Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana, or, A fabrick of science natural, upon the hypothesis of atoms founded by Epicurus repaired [by] Petrus Gassendus ; augmented [by] Walter Charleton ...

CHAP. 1. OF GENERATION AND CORUPTION.

SECT. I.

THat Nature,* 1.1 or the Common Har∣mony of the World, is continued by Changes, or the Vicissitudes of Individualls, i. e. the Production of some, & Destruction of other Things, determined to this or that particular Species; and that there must be one Catholique Matter, of which all things are Elemented, and into which they may be again, by Dissolution, reduced: are Positions, to which all men most readily prostrate their as∣sent. But, What that First and Com∣mon matter is; How Concretio••s are Educible out of it; and How Re∣ducible at length into it, after the Privation of their Specificall Formes:

are Quaestions, whose Beginnings are more easily known, than their ends. However, forasmuch as we have endeavoured, in our immediate∣ly foregoing Book, to determine the First of them, together with the possible Emergency of all Qualities (whereof either our sense, or Reason can afford us any measure of cognizance) and the Reasons of the Per∣ception of them by Animals, from Atoms, so and so Configurated, and so and so Disposed in Commistion: it now neerly concerns us, to at∣tempt the most hopefull Decision of the other Two that so we may not seem to have thus long discoursed of the Principles, and Affections of Compound Bodies, while we remained wholly ignorant of the most pro∣bable wayes both of their Origination from those Principles, and of their Reversio•• into them again, when they have lost the right of their for∣mer Denominations, and suffered to the utmost of their Divisibility.

* 1.2By the terme, GENERATION, we ought praecisely to under∣stand that Act of Nature, whereby she produceth a Thing de novo, or gives Being to a Thing, in some certain Genus of Bodies Concrete: and con∣sequently, by its Contrary, CORRUPTION, that whereby she Dissolves a Thing▪ so that thenceforth it ceaseth to be what it was. For, when Fire, a stone, a Plant, an Animal, or whatever is referrible to any one determinate kind of Bodies Compound, is first produced, or made, and begins to be so, or so Denominated; it is truely said to be Generated: and contrariwise, when a Thing perisheth, and loseth the right of its former Denomination; it is as truely said to be Corrupted. And this is that which Aristotle (1. de Generat 2.) frequently call's Gene∣ratio 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Generation Simple and Perfect; so to praevent that Confusion of Generation with Alteration, into which many of his Prae∣decessors had oft•••• fallen, to their own and their Disciples no little dis∣quiet. For, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Alteration can be accounted a Generation on∣ly improperly, of secundum quid; forasmuch as by Alteration a Body is not produced de novo, but onely acquires some new Quality, or some Accidentary Denomination: and Philosophers accordingly define it to be Progressionem Corporis ex una qualitate in aliam, a Progression of a Body from one Quality to another, as when water is changed from cold to hot by fire. Again, every Mutation requires a subject to be Alte∣red; and that subject must be something Compound, complete, and al∣ready constituted in some determinate Genus of Beings: But, of Ge∣neration strictly accepted the onely subject is the First and Universall matter, which being in it self destitute of all Form Aristole doth there∣fore subtly call simpliciter Non-ens, simply, or determinately Nothing; forasmuch as he frequently inculteth, that Generation is made [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪] ex N••n ente simpliciter. Because had He ommitted that ad∣verb simpliciter, his Reader might justly have understood Non ens ab∣solute Nothing Absolutely; and so have accused him of openly contra∣dicting his own Fundamentall Axiome, Ex nihilo nihil fieri, that nothing can be made or ••enerated of Nothing.

This being praemised, to praevent the danger of Aequivocation;* 1.3 we observe First, with Aristotle (3. de caelo 1.) that among the An∣cient Philosophers, some held, that Nothing is Generated, nothing Cor∣rupted; as Parmenides and Melissus: Others again, that. All things are Generated and Corrupted; as Hesiod and Heraclitus. Secondly, that of Those, who admitted Generation, and consequently Corruption, some conceived, that Generation is made by the Access of a Form to Mat∣ter; and that that Form is a certain New substance, absolutely distinct from that of the Matter, and together with it constituting the Com∣positum, or whole resulting from the Commistion of Matter and Form: of which sect Aristotle Himself deserves to be in the Chair, because in order to his Assertion of this Opinion, He supposeth a Threefold sub∣stance, the Matter, Form, and Composiitum arising from their Com∣mistion. But, Others though they concede, that Generation, indeed, consisteth in the Accession of a Form to Matter; yet will they not allow that Form ac••eding, to be substantiall, but onely a certain Acci∣dent or Modification of the Matter it self: so that according to their theory, in Generation there superveneth upon Matter some certain Qua∣lity, of such a Condition, as that by reason thereof a Thing obtain s a certain Being in Nature, and acquireth some determinate Denomina∣tion, respective to that Genus of Bodies, to which its Nature doth re∣ferre it. And in the Catalogue of Philosophers of this persuasion, Aristotle nominateth as Principalls, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democri∣tus, and Leucippus; all which He sharply taxeth of Confounding Ge∣neration with Alteration, and of inferring, that aswell Generation as Corruption ariseth, not from the Transmutation of Principles, but one∣ly from their [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] Concretion and Secretion: which is not only inconsistent, but contrapugnant to His own great Hypo∣thesis, that the Four Elements, or Catholique Principles of Genera∣tion, are so Transmutable, both secundum substantiam (at least, accor∣ding to the Comments of all his modern Expositors) & secundum Qua∣litate••, as to their substance and Qualities, as that from their Com∣mistion, Alteration, and Corruption, a certain New and distinct sub∣stance doth arise, which is the Form of the Thing so produced. For, having supposed for a Groundwork, that the Four Elements are not the First Principles; it could not stand with his advantage, not to have assumed also, that the Elements may be so Transmuted, as that the more Generall and Common Matter doth still remaine: and that the same, upon the perdition of the Elementary Forms, may put on a New Forme, that is substantiall; and that very thing, by which the resulting or Generated Body is specified, and entituled to such a De∣nomination. But, as for Empedocles, and the rest enumerated (to whom we may add also Epicurus) 'tis well known that notwithstanding they all admitted the Four Vulgar Elements, as readily as Aristotle Him∣self, yet would they by no means hear of their Transmutability either as to substance, or Qualities: unanimously decreeing, that in their Commistion each of them is divided into particles most minute, which yet retain the very same substance and qualities, that they had before, as that every particle of Fire doth still retain the substance and quality of Fire, namely Heat; and that every particle of Water doth

likewise constantly conserve the substance, and quality of Water, viz. Moisture; and so of the other two: so that it is most evident, They would have, that in Generation there is onely a [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] Concre∣tion of the insensible particles of the the 4 Elements, but no Transmu∣tation of any one of them, either with the Perdition of their own, or the Adeption of a new substantiall Forme; both which are praesumed by Aristotle.

