The five days debate at Cicero's house in Tusculum between master and sophister.

The Cure of Discontent. The Causes and Remedy of the De∣pravation of Humane Nature, are premis'd, Sect. 1, 2, 3. (Book 3)

Book III. (Book 3)

SECT. I. The Reluctancy of deprav'd Man, against his own Cure.

VVHAT should I take to be the Cause, most worthy Brutus, since we consist of Body and Soul? why an Art hath been sought out for recovering and preserving the Bodies Health, and the usefulness of it (a) attributed to the Invention of the Gods; but the Physick of the Soul was neither so much wanted, before it was found out; nor so much frequented since its discovery; nor is so agreeable and accepted by many; nay, is suspected and loath'd by the greater part; Is it because we judge of the Bodies Infirmity and Pain, by the Soul; but have no Sense of the Souls Mala∣dies

by the Body? So it happens that the Soul does not pass judgment of it self, (b) till that which is to give the judgment be distemper'd. Now if Nature had brought us into the World with an Original Ability, to look into, and clearly discern her Or∣dinance; and that under her surest conduct we might pass the course of our Life; there would be no reason, why any should have use of Logick or Philosophy. But now she hath put into us only some small glimmerings, which we being suddenly corrupted with ill habits and opinions, so far stiffle, that the Light of Nature doth no where appear; for there are Seeds of Vertues innate in our very Souls; which if they might spring up till they come to maturity, Nature it self would conduct us to Happiness of Life. But now as soon as we are brought into this World, and taken up, we are presently encompass'd with all Corruption of Manners, and falshood of Opini∣on; that we may seem to have suck'd in Error almost with our Nurses Milk. But when we are brought home to Parents, and then turn'd over to Masters, we are season'd with such variety of Mi∣stakes, that Truth is forc'd to yield to falshood, and Nature it self to prejudicate Opinion.

(a) Attributed to the Invention of the Gods.] Apollo and Aesculapius.

(b) Till that, which is to give the judgment, be distemper'd] Therefore not only the inferior Faculties of Will and Passi∣ons are disordered, but the Superior Power of the Soul, the Understanding is disturb'd and Sick, contrary to the an∣swer which he gave Panaetius above, about the Sickness of the Soul: This, in reference to the mind, consists in a Cor∣ruption of Judgment, and reprobate Sense; only curable by attention and assent to sound Doctrine.

SECT. II. Further Causes of the Depravation of Humane Nature.

THEN come in the Poets: These carrying a great appearance of Learning and Wisdom, are heard, read, con'd without Book, and stick in our Memories; but superadd to all, as it were, our highest Master, the People, and the whole Multitude, on every side, conspiring in favour of Vice, then we become entirely debauch'd in judg∣ments, and fall off from our very Natures. So that they seem to me, to have envy'd us the Pre∣rogative of the best Nature, who have judg'd no∣thing better for man, nothing more desirable, no∣thing more excellent than Honours, than Com∣mands, than Popular Glory, toward which, the best of men pursue; and affecting that true Honour which Nature doth propose, as the sole object of its most diligent Enquiry, grasp at meer Emptiness and Vanity. These pursue no substantial and grand Figure of Vertue, but a superficial and sha∣dow'd resemblance of Glory. For Glory is a solid thing, and substantial, not a faint shadow; it is the concurrent praise of good men; the incorrupt approbation of such as judge rightly, concerning excellency in Vertue; that answers to Vertue, as the eccho. Which being the attendant on honest Actions, is not to be re∣jected by good men; but that which apeth it, po∣pular vogue, a rash and inconsiderate cryer up of Vices for the most part, by a semblance of Honour,

sets a false varnish in the place of a true and natu∣ral Beauty. Men, out of this blindness, having been imported with an ardent desire after some sort of Excellency; yet having withall, entertain'd a false Notion, wherein it consisted; and what are its Properties; some have utterly subverted the Government of their Countries; others have fallen themselves in the Contest. Now these propound∣ing to themselves the noblest end, do not so much willfully miscarry, as through mistake of the way; What shall we say of them, who are acted by the love of Money, or Pleasures; and whose Spirits are to that degree disturb'd, as that they come lit∣tle short of madness, which is the Case of all un∣wise men; can no course be taken for their Cure? Is it because Maladies of the Soul are less hurtful, than those of the Body? or because Bodies may be cur'd, there is no Physick for Souls?

SECT. III. That the Soul may have Remedies for its Di∣stempers.

WHEREAS, in truth, there are more and more dangerous Diseases of the Soul, than of the Body: For even these latter, are therefore vexatious, because they reach the Soul, and afflict it. Now the Soul vex'd, is (as saith Ennius) to all quiet lost: Stays no where long; by new Lusts still is toss'd. Now what Bodily Diseases, in the whole World, can be more grievous than those two Dis∣eases (to pass over the rest) I say, than Discon∣tent

and Lust? But how can it be prov'd, that it should be able to cure it self; when it was the Soul that invented the Art of curing the Body? And whereas the disposition of Bodies and Nature doth work much towards the curing of Bodies; nor are Patients yet come under cure by certain consequence cur'd; Souls, on the contrary, which are willing to be restor'd to their Health, and fol∣low the Prescriptions of the Wise, do undoubtedly recover. In truth, there is a faculty of curing Souls, even Philosophy; whose succor is not, as in bodily Diseases, to be fetch'd from abroad; but we must, with our whole might, and by all means, labour that we may cure our selves. Although, as to Philosophy in its whole Latitude, how much it is to be desired and studied, hath been, I sup∣pose, sufficiently discoursed (c) in my Treatise on that Subject, call'd Hortensius; and since that time, we have scarcely ever ceas'd, both disputing and writing upon Points of highest Importance: In these Books too, are laid down those Disputes which we had among Friends that came to visit us at our House at Tusculum. But because in the two former, there hath been spoken as to Death and Pain; the third days Dispute shall make this third Volum; for as soon as we were come down into our Academy, I bid any one of them, that were in presence, propose a Subject to debate upon: Then the Matter proceeded thus.

(c) In my Treatise on that Subject, called Hortensius.] Tully writ a Book, wherein he answers the Objections against Philosophy, made by Hortensius; and therefore calls it by his Name; it is not now extant.

SECT. IV. The Position offers it as a probable Opinion, that a Wise man is liable to Discontent.

S.

IT is my judgment, that Discontent may be inci∣dent to a Wise man.

M.

May the other Disturbances too; Fears, Lusts, Wrathfulness; for these are, in a manner, of that Nature which the Greeks call Passions, I might Diseases, and the word would fully justifie me. But the Expression hath not been received in our Language; for Pittying, Envying, Giggling, Re∣joycing, all these the Greeks call Diseases, being Com∣motions of the mind rebelling against Reason: but we may, as I suppose, style the same inordinate Emotions of mind, Distempers; Diseases we can∣not, in any receiv'd Sense of the Word, unless you be of another judgment.

S.

I am, in that, clearly of your mind.

M.

Do you think then, that these are incident to a Wise man?

S.

Plainly I am of your opinion, that they are.

M.

Then truly this Wisdom, so much glorified, is of no great value, since it differs not much from madness.

S.

What do you take every stirring the Affecti∣ons, for stark madness?

M.

I am not the only Person that take it to be so; but that which I use often to admire, I find that this was the Sense of our Ancestors, many Ages before Socrates, from whom all this Doctrine of Life and Manners is deriv'd.

S.

How doth that appear?

M.

Because the name of Distemper, signifieth a Sickness and Disease of the mind; that is, being out of Temper; and that crazedness of mind, which they called madness, or being distempered. Now the Philosophers style all Passions Diseases, and say, that no Fool is free from these Diseases; but they that are not in Temper, are Distempered. Now the Souls of all unwise men are not in Tem∣per, therefore all unwise men are Distempered. Now this Temper of Souls, they judg'd to be plac'd in a calmness and constancy of mind; a mind destitute of these things, they called Distem∣per, or Madness; because in a disturb'd Mind, as well as Body, there can be no good Temper.

SECT. V. That men, imported by Passions, are Mad.

NOR was that less ingenuous, when they term'd such habit of the mind, as is withdrawn from the conduct of Wisdom, being out of the Wits, or besides ones self. Whence we may perceive, that those who gave these Names to things, were of the same judgment as Socrates deliver'd, and the Sto∣icks have firmly maintain'd, that all unwise men, are not sound in their Principle. Now the Soul that is any ways Diseas'd, (and the Philosophers, as I lately said, term these inordinate Motions Diseases) is no more sound, than the Body when it is Diseas'd. So it follows, that Wisdom is the soundness of the Mind; but Folly a kind of un∣soundness, Distemper, and being out of the Wits.

