those Definitions, doth not open our Notion of Forti∣tude, which all of us have of it cover'd and com∣plicated; which being unfolded, who is there that would fetch from abroad any aid either for Soul∣dier, or General, or Orator, and doth not think they can act couragiously without being in a rage. What mean the Stoicks, who say that all unwise men are Mad, do they not conclude these things? Remove the Passions, especially Anger; they will be taken to hold monstrous Opinions. But now they thus argue, that they affirm all Fools to be Mad, in such manner, as all mire stinks. But it doth not so always. Stir it, you will be sensible whether it do or not. So a hasty man is not always angry; pro∣voke him, you will presently see him in a rage. What of that Military Wrath? when it is return'd home, how doth it demean it self with Wife? with Children? with Servants? is it then also useful? is there then any thing that a mind in confusion can do better, than it can when it is settled? or can any one be angry without disorder of mind? our Country-men therefore, although all Vices were in the rank of Diseases, because none was more foul than wrathfulness, did well name only wrath∣ful Persons, as it were craz'd and distracted.

(h) Of Sphaerus.] Sphaerus a Bosporan, was Scholar of Zeno, and afterwards Cleanthes Fellow-Pupil with Chrysippus, flourish'd about the time of Ptolomy Philopater.

SECT. XXV. The Indignation of Orators, Displeasure of Pa∣rents, or other Governours regular.

BUT for an Orator to be angry, is far from de∣cent; to make as though he were, is not in∣decent. Do you take us to be angry then, when we speak any thing in our pleadings, with some∣what more than ordinary earnestness and vehe∣mency? What? after the Tryal is past and gone, when we pen our Orations, do we pen them in anger?

Ho! None attend? Bind him—

Do we think (i) that either Aesop ever acted in anger, or Attius writ in anger? These things are acted handsomly, and indeed better by an Orator if he be a true Orator, than by any Player; but they are acted dispassionately and with a calm mind. But to praise Lust, what a piece of Lust is it? You produce me Themistocles and Demosthenes; you add Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato. What do you call Studiousness, Lust? which though it be after the best things, as are those in which you instance, yet ought to be compos'd and calm. But to praise Discontent, the thing of all to be most abhor'd; what Philosophers, I pray, must that argue? But Afranius said ingeniously.

F.

Grieve he, though grieve for what he please.

He there spoke of a prodigal and dissolute Son, but our question proceeds upon a constant and wise man. Nay let a Captain or Ensign take this very anger, or others who are not necessary to be mention'd, least we divulge the Misteries of Rhetoricians, for it is expedient for him to serve him∣self of Affections, who cannot make use of Reason; but the Subject of our Question is, as I often testifie, a Wise man.

(i) That either Aesop ever acted in anger.] Aesop the Player liv'd in Tully's time; the Fabulist 500 years before.

SECT. XXVI. The pretended benefit of the other Passions dis∣prov'd.

BUT further Emulation is useful, Detraction, and Pitty. Why should one pitty another, rather than succour him, if he is able? Cannot we be bountiful without pitty? Sure we are not bound to pull upon our selves Discontents in favour of others, but to relieve others of their Discontent, if we are able. Again, what use can there be in de∣tracting from another, or emulating him with that vitious Emulation which resembles Rivalship; since he that emulates is afflicted at anothers good which himself hath not; on the other side, he that

detracts is afflicted at anothers good, because that other hath it as well as himself. Who can approve that, if one would have any thing, he should ra∣ther choose to sit down in Discontent, for being without it, then put himself upon attempts to gain it? for as to the affecting to engross it to himself, it is the highest pitch of madness. Again, who can justly commend Moderation in bad? for who is there, in whom Lust and Covetousness is, but must be lustful and covetous? in whom Wrath, but Wrathful? in whom Anxiety, but Anxious? in whom Fear, but Fearful? Do we therefore judge, that a Wise man is Lustful and Covetous, and Wrathful, and Anxious, and Fearful? of whose excellency much may be said in as large and co∣pious manner as one please; but most succinctly thus, Wisdom is the knowledge of Divine and Hu∣mane things, and perceiving the cause of every particular one, which hath this effect, that it imi∣tates the Divine Perfections, and esteems all Humane Occurrents inferior to Vertue. Now did you give it for your opinion, that disturbance was incident to this temper, as to the Sea, which is subject to the Winds? What is there able to disturb so great Gra∣vity and Constancy? is any unexpected or sudden turn? What such can befall him, to whom no con∣tingency of Humane Life is unpremeditated? For as to their saying, what is excessive should be retrench'd, what natural left; I demand what can be natural, which also may be excessive; for all these things sprout from the Roots of Mistakes, which must be torn and wholly pluck'd up, not pared and lop'd off.

