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The Interlocutors. LUCRETIVS, ATHANASIVS, ISODICASTES.
WEll met, my deare and honored A∣thanasius; Thus to encounter you, I am sure, is more then a good omen: It is a happinesse in present.
I wish it may be so, Lucretius; but, when I reflect upon my owne unworthinesse, and want
of power to be serviceable so my Friends, in any proportion to my respects, or the honour I re∣ceive in their commands; I cannot easily be so vaine, as to conceive, I can be an occasion of Hap∣pinesse to you, in any kind. However, let me assure you, both of my joy to see you, and my readinesse to serve you.
Ah! Athanasius, I am already convinc'd of both. I am not so unacquainted with the exteri∣our Characters of the Passions, as not plainely to perceive the evidences of joy in your counte∣nance. The serenity of your aspect, the pleasant smoothnesse of your forhead, the vivacity and lustre of your eyes, and the unusuall sanguine tincture of your cheeks, are perfect demonstra∣tions of that Passion within you, which with a sudden yet gratefull violence causeth an effusion of blood and spirits towards the habit of the bo∣dy; as if the Soul, impatient of delay and di∣stance, dispatch'd those her Emissaries to meet and bring in her beloved object. And, as for your singular Humanity, and generous inclination to oblige, by doing good offices; the happy expe∣rience I have had of that, hath long since confir∣med me, that, if there be any such thing as a per∣fect Friend left in the World, certainely you are that thing, where once you are pleas'd to pro∣fesse a Dearenesse. But, why do I injure my selfe, in deferring that content, this faire oppor∣tunity offers me, in your conversation; while I endeavour to prevent your further profession of that sincerity and truth, I long ago knew to be
inherent and essentiall to your very Souls Pray therefore, let me borrow you, for an hour or two, from your meditations or other serious imployments, that we may not onely solace our selves, with recalling to mind our ancient Cares∣ses, in the dayes of youth, innocence and peace, and mutually congratulate each others health and safety, after so many troubles, dangers, and changes of Fortune, as the late Civill Warres in England hath driven us upon: but also revive that quondam custome of ours, when we were Fellow-Collegiates in Oxford, of discoursing freely and calmely of some Argument or other in Philosophy. For, though I have not beene so good a husband of my time, as I might have been, nor improved the severall opportunities of aug∣menting my small stock of learning, that some yeares travell towards the South, and frequent hearing the most eminent professors of all Arts & Sciences, in forraigne Universities offered me; yet, let me tell you, I have not beene altogether a stranger to study, nor utterly lost my famili∣arity with the Muses. Nay more, since the day I first ventured abroad into the World, I have had no Mistresse that held any confiderable room in my thoughts, but One, and that the very same I have many times observed you to court, with the strongest desires and strictest de∣votion imaginable.
Who I? pray Sir, who was that? I doe not remember I ever tooke Cupid for any other
than an imaginary Deity, or that I resign'd up the rains of my will and Affections into the un∣steady hands of a Woman. Sometimes perhaps, I have so far comply'd with the incitements of my youth and blood, as to seeke to please my selfe in the company and favour of a handsome Woman, for divertisement▪ But I was alwaies too well aware of their Tyranny, ever to put my selfe seriously and durably under their govern∣ment.
Alas Sir, you mistake me. I doe not meane a Woman; but Her, upon whom women usual∣ly transfer the blame of all their imperfections, Nature.
Her, indeed, I have courted long and zealous∣ly, and intend to dy her Admirer. For, though it be a great while since I became conscious of the vast distance betwixt us, and of my incapa∣city to satisfie my desires in the knowledge of so much as the least part of Her; yet my desires are still the same, and I discover such an infinite va∣riety of fresh beauties & excellencies in her eve∣ry day, that but to gaze upon them at distance, & view Her in the weake and pale reflections made in the glasse of my own Reason, I finde the most pleasant & ravishing employment, my minde is capable of, and which me thinks sufficiently compensates all the Labours and Difficulties I meet with in my pursuit of her. And if this bee
that Mistresse, you have so long affected, I esteem you singularly happie in your Choice, and my selfe happie in having such a Rivall, as may pro∣mote my Addresses, and yet at the same time fur∣ther his owne.
And I beleeve I shall likewise dy, as I have lived, Her humble Admirer too. For, I have more reason then you, considering the vast ad∣vantage you have over me, in Wit, perspicaci∣ty, and judgement; and that your profession daily furnisheth you with variety of fresh obser∣vations and usefull experiments (for, the Art of Medicine is the best, if not the onely Practical Philosophy we have, and who so enquires into the operations of Nature, by no other light than that of Books and solitary speculations, shall in the end find his head full of specious Termes, but empty of true and solid Science.) I say, con∣sidering this, I have more reason than you to despaire of ever attaining to the least degree of Familiarity and privacy with so divine a Model, as she is. And I confesse ingenuously to you, that after all my studious applications to Her, for so many yeares together, and all my best endea∣vours to insinuate my selfe into her neerer ac∣quaintance, I can get no further then to discover, that she is like the Sun, the more we fixe our eyes upon her, still the lesse we discern of her; that she is an immense Ocean, too deepe for the sounding line of Man's reason ever to reach Her bottom: and (in a word) that betwixt Us, who call our selves Philosophers, Secretaries of Na∣ture,
&c. and the Illiterate, who calmely ac∣quiesce in the simple information of their senses, thereis no other difference, but what consisteth wholly in Opinion: We flatter our selves with a beleef, that we know more than really we do; and they remaine free from the disquiet of that curiosity, which occasions our delusion; they neither know nor beleeve they know; we only beleeve we know. And yet, for all this discourage∣ment, I am still constant in my affections to Her, and my Soul as eager and hot in the pursuit, as if it expected to carry Her clearely in the end. So that I cannot but stay heer a litle, and wonder at the strange temper of my Mind, which is still possess'd with a strong desire of what I see no possibility ever to enjoy; especially when I re∣flect upon what I have been taught, by such as were well skil'd in the nature of Passions, that Love is alwaies accompanied with Probability of Fru∣ition, which is the reason we much oftner observe persons of high rank to become enamour'd on their inferiors, than the contrary. This I am sure of, that this uncessant desire of knowledge must be Natural, and coessential to the Soul of Man; or else it must be a Production of Opinion, as sundry other Appetites are. And, if it be in∣grafted into our minds, by Natures owne hand, methinks it should be more capable of satis∣faction; for, Nature doth never institute any thing in vaine, but commonly provides meanes for the expletion of each Appetite she createth. But, if it be not Natural, and the effect only of Presumption; how comes it to be so Universall?