(d) And these words are much more significant and expressive in Latin than in Greek; as it occurs in many Instances a different Import; but of that elsewhere; now to the matter in hand. The im∣portance therefore, of the very word, declareth of what Nature and Property the whole matter under question is. For they must needs be under∣stood sound of mind, whose mind is disturb'd with no Passion, as with a Disease. Those who are con∣trariwise affected, must needs be called unsound of Mind, Distemper'd, or Mad. Therefore nothing can be better express'd, than the Latin Phrase, when we say of men, that they are broke loose from Government, when they are transported with un∣bridled Lust or Anger; although Anger it self be but a sort of Lust; for Anger is defin'd to be a Lust of Revenge. They, therefore, that are said not to be their own Masters, are therefore said so to be, because they are not under the Government of their Understanding; to which Faculty the Sove∣raignty of the whole Soul is by Nature given. Now whence the Greeks derive their name for Madness, I cannot easily guess; but we are more distinct in our Terms than they; for we separate this Distem∣per of Mind, which is joyn'd with Folly, and of larger extent from distractedness. The Greeks, in∣deed, aim at a peculiar word, but are not very happy in it. What we call Rage, they term Me∣lancholly. As though the Soul were only disturb'd by Choler adust, and not oftentimes, either by ex∣cess of Wrath, or Fear, or Grief; with which sort of Rage, we say Athamus, Alcmaeon, Ajax, Orestes were transported. He that is in this Circumstance, the twelve Tables forbid him to have the manage∣ment of his own Estate. Therefore it is not writ∣ten, if he cometh to be unsound of judgment, but to be

distracted. For they judg'd that Folly, that is, a shallowness of Parts, or a mind fickle and desti∣tute of sound judgment, might discharge ordinary Offices, and answer the common and daily occa∣sions of the World; but they look'd upon being distracted, as a total darkness of the Understand∣ing; which though it seem a greater Evil, than want of a sound Judgment; yet is this of that Ma∣lignity, that (e) a wise man may be distracted, but cannot be of an unsound Mind; lose his Rea∣son he may, but cannot act against it, while he hath it. But this is another question, let us return to the Proposition in hand; I suppose you said it was your Opinion, that a wise man might be liable to Discontent.

S.

In truth I am of that mind.

(d) And these words are much more significant and ex∣pressive in Latin than in Greek.] Tully seeks all occasion of Buoying up the Latin Tongue against the Greeks; and therefore a little below picks a Quarrel with their term for being Mad.

(e) A wise man may be distracted, but cannot be of an un∣sound Mind.] Wisdom is consistent with Madness, as with Sleep; but no more reconcilable to folly, than light is to darkness.

SECT. VI. The absurdity of denying a Wise man all use of the Affections, is declin'd.

M.

IT is from good Nature that you are so mind∣ed; for we are not hew'd out of the hard Rock, but there is implanted in the very Nature of our Souls somewhat tender and soft, which is subject to be beaten with the Sense of Evil, as with hardness of Weather. And Crantor of prin∣cipal Renown in our Academy, said not impro∣perly. I am by no means of their mind, who cry up a strange unintelligible Notion of perfect insensibility; whereas there neither can nor should be any such disposi∣tion. My first option is, saith he, that I may not be ill; but if I be at any time, let me be sensible, whether any Incision be made, or part dismember'd; for that same dedolency is not acquir'd, but at the charges of long and sore Afflictions, whereby the Body is mortify'd, and the Soul harden'd. However we may do well to con∣sider, (f) whether this be not the Language of such as flatter our Infirmities, and fondly comply with our carnal Ease. But for our own parts, let us take up a bold Resolution, not only to lop off the out-boughs of our disquiet, but to pluck up the very Roots with all the Fibres and tendrels of them. Somewhat will perhaps nevertheless be left behind, such deep rooting have the Stumps of Folly taken in our Hearts; but that only will be left, which is of necessary use. Take this for a cer∣tain truth, unless the Soul be cur'd, which can never

be done without Philosophy, there will be no end of our Miseries. Wherefore, since we have begun, let us deliver up our selves to be her Patients. Recover we shall, if we be put willing, and I will carry it on further; for I shall not only speak to Discon∣tent, though I shall to that in the first place; but to every Distemper of the Soul, as I have laid it down, or every Disease of it, as the Greeks term them. And first, if it please you, let us proceed in the Stoicks way, who are wont to cast their Ar∣guments into strict and bare Syllogisms; then we will dilate after our own Fashion.

(f) Whether this be not the Language of such as flatter on Infirmities.] The subject of warrantable Mortification, is not what is natural, but what is corrupt; yet we shall do well, to give diligent heed, least an Enemy escape in the garb of a Friend.

SECT. VII. The Assertion oppos'd by an Argument from the Topick of Fortitude.

(g) EVERY Valiant man hath also Assurance, (since Confidence, by a vulgar mistake, is only restrain'd to a bad Sense, although derived from confiding, which is commendable.) Now he that hath Assurance, cannot be in Fear; for to have Assurance, and be in Fear, are implicatory. But he that is liable to Discontent, is also to Fear; for we Fear those things impending and approach∣ing,

at whose presence we are Discontented. So it follows, that Fortitude and Discontent are in∣compatible. It is therefore likely, that he who is liable to Discontent, is also liable to Fear, to Faint∣heartedness, and dejection of Spirit; and he that is liable to these, is liable to be a Slave, to confess himself, at some time or other, worsted; and he that can admit of these, will admit of timorousness and Cowardise; but these things are not incident to a valiant man, therefore neither is Discontent. Now none is Wise, but he that is Valiant; there∣fore neither is Discontent incident to a wise man. Furthermore, he that is Valiant, must needs be brave Spirited; and he that is of a brave Spirit, invincible; and he that is invincible, must despise the World, and look upon it, as beneath him; but none can despise that, for which he can be Discontented. From whence necessarily follows, that a Valiant man is never Discontented; but all wise men are Valiant, therefore Discontent is not incident to a Wise man: And even as the Eye being out of order, is not duely dispos'd to the perfor∣mance of its Office; and the other parts, nay the whole Body, when it is out of order, cannot dis∣charge its Office and Duty; so the Mind being out of order, is not in fit case to discharge its Office. Now the Office of the Soul, is to use its Reason aright; and a Wise man's Soul is always so dispos'd, that he useth his Reason after a most right manner, there∣fore it is never disturb'd; but Discontent is a di∣sturbance of the Soul, therefore a Wise man will be always free from it.

(g) Every Valiant man.] Syllogistical Disputation was after the Stoical way, which begins here.

SECT. VIII.—by another from that of Temperance.

IT is further likely, that he who is Temperate; whom the Greeks call Sober, and name the Vertue it self Sobriety, which I am wont sometimes to term Temperance, other times Moderation, and another while Modesty; which yet I know not but it may be rightly called Integrity; this is more narrowly express'd among the Greeks, who call men of Integrity only useful men; but the Term is of larger extent, for it is all sort of absti∣nence, all sort of innocence; this hath no usual Name in Greek, but might be call'd by a word im∣porting harmlessness; for Innocence is such a dis∣position of mind, as to harm no Body. Integrity comprehends also all the other Vertues; which unless it were so great, and had it been confin'd within the narrow bounds of Frugality or Thrift, as some conceive, the Sirname of L. Piso had never been so honourable; but because neither he that, through Fear, hath quitted his Garrison, which is an act of Cowardise; nor he, who for covetousness, hath deny'd to restore a Trust secretly committed to him, which is an act of Injustice; nor he, who through rashness, hath miscarried in any under∣taking, which is a piece of Folly; because none of these are wont to be call'd honest men, or men of Integrity: Therefore Integrity comprehends three of the Vertues, Fortitude, Justice, and Prudence;

and if it do so, it is common to all the Vertues; for all the Vertues are link'd and fasten'd inseparably to one another. Therefore Integrity must needs be the remaining and fourth Vertue; for it seemeth to have this Property, to regulate and compose the Affections, always to repress the Enormity of the Will, and to preserve a constant Moderation in all things. The contrary Vice to which, is called Naughtiness. Frugality is, as I suppose, from Fruit, than which, nothing better springs out of the Earth. Naughtiness is hence, (though, perhaps it may be somewhat hard, however let us assay, though it pass but for an Allusion, if there should be nothing more) it is hence deriv'd from, that such a man hath not ought in him, whereupon he is also said to be nothing worth. He, then, that is Honest, or, if you had rather, that is Modest and Temperate, must of necessity be Constant; and he that is Constant, Quiet; he that is Quiet, free from all Disturbance; and consequently Dis∣content; but these are the Properties of a Wise man; the••••fore Discontent will be far from a Wise 〈…〉〈…〉.

SECT. IX.—by an Induction from Particular Passions of Wrath, Envy.

SO that Dionysius of Heraclea Disputes not un∣handsomly upon that Passage of Homer, where∣in Achilles complains to this purpose, as I take it.

My Heart swells big, whil'st I on this reflect, Rob'd of my Lawful Prize, and iust respect.

Is the Hand rightly dispos'd, when it is swell'd? or is there any other Member which hath a Rising or Swelling, that is not out of order? in like man∣ner, therefore, the Soul, puffed up or swollen, is out of order; but the wise mans Soul is always in order, therefore it never rifeth, never swelleth. But now the Soul in anger is so; therefore a wise man is never angry, for if he be angry, he also Lusts; for it is the property of one angry, to desire a fix∣ing the most grievous Pain on him, by whom he thinks he is injur'd; and he who covets that, if he shall obtain it, must necessarily be transported with joy; whence it follows, that he must rejoyce at anothers harm; which because it is not incident to a wise man, neither is it incident to him to be an∣gry; but if Discontent were incident to a wise man, so also were the Passion of Anger; but because he is free from this, so must he be also from that of Discontent. For if a wise man were liable to Dis∣content, so might he also be to Pitty, so might he also be to Envy. I use a word of active significa∣tion, because the ordinary Latin word rather sig∣nifieth passively an Odium, that so we may decline the Iniquity of the Term; now the Latin word for Envy, is deriv'd from a Verb, which imports look∣ing very wistfully upon anothers Beauty; as in the Play Menalippus.

Who on my blooming Sons look'd with ill eye?

The Latin Construction seems wrong, but Attins said singularly well; who though he departs from

Custom, at present prevailing, yet challeng'd the Priviledge of a Poet, ventur'd to follow the natural Analogy.

SECT. X.—and Pitty.