SECT. XXVII. Whence the Remedies of Humane Frailties are to be drawn.

BUT because I suspect you do not put the que∣stion so much about the Perfect wise man, as about your self in a state of proficiency (for him you think to be free from all Passion, you would come to be so) let us see how great are those Re∣medies, which are by Philosophy prescrib'd to the Diseases of Souls, for, to be sure, there is some Physick for them; nor was Nature so insense an Ene∣my to Man-kind, as to provide so many means of recovery for Bodies, and none for Souls. To which she hath been so much the more kind, as that the aids of Bodies are fetch'd from without, the relief of Souls is inclos'd in themselves. But the greater and diviner Excellency is in them the greater Diligence do they need. On this account reason well consulted, behold what is the best, when neg∣lected, is entangled in many Errors. Therefore my whole discourse is to be turn'd to you; for you put the case, as of a wise man, but perhaps you enquire about your self. There are then diverse cures of those Passions, which I have laid down; for every Discontent is not asswag'd the same way, for there is one method to be taken with him who Mourns, another with him that Pitties, another again with him who Envieth. There is further in all the four Capital Passions, this distinction, whe∣ther the Discourse be better address'd against

Passion in general, which is a disobeying of Reason, or an over-vehement Affection; or against the particu∣lar ones, as Fear, Lust, and the rest. Again, whe∣ther that particular object, which occasions our Discontent, be to be taken hainously; or whether we should be discontented upon any occasion at all. As if one should be troubled that he is Poor, whether you should dispute with him that there is no evil in Poverty; or that a man should be con∣tented in every condition; clearly this is the bet∣ter, least, if you should not perswade in the in∣stance of Poverty; way must be given to Discon∣tent; but if Discontent be remov'd by the proper Arguments which we used yesterday, the evil of Poverty is also in some sort remov'd.

SECT. XXVIII. The most certain method of cure, is to convince that all Passions are of themselves culpable.

BUT all such disturbance of Spirit would be clear'd by pacifying the mind, as thus, to in∣form it how that is neither good, whence its Mirth or Lust arises; nor that evil whence either its Fear or Discontent; but this is the sure and Catholick Remedy, if you inform the Person that the very Passions are of themselves culpable, and have no∣thing in them either natural or necessary; as we see even Discontent it self to be asswag'd, when we expose to Persons, impatient under Sorrow, the feebleness of an effeminate Spirit; and when we commend the Gravity and Constancy of those who

endure the chances incident to Humane Life, without breaking forth into Passion; which also is the case of those who think these Afflictions to be Evils, but such as are to be born patiently. One taketh pleasure to be good; another Money; yet both the former may be reclaim'd from Intempe∣rance, and the latter from Covetousness: but that other method, which both rectifieth the Mistake, and removeth Discontent; that is indeed the more beneficial, but seldom taketh effect. Nor is it to be address'd to vulgar Capacities. Again there are some Discontents which that Application can no way relieve; as if one should be troubled in mind, that he hath in him no Vertue, no Under∣standing, no Conscience, no Honour, he is in truth afflicted for Evils, but a Remedy of another Nature is to be apply'd to him, and such wherein all Philosophers, though otherwise disagreeing, do consent; for all of them must accord in this, that stirrings of the Soul averse to right Reason, are faulty; so that whether those things which cause Fear and Discontent, be not Evil; or those which move Lust or Mirth be not Good; yet the stirring it self is faulty; for by him, whom we call a coura∣gious and Gallant man, we mean one Constant, Com∣pos'd, Grave, and undervaluing all Contingencies of Humane Life. But neither can one who Mourns, or Fears, or Covets, or Vaunts be such; for these are the Deportments of such as count the Events incident to Humane Life, to have an ascendent over their Souls.