* 1.4But this great Difficulty, about the Generation of Things from the Commistion of the General Principles, soon loseth it self in a Greater, which concerns the Manner and Condition of their Commistion, and whose consideration will best instruct us aswell what is the main Dif∣ference among Philosophers, touching this most weighty Theorem, as what opinion can best deserve our Approbation and Assent. Concer∣ning this, therefore, we find two necessary Remarks (1) That there are Two different Kinds of Commistion, whereof the one is, by Aristotle (de Generat. 1. cap. 10.) termed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Composition, and by others, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Apposition: the other is called, in the Dialect of the Stoicks, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Confusion, and in that of Galen, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Coalition, or Temperation. The Former is when those things, whether Ele∣ments, or others, that are mixed together, do not interchangeably penetrate each others parts, so as to be conjoyned per minima; but either themselves in the whole, or their parts, onely touch each other superficially: as in the Commistion of the Grains of wheat, Barly, Rye and other Corn. The Latter, when the things commixed, are so seemingly united, and concorporated, as that they may be concei∣ved mutually and totally to pervade and penetrate each other, per minimas partes, so as that there is no one insensible particle of the whole mixture, which hath not a share of every ingredient; as when Wine and Water (that we may use the Example, aswell as Conce∣ption of Aristotle) are infused together into the same vessel. Now the Stoicks and Aristotle are equally earnest to have this Latter way, or manner of Commistion, viz. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Confusion, to be that, accor∣ding to which the Elements of Principles of Bodies are commix't in Generation: But Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, with all their Sectators, allow none but the Former, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Ap∣position; with very solid arguments (among which the easy separa∣bility of Wine from Water, either by a sponge, or Cup of Ivie, is not the least) asserting, that the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of Elements, as also of all other things, is really a meer 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Composition of their small par∣ticles, though apparently, or according to the judgement of sense, it may pass for a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Confusion.

(2) That, when either the Elements themselves, or any other Bodies more Concrete, as Water and Wine, are mixed together; they may recipro∣cally divide, dissect, and resolve each other into either very small and insensible [moleculae] masses, which yet are each of them composed of multi∣tudes of Atoms concreted; or most exile particles, i. e. Atoms themselves: and where the resolution is only into insensible Masses, there may the Com∣mistion be accounted Perfect; but, where the parts of each ingredient

are so far resolved, as to be reduced quite down to the first Matter, Atoms, there is the Commistion most Perfect.

Now, upon this Distinction depends the whole Controversy betwixt Aristotle and the Stoicks, on one part, and the Atomists, on the other, about the Manner of the Commistion of the Common Principles in Generation: Those vehemently contending for their totall Concorpora∣tion, or Unition per minimas partes, so that every the most minute particle in the whole mistum, must be of the very same nature with the whole; These strongly asserting, that no Mistion of Ele∣ments, or Temperation of Principles, goes further than a meer Ap∣position, or superficiall Contingency of their several particles, so that the particles of each ingredient must still retain the very same nature they had before commistion, howbeit they may seem to be totally Concorported, or Confused, in regard they are reduced to such Exility, as that each single one escapes the discernment of the sense.

These two ••o highly repugnant Opinions being thus rightly stated,* 1.5 it follows, that we uprightly perpend the Verisimility of each; that so we may confer our Assent upon the more ponderous. If we look no further than the Commmon Notion, or what every man understands by the Terme, Mistion; it is most evident, that the things commixed ought to Remain in the Mistum; for if they do not remain, but Perish, both according to substance and Qualities, as Aristotle and the Stoicks hold, then is it no Mistion but a Destruction: and since the proprie∣ty of this Notion cannot be solved by any other reason, but that of the Atomists, that the particles of things are in commistion onely ap∣posed each to other, without amission of their proper natures; what Consequence can be more naturall and clear than this, that that their opinion is most worthy our Assent and Assertion? (2) Though Chry∣sippus attempts to conserve the integrity of this Common Notion, by a sub••lety, saying; That the most minute particles of things mixe••, do so remain entire both as to substance and Qualities, as that they reci∣procally penetrate each other, and become mutually Coextended; and that thence it comes to pass, that in the whole Mistum there is none the smallest particle, which is not mixed, or which doth not partake aswell of the substance, as Qualities of every ingredient 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ ••et doth He not onely fall short of his designe, but also further en••ang••e himself, and subvert other more manifest Notions. For, f••••m that his Position it necessary follows. (1) That two Bodies are at once in one and the same place, both mutually penetrating each others dimensions, or without reciprocall expulsion (2) That a pint of Water, and a pint of Wine commixed, must not fill a quart, but that both are no grea∣ter than one, i. e. be both contained in a pint together: forasmuch as it supposeth, that the particles of one have no other Ubi, but what is posse'st by the particles of the other. (3) That a very small Body may be Coextensive, or Coaequate to a very great one; as that a spoonfull of Water may be Coaequate to a But of Wine: since it supposeth, that, both being commix't, there is no part of space in the vessel including them, which doth not contain somewhat of the Water as well

as of the Wine. Now, all these things being manifestly Repugnant, and yet naturally Consequent upon Chrysippus Position: it is no less repu∣gnant, that the particles of things commixt should remain, by mutuall Penetration, and Coe••••ension.

* 1.6(3) Nor, indeed, hath Aristotle Himself been more happy than Chry∣sippus, in his invention of a way, to remove or palliate the gross repug∣nancy of his opinion, to the proper importance of the term, Commi∣stion; as may easily be evinced by a short adduction of it to the test of reason. That He might defend his Doctrine of the Remanence of things commixed, notwithstanding their reciprocall Transubstantiation; and at the same time avoid ••hose sundry manifest 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Incongruities, to which that doctrine 〈◊〉〈◊〉 subject: He excogitated Two sophisticall subter∣••uges. The one, that when two divers things are commixed, in very une∣quall proportions, so as the one is very much praevalent o're the other (as when one single ••rop of Wine is instilled into ten thousand Gal∣lons of water) in th•••• case there is no Mistion, in strick acceptation; but an absolute Ex••olution and Transmutation of the species of the weaker into that of the stronger, (of the species of the Wine, into that of the Water.) The Other, that when the things commixed are so exactly equall in qu••••••ity or Virtues, as that one is not the least praeva∣lent over the other; o•• when the one praevails upon the other but little: in both these cases▪ though each put on the nature of the other, by reciprocall t••ansmuta••••on, or that which is a little inferior be altered from its own nature into that of the Superior; yet is not that Transmutation of both, a Generation of either, or the transmutation of the one, a Ge∣neration of the other▪ but onely of some Third thing, which is middle betwixt, and common ••o both.

