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IT is not my businesse at this time to make any Metaphysicall distinction be∣tween
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the Persons of Men and Angels; b•••• I desire to distinguish between created an•• uncreated Persons▪ because uncreated Per∣sons subsist in one single and infinite ess••nce▪ It may seem strange to some Metaphysical wits that one Person, and much more th•••• three distinct Persons should subsist in o•••• single and undivided essence; but these dis∣coursing wits do not distinguish betwee•• created and uncreated Persons. 2. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ground their faith on scholastical subtiltie••▪ 3. Do not study the Holy Scriptures wi•••• humility and faith, and beg a blessing o•• their studies by fervent Prayer▪* 1.1 For they might read in the Scriptures of a divin•• Person subsisting in the divine nature. Phil 2. 6. Being in the forme of God, &c. That is subsisting in the Nature of God, because it presently follows, that therefore he thought it no robbery to be equall with God; for Persons that are coessentiall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 needs be coequall; Christ and his Father do both subsist in the same divine essence, for Christ is the expresse image of his Fathers subsistence, and he and his father are one, one in essence, Iohn 10. 30. Heb. 1. 3. We find this interpretation was received in the time ofa 1.2 Iustinian the Emperour, and therefore it is not an interpretation lately
coined. Because it is said [who being in the forme of God,] the Holy Ghost doth de∣monstrate the Hypostasis or Subsistence of the Word in the Essence of God. And because it is said that he took upon him the forme of a servant, it signifies that God the Word, [that is God the Son,] is united with the Nature, not the Subsistence or Person of man. He did subsist in the nature of God, but he did assume the nature of man, and therefore Christ hath a divine subsistence, no humane Person; no humaneb 1.3 Person subsists in the nature of man; nor doth the Person of an Angel subsist in the nature of an Angel; but the divine Person of Christ doth subsist in his Divine Nature, nay all the three Persons do subsist in the single and infinite nature of God. From whence I conclude that there is not onely a manifest, but an infinite difference be∣tween created and uncreated Subsistences or Persons; And I speak ofc 1.4 Persons, ra∣ther then Personalities, because those ab∣stract notions are not very well under∣stood by the most discoursing men; for even they acknowledge thatd 1.5 Abstracts are not well, or not happily understood, un∣lesse you descend to the consideration of their subjects. My purpose therefore upon most mature deliberation, is, 1. To distinguish between created and uncreated Persons. 2. To treat of uncreated Persons rather
then Personalities, that is to treat of the three Persons not abstracted from, but subsisting in the divine nature. I will not speak simply of the Son, as a Son in that ab∣stract relation, or of the Son as a Person, or as the second Person, by abstracting his Personality from the Divine Nature in which he subsists; but I desire to speak of Iesus Christ, as subsisting in the nature of God, according to that expression of the Apostle, Phil. 2. 6. who subsisting in the nature of God. For I am resolved to follow the Scripture, and I do not think it safe to abstract the incommunicable Subsistence of Christ, from the Divine nature in which he subsists, least I fall into vain speculations, as many learned men have done. Now if you take in the Divine Nature of Christ, (and there is the same reason of all three Persons, because all have the same Divine Nature) there will be I say not only a mani∣fest, but an infinite difference between the Person of Christ, and the Person of the most glorious Angel in Heaven.* 1.6 They who have long studied the most refined and curious part of Metaphysicks, when they come to discourse of the distinction between a sin∣gular Nature and a Person, are forced to confesse that they do confine their speech to created Natures and Persons, because e 1.7there is even almost nothing evident to them by the light of reason, concerning the Divine
nature and uncreated Persons. And there∣fore on the other side, it well becomes me to confine my discourse to uncreated Per∣sons, because there is so vast a difference be∣tween them, and the most excellent of all created Persons; only something I must say of created Persons, that by comparing them with uncreated Persons, I may demon∣strate wherein they agree, and wherein they differ.
Boetius relates, that when there was an Epistle of the Councell of Chalcedon read, in which there was this Orthodox Position, That Iesus Christ is a single Person, and yet there are two distinct natures in his single Person; Boethius desired the learned men then present, to assigne the difference be∣tween a singular Nature, and a Person, and no man, saith he, was able to tell me the difference, or to declare what a Person was. But though Boethius smiled at the ig∣norance of others, yet he was not wise f 1.8enough to conceal his own; for he defines a Person thus; A Persong 1.9 is the undivided substance of a rationall nature. I am not at leasure to reckon up the defects of this im∣perfect definitiō. Vasquez is bold to say that Aristotle knew not how to distinguish a Per∣son from a singular nature. And there is no doubt but veryh 1.10 wise men have erred grossely in this point for want of studying, ••▪ The state of the soule in its separation from
the body. 2. The humane nature of Christ assumed without any humane person. 3. The difference between the Divine Nature, and Persons which subsist in it. I believe Ari∣stotle did not study the first so exactly as he should have done; and I am sure he knew nothing of these two last most con∣siderable points. I shall not stand to shew the vanity ofi 1.11 Laurentius Valla, who seems to forget all his Elegancies when he comes to discourse of a Person, and drawes his arguments from the flourishes of an Ora∣tour, or the severall passions, humours, re∣lations, conditions, or offices of men that are personated upon a Stage; and there∣fore this Whiffler deserves to be hissed off from his stage, for he doth only make sport for Atheists and Familists by such ridicu∣lous discourse. And he is sufficiently ab∣surd, when he stoops so low as to say, that a Person is a Quality, and that there is a triple Quality in God. Andk 1.12 Scaliger shewed his Critical skill in Divinity to pur∣pose, when he was so foolish as to say that a Person doth not signifie a substance, but a quality.l 1.13 Bellarmine is Orthodoxe in this point, and proves at large that the word Person doth usually signifie a Substance, in very approved Authors both sacred and pro∣fane. Well may we then say, that the Church of God hath not offended the curious eares of such as are the great Masters of language
the Oratours,* 1.14 Civilians, Grammarians and others, when they say that a Divine Person doth at least connote the Substance or Nature of God; and the self-same substance being in all three persons, it doth not follow as Gostavius, or Mr. Fry would have it, that there are three Substances in the Godhead, because there are three Persons subsisting in the Godhead; for the substance or nature is the same in all three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. And we speak of the substance of the Persons, when we describe them, not that we may shew wherein they differ, but that we may shew wherein all three Persons agree. And if we should ab∣stract the Personality of these uncreated Persons from their Divine Substance or Nature, when we describe them, we should seem to rob them of their Divinity even in the very description of them. We must not say that a Divine Person is a meerm 1.15 relative Propriety, or a pure manner of being, existing, or subsisting: for every person is God, and all three Persons but one Jehovah, one God. They do imprudently destroy the divine and coessential Trinunity, who affirme the Holy Trinity to be nothing else but three Proprie∣ties or three manners of subsisting. For what is that consubstantial Trinunity, of which the Ancients speak, but the single and infi∣nite substance or essence of three Divine Subsistences or Persons? If you leave out
the Divine Essence or Substance out of the definition, how is it a Consubstantial or Co∣essential Trinunity? The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, all three doa 1.16 naturally subsist in the same divine and undivided nature. I must therefore describe Divine persons as divine persons, when I am to put a difference between them & uncreated persons; and if I describe them as Divine persons, I must not abstract their personal proprieties frō their divine nature, though what isb 1.17 Personal may in some sense be affirmed to be naturally due to that particular person. But besides those Personalc 1.18 Proprieties or Characters where∣by the Father, Son and H. Ghost do appear even to our weak understanding, to be three distinct Subsistences; the whole and undividedd 1.19 Godhead dwells in every one of these three Subsistences, though it do subsist after a different manner in every one of the three. The Father is God subsisting after that peculiar manner, which is proper to the Father: Now that peculiar manner of sub∣sisting superadded to the Divine nature, doth make a true distinction between the Father, and the other two Subsistences, but it makes no Composition at all, either in the Father, or in the Godhead. Hencee 1.20 it is
that divers profound and Orthodox wri∣ters maintain, that A divine Person is nothing else but the very Divine Essence it self modi∣ficated. Give me leave to explain this ab∣struse notion a little, by giving an instance in the 1. Personal Principle, God the Father.
God the Father is the first Person of the Godhead distinguished from the Son and Spirit (who are one and the same God with him) by his peculiar maner of subsistence, sin∣gular relation, & incommunicable properties.
Here is, as they love to speak, thef 1.21 Di∣vine Essence modificated with a peculiar manner of subsistence, a singular relation and incommunicable properties. What this pe∣culiar manner of Subsistence, singular Rela∣tion, and incommunicable Properties are, I shal demonstrate when I come to treat of the distinction of these 3 Divine Subsisten∣ces in the very next Chapter. I hope I need say no more to prove, that A Divine Person doth at least connote the Substance, Essence, Nature of God; and therefore it will not be
safe to abstract the Personality of an uncrea∣ted Subsistence, from that single and infinite Nature which is one and the same in all three Subsistences. I do not find the most raised g 1.22Metaphysical wits very forward to define or describe a Personality; but they speak of a Person in concreto, of a Subsistent rather then a Subsistence; and of a Suppositum, ra∣ther then an abstract Suppositality. The im∣perfect Definition of Boethius is commonly too commonly received in the Schooles; and he saith, a Person is an undivided sub∣stance. They who have studied the point more exactly, and correct his definition, do all agree that a Person is an undivided substance, an understanding substance, a com∣plete, incommunicable, independent substance, which doth not depend upon any thing else by way of inhaesion, adhaesion, union, or any other way, for its sustentation. This is the general andh 1.23 common opinion. I know there are some private opinions, as I may call them, concerning the Formality of a Person; which I shall but point at, and easily confute with the light & gentle touch of a running
pen. It is very absurd to say that a Person is made compleat in his subsistence by any i 1.24accidents or any formality arising from an heap of accidents, because a Person is the most perfect substance, and therefore can∣not be made complete by any accidental sub∣sistence; there is a manifest contradiction in that ridiculous expression.k 1.25 Aristotle saith that singular substances do subsist 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 most properly, principally, perfectly; To subsist by its self, is the most perfect kind of subsistence; and that cannot be said to subsist by it self, which doth subsist by an heap of accidents. Others say that a person is completed by a meer l 1.26Negation, but Subsistence is positive, though Subsistence may be described by some ex∣pressions that are negative. The second person of the Trinity doth supply and per∣forme all that an humane person can per∣forme to the humane nature of Christ. Now to say that the Divine person of Christ doth supply the room of am 1.27 Negation, and do all that a Negation can do, is to say it doth very little or nothing at all. Finally, some say that a person is completed by the n 1.28Existence of its nature. But it is cleare that a soule in the state of separation doth
exist, and yet that soule is not a Person, nay never was a Person at the first instant of its creation or union. And it will be most ab∣surd to say, that the humane nature was assumed by Christ, and hypostatically united without or before the existence of that na∣ture, because it was united before it had any humane subsistence, and consequently before it had any existence, if that subsist∣ence be nothing else but existence, as these Discoursers suppose. But it is high time to leave pursuing of these wanderers; For it is cleare, that Subsistence is a Positive and Substantial Mode, because the most perfect manner of being, which we expresse as well as we can, when we say, A Person doth sub∣sist by it self, without union unto, or depend∣ance upon any thing else for its sustentation; nay, that it is uncapable of any such union, though it be for the present in a state of
separation. And therefore the Schoolmen usually say, Quod subsistit per se, nec est nec esse potest in alio, ullo modo; quia subsistere per se sumitur pro perfectissimo modo subsi∣stendi per se. It is evident by what hath been said, that even created persons are defined by their substance or nature which is in stead of a Genus when we define a Per∣son in Concreto; and when we speak o•• the Formality of a Person, we say it is a sub∣stantial mode, and the most perfect manner of subsisting; and therefore a created per∣son is not completed by any quality or acci∣dent whatsoever. Now if a created per∣son be a substance, and the Formality of a created person be substantial, I have no ground to abstract a Divine Person from the Divine Substance or Essence, because a Divine person cannot be separated from the Divine nature; as the humane nature may be from an humane person; and though a Praecisive abstraction doth not lay any ground either for a Rational negation, or a reall separation; yet if the Divine Na∣ture be not considered and taken notice of in the description of every Divine Person, men will be apt to conceive that the Di∣vine Nature and Persons may be separated. The Scripture doth not present any such abstract notion of the Father, Son, or Holy Ghost unto us, but teaches us to consider them as Divine Persons, that is, Persons
that have a Divine nature; for else we should make aa 1.29 Trinity of Modes, no Trin∣unity; ab 1.30 Trinity without God or Godhead, and give our adversaries cause to say what they have said, without cause, contrary to their own principles as well as ours; E•• Trinitatem sine Deo! for even they them∣selves acknowledge the first Person of the blessed Trinity to be God. It is our wisest course therefore to describe every Person as a Divine Person, as God, and acknowledge all three Persons to be one and the same God, according to the Scriptures. For we must not only consider three Personalities, but threec 1.31 Persons, and the same single God∣head in all three Persons, and all three Persons in the Godhead. I must not treat of the first Person simply as a Father, but as a Divine and Eternal Father, as God the Father, Rom. 15. 6. Ephes. 5. 20. Coloss. 2. 2. Joh. 17. 3. For God is to be so considered as he is to be worshipped by us, and we are not to worship an abstract Personality with∣out reference to the Godhead. We must con∣sider what is Common, as well as what is Incommunicable; we must treat of that which is Absolute, as well as of that which is Relative; and whilest we speak of a Trinity of Persons, we must not forget the Vnity of the Essence, that so we may not hold forth a Trinity of Modes without
d 1.32the Godhead, or tempt weak heads to dream of a Trinity of Gods. Judicious Mr. Calvin did not think fit to discourse much of Created Persons, and therefore descri∣bed none but a Divine Person; and he would not adventure to abstract an uncre∣ated Personality from the Divine nature in which every of the three uncreated Persons doth subsist. In our most accurate definition of any created nature, which we are best acquainted with, we judge it reasonable to take in that which the nature defined hath common with other natures, as well as that which is proper to it alone. And certainly it is very fit, in our description of every Divine Person, to take in the Nature which is common to all three Persons, and not only what is proper and peculiar to any one. I call a Person (saith Calvin) a Sub∣sistence in the Essence of God. And then he descends to take notice of the Relation of a Divine Person to the rest of the co-essential Persons, and his distinction from them by some incommunicable property. It will be a very dangerous attempt then to treat of the Divine Persons in such abstract expres∣sions as do only hold forth some curious notions about the relation of these persons
to,* 1.33 and distinction from one another, with∣out taking notice that all three Persons 〈◊〉〈◊〉 coeternall and coequall, because coessential▪ If we will discourse soberly of the God∣head, we must speak of it as one single in∣finite perfection common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to all three, and none other The single Godhead, the whole Godhead is i•• every single person, and it is common to a•• three in a singular and glorious way. For the divine nature is not communicated to these Three, as a Genus to its Species, for it i•• undivided and indivisible; nor as a Speci•••• to its Individua, for it is not multiplicable nor as a Totum or whole to its parts, fo•• the Godhead hath no parts, it is imparti∣ble, and as hath been said, indivisible; nay the Godhead is not communicated so to any one Person, as a created nature to•• created person, which may be separate•• from a created subsistence; for the Divin•• Nature cannot possibly be separated from all, or any one of the Divine Subsistence•• or Persons. And therefore we must no•• discourse of the Godhead in such a Notio∣nal way, as if the Godhead did exist out o•• the three Persons without any relative sub∣sistence; for that is clearly to dream of som•• strange Absolute God,* 1.34 who is neither Fa∣ther, Son, nor Holy Ghost. When we de∣scribe the Godhead according to our be•• understanding, we dare not abstract it from
the three Persons; but say, that▪
The Godhead is one single,* 1.35 spiritual, infinite Essence, in which the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost do subsist.
And when we describe a Divine Person, it is absurd to abstract the Personality from the Divine Nature; for how can you de∣scribe a Divine person, if you do abstract his Personality from his Divinity. Every single Person is God, nay every single Person is the Godhead, the Nature, the Essence of God, considered with that subsistence, relation, and propriety which is peculiar to that Person. Every single Person is God of him∣self,* 1.36 Deus non est per alind Deus. Finally, ••ake all the three Persons together, and ••hey are nothing else but one God; and ••hey are one God, not Absolutely consider∣••d in his abstract nature,* 1.37 but Relatively considered with those peculiar relations, ••nd incommunicable properties whereby ••he three Persons are distinguished from one another. When thea 1.38 name of God is ••aken Essentially or Commonly in Scrip∣••ure, we say it doth belong to all three
Persons, because it is spoken without any determination or restriction to any one particular person, as Iohn 4. 24. God is a Spirit, Mat. 4. 10. Mat. 19. 17. There is none good but God. These places must needs be interpreted of all three Persons; for it is certain, that Christ did not by these speeches exclude himself or the Holy Spirit from be∣ing good, or being worshipped. And when the Name of God is taken personally or singularly in Scripture, we say it is under∣stood of one Person by a Synechdoche, because though the other Persons may be excluded from what is proper and peculiar to any one Person, because it is personal, and therefore incommunicable, yet they cannot be excluded from any thing that is essential, because the same Divine essence is common to all. Now the Title of God is essentiall; and what hath been said of that, is true of all Essen∣tial Titles and Attributes: but Personal relations, properties, and actions, are all pe∣culiar, as we shall shew at large in the next Chapter.
All that I need inferre from hence for the present is, That when we describe the Divine nature, we should not abstract it from the three Persons; and when we describe a Divine Person,* 1.39 we should not abstract him from the Divine Nature. When the Scrip∣ture speaks of Created persons, it doth not abstract the personality from the singular
substance or nature. When the Apostle saith, 2 Cor. 1. 11. that thanks shall be given by many persons, he doth not mean many personalities, but many humane singular substances; thanks should be given by a multitude of men, particular men. Actiones sunt suppositorum, non suppositalitatum. In like manner when we read that Christ is the Character of his Fathers person,* 1.40 Heb. 1. 3. the word is Subsistence; the meaning is not, that the Son is the character or ex∣presse image of the Fatherhood of the first Person; for Christ doth not beget a Son, as the Father doth; but Christ is the image of the Subsistent, (that is) of God the Father, and not of the mere Subsistence or Personality, as it is abstracted from the Divine Nature.
Jesus Christ hath two natures in one single person:* 1.41 now that person is a Divine person, the second person of the Godhead; and if I describe the person of Jesus Christ, I may abstract his person from his humane nature, and not mention that nature, which doth infinitely differ from his Divine per∣son: but I must not abstract the person of Christ from his divine nature,* 1.42 because he hath no other then a divine person, which cannot be separated from, (and should not be described without consideration, and mention of) the divine nature. For this Second Person is not barely considered as a
person, or as a second person, but as a divine person, as the second person of the Godhead, as the naturall, coessential, coequal, coeternal Son of God as his own Son, his first begott•••• Son, his only begotten Son. Rom. 8. 32. Ioh. 1. 14. And therefore he must be considered as God, the true God. God blessed for ever, Ioh. 1. 1. 14. 18. Rom. 9. 5. 1 Ioh. 5. 20. and therefore he must be described as God 〈◊〉〈◊〉 himself; for the Son is Iehovah, as hath been proved and we are obliged to believe in the Son as well as in the Father, Ioh. 4. ••. Iesus Christ is one and the same God with the Father. Now Papists and Socinians wi•••• both confesse, that the Father is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 God of himself; and therefore it will fol∣low that the Son* 1.43 is God of himself. If the Godhead of the Son were begotten, and the Godhead of the Father unbegotten, there would be two distinct Godheads in the Father and the Son, the one begotten, and the other unbegotten. Take it thus the•• in brief: The second Person† 1.44 of the Godhead is the only begotten Son of God subsisting i•• the unbegotten nature of God▪ because he is the naturall and coessentiall Son of God the Father, and therefore hath one and the same unbegotten nature with the Father; the subsistence of the Son is begotten, but the divine nature of the Son is unbegotten.* 1.45
The Holy Ghost is an infinite Spirit, co∣essential with the Father and the Son, and
not a mere Subsistence proceeding from both; and yet he is distinguished from both by his personal relation and incom∣municable property.