SECT. XXIX. Laying open the changes common to our condi∣tion allays excessive grief.

WHerefore it is the universal method of cure, as I said before, of all Philosophers not to descant of what nature is the object which moveth our Passion, but to discuss the Passion it self. There∣fore first as to concupiscence it self, it being only propos'd to remove it, we must not enquire whe∣ther the object of that Lust be good or not, but the Lust it self must be remov'd. So that whether honesty be the chiefest Good, or Pleasure, or both of them jointly, or the three sorts of good; how∣ever ordinate be the affection, yet if it become immoderate, the same address by way of dehorta∣tion is to be made to all. Now Humane Nature brought into view, infers all motives of appeasing the Spirit; which that it may be the more plainly discern'd in its colours, the common condition and terms of life, are to be explain'd in our Discourse. Therefore Socrates upon good grounds, when Eu∣ripides first brought upon the Stage his Tragedy of Orestes, is said to have bid repeat him again the three first Verses.

No matchless grief can Poets wit invent, No vengeance from incensed Heav'ns be sent; But Humane Nature may its pressure bear.

Now towards the perswading that such misfor∣tunes both may and ought to be born; the recital of such as have born the like is useful; although the means of allaying Discontent have been ex∣plain'd both in yesterdays Dispute, and in our Treatise of Consolation, which we writ in the midst of our Mourning and Sorrow, (for we were not of them who had attain'd to Perfection) and what Chrysippus forbids the applying remedy, as it were, to the green Sores of the Soul, that did we, and of∣fer'd violence to Nature, that so the Plaister might be as broad as the swelling that it was to discuss.

SECT. XXX. The like Remedy of Fear.

BUT bordering upon Discontent, concerning which we have sufficiently disputed, is Fear, about which a few things are to be spoken. For as Discontent refers to an evil present, so doth Fear to one future; therefore did some say, that Fear was a part of Discontent; but others call'd Fear a trouble aforehand, because it is as it were, the fore-runner of ensuing trouble; upon what accounts therefore present Evils are borne, upon the same following ones are slighted; for we must take heed in both, that we do nothing mean, base, cowardly, effeminate, low-spirited, and desperate. But although we are to speak to the inconstancy, feebleness, and levity of Fear it self; yet is it of good advantage to depretiate the objects of Fear: So that whether it were by chance, or upon design,

it is fallen out very luckily that we have disputed of those things which are the great objects of Fear, Death, and Pain, the first and second day; which Reasons, if they were convictive, we are already in great part deliver'd from Fear. Thus much then be said to the opinion of Evils.

SECT. XXXI. The difference between Mirth and Joy.

LET us consider now that of Goods, that is, of Mirth and Concupiscence. I am of opinion in this whole account, referring to the Passions, the stress of the whole cause lyes in one thing, that they are all under our own Power, all taken up by choice, all voluntary. This mistake therefore, must be rectify'd, this opinion undeceiv'd, and as in conceited Evils they are to be represented tolerable; so in like Good, those which appear great and joyous, are to be render'd more calm. Now this is common to Good and Evil, so that if it be at this time difficult to perswade, that none of these things which di∣sturb the mind, is to be reckon'd among either Good or Evil things; yet one sort of cure is to be apply'd to one affection, and another to another; and the malitious is to be amended by one course; he that is given to Women by another; the World∣ling again by another; the Coward by another; and it were an easie matter, pursuant to that Sup∣position which is most currant concerning things Good and Evil, to deny that an unwise man can ever rejoyce, because he never possesseth any Good

thing. But we now speak after the common Cu∣stom; allow them, since you will have it so, to be Good things, as they are reputed; Honours, Riches, Pleasures, and the rest; yet a vaporing and flashy Mirth in the Fruition of those very Be∣nefits, is unseemly; as though Laughter be al∣lowable, yet Giggling is blameworthy, for the flushing of the Soul in Mirth, is liable to the same censure, as the shrinking of it in Sorrow; and Con∣cupiscence hath the same levity in Desire, as Mirth in Enjoyment; and as Spirits too much dejected with trouble, so the same too elevated with Mirth, are justly judg'd to be light. Now whereas Envy is a sort of Discontent, and taking pleasure in anothers Mis∣fortunes, a sort of Merriment, both of them are wont to be redress'd, by discovering how barbar∣ous and inhumane they are. Now as to beware is seemly, to Fear unbeseeming; so is it seemly to rejoyce, unbeseeming to be merry; since we di∣stinguish Mirth from Joy, for greater clearness in Explication of the Point. This we have before de∣liver'd, that dejection of mind can never be war∣rantable, Elevation may, for Hector in Naevius doth rejoyce after one sort.

