Thomas Campanella, an Italian friar and second Machiavel, his advice to the King of Spain for attaining the universal monarchy of the world particularly concerning England, Scotland and Ireland, how to raise division between king and Parliament, to alter the government from a kingdome to a commonwealth, thereby embroiling England in civil war to divert the English from disturbing the Spaniard in bringing the Indian treasure into Spain : also for reducing Holland by procuring war betwixt England, Holland, and other sea-faring countries ... / translated into English by Ed. Chilmead, and published for awakening the English to prevent the approaching ruine of their nation ; with an admonitorie preface by William Prynne, of Lincolnes-Inne, Esquire.

CHAP. XIV. Of the Barons, and Nobility of the Spanish Monarchy. (Book 14)

THe King of Spain, to the end that so vast a Monarchy may not fall to decay, hath need of such men as are excellent both for Learning, and the practise of Armes; whom He ought to reward af∣terwards with Baronies; that so being from thenceforth made sharers, as it were, of the said Monarchy, they may to their utmost power endeavour to maintain, and make good the same to their Prince. Which Baronies not∣withstanding, when they once fall into the hands of Unworthy persons, are the cause of much mischief. And they do fall into such hands, when they come to be bestowed either upon Buf∣foons, or perhaps such Exchequer Men, as have found out new waies of oppressing the Subject: or else, when they have been conferred at first upon Wise, and Valiant men, whose Successors for all that may have proved to be Mean, Inconsiderable persons; or are else riotous, and proud; and such, as laying aside all thought of their Ancestors Virtue, take the full enjoyment only of that they have left them, and having no worth of their own, can onely boast of the Nobility of their Ancestors. And hence it is, that the King is in want so much of Persons of Worth, whilest the number of such Uselesse Drones encreaseth in the Kingdom.

The Great Tu••k, that he may prevent the latter of these Mischiefs, putting by all such as are bottom'd only upon Others Nobility, takes notice of such onely as are Eminent for some worth of their own: Neither doth he suffer any son to succeed in the Estate, or Goods of his Father by Right of Inheritance; but he is to receive the same at his hands, as a reward of his Ser∣vice, if so be he deserve it. But in case he do not, he must then serve him either in some Ignoble Art, or else in some inferiour Office in his Wars.

The Former of these Inconveniences any King of Spain may prevent, if he but confer these rewards upon such onely, as are deserving Persons; but the Remedy of the Second, which is practised by the Turks cannot be made use of among Christians. Onely let him be sure that many of these Baronies do not in time fall into the hands of one man, who perhaps upon the first Opportunity given may revolt from him; as did the Nobility of Iapan, who being grown great in power, made opposition against their King in the City Meaco, which was also done by the Barons of France, who thereby hindered their own Monarchy; and as Scanderbeg did to the Turk: and so likewise the Princes of Ta entum and Salerne, and many other in the Kingdom of Naples, who made the same Attempts against their Kings, both those of Arragon, and of Anjou too. Now the Mischeifs which these Barons bring upon the People, and consequently upon their King, are these. They come to Naples, and to the Court, and there spending their mony profusely and lavishly, they make a great shew for a while, and get in favour with the Kings friends; and at length having spent all, they return poor home, and make prey of whatsoever they can, that so they may make themselves whole again; and then they return to Court again; running round still, as it were, in the same Circle; in so much that we see these mens Territories much more desert, and naked, then the Kings in Italy are; all through the default of the Ba∣rons themselves. And then, if the People have been infested with any Pestilential Diseases or have suffered by the Turks; They presently beg of the King to have the yearly Taxes to be remitted for some certain time; the payment whereof they them∣selves require at the hands of the People, and in the Kings name too, and that with all the severity that may be: which the Prince of Rogebo had the confidence to do, after the battel with the Turks. And lastly, under the pretence of the Camera, (as they call it,) that is to say, that the Country may be freed from quartering of Souldiers, they extort from the Subjects many Thousands of Crownes. And they find out a Thousand other wayes of fleecing the poor Subjects, that so they may never want Supplies either for their Luxury, or their Prodiga∣lity. And notwithstadning that the Spaniards believe, that this Lavishnesse of theirs makes for the Kings Advantage, and renders his state the more secure; because that those that are so