These grounds being laid for a founda∣tion,* 1.46 it is easie to build on, and inferre— 1. That the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not mere Personalities, but Divine Persons. 2. A Divine Person is not a Qua∣lity or any other Accident, but an infinite Substance subsisting after the most perfect, and glorious manner that is, or can be. 3. The Divine nature being infinite, doth contain all manner of perfection within it self, both Absolute and Relative; and therefore the relations which are between the Divine Persons, are naturall, perfect, divine. 4. The Divine Nature cannot be separated from all▪ or any one of the Di∣vine Persons. 5. These three Divine Per∣sons are one and the same God, one Infi∣nite Spirit; and therefore they are Co∣essential, Coequal, Coeternal. 6. These three Divine Persons are distinguished (as shall be shewen in the next Chapter) but cannot be divided or separated either from the Divine Nature, or from one another, because they do al•• three subsist in the Di∣vine nature, and in one another; for they have one and the same single and infinite nature, and are one infinite Spirit, the same omnipresent God. 7. The* 1.47 word
[* 1.48 Subsistence] is a consecrated word, which as we find upon record in the holy Scrip∣ture, is fit to be made use of when we speak of that Divine manner of being which the Father, Son and Holy Ghost have in the Godhead and in one another. The heathen Oratour could say, Verbis consecratis uten∣dum; He meant words that were conse∣crated by the use and approbation of Clas∣sical Authors; but I mean, words conse∣crated by the Holy Ghost. The word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which we render Subsistence, and by way of Analogie, PERSON; hath many a 1.49other significations; but when it is used on this occasion, upon this subject, we may after so many disputes about this Argu∣ment, easily understand the proper, and consecrated importance of the word. We may take warning by the mistakes of o∣thers, and avoid those rocks on which o∣thers have suffered shipwrack. Some who understand that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 did signifie essence, were offended with such as said there were three Hypostases in God; because accord∣ing to that signification of the word, to say that there are three Hypostases in God, is to say that there are three Essences in God
and consequently, that there are three Gods. It is readily acknowledged that the c 1.50word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 doth sometimes signifie the nature or essence of a thing, not the generi∣cal or specifical nature in their latitude and abstract universality, but the natured 1.51 truly existing, and subsisting in the world. This acception of the word may, all things duly considered and soberly expounded, be ad∣mitted, with some grains of allowance for the infinite difference which is between created, and uncreated Subsistents. For if Hypostasis be described in concreto, for which we have with invincible reason con∣tended all along this Chapter, thene 1.52 Hypo∣stasis doth connote the Divine Nature, and signifies not an Abstract Subsistence, but a Complete Subsistent. When I say that Jesus Christ is the Character of his Fathers Sub∣sistence, I do not (as I have formerly shewn) understand it thus, that Jesus Christ is the Character of his Fathers Abstract Perso∣nality, but he is the Character of God the Father; I take in the Divine Nature. But you must then consider that the glory of the Trinunity must be preserved in this ac∣ception;
for there is not a new nature in every one of the Three but the Divine na∣ture which is connoted in these three Hy∣postas••s is the very same; there is the glory of the Mysterie which dazles the eye of car∣nal reason; And therefore whatever we say on this argument, must be taken cum granosalis and expounded 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, be∣cause of the infinite difference between a fi∣nite and infinite nature, and between created and uncreated persons, as I shall (God will∣ing) shew at large before I conclude this Chapter. Three Persons may, and do sub∣sist in one and the same Infinite Nature: and therefore though e••eryf 1.53 Hypostasis doth connote the Divine nature, yet all •• here connote one and the same infinite g 1.54nature in which all three Persons doh 1.55 sub∣sist. To subsist, is (as Aristotle the great Interpreter expounds it) to have the most perfect manner of Being by it self, that a Substance the best of Beings can attain to; and it is very proper to say, that the Father Son and Holy Ghost have the most perfect manner of Subsistence in the Divine nature
that is or can be. The Divine i 1.56Nature considered with all Absolute & Relative Perfecti∣on in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, doth most truly, pro∣perly, and perfectly subsist; for there are three illustrious Subsistences in that one undivided infinite Na∣ture;* 1.57 and therefore the Godhead thus considered, doth subsistk 1.58 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Singular substances have the most perfect subsistence. A Spirit is the most perfect Substance; God is the most single and singular Substance, and he is the only Infinite ••pirit, the best of Spirits, and there∣fore he must needs have the most perfect Subsistence. Every single Person is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and therefore I will be bold to inferre, that these three Persons only do perfectly sub∣sist by themselves, though inl 1.59 one another; for they have one Independent, Spi••itual, Infinite Nature, which is of it self, and is complete in it self, because Infinite in Per∣fection, and therefore contains all absolute and Relative perfection in it self: but when we speak of the Relative perfection, we speak ofm 1.60 three in one, because the Relative properties are distinctive: and when we treat of the Absolute perfection, we speak of One in Three, one Essence in three Per∣sons,
who do all three subsist with their Relative and Incommunicable properties, in that most perfect and single Essence. This is that Divine Trinunity which contains all Absolute and Relative Perfection, And therefore hath the most perfect and ex∣cellent Subsistence, that is, or can be, Finally, though these three Persons do mu∣tually subsist in one another, yet they are said to subsist by themselves,
1. Because these Persons do not subsist in one another,* 1.61 as Accidents do exist in a Subject; for Accidents exist in another, because of their imperfection; but these subsist in one another, because of their per∣fection, because they have the same single infinite nature, and are one infinite and omnipresent Spirit.
2. They subsist mutually in one another; the Father subsists in the Son, Ioh. 14. 10, 11. as well as the Son in the Father; and there∣fore this subsisting in one another doth not argue any imperfection, but doth demon∣strate the infinite perfection of all Three Subsistents: but there is no mutuall in∣existence of an accident in a subject, and a subject in that accident or any other.
3. These three Subsistents have one and the same spirituall,n 1.62 independent, infinite nature, which is complete of it self, and in it self; and the whole Creation doth not afford one Example to illustrate, much
lesse to parallel these three illustrious Sub∣sistences in one undivided Nature. And it is impossible it should: for, this one un∣divided Nature in which these three glo∣rious Persons do subsist, is an infinite na∣ture, and there can be but one Infinite; and therefore the Socinians seem to have lost what they do so much idolize, their Rea∣son, when they desire us to illustrate this My∣sterie by an Example.
4. These three Subsistents are Coequal, because Coessential. The Fathers upon some of these considerations did agree to use the phrase of three Hypostases and one Essence, though the word Hypostasis was not so plain and familiar at first, espe∣cially to Latine eares, and thereforeo 1.63 Hie∣rome complains that some were too rigo∣rous in imposing that word without ex∣pounding of it to such whose judgment was Orthodox, though their skill but small in the Greek.
To conclude my discourse upon this word Subsistence, be pleased to consider that we read of the Nature of God, we read of the Subsistence of the Father, and we read that these three, Father, Son and Holy Ghost are one; having these two words [Nature & Subsistence] in Scripture, we are prompted by the Spirit speaking in the word to explain this Mystery thus; The Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three
in Subsistence, but one in Nature. No My∣stery can be explained with lesse Violence and more Sobriety; for we are precise in keeping to the very words of Scripture in explaining this grand Mystery to the plain∣est of men; and therefore they were sen∣tenced of old that did not beleeve this plain truth.
IX. We have no reason to be offended with the Vse of the word Person,* 1.64 when we treat of this Argument, if we adde a fit Epithet, and say the Father is a divine Per∣son, or an uncreated Person, and say the same of the Son and Holy Ghost▪ The word Person signifies the most excellent kind of Subsistent, an understanding Sub∣sistent, as is acknowledged by all the Ma∣sters of Language, sacred and prophane, as hath been proved; and that place 2 Cor. 1. 11. is very cleare; of all the derivations of Persona, that pleases mep 1.65 best, Persona quasi per se una; because it doth expresse the unity and excellency of a personall sub∣sistence. Per se notes the excellency, be∣cause subsistere per se notes the most ex∣cellent kind of subsistence. Nay, the word q 1.66Person doth expresse more excellency then the word subsistence alone, doth im∣port,
for it is proper to say that a Beast doth subsist,* 1.67 but it is absurd to say that a Beast is a Person because a Person is an un∣derstanding subsistent. But neither of these r 1.68words doth expresse the excellency of that subsistence which the Father, Son and Holy Ghost have in the Godhead. And therefore we do not only say that these three are Persons or Subsistenc••s, but we say they are uncreated Persons, Divine Sub∣sistences, Persons subsisting in the Divine Nature, Persons of the Godhead, that so we may take in all the excellency which these words Subsistence and Person do af∣ford; and then by other Epithets superadd that excellency which is proper to Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and leave out all that imperfection which is in created persons and subsistences. The word Subsistence is in the Scripture; Heb. 1. 3. The word Person is in Scripture applyed to men, 2 Cor. 1. 11. who have a more excellent subsistence then beasts▪ An understanding subsistence; and therefore boths 1.69 Greek and Latine Fathers did at last agree to use the word Person, because it signifies an understanding sub∣sistent. And if you adde divine or uncreated Person, then there is no danger of any mi∣stake; unlesse men will be so vain as to say
the wordt 1.70 Person doth sometimes signifie a visible shape, an outward form or appearance, the countenance or gesture of a man, or else some office, relation, or quality; and say that we do make three shapes, countenances, &c. in the Godhead; as Sabellius, Servetus, and such bold Atheists as have sucked in their poyson, are wont to say. We do therefore vindicate the Church of God from these insolent and groundlesse aspersions, and freely declare what we mean by Person, namely an understanding Subsistent. Every of the Three Divine Persons hath an office, and hath a relation; but no Divine person is an Office, or a mereu 1.71 Relation; but the Godhead doth contain all relative as well as absolute perfection within it self, as hath been said.* 1.72 God, as represented to us in Scripture, doth as it were take upon him the person of a displeased Father, and some∣times of a well-pleased Father; but we do not say there are three such Persons in the Godhead: for one Divine Person may su∣stain the person of a well-pleased Father at one time, and the person of a displeased Father at another. And if any man will be
so ridiculous us to conclude from thence, that then one person may be two persons; I hope he will see his own vanity, and be sensible of the equivocation, by considering what hath been said already in this very Chapter.
When we say, God doth take upon him the Person of a well-pleased Father, we speak 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 after the manner of men; just as when we speak of the eyes and hands of God, but we must be under∣stood a 1.73〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 after such a manner as becomes the infinite dignity and pure ma∣jesty of God.
If men do not wilfully mistake,* 1.74 they may then know what we mean by Person, when we say there are three uncreated Per∣sons in the Godhead. The word Person is in Scripture; and if it were not, yet as long as the thing signified by it is there, we have no reason to account thatb 1.75 word, or any other such like, an Exotick word, because we find it very proper and pertinent to the point in hand, in the sense which we have so often declared, that there might be
no mistake, but a full agreement in such an high and weighty point.c 1.76 It is out of que∣stion, that we may expound the Scripture by words and phrases which are not in those very letters and syllables to be found in Scripture, as long as we do not affect a needlesse curi∣osity in inventing new and obscure phrases▪ & a rigid superstition in defending them; for that would not conduce to edification; but beget or foment an endlesse contention. Our expressions must be sober and plain; grave and usefull, such as may hold forth the godly and prudent simplicity of the Scripture. That is al that needs be said for the use of such words and phrases as are fit and necessary to be used in this and di∣vers other obscure points.
There are some that mistake the Attri∣butes of God for Persons,* 1.77 and they make more then three persons; and therefore I shall not go about to reckon up the innu∣merable absurdities which follow upon that one mistake. Vno absurdo dato, mille se∣quuntur. I read, indeed, that Sabellius conceived the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be different Attributes of God: But the Orthodoxe Christians desired him to re∣member that there were more then three Divine ••ttributes, and pressed him to ac∣knowledge,
that A Trinity of persons do subsist in the unity of the nature of God;* 1.78 and then they would close with him and give the right hand of fellowship unto him.
The fraud and subtilty of Arius, Sa∣bellius, and the rest of the old Heretiques, gave the reverend Doctors of the Chu••ch cause to use the wordsd 1.79 Trinity, Coessential, Consubstantial, and the like, that they might more clearly and fully manifest this pro∣found and glorious mysterie: And they who did wrangle about these Words, did indeed deny the Mystery and thing it self; and therefore did but manifest their pride, fraud, obstinacy, for the maintenance of their damnable Heresie, when they quar∣relled with those eminent Writers, for making use ofe 1.80 unwritten words & phrases, upon so just and necessary occasion, that the written truth might be more clearly ex∣plained and fully defended. It is not in the judgement of any man, any fault at all, to make truth plain; unlesse in the deluded judgement of such who are enemies to truth. Now we have removed the rubbish, we be∣gin to build.
A Divine Person is a Spiritual and Infi∣nit Subsistent,* 1.81 related indeed to those other uncreated Persons, which subsist in the same Divine Nature with it, but distinguished from those Coess••ntial persons by its pecu∣liar manner of subsistence, order of subsist∣ing singular relation▪ and incommunicable propertie. In these few line there is mat∣ter enough to fill many sheets, and I am to treat of the distinction of persons at large in the next Chapter.
A Divine Person is Spiritual,* 1.82 for God is a Spirit, the Father of Spirits, the Spirit of Spirits, an infinite Spirit, and therefore hath life, the best of lives, nay is life it self in per∣fection, and therefore we read of the un∣derstanding and will of God; an under∣standing life is the best life that we are ac∣quainted with; and the life of God is a sub∣sisting life, every one of the Divine persons is subsistent, and therefore, every one of them hath subsisting life. We may then safe∣ly conclude, that every one of the Divine persons is a spiritual and infinite Subsistent: I say Subsistent, to shew that I do not ab∣stract the Subsistence of the person from the Divine Nature in which the person doth subsist; herein all the three Persons do agree.
Moreover, every Divine Person hath some Relative perfection, for they are mutually related to one another.
Finally, every Divine Person hath some peculiar and incommunicable propertie. But if we come to treat of any peculiar manner of subsisting, or the Order of subsist∣ing, or that singular relation which is proper ••o every one of the three, or any certain ••ncommunicable propertie, whereby any one person is distinguished from the rest, ••hen we must leave treating of what is common to all three persons, and shew wherein these Coessential persons differ, or whereby it doth appear to us, that they are distinguished. We will therefore for Orders sake enquire,* 1.83
1. What distinction there is between the Divine Nature, and the Divine Persons, Father, Son and holy Ghost.
2. What difference there is between ••reated and uncreated persons.
3. How these three uncreated persons are distinguished from one another.
This question concerning the Distin∣ction of the Divinef 1.84 Nature and these three most glorious persons which subsist in it, is the most difficult point in all Divinitie, ••nd therefore I humbly beg the assistance of all these glorious persons, that I may conceive and write judiciously and reve∣••ently of this profound and glorious My∣••••erie of Faith. I remember that excellent ••peech of judicious Calvin; Non minori ••eligione de Deo nobis loquendum quam co∣gitandum
sentio; quicquid autem de Deo a nobis cogitamus stultum est, & quicquid lo∣quimur insulsum. What ever we think•• or speak of our own heads concerning God, will be like our selves unsavourie, foolish and vain. No language is rich enough, no words are significant enough to declare this profound Mysterie, which the understand∣ing of men and Angels cannot compre∣hend, nor the tongue of men and Angels express; if all the Saints and Angels in heaven and earth should sit in Councel and communicate their notions to one ano∣ther about this Argument, they would ac∣knowledge this Mysterie to be not onely in∣explicable and unspeakable, but unconceive∣able and incomprehensible.
1. Concerning the Distinction which is between the Divine Nature,* 1.85 and a Divine Person, it is to be considered that I have most studiously declined the describing of a Divine Person in abstracto for the rea∣sons mentioned above, and I might add many others; but it is enough to say that the most cleanly Abstraction doth but suggest an inadaequate Conceit of a Divine Person;* 1.86 and when you abstract the nature of God from the personalities, men are apt to dream of some strange God that is neither Father, Son nor holy Ghost, and so to create a new God, or to conceive that the Divine Nature may, as the humane na∣ture
of Christ doth subsist in alieno sup∣posito.
2. They who denie the Trinitie, must if they be not worse then Turkes or Soci∣nians acknowledge,* 1.87 that God the Father doth subsist, and therefore they are enga∣ged to shew the difference between the Essence and Subsistence of the Father, as well as we are, who believe the Trinitie. But there is no greater a distinction be∣tween the Person of the Father, and the Nature of the holy Ghost, then there is between the Person of the Father, and the Nature of the Father; for the Nature of the Father and the holy Ghost is one, and the same Divine Nature, which is as im∣possible to be divided, or multiplied in two or three Persons, as it is in one single and undivided person, because the Divine Na∣ture is single and infinite, and the Divine Persons do mutually subsist in one another, and all three Persons subsist in this single and undivided Nature, which is indivisible, immultiplicable and most purely and sin∣gularly one and the same infinite perfe∣ction in all three Persons, and there can be but one most single absolute and infinite Perfection.
3. The Divine Nature is subsistent, neces∣sarily and perfectly subsistent; the most per∣fect manner of subsisting by and of it self is due to the most perfect Nature.
4. The Divine Nature is not indifferent to subsist in the Father,* 1.88 Son and holy Ghost, or out of them; for in regard of its infinite Perfection and actualitie it can nei∣ther subsist without, or otherwise then in the Father, Son and holy Ghost; because the Divine Nature cannot subsist without all, or any of that Relative perfection, which shines in these three glorious persons, who do all subsist in the same Divine Nature, and yet mutually subsist in one another with all Relative Perfection. The reason is most clear, because the Divine Nature being infinite in perfection must needs con∣tain and comprehend all Relative as well as all absolute Perfection.
5. God is not compounded (as Angels are) of Nature and Subsistence; for whatsoever doth belong to the Perfection of God, doth belong to the Nature of God, and therefore God doth not subsist by the su∣peradding of any thing or manner of a thing, any. Modus that is (as the Schooles speak) Extraessential, or really distinct, and separable from the Essence and Nature of God. And we have formerly shewen, that the Essence of God is intrinsecally necessary, and infinitly perfect, and there∣fore the most perfect manner of subsisting by, and of it sel•• is due to the most perfect Nature.
6. Although Men and Angels are not
able to comprehend,* 1.89 much less express this incomprehensible Mysterie, yet we may set satisfactorie bounds to our thoughts and discourses by the Analogy of faith; for the Scripture saith that the Father and the Son are one, and that all three Persons are one, and therefore we do conclude that as the infinite Perfection and Actualitie of the Di∣vine Nature doth require three Subsi∣stences, because this infinite Perfection doth contain all Relative, as well as all ab∣solute Perfection, so doth the single and most singular Nature of God, require that these three glorious Persons subsist in the Vnitie of the Godhead. Now we are sure that the One-nesse, or singlenesse of Gods Nature doth well agree with the infinitness of his Nature, because there can be no mul∣tiplication of that which is infinites; there cannot be two or three infinites, and therfore we must needs conclude, that these three Subsistents are one infinite God subsisting with all absolute and Relative Perfection. This is the Sum and Substance o•• all that can be said a parte rei as we use to speak; but because we are not able distinctly to
apprehend the absolute and Relative Per∣fefection of God, God doth make himself known to us in a way most suitable to our weak apprehensions in representing him∣self to be an eternal Father, and then we are ready to enquire after and willing to heare of an eternal Son; Now according to our weak manner of conceiving we must needs apprehend that there is a Di∣vine Relation between the eternal Father and his coeternal Son, and conclude that these two are distinguished from, and in a well qualified Sense opposed to, one another with a mere Relative Opposition, for there can be no contrarie Opposition between the Persons; but this Relative and friendly Op∣position assures us, that the Father is not the Son, and that the Father did not beget himself, but did beget his Son; But then we consider again, that this Son is an eter∣nal Son, and therefore is God, and we are sure God did not beget another God, for the Power of God is not nay cannot be exercised about any thing repugnant to the Nature of God, and nothing is more repugnant to the Godhead then a Pluralitie of Gods; and therefore we must conclude, that the Father and Son are one, and the same God; Now we are come to the Mysterie which faith must receive, and reason ad∣mire.
7. We may best resemble all that differ∣ence
which is between the Essence of God and the Divine Subsistences, by considering the transcendent Affections of Ens simpliciter and the Attributes of God,* 1.90 who doth infi∣nitely transcend not only a Praedicamental Substance, but a Metaphysical Entity, as the most Metaphysical men who are sound in the Faith▪ do honestly confesse.
1. Concerning the transcendent Affections of Ens,* 1.91 which are unum, verum, & bonum; we say, these three affections, and Ens in la∣titudine, do not make foure things really distinct; and yet we say they are reall and positive affections; for our Metaphysical science hath too much serious Majesty, to be pleased with the pretty fictions of Rea∣son, when our understanding hath got leave to play, and recreate it self with its own artificial inventions. The thing is most cleare and evident to all at the very first proposal, because the things which God hath made, are not beholding to God only for their Entity, and to us for their good∣nesse; for the things do not cease to be good, when our understanding ceaseth to work; but the things are truly and really good, whether we think them to be so, or no.
Moreover we say, that these Positive and reall affections of Ens do not make any composition at all in Ens transcendent∣ly considered, because then the most simple
and uncompounded Being would lose its Being. For Simplicity would be repugnant to Entity, if that Entity it self did involve any Composition. And therefore it is agreed on all sides, that this proposition, Ens sim∣plex est Ens, is a true proposition. Finally, from what hath been said it is reasonably and commonly inferred, That Entity, Truth, Goodnesse, and Unity, make but one Real thing, though they do all foure differ quoad modum significandi; Because the thing adaequately signified by all those foure words is but one Real Thing, namely the very Entity of Ens transcendently con∣sidered. For when I say, Ens est unum, this Praedicate Vnum doth not superadde any new Entity, but doth imply and con∣note the very Entity of Ens. Nay more, if you ask these Metaphysical men, what this transcendent Unity is; they will not answer, that Vnity is Indivision, but Unity is the very undivided Entity it self; not that Unity alone doth signifie simply and adaequately the same that Ens doth in tota latitudine, as Res or Aliquid do; for Unity doth not signifie Truth and Goodnesse, which are the two other transcendent af∣fections of Ens, but Ens in its complete compasse and adaequate signification doth import Entity, Truth, Unity, and Good∣nesse also. Truth is a single affection of Ens, and therefore it doth signifie or rather
connote Entity under an inadaequate con∣ceit or notion▪ for it doth represent Ens not in its full latitude, but as considered with respect to the understanding. If we may now make so bold as to compare the Essence of Essences with these Metaphysical notions, we may in some weak measure re∣semble that difference which is between the Essence of God and Divine Subsistences, at least in some few particulars: For if when we compare creatures with creatures, there appear to be some dissimilitude even in the most apt similitude, and no similitude runs (as we say) upon four feet; it is not to be wondered at, if this comparison be ra∣ther a resemblance, then an illustration. When Divine revelation hath gone before,* 1.92 and we have built upon that as the ground∣work and foundation by a serious faith, these Metaphysical notions may be sub∣servient helps in a subordinate way.
1. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, do all Three really, positively, truly subsist in the Divine Essence; and yet these three Subsistences, and the Divine Essence, do not make four, no nor two things really di∣stinct; even as Entity, Truth, Goodnesse, and Unity, do not make four things really distinct, as you heard but now, but are one reall thing and no more.