I joy, Sir, prais'd by you, who merit praise.

Chaerea in Trabea after another.

The Baud, with Gift appeas'd, if I but wink; Will in my looks read what I will, I think. Touch but the door, it shall wide open fly; Chrysis surpriz'd to see, e're I draw nigh: Shall meet me, smiling, courting my embrace; Render'd—

How brave this is, himself shall subjoyn.

—I Fortune shall in bliss surpass.

SECT. XXXII. The scandalousness of Lust.

HOW indecent this Mirth is, any one who doth but mind it any thing near, may clearly see. And as those are base who are elevated in Mirth, upon the satisfaction of their Lust, so are they scan∣dalous, who are carried forth after it with an en∣flamed Concupiscence, and that whole affection commonly called Love (nor in truth do I find by what other name it may be call'd) hath so much of Levity in it, that I know nothing which I can think comparable to it; of which Caecilius.

I must the Man, or Fool, or Novice deem, Who doth not Love, a mighty God esteem; Love an unlimited Power doth exercise, Makes whom he will run mad, keeps others wise; Some he to cure, and some to kill delights; Sets others up the Ladies Favourites.

Oh rare Reformer of Manners, Poetry, which thinks that Love, the Author of Leudness and Le∣vity, is to be seated in the Counsel of the Gods! I speak of Comedy, and indeed there would be no such thing, as that whole Posie, did we not ap∣prove of these Scandals. But in Tragedy, what saith the Prince of the Argonauts?

You sav'd me for your love, not my respect.

What then? how great a train of miserable Consequences did this love of Medea draw after it? and yet she dares, in another Poet, tell her Father, she had for an Husband one.

Whom Love more powerful than a Father gave.

SECT. XXXIII. Inordinate Love tax'd in Poets.

BUT let us give Poets leave to be pleasant, in whose Fables we see Jupiter himself that way scandalous. Come we to Philosophers the pro∣fess'd Teachers of Vertue, who deny that Love relates to uncleanness, and contest about that with Epicurus, not much, in my opinion, therein mistaken; for what is that Love of Friendship? or how comes it to pass, that none fall in Love either with an unhandsom Youth, or an handsom Old man? This Custom seems to me to have been taken its Original in the Academies of the Greeks, amongst whom those Amours are free and allow'd. There∣fore Ennius said well.

To strip in publick, tempts t'immodesty.

These men, though they be, as I see they may be, honest, yet are perplex'd and anxious, and so much the more, because they struggle under Pro∣vocations

to refrain themselves. Now to pass by Love made to Women, wherein Nature hath granted a greater Freedom, who either in the rape of Ganymede, maketh any doubt what the Poets mean by it? or doth not understand what Laius in Euripides both speaks of, and Lusts after? or lastly what those learned and eminent Poets publish of themselves in their Songs and Sonets? Alcaeus a man of try'd Courage in his Country, what hath he written of his Love of Youths? as for Anacreon, his whole Posie is amorous; but Ibycus of Rhegium, that he was most passionate in his Loves, appears from his Writings.

SECT. XXXIV.—but more in Philosophers.

NOW we see all these mens were lustfull Am∣ours. Philosophers are risen up of us, and our Plato is the Author too, whom Dicaearchus doth not without good reason, tax in that behalf, for giving Reputation to Love. The Stoicks too, both determine that a wise man may be in Love, and de∣fine Love to be an essay of contracting Friendship upon the account of Beauty. Now if there be any such thing in Nature, without perplexity, without lingring, without care, without sighing, be it with all my heart, for it is free from Lust; but this Discourse proceeds upon Lust. But if there be any Love, as in truth there is some, that is not at all, or not much remov'd from madness, such as is in Leucadiae.

If any God do my Affairs procure.