But▪ there is neit••er of these, which may not be called a snare, more justly than a subter••••••••. For, as to the First; were He living, and in the Schools, we sh••••ld onely demand of him, if after the instillation of one single drop of Wine into 10000 Gallons of Water, a second drop should be supe••••nfused, and after that a third, a fourth, and so more and more successively▪ till the mass of Water were augmented to ten, a hundred, a thousa••••fold: of what Nature would the whole mixture of Wine and Water be? He, doubtless, would Answer Us, that the whole would still b•• Water, though to one measure of Water 10000 measures of Wine were superaffused drop after drop; since, according to His own theory▪ it allwayes must remain meer and simple Water (other•••••••• the first ••••op of Wine could not be transpecificated, or be converted into the ••••ture of the Water) into which even the very last drop of Wine wa•• ••••••used: or else He must teach us when, i. e. from what particular drop of Wine instilled, the whole Aggregate or Mass of both l••quo•••• beg•••• ••o put off the nature of Water, and on that of Wine. And, who is so 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••ither by nature, or praejudice, as not to apprehend, that the Re••son is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 same for one, as for the other; for ten thousand ••••ousand Gallons, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••or one single Drop of Wine? Now this being Absurd, as f••r beyo••d palliation, as pardon; is it not much better for Us to say, 〈…〉〈…〉 drop of Wine be infused into so large a quantity of Water, it is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 into very exile particles, each whereof doth

still retain the nature of Wine, but so commixed and adhaering to the in∣commensurably more dense and numerous particles of the Water, as that they seem to vanish, though really they still subsist the very same, as before commistion? That Two drops being infused into the ••ame Water, the particles therof becoming doubly more numerous, would be contingent and cohaerent to more particles of the Water? That, if ••en, a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand, a hundred thousand, &c. Drops of Wine be successively superaffused into the same Water; the particles of the Wine would at length amount not only to an equall, but a greater number than those of the Water: and consequently so praevail over them, as ••o change their Virtue, and subdue them into the Apparence of Wine?

And as to the Other; we might very lawfully Except against it, as altogether Unintelligible (for, who can understand, How the Inferior Mistile can be transmuted into the Nature of the superior, and yet not be the very same thing with it?) but, least we appear all severity, we shall wave that cavill, and insist onely upon the most important part of the Assertion. Aristotle saith, That f••om the Commistion of two di∣vers things, a certain Third thing is Generated, or Produced, which is of a Nature Median betwixt, and Common to Both those things com∣mixed. Now, Whether is it His meaning, that the Resulting middle and Common thing doth participate of the Extremes of Each mistile: or, that it ariseth from the Destruction of both Mistiles? For the Text will endure no third interpretation. If the Latter; then do not either of the things mixed Remain, and so there can be no Mistion: expres∣ly contrary to His own Assumption, and the tenour of that Common Notion, for the praeservation whereof He excogitated and designed this Subterfuge. If the Former, as seems most genuinely inferrible from the Adjectives, Medium and Commune; then our Enquiry is, How, and in what respect, that Middle and Common thing comes to be participant of the Extremes of each Mistile? In the Wine (that we may retain his own Instance) there was Matter, there was Forme, there were Qualities; and likewise in the Water: shall we therefore conceive, that the Middle and Common thing produced, is participant of all, i. e. Matter, Forme, and Qualities of Both the Mistiles; or onely of those of one of them?

(1) For the Matter; He cannot deny, that the Mistum containes the whole Matter of Both: because neither the Matter of the one, nor of the other can be destroyed. And since the Matter of each hath Parts, the smallest of which is Extense or Quantitative, and so must pos∣sess a proport••onate part of space in the Continent; therefore we demand, whether are the Parts of the Matter of the Wine existent in the very same places, with the Parts of the matter of Water; or in distinct places by th••mselves? If He should say, as the supposition implies, that the parts of Both do exist in one and the same place; He would ruine him∣self upon that Impossibility of the Coexistence of Two Bodies in one place: and if that they are in distinct places; then must it follow, that they onely touch each other superficially, and so are not mixed by mutual Penetr••tion and Coextension (as He affirmed) but by meer Apposition, or Composition. (2) As to the Forms; Aristotle cannot but admit, that

the Forms of both Wine and Water do survive their Commistion, and exist in the Mistum▪ or Middle and Common thing resulting from them; because, otherwise, there would be a plain Corruption, not a simple Alteration of the things mixed, and consequently Mistion ought to be defined rather Mis••ilium Corruptorum, than Alteratorum Unio: Besides, if the Formes perish, ••he Emergent Form must be absolutely New, and so not participant of ••he Form of each Mistile. But, if He reply, that Both Forms are Unit••d and coexistent in the whole matter of the Mi∣stum; then must eve••y the smallest particle of the matter of each have both the Form prop•••• to it self, and the Form of the other also, and so the whose matter must have two whole distinct Forms at once: which is an Absurdity 〈◊〉〈◊〉 below the concession of Aristotles subtility, and whether or no hi•• Sectators will defend it, we leave to themselves. To elude this Dilem••••. He, indeed, hath determined, that the Form of the Mistum is one on••••▪ and that neither of the Praeexistent Forms, in Act, but both in 〈◊〉〈◊〉. But, alas! this is a poor shift for so great a Philosopher; for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••he praeexistent Forms of both Mistiles be not Actually in the Mistum, then are not the Mistiles onely Altered, but wholly Corrupted: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 can i•• enter into the thoughts of any sober man, How the Resulting 〈◊〉〈◊〉 should contain the Praeexistent ones, in Power. For, if the Result•••••• Form is capable of being changed again into the praeexistent one••▪ from which it did result; as when Wine and Water commixed, ••re again separated: that argues of necessity, that the Forme o•• the Mistum is not a New Forme (as He as∣sumes) but one Composed of the two praeexistent▪ ones commi∣xed.

(3) And l••stly, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for the Qualities; neither ought Aristotle to deny the Remanence of 〈◊〉〈◊〉: for, since in them consisteth the chief Capa∣c••ty o•• Power of ••••••overing the last Forms; if they perish, how can they be in••e••vien•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••he recovery of the Forms? Necessary it is, there∣fore▪ that the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of things commix't be onely interchangably Refracted, not Ab••••••shed. And thus have we demonstrated, that Ari∣stotle, aswell as the ••t••icks, engulfed himself in an Ocean of bottom∣less Diffic••ties, an•• ••r••econcilable Incongruities; while He sought to propugne that unre••••onable Opinion, of the Mutuall Confusion, and Transmutation of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 things commixed in Generation. For a Collate∣ra•• Remark▪ be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to reflect upon this great Example, when you would e••force, How 〈…〉〈…〉 burthen lye's upon those shoulders, which take upon th••m to support an 〈◊〉〈◊〉: and how weak the Armes of the most Giant 〈◊〉〈◊〉 are found 〈◊〉〈◊〉 they strive to bear up against the stream of Truth.

* 1.7Having detec•••••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sundry Difficulties, that wait upon the Do∣ctrine of Aristotle▪ ••ouching the Origination, or Emergency of a Form, in a thing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from divers things commix't; let us proceed to Another 〈…〉〈…〉 same Cha••ter and enquire whether there be no•• also 〈…〉〈…〉 Difficulty inseparable from his Doctrine of the Es••ence 〈…〉〈…〉; that so at length we may the better 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ W••ether the Forme of a thing Generated from Elements,