there being no man, though nere so rude and savage, who doth not perceive his Mind to be under the sovereignty of this Affection, more or lesse: nay, as I remember, I have read a discourse of yours, wherein you have proved that all the Actions of our lives are in some sort or other the effects of this Tendency to Science. And thus you see, Athanasius into what a labyrinth I have unexpectedly brought my thoughts; nor can I hope to extricate my selfe, unlesse you shall please to lend me the Clue of your stonger and more decisive reason.
Lend you the clue of my Reason, say you? Alack, alack, Lucretius, I well perceive, your long conversation which the French, hath in∣fected you with the humour of saying a great deale more then you thinke, and tempting your Friends modesty with attributes of more value▪ than you know belongs to them, as if I could be so arrogant as to undertake the solution of a Ridle, which Lucretius really finds too hard for him. No, Lucretius, no, I am too conscious of my owne dulnesse and ignorance, ever to entertaine a conceipt so extreamely vaine. But, come, I perceive your drift. I know you to be one of E∣picurus's Disciples, and indeed the most emi∣nent amongst them; and having long since di∣gested and heightned all your Masters Argu∣ments, for the Mortality of the Human Soul; knowing me to be irreconcileable to that un∣comfortable and dangerous Opinion, you would
now take the opportunity of experimenting the force of them upon so weake an Adversary as my selfe. Not that I think a person of your wit and acutenesse can be so insensible of the admi∣rable and almost divine operations of that noble Essence, even while she is lodged in Walls of clay, as to be seriously of his perswasion, That she is onely a certaine Contexture or disposition of thinnest and sublilest Atoms, and so upon the change of that disposition by death, is imme∣diately dissolved, and those Atoms againe dis∣persed in the infinite Inanity or Space; but, that you would willingly heare what I am able to alleage to the contrary.
Will you beleeve me, Athanasius? I had no such designe upon you: Nor can I easily con∣ceive, how you could from that doubt I proposed to you, draw any such suspition.
No? Whither then could that discourse of yours tend? Is it not plaine that the Soul's insati∣ate and unlimited desire of knowledge, is a good Argument of her being Immaterial, and conse∣quently indissoluble?
O, now I apprehend you. I remember indeed I have heard that urged, and as a mighty Argu∣ment in the Schooles, but at present I had no re∣flection thereupon. However, I thanke you for
giving me the hint, and humbly beg your pur∣suite of it. 'Tis a Theam worthy so strong a brain as yours, and (pardon my freedom) I think you are oblig'd to satisfie the expectation of the World, by divulging your Conceptions con∣cerning that Subject. For, as I remember, in the Conclusion of your Physiology (which I had the good fortune not long since to see and peruse, in the Iesuits Library here in Paris, and with more content and benefit to my mind, than your mo∣desty will permit me to expresse to you) you promise a second part thereof, in way of disco∣very of the Nature and Immortality of the Rea∣sonable Soul of man.
Truth is, I there said somwhat of my Hopes and willingnesse to finish that structure (how slight and confused soever it were) by addition of what seem'd requisite to make it entire, which is the Consideration of the nature of Souls; as well those of Unreasonable, as those of Reason∣able Creatures: And this some, and you among the rest, have been pleas'd to interpret for a pro∣mise. But, grant it be so; Yet, sure I am, it was only Conditionall, and in case I should receive the friendly Approbation of such judicious per∣sons as had survey'd the first Story of that build∣ing, for my encouragement, and obtain Leisure and Quiet, for my better effecting the rest. And how far I have been from receiving that, or ob∣taining these, I suppose you cannot be ignorant.
Yes really I am.
That's somwhat strange. Why then give me leave to tell you, that, instead of that Candor in the forgivenesse of my lapses, and that appro∣bation of my toyl and industry, which I look'd for from my Readers; I have reaped no other fruit of all my labours in that long and difficult Work, but most severe, inhumane, uncharita∣ble, unjust Censures. Some condemning me of too much youthfull Heighth and Affection in the style; others accusing me of usurping other men's Notions, Maxims, and Experiments for my own, without so much as naming the Au∣thors, to whose bounteous Wit and Industry I was beholding for their discovery and commu∣nication; a third sort reproaching me with incon∣sideration, in assuming a taske of weight so vast∣ly disproportionate to the slender nerves of my judgment; and a fourth scandaling me with neg∣ligence in the duties of my Profession, and inva∣ding the certainty of all its Rules and Maxims, while I wholly addicted my selfe to the Innova∣tion of its Fundamentalls. Now if you can allow this for encouragement, I shall the lesse wonder at your expectation of my proceeding to the ac∣complishment of that worke, which (I call Hea∣ven to witnesse out of pure devotion to know∣ledge; and commendable ambition to be service∣able to the Commonwealth of Learning in pro∣portion
to my talent) I had proposed to my self to enterprise: Otherwise, I hope, you will not en∣vy me, the Peace I aim at, in being henceforth silent, and employing all my Collections, Ob∣servations, and Speculations Philosophicall, only to the furnishing the little Cabinet of my own brain. I have now at length learned, that Sapere domi, to endeavour the acquisition of Science in private, ought to be the principall scope of a Wise man: Nor shall I easily suffer my self to be diverted from the resolution I have taken, con∣stantly to put that excellent Lesson in practice.