THerefore also the Passions of Pitty and Envy are incident to the same Subject. For he that is griev'd at some ones Adversity, is also griev'd at some ones Prosperity. (h) As Theophrastus deploring the un∣timely death of Callisthenes his Fellow-Student, ma∣ligneth the good successes of Alexander; therefore he saith, that Calisthenes light upon Relation to a Person of the greatest Power, and highest Fortune; but ignorant how to manage Prosperity as he ought. Now as Mercy is the being afflicted at anothers Adversity; so Envy is the being afflicted at ano∣thers Prosperity. Whosoever, therefore, is liable to Pitty, the same is also liable to Envy; but Envy is not incident to a wise man; therefore neither is Pitty. Now if a wise man used to take Discontent, he would use also to take Pitty; therefore a wise man is not liable to Discontent. (i) These Ar∣guments are thus brought by the Stoicks, and in∣fer'd by legitimate Conclusions; but they are to be discours'd somewhat more at large, and with greater Variety. Yet we must maintain their Te∣nets more expresly, who have proceeded upon the most couragious, and as I may say, manly Prin∣ciple and Opinion. For our Friends the Peripate∣ticks, though there be nothing under Heaven more

Copious than they are, nothing more Learned, nothing more Grave, yet do not make out, to my judgment, a Moderation either of the Distempers or Diseases of the Soul; for every Evil, though but indifferent great, is great: But we are proving this, that there is no such thing at all in a wise man: For as the Body, if it be but indifferent, is not well; so if there be the same indifferency in the Soul, it is not in Health. Therefore our Ancestors did ex∣cellently well name, as many other things after their Propriety, so Vexation, Disquiet, Anxiety a Distemper; and the Greeks express every disorder of mind, by a Term near the same; for they call every inordinate Sally of the Spirit, a Passion, which in that Language imports a Disease. We more properly; for the Distemper of the mind bears great Analogy with bodily Sickness. But Lust is not like Sickness; nor is immoderate Joy, which is an ecstatical and extravagant pleasure of the Mind. Nay, Fear it self is not very like a Disease, though it borders upon Discontent. But properly, as Sickness in the Body, so Distemper in the Soul, hath a name not sever'd from Pain; therefore the Original of this Pain, is to be laid open by us; that is, the efficient cause of Distem∣per in the Soul, as of Sickness in the Body; for as Physicians, having found out the cause of a Disease, think the Cure found out; so we, having discover'd the Cause of Discontent, shall find out the method of curing it.

(h) As Theophrastus deploring the untimely death of Callisthenes his Fellow-Student.] Callisthenes the Olynthian was well known to Alexander the Great, having studied together under the same Tutor Aristotle. The King took him along with him to Pen the History of his Asian At∣chievements;

but the freedom of his Discourse, and un∣complying demeanor, wrought his overthrow. For when King Alexander, now Lord of Asia, requir'd of his Mace∣dons, to give him the Ceremony of Persian Adoration; he, with some others of the Macedonian Nobles, too openly de∣clar'd their dislike of it. The haughty young Victor could not brook, that the Majesty of his Empire, and with that, Grandeur improv'd, should be disputed by his Vasals; and therefore is said, under a colour of a Sham-Plot of Hermo∣laus, to have executed many of the Non-conforming No∣bility; but Calisthenes he first mangled and disfigured; cut off his Ears, Nose, and Lips; afterwards put him into a Cage with a Dog, and so carried him about whithersoever the Army march'd; till at last he dy'd with the torture and regret of Spirit. Theophrastus wrote a Book entitled Ca∣listhenes, or a Lamentation from whence this Passage is quoted,

(i)These Arguments are thus brought by the Stoicks.] From strict Arguing, he cometh to examine Terms, and pre∣pares the way to enlarge more clearly on the Subject.

SECT. XI. The Cause of Dissatisfaction, is a mistake in Opi∣nion.

(k) THE whole, therefore, is in Opinion; nor is that the Cause of Discontent only, but of all the other Passions also, which are four general ones, but sub-divided into more Particulars; for whereas every Passion is a Motion of the Mind, either destitute of Reason, or slighting Reason, or not obeying Reason; and the same motion is rais'd from an (l) opinion either of Good or Evil; the four Passions are equally distributed under two heads; for two arise from an opinion of Good;

the one of which is a fond Pleasure, that is ele∣vated beyond the due measure, from an opinion of any great Good, whereof we have the Possessi∣on; the other may be rightly call'd, either a co∣veting or Lust; which is an immoderate pursuit after some conceiv'd great Good, not obeying Reason. These two sorts therefore, fond Pleasure, and Lust, are disorderly upon a conceit of Good; as the other two, Fear and Discontent, of Evil. For both Fear is an Opinion of some great evil impending; and Discontent is an Opinion of some great Evil incumbent; and further a fresh con∣ceit of such Evil, as that it is just to be disquieted at it; which cometh to this, that the Party grieving, thinks he ought to grieve. Now if we would pass that portion of Life which is allotted us with any Peace and Serenity, we must with our whole Strength and Succors from abroad, resist these Passions, which Folly in common Conversation sets in upon us, as certain Furies, and incenseth them. (m) But as to the other elsewhere; now let us, as we are able, repel Discontent. Let that be our present Subject; since you said that it was, in your opini∣on, incident to a wise man, which I do by no means allow, for it is a desperate, wretched, de∣testable thing, to be run from, as from a Pirate, by making all Sail, and tugging hard at the Oar, as is in the Proverb.

(k) The whole therefore.] The Passions are here with great perspicuity describ'd in their Cause, Objects, and the Times of them; their Cause, and Opinion its object Good or Evil; Imminent or Incumbent.

Opinion of

• Good
  • Future Desire.
  • Present Joy.
• Evil
  • Future Fear.
  • Present Discontent.

(m) But as to the other elsewhere.] In the following Debate, which is the fourth Tusculane Question.

SECT. XII. The Picture of Discontent in certain unfortu∣nate Princes.

FOR how like you, that Grandson of Tantalus, Son of Pelops;

Who from Oenomaus, his wing'd Steeds out-run, The Royal Bride Hippodamia won.

Great Grand-son of Jupiter: Should he therefore have been so mean, so dis-spirited as to say;

Friends keep aloof; hold there, lest my breath blast, Or shadow on the good Infection cast; Such Power of Guilt doth to my Body cleave.

Thyestes! will you condemn your self, and cast away the Comfort of your Life, (n) for the Power of anothers Guilt? What think you of (o) the man descended of the Sun? Do you not judge him unworthy to behold the very light of his Fa∣ther?

My Eyes are sunk; my Body wan and spent; Salt Tears deep Furrows on my Cheeks indent: My knotted Beard with filth and stench replete; O're-grown, against my nasty Breast doth beat.

Aeete, greatest of Fools, thou hast added these Evils to thy self; there were none such among For∣tunes Inflictions on thee: And this thou hast done after the trouble had grown old, and the swelling of the Soul was asswaged. Now Discontent con∣sists, as I shall make out, in a conceit of a fresh Evil; but you afflict your self, as it appears, for lack of Empire, not your Daughter; her you hated, and that perhaps not without reason; you could not, with any Patience, be without a King∣dom. Now that is an impudent grief, to pine away with melancholly, because one cannot usurp Soveraignty over a Free People. (p) Dionysius the Tyrant, ba∣nish'd from Syracuse, kept School at Corinth; so impossible was it for him to live without Empire. But what was more impudent (q) than Tarquin, who wag'd War with those who could not brook his Haughtiness. He then seeing he could not be restor'd to his Crown, neither by the Vejan nor Latin Arms, is said to have retir'd to Cunae, and in that City to have been consum'd with Vexation and Melancholly.

(n) For the Power of anothers Guilt.] Thyestes crys out, as above, when he had sup'd-upon his two Sons, set on the Table by his Brother Atreus.

(o)The man descended of the Sun.] Aeetes King of Colchos, said to be born of the Sun; had a Ram with a Golden Fleece, by the Gracle deliver'd to be the Mystical Pledge of his Kingdom; when Jason came in the Expedition of the Ar∣gonauts,

Medea falling in Love with him, betray'd it, and her Father after lost his Kingdom; and thereupon in the Tragedies he thus laments.

(p) Dionysius the Tyrant banish'd from Syracuse, kept School at Corinth.] This was Dionysius the younger, first driven out by Dion; and afterwards recovering, with exer∣cise of greater Cruelty; but finally ejected by Timoleon the Corinthian, and sent to Corinth, where he taught Children, as Tully facetiously remarks, from ambition of retaining an Image of Empire, though over that small Flock.

(q) Than Tarquin.] The seventh and last King of the old Romans, who for his Cruelty and more intolerable Pride, was expuls'd. Tully dwells much upon depos'd Princes, not without some tacit Reflexion on Julius Cesar; and stomack for the Roman Liberty oppress'd.

SECT. XIII. Not to Despair, under whatever pressures we lye.

NOW do you think this possible to befall a wise man, to be overwhelm'd with Discon∣tent, that is, with Misery? For whereas every Passion is Misery, Discontent is a Rack. Lust hath its Scorching; Fond Pleasure its Levity; Fear a meanness of Spirit; but Discontent carrieth along with it more destructive Evils; a Consumption, Tor∣turc, Vexation, Deformity. It tears, it frets the Soul like a Canker, and utterly brings it to Destruction. Un∣less we put off this, so as to cast it away, we can never want for Misery. Now this is clear, that Discontent doth then arise, when somewhat hath the appearance, as if some great evil did seem pre∣sent and pressing upon us. Here Epicurus is of the judgment that a conceit of Evil, is formally Dis∣content;

that whosoever looks upon any signal Evil; if he thinks that to be fallen upon him, he becometh immediately Discontented. (r) The Cyrenaicks do not think that Discontent is wrought by every Evil; but by that only which is sudden and unexpected. That is, indeed, of no small mo∣ment to heighten the Trouble; for all sudden acci∣dents appear the more grievous; to which purpose that Passage is quoted as well spoken.