or other more compound Bodies commix't, be a substance (as Aristotle con∣tends) or onely some certain Quality, or Accident (as Democritus and ••picurus assert.) But, first, we are to advertize, that from this Discourse of ours, against the substantiality of Forms Generated, we exempt the Rationall Soul of Man; for, that being an Essence sepa∣••••ble from the Body, and subsisting entire and complete after separa∣tion (as we intend, if God shall be pleased to grant us health, and the world vacation from publique cares, to demonstrate at large, in a singular Treatise) may therefore be most justly termed a substance, o•• Form substanti••ll: as intending onely to examine the reasonable∣ness o•• th•••• opinion, by the Schools imputed to their Master Ari∣s••o••le; that the Forms of things are substantiall, and wholly distinct 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Matter. The Quaestion (and indeed a very Great one) is, Wherein that substan••e, or Form, which Aristotle affirm's to arise, de novo, in Generation, lay hid before Generation? His sectators un••n••mously t••ll us, that it was contained in the Matter, not in Act, but onely in Power, or Capacity: and we demand again, if it were not Actu••lly contained in the Matter, how could it be Actual∣ly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••om thence? They reply, that it is educed out of the M••tter on••ly by the Power of the Agent. But, this is a shame∣full Desertion o•• the Quaestion, which is not about the Power of the Agent; but, How the ••orm of a thing, which themselves as∣sume to be a subst••n••e, i. e. a reall and self-subsisting Entity, and so clearly Distinct from the Matter of the Mistum, can yet be Edu∣ced out of that very Matter? When they say, that the Form is conce••led in the Power of the M••tter; if they would but permit us to understand the Form to be a certain portion of the Matter, and as it were the Flower, o•• pu••••r part thereof, which should after∣w••rd, in Gener••tion, be attenu••ted, refined, sequestred from the grosser m••ss; and then be again conjoyned to the same, and as it were Animate it: then, indeed, might the Eduction of a Form, as a reall ••nd substantiall Being, be easily conceived, and assented to. But, ••his they expresly prohibite, lest they should incur a double Contradiction: the one, in ••onceding the Matter to be Corruptible; the other, in allowing the Form to be indistinct from Matter. Foras∣much, therefore, as they protest against that Interpretation of the Text; and yet are peremptory, that the very substance of the Form educed, wa•• before eduction potentially comprehended in the very substance of the Matter: they give us the trouble of still pressing them to explain How, or after what manner, the substance of the F••rm was Potenti••lly contained in that of the Matter? And here they fly to their accustom'd refuge, an obscure Distinction, say∣ing; that the Power of the Matter, in respect to the Form, is 〈…〉〈…〉 Eductive, forasmuch as the Form may be, by ••••rtue o•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Ag••nt, educed out of it; (2) Receptive, forasmuch as it rece••v••s that same Form educed. And so they conclude, that the M••tter doth c••ntain the Form in both these Powers, or double Ca∣pacity. But, this will not blunt the edge of Curiosity. For, as to the ••••rst, viz. the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Power; 'tis manifest, that to con∣tain a thing by an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Power, imports no more, nor less than this, to have Actually in it self that, which is capable of eduction

from it. Thus a Purse, wherein ten pieces of money are actually contained, may well be said to contain them by an Eductive power; because He that hath the purse, may at his pleasure Educe them from thence: but, if the Purse did not actually contain them, He that wanted money, might starve before He could prove, that they were contained therein by an Eductive power.

And therefore we may set up our rest in this Conclusion; that as a piece of Gold cannot be educed out of an Empty Purse: so doth not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, o•• Exforme Matter (so themselves determin e it to be) contain a Form, by an Eductive Power.

As to the Other member of the Distinction, the Receptive Pow∣er; tis also mani••••st, that to contain a thing by a Receptive Power, is no other than to be in a condition of Receiving it: but, this Capabili••••, or Power Receptive comes much short of being sufficient, that any thing should be actually educed from that, which hath onely such a power of entertaining it; since other∣wise the prodigall need not fear the exhaustion of all the money in his purse, becaus•• it is capable of more, when that's gone. Which being most grossy Absur'd; it cannot be less Absurd to conceive, that the Form of a thing may be educed from the matter thereof, be∣cause it is contained therein by a Receptive Power. Indeed, if they would allow the Form to be, not a substance, but a certain Quality, species, or modifi••ation of a substance or Matter; then might we understand how it might be contained in the Power of the Matter; because the sense would be no more than this, that the Matter is ca∣pable of being so changed and disposed, as to be put into such a Mode, or Form•• by the same reason, as the species, or Image of Mercury may be s••id to be contained in the power of a piece of wood, or be e••uced out of it; insomuch as the wood is capable of being formed ••••to the statue of Mercury, by the hands of the statuary.

But, while t••ey make the species or Image of Mercury, to be a New subst••••ce, absolutely distinct from the wood, which is the substance, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Matter of that Image; and in Generall discri∣minate the Figu••e▪ or Forme of a thing, from the substance of the thing it self 〈◊〉〈◊〉 we are to be excused, if we do not at all under∣stand them, in ••ore than this, that they endeavour to assert what themselves do no••▪ nor cannot understand.

* 1.8But, as for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 other Philosophers, formerly nominated; if you please to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 your attention to the summary of their theory concerning the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Argument, we doubt not but in the conclu∣sion you will 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with us in this judgement, that They speak ••at leas•• bo•••• much more intelligibly and satisfactorily. They deny not▪ tha•• Generation is indeed, determined to a sub∣stance••▪ 〈…〉〈…〉 the thing produced or generated, is a substance. Nor that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••neration there alwayes ariseth a Forme, by which the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 generated is specified; because Generation sup∣poseth 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and specification imports a Forme. Nor, again, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••orm is really a substance, i. e. a certain

most tenuious, most spiritual, and so most active part of the Body, such as we h••ve o••ten hinted the soul of a Plant or Brute Animal to be. But the points which they declare against, as manifestly unreasonable, are these Two: (1) That such a Forme is a New substance, or formerly not Existent; be∣cause it is unavoidably necessary, that that most tenuious, m••st spiritual, and most active portion of the matter should be somewhere praeexistent, be••••re it was copulated to the grosser and less active part of the mass, and affected it with such a particular mode, as specifies the mistum: (2) That that which is properly called the Forme of a thing, is ought else but a certain ••uality, or determinate Manner of the substances exist••ng, or special Modification of the matter thereof. For, it being unanimously decreed by them All, that every thing is generated from an Aggeries of Matter, or Material Princi∣ples, coalescing in a certain Order and Position: they therefore determine, that the thing generated, or Concreted, is nothing but the very m••t••r••al Principles themselves, as convened and coalesced in this or that determi∣nate Order and Position, and so exhibited to the cognizance of our sen∣ses, under this or that determinate Forme, Species, or Quality. And lest we should delude our selves, by a gross apprehension, that the tenu••ous and more agile part of the b••dy is on••y confused••y blended together with the gross and less agile part; Empedocles and Anaxago∣ras tell us praecisely, that the Forme of the whole, or ••uality by which the Body is made such as it is, doth yet result from as well the order and situa∣tion of the tenuious parts among themselves, and of the gross••r among themselves, as of the tenuious and grosser con••unctively, or one among a∣nother. And this they illustrate by the similitude of an Hou••e. For, as an House is nothing but Timber, Stones, Morter, an•• other materials, ••ccor∣ding to such or such a reason and order disp••sed an•• contexed together, and exhibiting this or that Forme; and ••s there is nothing in it, which before the structure thereof was not found in the wood, quarry, river, and other places, ••nd which a••ter its demolition (whereby its Forme perisheth) doth not still exist in some place or other: so is a Horse ••for example•• nothing else but those material Principles, or exile Bodies, of which after a certain manner connected among themselves it is composed, both with this deter∣minate Conformation of Members, and this interior F••cu••ty of Veget••ti∣on, and in a word, with this particular Forme, ••u••lity, Species, or Con••••ti∣on, which denominates it a Horse▪ when yet the Principles of which ••oth its Grosser members are coa••unated, and its tenuious and spiritual subst••nce, the soul, is contexed, w••re fo••merly ex••stent in his progenitors, in gr••••s, in Water, Aer, and other Concretions; and the Form also, so ••oon as the Co••∣positum is dissolved, vanisheth, as well the tenuious as grosser particles retur∣ning again to aer, water, earth, or other Bodies, as they were before their Con∣cretion, or Determination to that particul••r species ofthings, by Gener••tion.