given to rioting and Luxury, are never any gatherers, and hoard∣ers up of vast Sums of Mony which may prove the Instruments of Rebellion; yet the plain truth of it is, they do him much hurt: for they by this meanes reduce the People, from whom the greatest part of the Kings Revenues come, to a poor, low con∣dition. For the remedying of which Mischeif, it would do well if there were a Law made, that no Baron should have above 3000. Crownes of yearly Revenues: and that whatsoever any of them hath more, it should not descend to his Successor, but should go after him to the Exchequer: I speak here onely of such Baronies as shall be conferred by the King, upon the Grounds aforesaid.

As for the Ancienter Barons, it would do well if there were some Competitions cherished among them, that by this means, by their contentions they might keep one another under: and so likewise, that at every Seven years end there should be such an Assembly called together, as I spake of before: and that the Barons should be freed from all Bonds. Likewise, that every Baron should every three years find the King as many Souldiers and Horses, as he hath Thousands of Crowns of yearly Revenue. Let him also divide the Titles of Honour; and besides, he may do well to create many New Lords, finding out for them New Titles; that so the smalnesse of their number may not encrease their dignity and honour. Let Him take care also, that the Lordships, and Lords Mannours of the Kingdom of Naples, Mil∣lan, Spain, and the N••therlands may be bought by Forraigners; that is to say, by the Genuese, Florentines, French, and Venetians; that so the Barons, that are the Natives, may be brought lower, and the Forreigners may bring the King in a large yearly Revenue out of their own Country Lordships. By which means I dare be bold to affirm, that the King shall have greater power, and Command at Genoa, then at Millan; because that nothing can be done, or resolved upon at Genoa, without his knowledge and consent; whiles the Genueses will alwayes be in fear of losing the Lordships they have in the King of Spains dominions. And by this means also the King shall not need to trouble himself about allowing them maintenance, as he is with the Millanois: for, Whosever is fed by thee, he is thy servant. And thus have the Florentines alwaies been servants to the King of France, into whose Dominions they have liberty of Traffick allowed them.

But there must be care taken, that no Fortified Places be ever put into the hands of any of the Barons. And besides, there must be such Provision made, as that all the Sons of the said Barons should have Spaniards for their Tutors, who shall His∣paniolize them, and train them up to the Habit, Manners, and Garbe of the Spaniard. And when these Barons shall once be∣gin to grow Powerful, He must take them down; yet under the pretense of honouring them, by sending them away to some Office, or Charge, that lies in some place far remote from their own Lordships, and where they shall be sure to spend more then they get. And again, when ever the King shall please to take his Progresse into the Country, let him so contrive his Gists, as that He may lye upon these Barons; and so under the pretext of doing them Honour, may force them to be at a great charge in entertaining Him. Let Him give a willing ear to the People, when they make any complaints of them. Neither ought Nobility to be higher prized by the King, then Virtue; which is a Rule that deserves to be observed above all the rest. Besides, in all the Metropolian Cities in his several Kingdomes, as at Lis∣bon, Toledo, Antwerp, and the rest, as well in this, as in the other Hemisphere, the King under pretext of doing them ho∣nours may constitute, in each of them, five, eight, or ten Ranks, or Orders of Barons; such as are at Naples; that when they are to treat of any Affairs of State, each of them may go into his own Order and Place. For being thus divided, they will never be able to determine any thing that shall be Prejudicial to the King, by reason of the Ambition that will be amongst them, and so, where there shall be three Lawes perhaps made, to the Kings prejudice, there will alwaies be eight made for his advantage. And the common People also may in like manner, be distributed into their several Classes and Ranks. And this is much the more honourable, and secure way, then to cause di∣visions, and sidings into parties among them, which is the coun∣sel of some Writers, who have a Saying, Divide, & impera: Cause Divisions among thy subjects, and thou shalt rule them well enough.