I knew that they, whom I begot, must dye, And bred them up that prospect in my Eye: Further, when I the Youths to Troy did send, With Courage Greeces Freedom to defend; I knew they were for bloody Battle prest, And not invited to a Bridal Feast.

(r) The Cyrenaicks.] The Followers of Aristippus, who held Pleasure the chiefest good.

SECT. XIV. Meditation on possible Events, abates the Evil of bad ones.

THIS Premeditation, therefore, on future Evils, renders their coming less insupportable by their being descry'd at a great distance in the way before their nearer approach. Hence the Saying of Theseus in Euripides is commended, which we shall take the Liberty to translate out of the Ori∣ginal,

as we have often done the like on other oc∣casions.

I, as by a great Scholar taught, On future Troubles fix'd my thought; Untimely Death, or Banishment, Still to me did some Cross present; That, whatsoe're Change should arise, Might me not unprepar'd surprize.

Now what Theseus, saith he, heard of a learned man, that Euripides, by a Figure, transfers to him from himself; for he had been the Hearer of Anax∣agoras; concerning whom they report, that upon the News brought of his Son's death, he reply'd, I know that I begot him Mortal; which expression declareth, that these occurrents are sharp to them, by whom they have not been consider'd. There∣fore it is no question, but that all things which are reputed evil, fall more grievous, when they come unawares. So that although this be not the sole Cause which creates the greatest Disquiet; yet, because the foresight and preparation of the Soul is of great Power to the diminishing of Grief, let all the incidents to Humane Life be well consi∣der'd by every man: and in truth this is that ex∣cellent and Divine Wisdom, to have a full insight and experience of all the Chances of Humane Life; to admire nothing when it is happen'd; to suppose of nothing, but that it may come to pass, before it is come to pass.

Wherefore all men, whil'st in most prosperous State; To bear affliction, most should meditate. Suits, Fines, safe home return'd, still bear in mind; Son faulty, Daughter sick, Wife dead to find.

All common, possible; nothing new appear; What unexpected cometh for profit clear.

SECT. XV.—Is also ground of Constancy.

NOW since Terence hath so aptly insinuated this Notion borrow'd from Philosophy; shall not we, out of whose Fountains it is drawn, both say the same thing better, and more firmly hold it? for this is that countenance always the same, which Xanthippe is reported to have used to de∣clare, that her-Husband Socrates had, and that she saw him have one and the same when he went forth, and when he return'd home again. Nor was it that brow which M. Crassus the Ancient bore, of whom Lucilius reports, that he laugh'd but once all his life-time; but it was calm and serene, for so have we receiv'd by Tradition. And well might it be always the same countenance, when there was no alteration in the mind, by which the looks are fashion'd. Wherefore I receive from the Cyrenaicks, these Arms against contingent Events, whereby their approaching insults, may, through long Premeditation, be rebated; and withall I judge, that their Evil is from conceit, and not na∣ture. For if it were in that object, why would they be alleviated by being foreseen? but there is somewhat more accurately to be spoken on this matter after we have look'd into the opinion of Epicurus, who judgeth that they must all of necessi∣ty be Discontented, who conceive themselves to

be under Evils, whether these Evils have been foreseen and expected; or whether they are grown old; for that neither are Evils abated by long time, nor yet alleviated by foresight of them; and that the poring on Evils not yet come, and perhaps that never will come, is foolish. For that all Evil is Vexati∣on enough, when it is come; but he that is always thinking that some Adversity may possibly befall him, to him it becometh an everlasting Evil; but if it shall never actually come upon him, a volun∣tary Disquiet is taken up on false grounds; so the mind is always vex'd, either with enduring, or ex∣pecting Evil. But the relief of Discontent he placeth in two things, a taking of the mind from consider∣ing its troubles, and setting it on the Contempla∣tion of Pleasures; for he judges the Soul in capa∣city to obey Reason, and to follow whether that leads: therefore Reason forbids to dwell upon the Causes of its Trouble: it fetcheth off from anxious thoughts, the sight of the mind dim'd with poring upon its Miseries; and when it hath sounded a re∣treat from them, it pusheth it forward again, and provoketh it to look on, and with the whole fancy tast variety of Pleasures; with which he thinks the life of a wise man is fill'd, both through the me∣mory of the past, and hope of following ones. This account we have given after our own fashion; the Epicureans deliver after theirs; but let us see what grounds we have to slight what they say.

SECT. XVI. The contrary Tenet of Epicurus and his Followers.

FIRST they do ill to reprove a Premeditation of future Contingences, since there is nothing doth so much take off the edge of Discontent, and weaken it, as the continual consideration thorough∣out the whole course of our Lives, that there is no∣thing but may befall us; as a Meditation on man's Frame; as on the condition of Life, and a Study to submit to it. This hath not that effect to make us always, but never melancholly; for he that con∣siders the order of Nature, and the Vicissitudes of Life, and the Frailty of Mankind is not melancholly when he considers these things, but is then most principally imploy'd in the exercise of Wisdom, for he reaps a double advantage; both that in the con∣sideration of man's circumstances, he enjoyeth the proper Office of Philosophy; and in case of Ad∣versity, he is supported by a threefold Consolation. First, that he hath long consider'd that such acci∣dents might come; which consideration alone doth most weaken and allay all Afflictions. Then he cometh to learn, that all Tryals common to men, should be born, as such, patiently. Lastly, that he perceiveth there is no Evil, but where is blame; but there is no blame, when that falls out, the Prevention of which, was not in man to warrant; for that sounding a retreat, which Epicurus en∣joyneth, when he calleth us off from looking upon our Evils, is null. For not to take notice, or to

put out of memory, is not in our Power, when those things gore us, which we conceive to be Evil. They Tear, Fret, Spur-gall, apply Torches for Torture, allow no breathing time. And you bid us to forgo what is against Nature; what remedy is by Nature given, would you wring away, that of a grief worn old? True, it is a slow Process, yet of great Efficacy which length and time do effect. You bid me consider the good, and forget the bad; you would say somewhat and worthy a great Phi∣losopher, if you held those things to be good, which were most suitable to the Dignity of man.

SECT. XVII. The true Remedy assign'd.

SHOULD Pythagoras now, or Socrates, or Plato say to me; Why are you cast down? or why do you fret? or why do you sink and render to Fortune, which may perhaps pinch and prick you; cannot, to be sure, over-power you? Great force there is in the Vertues; rouse up them, if they chance to be dormant. In the first place will present it self to you Fortitude; which will oblige you to take such courage, as to contemn and count as inconsiderable, all the chances of Humane Life. Temperance will come with her, which is also Moderation, and by me a little before call'd Fru∣gality or Staidness, which will suffer you to do nothing basely, nothing lewdly. Now what is more base or lewd, than an Effeminate man? Nay Justice will not permit you to behave your self in

such sort; though she seem to have the least rela∣tion to this business, which yet will thus bespeak you; that you are on a double account injurious; both in that you covet what is none of your own; since being born Mortal, you aspire to the condi∣tion of the Immortal; and in that you take offence, to restore what you only borrow'd: but what Apology will you make to Prudence, instructing you that Vertue is self-sufficient, not only to living Well, but also Happily; which if it depend on Foraign Ac∣cessions, and have not as its source from; so its resort to it self, and in the same Circle, comprising all its Pretensions, borrows nothing from abroad: I know no reason why it either should be thought worthy to be so much extoll'd in words, or so ea∣gerly courted in Life. Epicurus, if you sound to me a chace after these Goods; I obey, pursue, follow your self my Commander; nay further, I forget my Evils, and so much the easier, because I do not so much as put these Afflictions into the rank of things truly Evil. But you draw off my thoughts to Pleasures. Of what sort? Bodily ones, I suppose; or such as the Soul, in order to the Body, entertains by remembrance of them past, or hopes of others to come. Is there any thing else in the case? Do I rightly explain your Sense? For those of that Perswasion, are still wont to charge us, that we do not comprehend Epicurus, what he means: why this he means, and that paultry Greek (s) old Zeno, the most subtle Dis∣putant of all that Tribe, was wont, with great heat, and aloud in my hearing, at Athens, to argue, that the man is happy who enjoys present Pleasure, and hath a confidence that he shall enjoy the like, either through the whole, or a great part of his Life, uninterrupted by any Pain; or if he were

disturb'd by any, that if it were in Extremity, would be but short; or if it prov'd longer, would have a greater mixture of Joy than Evil: he that consider'd these things would be happy, especially if he were satisfy'd with the good things already enjoy'd; (t) and had no dreadful apprehensions of the Deity.

(s)Old Zeno.] There are diverse of the same name, as Zeno Cittieus the Stoick, also Zeno Sidonius here menti∣on'd, the Epicurean; and, in Philo's judgment, the chief of them.

(t)And had no dreadful apprehension of the Deity.] Su∣perstition is joyn'd with a dread of God, as a strict Avenger and inexorable. This partial apprehension should be set right, by a due consideration of the Divine Nature and Good∣ness, and not by discharging God of the Government of the World, with the Complement of a Writ of Ease.

SECT. XVIII. And verify'd in the Case of Thyestes, Aeetes; Telamon.

YOU have Epicurus's Scheam of Happiness drawn up in the words of Zeno, so that it is in vain to deny it. What now? can the Proposal and Contemplation of this Life, administer any re∣lief either to Thyestes or Aeetes before mention'd; or to (u) Telamon chas'd from his Country, and living in Want and Banishment? upon whom this Admiration was made;

Is this that Telamon, late renown'd and fear'd? Whose looks the wond'ring Greeks so much rever'd?