But, Demo••ritus, Epicurus,* 1.9 and Leucippus are somewhat more full and perspicuous in their Solut••on of this Problem, declaring ••1•• That, when a Thing is Generated, multitudes of Atoms are congregated, commixe••, c••••∣posed, disposed, & complicated a••ter su••h a dete••minate manner, as that ••••om thence doth necessarily result a body of such a particu••ar species, ••pparen••e, and consequently of such a respect••ve denom••nation. (2) That in su•••• a Body there is no substance, which w••s not praeexistent▪ it being im••ossib••e that New Atoms whi••h only constitute C••rpore••l 〈…〉〈…〉 shoul•• ••e created: but only that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 certain D••spositi•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Atoms, eternally praeexistent, is made, 〈…〉〈…〉 s••cha Form 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which

is nothing really distinct from, but is the very Atoms themselves, as they are thus, and no otherwise ordered and composed. (3) That the Forme of a thing, considered abstractly or by it self, is therefore onely a meer Quality, Accident, or Event, of wh••ch the Atoms, which compose that Body or sub∣stance, are naturally capable, when thus consociated and mutually related: whether we understand it to be the Forme of the whole Compositum, or of that most subtile and active part of the substance commonly called the Soul, or specifical Forme▪ V. G. of an Horse) the same being (not a New, or freshly created substance, as Aristotle, and the Schools upon his Authority conceive, but) only a certain Contexture of the most subtile and moveable Atoms in the composition. (4) That out of the infinite stock of the Univer∣sal and First Matter, uncessantly moving in the infinite space, when such Con∣simular Atoms meet together, as are reciprocally proportionate or respon∣dent, and mutually implicate each other by their small Hooks and Fastnings; then are generated certain very small Bodies, or masses, such as being much below the discernment of th•• sense, may be accounted Semina Rerum, the seeds ofthings: differing from the Homaeome••ical Principles of Anaxageras in this, that though very hardly, yet at last they may be dissolved, and redu∣ced to the single Atoms, of which at first they were composed▪ whereas the Homoeomera of Anaxag••ras are Irresolu••le, ••nd First Principles. (5) That these Moleculae, Fi••st Masses, or smallest Concretions of Atoms, are the Proxime and Immediate Principles of ••ire, Water, Aer, and of other things more simple, such as the Chym••sts conceive their Three Catholique Principles, Sal, Sulphur▪ ••nd Mercury to be: from which afterward congre∣gated and comm••••t into greater mas••es, ari••e variou•• kin••s of Bodies, respe∣ctively to the various m••nners of the••r commistion, disposition, and con∣cretion▪ as Animals, V••getables, Minerals. ••6•• That from the Dissolu∣tion of Bo••ies composed of divers sorts of ••uch First M••sses of Atoms, ••uch as Animals, Plants, Minerals, and each of their several species; divers Bo∣dies of more simple C••mpositions may be Generated, according as the small masses or Complications of Atoms, separated, by dissolution, from them, shall be more or less Consimilar, and convene again in this or that or∣der and position, or particular species; as when from wood dissolved by Fire, are generated Fire, Smoke, Flame, Soot, and Ashes. And this is th•• Summa∣ry of the Atomists Doctrine concerning the essence of Forms: which that we may conveniently illustrate, let us a while insist upon that most oppor∣tune instance of the Generation of those divers things, Fire, Flame, S••••oke Soot, Ashes, and Salt, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Dissolution of Wood.

Let us conceive (1) That Wood is a Compound Body, made up of various Moleculae,* 1.10 or small masses of Atoms: (2•• That those small masses of Atoms are such, as that being congregated, commixt, and according to such a determinate manner disposed, they must in the whole composition, retain the species or Fo••me of Wood; but being di••located, s••parated, and after another manner again connexed and disposed, they must exhibite other less compound Forms, or species of Bodies: (3) That in the Con∣cretion there are exis••ent multitudes of spherical, most exile, and most a∣gile Atoms, such as, when they are expeded from the ••etters of the g••osser mass, and flye away together in great numbers, and consociated, are compa∣rated to make and exhibite the species of Fire: (4) That of these Igneous particles is generated Flame. Whose Clarity & Splendor ariseth from the Ab∣jection of other dissimilar and impure parts, formerly commixt with the Ig∣neous particles. Whose tendency Vpwards, and succeeding Disapparence arise both from the force and pernicity of the Igneous particles in their exsiliti∣on,

and the pres••ure or urgency of the ambient Aer. Whose gradual At∣tenuation, and conicall Figure arise from hence, that the Igneous particles, in respect of their roundness, exility, and superlative mobility, evolving and expeding themselves from the Concretion the soonest of all others con∣tained therein, and in swarms diffusing themselves through the environing aer, on all sides, do create a Light, which is by degrees so exhausted, in re∣gard of the speedy avolition of the igneous Atoms composing it, that it dwindles or consumes away to a cone or sharp point, which is also much more rare then the basis, where the igneous particles are most dense and agminous. Whose Dilatation from its base to some degrees, and Tremu∣lation or Vndulation arise from the copious, but indirect emption of the ig∣neous particles, disengaging themselves from the grosser parts of the mix∣ture. Whose Obnubilation by some smoke commixt with it, is caused by the many Fuliginous particles, that the Igneous ones carry off with them, as they flye away. Whose faculty of Pungency, Penetration, and Dissolu∣tion of most bodies objected, consisteth in the transcendent subtility of the Igneous particles, and in the pernicity of their motion, as we have largely de∣clared in our praecedent Discourse of the Nature of Heat. (5) That the Fume, or smoke issuing from wood in combustion, together with Flame, is much more simple than the wood it self, but yet compounded of divers par∣ticles, some whereof are Watery, others Earthy, others Salt, others Fuligi∣nous, as appears by the adhaerence of the soot to the Chimny, by the prae∣cipation of the earthy faeces of soot to the bottom of a vessel of Water, and the extraction of Salt from thence by a dissolution of soot in warm water, and the Denigration of things thereby. (6) And lastly, that what we have conc••ived of Flame and Smoke, may be equally reasonable, if applied also to the remaining Ashes of wood burned, they being like∣wise composed of various particles or small masses both of Salt and Earth; and the particles of Earth being again composed of Mud and Sand, or such as that of which Glass is made. And when we have perpended the verisimility of these Conceptions, we shall be fully convinced; that Wood is a thing composed of divers sorts of small bodies, or minute masses of Atoms; and that the Form thereof doth consist in the Congeries, Concretion, complexion, and deter∣minate Disposition of them all; as also that the Fire, or Flame issuing from ••t in combustion, is a thing likewise consisting of various sorts of particles contained in the Wood, and which being separated, and again consoc••ated (according to the Consimilarity or likeness of their natures) and concreted among themselves, obtain another Disposition, and Forme, and so exhibite the species of a New body.