2. Ens is not compounded of Entity, and its three Affections; nor is God com∣pounded
of the Godhead and three Sub∣sistences; nor is any one Person compoun∣ded of the Divine Nature and Subsistence.
3. As Truth is not Goodnesse, nor Good∣nesse Truth, nor either of them Unity, and yet all three are Entity; so the Father is not the Son, nor is the Son the Father, nor is either of them the Holy Ghost, and yet all three are God, for they are all three but one God subsisting with all absolute and re∣lative perfection, as hath been shewen.
4. Every one of the three Affections of Ens, doth connote Entity: Every one of the three Subsistences doth connote the Godhead, the Divine nature, as hath been proved at large.
5. Not any one of the three Affections of Ens doth, nor do all three together su∣per-adde a new Entity; not any one of the three subsistences doth, nor do all three together super-adde a new Deity, a new Divine nature, or Godhead: For Ensa 1.93 is one; Ens est trinum, non triplex, tri∣num et unum Ens trinunum: Deus est tri∣nus non triplex, trinus et unus, Deus trin∣unus; This instance doth in some measure resemble the mystery of the Trinunity.
6. No affection of Ens can be really se∣parated from Ens: Nor can one of the Divine Persons be separated from the Di∣vine Nature, or the Divine Nature from any one of the Divine Persons, or any one of the Persons from either of the other two.
7. All the Affections of Ens are distin∣guished, but none divided: all the three Subsistences are distinguished, but they can∣not be divided.
8. Truth and Goodnesse which are two of the Affections of Ens, are distinguished by their severall and peculiar relations; Truth hath relation to the understanding, and Goodnesse to the will: The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are known to be di∣stinguished by their severall and peculiar relations; and if it be not unreasonable to say that there is in Entity three affections, and two relations in ente simplicissimo, without any Composition in, or Multipli∣cation of the Entity, why should it seem unreasonable, or at least why should it seem incredible that there are three subsi∣stences and severall relations in the Godhead, without any composition in, or multiplication of the Godhead?
9. One affection, nay all the affections in abstracto, do but inadaequately represent Ens, unlesse you take notice of the Entity
it self, as well as the three Affections. One single Subsistence, nay all three Subsistences in abstracto, do but inadaequately represent God, unlesse you take notice of the God∣head in which they subsist; and therefore this praecisive abstraction of the Subsistences from the Divine nature, is but an inadaequate conceit of God, as hath been demonstrated above in this very Chapter: for we must not dream of a Trinity of Modes, but as∣sert and believe the glorious and Coessen∣tial Trinunity. The Father is truly God, that God who is the only true God; but the Father alone doth notb 1.94 adaequately repre∣sent God to us as he is described in the Holy Scriptures. It is true that the Divine Essence is by the Subsistence of the Father adae∣quately the Father; but as God is represent∣ed by that Divine subsistence only, he is not Deus Trinunus, he is not Father, Son and Holy Ghost; the Father alone is not all those three Witnesses who are one God. And there∣fore the acute Socinians with their precise abstractions do but suggest an inadaequate
conceit of God: that only true God whom we worship, doth not subsist only in the Person of the Father. We worship God sub∣sisting with all Absolute and Relative Per∣fection in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; for these three are that one God who is the only true God blessed for ever. This is the adaequate representation of God in the Scrip∣tures of truth. And we are resolved to re∣gulate all our Metaphysical notions by the holy Scriptures, that we may make the highest of Sciences to acknowledge the supremacie of that Divine science which is nowhere to be learnt but in the Word of God; for the purestc 1.95 reason must be ele∣vated by the Word and Spirit of God, for the discovery of this mysterie.
10. These affections of Ens represent the manner of that Being which Ens hath as it is transcendently confidered; and the three Divine Subsistences do represent that manner of Being which God hath as he is mostd 1.96 transcendently considered, namely as subsisting after the most glorious man∣ner with all Absolute and Relative Per∣fection. It is the manner of a transcendent
Entity to be one, and true, and good, and it is the manner of Gods being to be one God in three Subsistences; These three are one single God, there is no Composition or Multiplication imaginable in this single and infinite being.
I was bold to adventure upon this en∣quiry because soe 1.97 many reverend learned Orthodox and pious Doctours of the Church have declared that the Divine Es∣sence differs from the Divine subsistences as the manner of the thing doth from the thing it self; and the Persons differ from one another, tanquam modi a modis. I con∣ceived that there was something more in the expression then was commonly known. Moreover I considered that if there might be so great simplicity or singlenesse in a Created and finite Entity, notwithstand∣ing there are three affections and two re∣lations which do affect that Entity, it seem∣ed to me somewhat easie to beleeve that there are three subsistences in one infinite Godhead without any composition in, or mul∣tiplication of the single Godhead. Finally I perceive that some youthfull towring wits are drawn away from the simplicity of the Gospel by some froathy speculati∣ons presented to them as most sublime cu∣riosities andf 1.98 Metaphysicall notions; and
therefore I humbly submit what hath been said to the judgement of the learned, and conclude this discourse with the same pray∣er wherewith Augustine shuts up his books of the Trinity, Domine, Deus unus, Deus Trinitas, quaecunque dixi in hoc libro de tuo agnoscant et tui; si quid de meo, et tu ig∣nosce & tui. O Lord, who art one God, O God, who art a whole Trinity of Persons in the Godhead, what ever I have said (in this discourse) of thine, let all that are thine ac∣knowledge, what ever I have said of mine own, Lord let it be pardoned by thee and thine.
II. Concerning the Attributes of God, [ II] we may observe that they are al perfect, glo∣rious,* 1.99 infinite, because they do signifie and declare the infinite Perfection, Happinesse, Majesty and glory of God; and to speak higher yet, these glorious Attributes though they be very many, are nothing else but the single undivided indivisible Essence of God, we may be instructed, but are eveng 1.100 con∣founded with the glory of this mystery.
There are three reasons why we do not readily apprehend this truth.
1. The defect ofh 1.101 words to expresse it, especially in English, but indeed the most rich and copious languages are onely hap∣py in the confession of their penury when we come to treat of this argument, because the mystery of the Godhead doth transcend all our eloquence, and teaches us to admire and adore with silence what we cannot expresse without a manifest de∣monstration of our ignorance.
2. The imperfect manner of signifying is easie to be observed in our most significant words, and therefore we must confesse that the Excellency of God doth transcend the significancy of the most significant words in the most rich and copious tongues.
3 The imperfection of our owni 1.102 under∣standing, and of our manner of apprehend∣ing and judging of things whiles we are
in thek 1.103 body. If any man desire to know a reason why he cannot readily apprehend these divine Mysteries, let him consider the perfection of the mystery, and the imper∣fection of his own reason, & he hath a suffi∣cient reason, a reason from whence he may draw a most invincible argument against i∣dolizing of his own reason, so far as to make his reason judge of the mysteries of faith.
Let us then prudently consider that we are not able to apprehend thel 1.104 infinite and impartible Essence of God but as it were by parts, by many incomplete and inadaequate conceits and apprehensions. The most profound and seriousm 1.105 schoolmen have fairely expressed this truth: there are not (say they) many Attribut all Perfections, nay there is but one Perfection in God; for all the Essentiall Attributes of God are no∣thing else but that single and undivided Essence which is singularly and altogether the same Essence in all three subsistences. Nay, to speak properly the Div••ne Essence is one single infinite perfection, and we cannot say that Perfection is in the Essence
of God; but rather that the highestn 1.106 per∣fection, even infinite Perfection is the Essenc•• of God; it is every way his Essence, and no way at all distinguished from it. Finally, if by Attributal Perfections you mean the Conceits or Signs of Perfection, they say these Signs do indeed signifie the Divine Essence, but the Signs themselves are so far from being the Essence of God, that they do not all of them signifie the same Divine Essence after the same way and manner of signifying; for it is clear, that some of the Attributal Terms are affirmative, some are o 1.107negative, some are absolute, some conno∣tative, and relative. For observe that, when the Perfection of God is declared per viam negationis, byp 1.108 negative Expres∣sions, as when we say God is immaterial, incorporeal, invisible, immortal, immutable, immense, and the like, we intend to remove all imperfection from the ••ssence of God, and leave his pure Essence single and alone, because it is one single and infinite Perfe∣ction; we denie that there is any thing in God which might make him like to the Creature in imperfection: For what ever there is which betokens matter, change, privation, or imperfection, we denie that to be in God, because God is one entire, infi∣nite Perfection, and therefore we say as
q 1.109Isidore Clarius doth, that in these nega∣tives there doth lay hid, not only a positive but an infinite Perfection, and what is infi∣nite, must needs be single; you see still the Perfection is a single Perfection. And when the Perfection of Go•• is declared per viam eminentiae, as the Schooles speak, by attributing all Perfection which we find in the Creatures unto God, after we have removed all imperfection, we say the perfectionr 1.110 signified is most perfectly and properly in God; but the manner of signi∣fying of that Perfection by Attributes taken from the Creatures, doth somewhat rellish of that imperfection, which is in the Creature; and therefore we say such Attri∣butes in respect of the imperfect manner of signifying do not clearly hold forth that single and infinite Perfection which is in God; Hence it is that reverend Divines have laid down so many rules as Cautions to direct us in this weightie point.
1. A finite and compounded under∣standing cannot apprehend the glorious perfection of a single and infinite Es∣sence, but by distinct proprieties or Attri∣butes.
2. The Essential Attributes are all of them common to all the three Persons of the Godhead, and to them* 1.111 onely.
3. These Essential Attributes are not di∣stinguished from the Divine Essence, but are the very Divine Essence or Godhead it self.
4. All these Essential Attributes are in∣finite and eternal, because they are the in∣finite and eternal Essence of God.
5. These Essential Attributes dos 1.112 not differ from one another, because the Es∣sence of God is single, uncompounded, un∣divided, indivisible, and one of these Attri∣butes doth Essentially praedicate of the other. The power, wisdom, goodnesse of God, are single, eternal, immutable, in∣finite.
6. These Essential Attributes do differ from one another,* 1.113 onely according to our weak apprehension; for our finite and compounded understanding not being able to comprehend what is single and infinite, doth frame different conceits of the pro∣perties of God, according to the different objects and effects of these Attributes. Now because our understanding doth ground all its conceits upon the several
Objects and Effects of these Attributes,* 1.114 we say, the Difference is not purely Ra∣tional, or a meer fiction of reason, but we call it a virtual or eminent Distinction, framed by reason upon the grounds afore∣said, for the help of our weak understand∣ings. For we must consider, that this Vir∣tual Distinction is not at 1.115 Real Distinction; because it doth not import, that the At∣tributes of God are actually many, or real∣ly different; but it signifies, that the infinite Essence of God doth eminently contain all real Perfections which are many indeed in the Creatures; but all Perfection in God is but one single and infinite Perfection, which single and infinite Perfection in re∣gard of itsu 1.116 eminency, and our weaknesse cannot be expressed by one single Act, or by one Formal and adaequate Conceit of ours, because we do apprehend things ac∣cording to those several Objects about which they are exercised, and those several Effects which are by their Virtue and In∣fluence really produced. Nowx 1.117 no Effect in the world is adaequate to the infinite Vir∣tue
and eminent Perfection of the Divine Nature, and therefore we cannot appre∣hend the eminent and infinite Virtue of the Divine Nature, but by considering of those many Objects and manifold Effects in the world, which do all represent the eminent and infinite Virtue of the Divine Nature; and hence it is that we call it a virtual and eminent Distinction, whereas indeed it is rather an Eminencey 1.118 then a Distinction, be∣cause the Divine Nature doth eminently contain all Perfection in its infinite Perfe∣ction, and the Divine Virtue doth mani∣fest it self upon diff••rent Objects and va∣rious Effects; and therefore our weak un∣derstanding frames different concei••s of it according to those different Objects and Effects, and consequently gives so many different Attributes to God. And God hath so far condescended to our weakness in Scripture, as to declare his single Perfe∣ction by several names and Attributes, an∣swerable to those different Objects and Effects, in which the eminent and infinite Virtue of God doth gloriously shine throughout the world. I have insisted long upon this virtual and eminent Di∣stinction, that I might by so many several expressions beat this grand Mysterie into the heads of the meanest Christians.
7. When one Attribute of God is ab∣stractly considered from the rest of the
Attributes,* 1.119 that Abstraction must be purely Praecisive, not Exclusive; I must not con∣sider Gods Iustice alone, so as to exclude his mercie, or any other of the Divine Attributes, from being comprehended within the single and undivided Perfection of the Divine Es∣sence. When the Justice of God is consi∣dered abstractly, and the Abstraction is purely praecisive,a 1.120 all the Attributes of God are at least implicitely included within the abstract Consideration of Divine Justice; for Divine Justice is Essential Justice, infinite Justice; God is just by his Essence, not by any Virtue, or good qualitie; and he that is just by his Essence, is perfectly just, infinitely just; you see that infinite Perfe∣ction is implyed, and infinite Perfection is Essentially all Perfection, and therefore all the other Attributes of God are implyed, when I do consider one single Attribute within an Abstraction purely praecisive; for there is the same reason of all other At∣tributes of God; because God is essen∣tially good, wise, mercifull, &c. as well as just.
8. The Attributes which are called Communicable Attributes, are as truly the single and undivided Essence of God, as those Attributes, which we call incommu∣nicable; for if we speak properly and strictly, no attribute of God can be com∣municated to a Creature, any more then
the Divine Essence it self, Isa. 42. 8. Matth. 19. 17. 1. Tim. 1. 17. For all the Attributes of God are his Name, his Per∣fection, his Glorie, his Essence, his God∣head; and if any of the Attributes were communicated, the Essence of God must be multiplied, divided, or distracted from it self; The communicable Attributes are infinite, and there cannot be more infinites then one, and therefore they must all si∣gnifie one single and infinite Perfection. For if any of the Attributal Perfections were finite, then the Perfection of God would be made up of manyb 1.121 finite Perfe∣ctions; and God would not bec 1.122 infinitely perfect in himself, of himself, and by him∣self, but by some finite Perfections super∣added to his Essence, which is utterly re∣pugnant to the single and infinite Perfe∣ction of God. Yet true it is, that some Attributes of God are said to be commu∣nicable byd 1.123 Analogical Accommodation, not in respect of the properties themselves, which are all infinite, but in respect of the Effects of those properties; there is some∣thing in the Creature by the bountie of our Creatour, and Grace of our Redeemer, which
doth after a weak manner resemble the Per∣fection of God, and therefore we are said to be partakers of the Divine Nature, 2. Pet. 1. 4. when we bear the image of God in righteousnesse and holinesse of truth.* 1.124 For we are still to remember that God is to be known per viam eminentiae, when we make an Eminent Distinction be∣tween one Divine Attribute and another, or ascribe any of the Perfections which are found in the Creatures by way of Attri∣butal Perfection unto God. Fore 1.125 God is not great in quantity, or good by a qualitie, but by his own infinite Essence. We must remove all imperfection from God, that we may know him per viam negationis; and therefore we say mercie and goodness are notf 1.126 accidents in God, his understanding and his will are not faculties, his anger and hatred are not passions, his many Attri∣butes are but one single Perfection; the Perfections which are in the Creature are imperfect, but the Perfection of God is in∣finite. Finally we must consider God as the cause of all Perfection in the Creature, that we may know him per Viam Causali∣tatis.
These grounds being laid, let us consider what great difference there doth to ou•• weak understanding appear to be between the Divine Attributes, whether they be compared with the Divine Nature, or with one another, and yet that indeed and truth there is no real difference between the At∣tributes and the Divine Nature, or be∣tween the Divine Attributes themselves, and we shall more easily conceive what great difference there is between the Fa∣ther, Son and holy Ghost without any Es∣sential difference between them.
The holy Scriptures speaking to our weak capacitie, describe God and his At∣tributes after such a distinct manner to us, that we cannot but conceive, that there is some ground even in the word of God for this virtual andg 1.127 eminent Distinction be∣tween the Attributes, as will-be most evi∣dent to any that observe the usual phrase and language of the Scriptures in these and the like places, Exod. 34. 6. 7. 1. Tim. 1. 17. Psal. 103. 8. 9. 10. 1. Tim. 6. 15. 16. But it is as clear that God doth herein gra∣tiously condescend to our weakness, be∣cause we know that the Divine Nature is
••••ngle, and infinite, and therefore doth con∣••ain in it all Actual Perfection eminently, ••nd allh 1.128 possible Perfection both singly and ••ctually, because all true and pure Perfe∣ction is most Formally included in the Na∣••ure and Essence of God; and therefore this eminent Distinction grounded on the Phrase of Scripture, and upon visible Ob∣••ects and Effects, gives us no ground at all ••o conceive, that the Divine Nature is not one single infinite perfection, because the Scripture speaks distinctly of God, and of his several Attributes, only to teach us to apprehend the impartible perfection of God by degrees rather then parts, because we cannot apprehend it altogether. Our conceits of God are inadaequate, and collected by way of Analogy from the perfection of the creatures; but we must consider that what the creatures do performe by many and di∣stinct qualities and acts, God doth performe by his owne Essence which is one most single▪ and most pure act. And therefore we con∣clude that this distinction is not really grounded upon God himself, upon his Na∣ture, or Essence, but upon the Effects of God. The objective conceits or things conceived, are not really or actually diffe∣rent in themselves, but virtually and ••mi∣nently in the several Effects, Egresses, Ter∣minations of Gods eminent vertue, and
single power, which is every way bound∣lesse and infinite, and therefore never works according to its full and adaequate vertue. Thea 1.129 Scotists do indeed seeme to say more, because they say that this distin∣ction of the Attributes is Formall and ex natura Rei; but then they come off againe in their explication of these termes, and say that their meaning is that they are di∣stinguished Formally, not Actually, but Virtually and Eminently, and therefore we meane the same thing. For the divine Essence is not only a singleb 1.130 Unity, but the first Unity, which is uncapable of any dif∣ference or number whatsoever; only we cannot by ac 1.131 single act comprehend Gods single perfection, because our understand∣ing is finite, and his perfection is infinite.
But it will be said that the Attributes of God have to our apprehension not only different, but contrary effects: the Justice of God doth punish, and the mercy of God doth spare.
The answer is easie:* 1.132 the Effects are to our apprehension contrary, nay they are contrary in themselves, but the Attributes are not contrary; for the Attributes do both belong to the same God, nay they are the same God; and these Attributes do not overthrow, but preserve one another. Now we readily grant that the Effects are real∣ly different, nay contrary; but we deny that the Attributes of Justice and Mercy are really different, or contrary in them∣selves.
Finally, we grant, that according to our manner of apprehension, it is very impro∣per to say that the Attribute of Gods mer∣cy is the Attribute of his Punitive Iustice, because the termes are here taken ind 1.133 sen∣su formali, as we use to speak, and there∣fore that manner of predication is impro∣per; yet if you take the termes in sensu i∣dentico, the thing is true, because Mercy and Justice are the same thing, the same Essence. We may say that the same God, the same Essence, which is mercy it selfe,
doth punish; but it is very improper and absurd to say that God doth forgive by his punitive Iustice, because God who speaks distinctly of his own: Attributes in his word, that he might help our weak under∣standing, will not give us leave to speak so confusedly of his glorious Attributes, as to puzzle the understanding of our weak bre∣thren.
What I have said concerning the Justice and Mercy of God, might Consideratis con∣siderandis, be applyed to his other Attri∣butes; and I might discourse in like man∣ner concerning the understanding and will of God, concerning the Acts and Decrees of God, and enquire whether they are di∣stinct from the Essence of God? that so we may the better understand the distinction which is between the Divine Subsistences and the Divine Essence, by comparing the Divine Attributes, Acts, Decrees, Subsi∣stences and Essence altogether; but I shall be brief in that.
IX. The Decrees of God,* 1.134 which we, ac∣cording to our weak apprehension, are apt to conceive as many, are but one single and e 1.135pure Act in God; nay, to speak strictly, they are nothing else butf 1.136 God himself de∣creeing; for the Divine Essence is one pure and single Act. In Deo non distinguuntur Esse
Posse & Operari, The Decrees and Acts of God, his knowing, willing, &c. are not many in their owne Absolute nature, for they are the Nature of God considered as a pure and Vital Act; and hence it is that we say the Decrees of God (in their Absolute Nature, or as they are considered with re∣ference to Gods owne uncreated truth and goodnesse) are all Essentiall and Necessary, they did not begin to be, they cannot cease to be; God did not begin to know or love himselfe, he cannot cease to know his owne Almighty power, or to love his owne uncreated goodnesse.
The Decrees of God upon this account, and in this consideration, are not capable ofg 1.137 multipicity, or division, opposition or succession, dependance or order. For here is nothing but one pure, vitall, eternal, un∣changable Act, which is God himselfe, knowing and loving of himselfe for him∣selfe. Take it all thus in brief, in a few short conclusions.
[ I] 1. God is a Pure Act,* 1.138 and therefore he cannot buth 1.139 Act vitally;* 1.140 he must needs un∣derstand, and will; here is no such Liberty or Mutability as Vorstius dreamt of, op∣posed to unchangable necessity; for as God cannot cease to be because he is the first, ne∣cessary and Independent Being, and his necessity of being speaks his infinite per∣fection: so he cannot cease to Act, because he is a pure Act; he must needs act vi∣tally, who is life it selfe; he must needs know and will because he is the best life, and pu∣rest Act; and this necessity speaks his pu∣rity and perfection also.
[ II] 2. If this Pure and vitall Act be consi∣dered with reference to Gods owne Es∣sence,* 1.141 they cannot be distinguished, be∣cause Gods Essence is a Purei 1.142 Act. The self-same divine Essence is both the Act, and
Object in these immanent Actions, which do not passe out of God towards, and there∣fore have no relation at all to, or denomi∣nation from, anyk 1.143 external, Object. God doth know and will all things within him∣self naturally, and necessarily; it's his nature to love himself; here is no distinction ima∣ginable.