Now if any one, as the same Poet saith, both Courage and Estate hath lost; a Cordial is to be sought from those ancient grave Philosophers, not from these Sensualists. For what do they call a Store of Goods? Grant them, that to be without Pain, is the chiefest Good; although that be not proper∣ly call'd Pleasure; but we cannot at once speak to all Questions. Is that the State to which we must be brought over, for the relief of our Sor∣rows? Allow what they would have, that Pain is the greatest Evil; is there any Consequence, that he who lies not under it, because he is not under Evil, must therefore be in Fruition of the greatest Good? Epicurus, why are we shy, and loth to con∣fess that we speak of that Pleasure, which your own self, when you have braz'd your Forehead, are wont to speak out? Are these your words or no? in that very Book which contains the System of your whole Doctrine, you say these words. (For I will perform the Office of a strict Interpreter, least any one should think it a Fiction of my own.) In truth I am at a loss, what to apprehend for that good, abstracting from those delights which arise from the tast; abstracting also from those which are convey'd by the hearing of Musical Aires; abstracting likewise from those agreeable Impressions which are made on the Eyes by the sight of comely objects; or any other Pleasures which are rais'd through the whole man from any Sense whatever; nor can it truly be said, that the Joy of the mind, is only to be reckon'd upon as good; for I have known the mind, upon that very account, transported with joy, upon hopes of all these things above-nam'd, that

Nature would come to enjoy them, and be freed from Pain. Now all this he saith in the very words, that any man may perceive what Pleasure Epicurus means. Then a little after, he saith, I have often enquir'd, of those that pass for wise men, what good they left remaining, after they had abstracted from these things, unless they would utter a parcel of insignificant Notions, and never yet could learn any thing; but if they shall fall a canting of Vertues and Perfections, they will, in effect, say nothing more, but the means where∣by the above-said Pleasures may be compass'd. What follows, is to the same purpose; nay, that whole Book which is of the chief good, is stuffed with such Sentences and such Expressions. Now would you exhort Telamon, in the condition mention'd, to take to this course of Life, that so you might divert the Melancholly? or if you should see any of your Friends under great dejection of Spirit, would you set before him a Sturgion, rather than a Dialogue of Socrates? would you invite him to hear the sound of the Organ, rather than the words of Plato? will you display before him, rich and gay Embroidery? put a Posie to his Nostrils? burn Odours? and will you bid him be crown'd with Chaplets of Roses? (w) But if you should go a little farther, then you will, to be sure, have wip'd off all sorrow from him.

(u) Telamon chas'd from his Country.] Aegina the King∣dom of his Father Aeacus.

(w) But if you should go a little farther.] A decent Ab∣ruption in recanting Pleasures, lest he should particularize in speaking out Obscentities, if you should procure him a Mistress.

SECT. XIX.—and Andromache.

EPICURUS, these things must be confess'd by you, or else those other which I have alledg'd according to the express word, are to be expung'd out of your Book, or the whole Book rather to be expung'd; for it is all over made up of voluptu∣ousness. The question, therefore, lyes before us, how we should cure one of Melancholly, (x) that speaks after this sort;

My present Miseries reproach my birth; Exile and Poor to a great Kingdom born; Augments my want, and aggravates my scorn.

What now must we clap to his mouth, a Cup of sweet'ned Liquor to still him from crying? or take any such course? Look now (y) from another Play in the same Poet:

A Princess once, Hector! thy help I need; Help her we must, for she implores aid. What Succour left, the Castle lost and Court? What safe retreat to Forraign Land or Port? My Country Altars, heaps of Stones, are made; And Sacred Temples in their Ashes laid. What State my ruin'd Palace once did bear, The Pictur'd Walls, and rich-grain'd Beams declare.

Ye all know what follows, and particularly that,

O Father! Country! Priam's Palace! Temple with Gates fast bar'd and bolted! I saw thee, when by Phrygians guarded; With curious Cealings carv'd und vaulted, Guilt richly, and inlay'd with Ivory.

O excellent Poet! however slighted by the Mo∣dern Songsters of idle Sonnets; he is sensible that all sudden and unexpected changes do more deep∣ly afflict; therefore having extoll'd the King's Power, which to all appearance was establish'd for ever; what doth he sub-joyn?

All these I saw, in ashes lain; Priam by the proud Victor slain; Jove's Sacred Altar Blood profane.

The Verse is singularly well, being mournful both in Sense and Words and Tune; to put her out of this Melancholly, what course should we take? Seat her in a Down-bed Couch, bring in a Minstrel, burn strong Perfumes, give her a Cup of Cawdle, provide her too a Dish of Meat. Are these your good things, by which the sorest troubles of mind are to be remov'd? For you asserted, a little be∣fore, that you could not so much as apprehend any goods of other Nature; therefore Epicurus and I should be agreed, that the Soul is to be call'd off from Melancholly, to the Contemplation of good things, if we were but agreed what is good.

(x) That speaks after this sort.] Cited from the Telamon of Ennius.

(y) From another Play in the same Poet.] The Andromache of Ennius.

SECT. XX. Epicurus prov'd inconstant to his own Principles.

SOME will object. How now? do you think Epicurus meant any such thing, or that his Doctrine was licentious? I think so? by no means. For I see many things spoken by him severely; many excellent well Therefore the Controversie is, as I have often said, about his Logick, not his Morals. Let him never so much undervalue those Pleasures which he lately magnified; yet I shall keep in memory, what he judgeth to be the chiefest good; for he not only put it in the simple term Pleasure, but hath explain'd what he meant. Tast, saith he, and the embracing of Bodies, and Plays, and Musick, and beautiful Objects, with which the Eyes are entertain'd. Is this any Fiction of mine? Is it a Lye? I would fain be disprov'd; for what other Interest have I, but that the Truth may be disco∣ver'd in every question? Ay, but he also saith, when Pain is once remov'd, Pleasure admits of no farther increase; and to be free from Pain, is the height of Pleasure. A few words, but three gross Absurdities: One is, that he contradicts himself; for but lately, having affirm'd that he could not imagine any good, but whereby the Senses are, as it were, tickled with Pleasure; he now supposeth,

that Freedom from Pain, is the height of Pleasure. Can he utter more palpable Contradictions? A second Absurdity is, that whereas in Nature there are three Conditions, one of Joy, another of Pain, a third neither of Joy nor Pain; he taketh the first and third for the same, and confounds Pleasure, with not being in Pain. A third Absurdity, com∣mon to him, with some other; that whereas Ver∣tue is most desirable, and Philosophy was sought out for the acquiring of it; he hath separated the chief good from Vertue. Ay, but he commends Vertue, and that often. So did C. Gracchus all the while that he dealt forth great Largesles, and exhausted the Treasury, yet in words defend the Treasury. What tell you me of Words, when I see Actions? Piso sir-nam'd the Frugal, always voted against the Bill for Corn-Tickets. When the Bill was past into a Law, he that had been Consul came to re∣ceive his Dividend. Gracchus perceiv'd Piso stand∣ing in the Assembly, and asks of him, in the Audi∣ence of the Roman People, with what consistency to himself, he could Plead the Priviledge of that Law, the passing of which; he had by Speech disswaded? I would not, Gracchus, saith he, it should be your Pleasure to divide my Goods among the People, man by man; but if you do it, I will put in for my share. Did not that grave and wise man sufficiently de∣clare, that the publick Revenue was squander'd away by the Sempronian Law? Read the Orations of Gracchus, you will say he was an Advocate for the Treasury. Epicurus denys there can be any living pleasantly, without living vertuously. He denys that Fortune hath any Ascendent over a wise man. He preferreth a slender Diet before a sumptuous one. He denys there can be any time wherein a wise man is not also happy. All Notions worthy a

Philosopher, but opposite to Pleasure. He doth not mean that Pleasure. Let him mean what Pleasure he will, to be sure he means that which hath no share in Vertue. Well, if we do not un∣derstand Pleasure, do we not Pain neither? I deny then, that it is consistent with him, who measures the greatness of Evil by Pain, to make any men∣tion of Vertue.

CHAP. XXI. The stoutness of the Epicureans taken down.

YET the Epicureans complain, Good Fellows as they are (for I know no sort of People less dangerous) that I am still picking Quarrels with Epicurus. I warrant the Competition is about some place of Trust or Honour. To my judgment the chief good is in the Soul; to his in the Body, I place it in Vertue, he in Pleasure. Now they fall to blows; nay, call the Town to help them; and many there be, that run in at their cry. On the contrary, I am the man that own no concern either way; am ready to be concluded by what they de∣termine; for what great business is it? A Debate about the Punick War? yet in a Council of War about that, when M. Cato was of one opinion, and L. Lentulus of another, it never came to any heats. These are too passionate, especially considering that no very honourable Opinion is maintain'd by them; since in the Defence of it, they durst not speak in the Senate, nor in the Assembly of the People; not to the Army, nor before the Cen∣sors.

But I shall have occasion to deal with them elsewhere; yet with this intention, not to make any formal Contest. I shall readily submit to whosoever speak true; only I shall mind them, though it should be never so true, that a wise man acts always in subserviency to his Body; or, to word it more inoffensively, doth nothing but what may turn to advantage, maketh his own Interest the ultimate end and measure of all his Actions; yet because these Principles are not plausible, that they would keep their Joy to themselves, but for∣bear to utter lofty words.

SECT. XXII. The judgment of the Cyrenian Sect, how far allowable.