A worthy employment indeed, for all the Gods to procure him the good graces of his Mistress.

Wretch that I am!

The truest word you could have spoken. The other also puts in not amiss.

—What? are you in your Wits, To make such idle moan?—

So that he seems mad even to those about him; but what uproar did he make?

Help bless'd Apollo! mighty Neptune help! And you fair Winds!—

He thinks that the whole course of Nature must turn aside out of its way, to relieve his Passion. Only Venus he excepts against as partial.

To Venus, why should I appeal?

He doth not allow her to regard any thing out of Lust; as though he did out of Lust both speak and act so scandalously.

SECT. XXXV. The remedy of Love.

WITH a man therefore, in this condition, such course is to be taken, as to shew him how slight, how contemptible, how worthless the ob∣ject of his desire is; how easily it may be supply'd either from another place, or by other means; or be quite let alone sometimes too, the Person is to be taken off to other Studies, Employments, Cares, Businesses: Lastly, he is often to be cur'd, as consumptive Patients, by change of Air. Nay, some think that an old Love is to be cast forth by a new one, as one Peg is driven out with another. But especially the Party is to be inform'd how out∣ragious the sway of Love is; for in truth of all the Passions, none is more violent. So that though one should not at the present inveigh against Debau∣cheries, Rapes, Adulteries, and to instance in no more, Incests, the vileness of all which, is justly reproachable; but to wave all these, the bare dis∣order of the mind in Love, singly by it self consi∣der'd, is deformed. For to pass by, as I said, those parts of outrage, what fickleness is there in these, seeming petty Matters.

—Abuse. Suspition, open falling out, short Truce, War, Peace again; who for Absurdities Account demands, bids be both mad and wise.

This inconstancy and changeableness of mind, whom would it not scare with the very obliquity of it? for here also must that be demonstrated, which is said of all Passions, that there is none of them, but in conceit, are taken upon choice, and voluntary; for if Love were natural, both all would Love and be lov'd; and would always Love, and would Love the same thing; nor would shame deter one, consideration another, a third satiety.

SECT. XXXVI.—of Anger.

BUT Anger, how long soever it disturbs the mind, is without Controversie madness; by the instigation of which, such ill Language passeth even between Brethren.

What man more impudent than thee, e're liv'd? Or than thee more malitious?—

You know what follows, for bitter reproaches are retorted by one Brother, upon the other in Verses interchangeably; so that it may easily ap∣pear that they are Atreus his own Sons; his who contrives a new vengeance upon his Brother.

Some strange Plot, deep design I must devise, His raging heart with horror to surprise.

What then is this Plot? hear Thyestes himself.

Welcome, saith my kind Brother, pray fall on; Good chear! my Sons.

And sets their Bowels in a Dish before him; for what Degree is there that Anger will not arrive at, and at which Fury will? Hence we say of men in Passion, that they are out of all Government, that is Counsel, Reason, Understanding; for these ought to have the Government over the whole Soul. For men in this condition, either those are to be convey'd from them, upon whom they would fall violently, till they recollect themselves (now what is it to recollect ones self, but to rally the scatter'd and disorder'd parts of the Soul into their proper place?) or they are to be intreated and beg'd at to defer what thoughts they had of executing their revenge, till another time, when their Anger cools; now cooling implys, that the Spirits did boyl over contrary to the Dictates of Reason. To which that saying of Architas refers, who being in some heat against his Bayliff, said, How would I have order'd you, were I not Angry.

SECT. XXXVII. The Cause of Passions, an opinion that they are our Duty.

WHERE then are those that say Wrath is use∣ful? Can Madness be useful? or natural. Can any thing be agreeable to Nature, and con∣trary to Reason? Now if Anger were natural, how could it be either that one man should be more hasty than another; or that it could be over before the desire of Revenge be satiated, or that any should repent of what they did in Passion; as we see by King Alexander, for (a) after he had kill'd his Friend Clitus, he could hardly forbear offering violence to himself, so strongly did Repen∣tance work upon him. These things being noto∣rious, who can doubt but that this motion of the Soul is also wholly in conceit and voluntary; for who can doubt but that the Diseases of the Soul, such as Covetousness, Ambition, arise from this, that the object upon which the Soul dotes, is over∣valu'd, whence ought to be understood, that every Passion also hath its being from opinion; and if assurance that is, a firm affiance of the mind, be a kind of Science and stedfast opinion of one yielding his assent upon good grounds only, then is Fear a diffi∣dence of mind, upon some expected and impend∣ing Evil. If hope be the expectation of Good, needs must Fear be an expectation of Evil; as Fear then, so the other Passions relate to Evil. As Constancy then is Fruit of Knowledge, so is Passion of Error.