3. Personal Acts (such as the begetting [ III] of the Son,* 1.144 and breathing forth of the Spi∣rit) are not arbitrary, but necessary and na∣tural Acts, and therefore aeternal; now acts that are absolutely necessaryl 1.145 sine potentiâ ad oppositum, as we use to say, being natu∣ral and aeternal, are nothing else but God acting in, and by some one or more of the three Divine Subsistences. Nothing that is eternal can be out of God, and there is no∣thing in God that is not God, and therefore I need say no more of those Personal Acts in this place, because I am to treat of them at large in the very next Chapter.
4. The Intrinsecal Acts of God which [ IV] do connote some habitude and respect to some thing that is out of the Godhead,* 1.146 are the will of God, or the Essence of God considered after the manner of an Act of
his will, Esentiâ ex se actuosa (as the Schooles speak) concepta per modum actus volendi. If this Act be considered in it self, it is nothing else but the will or Es∣sence of God, because it is an intrinsecal m 1.147and vitall Act. But now if this Act be considered as Relative, and as related to some thing that is out of God; we say this Act is not necessary, but free in respect of all those things which God decrees to pro∣duce or permit in the World; for God doth Arbitrarily decree to permit or pro∣duce this, and not that, according to the Counsel of his own will, it being as truly and fully in his power to permit or pro∣duce that, as this: both were alike possible, but this is made future, and will in the full∣nesse of time be present in Act by virtue of the free decree of God; for all Creatures are produced and do exist by the will of God. It is most evident that the will of God is the same whether it act upon himself or something that is out of the Godhead.
[ V] 5. The Relation which is between the will of God,* 1.148 and the Creature, whe∣ther
in futurition, or existence, is extrin∣secal.
6. The Denominations grounded upon [ VI] the termination,* 1.149 or relation of the will of God towards the Creatures, is extrinsecal also.
7. These Actions of God which are [ VII] said to be rather from God,* 1.150 then inn 1.151 God, as to create, govern, redeeme or the like, are called extrinsecal, and therefore the Denomination of God from them must needs be extrinsecal.
8. We have no ground to conceive that [ VIII] the Essence of God is compounded with extrinsecal Terminations,* 1.152 Relations, or Denominations.
9. Though the Objects which God doth [ IX] will are very different,* 1.153 and their produ∣ction is successive, yet the will of God is the self same, and is one single and pure Act: the Power of willing and the Act of willing are not distinct in God; nay God doth will his own happinesse necessarily, and the happinesse of men and Angels freely by the same will;o 1.154 necessity and li∣berty do not make distinct Powers or wills in God.
10. There is no Potentia Executiva in [ X] God,* 1.155 and therefore all those conceits of Vorstius concerning any Change or Com∣position
in God by several Acts or decrees are but meer dreames, and vain conceits, though they be now published to the World, not with less blasphemic then im∣pudence in this licentious age.
It is evident by what hath been said that the eminent Virtue of God (notwith∣standing its several Objects, Egresses, Terminations, Relations, Denominati∣ons and Effects) is one single and infinite Perfection. This will be the constant re∣sult and Conclusion of all sober debates, and Christian discussions. For if the Per∣fection of God be not single, then it must be compounded: but it cannot be com∣pounded either of things that are finite, or of things that are infinite; the Perfe∣ction of God cannot be compounded of finite things, because it is infinite; for many nay all finite things cannot make up one infinite; and God cannot be com∣pounded of many infinite things, because there can be but one thing thats infinite, and that is God. And therefore since Gods Perfection is his Essence, and his Essence is single, uncompounded, undivided, indivi∣sible, it must needs follow that what∣soever is in God, is God, and God is (as hath been often shewen) one single infinite Per∣fection. This is our first Principle, and last Conclusion into which all our debates, and by which all our doubts about this
Argument may and ought to be re∣solved.
X. The Distinction between the Di∣vine Nature and Persons may be consi∣dered,* 1.156
1. In respect of predication; the Di∣vine Essence is predicated of every Person, because every one of the three Subsistences is God, nay is the Divine Nature consi∣dered with this or that Personal Propriety and Relation respectively. But one Per∣son is not predicated of another, the Fa∣ther is not the Son, nor is the Son the Father, or the holy Ghost.
2. In respect of Communication, the Divine Nature is not onely communicable but communicated to all three Persons; but it is of the Formal Reason of a Per∣son to be incommunicable.
3. In respect of Relation. The Di∣vine Nature doth indeed eminently con∣taine all absolute and relative Perfection; but the Formalp 1.157 Relations whereby the Persons are not onely distinguished from, but opposed to one another, cannot be Es∣sential under that consideration, because they are peculiar to the several Persons, and not common to all three Persons, as the Essence and Nature is. Peculiar and distinctive Relations are not essential, be∣cause the Persons who are relatively di∣stinguished, are not essentially distin∣guished.
The Divine Nature of the Fa∣ther isq 1.158 not his Father-hood: for if it were, then every one of the three Persons would be God the Father, all three Persons would be one Person, which is a manifest Contra∣diction.
4. In respect of Generation and Pro∣cession; the Divine Essence doth not beget, nor is it be gotten, it doth not proceed; and yet the Father doth beget, the Son is begotten, and the holy Ghost doth pro∣ceed; the Person of Christ is begotten, but his Divine Nature unbegotten.
5, In respect of number; the Persons are three, the Divine Nature most simply sin∣gle, and singularly one.
6. In respect of Order; there is an Or∣der to be observed amongst the Divine Persons; the Father is the first Personal Principle, the Son the second, and the ho∣ly Ghost who is breathed forth by the Fa∣ther, and the Son, is the third; the Scri∣pture saith there are three, and doth com∣monly reckon them in that Order; and we have no ground to reckon the holy Ghost before the Son because he proceeds
from the Son; but the Divine Nature being a single Vnitie, and the first Vnitie, is as uncapable of Order as it is of Number.
XI. Notwithstanding all these and some other distinct Considerations, I shall be bold to make this Peremptorie Determination; The three Divine Sub∣sistences are not really distinguished from the Divine Nature, or Essence. The Scrip∣ture saith, Christ and his Father arer 1.159 one, Ioh. 10. 30. and that all three are one, 1. Iohn 5. 7. Essentially one, and therefore really one. I have said enough above to prove all three Persons to be essentially one. The three Persons are one God sub∣sisting with all possible Perfection, Relative as well Absolute in one pure Act ex parte Rei. The three Divine Persons do not differ from the Divine Nature, as an hu∣mane Person doth from the humane Na∣ture singularly considered: for a singu∣lar humane Nature may be separated from an humane Person as is evident in the In∣carnation of our Lord and Saviour. But the Divine Nature cannot subsist in alieno supposito; the Nature of God cannot sub∣sist in any other or any fewer then these three Persons, who are one and the same
God; And therefore the Divine Nature doth not differ really from the Persons, tanquam res à re, as we say, nor tanquam res à modo separabili; they do not differ really either way; nor do the Persons dif∣fer really, that is realiter separabiliter from one another, as shall be proved, when we come to speak of the Distinction of the Divine Persons in the next Chapter.
XII. The Distinction between the Di∣vine Nature and three Divine Subsistences is not a groundlesse Conceit or a meer fiction of reason, because it is grounded on the s 1.160Word of God. For our apprehension of God must be agreeable to that Divine Revelation, which God hath vouchsafed us of himself in Scripture. Now it is most clear and evident, by what hath been said in this whole Discourse, that the holy Scriptures teach us to conceive distinctly of some things in God, which are not re∣ally distinguished in him. And therefore Mr. Fry may do well to consider, and retract that rash Censure which he passes upon this Doctrine of God, when he saith that the Doctrine of three distinct Persons or Subsistences in the Godhead is a chaffie, grosse, Carnal and absurd Opinion, in the Title and 22. page of his blasphemous book; For this distinction is not onely
grounded on at 1.161 Phrase of Scripture, but is eternal.
XIII. The Distinction between the Divine Nature and Persons is an Eminent distinction; I have told you above, what we mean by that expression. The Persons are the Essence of God, and not any thing se∣parated or divided from it; every one of the three Persons is a Person of the God∣head, nay every one of the three Persons is the Godhead considered with some par∣ticular property and relation; and the Godhead being absolutely single, we must conclude that the Divine Nature and a Di∣vine Person is the same Essentiall Reall thing, though they are Eminently distin∣guished by sundry considerations, as hath been shewen.
But it is objected that every one of the three Persons is a Substance,* 1.162 and if there be three substances subsisting in the Godhead under sundry Formal considerations, then there will be three Divine Substances, three Substantial Relations and Properties, and therefore the Godhead will be compounded by these three Substances, substantial pro∣perties and relations, or else there will be
three substantiall and formall Gods.
To this grand objection, I make these few returns by way of answer.
1. Every one of the three Persons is a Sub∣stance, a Divine Substance,* 1.163 but they are the same Divine Substance, because they are the same God: these three are one, they are unum, one divine substance, one God; they are all three divine Persons, but they are Coessentiall Persons, andu 1.164 Inessentiall per∣sons of the same Godhead.
[ II] II. The peculiar relations do distinguish, but they do not compound,* 1.165 for they do not su∣per add any new Entity, much lesse any new Godhead, because all these relations are Na∣tural, eternal, and therefore they are God; Absolute and Relative perfection in God, are but one single perfection.
1. The parts or extremes wherewith a∣ny thing is compounded must be really,* 1.166 or at least Modally and Separably distinct; for all created Natures and Persons being com∣pounded, are not only Modally, but sepa∣rably distinct.
2. The parts compounding must be uni∣ted by somex 1.167 efficient cause, and one of the parts must be a meere power or passive
potentiality, that is capable of farther per∣fection; and the other an Act to make that powery 1.168 perfect and complete.
3. There must be by vertue of this union and perfection some dependance, multi∣plicity and change. Now it is clear that the nature of God in which the persons subsist is not capable of these imperfections; for,
1. There are no compounding parts in God.
2. The persons are not made one per∣son by their Inessentiali subsistence, but remaine three distinct Persons.
3. The Persons are not separably di∣stinct from the divine nature, or from one another.
4. The Persons do nota 1.169 perfect the di∣vine nature, for it is infinitely perfect of it selfe, and the three Persons are by ver∣tue of the same divine Essence Essentially the same God, and really one, as hath been laid. The divine nature is not like a created nature, which is (imperfectae actualitatis as we say) so imperfectly actuated, as that it
is capable of farther perfection; for the divine nature hath no weak, imperfect, de∣fective, Passive Potentiality in it, and there∣fore cannot be contracted, determined, actu∣ated by any personal properties or relati∣ons. If God be Essentially considered, he hath a singular existence of himselfe by his owne Essence, and hath most perfect uni∣ty and quidditative or Essential Actuality, because his Essence is the most perfect Es∣sence that is, or can be. If God be Perso∣sonally considered, he hath the most per∣fect personality that is, or can be, and every person hath a perfect, proper and peculiar subsistence, which is not capable of any far∣ther perfection in Esse Personali. Every person is complete in Esse quidditativo per essentiam, in esse Personali per propriam sub∣sistentiam. I need say no more on that Ar∣gument, because I have upon severall occa∣sions said so much already.
III. The Essence of God is not multi∣plyed by sundry considerations of the same Essence.
IV. The three Formall considerations are notb 1.170 Essentiall, but Personall considerations, and we grant that there are three Formall Persons in, and of the Godhead; but it will not follow from thence that there are three Gods, for these three Persons are one God.
V. A. divine Person may be presented to our most serious thoughts under a three-fold consideration, as learnedc 1.171 Iunius ob∣serves.
1. The first consideration of a Person is Common or Essentiall, because the same divine Essence is common to all three Persons; when a Person then is consider∣ed as God, we call this an Essentiall or Common consideration, because the per∣sons ared 1.172 no way distinguished under this first consideration, but are one thing, the choycest and chiefest of things, and are one
with the most single and singular kind of unity: Father, Son and ••pirit are one Je∣hovah, one God and the same God.
2. The second consideration is Personall, and yete 1.173 Absolute, whereby the person is con∣sidered as subsisting in the Vnity of the di∣vine Essence. This consideration is more singular, because every person hath its pro∣per and peculiar subsistence; for the Father doth subsist of himselfe, but the Son hath subsistence from his Father; Now the self∣subsistence of the Father is proper, peculiar, personall, that is, proper and peculiar to his person, and yet this self-subsistence is Abso∣solute, for his self-subsistence is not his Fa∣therhood, and therefore it cannot be esteemed Relative. But though this consideration is more singular, because every person hath his peculiar subsistence, yet herein all three persons agree, that they do all three subsist in the unity of the same Godhead, though every person hath his proper subsistence, & his peculiar way of subsisting; here are in∣deed three subsistences under this conside∣ration, and yet but one divine Substance, Essence, Nature, Godhead, because all three do subsist in thef 1.174 Vnity of the same God∣head;
for we must still keep our eye fixed upon that Text, These three are one.
3. The third Consideration is Relative in the order of one person to, and distinction of one Person from another.g 1.175 This distinction of persons is to be handled at large in the next chapter; our point in question here in this chapter doth not concerne the di∣stinction of one person from another, but the distinction of all three persons from the divine Nature.
Now, they who speak most largely of the distinction between the persons, and say it is in some sense ah 1.176 Reall distinction, do yet confesse that the reall distinction which they treat of is noti 1.177 Essentiall, and therefore still here is an Essentiall union of the three persons under all these three Consi∣derations. We do still make much of that Text, and hold it fast for our direction and support, 1 Iohn 5. 7.
VI. This Argument will be best an∣swered by shewing the vast difference be∣tween created and uncreated persons, and I have with a great deale of patience wa∣ded through all these perplex disputes, that I might make way for the clearing of this grand Mystery, and glad I am that I am now got within sight of it, though I have had as hard a passage as Hanibal had over or through the Alpes, and yet I have made my [ II] way without fire, or vinegar.
II. Concerning the difference between created and uncreated persons,* 1.178 we may ob∣serve that
1. All created persons have a finite and dependent Nature.
2. They have a Compounded Nature.
3. They have a different Nature.* 1.179
4. They have a different understanding, will, power.
5. They have a different place and pre∣sence.
6. They have different Accidents, and are distinguished by an heap of Accidents.
7. Humane Persons with whom we are best acquainted, may differ in time also; one humane person may subsist a long time after another is dissolved.
Having laid down these Positions, let us now make the comparison, and observe the difference between created and uncre∣ated persons.
1. All created persons have a finite and dependent Nature,* 1.180 but the nature of all uncreated persons is Independent and In∣finite; this one difference is an infinite diffe∣rence,* 1.181 and surely if there were no other difference, that wonld suffice to discover and overthrow all the Arguments of So∣cinians and Familists. I do often admire that the acute Socinians who pretend to be wholly ruled by reason, should have no more reason in them then to argue after this absurd manner. Three humane per∣sons are thus and thus distinguished, Er∣go if there be three divine persons, they must be thus and thus distinguished also, even just as humane persons are. Is not this a grosse fallacyk 1.182, because of the impa∣rity and infinitel 1.183 inaequality? if the divine persons must be called into question, let them be tryed by their Peeres. They say they cannot comprehend this Mystery; I say the reason is because it is a Mystery; and if they cannot comprehend it, they may the better beleeve it to be incomprehensi∣ble. The single Nature of these three per∣sons is infinite, and if men wonder that they cannot comprehend what is infinite, it is be∣cause they do not consider that they them∣selves are finite.
2. The nature of these three glorious
subsistences is Independent; the nature of all created subsistences is dependentm 1.184, and therefore it is no wonder if a dependent nature do subsist in its proper person, and depend upon its proper person for susten∣tation; but the divine Nature doth not de∣pend upon the three subsistences for its susten∣tation or subsistence; but all three persons do subsist in this Independent and infinite Nature. Philip. 2. 6. subsisting in the Nature of God; so the Scripture expresses it, and we must apprehend and beleeve these ho∣ly Mysteries according to the holy Scrip∣tures, because no man hath seene God, and God is the only all-sufficient Witnesse concern∣ing his owne essence and subsistence, concern∣ing himselfe; and therefore we must not think or speak otherwise of God then ac∣cording to the Scriptures of truth, in which God hath sufficiently and graciously revealed himself, Iohn 1. 18. Matth. 16. 17. Matth. 11. 26, 27. The Scriptures direct us how to distinguish uncreated persons from created persons. Our finite and de∣pendent Nature doth subsist in a created per∣son, but uncreated persons do subsist in an Infinite and Independent Nature; there is a manifest difference. Our nature indeed doth subsist in the divine and uncreated person of the Son of God, but that is not according to the common course of na∣ture, there is a peculiar reason and another
Mystery in that wonderful subsistence; And yet even in that wonderfull Mystery our dependent Nature doth subsist in a person,* 1.185 which notes its dependance; and our Na∣ture is more satisfied and quieted by subsi∣stence in a divine, then in an humane per∣son, because it hath a more glorious susten∣tation, and is more powerfully upheld by that divine and uncreated person. The di∣vine person of Christ doth subsist in his di∣vine Nature, and the humane Nature of Christ doth subsist in his divine and onely person.
III. All created persons have a com∣pounded and divisible nature,* 1.186 but uncrea∣ted persons have a single undivided and in∣divisible nature. The Socinians, Arminians and Vorstians of this age do not love to hear any discourse of the single Nature of God, in Father, Son and Holy Ghost; this Doctrine, they say, is Philosophical, Scho∣lastical, Metaphysical, and therefore there is nothing which concernes Faith, Piety, or manners in it.
But it is most clear and evident that all the glorious Attributes of God are united by an Eternal bond which cannot be dis∣solved, and we have invincibly proved,
that they do all signifie but one single and infinite perfection. If you take away the singlenesse of Gods being, you take away his Incommunicable, unchangable, incomprehen∣sible, independent and infinite perfection. This point is excellently discussed and opened byn 1.187 Damaseene. Composition (saith he) doth beget strife, strife may well cause a se∣paration, and separation dissolution, which all who know any thing of God, will acknow∣ledge to be repugnant to the perfection of the Godhead. The learnedo 1.188 Doctours of old did consider that God is a most pure and perfect Act, the first and Independent Being, that he is what he is by his owne Es∣sence, and not by participation. Butp 1.189 Vor∣stius was bold to publish his dreames co••∣trary to the Analogy of Faith and unani∣mous judgment of the reverend Doctours of the Ancient Church. The Socinians in theirq 1.190 Catechisme, ther 1.191 Arminians in their Confession and Apology are exceedingly too blame in this point. The Socinians do expunge the single and infinite perfection
of Godss 1.192 spiritual nature out of their Ca∣techisme, that they may more securely de∣ny the Coessentiall Trinunity of Father, Son and Holy Ghost; and therefore I do insist upon this difference between created and uncreated persons, because if the Doctrine concerning the single and infinite perfection of Gods spirituall nature be overthrowne; All thet 1.193 Fundamentals of the Christian Re∣ligion will be overturned.v 1.194 God is Jehovah, he is what he is by his owne Essence, he can neither cease to be, or to be what he is; for he cannot be any other thing, or any otherwise, then now he is, and ever was, Exod. 3. 14, 15. Revel. 1. 8. Iames. 1. 17. Psal. 10. 2. 27. Gos is called Light, and Love, & Life in Scripture, to note the single∣nesse of his being, because whatsoever is in him, is himself, and he himself is one single infinite perfection, he is light it self, and in him is no darknesse at all, 1 John 1. 5. God hath not such an imperfect singlenesse of be∣ing,
as we say, is in thex 1.195 first matter of last difference and the like; nor such a single∣nesse as is in Angels, or the souls of men, for theirs is but a Comparative singlenesse, there is some kind of composition even in the most glorious Angels. God is not com∣pounded of a Nature,y 1.196 Atrributes, and Re∣lations, as hath been shewen, nor is any of the Divine Persons compounded; nor can the Godhead be said to be compounded of three Persons; for though the Persons be distinguished, they do not compound, nor can they be compounded. Distinction con∣notes perfection, because it is opposite to con∣fusion: but Composition denotes multiplicity and imperfection; we must then consider that
1. The Essence of God is mostz 1.197 per∣fect, and therefore nothing can be added to it to make it more perfect, because it is infinitely perfect.
2. Whatsoever is compounded may be
dissolved into the parts whereof it is com∣pounded; The Godhead cannot be dis∣solved, because it cannot be changed.
3. Whatsoever is compounded, must needs be dependent both in being and in working. But God isa 1.198 Independent. Ergo.
4. The parts compounding areb 1.199 before the whole that is compounded; but God is the Former of all things, and therefore no∣thing can be before God. The divine Es∣sence cannot be later then it selfe, or later then any thing else, because it is the first and eternall being.
Now if neither of the Nature or Attri∣butes c 1.200of these uncreated persons, nor the persons themselves be compounded, nor God compounded of the Nature and Per∣sons; here is another very great difference between created and uncreated persons, who have life, and are life it self, because they are one single perfection.
