Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana, or, A fabrick of science natural, upon the hypothesis of atoms founded by Epicurus repaired [by] Petrus Gassendus ; augmented [by] Walter Charleton ...

SECT. III.

* 1.1IF Time be, as our Description imports, Non-principiate and In∣finite: how can we Discriminate it from Aeternity? Should we resolve, that Aeternity, in the ears of an unpraejudicate understand∣ing, sounds no more then PERPETUAL DURATION, or Time that never knew beginning, nor can ever know an end: we are instantly assaulted with this Difficulty; that Time hath Di∣mensions successive, comprehends Priority and Posteriority of parts, and essentially consisteth in a certain perpetual Flux; but Eternity is radicated in one permanent point, falls under none but the Prae∣sent Tense, and is only a certain constant 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or intransible NOW; or, as Booetius defines it, Interminabilis vitae tota simul & perfecta possessio, an interminable and perfect possession of life altogether, i. e. without praeterite and future, or, Forever at once. To extricate our selves from this seeming Confusion of two things, whose Natures appear so irreconcileably disparate; we are to begin at two praevious Con∣siderables.

(1) That Plato (out of whose Timaeus that eminent Definition of Booetius was extracted,* 1.2 which hath received the approbation and prai∣ses of most of our Ecclesiastick Patriarchs) asserting his opinion, that Immutable and Eternal Natures are not subject to Time, to which A∣ristotle also assented; doth not intend the word, Aeternity, abstractly and praecisely, to signifie a species of Duration: but Concretely, for something whose Duration is Eternal, viz. the Divine Substance, which He otherwise calls, the Soul of the World. This may be, without violence or sinister perversion, collected from hence, that He dislikes the incongruous conference of both and either of those Tenses, Fuit and Erit, as well upon Eternity or interminable Duration, abstractly considered; as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, upon the Eternal Substance. And Plotinus (En. 3. lib. 7. cap. 1.) more then once expresly declares as much: and most ingeniously insinuates the same both when He derives the

word Aeternity, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ab eo quod semper est; and when he excludes all real Alterity, or difference from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quod est, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quod semper est, importing that Is and Eternity are Iden∣tical.

(2) That when Plato denieth the Congruity of Praeterite and Fu∣ture, but allowes that of the Praesent Tense, or Est, to the Eternal Sub∣stance; He only aims at this, that, saying of the Eternal Substance, Fuit, it hath been, we do not understand it the same with Non ampli∣us est, it is no more; and also when we say of it, Erit, it shall be, we do not understand it as Nondum est, it is not yet: but not that Fuit is incompetent to the Eternal Substance, provided we in∣tend that it doth now continue to be the same it ever hath been; nor Erit, while we conceive it shall be to all Eternity the same, that it ever hath been, and now is. It being manifest from the Syn∣tax and purport of all his Dialogue, that his cardinal scope was on∣ly to praevent the dangerous adscription of those temporary Mutations to the Eternal Being, which are properly incident to Generable and Corruptible Natures: and to demonstrate, that we ought to conceive God, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, neque seniorem, neque juniorem. In a word, Plato doth judge, that the Tense Est is proper only to the Divine Nature, because it is ever the same, or invariably possesseth the same perfections, nor is there any moment in the vast am∣plitude of Eternity, wherein it can be justly said, Now it hath some Attribute, which it had not formerly, or which it shall not have in the future: since the progress of Time can neither add any thing unto, nor detract any thing from it, as it doth to other Natures, that are obnoxious to mutation; so that God may well be called, in Plato's Phrase, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Habens se immobi∣litèr.

These remora's of ambiguity removed,* 1.3 we may uninterruptedly advance to inference, and without further haesitancy determine, (1) That when Aeternity is said to be, Quidpiam totum simul, some∣thing wanting succession or flux of parts, as in the memorable Defi∣nition of Booetius; then is it to be accepted, not abstractly for Dura∣tion, but Concretely for the Divine Substance, whose Duration is sem∣piternal. (2) That Time and Eternity differ each from other, in no other respect, then that Eternity is an infinite Duration, and Time (according to the Vulgar intent of the word) a certain part of that infinite Duration, commensing at the Creation, and determining at the Dissolution of the World.

This Cicero rightly apprehended, and emphatically expressed, in his sentence, Tempus est pars quaedam Aeternitatis, cum alicujus annui, menstrui, diurni, nocturnive spatii certa significatione. In this respect, Eternity is said to be Duration Non-principiate and Interminable; which is proper only to God: and Time is said to be Duration Principiate and Terminable; which is competent to all Caduce, Mutable, and Cor∣ruptible Natures: as also that part of Eternity, which the Neotericks by a special idiome name ••••vum, is Duration Principiate, but Inter∣minable, which is adscriptive to Angelical or Intellectual Natures, and

to the Rational Soul of man; for thus we understand that frequent Bipar∣tition of Eternity into à parte ante, & à parte post, invented by the Schoolmen.

* 1.4These Positions being indisputable, the remaining subject of our praesent Disquisition, is only Whether the Platonicks spake rationally and intelligi∣bly, when they defined Eternity to be one everlasting NOW, or a Duration void of succession, or flux of parts?