And as for Leisure and Quiet (without both which, you well know, no man can compile a work of any solidity and accuratenesse, in any part of Learning whatsoever) I have been so farre from enjoying either of them, that on the contrary, from the time I first published that Physiology you mentioned, even to this very day, I have been embroil'd in as many troubles and distractions, as malice, persecution, and sharp adversity could accumulate upon me. I have been driven from my Country, House, Fa∣mily, Books, Friends, and Acquaintance; and wholly depriv'd of all the chief endearments of life; insomuch that I am a perfect stranger to a∣ny such thing as comfort, but what I sometimes form to my self out of the assurance of my Inno∣cence, and the hope of that compensation that is ordained for Patience in unjust sufferings. In a word, Lucretius, (for as it sharpneth the sense of my afflictions in my self, for me to recount them; so I know it cannot be, but very unpleasant to
you, to hear the miserable adventures of your Friend) for almost these two last years, I have been continually toss'd up and down by a Tem∣pest of Calamity, which is yet so violent, that the dangers, which threaten me, seem to despise the prevention of that small skill I have in the use of my Compass: My Anchors are lost, my Vessell leaks, the VVinds hurry it from land, and I hourly exspect to sink down-right. Nor can I see how it is possible for me to avoid it, unlesse relief suddenly come from that Divine Power; by whose permission (for my chastisement) it is, that the cruelty and rage of my Enemies have raised this storm against me. Consider, then, whether this be a Condition fit to study in, or whether you could forbear to have an indigna∣tion against this folly; who, being in such a case, should hope to write any thing worthy so judi∣cious and curious an eye, as yours is? If not, pray cease to reproach me, with having been wanting as well to my self as to the VVorld, in not making good the Promise you urge; And ra∣ther give me your advice how to deport my self as becomes a Philosopher, with Constancy and tranquillity of mind, than strive to aggravate my disquiet, by engaging me to write on so abstruse and difficult a Subject.
You have told me enough to change my Curi∣osity into Sadnesse and Commiseration. I shall not be so rude to exasperate the smart of your wounds, by pressing you further to disclose them
to me, nor am I so good a Physician for the Mind, as to prescribe you any more soveraign remedies against Discontent, than what I am sure you well know already. But since you re∣quire my advice, I shall bid you look into that Magazine of choice Morall Precepts, which you have been long collecting, and treasuring up in your own breast: For, there, I am sure, you will find such Cordialls, and vertuous Antidotes, as will secure your Soul from being discompos'd at the worst that evill Fortune can do against you, and heighten your thoughts and Resolutions to a generous defiance of temporall crosses, and a perfect Contempt of the VVorld. And among the rest, as you meet with it, be sure to dwell longest upon this rule, Never suffer your Spirit to sink; still remembring, that Vertue is like pre∣cious Odours, most fragrant, when incens'd or crush'd; and that the extremities of worthy Per∣sons are usually annihilated in the consideration of their own deservings, but alwaies overcome in the end, by their bravery and magnanimity shew'd in the entertainment of them. VVhich I the rather point at, because I know you to be of a Melancholy disposition, and such commonly suffer adverse accidents to make too deep im∣pressions upon their mind, which is thereupon apt to dejection, which some have defined to be the first step to finall Despair; And how difficult a thing it is to raise him up, who helps to de∣press himself; I need not tell you. It will not be amisse also for you, often to have recourse to gentle and Philosophicall Divertisements, and
to admit conferences with your Friends, touch∣ing some Argument or other, that you are able to discourse of familiarly, and without torturing the brain, and putting your Imagination upon the rack: For, by this means, you shall insensibly wear out the Characters your misfortunes and distresses have stampt in your Soul, and find a pleasure in taking occasionall reviews of the se∣verall usefull Notions filed up in the rolls of your Memory, and at the same time, both bene∣fit and endear your company.
Sir, your Counsel is excellent, and I shall make it my chief care to let you see how much I prize it, by my endeavours to follow it pre∣cisely. But, know withall, Lucretius, that the foresight, I tell you, I have of my approaching ruine, as to all that Fortune laies claim to as hers, doth not imply either my Fear of it, or want of resolution to sustein that, and even Death it self, in what shape soever it shall present it self, without stooping one hair's breadth below that pitch of spirit, that belongs to an honest Mind to conserve in all encounters. 'Tis one thing to pre∣vise a danger, and another to be startled and grow pale at the stroak of it: I well understand the value of the goods of the Mind above those of Fortune: And if I can be so much in favour with Heaven, as to be endowed but with the least portion of the Former, I shall easily part with the Latter, and account my self rich enough in the exchange. Be confident therefore, that so
long as I can conserve my integrity, and the peace of my Conscience entire, I shall also keep my Spirit from dejection, nor will it be in the power of my Adversaries ever to depresse it, with all the weights of adversity they can heap upon me.