[ IV] IV. Three created persons have three dif∣ferent Natures,* 1.201 but thesed 1.202 three uncreated Persons have the selfe same most single and singular nature. Three created persons may have the same specifical nature, but they have not the same singular nature; created persons in respect of their specificall nature which is universall, are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of like na∣ture, but in respect of their singular nature they are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. But now these uncrea∣ted persons are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in respect of their e 1.203singular Essence: Look how manyf 1.204 cre∣ated persons there be of the same species, so many singular substances there are of that species. For, ag 1.205 finite nature cannot be communicated to severall proper persons of the same species without a multiplication of singular natures or substances, because every finite nature is imperfect and divisi∣ble. The humane nature is communicated to Paul, Peter and Iohn: Now these three
persons are three men, for they have three distinct singular natures, though they have one universall nature; and no wonder, for their nature is imperfect and divisible; their universall nature is unum multiplica∣bile. But the nature which is common to these three divine Persons is not universall but singular; it is unum immultiplicabile, because the divine nature is infinite, and that which is infinite cannot be multiplyed; the unity of the divine nature is reall h 1.206and most perfectly singular. The same singular nature, the whole nature being of bound lesse perfection is really and eternally communicated to all three persons without a∣ny division of the nature, se∣paration of the persons or composition of nature and persons: the persons are di∣stinguished, but not separated; and if we speak properly and strictly, the divinei 1.207 Nature, as it is common to all three per∣sons, is neither distinguished nor multiplyed; for the na∣ture is not distinguished from k 1.208it self, nor are the per∣sons distinguished from one another by the Nature, or naturall properties, but by personall
properties,* 1.209 which are not naturally com∣mon to all three, as the Attributes are (which we call Naturall, because they are Essentiall,) for these personall properties are naturally peculiar and incommunica∣ble, and yet they do nor superadd any new Nature; because the divine Nature doth containe all Relative as well as Absolute perfection in it; and the Godhead considered with all these incommunicable properties is but one single Godhead, as hath been shew∣en: this is a transcendentl 1.210 Mystery in∣deed.
[ V] V. Created Persons have a different Un∣derstanding,* 1.211 a different Will, a different Power, because they have a different Na∣ture. But uncreated persons who have one and the same undivided and infinite Na∣ture, must needs have one and the same Un∣derstanding, Will and Power. For, we cannot comprehend God as one pure vital act, but as his life is actuousm 1.212 or active in his Vn∣derstanding and Will, in his Essentiall and Almighty Power. Now, what isn 1.213 Essential, that must needs be common to all three persons.
Whatsoever the Father is as he is sub∣stance, as he is life, as he is eternity, as he is perfection, as he is God, the same is the Son of God, and the Holy Ghost, as Augusti•• doth frequently discourse. When theo 1.214 Attribute or praedicate is Es∣sential,
whatsoever is affirmed of the Attri∣bute or praedicate, that must needs be true of the subject, as the Philosopher and all that have any reason in them, do unanimously conclude. The Essentiall power of God is the very Essence of God; God doth Act by, and of himself, and not by any faculty or pow∣er superadded to his Essence; Christ is called thep 1.215 power of God, and the Holy q 1.216Ghost is called the power of the most high. 1 Cor. 1. v. 8. 24. Luke 1 35. to shew that they have the same Essential power that the Father hath Christ saith, that none can take his sheep out of his hand, be∣cause none can take them out of his Fathers hand; for saith he, I and my Father are one, John 5. 28, 29, 30. We have one nature, one hand, that is one Power. For the hand of God can be nothing else but the power of God. And therefore since all the three di∣vine Persons are one God, because they have one and the same divine Nature, th••se three arer 1.217 one with the most perfect and singu∣lar manner of unity. Finally, since the Pow∣er of God is the Essence of God, it must reeds follow that all three persons have the same power, because they have the same di∣vine essence, and they have the self-same essence by nature, not by meere indulgence or grace.
But then some who have a great mind to cavill,* 1.218 tell us that we do but equivocate when we say these three Persons have the same Essentiall Power, because we do con∣ceale the other member of the distinction, which is Relative ors 1.219 Personall Power. Now it is impossible, say they, that these three should have the same Personall or Relative power, because the Father doth beget a Son as he is God the Father, as he is the first personall principle, and not simply and absolutely as he is God; But the Son hath not power to beget himselfe, or to beget a∣nother Son, because there can be but three divine Persons, and there is but one of the three called a Son in Scripture. Moreover, the Son is begotten, and therfore his pow∣er is rather a Passive then an Active pow∣er. But the power of the Father whereby he did beget his Son is an Active power. Nor did the Holy Ghost breath forth him∣selfe by his owne power, for he did not proceed from himselfe, but from the Fa∣ther and the Son; and therefore though there be but one Essentiall power, it should seeme that there are three Personall or Re∣lative powers truly distinct in the God∣head.
This Argument is the most plausible Ar∣gument which is urged by them, and there∣fore it must be most warily answered.
1. We do not equivocate in this or any other point, but do readily acknowledge that God the Father doth beget a Son as he is God the Father, and not simply and absolutely as he is God; because this eternal generation points at a personall property con∣sidered after the manner of a vitall Act. But then as this personal property and relati∣on doth not differ really from the divine Essence, so this personal power of beget∣ting doth not differ really from the Essen∣tiall power, because God doth beget a Son in the unity of his owne divine Essence; his Son ist 1.220 equall to him, and therefore notu 1.221 es∣sentially x 1.222different from him, John 5. 18. 26. John 10. 30. Nulla fuit mutatio essentialis in filio, cujus essentia est immutablis.
2. We deny that there is an active Pow∣er in the Father,a 1.223 and a passive Power in the Son in respect of generation, because a Passive power notes materiality and imper∣fection; but this eternall generation cannot
be materiall, for God is a Spirit infinitely more spiritual then the most glorious An∣gel. Pater genuit filium & filius genitus est—spiritualiter, immutabiliter.
3. The two words of begetting and beingb 1.224 begotten which are used in Scrip∣ture do not point at two different powers, an Active and a Passive, but at two different persons; the Father who did beget, and the Son who was never unbegotten, Mi∣cah 5. 2. for he was of old, from the dayes of eternity.
4. It was not in the power of the Fa∣ther to forbeare the begetting of his Son, because the Son is Ensc 1.225 summe necessari∣um, as well as the Father, the Son is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, God of himselfe, and not God by participation, nor a different God from the Father, but the same God with the Fa∣ther, and therefore an Independent, Eter∣nall God, who did not begin to be God,
who cannot cease to be God, but hath life in himselfe as well as the Father, Iohn 5. 20. and hath the self-same divine life, divine nature, divine power which the Father hath; and therefore the Schools conclude well that the Father and the Son have the d 1.226same power, but with a different relation; but these different relations do not super∣add a new Essence, a new divine Nature; and they who have the same Essence, must needs have the same power, because the Power of God is not distinguished from the Essence of God, and the Father doth commu¦nicate the same Essence and Power which the Son receives.
5. There is the same reason of the Son and Holy Ghost; for these three aree 1.227 e∣quall, nay one, Essentially one, one God with the most perfect kind of unity, as hath been shewen: and some that are Me∣taphysical acknowledge that nothing is sim∣ply f 1.228one, but that which is most 〈…〉〈…〉 and nothing is most singly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 but God, who
hath nothing in himself but that which is himself.g 1.229 Aristotle discoursing of six kinds of unity saith that things may be said to be one▪
1. in respect of Continuity, because they are one Continued body.
2. In respect of their Subject, as two accidents in the same subject.
3. Because they are under the same Ge∣nus.
4. Because they are of the same Species.
5. Because they have the same definiti∣on; but then he concludes that all these are but imperfect kinds of unity, if compared with the last unity, which is
6. When a thing is one in respect of its single and indivisible Essence.h 1.230
Now the Father and Son are one, Iohn 10. 30. The Father, Son andi 1.231 holy Ghost are one, 1 Iohn 5. 7. and they are one af∣ter the most perfect manner, they are one in respect of the most single and indivisible Essence, because the divine Essence is most
single and perfectly one. And therefore sincek 1.232 Essence and Power are not distin∣guished in God, it followes undenyably that these three who have one Essence, have one and the same power, but with different properties and relations.
This truth will be more evident when we have discoursed of the distinction of these three divine persons, of which we are to treat in the next Chapter.
VI. Created Persons have a different place and presence,* 1.233 but Uncreated Persons are omnipresent, they cannot be separated or divided from one another in respect of place or presence, but do subsist in one an∣other. The Father didl 1.234 beget the Son in the unity of the divine nature, and the Son doth subsist in the nature of God, Phil. 2. 6. and all three persons subsisting in them 1.235 same single & omnipresent nature, they must needs subsist in one another. The divine nature of the Father is in the Son, and therefore the Father is in the Son; the divine nature of the Son is in the Father, and therefore the Son is in the Father, and the like may
be said of the Holy Ghost, for the divine nature of the Holy Ghost is in the Father and the Son. These three glorious persons are distinguished from one another, and yet they do subsist in one another. They do subsist in one another without any con∣traction n 1.236, commixtion, or confusion, as o 1.237Damascen taught the Schoolmen to speak; when Philip desired Christ to show him the Father, our Saviour answers, He that hath seene me hath seene the Father, John 14. 9. because he is the Image of his Fathers Person, and the illustrious brightnes of his Fathers glory; nay, because the na∣ture of his Father is in him, and the person of his Father is in him; and therefore he calls upon Philip to beleeve that his Father is in him. Iohn 14. 10▪ Beleevest thou not that I am in the Father and the Father in me? as if he had said, I wonder you should not beleeve this truth, it is a special Article of your faith if you be a Christian: and it is a ve∣ry plaine Article, for you have some sensi∣ble Arguments to confirme your faith in this point, both from my words, and from my works; you may hear the Father speak∣ing in me, and see my Father working in me. The words that I speak unto you, I speak not of my selfe, but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doth the works. Joh. 14. 10.
And then he presses the point home up∣on him by a Peremptory Injunction in the 11. verse. Beleeve me that I am in the Fa∣ther,
and the Father in me: or else beleeve me for the very works sake. Philip might hear what was truly divine in the saving words of Christ, and see what was divine in the miraculous works of Christ, and by the words and works (and Spirit of Christ ma∣king both effectuall) he might be brought to beleeve this necessary point, that the Nature of God the Father, and the Person of God the Father is in Christ.* 1.238 Give me leave to insist upon this point, for there is more in it then we can well observe at first view, and therefore our Saviour did presse this point home very frequently, and require that men would expressely beleeve it, Iohn 10. 38. beleeve the works—but to what end? Why, that yee may know and beleeve that the Father is in me, and I in him. This is the end of Christs working so many mi∣racles amongst them, to bring them to be∣leeve that he and the Father did mutually subsist in one another. Credite operibus, beleeve my works saith he, they speak me to be God, and the Son of God, and there∣fore I am not guilty of blasphemy, because I say I am the Son of God, and equall to God, for I am God, I and my Father are one God; and if you beleeve that I and my Father are one God,* 1.239 you must beleeve that I am in the Father, and the Father in me. This is the summe and substance of our Saviours dis∣course from the 25. verse of the tenth
chapter of Iohn to the 39. verse of that chapter; and our Saviour did enter into this discourse at the request of the Jewes, who came round about him, and desired him not to hold them in suspence any longer, but to tell them plainly whether he were the Christ or no. John 10. 24. all then who beleeve Jesus Christ to be the Christ, the true Messiah, the onely Saviour, and an all sufficient Saviour, must beleeve, con∣fesse and acknowledge this truth, That the Father is in Christ, and Christ in the Father. From what hath been spoken it is clear and evident, that this is a point of life and death, as we say, a fundamentall point, a point ne∣cessary to salvation, and therfore our Savi∣our did so often insist upon it. In the 8th. of Iohn,* 1.240 our Saviour tells them more then once, that he was not alone, and therefore his te∣stimony of himselfe was not a single testi∣mony, but his Father who was with him and in him did bear witnes with him, and of him, John 8. 16. for I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent me; I am one that beare witnesse of my selfe, and the Father that sent me beareth witnesse of me, v. 18. And he that sent me is with me, the Father hath not left me alone, v. 29. This point is difficult to beleeve, that Christ who is man is very God, the same God with the Fa∣ther, a different Person from the Father, yet subsisting in the Father, who is the on∣ly
true God; but as Rollock saith well, though this point be mosta 1.241 difficult, yet it is most necessary, and therefore we must beg the spirit of God that we may get above nature, and see the Father in Christ, and Christ in the Father, for the naturall man doth not relish, receive or perceive the things of God, 1 Cor. 2. 14, Our Saviour told his Disciples, that when the Spirit was pour∣ed out more plentifully upon them, then they should know him to be in his Father. The Father will give you another Comforter even the Spirit of truth, and at that day yee shall know that I am in my Father, John 14. 16, 17, 20. and in the sixteenth of Iohn the Spirit had convinced the Disciples of this weighty truth; for they say, By this we beleeve that thou camest forth from God; Iesus answered them, Do you now beleeve? Behold the houre cometh, yea is now come, that ye shall be scattered every man to his owne, and shall leave me alone, and yet I am not alone, because the Father is with me, John 16. 30, 31, 32. In these and divers o∣ther places our Saviour doth declare this truth unto us, that he is in his Father; and if it were not a weighty truth of very great consequence and high concernment, he would not insist so much upon it; it is the mutuall in-subsistence, and Coessential b 1.242Omnipresence of the Father and the Son.
And the Spirit beingc 1.243 Coessentiall with the Father and the Son, must needs be in them both, from whom he proceeds in the unity of thed 1.244 Divine Nature; for it is cleare that an infinite Nature cannot be poured forth beyond it selfe, because it is boundlesse, and therefore when we read 1 Cor. 2. 11. What man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man, which is in him? Even so the things of God knowes no man, but the Spirit of God, (we may safelye 1.245 adde) which is in God, because he did proceed in the unity of the divinef 1.246 indivisible and boundlesse nature. The Holy Ghost hath the same Nature with the Father and the Son; and a Nature of infinite and boundlesse perfection▪ cannot be communicated to any thing that is not infinite, to any thing that is not it selfe, because there can be no other infinite thing but it selfe, there can be but one infinite, and every one of the three glorious per∣sons is one and the same infinite God; up∣on these grouds we may answer many que∣stions.
If you ask Where God was before the World was made? I answer, that he was then, just where he is now, in himselfeg 1.247.
Dic ubi tunc esset, cum praeter ••um nihil esset; Tunc ubi nunc, in se, quoniam sibi sufficit ipse.
If you ask where the Father was; I an∣swer, in the Son; if you ask where the Son was; I answer, in the Father: If you ask where the Spirit was, I answer, he was both in the Father and in the Son, and they both in him. Godh 1.248 was in all three persons, and all three persons in the Godhead, and in one another, and so they do, and will remaine to all eternity, because they are Coessentiall, because they are one omnipresent and eternall God. The Godhead is not shut up in the narrow cir∣cle of the universe, the whole Godhead is in the world, and the whole Godhead is out the world, for the world cannot containe the true God, who did create, and doth up∣hold the world, and the single Godhead cannot be divided; and therefore we must not conceive that part of the Godhead is
in the world, and part of it out of the world, but the whole Godhead isi 1.249 every where, it is not included in any place, or excluded from any place; the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot containe him, 1 King. 8. 27. his perfection is higher then heaven, and deeper then hell, Job 11. 8.
From what hath beene said, it is most cleare, that since the Essence of God is om∣nipresent, and the selfe same indivisible Essence is in Father, Son and Holy Ghost, all three must needs mutually subsist in one another; though the persons be distinguish∣ed, they cannot bek 1.250 separated, divided or contracted; and therefore this sixth diffe∣rence between created and uncreated per∣sons,
is so remarkable, that I need not go about to prove that humane persons are separated as well as distinguished; tot sunt humanitates quot homines; and it is most certaine that Angelicall persons have a li∣mited presence, because they have a finite es∣since. But it is otherwise in divine persons, for the Father works in the Son, and by the Spirit the Father subsists in the Son and in the Spirit, and cannot be separated from these Coessentiall and Omnipresent per∣sons, who do subsist with him (as they are both from him) in the unity of the God∣head.
I need say no more concerning Angels then what is commonly said, Angeli sunt Alicuòi Definitive; sunt enim in suo Vbi non per operationem vel circumscriptionem, sed per Designationem Definitivam, Angels are naturally somewhere; though they are not in any place by extension of parts yet their finite nature is contained within cer∣taine bounds and limits. Hencel 1.251 it is that some learned men affirme that it is impro∣per
to say, that God ism 1.252 somewhere because he is every-where; Somewhere is a defini∣tive word.
VII. Created Persons have many other different Accidents besides Place,* 1.253 of which we have spoken; and ••ime or Duration, of which we are to speak. It will not be ne∣cessary or usefull to discourse of every par∣ticular; but that which I intend to insist upon under this head is, That Created Per∣sons are distinguished from one another by an n 1.254heap of Accidents, and therefore it will be sufficient for the making good of this seventh Difference, to show that divine Persons are not distinguished by a Conge∣ries, or heap of Accidents, because there is no Accident at all in God. For the being of God is infinitely perfect, and singularly single, as hath been proved; and therefore it is infinitely below the single perfection of God to be compounded of a substance and accidents for the adorning or perfect∣ing of his glorious being. Relations are not Accidents in God. Theo 1.255 reltion of one Coessentiall person to another is agreeable
to the Essence of God; it is a necessary rela∣tion which did never begin to be, and cannot cease to be.
The relation of God to the creature cannot be reall, because it is such a relati∣on as might not have been; but there is no reall thing in God which might not have beene.
2. There can be no reall relation be∣tween two extremes, one of which two extremes is unchangeable, and the other might not have been.
3. God was not in any passive Potentia∣lity or Power, before he did create the world, to receive any reall act, because he is really ap 1.256 pure act; and it is evident that a new reall relation is a kind of act wher∣of the pure, single, perfect and unchange∣able essence is uncapable.
4. Our weak understanding comparing God with the creatures, is apt to frame many denominations, which according to the manner of signifying, seem to import as if God were in potentiâq 1.257 ad multa; yet if we do consider the thing signified, as we ought in a way agreeable to the pure, single and infinite Perfection of God, we
shall find that these are but extrinsecall denominations. This point is much beat∣en upon by the most acute Schoolmen, and Writers of Metaphysicks, and therefore I need not insist upon it; only observe that when I say created persons are distinguish∣ed by a heap of Accidents, I do not mean that a person is made compleat in his sub∣sistence by any Accident, or an heap of Ac∣cidents, for I have refuted that conceit, in this present chapter pag. 73. I hasten to the eighth Difference.
VIII. Humane Persons with whom we are best acquainted,* 1.258 may exist in a very dif∣ferent time as well as in different places; some lived before, some since the flood: some before the Incarnation, others since the Death and Resurrection of our Lord and Saviour; but herein all agree that time is the measure of them all; their duration is very imperfect, their duration is not always contemporary, never Coessentiall. But all three uncreated Persons are Coeternal, be∣cause they are Coessential, because they have the same divine eternal Essence: Angels are said to have an eternall duration, but they are noty 1.259 eternall in the same sense that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are Eternall.
1. Because they were created, Coloss. 1.
16. and therefore did begin to be,* 1.260 they have not (as the Schools say) an interminable or interminated duration à parte ante.
2. If they had been created from eter∣nity, yet they could not have beene esteem∣ed Coeternall with their Creatour, who did create them out of nothing, and did not beget or breath them forth in the unity of his own divine Essence.
3. There can be no lesse then an infinite dif∣ference between the finite, dependent,s 1.261 chang∣able, defective duration of an Angel, and the infinite, independent, immutable duration of these three uncreated, and all creating per∣sons, who are one independent, unchange∣able, eternall, infinite God the eternity of the three glorious persons is interminable, indefectible, immutable.
4. If Angels had been created from e∣ternity, yet they would not have been es∣sentially t 1.262or intrinsecally eternall, because their essence doth not include any repug∣nancy to an actuall beginning.
5. If Angels had been created from e∣ternity, yet God might have annihilated them afterwards, and then they had actu∣ally ceased to be.
6. Although they were not actually an∣nihilated, yet the veryu 1.263 possibility of be∣ing annihilated is enough to prove their duration terminable, changeable, defecti∣ble; and therefore though they had been created from all eternity, they would not have been coeternall with their maker, nor would three Angels have been coes∣sentially coeternall with one another.
7. If Angels had been created from e∣ternity, they would have been eternall, not by any intrinsecall or naturall durati∣on, as hath been proved; and therefore they would have been eternall only by an x 1.264extrinsecall denomination, taken from the Eternity of God.
8. Upon consideration of the Premises, many Reverend Doctours of the Church conclude, that Angels are eternall only à parte post; and they are eternal à parte post, not by their own nature, but by the free fa∣vour and appointment of God; and there∣fore there is an infinite difference between the duration of these three uncreated per∣sons, and the duration of the most glorious Angels in Heaven. Angels arey 1.265 mu••able, and God is free Agent both in respect of Crea∣tion, and in respect of preservation; and ther∣fore God and Angels are not Coeternall as the Peripateticks dreamt. God did vo∣luntarily engage himself to create and pre∣serve Angels by his own Decree; and there∣fore that subordinate aeternity which they have à parte post, is vouchsafed unto them by the free and undeserved favour of God. For (asa 1.266 Damascen saith well) whatsoever had a beginning would soon have an end∣ing, if he who gave a beginning to it by his infinite power should think fit to suspend his upholding and preserving influence, or put forth his Almighty and irresistible power against it in a destructive way.
I will not take this faire occasion to speak of the acts or motions of Angels to make this difference seeme greater; for that which hath been said is su••••••cient to make it evident that Angels do not coex∣ist with God the Father with the same du∣ration wherewith God the Son and God the Holy Ghost do coexist with him; be∣cause these three coessentiall persons are Co∣eternall; they are all three one God, who is his owne Essence, his owne Eternity; The Scripture calls the God of Israel the Eter∣nity of Israel, 1 Sam. 15. 29. andb 1.267 Ari∣stotle calls him life it selfe, the best life, an Eternall life, that hath neither beginning nor ending, nor succession; and therefore it is evident that he did not beleeve God to be subject toc 1.268 change or variation. God is (saithd 1.269 he) a self-sufficient and eternall life. God is truly self-sufficient, because he is al∣sufficient, he is infinite in perfection, and therefore infinite in duration; his infinite perfection and duration is nothing else but
but his infinite Essence; and this infinite Es∣sence is the self-same in all three Coessenti∣all, Coeternall and Coequall persons, as hath been proved. And therefore we have good cause to rejoyce and triumph in this glorious difference between created and uncreated persons.