Concerning this grand Doubt, we profess, would Truth have con∣nived, we could most willingly have past it by untoucht; because most of our Christian Doctors have fully assented unto them in this particular: but, since the convulsion of this their opinion doth stag∣ger no Principle of Faith, or Canonical Document made sacred and established by the Authority of the Church; we shall not de∣serve Excommunication, nor suffer the expurgatory Spunge of Rome, if we quaestion the Congruity of that Definition, and affirm that No man can understand it. For, what Wit is so acute and sub∣lime, as to conceive, that a thing can have Duration, and that Duration can be as a point without Fusion and Continuation from one moment to another, by intervenient or mediate moments? Ea∣sie enough, we confess, it is to conceive, that the Res durans is al∣together at once, or doth retain the sameness of its Nature, without mutation, diminution, or amission of any Perfection: but that, in this Perseveration, there is not many Nows, or many Instants, of which, compared among themselves, some are Antecedent, and others Consequent; is to us absolutely incomprehensible.

Nor can we understand, why it may not be good Christian Phrase, to say; God WAS in the time of the First Man, and SHALL be in the time of the Last: or why it is not more Grammatical and proper for us to say, God Created the World HERETOFORE, and will both destroy and renovate the World HEREAF∣TER; then, that God doth NOW Create, destroy and reno∣vate.

* 1.5To this the Common Answer is, that the Reason why these Anthropopathical Phrases are tolerable, is because Eternity is Coexi∣stent to our Time▪ but this is Ignotum explanare per ignotius; for the manner of that supposed Coexistence hath been never explained, and seemeth ••aid by till the advent of Elias. That an Instant, i. e. what wants succession, can be Coexistent to a successive thing; is as ma∣nifest an impossibility, as that a Point, i. e. what wants Longitude, can be Coexistent or Coextensive to a Line. Indeed, They have en∣deavoured to wave the Difficulty, by subnecting, that the Instant of Eternity is of such peculiar Eminency, as that it is Aequivolent to Time though Successive: But as to the Formal Reason, and manner of this peculiar Eminency, they have left it wholly to our Enqui∣ry also. Nor did they bestow one serious thought upon the con∣sideration of it; for had they, doubtless they must have found their Wit at a loss in the Labyrinth of Fancy, and perceived themselves re∣duced to this Exigent: either that they had fooled themselves in

trifling with words not well understood; or that they had praecariously usurped the Quaestion; or that the same Instants are in Eternity, that are in our Time, but with such Eminency, that infinitely more are contained in Eternity, then in our Time. How much better were it said, that we are Coexistent with God; or, that we are existent in a small part of that Duration, in which God infinitely existeth? For, while we are, certainly, we cannot imagine Two distinct Durations; but one, which in respct to our Nature, that is principiate, mutable, and terminable, doth contain designable Terms; and in respect of the Di∣vine Nature, which is nonprincipiate, immutable, interminable, hath its Diffusion or Extension infinitely long before, and as long after us. This may receive ample justification from that speech of the Hebrew Poet, whose Inspirer was the Holy Ghost, (Psal. 101.) Thou shalt Change them and they shall be changed; but thou, O God! art the same forever, and thy years shall not fail. For here YEARS are attri∣buted to God, but not any mutation of Substance: so that when our years are exhausted, in a short, or span-like flux of Time, the Glass of His Duration is alwayes full. And, therefore, the Expression is only Tropological, when it is said, that the years of our life make but a Day in the Almanack of Divinity: for the life of the Hemerobii compared to ours of threescore years and ten, holds some propor∣tion; but the life of Methusalem, compared to the Duration of the Life of our lives, the Divine Essence, holds none at all. Upon this consideration, it was more then a Heathen observation of Plu∣tarch (in Consolat. ad Apollon.) that there is no difference be∣twixt a long and a brief time, in respect of Eternity: since, as Simonides, a thousand, nay a million of years make but a point, nor so much as the least part of a point in the line of infinite Du∣ration.

Convicted thus by Reason, our Doctors convert to Scripture,* 1.6 urging that God (Exod. 3.) indicates his Beeing only in the Prae∣sent Tense, as peculiar to his Eternity, saying, I am, that I am, and I am hath sent thee to Moses. But this Objection ad∣mits of a threefold evasion. (1) The Hebrew Text doth not, in that place, use the Praesent, but the Future Tense, I shall be, what I shall be, and I shall be hath sent thee. (2) We can oppose many other Texts, which adscribe to God as well Praeterite and Future, as Praesent time; and most eminently in the Revelation, He is described, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He that is, and was, and is to come. (3) God Himself doth frequently enunciate many actions, not that He now doth, but that He hath formerly done, and will do in the future, in that moment of opportunity, which His Wisdom hath praedetermined. Hence also expulsed, They fly to their last fortress, viz.