As for that way of Divertisement, by free and unbiassed Philosophicall Conferences you speak of; I approve it as very available both to the gentle weaning of the Mind from sad appre∣hensions, and the exercise of its more agreeable Habits. But, I fear me, you do as that Physician, who prescribed his Patient a dose of the grand Elixir, in the yolk of a Phoenix egge; You refer me to a Medicine I cannot possibly obtain. For, though among the French there be many excel∣lent Wits, and men eminent for their abilities in all kinds of Learning; Yet I observe them gene∣rally to be of a temper more fit for hot and testy Disputes, then calm and peaceable De∣bates, in way of Disquisition: and commonly, they are so fierce and ardent in defence of their own preconceived opinions, that they account it a piece of disrespect and incivility in any man that seems to doubt, or call the verity of them in question. So that a Noble person of our Na∣tion, who hath lived long in this City, and is able to give a true Character of the French Ge∣nius, as to this particular, was pleas'd to tell me within these few daies, that their humour of prejudice to all that is not their own, though re∣ally much better then their own, extends also to their Tenents in Arts and Sciences; And that
it would be hard for me to find a Scholar among them, who would not rather lose the opportuni∣ty of investigating a truth, by an equitable and patient comparing of the strength of other mens reasons with his own, then not appear to have clearly understood the full nature of the thing, before it was proposed. Now, how highly disa∣greable this would be to my Genius, which is so averse to all contests and passionate Altercati∣ons, and which alwaies brings me to Philoso∣phicall Discourses only as to Enquiries, not final Determinations, and with perfect indifferency to either side, not caring at all whether my Al∣legations, or my Opponent's, give the greater light to certainty, so I attain to any degree of certainty in the end: I say, how disagreeable this Overweening of the French, would be to me in Conversation, you may easily conjecture. Besides I am yet but beginning to speak their Language, and so am uncapable of the benefit and pleasure of their Colloquies. And though many of them are very great Masters of the Latine, and write very elegantly therein; Yet when they come to speak it, you may perceive such a tedious re∣dundancy of words flowing from their tongues, as will sufficiently convince you, that they can∣not suddenly translate the conceptions of their minds into another Language, without retain∣ing the verbosity of their own. Which I find ex∣ceedingly troublesome to me, in respect of the narrownesse of my capacity, that causeth me many times to lose the notion and sense, in the long and strict attention to the expressions; Just
as when we meet some person in brave and gawdy clothes, the waving of his Feather and Ribons, and the Lustre of his Lace, so distract and take off our sight, that we see the lesse of his Face; and when he is past by us, we remember more of his dresse, than his stature, complexion and aspect. And thus you see how unlikely it is for me to meet with the Physick you prescribe me, here among the French.
And as for the English that now reside here; I am not acquainted with any one (except your self) who makes it his businesse to pursue the favour of those severe and reserved Muses, that you and I so much adore. Some doubtlesse there are of the same contemplative inclination; But (as I tell you) I have not encountred so much felicity as to know any one of them; and if I did, without good experience of his candor, and some degree of intimacy, I should think it an unpardonable Soloecisme in good manners, to molest him with the importunity of my Con∣versation, which savours of nothing so much as of sowrnesse and melancholy. So that unlesse you please to be the remedy you advise, I see no probability of my obtaining it, till I return into England.
What you have now remarked of the French's being generally great Opinionators, my observation also confesseth to be altogether true. Nor are there among our Country-men, in this place, many of those we call Votaries of Na∣ture;
Yet I can introduce you to the knowledge of a Person, noble by Birth, and of high conditi∣on, but infinitely more noble by the Heroick en∣dowments of his better part, and the large mea∣sure of Knowledge he hath acquired in all things of most use, to the well government of our selves, in all the various occurrences of life. He is a prudent Estimator of mens actions and opinions, but no rigid Censor of either. A valiant Assertor of truth, yet far from Tyranny; where he finds an errour, as alwaies reflecting on hu∣man frailty, and the obscurity of things in them∣selves. He well knows how to overcome, but not at all to triumph; And when he hath over∣come, you can hardly perceive he ever contend∣ed. For, he doth not seem so much to refute, as to teach, rather gently insinuating verity, then strugling in the detection of falshood. Curious in the collection of Books, diligent in reading them, accurate in examining what they deliver, & al∣waies more favourable to Reason, then to Au∣thority, unlesse in matters of Faith. A great Lo∣ver of Experiments in Physick and Chymistry; Yet no waies infected with the vanities of the one, or frauds of the other. A friend to all learn∣ed & judicious men of your Profession, he meets with; and a Patron to the Art it self. Witnesse the vast paines and cost he hath lately bestow'd upon his Garden, wherein are now growing more then two thousand six hundred Plants, of different sorts; Each of them being, according to admirable method, dispos'd into a particular Classis, conteining all the species referrible to
their proper Genus or Tribe: So that conside∣ring the great variety, and orderly ranging of the Plants, I cannot think it much inferior to the famous Seminary of Vegetables at Bloys, belonging to the Duke of Orleans. Witness like∣wise the spacious Elaboratory, he hath caused to be erected in his house, and furnished with Furnaces, Vessells, and Instruments of all sorts; Which he imployes rather for his recreation, and the extraction of the most virtual and pu∣rest parts of Herbes, and other medicinal Sim∣ples, and the distillation of choise Cordial Wa∣ters and Spirits, for the conservation of health, than in practising the impostures of Pseudo▪chy∣mists, that pretend to the mysterious Art of Transmutation of Metalls, and making the Phi∣losophers stone, as they call it. And yet I have known when he hath permitted one of those Bastards of Hermes, therein to run through a whole Progresse, or course of Spagirical opera∣tions, in order to the production of the Seminal tincture of Gold: But, it was only, that the man himself might be the better convinc'd, and the World satisfi'd of the folly and knavery of such attempts, by the constant unsuccessefullness of them. In a word, Athanasius; he is a perfect Virtuoso, one infinitely above the best Character I can give him: Nor do I herein aim at praising him, but assuring you, that in him you may meet with the most pleasing and satisfactory Conver∣sation in the World.