SECT. II.

* 1.11FRom Generation (••s in the Method of Nature, so in our disquisitions concerning Her) we pass to CORRUPTION; which is no more but the Dissolution of the Forme, i. e. the determinate Modification of the matter of a thing, so that it is thereby totally devested of the right of its former Denomenation. For, since it is most certain, that in Generation, there doth arise no such New substantial Forme, as Aristotle dreamt of, and most men have ever since disquieted their heads withal: it can be no less certain, that neither in Corruption can any such Form, as ever was substanti∣al, perish or be annihilated. Which verily that we may most commodi∣ously enforce, resuming our late Instance of the Generation of Fire, Flame Smok, &c. from the combustion of wood, we shall to our praecedent re∣marks there thereupon, superad this observation; that when wood perish∣eth by Fire, and so is resolved into divers other Bodies, it is not resolved in∣to any other, but those very same things, which were really praeexistent and contained therein; and consequently, that nothing thereof perisheth, but only that determinate Connexion and situation of its parts, or that special manner of their existence, (you may call it Forme, Quality, Species, Acci∣dent, or Event) in respect whereof it was wood, and was so denominated. A strange Assertion you'l say, that there is really existent in wood, Fire, that there is Flame, that there is Salt, that there are all those divers things into which it is resoluble by corruption. And yet the Truth much transcends the strangeness of it▪ the difficulty, at which you are startled, consisting only in Name, not in the Thing it self. For, if by Fire you understand burning Coales or Flame actually ardent and lucent; and if by Salt you conceive a Body sapid, really and sensibly corrading the tongue: then, in∣deed, we shall confess that there is no such Fire, nor Flame, no such Salt ex∣isting actually in wood: But, if you b•• the names of Fire, and Salt, under∣stand (as the tenour of our Dissectation, both directeth and obligeth you to understand) the seeds, or small masses, or first Concretions of Fire and Salt, such which ar•• so exile, as that each of them singly accepted is very much beneath the perception and discernment of the most acute of senses; but ye•• when multitu••es of them are sequestred from the whole mass, and are again congregated and freshly complicated together, the seeds o•• Fire by themselves, those of Salt by themselves; then do these actually burn and shine, and those actually make a Sapour, sharply affecting and corrading the tongue: we see no reason, why you should wonder at our tenent, that both Fire and Salt, viz. that very Fire which burns and shines in the wood, that very Salt which may be extracted from the Ashes thereof, were praeexistent in the wood. Certainly, you cannot but admit as highly con∣sentaneous to reason; that in a vapour to what rate soever attenuated, there are contained the seeds of Water, or the first concretions of Aqueous A∣toms; which though singly existent they are wholly imperceptible, yet nevertheless are they really particles of water: for as much as they want only the convention and coalition of many of them together, to the disco∣very

of their nature in sensible masses; for of many of them condensed are made very small drops of water, of those drops assembled together arise greater drops, of those rain is generated from that rain arise whole streams▪ and many of those streams meeting together swell into great and impe••uous torrents. And if this be so easily, why should that be so hardly admit∣tible?

But to desert this Example,* 1.12 and address to another so competent and il∣lustrious, that it takes off all obscurity as well as difficulty from our concep∣tion; it is well known, that silver is capable of such exact perm••stion with Gold, as that though there be but one single ounce of Silver admixt by con∣fusion to 1000 ounces of Gold: yet in the whole mass there shall be no sensible part, wherein somewhat of that small proportion of silver is not contained. Now, you cannot expect that each single molecula, or seed of silver should appear to the sense, so as to distinguish it self, by its proper co∣lour from the small masses of Gold: because each molecula of silver is sur∣rounded with, and immersed among 1000 particles or small masses of Gold. Nor can you believe, that the silver is wholly unsilvered, or Changed into Gold; as Aristotle affirmed, that a drop of Wine, infused into a great quantity of Water, is changed into Water: because the skilful Metallist will soon contradict you in that, by an ocular demonstration. For, by Aqua Fortis poured upon the whole mass, He will so separate the silver from that so excessive proportion of Gold, as that there shall not be left inhaerent therein so much as one the smallest particle thereof; and in the superfice you may plainly discern multitudes of very small holes, (like punctures in wax, made by the point of the smallest needle) in which the moleculae or small masses of the silver were resident, before its sequestration from Gold. Why therefore, according to the same reason, should it not be equally pro∣bable, that the seeds, or particles of Fire are so scatteringly diffused through the substance of wood, as that being surrounded and overwhelmed with my∣riads of particles of other sorrts, they cannot therefore put on the appa∣rence proper to their nature, and discover themselves to be what really they are, until being by the force of the external fire invading and dissolving the compage of the wood, set at liberty, and disengaged from their former op∣pression, they issue forth in swarms, and by their coemergency and consimi∣larity in bulk figure and motion being again congregated, they display them∣selves to the sense in the illustrious Forme of Fire and Flame, and proporti∣onately diminish the quantity of the wood; which thereupon is first redu∣ced to Coals, and a••terward, the separation and avolation of more and more particles successively being continued, to Ashes, which containing no more igneous particles, can maintain the combustion no longer.

The like may be said also of the Salt, diffusedly concealed in Wood.* 1.13 For, insomuch as each single particle of Salt ambuscadoed therein, is blen∣ded among, and as it were immured by myriads of other particles: it is im∣possible they should exhibite themselves in their genuine Forme, while they remain in that state of separation or singular existence; which they must do, till the compage of the whole mass or Concretion be dissolved. And would you be, beyond all pretext of doubt, convinced, that they yet retain their proper nature, amidst such multitudes of other particles; be pleased only to make this easie Experiment. Take two pieces of the same Wood of equal weight, and steep one in water, for two or three days, and keep

the other from all moysture; then by fire reduce each of them apart to Ashes, and by Water a••••used thereunto, and boyled to a lee, extract the Salt from the Ashes of each: this done, you shall find the Ashes of the drie piece to have yeelded a quantity of Salt proportionate to its bulk, but those of the wet one very little, or none at all. And the Reason is only this, that the water in which the one piece was macerated, hath exhausted most part, if not all of the Salt, that was contained therein. Now this Ex∣ample we alledge to praevent your falling upon that vulgar conceit, that the Salt of Ashes is produced only by the Exustion of the Wood: since, ac∣cording to that supposition, the macerated piece of wood would yeeld as much of Salt, as the Drie. This considered, it remains a firm and illustri∣ous truth, that all the particles of the Fire, Salt, Smoke, &c. educible from wood, were really praeexistent therein, though so variously commixt one a∣mong another, as that notwithstanding each of them constantly retained its proper nature entire, y••t could they not discover themselves in their own colours, proprieties, and species, till many of each sort were dis-engaged from the Concretion at once, and assembled together again.

* 1.14Now such are the Advantages of this Theory above that of Aristotle, that besides the full suf••ragation of it to the Common Notions of Genera∣tion and Corruption, of substance, Forme, &c. it assists us in the expositi∣on of Three General Axiomes, which though drawn into rules by Ari∣stotle himself, are partly inconsistent with, partly unintelligible from his doctrine.