But as for some mens being said to be naturally hasty, or pittiful, or envious, or any such thing, they have Souls, as of an unhealthful Constitution, yet curable, as is said of Socrates, when Zopyrus a great Pretender to skill in Phisiognomy, had open∣ly in company recounted many Vices, which he concluded from his Art to be in Socrates, he was derided by the rest who knew no such Vices to be in Socrates, but was help'd out by himself, who own'd himself subject to those Vices, but withall said he had subdu'd them by Reason. Therefore, as he that is in the best health, may be thought naturally proner to some Disease or another; so is one mind more inclinable to one Disease, and another to another; but they who are said to be vitious, not from Na∣ture, but through their own default, their Vices consist of misapprehensions about things good and, bad; so that one is proner to one Motion and Pas∣sion, and another to another; but evil habits in Souls, as Chronical Distempers in Bodies are more diffi∣cult to be remov'd, than a simple disorder; and a sud∣den swelling of the Eyes is sooner cur'd, than a long soreness is remov'd.

(a) After he had kill'd his Friend Clitus.] Alexander the Great, who subdu'd all things that stood in his way, yet was vanquish'd by Wine and Anger. On a time as he was drinking with his Commanders, Clitus had magnified the Actions of King Philip, which he took as done in Deroga∣tion to his Glory, and run him through with his Spear; but when he came to himself, and his Passion was over, he was so troubled at the barbarous Act, that he was ready to turn the same Spear against his own Heart, tore his Face, and beg'd of all about him, that they would not let him sur∣vive that infamy. Three days he stir'd not out of his Tent, and could hardly he prevail'd upon to take any more suste∣nance, but by the intercession of his Friends, and especially

the Counsels of Callisthenes, he was brought again to some comfortable quiet of mind. Clitus was the Son of Alex∣ander's Nurse, an old Souldier of King Philip, and who in the Battle of Granicus, had protected with his Shield King Alexander, fighting bare-headed, and cut off the hand of Rhosaces lifted up against the King's Head, with many other honourable Exploits.

SECT. XXXVIII. The cure of them in rectifying that mistake.

BUT the cause of the Passions being already found, that they all arise from Judgments form'd upon Opinions, and our Wills, let this Dis∣pute draw to a Conclusion. We must likewise know, that after the knowledge of the Extremi∣ties of Good and Evil, as far as Humane Nature is capable of it, nothing can be look'd for from Phi∣losophy, either greater or more useful, than the Subject of these four days Disputation; for after the contempt of Death, and reducing Pain within the bounds of Patience, we have added a quieting of Discontent; than which, man hath no greater Evil; for although every Distemper of mind is grievous, and doth not much differ from madness, yet are we wont to term other Persons, when they are in any Passion, either of Fear, or Mirth, or Lust, as only stir'd or disorder'd; but those who have abandon'd themselves to Discontent, miser∣able, afflicted, melancholly, calamitous: There∣fore it seems not to have been casual, but with good judgment propounded by you, for us to dis∣pute about Discontent apart from the other

Passions; for in that is the source and spring of Mi∣series. But the cure both of Discontent and the other Diseases of the Soul is one, that they are all from conceit and voluntary, and taken up for this rea∣son, because it seems fitting so to do. Philosophy un∣dertakes to extirpate this Error, as the root of all our Evils: Let us then resign our selves up to her culture, and be content to be cur'd; for whilst these evils lurk in us, we are so far from a possibility of being happy, that we cannot be so much as in our Wits. Therefore either let us deny that any thing can be effected by reason, whereas on the contrary, no∣thing can be well done without reason, or seeing Philosophy consists in a deduction of Reasons, if we would be both good and happy, let us fetch from thence all the aids and assistances, to a good and happy Life.