Even now you mention'd the Philosophers stone, Lucretius, and sure this excellent Person you describe, is it: For if the Elixir be only Vir∣tue in a Parable, as I know some wise men have affirmed, why may not I think him so? But who is it, I pray?
I am sure you have often heard his name, and perhaps seen him too: 'Tis IS ODIC AS∣TES.
I know him both by sight and fame. He was with us in Oxford, in time of the late Warres, and in great favour and trust with the King his Master. And now I am confirmed of the truth of all you have said of him, having heard as much from sundry others of worth and Credit. But will you adventure the reputation of your Judg∣ment so far as to commend me to his notice? I fear, you dare not.
Yes I do, and doubt not to receive his thanks for my Labour, for I know you to be singularly able in your Profession, and as free in the com∣munication of any thing you have found condu∣cible to the advancement of it, or any other part of Learning: And either of those two qualities
(if you had no other that were commendable) is sufficient to endear you to him in a short time.
When will you permit me to wait upon you to him?
Even when you please: What say you of go∣ing thither this present evening? For his house is not far off this place, and about this hour of the day he is usually at leasure, and disposed to admit visits. We shall find him, I suppose, view∣ing his Nursery of Plants, and keeping a Diary of their short lives; recording in the margine of his Catalogue, which of them are now in their youth or immaturity, which in their full vigour and growth, and which beginning to decline; And noting also which is in the blossome, which in the Flower, which in the Seed, which fit to be cropt, that so he may be exact in know∣ing the true season when each kind attains to its pride and perfection of Virtue. For, at this time of the year, and till the latter end of August, this commonly is his recreation every evening, in case the weather be favourable. So that if you think fit, I will conduct you thither instantly.
With all my heart; I am not for deferring happinesse one moment.
Content; But let me advertise you of one thing before we go: Though you are a stranger to him in person; yet he is acquainted with your Genius, by your Writings. You know the say∣ing, Oratio indicat virum. And it is not many daies since I heard him commend your Physio∣logy, and wish you would proceed to publish the remainder of it, concerning the Immortali∣ty of the Reasonable Soul. So that assure your self, he will soon find occasion to draw you on to discourse of that subject: Nor can you with civility decline it. Therefore, provide your self for the ambush, by turning over the records of your memory, and rallying your scattered noti∣ons, in as good order as you can, upon so short warning.
Hear you, Lucretius; doth this consist with the counsell you gave me, even now, to divert my self from the sense of my misfortunes, by en∣tertaining frank and familiar conferences with ingenious company, without torturing my brain, and racking my imagination? You are like a Physician, who forbids his patient Wine, and yet can be content to see him drunk, so it be in his company. Do you think I can discourse any whit tolerably of so difficult an Argument, and in such a presence, without great labour of the Mind?
Why not? having profoundly considered, and frequently revolved the matter in your Mind, before hand, as I am confident you have, or o∣therwise you would not have given us hopes of your writing a particular Treatise thereupon. Pray, deal ingenuously with me, have you no Adversaria, no First-Draught of that piece you intended, among your Papers?
Some few sheets I have, in which I hastily scribled over my Collections, and First Thoughts, as they chanced to occurr: But dis∣joynted, without Form, and wanting the decen∣cy of connexion and language. But what of that? Would you have an Architect acquaint you with his design, only by shewing you his Mate∣rialls lying confusedly congested together in a heap?
From a view of the Materials, I can guess at the strength and firmnesse of the building inten∣ded, though not at the Model or Platform. Therefore, without any further excuses or evasi∣ons, be pleased to comply with the desires and expectation of your Friends, either by affording us the liberty of perusing those memorials of your thoughts; or by abstracting the substance or marrow of them your self, and infusing it in∣to our ears in a brief discourse.
I perceive, Lucretius, you well understand the unlimited power you have over me; otherwise you would not thus have put me upon such a Demonstration of it, as requires me, at the same time, to lay aside my Reason, and resign up my discretion wholly to the conduct of your impor∣tune Curiosity. But, that you may see I am all obedience and complacency, where I have once enter'd into a league of amity; I will no longer consider the hazard of my reputation, in expo∣sing to your Examination (which I am sure, will be strict enough) a Summary of those Reasons, which I conceive sufficiently strong and evident to evince the Immortality of the Human Soul, while they yet want due Connexion, and such illustration of Art and Language, as they de∣serve, and as perhaps I could have bestowed up∣on them, at my better leisure, and vacancy from sollicitude of mind: I say, I will no longer keep my reputation in the ballance against your Commands, but freely deliver you an Abbre∣viate of my Notes, touching the subject mentio∣ned. Nor will I defer your satisfaction longer than untill to morrow, about this time; When, if you please to meet me here in this cool Cy∣press Walk, in Luxemburgh Garden, you shall hear what I am able to say, concerning that par∣ticular. In the mean time, I will go home and look over my papers, and digest the contents of them into the most naturall method I can, upon so short premeditation. If they answer not your
expectation, be just in imputing it to your own unreasonable haste; Which would not allow me convenient time, to cast them in a more uniform mould: If they do, be not so much a Courtier, as to ascribe it to any thing, besides the Goodnesse of the Cause, in defence whereof they are alleaged.