The First is, si aliquid corrumpitur ultimum abire in primam Materiam, That when any thing is corrupted, it is at last reduced to the First matter: which doth expresly contradict His grand thesis, that the Forme of a thing is a substance, which begins to be in Generation, and ceaseth to be, or is annihilated in Corrupt••••n; for, had He spoken conformably thereto, He must have said, that when the Compositum is dissolved by Corruption, it is partly reduced to matt••r, partly to Nothing. But, if the Form be not substantial, and that what is Corrupted, is composed of no other substanti∣al parts, but those wh••ch are material; as we have assumed: then, indeed, doth the Axiome hold good, and we may with good reason say, that when any thing is Corrupted, it is reduced to matter, or the material parts, of which it was composed, as wood dissolved by fire, is reduced to Fire, Smoke, Soot, Ashes, &c. of which it did consist. And forasmuch as by that Ad∣verb, Ultimum, Finally, He gives us the occasion of Enquiring, An in Cor∣ruptione detur resolutio adusque materiam Primam? Whether or no in Corruption there be a Resolution even to the First matter? we cannot but observe, that the manner of that ultimate resolution may be much more easily comprehended, according to our assumption, than according to His own. Because Our First matter is Atoms, and the second matter certain small masses of Atom••, or the first Concretions, which we therefore, ob∣serving the phrase of ••picurus and Lucretius, call Semina Rerum, the see••s of Things, such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 those whereof Fire, silver, Gold, and the like Con∣cretions are composed▪ and so, if the Resolution proceed to extremity, i. e. to Atoms, or in••••soluble particles (as in some cases it doth) then may it well be said, that the resolution is made to the First Matter; but if it go no farther then those ••••all masses of Atoms (as most commonly it doth not) then can we just•••• say no more, than that the resolution is made only to the second matter.

The Second is, Corruptionem Unius esse Generationem al••erius, that the Corruption of one thing is the Generation of another, which cannot con∣sist with truth, if understood in any other sense but that of our supposition· For, since, Corruption is nothing else but a separation and exsolution of the pa••ts, of which a thing was composed: we may conceive, how those parts so separated and exsolved, may be variously convened and commixt again af∣terward, as to constitute New Concretions, & put on other new Forms. Not that they were not formerly existent, as to all their substantial parts: but only that they were not formerly existent in a state of separation from others, nor coadunated again in the same compage, and after the same man∣ner.

The Third, Id quod semel Corruptum est, non posse idem numero naturae vi∣ribus r••stitu••, that what is once Corrupted, cannot by Natures power be a∣gain restored numerically the same: which is to be understood in this sense. As a Watch, or other Artificial machine, composed of many several parts, may be taken in pieces, an•• easily r••••omposed again into the very same nu∣merical Engine, both as to matter and Forme; the Artificer recollecting the divided parts thereof, and so disposing them, as that each possesseth the s••••e pl••ce and position, as before its dissolution: so likewise might the same N••tural Comp••situm, V. G. a piece of Wood, be, after the separation and e••so••ution of all its component parts, again recomposed numerically the very same, both as to m••tter and Forme, in case all those dissolved parts cou•••• be recollected, reunited, and each of them restored to its former pl••ce and position. But, though all the various parts thereof remain, yet are they so scattered abroad into so many and so various places, and commixt (perchance) with so many several things, that there is no Natural Power th••t can recollect and restore them to the same places and positions, which they held before their disunion and dissolution. And, therefore, if any man shall say, that such or such a thing, dissolved by Corruption, is capable of being restored again the same in specie; we ought t•• understand him no o∣therwi••e than thus: that some of the parts of that thing may so return, as that being conjoyned to others, not numerically the same, but like unto those, to which they were formerly conjoyned, they may make up a body ex••ctly like the former, in specie or of the same Denomination; as when the C••rcase of an Horse is corrupted, some parts thereof are converted in∣to Ea••th, some of that Earth is converted into Grass, some of that Grass e••t••n by another Horse, is again converted into Seed, whereof a third Hor••e is generated. And thus are we to conceive the endless Circulation of Forms.

As for the Principal CAUSES of Corruption,* 1.15 (omitting the conside∣ration of such as are External, or invading from without, in respect they are innumerab••e; and of that Internal one also, the intestine war of Elements in every Concretion, of which Aristo••le hath such large discourses, and the Schools much larger) the theory of Epicuru•• instructs us, that they are on∣ly Two. The Fi••st and G••and one is the Intermistion of Vacuity among the solid particles of bodies▪ in respect whereof all Concretions are so much more easily Exsoluable, or subject to Corruption, by how much more of Vacuity they have intercepted among the solid particles, that compose them: according to that D••stich of Lucretius.

Et quam quaeque magis cohi••et res intus Inane, Tum magis his rebus penit••s tentata labascit.

The other is the Ingenite Gravity▪ or natural and inamissible propensity of Atoms to Motion which always inciteth them to intestine commotions and continual attempts of exsilition. So that where their Connexions and complications are but lax, and easily exsoluble, as in all Animals, all Plants, and some Metals, there do they sooner and more easily expede themselves, and so in short time totally dissolve the Concretions, which they composed. But, where they are bound to a more lasting peace, by more close compa∣ction, and reciprocal complications, as in Gold and Ad••m••nts; there their inhaerent propensity to motion is so supprest, as that they cannot diseng••ge themselves each fro•• other, without great difficulty, and after many hun∣dred yeers continual attempts of evolution, convolution and exsilition. Which is the true Reason both why Gold is the le••st Corruptible of all things yet known▪ and why it is not wholly Incorruptible, but obnoxious to spontaneous Dissolution, though a••ter perhaps a million of yeers, when after innumerable myriads of convolutions, the Atoms which compose it, have successively attained their liberty, an•• flye off one after another, t••••l the whole of that so closely compacted substance be ••i••solved.

* 1.16From the Causes, our thoughts are now at length arrived at the MAN∣NERS, or Ways of Generation an•• Corruption▪ and fin•• them to be of Two sorts, General and Special. Concerning the General we ob••e••ve, ••••at accord••ng to the do••trine of Epicu••us, (who••e great praehe••inen••e in point of Verisimility and Concordance throughout, hath ma••e us prae••er it to that of Aristotle, which we have am••ly convicted of manifest Incom∣prehensibility, and self-contradiction) things are generated either immedi∣ately of Atoms themse••ves convened together and concreted, and resolved again immediately into Atoms; or immediately of praeexistent Concreti∣ons, and resolved imm••••iately into them ag••in. Of the way how the For∣mer is effected, we have said enough, in the second chapter of our D••scourse against Atheism. A•• to the Latter, be pleased to unde••stand, in a wor••, that all Generation is caused by either (1) A simple Transposition of pa••ts of the same numerical matter, Or (2) an Abject••on of some pa••ts of the old▪ or pr••••xistent matter, or (3) An Accession of new parts. For, howbeit all these three General w••ys of Generation are mostly so concurrent an•• com∣mixt, as that one is hardly found w••thout the association of the other two: yet when we consider ••ach of them in special, and would determine which of them is praedomin••nt over the others, in the generation of this, or that particular species of ••hings: it will be necess••••y, that we allow this Discri∣min••tion. First, the••••••ore, those things ••re s••••d to be generate•• [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] by a meer T••ansposition of parts, which are observed to be spon∣taneous in their Pro••uction; as Frogs engendred only of mu•• or sl••••e, Worms from putrid Chees, &c. because from the very ••elf-s••me praeeist••nt matter, only by a various transposition of its parts, & succeeding re••uct••on of them to such, or such a determ••n••te order & situation, ••o••ething is gene∣rated, of a nature absolutely new or qu••te different from what th••t m••tt••r formerly had. An•• ••••ther also are we to refer tho••e Transmuta•••••••••• of ••∣lements, of which Ar••stotle and the Sc••ools have such frequent ••nd high dis∣courses: because, when Aer is conceived to be changed into Water, or Wa∣ter

