detracts is afflicted at anothers good, because that other hath it as well as himself. Who can approve that, if one would have any thing, he should ra∣ther choose to sit down in Discontent, for being without it, then put himself upon attempts to gain it? for as to the affecting to engross it to himself, it is the highest pitch of madness. Again, who can justly commend Moderation in bad? for who is there, in whom Lust and Covetousness is, but must be lustful and covetous? in whom Wrath, but Wrathful? in whom Anxiety, but Anxious? in whom Fear, but Fearful? Do we therefore judge, that a Wise man is Lustful and Covetous, and Wrathful, and Anxious, and Fearful? of whose excellency much may be said in as large and co∣pious manner as one please; but most succinctly thus, Wisdom is the knowledge of Divine and Hu∣mane things, and perceiving the cause of every particular one, which hath this effect, that it imi∣tates the Divine Perfections, and esteems all Humane Occurrents inferior to Vertue. Now did you give it for your opinion, that disturbance was incident to this temper, as to the Sea, which is subject to the Winds? What is there able to disturb so great Gra∣vity and Constancy? is any unexpected or sudden turn? What such can befall him, to whom no con∣tingency of Humane Life is unpremeditated? For as to their saying, what is excessive should be retrench'd, what natural left; I demand what can be natural, which also may be excessive; for all these things sprout from the Roots of Mistakes, which must be torn and wholly pluck'd up, not pared and lop'd off.