Give me leave to sweeten this dispute with some devotion. We have an everlast∣ing Father, an everlasting Saviour and an everlasting Comforter: and we have good cause to lay a charge upon our immortall souls to blesse & praise all three Coeternal persons, for their eternall love, our eter∣nall redemption and salvation. Praise the Lord O my soule, while I live will I praise the Lord; whilst I have any being will I sing praises to my God, and put confidence in him, for with the Lord there is plenteous and eter∣nall redemption. But O put not your trust in Princes, nor in those sons of men in whom there is no salvation, for their breath goeth forth, they returne to their first earth, and in that day all their thoughts and counsels perish.
Happy is he that hath the God of Jacob for his help, whose hope is in the Lord his God, which made heaven and earth, the sea and all that therein is, which keepeth truth for ever; read and consider the six first verses of the 146. Psalme▪ there is a great Empha∣sis in the sixth verse, which keepeth truth for ever. O let us declare it to the follow∣ing generation that ••his God is our God for ever and ever, and he will be our guide even unto death, Psal. 48. 13, 14. Happy it is for us that we are redeemed by the pre∣tious bloud of Christ, who offered up him∣self by by his eternall spirit, his divine and eternal Nature, Heb 9. 14. that he might bring in everlasting righteousnesse, Dan. 9. 24. obtaine eternall redemption, and pur∣chase an eternall inheritance for us, Heb. 9. 12. 15. Happy, thrice happy it is for us that we are born of incorruptible seed, which will abide in us for ever: for we are born of the eternall spirit, who will per∣fect his work in us, and be our everlasting Comforter. Finally, all three uncreated Persons will be our all-sufficient and satis∣factory portion and reward for ever-more.
IX. Three Created persons have diffe∣rent actions and operations,* 1.270 because they have different singular natures, different powers, &c. as hath been shewen in this ve∣ry chapter. All actions of Father, Son and
Holy Ghost upon the creatures are undivi∣ded, nay indivisible; how Personall Acti∣ons ad infra differ, I am to declare at large in the next chapter, where I am to shew how these three glorious persons who can∣not be divided, are truly distinguished from one another; onely before I con∣clude this chapter, it will be requisite to note, that though the Son cannot be said to beget himself, yet he is not Passive in that eternall generation, as hath been proved a∣bove; the divine nature which is communica∣ted to the Son by generation, is the nature of the Son as well as of the Father: the Father doth necessarily beget the Son in the power of that Nature, and in the unity of that self-same single and indivisible Nature; and that divine Nature which is communicated to the Son,* 1.271 is not begotten by the Father, but is of it self; and therefore we say that Christ is God of himself, though he be not a Son of himself, but of the Father by eter∣nall generation, because the Father is the first principle of subsisting life.
I might proceed to treat of other diffe∣rences: that common Rule, Actiones sunt suppositorum,* 1.272 is true of divine actions and uncreated Persons; but it is manifest that there are many actions of the soule of man, both when it is in a state of union with, and when it is in a state of separation from the body, which cannot be properly and truly cal∣led
actions of a person, but I shall not de∣scend so low, as to take notice of such dif∣ferences.
The nine differences which have been in∣sisted on are all considerable. And from them all we may safely conclude that the word Subsistence or Person cannot be attri∣buted after the same maner to God, Angels and men. A divine Person is a Spirituall and Infinite Subsistent, which must not be considered as abstracted from, but as Sub∣sisting in the Divine Nature, and as related to those other Coessentiall persons, from which he is sufficiently distinguished by some Personall and Incommunicable pro∣perty; And therefore Subsistence is attri∣buted to God after the most excellent and glorious manner. A Person signifies the most excellent kind of Subsistent, an un∣derstanding subsistent, as hath been shew∣en; but then an uncreated person, a divine person doth infinitely excell and transcend the person of the most glorious Angel in Heaven; and therefore we must remove all those imperfections from our thoughts, which are in created persons, when we me∣ditate or discouse of these divine and un∣created persons, that we may think and speak according to the Analogy of faith.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Phil. 2. v. 6.
Justini∣an. Edict. de Fide. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
Solis per¦sonis divi∣nis ob infi∣nitam & simplicem Essentiam convenit in Essentiâ subsistere. Nulla e∣nim perso∣na Angeli∣ca vel hu∣mana sub∣sistit in Na∣tura vel essentiâ.
Persona propriè est quid con∣cretum ex essentiâ in∣telligente & Persona∣litate.
Abstra∣cta faelici∣us intelli∣guntur mentione Subjecto∣rum. Intellec∣tus potiùs de Concre∣tis omnia praedicit quàm de Abstractis▪ quia acti∣ones sunt Supposi∣torum.
Created Persons.
De Natu∣râ & Per∣sonis divi∣nis ex lu∣mine rati∣onis fer•• nihil dici potest; my∣sterium de Deo Trin∣uno uni∣versam transcen∣dit Philo∣sophiam.
Vide Ch••̄niti∣um ••e Tri∣nitate c. 4.
Persona est naturae rationalis individua Substantia▪ Boehbius l. de duabus naturis & una perso∣na Christi▪
Philos. distinctio∣nem natu∣rae & Per∣sonae vix intellige∣bant, quia nihil de mysterio Incarnati∣onis au∣diebant.
Laurenti∣us Valla. lib. 6. Elegant. In Deo po∣ni perso∣nam, quod verè Deo sit triplex qualitas, tales qua∣litates sta∣tuo in Deo & has dico esse perso∣nas.
Vide sis Soaligerum in oratio∣ne de ver∣bo Inepti satis inep∣te disseren∣tem. in E∣pist. p. 374.
Bellarm. lib 2. de Christo. cap. 5.
An uncre∣ated Per∣son.
Nulla persona est pu∣rus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sive ex∣istendimo∣dus, & me∣ra propri∣etas, vel relatio; Triniratē impruden∣ter tollunt qui Patrē Filium & Spiritū Sanctum tres exi∣stendi mo∣dos defini∣unt; sunt enim Per∣sonae Co∣essentia••es
Ca••olus Magnus apud Ge∣nebrardū cap. 20. Li¦turgiae; Pa∣ter prima, est divini∣tatis perso¦na in quâ▪ caeterae duae natu∣raliter ma∣nentes ex∣istunt.
Quic∣quid Patri proprium & peculi∣are est, Pa∣tri sano modo na∣turale di∣citur; est enim per∣fectio Re∣la••iva Pa∣tri quà sic natur••li∣ter debita, tanquam primo principio Perso••al••.
••aivinus Personas divinas proprietates vocavit, sed nudas proprieta∣tes esse negavit.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quicquid tribus commune est cum pr••prietate habet peculiari. Proprietatibus dignoscuntur personae, non constituuntur,
Vide Bisterf. de uno Deo, &c. lib. 2. §. 1. cap. 4. Essentia divina est modo substantiali modi∣fica••a; Subsistentia enim est modus substantialis, qui ab ipsa essentia divina separari nequit, imò persona divina est ipsam et essentia divina certo modo se habens. Est enim persona divina ipsissima Essentia Modificata. Persona autem non est essentia Simpliciter, sed cum modo subsistendi considerata. Vide D. Alting. Loc. Com. Part. 1. & Problem. Calv. Inst. l. 1. c. 13. Bezam. part. 1. quaest. & Homil. prima adversus Sacramenta∣rios. Zanchium de tribus Elohim. Melancton. Loc. Com. Po∣lanum in Syntag. Chamierum de Trinitate. lib. 1. cap 3.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Persona divina est ipsamet natura di∣vina pecu∣liari modo se habens.
Persona directè de∣notat sub∣sistentiam, consequen¦ter conno∣tatnaturā. Vasquèz. Persona est indivi∣duum sub∣sistens vi∣vum, intel∣ligens, in∣communi∣cabile, in∣dependen∣dens, non sustentatū ab alio nec pars alte∣rius. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Per∣sona est suppositū intelligens Persona in Concreto naturam includit, quia Persona naturam participat, & perso∣nalitas est substantiae sive naturae modus Substantialis & sepa∣rabilis, rarissime autem separatus. Persona est substantia com∣pleta intelligens, per se subsistens▪ incommunicabilis, & inde∣pendens.
Persona conficitur ex essentia & proprietatibus distincti∣vis ita ut quaelibet persona in se sit perfecta substantia. vide Hilarii Sermon. in F••st. S. Trinitatis.
Persona subsistit per se; ac∣cidentia autem sunt in alio; ex natura Substanti∣ali & acci∣dentibus non potest fieri unum per se. Vi∣de Ferrari∣ens. con∣tra. Gen. 4. c. 39.
Aristot. Categor. cap. 5.
Comple∣mentum Personae dicit nega∣tionem u∣nionis cō∣municati∣onis & de∣pendentiae tum aptitu¦dinalis tū actualis, ut omnes partes tam integrantes quàm essentiales ipsaque etiam anima separata à ratione Personae excludantur. Vide Joannem de Neapoli in Quodlibet.
Vide Suarez. Disp. 34. Sect. 2. n. 8.
Exi∣stentia communicabilis non potest este Subsistentia Personalis. Tria sunt in Supposito; Natura, Existentia, & Subsistentia, sive Personalitas. Pantusa. Natura humana existit in personâ di∣vina sine propriâ personalitate, non sine propriâ existentiâ. Vasquez. Natura existens producitur non tantum in suppo∣sito proprio sed & in alieno, uti patet de natura humana in Christo; non est enim in Christo duplex Suppositum. Caie••a∣nus. Subsistentia est modus positivus & Substantialis incom∣municabilis & Independens, naturae intellectivae, integrae, & completae conveniens. Anima rationalis separata habet Mo∣dum per se, quem non habebat in corpore, sed est incompleta, & habet non tantum obedientialem sed & Aptitudinalem depen∣dentiam, quia ex naturâ suâ est forma materiae, & proinde non habet perfectissimum modum subsistondi per se.
Non est Trinitas modorum, sed perso∣narum co∣essentialiū trinū itas.
Quod excipiunt Trinitatē igirur fore sine Deo, ex eadem insulsitate nascitur. Vide Calv. Instit. lib. 1. cap. 13. Sect. 25.
Nam De∣us ita se praedicat unic•• esse ut distin∣ctè in tri∣bus perso∣nis consi∣derandum proponat quas nisi tenemus, nudum & inane dun∣taxat Dei nomen si∣ne vero Deo in ce∣rebro no∣stro volitat. Calvin. Instit. lib. 1. cap. 13. §. 2.
Vide Cal∣vinum Me∣lanct. Oeco∣lampadiū, Bucanura, D. Altingi∣um, D. Go∣marum. Wendeli∣num, Bi∣slerfeldi∣um. Perso∣na divina est essenti. ae divinae subsisten∣tia incom∣municabi∣lis. Perso∣nam voco subsisten∣tiam in Dei essen∣tiâ, quae ad alios relata, pro∣prietate incommu∣nicabili distingui∣tur. Calv. Instit. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Vide Cyrillum Exposit. fi∣dei Orthod. Anastasium Theopolit. Damascen. de Orth. fid. lib. 3. c. 4. 5, 6. Persona divina est substantia spiritualis ad alios sibi coestentiales relata, & tamen ab illis incommunicabili propri∣etate distincta.
The God∣head is not to be abstra¦cted from the persons or the per∣sons from it The God∣head descri¦bed, not ab∣stracted. De omni∣bus & sin∣g••lis & so∣lis his tri∣bus perso∣nis tota Deitas per∣fecta & omnibus numeris una dici∣tur.
The strange God idoli∣zed by some▪
The single Godhead.
How the three Per∣sons are one God.
How the Name God is used in Scripture.
Vox De∣us de eo proprie di∣citur qui naturâ De∣••s est, & de eo quidem vel 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Communiter sine certae per∣••onae determinatione, vel, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 de una aliquâ personâ ••er Synecdochen. Nomen Deus sive Absolute dicatur de to∣••â simplicique Deitate, sive Relate de unâ aliquâ personâ u∣••am eandemque essentiam designat; quaelibet enim persona est 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & in Deo non distinguuntur esse & essentia; tota De∣•• as est ex se, & à se, & singulae personae sunt ipsissima essentia ••um distinctis relationibus personalibus considerata.
Created Personali▪ t••es not ab∣stracted.
How Christ is the Cha∣racter of his Fathers Person.
The Person of Christ is single and Divine.
Christus non solùm officio De∣us est, ut blasphe∣mant So∣ciniani, sed Naturâ Deus est; coessētialis enim filius est. Con••e∣quens est, si in Deum credius, & in me cre∣d••re debe∣atis, quod non esset consequēs si Christas non esset Deus. Io∣han. 14 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 non est Pa∣tri peruli∣aris, sed tribus per∣sonis Cō∣munis.
The unbe∣gotten Na∣ture of the only begot∣ten Son.
The second Person of the God∣head.
The Divine ••erson of the Holy Ghost.
Certaine Conclusion•• concerning Divine Persons.
The Word Subsist∣ence ex∣plained.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sumi∣tur pro re per se Sub¦sistente, pro suppo∣sito intel∣ligente, pro divinâ Dei Patris Subsisten∣rià, Heb. 1. 3. F••lius est imago Personae Patris, est enim filius essentiae e∣jusdem cū Patre, non imago essentiae.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in Scriptu¦ris frequē∣ter sumi∣tur proba∣si, seu fun∣damento quo ali∣quid niti∣tur, 2 Cor. 9. 4. 2 Cor. 11. 17. Heb. 3. 14. fundamentum in quo spes nostra & gloria ni∣titur. Fides etiam 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 dicitur Heb. 11. 1. ut Hypostasis significat essentiam; haereticoru•• est tres Hypostases as••erere in divinis. Vide Theodor. Hist. Eccles. lib. 2. c. 8. Patrum consensum hac de re videas apo•• Damascenum, Nazianz. &c.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 significat naturam verè Sub∣sistentem & per se subsisten∣tem hoc est modo per∣f••ctissimo subsisten∣tem.
Hyposta∣tica Em∣phaticis opponun∣tur, quia omnia Hy∣postatica veram ha∣bent essen∣tiam. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Aristot.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 est Essentia divina charactere hypo∣statico insignita, sive proprio subsistendi modo distincta. Magnum discrimen est inter Personam & proprietatem Personae: proprietas Patris Absoluta, est esse 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Respectiva esse Pa••rem; Persona autem Patris est Deus filium gignens in unitate essentiae ingenitae.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sig∣nificat na¦turam Ab¦solutam Commu∣nem: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sig∣nificat Na∣turam sub∣sistentem cum pro∣prietati∣bu•• Rela∣tivis & di∣stinctivis
Personae divinae sunt per se subsistentes; nihil autem per se subsistit sine subsi∣stentiâ.
Subsistentia divina est ipsamet essentia divina peculiari modo se habens; unius autem essentiae sunt plures modi, sive respectus diversi juxta nostrum concipiendi modû Scripturis conformem. Singull autem modi singulas essentias non postu∣lant in rebus creatis, & proinde ejusdem essentiae infinitae plu∣res modi & re••pectus diversi esse possunt.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 apud Craecos Lo∣gicos Personam significat, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 non raro es∣sentiam, sed vocum ea∣rum in Theol. jam fixa est & limitata significatio, & proinde Logicos istos nobis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non licet.
The Divine Persons do most perfe∣ctly s••bsist.
Aristot▪ Categor.
Clama∣mus, siquis tres Hypo∣stases, aut tria 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 hoc est tres subsisten∣••es perso∣nas non confitetur, Anathenia ••it. Hiero∣nym. Epist 57. How there are three in on••. & one in three.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Athan••s. Symb. Naz. orat 37. So∣phron. act. 11. Concil. Oecum. sexti. Damas. Anasta••. Syn.
How the divine Persons subsist by themselvs, and yet in one ano∣ther.
Hyposta∣ses dicun∣tur, nulla tamen est in divinis personis suppositio vel subje∣ctio, sed coessenti∣alis aequa∣litas. Vide A∣quin. p. 1. q. 39. art. 1.
Hierony∣mus Epist. 57. Novel. lum a me homine Romano nomen ex∣igitur—Interroga∣mus quid per tres Hyposta∣ses posse arbitren∣tur intelli∣gi. Tres Personas subsisten∣tes aiunt. Responde∣mus nos ita credere. Non suffi∣cit sensus, expressum nomen ef∣flagi••ant—& quia vo∣cabulanon ediscimus haeretici judicamur Hieron. E∣pist. 57. si quis tres subsisten∣tes perso∣nas non confitetur Anathema sit.
Concerning the word Person.
Persona quasi per se Sonan•• fic non ne∣mo. Perso∣na quasi per se una; sic Criticorū facile prin¦cipes Per∣sona quasi à verbo 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 vel 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 qua∣si cinctum quid, vel 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quasi habens aliquid circa corpus.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quamvis substantiam prim••m significat, tam animatam quàm inanimatam, P••••sona verò, tantùm substantiam singu∣larem intelligentem qualis Deus, Angelus, homo.
Vncreated Persons.
Magnâ prorsus ••opiâ hu∣manum laborat e∣loquium. Dictum est tamen tres perso∣nae, non ut illud dice∣retur, sed ne tacere∣tur omni∣no. Non e∣nim rei in, effabilis e∣minentia hoc voca∣bulo ex∣plicari va∣let. Aug. lib. 5 de Trinitate cap. 9.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Damascen. in Dialog. cap. 43. Nazianzen. orat. 31. in laudem Athanasii.
Vocibus non sem∣per cum respectu suae origi∣nis, sed ex receptà consuetu∣dine uten∣dum. Anti-Tri∣nitarians aequivo∣cate in a∣busing the various significati∣ons of the word Per∣son.
Persona significat Relationē prout est Subsistens in naturâ divinâ. Aquin. p. 1. q 39. art. 1. In creaturis relationes sunt accidentales, & proinde accidentaliter insunt, relationes autem in Deo sunt subsistentes, & ipsamet essentia divina, Aquinas ibidem. Pater non genuit meram nudamque relati∣onem, sed correlatum, Filium subsistentem, nec non coessenti∣alem.
How a divine Per∣son is said to take up∣on him two severall Persons.
Locuti∣ones Im∣propriae Dei essen∣tiam non exprimunt, sed ejus notitiam tenuitati nostrae accommodant.
Vnwritten words hold forth the written truth.
Voces tanquam consecra∣tas omni jure judi∣camus, si earum conjugata, & Synonyma in Sacrâ paginâ reperiantur. Si enim talibus vocibus sensum mentemque Scripturae exprimentibus uti non liceret, nec explicare Scripturam pro concione lice∣ret, neque in alias linguas vertere.
Temerè non sunt inventa nomina quae per evidentem conse∣quentiam mentem Domini in Scripturis loquentis fideliter exprimūt; cavendum est ne vo∣cabula re∣pudiando, ipsam re∣pudiemus veritatem, superbaeque temeritatis simul & haereseos arguamur.
Persons are not At∣tributes as Sabellius dr••am't.
Vnwritten words hold forth the written truth.
Cùm Scriptura testetur tres dici quorum quisque in solidum sit Deus, nec tamen plu∣res esse De∣os, nimis morosum est de voce contende∣re, cùm res in aperto sit. Colon. Anal. Pa∣raphrast. Calv. Inst. pag. 34. In Scriptu∣ris occurrit vox Trini∣tatis nu∣mero na∣merante. 1 Iohan 5. 7. & numero numerato passim, ut in Baptismo Christi. Matth. 3 & in Baptismo nostro Matth. 28.
Hi••ar. lib. de Synodis. Inane enim est calumniam verbi pe••timescere ubi res ipsa cujus verbum est non habeat diffi∣cultatem—expertus pridem sum & quidem saepius quicun{que} de verbis pertinacius litigant fovere occultum virus, ut magis ex∣pediat ultrò provocare, quàm in ••orum gratiā obscuriùs loqui.
A Divine Person de∣scribed.
The descri∣ption of a Divine Person ex∣plained and confir∣med.
Three di∣stinguish∣ing questi∣ons pro∣pounded which are in their or∣der to be stated and resolved.
Vox Na∣t••rae a ••as∣cendo de∣rivatur, sed pro quavis essentiâ u∣surpatur; vocibus e∣nim non semper cū respectu suae origi∣nis, sed ex receptâ cō∣suetudine utendum. Hyposta∣ses in di∣vinis non dicunt ali∣quam sup∣positionē vel subje∣ctionē sed aequalita∣tem coes∣sen••ialem.
The diffe∣rence be∣tween the divine Na∣ture▪ and Persons.
The Inac••••∣quade con∣ce••t of a di∣vine Person
The Soci∣nians en∣gaged to state the point in question.
Divina na∣tura salvâ omnimodâ perfectio∣ne Dei non potest ca∣rere ali∣quâ perso∣narum di∣vinarum.
Deus est idem quod sua essen∣tia vel na∣tura; de Deo lo∣quentes u∣timur no∣minibus concretis ut signifi∣cemusejus subsisten∣tiam, & u∣timur no∣minibus abstract is ut signifi∣cemusejus simplicita∣tem. Quod ergo ••ici∣tur Deitas vel vita, velaliquid hujusmodi esse in Deo referend•• est ad di∣versitatem quae est in acceptione intellectus nostri, & non ad aliquam diversitatem rei. Aqin. Sum. p. 1. q. 3. art. 3. in corpore Art. & resp. ad primum. Est de es∣sen iâ cujusliber personae divinae & cujuslibet personalitatis divinae esse ipsum esse per essentiam saltem a parte re••, quicquid sit de modo concipiendi nostro. Vide Suarez. Me∣taph. D••sp. 34.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
The tran∣scendent affections of Ens.