THE opinion of the Cyrenaicks remains to be dis∣cust; these think that Discontent then ariseth, when any Affliction falls upon us unawares; there is much in that, as I said above; and I know Chry∣sippus is of the mind, that what is not foreseen, cometh with the greater Blow; yet this is not all. However an undiscover'd onset of Enemies, puts into some∣what more Confusion, than what is expected; and a sudden Tempest at Sea gives greater Terror to those that are Sailing, than that which was some∣time foreseen; and most such Instances have like Effects: yet when one looks narrowly into the Nature of unexpected Contingencies, he shall find nothing else, but that all suddain things seem greater; and that for two Reasons: First, because

space is not left of considering how great the acci∣dents are; and then because there seems to have been a possibility of Prevention, had it been fore∣seen, the evil createth the sharper remorse, as if it had been incur'd by some fault of our own. That this is so, time demonstrates; that Process whereof doth give such ease, that though the Evils remain the same, yet the Trouble is asswaged, and, in the most, taken quite away. Many Carthaginians liv'd in Bondage at Rome; Macedonians when King Perses was made Captive. I my self also, when young, saw, in Pe∣loponnesus, some Corinthians; these could have taken up that Lamentation out of the Andromache.

All these I saw—

But perhaps too, they had already Sung it over so often, as to leave doing it any more; for such was their Look, Language, all their other motion, and presence that one would have taken them for Argives, or Sicyonians: and the Ruines, on a suddain beheld at Corinth, more affected me, than the Co∣rinthians themselves; for long consideration through tract of time, had cicatriz'd their Souls. We have read a Book of (a) Clitomachus, which he sent to his Captive Country-men, to comfort them upon the rasing of Carthage; in that is a Disputation of Carneades written, which he saith he put down into his Note-Book; upon this Thesis, that it was the Respondents opinion, that a wise man would be discontented at the Captivity of his Country. What Carneades disputed on the contrary; is written; so great a Remedy therefore, of the present distress, is apply'd by the Philosopher, as would not have been requisite, when it had been grown old: for had the same Book been sent some years after to

them in Bondage, it would not have been admi∣nister'd to their Wounds but Scars. For grief di∣minisheth by a soft and gentle progess, not that the mat∣ter is wont to receive any change, or can admit it; but use teacheth that Lesson which Reason ought, that those things in reality are lesser, which to appearance were greater.

(a) Clitomachus.] A Carthaginian, who at forty years of Age, came to Athens, Carneades being Professor in the Academy of the Platonicks; him he heard, and afterwards succeeded in that Chair; being well ••••••s'd in the Stoick, Pe∣ripatetick, and Academick Schemes.

SECT. XXIII. Forecast of possible Calamities is needful.

WHAT need, therefore, is there of Reason, will some say, or of any Argument at all of Comfort, such as we are wont to use when we would abate the grief of those that are greatly de∣jected? for this is obvious to lay before them, that nothing should be thought unexpected. But how will he bear his affliction more patiently, who knows that there is a necessity for such accidents to befall frail men? for this same Language deducts nothing from the Sum of ill; only acquaints us, that no∣thing is befallen us, which should not have been expected. Nor yet is this sort of Address wholly ineffectual in comforting; but whether it have the most efficacy, again I cannot say: therefore these unexpected ac∣cidents are not so considerable, as that the whole

trouble should arise from thence. Perhaps they give the greater Blow; yet have not that effect to make Accidents seem greater, because they are new, but because they are sudden. Therefore there is a two-fold Method of finding out Truth; nor in those things only which seem evil, but in those also which pass for good; for either we en∣quire of the Nature of the thing it self, of what kind it is, and how great; as sometimes concerning Poverty, whose burden we alleviate by recounting How small and few things they are which Nature craveth; or else we pass our discourse over from the subtilty of Arguing, to A••••••gation of Examples. Here So∣crates is produc'd▪ here Diogenes; here that Passage of Caecilius.

A Gray Coat often Wisdom may conceal.

For whereas Poverty hath still one and the same Force, what reason can be alledged, why it should have been (b) tolerable to C. Fabricius; others say they cannot sustain it; Therefore that method of comforting, which teacheth Accidents to be common to men, is like this second sort of Argu∣ments; for such Disputation not only containeth this, to lead us into the knowledge of man's Na∣ture; but further implyeth, that those things are in themselves tolerable, which others have born, and do bear.

(b) Tolerable to C. Fabricius.] He was General of the Romans, his whole Cupboard of Plate was a Salt, and Boul for Sacrifice, which yet stood on a Horn Foot. He refus'd a great Sum of Gold, presented him by the Samnian Em∣bassadors; and return'd his excuse to Pyrrhus, offering him to be second in the Kingdom of Epirus. His Daughters, at their Marriage, receiv'd a Portion from the Publick Treasury.

SECT. XXIV. The use of Presidents.

THE question is about Poverty, many Patient Poor men are instanc'd in. About despising Honour, many that have fallen into disgrace are produc'd, and, for that very reason more happy: And particularly the Life of those is commended, who have prefer'd Privacy and Retirement, before Pomp and Business. Nor is (c) that Stanza of the most potent King, pass'd by in silence, who commends an old man, and declares him happy, because he should pass to his Grave ignoble and inglorious. In like manner, losses of Children, taken quietly, are extoll'd by producing instances, and thereby the Sorrows of them who exceed their due bounds asswaged; so the persevering Patience of others, causeth the Accidents to seem much less, than what they were before reputed to have been. Thus upon consideration, by degrees it appears, how much opinion hath impos'd upon us: Now this the above-mention'd Telamon declareth, I knew, when I begot them—and Theseus, On future troubles still I thought;—and Anaxagoras, I knew that I begot a Mor∣tal. For all these Persons, by long consideration upon the Circumstances of Humane Life, under∣stood that they were not to be dreaded, after the rate of vulgar Apprehensions; and in truth, as to my judgment, those who have long before consi∣der'd, and those whom length of time cureth, seem to have been wrought upon, in a manner, by one

and the same cause; only that a Principle of Rea∣son healeth the former; Nature the latter; when that cometh to be understood, wherein the Re∣medy consists, that the evil, which was conceiv'd to have been excessive, is not yet so great, as to cast down a state of happiness. This therefore is consequent, that through want of consideration, the wound is greater; but what they imagine, doth not follow, that when equal misfortunes befall dif∣ferent Persons, he only is afflicted, by the mis∣chance, on whom it fell unexpected; therefore some in distress, when they have been minded, that we came into the World upon those terms, that no man can pass the whole course of Life, without his share of suffering, are said to have been the more trou∣bled.

(c) That Stanza of the most potent King.] Agamemnon in Euripides, his Iphigenia in Aulis, bespeaks an old Coun∣try-man.

Father, I envy thy content; Who e're safe, private life hath spent, I envy much his happiness, But Potentates I envy less.

SECT. XXV. The Cavil of Carneades examin'd.

WHereupon Carneades, as I find our Friend Antiochus Record of him, was wont to blame Chrysippus for quoting, as some wise passage, that Verse of Euripides.

No Mortal is advanc'd above all Pain; But buries Children, breeds up some again: Then dys himself; yet their deceased Friend, Vain Mourners to the Grave with Pomp attend. Dust will to Dust; one Law is made for all; Life, like ripe Corn, must by the Sickle fall.

He deny'd that Arguments of this sort, had any influence at all to the abating Sorrow: for, said he, that is the very matter of our grief, to be caught in such a cruel necessity; and a Discourse in re∣hersal of other mens Sufferings, only to be suited to the Consolation of ill-natur'd Persons. But I am clear of a differing judgment, for both the ne∣cessity of conforming to that condition, whereunto we were ordain'd, doth with-hold us from fighting, as it were, against God, and minds us that we are but men. Which consideration doth greatly allay Sorrow; and the recounting Examples is not pro∣duc'd to give content to the malitious, but to in∣form the judgment of him that is in trouble, that he is well able to bear what he seeth many have born before him, with Moderation and Patience:

for they are to be staid up by all methods, who are sink∣ing, and cannot hold together through excess of grief. Chrysippus was wont to make the allusion; as if the Greek word importing Sorrow, imply'd in the very Term, a Solution of the whole man. This evil Humour may be utterly expell'd, by lay∣ing open, as I said in the beginning, the cause of Discontent: Now this is no other than an opinion and judgment of some great evil instant and pressing; therefore also bodily Pain, though the Fit be never so sharp, yet is sustain'd by enter∣taining probable Hopes of Ease: and a Life led with Reputation and Honour, carrieth along with it such strong Consolation, as that no Affliction can touch those who so liv'd; or else Troubles make but a very slight impression on their Souls.

(d) That Verse of Euripides.] They are the words of Amphiarchus, comforting the Mother of Archemorus, for the loss of her Son.

SECT. XXVI. The mistake, that trouble of mind is a Duty.

BUT over and above the opinion, that our evil is great, when a further opinion falls in, that we ought, that we do well; that it is our duty to be disquieted at any misfortune, then ariseth that violent Storm of excessive Sorrow. From this opi∣nion come those diverse and detestable sorts of Mourning, neglects of being trim'd, smiting on the

Breast, Thighs, and Head. Hence Agamemnon in Homer, and no less in Attius is personated.

Tearing for grief, at times his Looks unshorn.

Which occasion'd this ingenuous Saying of Bion, that sure the King was out of his Wits, to pull his Hair up by the Roots, as though melancholly were to be abated by a bald Pate; but they do all these things out of a conceit that they should be so done. Upon the same ground also, doth Aes∣chines inveigh against Demosthenes, because he of∣fer'd Sacrifice a Sevennight after his Daughters Death. But in how Rhetorical strains? how co∣piously? what strong lines doth he compile? what words dart forth? that one would conclude a Rhe∣torician may take upon him as much as he pleaseth. Which Liberty none could allow, unless they had this Principle ingrafted in their Souls, that all good men ought to be most grievously afflicted at the death of their Relations. From hence doth it proceed, that in troubles of mind, some affect solitary Walks, as Homer of Bellerophon.