The King must alwayes make much of such persons, as are of eminent either Valour, or Virtue, and must prefer them to digni∣ties and honours. In every place also, where He hath any Councel sitting, He ought to joyn to them one of some Religi∣ous

Order or other, whom he can trust; and that, for the com∣mon security of both parties, both Prince, and Counsellour. And all such persons as shall be admitted to this honour, should have an Oath administred unto them, or else should have some kind of Obligation by way of some Religious Fraternity with the Crown, by which they should be bound, in all trou∣blesome and perillous times, not only to deliver into the Kings hands all the Gold and Silver they have, but that themselves al∣so shall in person serve in the Wars, in defence of the Fortune and safety of the Kingdom. By which means the King shall prevent all Insurrections among them: or in case they should stirr, He shall have a sufficient Pledge in his hands, as being possessed of all their Treasures; in so much that their Wives will not spare in this case, to bring in what Rings, Brace∣lets, and Chains of Gold, or any thing else of value that they have, (as we read, the Roman women did, when Rome was di∣stressed by Hannib••l, and other Enemies,) and lay them all at the Kings feet.

And as for Commanders in War, those he ought to account the best, that were themselves once common Souldiers; such as Antonius de Leva, and Gonsalvus de Corduba were; as those Counsellours also are to be esteemed the ablest•• that have ri∣sen to that height from the lowest, and meanest Trusts and Em∣ployments. And therefore the King shall not take any great care for such Barons, as have not been in service abroad before, so that they may have thereby rendred themselves fit to discharge the offices of able Commanders in War, or to serve the King in his Councells. But he must get about him such, as have been men of long Experience, and are well ac∣quainted with, and versed in the Affaires of the World.

Neither is it a small Calamity, that the Kingdom of Spain lieth under, by reason of such Quarells, and Suits of Law as of∣tentimes arise among the Nobiliy, about Precedency, as they call it: which certainly, in the time of War, must needs be of most dangerous consequence; for There, Military Valour is onely to be looked after. And who knowes, whether or no this very thing might not be the cause of the Miscarriage of the Armado that was sent against England in the year 1588. But herein the Barons are of great use, and advantage to the King, because that in case He shall have any ill successe in any ex∣pedition,

He can immediately make himself whole again by his Barons: which the Turks can not do. For when he hath once received but one notable Blow, and is now much weaken∣ed thereby, He hath no Barons left him, by whose aide he may recover himself again: which was the case also of D••rius, when he was overthrown by Alexander the Great; and of the Sultan of Aegypt that was conquered by Selim; both which being once beaten, were never afterward able to make head again against their Enemy. And if so be that Emulation and Envy had not born too great a sway among the Christians, in that Memoral Victory obtained at Sea against the Turk, in the year 71. Constantinople might at that time have been recovered, and the Turk utterly rooted out.

The King must therefore take especial notice, wherein the Barons may be prejudicial to Him, and in what they may ad∣vantage Him: and He must make use of them rather as his Treasurers of his Arms, and Monies, then make them, as it were, the Patrons of His State. And yet out of these Treasurers of his he may choose out some to be Commanders in his War; provided, that he lay a Command upon them to set aside their Second Sons, to be as a Seminary of Military Valour both for Sea, and Land Service; as we shall shew hereafter: and by this means He shall have their Fathers, the Barons themselves, as it were bound to be faithful to him, by reason of this Engage∣ment of their Sons to the Prince; and so He shall be sure to have them at his devotion, whensoever he shall have occasion to make use of them: as shall be shewed hereafter, in the Chapter Of Navigation.