Rationes praeceden∣ces minu∣unt, rati∣ones sub∣sequentes augent fi∣dem.
Ens est unum, ve∣rum, bo∣num. Ens est essentiâ unicum, affectio∣nibus au∣tem trinū, trinum & unum, Ens trinunum. Unum est quod pri∣us de unoquoque ente cognoscitur: Verum quod proxime cognoscitur; intellectus enim est prior potentia, quàm intel∣lectus; & verum dicit ordinem ad intellectum; bonum ad voluntatem. Denique si res sit ficta, non est bona; & proinde bonitas quodammodo fundatur in veritate; omnes autem tres passiones sunt à parte rei. Entitas quoad significa∣tum intrinsecum; entitas est bonitas & è converso.
Una sub∣sistentia divina non plane pra∣stat idem quod prae∣stat altera; est enim inter per∣••onas di∣vinas dif∣ferentia relativa numerica Nec est es∣sentia di∣vina bis aut pluries id quod est, per tres subsistentias. Nam per subsistentiam Patris essentia divina est Pater, non Filius: per subsistentiam verò Filii nec Pater est nec Spiritus Sanctus: non itaque bis est Pater, vel bis Filius, vel bis Spiritus San∣ct••s; nec possibile est ut eodem respectu essentia divina sit Pater, quo est Filius. Tanta autem est essentiae divinae per∣fectio, ut una subsistentia ipsi non possit esse adaequata. Per subsistentiam itaque Patris divina essentia adaequatè est Pater, non verò adaequatè Deus. vid. Bisterfeld. lib. 2. sect. 1. cap. 5.
In qui∣bus ratio estintegra, religionis nostrae mysteria cum rati∣one con∣sentiunt: in quibus corrupta, cum rati∣one pug∣nant my∣steria, ut rationem corrigant potius quàm superent. In omnibus enim mysteria supra rationem sunt omnino re, ratione, & ••odo.
Deus est essentia univocè sive Ens entium, transcendens transcenden••ium, & proinde essentias non solùm Physicas, sed & Metaphysicas omnes infinitè omnibus modis superat; & proinde discrimina multa incidere ne mireris propter similium istorum inaequalitatem maximam.
Verita∣tem con∣venienter Naturae ex sacris Scripturis asserimus; exiguum autem lu∣men tam est simile maximo, ut prout natur•••• u∣num sunt, ita conjun∣ctione in unm tran∣seant, & in majore ac perfectio∣re minus sorbeatur, vide I uni∣um Trinit. defens. 1
Curan∣dum est quod men∣tem errantium occupat, tumor rationis humanae ina••i Philoso∣phiae Metaphysicae spe cie abre••tae; unu•• aut alterum Scriptu∣rae locum in transcursu vellicat, ne sine Christo aut Scripturâ (quod vel imperitis foret odiosum) videantur esse: et pro∣inde quia ratione humanâ intumescunt, ex ijs ipsis principi••s quae natura docet, et approbat, falsas esse ipsorum hypotheses, et Argumentationes demonstravi. Ab ijs quae nobis notiora sunt explicatio petenda est, et proinde explicatio Metaphysica non contemnenda est; quae enim docet Natura minimè cum verbo Dei pugnantia, docet Deus.
The Attri∣butes of God are the Essence of God.
Quanto diutius co∣gito, tanto mihi res videtur ob∣scurior. Cicero de Simonide lib. 1. de Natura Deorum.
Quam admirabi∣lis est De∣us, cum omnibus linguis sit ind••cibilis, omnibus cordibus incogita∣bilis! Aug. de cogniti∣ne verae vi∣tae. cap. 3. Lombard. 1. sent. distinct. 8. Homo imbecillitat••s So∣boles, ignorantiae alumnus, in tan••â mysteriorum caligine Dei ignarus vocibus tenebrosis utitur ad lucem significandam; in verbo veritatis tenebrae appellamu••, est cato in nobis tene∣brarum interiorum subjectum, exterio••um illex: est pecca∣tum in nobis depascens carnem ut hedera parietem, mentem obscurans, et voluntatem à vera luce abripiens tanquam un∣co Carnifex.
Paucae lectionis, nullius in∣tellectio∣nis mancipia, intellectione satis mutilâ perfecton••m metiun∣tur infinitam.
Visio quae caele∣stis Reip. cives beat, non fit per principia nobis con∣naturalia: ibi intel∣lectio sine ratiocina∣tione, scientia sine disciplina, quies sine motu: istius coeli Sol ipse Deus est sine occasu & sine ortu.
Intelle∣ctus fini∣tus quod est simple•• & infinitū unico sim∣plici{que} a∣ctu non capit.
Acci∣piendo Perfectio∣nem p••o re ip••a quae per∣fecta est, non sunt in divinis plures perfectio∣nes Attributales; omnia enim in divinis quae sunt Commu∣nia tribus non plurificantur, sed sunt unum simpliciter & una simplex Essentia. Biel 1. Sent. dist. 2. quaest. 2.
Propriè & de vir∣tute sermo∣nis loquē∣do non est conceden∣dum quod in Deo vel divinâ Es∣sentiâ sit perfectio, sed perfe∣ctio sum∣ma est o∣mnibus modis di∣vina essen∣tia ipsa ab eâ penitus indistin∣cta. Biel. 1. Sent. dist. 2 quaest. 2.
Multi termini Attributa∣les Affir∣mativi, Negativi, Absolu••i, Connota∣tive, & Re∣lativi ip∣sam ••an∣damque Essentiam Divinam simplissimam sed diversimode significant.
Vide Basil. lib. 1. contr. Eunomium.
I••dor. Clarius Orat. 5. tom. 1. pag. 21.
Attribu∣ta illa quoad rem significa∣tam magis proprie Deo quam creaturis attribuun∣tur; acci∣piendo au∣tem per∣fectiones Attribu∣tales pro¦signis vel concepti∣bus▪ per∣fectionem significāt, sed imper∣fecto mo∣do significant, & proinde modus significandi creatu•• is proprie conv••nit, perfectio significata Deo convenit, sed secundum modum Eminentiorem. Vide Th, pag. 1. quaest. 13. art. 2. 3. 6. Zanch. de Naturâ Dei. cap. 8. quaest. 3.
Omnes proprieta tes Dei nō possunt creaturis communi∣cari, quia sic multi∣plicaretur ess••n ia: necali∣quae, quia sic divide∣retur.
Attribu∣ta Divina non di∣stinguun∣tur actualiter in reipsa, neque à Dei Essentiâ neque inter se, quia perfectio Divina est simplici••er infinita. vide Irenaeum l. 2. contr. haeres. cap. 8. Iust. Mart. q. 144. August. de Civ. Dei l. 12. cap. 2. Hen. quodlibet. l. 5. q. 1. Durand. Ocham. in 1. d. 2. q. 2.
The Emi∣nent Di∣stinction ••f Divine At∣tributes.
Plures e∣nim sunt conceptus objectivi virtualiter distincti qui re∣spondent pluribus concepti∣bus forma∣libus rea∣liter di∣stinctis. Concep∣tus autem objectivi non sunt varii reali∣ter, actu, in se, sed eminenter & virtua∣liter in ef∣fectibus distincti.
Perfe∣ctiones omnes creatura∣rum qua∣tenus sunt in Deo nihil aliud sunt, quam ipsamet creatrix Essentia Dei. Vide August. lib. 4. Gen. ad lit. cap. 24. lib. 4. de Trinitate. Anselm. Monolog. cap. 34. 35.
Deus solâ & suâ eminenti virtute omnes creatas perfectiones creaturis communicat, & quicquid est perfectionis in creaturis eminen••er continet.
Nullus effectus est infinitus, & proinde nullus effectu•• est Divinae Virtuti adaequatus.
Em••nens & v••rtual•••• dist••nctio in ••e, non est distin∣ctio sed eminentia; est ••amen respectu nostricon cipiendi virtutem eminen∣tem se∣cundum distinctos respectus ad diversa obj••cta & effectus distinctos.
All the At∣tributes are inclu∣ded in e∣very Attri∣bute.
Q••od∣libet attri∣butum di∣vinum est infinitum simplici∣ter in genere en∣••is, & pro∣inde essen∣••iam divi∣nam & re∣liqua o∣mnia Es∣sentialia Attributa•• in suâ Es∣sentiali ratione in∣cludit. Vide Caie∣tan. de en∣te & essen∣tiâ, cap. 6. quaest. 12. Communi∣cable At∣tributes.
Perfe∣ctio sim∣plex & in∣finita non est ex multis & finitis per∣fectioni∣bus con∣flata.
Perfe∣ctiones quae sunt in creatu∣ris distin∣ctae sunt in Deo sim∣pliciter & unitè; perfectio enim divina est infinita, & proinde simplex & uniciss••ma.
Quicquid est perfectionis in creaturis Deo attribuitur, salva Analogiâ quae inter Deum & creaturam perfectissimam semper intercedit. Perfectio creata ut sicnon est Formaliter in Deo seclusis imperfectionibus creaturae; nam seclusâ omni imperfectione non remanet Formalis perfectio creaturae ut sic. Vide Suar. Metaph. Disp. 30.
Nomen Analogum nullā na∣turā com∣munem rebus A∣nalogis si∣gnificat.
In his quae non mole ma∣gna sunt idem est majus esse, quo•• me∣lius esse. Aug. Tri∣nit. lib. 6. cap. 8.
Nulla perfectio creata est in Deo Formaliter secundum adaequa∣tam ratio∣nem quam habet in creaturâ, sed eminenter tantùm, quia imperfectio in∣cluditur in intrinseca ratione & conceptu creaturae; S••pientia creat•• est accidens, Sapientia creata est finita, & imperfecta. Perfectio itaque est in Deo Formaliter secundum proprium conceptum Dei.
Distin∣ctio non est Pura fed emi∣nens, quia formatur & funda∣tur in ver∣bo Dei quod di∣stinctè de iis loqui∣tur ad captum nostrum. D. Alting. Problem. part. 1. Pr••b. 10. pag. 49. D. Voet. pag. de unica & simplicissi∣mâ Dei Essentia. Vide. Wallaeum. Gomarum.
Deus est ex seipso Ens essen∣tialiter summe perfectum & proinde ess••n••ia di∣vina inclu∣di••omnem possibilem per••ectio∣nem; nam perfectio∣nes illae, quae sunt in Deotan∣t••m emi∣nenter pro∣ut in ipso, sunt For∣malissime de conce∣ptu Essen∣tiali Dei. Vide Sua∣rez. Met. Disp. 30. Sect. 6. ••dcir••o ne quae••amus qui sit, cū sit omnia, & super omnia, & p••aeter ••m∣nia, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Vide Iul. •• calig. Exercitat. 365. p. 2. de D••o.
Hanc di∣stinctionē vocant ra∣tionis rati∣ocinatae virtualem aut Emi∣n••ntem. Nonnulli autem di∣stinctionē appellant ex Natura Rei Forma∣lem, non Actu, sed virtute, aut Emi∣nenter. Vi∣de sis Rha∣dam Con∣trovers. in∣ter Tho∣mam & Sco∣tum part. 1. Contro. 4.
Quicquid in Deo est essentiale unum est: à primâ autem unitate omnis differentia, omnisque numerus abesse debet▪
Pluribus conceptibus Formalibus inadae quatis realiter de∣stinctis unam eandémque essentiam simplicissimam divisim vel potius gradatim concipimus. Conceptus autem ejusmodi Ana∣logicè desumimus à rebus creatis, quae per multas distinctas∣que qualitates praestant ea, quae essentia divina per se.
The justice of God is not contra∣ry to the mercy of God.
Istae pro∣positiones falsae sunt in sensu Formali quae signi∣ficant ali∣quid Deo convenire secundum eam rati∣onem se∣cundum quam verè non convenit; ex. gr. misericordia divina punit, justitia divi∣na miseretur: attributum Justitiae punitivae est attributum misericordiae: intelligere est velle: voluntas intelligit: in∣tellectus vult, voluntas est intellectus. Verae autem sunt istae proposi••iones in sensu Identico acceptae, quia essentia divina est simplicissima, & proinde res illa quae est vo∣luntas intelligit; res illa quae est misericordia punit. Vi∣de D. Vo••tium. Select. Disput. p. 1. de unicâ & simplicissima Dei essentia.
The De∣crees of God.
Deus in seipso sem∣per agit in∣tellectu & voluntate ut purus Actus.
De actionibus Dei quas Decreta vocamus rotundè dici∣mus, Decreta Dei secundum perfectionem quam dicunt in Deo esse necessaria, aeterna & essentialia. Decreta autem quo∣ad speciem, terminationem & extensionem ad externa esse libe∣ra, nec deo estentialia esse, nec ipsum Deum. Voluntas enim divina liberè terminatur ad creaturas sine ullâ sui mutatione, vel reali additione; accedit autem externa quaedam denomina∣tio, & respectus rationis ex parte Dei in ipso decreto jam libe∣rè terminato fundatus, ex parte creaturae in ipsa futuritione seu existentia illius.
Voluntas & volitio divina una est & sim∣plex; nec multipli∣citatē aut divisionem & distracti∣onem, ne∣dum oppositionem, nec prius & posterius aut successionem, nec dependentiam causalitatis & effectus aut cujuscunque al∣terius ordinis admittens; haec autem omnia rebus volitis com∣petere possunt; res autem volitae à voluntate & volitione divin•• realissimè & infinitè distinguuntur; de rebus enim externis li∣bere volitis loquimur. Vide Maccovium Miscell. qu. Disp. 17. 20. 23, 24, 25, 26. Voetium. ubi supra.
The Acts of God.
Actus divini con∣siderati se∣cundum id sunt, quod nil differūt ab essentia divina, & proinde nulla est in illis vel mutatio, vel libertas, sed summa necessitas. Sicut enim Deus non potest non esse, sic neque potest non velle, non intellige∣re. Imo actus divini considerati secundum respectum quem di∣cunt ad objectum Primum ac principale, ad ipsissimam nimi∣rum Dei essentiam, sunt etiam necessarii; quia Deus non potest non essentiam suam scire, & tanquam summum bonum amare.
Vitall acts consi∣dered with out refe∣rence to a∣ny object.
Vital Acts considered with refe∣rence to Gods Es∣sence.
Vita di∣vina est in∣tellectu, volunta∣te, & po∣tentiâ a∣ctuosa. Deus no∣vit seipsū ut primum & infinitū objectum, amat seip∣sum necessariò, necessitate naturae, sed absque coactione, quia non potest nolle gloriam suam, aut seipsum negare.
Actus immanentes nullum dicunt respectum ad, quia non transeunt in objectum externum.
Personal Acts.
Actus Personales sunt aeter∣ni, & pro∣inde horū est absolu∣ta necessi∣tas absque potentiâ ad oppo∣situm.
Intrinsecal Acts consi∣dered with reference to extrinse∣cal Objects.
Actus intrinseci in Deo connotan∣tes respe∣ctum ad extra sunt ipsa Essen∣tia Dei concepta per modum actus, sed relativi, & quidem ad extra. Omnia e∣nim novit Deus quae sunt extra se, substan∣tias, & ac∣cidentia. Gen. 1. 31. Universa∣lia, & sin∣gularia, Psal. 33. 13 14. Iob c. 1 & cap. 2. Magna & parva. Matth. 6. 25. bona & mala. Psal. 33. 15. Ge∣nes. 6. 5. interna & externa. Matth. 6. 4. praeterita. Isa. 38. 3. futura. Isa. 41. 23. praesentia: possibilia denique 1. Sam. 23. 11. & impossibilia. Tit. 1. 2. Omnia etiam liberè vult extra se, quaecunque nimirum statuit vel permittere vel producere; non enim quicquid potest facit.
Extrinsecal Relations.
Extrinse∣cal Deno∣minations.
Extrinse∣cal Actions.
Actus excrinseci s••nt a Deo effectivè, non sunt in Deo Subjectivé••
The single Essence.
Necessitie and Liber∣tie.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 natu∣rale & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 li¦berum nō constituūt diversas potentias in Deo.
No Poten∣tia Execu∣tiva in God.
The Distin∣ction be∣tween the Divine Na∣ture and Persons.
Distin∣ctio in Deo nasci∣tur ex re∣lationibus pr opriis sive perso∣nalibus quales sunt pa∣ternitas, filiatio, spi∣ratio, pro∣cessio; quaedam enim rela∣tiones sunt omnibus personis communes quales sunt Identitas fundata super Vnitatem Essentiae, simi∣litudo fundata super Vnitatem Attributorum, & aequalitas fun∣data super unitatem magnitudinis.
Essentia & paternitas virtute & eminenter Formalem distinctionem continent, quia ita se habent ac si Formaliter distinguerentur.
Ego & Paterun•••• sumus nempe ••s∣sentiâ, Po∣tentiâ & Gloriâ. Er∣go Chri∣stus dedu∣••it fidem nostram ad hoc fundamen∣tum, ••mi∣rum ut ip∣se sit unus cum Patre Deus—necesle habemus ut videa∣mus in Christo Deitatem, in facie ejus per∣sonam Patris, cum sit Character Personae ipsius; in facie ejus gloriam Dei, cum sit splendor gloriae ipsius: in manu ipsius manum & potentiam Patris; denique in illo ••otam Dei Patris majestatem. Rolloc. in Ioh. 10. 30.
Credi∣mus tres esse H••po∣stases no∣bis in Scripturâ significa∣tas per nomina quae rela∣tionem si∣gnificant. Non est enim Pa∣ter nisi Fi∣lii, nec Fi∣lius nisi Patris, nec Spiritus nisi Spi∣rantis. Itaque relationes quidem ipsas habemus in divinis literis. Chami••r. de Canon•• lib. 9. cap. 10.
Haec di∣stinctio ha∣bet funda∣mentum non tantum in effect is aut phraseologiâ Scripturae, quia fuit ab aeterno. Nam ab aeterno Essentia fuit non tantùm Com∣municabilis sed Communicata, persona autem incommunica∣bilis; persona filii, genita, essentia ingenita.
The grand objection.
The An∣swer.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
Peculiar Relations do destin∣guish, but not com∣pound.
Compositiô described by its seve∣rall requi∣sites.
Quae actuex na∣turâ rei di∣stinguuntur, non possunt inter se uniri nisi per actionem causae efficientis: nulla autem causa essiciens prior Deo est; ergo.
Essentia in creatis est divisi∣bilis & per∣fectibilis; persona enim creata actuat et perficit essentiam perfectibilem; personalitates autem increatae non sunt actus naturae divinae ut sic & praecise consideratae eam perficientes vel informantes.
Essentia in creatis est imperfe∣ctae actua∣litatis & proinde perfectibi∣lis. Essen∣tia autem divina non habet se ad modum potentiae perfectibilis, nec persona divina ad modum actus naturam divinam infinitam simplicissimam per∣ficientis. Ratio quidditativa, & ratio Relativa in Deo tan∣quam diversae rationes Formales à nobis concipiuntur, sed am∣bae illae rationes Formales sunt in Deo secundum ultim••m uni∣tatem & actualitatem propriam. Nihil enim perficit essentiam divinam in actu quidditativo praeter ipsissimam essentiam; ni∣hil perficit personam in esse Personali praeter propriam Subsi∣stentiam, nihil perficit personam in esse Relativo praeter pro∣priam relationem: Pater per ipsam paternitatem perficitur in esse Relativo.
In Deo est essentia & tres re∣lationes, sed non sunt tres essentiae relativae. Propri••ta. tes personales praecisè & formaliter sumptae non uniuntur in∣ter se, & in se: nam unio in & cum essentiâ est in aliquo tertio.
Vide Ju∣nium con∣tra Bellar∣minum, Controv. 2. lib. 1. Praefat. Ut res planior sit, id praemittendum est perso∣nae considerandae triplicem rationem esse; Communem in essen∣tiâ quà Deus est: Singularem Absolutam in Persona quà sub∣sistit in unitate Essentiae; & Relativam in distinctione & ordine personae unius ad alteram.
Ratione Commu∣nis Deita∣tis & com∣munium essentiali∣umque attributorum, nulla distinctio cogitari debet, sed tantùm ratione Personae & proprietatum personalium.
Essentia notat natu¦ram divi∣nam cum proprieta∣tibus com∣munibus: Persona notat natu∣ram divi∣nam cum proprietati bus dist in∣ctivis, si∣ve istae proprieta∣tes sint Ab∣solutae, si∣ve sint Re∣lativae; ha∣bere sub∣sistentiam à seest quid Absolutū: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 est quid Positivum Nomen autem Personae, nomen Relativum communiter dicitur ori∣ginationis aut originis respectum includens, quo Pers••na di∣vina à se, vel ab aliâ subsistentiam habere significatur. Habere autem subsistentiam à se, quantum m••hi videtur non dicit respectum ad aliud, vel alium.
Tres sunt in eadem naturâ divinâ indivisâ Coexistentiâ Coessentialiter subsi∣stentes; tres enim personae inconfusè uniuntur & indivisè discernuntur.
Est ali∣quid in persona Ab solutum quod est Proprium, est aliquid in Deo re∣lativum quod est Commu∣ne. Iden∣titas, simi∣litudo, ae∣qualitas, mutua praesentia personarum inter se propter incon∣fusam in se mutuò comprehensionem, sunt relationes ad intra omnibus personis communes; relationes autē distinctivae sunt propriae.
Omnis distinctio essentialis est realis, sed omnis distinctio realis non est essenti∣alis. D. Vo∣etius.
Personae divinae non differunt realiter essentialiter, nec realiter separabiliter, sed proprietatibus realibus personalibus; tales autem sunt istae reales proprietates quae essentiae divinae non superaddunt no∣vam entitatem. Vide D. Alting. Problem. X.