Who o're th' Aleian Deserts stray'd alone, Pensive, and sought for Paths to men unknown.

Niobe is fain'd to have been turn'd into Stone; I suppose, for her eternal silence in Sorrow. He∣cuba on the other side, for the bitterness of her Spi∣rit and out-rage, they suppose faign'd to have been transform'd into a Bitch. Others again there are, who in their Distresses, often delight to vent their Complaints in Soliloquies; as that Nurse in Ennius.

Now doth my Passion prompt me to relate, To Heav'n and Earth, Medeas sad Estate.

SECT. XXVII. Farther illustrated.

ALL this do men in Affliction, and conceive it to be just, proper, and what ought to be done in such Circumstances; and it is no small Evidence, that this cometh from a pretended Con∣science of Duty, in that such as mourn in State, if they chance to let any Action escape that looks like Civility, or speak a chearful word, they pre∣sently recompose themselves to a disconsolate Garb, and confess their fault in having transgress'd the Ceremony of Mourning. Nay, Mothers and Tu∣tors are wont to check their Children, and that not only by chiding, but also beating them, if they say or do any pleasant thing whilst the Family is in Mourning; they make them cry, what? when the time of second and less strict Mourning is come; and it is found by experience, that no advantage ariseth from Melancholly, doth it not declare that the whole business was voluntary and upon choice. What meaneth the Self-Tormentor in Terence?

I thus resolv'd in misery to share, Chremes, would my Sons wrong in part repair.

He resolves to be miserable. Now doth any one resolve upon any thing against his Will?

I judge I should deserve the worst of ills.

He judges he should deserve the worst of Pu∣nishments, unless he be miserable; you see plain∣ly that it is an Evil of conceit, and not in its own Nature. What and if the very Object forbids La∣mentation; as in Homer the daily Slaughters and great Carnage avail to Moderation in grief; in whom this Passage is found.

Many before our Eyes are daily slain, So that of Sorrow none can respit gain. Bury we then our dead, and ne're repine, But all our Mourning to one day confine.

Therefore it is in our Power to abandon Grief at our pleasure, in compliance with our occasions. Now since the matter is in our Power, is there any occasion of such moment to be comply'd with, as a present riddance of Discontent? It was ob∣serv'd that those who saw Cn. Pompey assassin'd, be∣ing put in fear for their own Lives, at that most deplorable and dismal Spectacle, because they saw themselves surrounded with the Enemies Fleet, did at that time nothing else but hearten the Rowers, and further their escape; but when they had gain'd Tide, then began to break out into Grief and La∣mentations: Fear therefore could give time of trouble to them; and cannot Reason and true Wis∣dom repell it?

SECT. XXVIII. Rectify'd by consideration that our Sorrow avail∣eth nothing.

NOW what can be of more importance to the laying down Sorrow, than a Sense that there is no advantage by it; and that it is admitted upon a pure mistake? And if it can be laid down, it can also not be admitted. It must therefore be con∣fess'd, that Discontent is admitted by Will, and up∣on Choice. Now this is evident by their Patience, who having often gone thorough many Adventures, bear more patiently whatever befalls them, and suppose they are harden'd against all Sense of For∣tune; as he in Euripides.

Had this day first arisen in a Cloud, Had I not long the dangerous Ocean Plow'd; Cause were of Grief; as when shy Colts admit Into their tender mouths, the curbed Bit. Habit of Woes, now makes me dedolent.

Since then the being tir'd out with Miseries, alle∣viates our Sorrows, it must necessarily be perceiv'd, that the object of our Sufferings, is not the real Cause and Fountain of our Grief; the greatest Phi∣losophers, who yet have not attain'd to perfect Wisdom, (e) do they not understand that they are under the greatest Evil? for they want Wisdom: Nor is there any greater Evil, than want of Wis∣dom; yet they do not Mourn: Why so? because

Evils of this sort have not annex'd to them, that it is fit and reasonable, our Duty to be troubled for ones not being wise; which yet we do annex to that trouble of mind, which implys Mourning, and is the greatest of all. Therefore Aristotle accusing the Ancient Philosophers, who thought that Philo∣sophy, through their Wits, was perfected; saith, They were either great Fools, or very Vain; but that he saw, within few years, there was made a great Acces∣sion; so that in short time it would come to be compleat. Theophrastus also lying on his Death-bed, is said to have accus'd Nature, for giving (f) Rooks and Ravens a long life, who have no occasion for it; when men, whom it most imported, were so short∣liv'd, whose Age, if it might have been of a longer Duration, the Consequence would have been, that through the Complement of all Arts, mens life would have been polish'd in every part of Learn∣ing. Therefore he complain'd that he must be taken away as soon as he had but begun to have sight of this. What? among the other Philoso∣phers, do not the best and gravest, confess their ignorance in many things? and that after the greatest proficiency, they have still more to learn? and yet are not discontented at the Sense of that Folly which remaineth in them, though nothing be more Evil; for there is no opinion mingled of an officious Grief. What say we of them, (g) who do not think it suitable for men to mourn? Such was Q. Maximus at the burial of his Son, a man that had borne the Consulship. L. Paulus after the loss of two Sons within few days. Such M. Cato at the death of his Son Praetor Elect. Such the rest whom we have collected in our Book of Consola∣tion. What else pacify'd them, but only a Sense that Sorrow and Lamentation were not proper for

men? Therefore, what some having taken for Duty, are wont to abandon themselves to Melan∣cholly; that these men judging dishonourable, have repell'd Sorrow; from whence is evident, that Discontent is not in the Nature of the thing, but from our own opinion.

(e) Do they not understand that they are under the greatest Evil?] Tully doth not speak it positively, that imperfecti∣on is the greatest Evil: but by way of Interrogation, as ac∣cording to the Stoical Paradox, doubtless insincerity is worse; and it is hard to determine, that he who hath not reach'd the Top in gradual attainments, must therefore lye at the bottom; but if the question had been ask'd in general, why men are not so much affected with the wants of their Soul, as Bodily, or outward Damages; the Resolution had been obvious; because we cannot want or desire what we do not know; therefore he makes instance in the greatest Phi∣losophers: Do they not understand? Some active dissatis∣faction they had in their present Estate, which put them up∣on further pursuit after Wisdom; but they were still much under the Power of an intellectual Lithargy. Deficiency in Morals, was less than their burthen, because they were unacquainted with the indispensable Sanction of the Divine Law. Had not those Direction, Motives, and Assistances to work in them a Spiritual Sorrow, which might engage them to be restless, till they had obtain'd such degrees of integrity, as this our frail condition admits.

(f) Rooks and Ravens.] It is a fabulous Tradition from Hesiod; but Aristotle affirms, no other Creature lives longer than Man, but the Elephant.

(g) Who do not think it suitable for men to mourn. It hath been observ'd that the old Roman Laws prescribe Wo∣men a just time of Mourning, are silent of Men; whence hath also been infer'd, that they look'd upon Mourning as not very suitable for them.

SECT. XXIX. That our Sorrows are by misapprehensions, ag∣gravated beyond their own Natures.

ON the opposite part these things are alledged: Who is so senseless as to mourn on his own Choice? Nature brings Grief; which, say they, (h) your Crantor owns, must be given way to; for it pusheth on, and follows hard, nor can be any ways resisted; therefore that Oileus in Sophocles, who had but a little before comforted Telamon up∣on the death of his Ajax, when he came to hear (i) of his own, broke forth into Passion; upon whose change of mind, is this said.

None to such perfect Wisdom can pretend, Having, with Counsel, staid his sinking Friend; But that he, when inconstant Fortunes course; Shall, against his concerns, direct his Force; To the surprizing Blow renders his Wits; All his grave Rules, and sage Advice forgets.

They who dispute thus, endeavour to prove that Nature can be no ways resisted; yet they confess that greater Resentments are assum'd than Nature imposeth. What madness is it, therefore, for us to exact the same of others? But there are several Causes of admitting grief. First, that opi∣nion of Evil, upon the sight of which, and a per∣swasion that it is such, trouble of the mind is a necessary consequent. Then again, men sup∣pose

they gratifie the Dead, the more heavily they Mourn for them. Over and above this, there is another Superstition, like that of Women; for men think they shall more easily, atone the Deity, if under the stroke of Divine Displeasure, they profess themselves (k) afflicted and laid prostrate. But many do not perceive how incoherent these things are, for they praise those who dye patiently; but think those worthy of blame, who bear with patience ano∣thers death. As though it were possible, what is wont to pass for Complement among Lovers; that any one could love another better than himself. It is very fair, and, if you examine it well, just and proper to love those that ought to be dearest to us, as well as our selves; but to do it better, is im∣practicable. It is not so much as to be look'd for in Friendship, that my Friend should love me more than himself; I him, then my self. (l) A Con∣fusion of life, and all Duties would thereupon follow.

(h) Your Crantor.] An eminent Academician; and therefore Tully gives the Objection its full weight, using their own Terms, a Figure call'd Mimesis.

(i) Of his own.] Ajax the Son of Oileus, smitten with a Thunder-bolt, and wrack'd. Ajax the Son of Telamon was distracted, and fell upon his own Sword.

(k) Afflicted and laid prostrate.] To be humbled under the correcting hand of God, is the necessary Tribute of our Obedience; but to fret and repine, to torment our selves, to despond, neither answers the end of his Paternal Corre∣ction, nor commends our Sense of the Divine goodness; and cannot be a reasonable Service.

(l) A Confusion of Life, and all Duties.] Natural Self∣love, is the Standard of all Offices, of mutual Charity, and ground of distributive Justice; so that if every man be false to himself, where shall be had that Bank of Faith, from whence any may be true to another? Excess of Love ren∣ders

us fond, as the defect unkind; in both we transgress the bounds of Charity and Discretion.