My dear Athanasius, my heart is too narrow to contein the joy you have infused into me; Nor can I expresse the smallest part of that con∣tent, which redounds to me from this your most affectionate condescention. And yet I would urge your kindness to a further grant.
Of what?
Of somthing, that will conduce to your own advantage, in the end.
I shall have but little regard to that, if what you require may but be really gratefull to your self. Pray, therefore, cease henceforth to esti∣mate my readinesse to serve my Friend, by the proportion his requests hold to my own utility an emolument: And freely speak your desire.
It is no more, but that you would permit me
to interrupt you, now and then, in your discour∣ses, to morrow, when we meet, in case I see oc∣casion of Doubting, or Objecting any thing that seems materiall. For (as you know) I am som∣what strict in examining the force of all Argu∣ments proposed to me, especially of such as pre∣tend Evidence and Certitude requisite to full Conviction. I would not willingly admit any Position into my beleif, but what hath past the severest triall of my Reason, I can put it to.
Nor shall you, Lucretius, be circumvented or ensnared into an error, by any sophistry of mine. If what I shall urge, in favour of the Soul's Eter∣nall subsistence after death, shall appeare to you to be lesse cleare or solid, than I apprehend; pray, detect the invalidity thereof and spare not. Where I am once assur'd of Candor, I love to be opposed. But since you intend to raise Scruples and Objections out of what I shall deliver, and that it is easily possible for you and me to dissent about the preheminence of each others reaso∣nings: me thinks, it were but just, we had some Third person present, whose judgement and e∣quity may qualifie him to play the Arbiter be∣twixt us, and unto whose decisive Verdict we ought equally to submit our Differences.
You have prevented me: Isodicastes, I am con∣fident, will do us the honour to be the Man. I know none so fit, in respect either of the admi∣rable
perspicacity of his understanding, or the sincerity and uprightnesse of his judgement: As no Fallacy can escape his remark, so the whole world cannot bribe him to a partial suffrage. And if you approve the choice, I will undertake to prevaile upon him to be present at our confe∣rence, and do us that noble office.
Pray, let him know withall how far I was from seeking this occasion of his trouble, and that I am not so vainly conceipted of the worth of my notions, as to promise to my self they shall compensate his patience, by adding one mite to that large magazine of knowledge, He is alrea∣dy master of. All I hope for at his hands, is a charitable forgivenesse of my Audacity, in da∣ring to enter the list against so potent an Oppo∣nent, concerning so difficult and sublime an Ar∣gument, and before so discerning a Judge; and that with such blunt weapons, as your unex∣pected and suddaine compulsion of me to the en∣counter, enforceth me to make use of.
Feare not my justice, either in owning the vi∣olence I have used, to draw you to comply with my desires, or saving your modesty the labour of prepossessing him with the extreme diffidence you have of your own Abilities. And now we are agreed upon the manner and circumstances of our Duell, pray, let us a little solace our selves with a turne or two in this coole and fra∣grant walk, into which the neighbouring Orange
trees so plentifully transmit the gratefull odour of their flowers. How like you this so much ad∣mired Garden? Doth it not clearely demonstrate to you, how great the additions are, that the beauties of Nature are capable of receiving, from the hand of Art?
I think it worthy as great a share in the specta∣tors wonder, as the vast and magnificent Fabrick to which it is adjoyned. And if it be lawful for us to guesse at the Greatnesse of Princes Minds, as well as at that of their wealth, by the amplitude and sumptuousnesse of the structures they have reared; I may conjecture, that the Foundresse of this prodigious Pallace, had a Soul in all things equal to the height of her Dignity, and the large∣nesse of Empire, she once enjoy'd; For, other∣wise her subtile Favorite whom she had raised to that immoderate sublimity of power, as made him fit to be her Competitor for Soveraignty in dominion; would not have conceived himselfe unstable in his unlimited sway, till he had clipt the wings of her aspiring Soul, and left her em∣broyld in the jealousie of the King, her Sonne: who being perswaded, that the lustre of his Diadem was eclipsed by her shining in the same Sphere; readily embraced their counsell, who suggested that the greatnesse of her policy and aimes, was never to be obscured, but by re∣moving her into another climate, by a kind of gentle Banishment. Had she been of as soft and flexible a spirit as the King was, whose power
he employ'd to her suppression; doubtlesse, Mon∣sier the Cardinall had never thought her worthy the honour of his Fears. Great envie is alwaies a certaine signe of great Merit. But to leave my unseasonable reflection on the Queen, who rai∣sed this stupendious Building, and answer your demand of my opinion of the Garden; I tell you, in a word, it is the most Princely I ever saw, for the largenesse of the ground or Con∣tents, for the uniformity it holds to the designe of the House, for the freedome of Prospect from all the principall roomes thereof, and for the va∣riety of entertainments it affords, according to the severall seasons of the yeare. Here are Grotta's, Groves, and places of shade, for Esti∣vation; and artificiall Fountaines perpetually spouting up streames of water, to attemper the fervour of the air, in heat of Summer: Spatious and open walks to take in the more temperate and refreshing breath of the Spring: and arched Piazza's that afford equall shelter from Sun, cold or raine. Here is a peculiar Garden for each moneth in the yeare, in which things of beauty and sweetnesse are then in season. Here is vari∣ety well sorted, Magnificence and Curiosity gracefully united; and yet a Natural wilde∣nesse so wel imitated in all, that the loveliness & perfection of the whole, seemes to consist in the neat disguise of the symmetry of the parts: so that Art is almost lost in the excellency of it self, & vi∣sible only in dissembling a confusion. Here Palats & Noses of all sorts are exactly accommodated and strangers usually dispute, whether the sight or Tast, or Smell be the better provided for: nor
is it easie to decide the controversie, where each sense is feasted even to satiety. Here are litle Cop∣pies of Orenge trees, environed with hedges of Jasmine; as if the Planter had respect to the mix∣ture of odours in the aer, and intended—
Hold, Athanasius, if the distance doth not de∣ceive me, yonder comes ISODICASTES, the wise and good—Yes it is He, I am sure. I can distinguish him thus far off, by the gravity of his Habit, and the sober evennesse of his pace, with a naturall decorum and comlinesse, expres∣sing the majesty and serenity of that noble Prin∣ciple, which gives motion to his body from within.