transformed into Aer; all the mysterie of those reciprocal metamor∣phoses amounts to no more, than a meer putting of the parts of the same common and indifferent matter into different modes, and the interception of more or less of Inanity among them, as we have frequently demonstra∣ted. Secondly, such things are conceived to be generated [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] by Addition or Accession, which are not spontaneous in their original, but of seminal production, and specificated by the univocal virtue of their seeds: because in Propagation, rightly accepted, a very small quantity of seed, per∣vading a greater mass of matter, doth ferment, coagulate, and successively appose more and more parts thereof to itself, and conform the same into the species of that thing, from which it was derived, and impraegnated with the idea of the whole and every part thereof. And this Difference includes not only all Augmentation, which is a kind of Aggeneration, and consisteth only in the Apposition of new matter or substance, and that in a greater pro∣portion than what is decayed or exhauste••: but also every Composition whatever, such as is the Insition or Inoculation of Plants. Thirdly, such things are said to be generated [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] by Detraction which arise from the Dissolution of others, and subsist only by Excretion or Separati∣on; as Fire, Smoke, &c. are derived from the Dissolution of wood, and other combustible substances, to which they were formerly commixt; and Wax from the separation of Hony, together with which it was blended in the Combs. And, as for the Contrary, Corruption, ••tis easie to deduce it from the contrary ways of disposing matter.

And here again the incircumspection of Aristotle manifestly discovers it self; who multiplies the General ways of Generation,* 1.17 to a superfluous num∣ber: expresly teaching, that every simple Generation ariseth from (1) either Transfiguration, as when a statue is made of molten metal; or (2) Addi∣tion, as wh••n Vegetables or Animals are Augmented; or (3) Ablation, as when a statue is hewn out of Marble, all such parts being cut off and abje∣cted, as were superfluous to the perfection of the Figure designed; or (4) Composition, as in the structure of a house of various materials composed, according to the rules of Architecture; or (5) Alteration, when a thing is changed as to matter, as when Ashes are produced out of wood combust. When notwithstanding, had not his accustomed diligence been laid asleep, or judgement perverted, he must soon have perceived, that his Transfigu∣ration, Addition, and Ablation are really the very same with the Transposi∣tion, Adjection, and Detraction of our Epicurus; and that Composition is necessarily referrible to Addition, and Alteration to Transposition.

Concerning the Special modes, or ways of Generation,* 1.18 we need adver∣tise you of only two Considerables. (1) That each of the three General ways, newly mentioned, is so fruitful in possible variety, as that the special subordinate ones, whereof it is comprehensive, are (if not infinite, yet) ab∣solutely innumerable, ineffable, incomprehensible. For, if the Letters of our Alphabet, which are but 24 in number, may be so variously composed, as to make such a vast diversity of words, which cannot be enumerated by fewer then 39 c••phers, viz.

295232799039604140847618609643520000000.

(Tantum Elementa qu••unt, permutato ordine solo)

What Arithmetician can compute the several special ways of compositi∣on, whereof that incomprehensible variety of Figures which (as we have frequently assumed) Atoms may bear, is easily capable?

* 1.19(2) That, as the Image of Mercury cannot be carved out of every stone, or every piece of wood; nor words fit for reading, or pronunciation arise from every commistion of Letters: so, in Natural Concretions is it im∣possible, that all things should be made of all sorts of Atoms, or that all A∣toms should be equally accommodate to the constitution of every species of Concretions. For, though Atoms of the same figure and magnitude may, by their various transposition, adjection, ablation▪ compose things of various forms or natures: yet are they not all indifferently disposed to the compo∣sition of all things, nor can they be connected after one and the same man∣ner, in divers things. Because, to the composition of every thing in specie, is required such a special disposition in the Atoms, which compose it, as that they must appose to themselves such other Atoms, as are congruous and suitable to them, and as it were refuse the society and combination of others that are not. And hence is it, that in the Dissolution of every Concretion, the consimular or like Atoms always consociate together, and expede them∣selves from the Dissimilar and incongruous.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Art. 1. The Introdu∣ction.
• * 1.2

  Art. 2. The proper Notions of Ge∣neration & Cor∣ruption.
• * 1.3

  Art. 3. Various opi∣nions of the Ancient Phi∣losophers, touching the reason of Ge∣neration: and the principall Authors of pacti.
• * 1.4

  Art. 4. The two great opinions of the same Phi∣losophers con∣cerning the manner of the Commistion of the Com∣mon Princi∣ples, in Gene∣ration; faith∣fully & briefly stated.
• * 1.5

  Art. 5. That of Ari∣stotle and the stoicks, refu••ed: and Chrysippus sub••erfuge, convicted of 3 Absurdities
• * 1.6

  Art. 6. Ar••st••tles two∣f••ld ••••vation of the 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.7

  Art. 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.8

  Art. 8. That the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a thing, 〈…〉〈…〉 certain 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.9

  Art. 9. 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.10

  Art. 10 An illu••••r••••••on there••f, by a praegnant and o••por••un•••• In∣s••••nce. viz. ••he Generation ••f ••he, 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.11

  Art. 1. That in Cor∣ruption, no substance perish∣eth; but only that determi∣nate Modifica∣tion of sub∣stance, or Mat∣ter, which spe∣cified the thing.
• * 1.12

  Art. 2. En••••rce••ent o•• th•• ••ame Th••sis, by an illustrius Ex∣ample.
• * 1.13

  Art. 3. An Exper••ment demonstrating that the Sal•• of Ashes was prae∣existent in Wood; and no•• produ••ed, but only educed by Fire.
• * 1.14

  Art. 4. The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sense of three G••ne¦ral Ax••••ms, de¦duced from the precedent do¦ct••ine of the Atomists.
• * 1.15

  Art. 5. The General I••testine Cau∣••es of Corrup∣t••••n, chiefly Tw••: (1) the interception of ••••anity among the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 parti∣c••es of B••dies. (2) ••••e ••enti∣al Gravity and in••eparable Mo∣bility of Atoms
• * 1.16

  Art. 6. The Generall Manners, o•• Ways of Gene∣ration and Cor∣ruption.
• * 1.17

  Art. 7. Inadver••••••cy of Aristotle in making Five General 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Generati••••
• * 1.18

  Art. 8. The special Manners of Generation, innumerable; and why.
• * 1.19

  Art. 9. All s••••ts o•• A∣toms, not indi••∣fe••ently co••∣peten•• to the Constitution of all sorts of thing.