SECT. XXX. The Motives of Consolation, too often prove in∣effectual, proceeds not from any defect in them, but our own indisposition.

BUT of this Point elsewhere; it serves our pre∣sent turn that we do not impute our Misery to the loss of our Friends, least we be thought to love them more than they would have us, if they be sensible, to be sure, more than we do our selves; for as to what they say, that very many find no ease upon Suggestions of Comfort; and that the Comforters themselves confess they are miserable, when the tide of Fortune turns against them; both Arguments are answerable; for those are not na∣tural Defaults, but personal Failures. Now a man may dilate very copiously in an Harangue against Folly; for both those who are not eas'd, invite others to be miserable; and they who de∣port themselves under troubles, otherwise than they have advis'd others to do under theirs, are not more culpable than almost the generality, who being Covetous, reprove the Covetous; and be∣ing vain-glorious themselves, those that are de∣sirous of vain-glory. For it is the property of Folly, to look upon other mens Failings, and to forget their own. But clearly this is the greatest expe∣riment, since it is plain, that Mourning is remov'd by long continuance; that this Power is not in the

length of time, but in long consideration; for if the Suffering be the same, and man the same; how can there be any change in the Grief, if there be no change neither in the Object, nor the Subject of it. Therefore a long consideration that there is no Evil in the misfortune cureth the Grief, not the bare length of time. (m) Here they come in with their Moderations, which if they be Natural, what need is there of Verbal Consolation? Nature it self will prefix bounds; but if they subsist in conceit only, let that whole conceit be remov'd. I suppose sufficient hath been said, that Discontent is an opinion of a present Evil; in which opinion is contain'd, that we ought to admit Discontent. To this Definition, is by Zeno well added, that this opinion of present Evil must be fresh; but he in∣terprets this term in such sort, that he doth not only mean that to be fresh, which fell out lately; but as long as there is in that conceited Evil, any force or vigor, and is still green, so long it may be term'd fresh. As that Artemisia, the Consort of Mausolus King of Caria, who built the noble Se∣pulcher at Halicarnassus; as long as she liv'd, liv'd in Mourning, and consum'd with grief, languish'd to death. She had that opinion daily fresh, which is then not to be call'd fresh, when it is wither'd with Age.

(m) Here they come in with their Moderations.] The Peri∣pateticks, he means, who do not suppress, but order the Passions.

SECT. XXXI. Directions for Comforters.

THESE then, are (n) the parts of Comforters, wholly to remove trouble of mind, or to abate the greatest part of it, or to stop it, and not suffer it to spread farther, or to transfer it to other occasions. Some think it to be the only Office of a Comforter, to perswade that the Affliction is not at all Evil, as Cleanthes holds. Some that it is no great Evil, as the Peripateticks. Some divert the mind from thoughts of Evils, to think of its good things, as Epicurus. Some suppose it enough to discover, that nothing unexpected, nothing Evil is befallen them. But Chrysippus thinks that to be the principal Point, in comforting, to undeceive the Mourner, if he thinks he discharges his bounden Duty in afflicting himself. Some also there are, who collect all these Topicks of comforting, for one is wrought upon by one Motive, and another by another; as we have heap'd up in a manner, all Arguments, into our single Treatise of Consolation; for my Soul was then big with Sorrow, and all Methods of Cure were to be practis'd. But the Season is to be observ'd, no less in Distempers of the Soul, than Body. As that Prometheus of Aes∣chylus, to whom when it had been said;

Prometheus, this I need not you assure, Who better know, Reason can Passion cure.

Reply'd,

If one with timely Med'cines it asswage, Nor with rough hands the angry wound enrage.

(n) The Parts of Comforters.] Condoling and Comfort∣ing have been always held a Civil or Religious Duty. The Jews in their Common-Prayer Book, have an Office of Con∣solation.

SECT. XXXII. The Method.

THerefore in Addresses of Comfort, the first Application must be, to inform that there is no Evil, or but a very small one in the Affliction. A second, to argue from the common condition of Life, and in especial, from that of the Mourners, if it have in it any peculiar Merit to moderate his grief. The Third, how it is the highest Folly ima∣ginable, for one to pine and fret himself away to no purpose, when he understands there cometh no advantage by it; for Cleanthes comforts the wise man who stands in no need of comfort; because if you have perswaded one in Sorrow, that nothing is Evil, but what is dishonest; you do not take away from him his Sorrow, but his Folly; but that is no proper time for teaching. And yet Cleanthes doth not seem to me rightly to have consider'd this case, that grief may possibly be sometimes admitted upon that, which he himself confesseth to be the

greatest Evil. For what shall we say, when So∣crates had perswaded Alcibiades, as we have by Tradition, that he had not the worth of a man in him, and that there was no difference between Al∣cibiades the High-born Prince, and any Porter? Now when Alcibiades was greatly troubled at this, and with tears beg'd of Socrates, that he would in∣struct him in Vertue, and rescue him in Folly; what shall we say, Cleanthes? will you say that there was no Evil in that thing which afflicted Al∣cibiades? what think we of those words of Lyco? who extenuating Discontent, saith, it is rais'd upon Suf∣ferings in Estate or Body, not Evils of the mind. What now? that which Alcibiades griev'd for, was it not for the Evils and Vices of his Soul? As to the Con∣solation of Epicurus, enough hath been said be∣fore.

SECT. XXXIII. That it is a Duty not to be swallow'd up of Grief.

NEither is that Motive of the strongest, although it is both usual, and oftentimes to good effect: You are not the only Sufferer in this sort. This, as I say, is effectual, but not always, nor with all, for some reject it: but it imports how it is apply'd, for we must urge instances, how particular men have wisely born their Sufferings, not what they have suffer'd. That of Chrysippus is of greatest strength, as to its truth, but difficult as to the time

of Sorrow. It is a great task to prove to a Mourner, that he Mourns out of judgment, and a conceit that he ought so to do. Thereupon, as in Causes, we do not always make the same state, (for so we call the several sorts of Controversies,) but suit them to the Season, to the Nature of the Cause, and to the Person, so in asswaging Sorrow. For we must discern what method of Cure each Person is capable of; but I know not how our Dis∣course hath digress'd from the matter propos'd; for your question proceeds about a wise man, in whose judgment either there can be no Evil, where there is no Dishonesty; or so small an Evil, that it is swallow'd up of Wisdom, so that it can scarce appear. One who adds no imaginary Troubles, nor im∣proves his Discontent, nor judgeth it to be right, to give himself the most grievous Torture, and to fret to Death; than which, nothing can be more wrong. Yet the sequel hath inform'd us, to my apprehension, although it were not the direct and proper question at this time, that there is no Evil, but that which may be call'd Dishonesty; so that we may withall see, whatever Evil there is in Discontent, it is not Natural, but contracted by our voluntary judgment, and mistake in opinion. Now that sort of trouble of mind, hath been han∣dled by us, which is greatest of all; so that upon the removal of it, we judg'd the Remedies of the rest, not of difficult enquiry.

SECT. XXXIV. A Passage to the Remedies of Disquiet, arising from the particular Passions.

FOR there are certain Common places which are said about Poverty, about an inambitious and obscure Life; and severally certain Essays upon Banishment, upon the Captivity of our Country, upon Bondage, upon Maimes, upon Blindness, and upon every other Misfortune, to which the name of Calamity is appliable: The Greeks divide these into distinct Disputations, and separate Tracts: For they lack work, although their Disputations are full of delight; and yet as Physi∣cians in carrying on the Cure of the whole Body, apply Remedies to the least affected part: So Phi∣losophy having taken away trouble of mind in ge∣neral; yet if any Error ariseth from Particulars, if Poverty bites, if Disgrace pinches, if Banishment casts us under a Cloud, or if any of the above∣mention'd Calamities befall us: although every Affliction hath its proper Consolation; to which you shall hear discours'd when you please; but still we must recur to the same Spring-head, that all Discontent is stranger to a wise man, because it is idle; because it is admitted to no purpose; because it ariseth not from Nature, but Judgment, but Con∣ceit, but a kind of drawing our selves on to Grieve, after we have determin'd that it is our duty so to do. Remove this which is wholly depending on our Will, and all that fretful Discontent will be ta∣ken

away; yet some Gripes and Resentments will remain in the Mind. Let them call this Natural, if they please; so the name of Discontent be for∣born; a name grievous, vexatious, deadly, which can by no means be; and, as I may say, dwell with Wisdom. But how many, and how bitter are the Suckers of Discontent, which must all be pluck'd up; when the Body of it is fell'd down; and if need shall require, at several times; (o) for we abound in this leasure, such as it is. But the Form of all Passions is one, the Names diverse; for both Envy is a Passion, and Emulation, and Detraction, and Pitty, Anxiety, Mourning, Fretting, Melancholly, Lamentation, Sollicitude, Grief, Uneasiness, Vex∣ation, Desperation; all these the Stoicks define; and the words which Irehears'd, have several No∣tions; and do not, as they seem, signifie the same things, but differ somewhat, which perhaps we shall treat of elsewhere. These are the Fibres and Tendrels of the Suckers, first mention'd; which must be search'd out and torn asunder, that not one of them may ever shoot up. A great and diffi∣cult Work; who denys it? But what is there excel∣lent, which is not also hard? yet Philosophy professeth to effect it, would we but admit its Cure. Now thus much for this Point; the rest shall be ready for you as often as you will, both at this, and any other place.

(o) For we abound in this leasure, such as it is.] Spoken with some regret, for his being out of Practice, Trust, and honourable Employment.