The diffe∣rence be∣tween cre∣ated and uncreated Persons.
7. Obser∣vations con¦cerning cre¦ated Per∣sons.
1. The infi¦nite Nature of uncrea∣ted Persons.
The diffe∣rence be∣tween cre∣ated and uncreated Persons is Infinite.
Vide Na∣zian, orat. de Spiritu Sancto. Da¦masc. or∣thod. sid. lib. 3. c. 5. Athanas. Dialog. de Trinitate & in Mat. 11. Nazi∣an. orat de pace Orat. 37, & 51.
Absur∣dum est personas coessentia∣les & infi∣nitas ad creatarum quae finitae & diversae essentiae sunt modulum redigere.
Natura creata est dependēs; persona creata est Indepen∣dens, quia non est in alio per de¦pendenti∣am ab illo tanquam susten∣tante.
Cum hu∣manitas Christi consequu∣ta fuerit personali∣tatem propriâ in∣finite per∣fectiorem, nonest cur propriam personal••∣tatem am∣plius appe∣teret. Si enim adhuc inclinaretur ad propriam perso••alitatem, vi qua∣dam detineretur in verbo, & ita status illius esset violentus, & quasi contra naturam. Cajetanus.
The third difference.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Da∣mascen. Orth fid. lib. 1. c. 4.
Vide Ire∣n••um lib. 2. cap. 16. Athanas. in decret. Synod. Ni∣cen. Nazi∣••••. lib. de Fide. Cyrill. lib. 10. contra Iulian. Euseb. Praeparat. Evan∣gel. lib. 8. c. 2. Athenagoram, Talianum, Augustin. de Tri∣nit. & passim.
Vorstius Deum contemnendum pingit Corporeum, visi∣bilem, mutabilem, accidentibus subjectum, in quo sunt plures res, &c. Vide Eglisem. Cris. & Hypocris. Bogerman contra Grotium. Synod. Nat. Dodrac.
Racov. Catechis. de cognitione Dei cap. 1.
Remonstrant. Con••ess. Apolog. p. 41. 42.
Deus est Spiritus. Joh. 4. 24. Jehovah Exod. 33. 19. Eheje. Exod. 3. 14, 15 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Apocal. 1. 4. Summe perfectus Genes. 17. 1. summe∣que unus. Deut. 6. 4. & proinde omnem de Deo com∣positio∣nem imò & quasi com∣positionē de Deo ne∣gamus. vi∣de Rhadā Episcop. Pact. Con∣trovers. in••∣ter Thomam & Scotum, part. 1. Controv. 4. append. 2. pag. 82. 83, 84.
Eglisem. contra Vorstium.
Maccov. Mis. quaest. Disp. 17. 20, 23, 24, 25. 26. Vas∣quez. disp. 16. Deus est liber ab omni compositione et••am im∣proprie dictâ, qualis est ex essentiâ & esse, ex natura & suppo∣sito seu ex essentia & subsistentiâ, ex genere & differentia: & proinde liber ab omni distinctione in essentia su••. Nam di∣stinctionis & multitudinis transcendentalis personarum at∣que adeo modorum & relationum longe alia est ratio. D. Voet.
Mareria Prima for∣mae, diffe∣rentiae ul∣timae, &c. simpliciter simplices dicuntur; Angeli sunt Com∣parative simplices; essentia au∣tem divina est Absolu¦tè & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 simplex. En•••• sum∣mum est 〈…〉〈…〉, & proinde essentiti•• unitate unum, simplicissimè unicum. Vide. D. Vo••ti∣um de Natura Dei sa••pl.
Non de••emus proprietates Dei ab essentia ejus vel cogita∣tione scpara••e, quia in essentiae forma & vir••ute omnes con∣tinentur, & Deus sine proprietatibus ejus cogita••i non potest. D. Wallaeus de Deo. pag. 127.
Essentia divina non est i•• po∣ten••iâ, quia est paras actus, non est perfectibilis, quia omnes perfectiones complectitur.
Deus non depender à subjecto à ••a ••sis vel internis, vel externis, à principio quocunque priori aut su∣perieri.
Essentia divina non est in se composita, nec aliquid ipsi com∣ponibile, nec ipsa a∣licui com∣ponibili. Essentia aeterna nec s••ipsâ nec ullâ realiâ posterior esse po∣test.
Proprie∣tates De•• non minùs 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sunt quàm ejus essen∣tia•• 〈…〉〈…〉 non essent ipsissima Dei essentia sim••l 〈…〉〈…〉 Joh, 5. 26. est vita; Joh. 11. 25.
The fourth difference.
Unius personae in creatae to∣ta est essen¦tia divina, sed non so∣lius.
Singula sunt in sin∣gulis, & omnia in singulis, & singula in omnibus, & omnia in omni∣bus, ••num omnia. Au∣gust. lib. 6. de Trinita∣te cap. ul∣timo. Nec major est essentia in tribus quàm in duabus, nec in duabus quàm in unâ, quia tota est in singulis. August. ubi supra.
Tot sunt sustantiae singulares quot personae creatae.
Essentia creata est finita, circumscripta, imperfecta, divisi∣bilis, perfectibilis: per differentiam enim individualem sive personalem contrahitur, perficitur. Essentia partibilis per par∣tes & separatim inest singulis individuis Angelicis & humanis. Essentia autem divina est perfecta infinita simplex, & proinde eadem etiam numero & individuo (quod aiunt) tribus perso∣nis communis citra omnem multiplicationem, divisionem aut separationem; eadem quippe natura singularis est tota in singu∣lis personis divinis.
Unitas specifica non est rei sed rationis extra men tem enim nostram non est unitas naturae humanae in personis diversis sed pluralitas. Unitas autem essentiae divinae est realis, & singularissima, quia ita Deus est unus ut etiam sit solus, & ita solus ut non possit esse alius.
Persona multiplicatur & proinde distinguitur; essentia autem divina nec distinguitur, nec multi∣plicatur.
Unitas ad essentiam proprie pertinet, distinctio autem personarum non ad essentiam propriè & per se, sed ad rationem in es∣sentiâ respicit. Iunius con∣tra error. Samosat.
Essentiall Attributes are common but Perso∣nal Attri∣butes are Incommu∣nicable.
In omni∣bus myste∣ria supra rationem sunt Re, Ratione, & Modo.
The fifth difference betweene created & uncreated Persons.
Vita Dei est actuo∣sa intelle∣ctu, volun∣tate, & po∣tentiâ.
Quod es∣sentiae pro∣prium est hypostasi∣bus com∣mune est.
Quicquid dicitur de praedicato essentiali, dici••ur de Subjecto.
Filius 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 dicitur ab Epipha∣nio contra Marcelli∣anos haere∣si▪ 72 pag. 358. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 inquit Ba∣silius de Filio con∣tra Euno∣mium lib 2 pag. 339.
Vide D. Go••ari Diatriben de Christo 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & D. Voe∣••ii notas in select. Disp. D. Voetii par. 1. pag. 442. 445. 449.
Omnes tres personae sunt Coes∣sentiales, & proinde essentialiter unum sunt; tres enim perso∣ne non sunt tres essentiae, sed ipsissima & unicissima essentia, quia simplicissima. Personae autem Coessentiales sunt coaequi∣les; licet enim filius & Spiritus Sanctus vitam, potentiam, omnia habeant à Patre, omnia habent per naturam, nihil per gratiam.
The grand objection.
Potentia divina di∣stinguitur in Perso∣nalem & Essentialē Personalis est quâ Pa∣ter generat filium, &c. Essentialis est quae cō∣munis est tribus per∣sonis. Po∣tentia Pa∣tris vide∣tur esse A∣ctiva, quia Pater est gignens; generatio autem filii videtur es∣se Passiva, quia filius est genitus Psal. 2. 7. Joan. 1. 14. There is no Passive Ge∣neration in the Son of God. The divine Essence of Christ is not changed, or begotten. The An∣swer.
Nullu•• horum a∣lium aut praecedit aeternitate aut exce∣dit magni∣tudine aut superat po∣testate Au∣gust. lib. 6. de trinita∣te cap. ul∣timo.
Ideo non est Pater major fi∣lio, quia aequalem sibi genuit. Originis enim quaestio ista est, quis de quo sit; ae∣qualitatis autem qualis aut quantus sit. Aug. Cont. Max. l. 3. c. 18.
Pater non genuit filium exse per seminalem rationem, nec extra se per Physicam productionem, sed in se, hoc est in unita∣te essentiae genuit. Philip. 2. 6.
Potentia passiva est propria materiae, ex quâ pro¦ducitur ge∣nitum. In deo autem nulla est generatio Materialis. In passiva generatione genitum à non esse ad esse producitur; Filius autem semper actu exticit; genitus non est gignente po∣sterior, quia ab aeterno genitus.
Genera∣tio consi∣derata re∣spectu fi∣lii geniti est filiat••o sive pro∣prietas fi∣lii; gene∣ratio autē respectu Patris est Communicatio vitae subsistentis; per hanc autem communicationem filius est unum cum Patre ab aeterno. Mich, 5. 2. non sunt itaque duae generationes sed duae personae gig∣nens, & genita. Vide D. Alting. Problem. XI. par. 1.
Quod est in po∣tentia gig∣nentis, id non sem∣per extitit, sed potest esse vel non esse. Filius au∣tem sem∣per exticit imò non potest non esse, quia est 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Ens sum∣me necessarium non minus quàm ipse Pater.
Eadem essentia quae in Pa∣tre est pa∣terni••as, in filio est fi∣liatio; eâ∣dem poten¦tiâ generat Pater, fili∣usque ge∣neratur. Habetitaque silius eandem potentiam quam Pater, sed cum a∣li•• relatione; Pate•• ut commuicans, filius ut accipiens, Johan. 5. 26. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 generare est dare potentiam, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 gènerari est acci••ere potentiam vide. Aquin. Sum. part. 1. qu. 42. art. 6.
Non po∣test autem qui accepit ei qui de••it esse i••••qual••••, qu•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 accepit ut esse•• ••qua∣lis. Aug. lib. 3. con∣t••a Maximinum. cap. 14.
Id solum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unum est, quod simplicissimum est; Solus itaque Deus s••mpliciter unus est in quo nihil omnino est quod Deus non est. Vide Fonse∣cam in Metaphys. Aristot. lib. 4. cap. 2. qu. 5. Sect. 7.
Aristot. Metaphys. lib. 4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 2 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 6. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 6 Kinds of Unity. All the three per∣sons have the same Power.
Omnia habet fili∣us à Patre, sed Pater & filius unum sunt: filius itaque nihil accipīt ab i∣lio, qui est a Filio aliud; filius enim est idem cum Patre uni∣cusque Deus.
Pater & Filius spi∣rando com¦municant vitam sub∣sistentem Spiritui Sancto per quam Spiritus Sanctus est unum cum Patre & Fi∣lio. 1 Joan. 5. 7. Spiritus itaque spiratus vitam accipit subsi∣stentem, nec non potentiam Coessentialem; eandem itaque po∣tentiam habet Spiritus, sed cum diversa proprietate sive rati∣one personali.
Patres dicunt es∣sentiam generare▪ hoc est es∣sentia rela∣tive acce∣pta, essen∣tia cum modo & proprietate personali considerata generat, hoc est Deus Pater generat Filium.
The sixth difference.
Essentia non gene∣rat essenti∣am quia est unica, simplicis∣sima: per∣sona non generat personam extra essen¦tiam, quia essentia in∣finita extra se fundi non potest.
Tota natura divina est in tribus personis, tota in singulis singularissime unica, servatis tum essentialibus essentiae, tum relativis personarum in unitate es∣sentiae proprietatibus.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, pro∣pter in con¦fusam in s•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cō∣prehensio∣nem & prae∣sen•••••• 〈…〉〈…〉 circum in∣cessionem ut satis barbare lo∣quuntur. Vide Goma¦ri Diatrib•• de Trinit. Inconfuse uniunt••r indivise discernun∣tur. The divin Persons sub∣sisting in one another
Vide ••a∣mascen lib. 1. Orth. fid. cap 19. Vide 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in sent, dist 19. q. 2. Thom p. 1. q. 42. at••. 5. John 14. 10, 11.
The nature and Person of God the Father is in Christ. John 10. opened. John 10. 38.
John 10. from the ••5 v. to the 39.
John 8, 16. 18, 29. John 14. 10, 11, 21. John 10▪ 38 John 16▪ 27. 30. 32. Joh. 17▪ 21 The sixth difference betweene created & uncreated persons.
Ut autem difficilli∣mum sit hoc crede∣re, & natu∣ram longè ex••perat: ita necessa∣rium est a∣deo ad sa∣lutem, ut sine fide il∣lâ non sit salus. Hinc sequitur quòd cum à naturâ a∣lienum sit, & tamen necessariū, oportere nos ex na∣turâ exire & supra na turam ef∣ferri, ad hoc ut vi∣deamus Deum in Christo ha¦bitantem. Rolloc. Cō. in Iohan. 14. v. 10, 11
Deus est ubique to∣tus in seip∣so: ••uōmo∣do ubi{que} si in seipso? ubique quia nusquam est absens: in seipso autem quia non Continetur ab eis, quibus est praesens; anq••••ā sine eis esse non possit. August. Epist. 57. ad Da••danum.
Qui ubi que est in seipso est; qui in se∣ipso est, in omnibus sibi Coes∣sentiali∣bus neces∣sario est, volens ta∣men gau∣densque.
Naturae est in tri∣bus perso∣nis non 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 tan∣tùm, sed & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: per sona••um non 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quasi vas esset in va••se, sed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, neina••qua∣litas inve∣heretur.
Spiritus Dei dicitur esse in Deo, 1 Cor. 2. 11. qui tamen est Deus ipse, 1 Cor. 6. 20. nempe ad intimam inexistentiam tri∣um personarum in seipsis exprimendam. D. Wallaeus de Simpli∣citate Dei pag, 128.
In processionibus divinis nulla est partitio 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, vel 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quibus tribus modis res creatae producuntur, quia eadem natura singularis simplex, indivisibilis & infinita sine divisione vel multiplicatione communicatur.
〈…〉〈…〉 seip•••• ••bi∣que est De∣us noster omniprae∣sentissimus, totus in mundo, totùs extra mundum totus super mundum, totus & unus in omnibus & singulis, nusquam in∣clus••s, nusquam exclusus, ubique immensus, non per essentiae multiplicationem, extensionem aut divisionem, sed per infini∣tatem simplicissimam.
Ante omnia De∣us erat so∣lus ipse si∣bi & lo••us, & mu••dus & omni••. uti Tertul∣li••••us con∣tra ••••ax.
Essentia Dei non miscetur cu••splen didis, n••c a sordidis contami∣natur, sed in utero virginis fuit hypostatice unita cum carne nostrâ sine ullâ commix••i∣one, confusione, contamin••tione, vel diminutione. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Si homo tantum∣modo Christus, quomodo adest ubique invocatus, cum haec hominis natura non sit, sed Dei ut adesse omni loco possit? Ter∣tulian. de Trinitate. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Anastasius Antiochenus. Angeli sunt substantiae spirituales separaim & per se subsistentes, & proinde sunt alicubi definitive.
Tres per∣sonae sunt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quia 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & non tan∣tum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Tres homines quibus una competit definitio, sunt tantum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quia natura eorum est finita, & divisa; non enim tota esten••ia patris crea••i sed par•• tantum filio commu∣nicatur, & hypostase•• eorum sunt separatae. Non sunt itaque ejusdem naturae indivisae, ejusdem naturae singularis, & pro∣inde licèt communi ratione homines dicantur, tamen reipsa non sunt unus homo. Personae autem divinae 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sunt propter unius communis, & tamen sing••laris naturae identi tatem, quam simul & pariter, & totam habent Pater Filius & Spiritus Sanctus.
Immen∣sa Dei prae sentia non est accid••••s vel modus essentiae e∣jus sed ipsamet essentia. Deus non est alicubi sed ubique; quod est Alicubi est in ubi Definiti••o. Vide Aug. qu. lib. 83. qu. 20. & lib. 8. Geres. ad lit. cap. 26. Chrysost. Homi••. 5. ad Coloss. Dan. as••en. Nazian. orat. 34. Basi••. Hom. 16. Hieronym. in Isa. 66.
Qui est ubique Repletive non est A∣licubi Definitive. Vide Scalig. Exercit. 159. §. 5.
The 7th. difference.
Personae creatae dif∣ferunt in∣telligentia voluntate, potentiâ, essentiâ, o∣peratione, locorum intervallis imo pro∣priâ acci∣dentium congerie. Vide Go∣marum de Trinitate Tom. 3. pag. 24.
Personae divinae non dicuntur Relativae propter essentias Relativas, sed propter modos sive proprietates Relativas, quae quidem proprietates non differunt realiter essentialiter, imo nec realiter separabiliter ab essentiâ divinâ. Personae autem divinae sunt extra omne genus omnemque dependentiam.
Vide Me∣taphys. Fonsec. lib. 5. cap. 15. Sect. 7.
Vide Sco∣tum, Esti∣um &c. in 1. sent. dist. 30. omn••s 〈…〉〈…〉 re∣spectiva concipitur in Deo ad creaturam est tantùm secundum rationem, & modum con∣cipiendi nostrum, quia divina natura est Absoluta in se, & ab omni ordine creaturarum independens, sive creaturae exi∣stunt sive non. Vide Suarez. Disp. 47. Sect. 15. Num 25.
The eighth Difference betw••ene created & uncr••ated Persons is in respect of their different duration.
Aecerni∣tas proprie dicta est increata; duratio i∣taque An∣gelorum non est vera aeternitas. Aeternum dicitur quod est extra terminum, & ex se incapax termini, quia in sua intrin∣secaratione infinitatem in durando includit.
Angels are not coaeter∣nall with God.
Aliud est esse aeter∣num, aliud sempiter∣num, quia omne ae∣ternum est immuta∣bile. Ri∣chard. Vi∣ctor. lib. 2. de Trinitate. c. 4. Ratio aeternitatis consequitur immutabi∣litatem sicut ratio temporis motum. Th. p. 1. qu. 10. art 2. c.
Deus est aeternus, imo & sua aeternitas; Deus enim est infinita perfectio, & proinde simul, & ex se, atque immu∣tabiliter habet totam perfectionem suam, ratione cujus ex se sit sufficiens ad coexistendum omni durationi, quantacunque illa sit; & proinde sicut Deus est sua essentia & perfectio, ita est sua aeternitat. Vide Suarez. Metaph Disp 50. Sect. 4. Th. p. 1. qu. 10, a. 2.
Est in Angelis potentia Obedien∣tialis ad corruptio∣nem, quae natural••s dicipotest, quia in na∣tura Angelorum quae à creatore dependet 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 desinere posse ad nutum creatoris fundatur. Omnis enim potentia Natura∣lis est quae in rerum naturis fundatur. Vide si•• Suarez. Disp. 43. Sect. 4. n▪ 2.
Si Angeli ab aeterno creati es∣sent à Deo, non seque∣retur eos esse Deo coaeternos per durati∣onem intrinsecam, sed potius ab aeterno esse, & aeternitati coex∣istere per denominationem extrinsecam à Dei aeternitate sum∣ptam; durarent enim ex aeternitate, non tamen duratione quae sit aeternitas, quia aeternitas est duratio per se, & abintrinseco necessaria, independens, immutabilis, quae nullam variatio∣nem aut successionem admittit neque in esse, neque in propri∣is & internis actibus aut motibus; vel per internam capaci∣tatem, vel extrinsecam potentiam. Angeli non sunt Deo co∣aeterni, multo minus aequaeterni, sed sunt potius aeviterni quàm aeterni.
Unum est pri∣mum, alia dependent igitur. Er∣go suâ na∣turâ om∣nia praeter unum cor∣ruptibilia. Tame••si enim sunt entia ab∣soluta a subjecto & a termi∣no: tamen haud sunt absoluta à causa. Sunt igitur per aliud, & ab alio; at omne dependens ab eo, à quo dependet, si est vo∣luntarium principium, mutari potest; ergo ipsae quoque men∣tes immateriales etsi ponantur, à Peripateticis coaeternae Deo, tamen ut à Primo pendent à Primi nutu deponi possunt ab eâ essentiâ, in quâ sunt ab illo constitutae. Vide Scalig. exerc. 307.
Damasc. Orth. fid. lib. 2. cap. 3. & 12. Iust. Mart. qu. 13, 14. Hieron. contra Pelagium lib. 2. Cyrill. 8. Thes. c. 2 Angelus auem non potest destrui per Physicam corruptionem, quia non componitur ex partibus Physicis. Viri itaque gravissimi ideo dicunt Angelos natura incorrupti••iles esse, quia Angelus non habet aliquid intra naturam sui corruptivum.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ari∣stot. lib. 11. Metaphys. cap. 7.
Id enim Deus est (inquit A∣ristoteles) & proinde Deum ipsam vitam esse intulit; aeternitatem ae vum continuum, aeternumque vocat sine successione, sine terminis.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 dicitur 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Legimus etiam 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 apud Aristot. 1. de Caelo text. 100. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 inquit Phavorinus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, aevum semper existens, quod nunquam caepit, neque desinit. Plutarchus insuper 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Deo ••ribuit. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Deus est, secundum aevum immu••abile, qui u••us in uno nunc aeter∣nitatem implevit. Psal. 146. 6 first Verses. Dan. 9. 24. Heb. 9. 12. 15. Heb. 5. 9. 1 John 3. 9. 1 Pet. 1. 20 23, 24▪ 25.
The ninth difference betweene c••eated & unc••eated Persons.
Christus est 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 non 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ est enim filius à Pa∣tre, Deus à seipso.
See Mr. Estwicks learned Treatise in confu∣tation of Mr. Bidle, pag. 41.