Pray put me not out of countenance, by telling him before my face, how inconsiderate I have been, in accepting your challenge against to mor∣row. Doe not insult over the facility and good nature of your friend, by boasting the force of your influence upon him.
I doe consider your excesse of modesty, and, therefore, will not touch upon our appoint∣ment, while you are present. But, now he drawes neer, let us not be rude in seeming in∣sensible of the singular respect due to his quality and worth: but mend our pace, and, by our speed to meet him civilly, confesse our transport of joy
to have the happy opportunity—Noblest and worthiest Isodicastes, your most humble servant.
Witty Lucretius, I am yours, and glad to en∣counter you thus unexpectedly.
I ask your leave Sir to present to your know∣ledge, this friend of mine here, a Person of more than common merit, which is more than I need tell you, when you have heard me name him.
I remember, I have seen this Gentlemans face often, or one extreamly like him, at least: But cannot, on the suddain recall to mind, or where, or when.
In Oxford, Sir, in time of the Warrs, doubt∣lesse, if at all. For, He was scarcely arrived at the twentieth year of his age, when the flames of our intestine commotions first brake forth into open hostility: And since they were extinguish't in the ruines of the Royall party, you have been constantly resident here in France, whither he is but lately come. But, not to hold you longer in suspence, This is Athanasius, of whom I have heard you speak, upon occasion of some new o∣pinions and experiments, in the Physiology he not long since published.
Worthy Athanasius, fortune could not have brought me to the knowledge of any Person, who had aforehand a greater share in my esteem then your self. I am an honourer of your Art, and so cannot but have a singular value and re∣spect for any, that endeavours by his studies and writings to contribute towards the advance∣ment of it, as I am satisfied you have done.
Most honour'd Sir, I am not conscious to my self of any thing in me, worthy the honour of your slightest notice, but barely my Good-will to Learning, and the sincere Devotion and re∣verence I bear toward your noble self, who are both so great an Ornament, and Patron of it. And if you shall vouchsafe to admit me to the lowest degree in your good Grace and favoura∣ble regard, upon so small an account as that: You will demonstrate the vast extent of your Charity, in obliging a poor and inconsiderable thing, and one that hath nothing but the sim∣plicity of his Zeal, to qualifie him for your ser∣vice.
You are unreasonably modest, thus to dimi∣nish yourself, Athanasius: And as immoderate in your overvaluation of my Capacity to expresse my affection to Learning and Learned Men, o∣therwise than only by the content I take in their
conversation. But, let us leave this formality of Complements to young Courtiers, as savouring of lesse plainnesse and freedom, than ought to be amongst the Votaries of Truth and Science, when they meet together: And give me leave to enquire of you (for, it seems you came but late∣ly thence) somwhat concerning the state of Learning now in England. I have been told of great Discoveries made, by men of your Facul∣ty there, in Anatomy, Diseases, and their waies of Cure; Far different from the Principles and Doctrine of the Antients. I have heard also, that the Mathematicks are in high reputation a∣mong you, and have received much, if not of improvement, yet of illustration, from the hap∣py industry of some, in our Universities. Pray, therefore, let it not be troublesome to you, to give us some hints of the particulars, wherein the Wits of our Nation have of late been so highly beneficiall to the Commonweal of Philosophy.
Sir, you have laid a command upon me, which is impossible for me to obey, without shamefully betraying my own ignorance, and (by a disad∣vantageous representation of them) much dis∣paraging the noble successes of those Heroicall Wits among our Country-men, who have ad∣dicted themselves to the Reformation and Aug∣mentation of Arts and Sciences, and made a greater Progresse in that glorious design, than many ages before them could aspire to, not∣withstanding
all their large hopes, specious pro∣mises, and manifold attempts. Neverthelesse, be∣ing your command, I shall strive to yeeld obedi∣ence to it, so far forth at least, as to recount to you in brief, what upon the suddain I can call to mind, of the most considerable Novelties in Na∣turall Philosophy, Medicine, the Optiques, A∣stronomy and Geometry, found out by the inge∣ny and labours of men now living in England, & as yet in the prime of their strength and years.
In the Colledge of Physicians in London, (which without offence to any thing, but their own Modesty, I may pronounce to be the most eminent Society of men, for Learning, Judge∣ment and Industry, that is now, or at any time hath been, in the whole World) you may be∣hold Solomons House in reality. Some there are, who constantly imploy themselves in dissecting Animals of all kinds, as well living as dead; and faithfully recording all singularities that oc∣cur to their observation, both in the severall species, and individualls: That so they may come to know, what is perfectly naturall, what pre∣ternatural, what rare and monstrous among the parts of them; And also what resemblance there is betwixt the Conformation of the parts in the body of Man, and those in the bodies of other A∣nimals, ordained by Nature to the same, or like and equivalent uses. So that it will be hard for any man to bring thither any Fish, Bird, or In∣sect, whose Emtrails these genuine Sons of De∣mocritus are not already intimately acquainted with; or, at least, which they will not with ad∣mirable
dexterity and skill anatomize without confusion of the smallest Organ, and instantly explore the proper office of each Organical part, by remarking the Figure, Substance, Vessells, and situation of it. And, I have some reason to put you in hope, that ere long you may see a Col∣lection of most of the Anatomical Experiments that these Men have made, in the bodies of Beasts, Birds, Fishes, and Insects of various sorts; together with the Figure of each, and all its principle Organs, expressed to the life in Copper-Cuts; and an exact account as well of the Ana∣logy, as Dissimilitude that is betwixt them and others of consimilar uses in Man, the grand Rule or Prototype to all inferior Creatures. Which is a Method, certainly, of inestimable use towards the complement of Natural History, and the only way to perfect that Comparative Anatomy, whose defect the Lord St. Alban so much complained of, in our Art.