If Eternity be not one permanet Now,* 1.7 then cannot all things be praesent to God, objectively. But vain is their hope of security in this also. For, many things, if we respect the when of their ex∣istence, have already been, and as many are not yet; but, because the Omniscience of God pervades as well the darkness of past, as of

praesent Time, and alwayes speculates all things most clearly and distinct∣ly therefore do we say, that all things are objects to His Opticks, or, that all things are praesent to His Cognition; not that He knows, all things to be praesent at once altogether, but that He hath before Him at once all the diversities of Times, and as perfectly contemplates them Future and Prae∣terite, as Praesent. For, the Divine Intellect doth not apprehend Objects, as the Humane, one after another, or in a successive and syntactical series; but grasps all things together in one entire act of Cognition, and compre∣hends in one simple intuition whatever hath been, or may be known. And, therefore, our opinion is not at all impugned by that sacred sentence; All things are open and naked to His eyes, and He calls upon those things, that are not, as if they were Hereupon some have, with unpardonable temerity and incogitancy, inferred; that ONCE there was no Time; for in this their very denial, they openly confess, that Time hath ever been: it being all one as if they had said, There was a Time when there was no Time.

* 1.8Lastly, as the Omniscience of God cannot be indubitated by our persuasion of the Identity of Eternity and Time, so neither can His Im∣mutability, as Aristotle would have it, only for this Reason (forsooth) that Time, or that Duration, which hath successive, and so prior and po∣sterior parts, is the General Cause of Corruption. For, our praecedent Dis∣course hath left no room for the intrusion of that futile Objection; inso∣much as it rather commonstrateth the Divine Nature to be so Constant and Perfect, that in the eternal flux of Time it can know nothing of Innovation or Corruption. Besides, Time, or the succession of Duration, is not the Cause, that induceth Corruption: but the Native Imbecillity of compound Natures, invaded and subdued by some Contrary Agent; and God is a Pure, Simple, Homogeneous substance, and so not subject to the invasion of any Contrary. Evident it is, therefore, that Aristotle, when He urged this Sophism, spoke more like a Poet, then a Philosopher; since Poets only use to give Time the Epithite of Edax rerum: nor could He be so absurd, as to dream, that Time was a vast Animal, with sharp teeth, an insatiate appetite, and a belly inexplebile, or an old man armed with a Sithe, as the Poets describe Saturn, making 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Sa∣turn and Time one and the same thing. For, Time really doth neither Eat nor Mow down any thing; and the Dissolution of all Create compound Natures can be imputed to no other Cause, but the Domestick Hostility of their Heterogenieties, or the uncessant intestine warr of their Elements, from whose commixture their Compositions, or Concretions did first result. With this qualification, therefore, we are not angry at that of Pe∣riander, in Stobaeus, Tempus est Causa omnium rerum: because in the pro∣cess of Time all things have their origin, state, and declination. In this restrained sense we also tolerate the saying of Thales Milesius, quoted by Laertius, Tempus est sapientissimum: since Time produceth Experience, and Experience Prudence. And that Antitheton of Pharon the Pythago∣rean, recited by Aristotle; Tempus est Ineruditissimum: because in pro∣cess of Time the Memory of all things is obliterated, and so oblivion may well be called the Hand-maid of Time, that perpetually follows at the heels of her Mistriss.

Our Clue of thoughts concerning Time is now wholly unravelled;* 1.9 and though we may not praesume, that we have therewith led the mind of our Reader through all the mysteries of its Nature: yet may we hope, that it may serve as a conduct to those, who have a more ample stock of Learning and Perspicacity for the support and encouragement of their Curiosity; at least that the Attentive and Judicious may easily collect from thence, that we have, upon no Interest but that main one of Ve∣rity, withdrawn our assent from the common Doctrine of the Schools, that Eternity is one permanent Now, without Succession, or Priority and Posteriority of Moments.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Art. 1. The Grand Quaestion, con∣cerning the Disparity of Time and Eter∣nity; stated.
• * 1.2

  Art. 2. Two praepara∣tory Conside∣rations, touch∣ant the aequivo¦cal use of the word Aeterni∣ty; requisite to the clear solu∣tion thereof.
• * 1.3

  Art. 3. Two decisive Positions, there∣up••n in••erred, and establish∣ed.
• * 1.4

  Art. 4. The Platoni••ks Definition of Eternity, to be one Everlasting New; not in∣telligible, and therefore col∣lusive.
• * 1.5

  Art. 5. Their Assertors subterfuge, that Eternity is Coexistent to Time; also un∣intelligible.
• * 1.6

  Art. 6. Our Ecclesia∣stick Doctors, taking San∣ctuary in the 3 Exod. for the authorizing of their doctrine, that the Prae∣sent Tense is only compe∣tent to God, and so that E∣ternity is one permanent In∣stant, without Fusion or Suc∣cession: not ••••cure from the rigour of our Demon∣stra••ion.
• * 1.7

  Art. 7. The Objective Praesence of all things at once, to the Divine In e••••ect, no wayes impug∣ned by our contradiction 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Doctors theory.
• * 1.8

  Art. 8. No•• the Immu∣tability of the Divine Nature; against Aristo∣tle.
• * 1.9

  Art. 9. Coronis.