Others there are, who daily investigate argu∣ments to confirm and advance that incomparable invention of Doctor Harvey, the Circulation of the Blood; And have already brought the Doctrine thereof to so high a degree of perfection, that it is not only admitted and admired by all the Schools in Europe, but the advancers of it also are able to solve most of the difficult phaenomena in Pathology, only by that Hypothesis; And fre∣quently effect such Cures, by having respect thereunto in their intentions and prescripts, as well in Cronique, as Acute Diseases, as could not be hoped from any other ground-work, or
supposition formerly laid; At least not with e∣quall correspondence to the true method of Healing, which ought to be deduced from Prin∣ciples of the greatest evidence and certainty in Nature, among which certainly this of the Cir∣culation is the chiefest. And though I deny not, but the like Cures may have been performed by Physicians, who never dream't of any such thing, as the continual motion of the blood from the heart, by the Arteries to the outward parts of the body, and thence back again, by the veins?, into the heart; but rested in the Antique opini∣on of a difference betwixt Arterial and Venal blood, both as to substance and uses: Yet I may safely affirm, that the Remedies used by them, wrought the effects aimed at, by waies altoge∣ther accidental, and beside the direct scope of those, who gave them; And to do a cure only by Accident, you well know, is much below the ambition of a Rational Physician, who ought to have a firm and well-grounded Theory of the Faculties and Virtues proper to each particu∣lar Instrument he is to make use of, in rectifying the disordered Oeconomy of nature in mans bo∣dy. For my own part (I speak ingenuously) I am so well satisfied of the Verity of this Harve∣an Circulation, and have so seriously considered the great advantages that may be made of it, in order to the ennobling the Art of Medicine, by reducing the maxims of it from obscure and con∣jectural, to evident and demonstrative; And by accommodating the same to the explanation of most of the Apparences in Pathology: That I
have had some thoughts of undertaking to justify all the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, which concern the Nature and Sanation of Diseases, by reasons and considerations deduced meerly from this one Fountain, the Hypothesis of the Circulation of the blood; And if my troubles had not deprived me of leisure, I had ere this made some progress in that enterprise. But, I have digressed, and ask your pardon for it.
There are, moreover, among the members of this venerable Society, who pursuing the hint, some few years since, given them by Iacobus Mullerus, a German, in an Academical exer∣cise, of the nature of Animal and Voluntary Motion; have gone far toward the explication of the reasons and manner of the Motions of the Muscles, by the principles of Mechanicks: An enterprise of great difficulty, and long desidera∣ted, as leading us to understand the Geometry observed by the Creator in the fabrick of the Microcosme, and the verification of Anatomical assertions by demonstrations Mathematical. The same persons likewise have demonstrated, that we goe, because we fall, i. e. that each step we ad∣vance, is but a shifting the body to a fresh Cen∣tre of Gravity; And our Rest but a remaining or fixing of it upon the same: As also that in progression, the Head of a man is moved through more of space, than his feet, by almost one part of four, in respect of its greater distance from the Centre of the Earth; which indeed was toucht, and only toucht upon, by that prodigie of Mathematical subtleties, Galileo, in his Second Dialogue de Mundo.
There are also of these Miners of Nature, who have found out more probable and commo∣dious Uses for the Glandules, or fatty Kernells scituate in divers parts of mans body, than were assigned unto them by all antecedent Anato∣mists. For, whereas Those generally conceived them to have been intended by Nature to no no∣bler an end, than either for the Imbibition or dreining of superfluous humours inundating the parts adjacent to them; Or for the susteining of Veins, Arteries, and Nerves in their progresse from part to part; These have discovered, that some Glandules serve for the preparation of the Succus Nutritius, or juice that nourisheth the whole body; That others are official to the se∣questration of some lesse profitable and disagree∣able parts of the same nutritive juice, or Vital Nectar; And that a third sort of them are or∣dained for reduction of those same lesse profita∣ble parts, after their separation or streining, back again into the masse of blood, by the small veins that are contiguous to them. And among these likewise there is one (A person of singular note, for his Universal Learning, and indefatigable in∣dustry in Disquisition) who aiming to promote the certainty of these New Tenents: (1.) That, according to the Anatomical observations of Ioh. Pecquet, a young Physician of Diepp in Norman∣dy, the Chylus is convey'd from the stomach, by the Venae Lacteae, or Milky Veins, into a certain Receptacle, or common promptuary scituate at the bottom of the Mesentery; and thence trans∣mitted upwards, by a conduit running all along
on the inside of the Spine of the back, to the sub∣clavian veins, and so delivered into the right Ventricle of the heart, there to be turned into blood: (2.) That the Liver is not the immediate instrument of Sanguification, but inservient only to the sequestration of the Cholerick parts of the blood, and the conveying the same into the Gall, to be thence excluded into the Duts: (3.) That there is no Anastomosis, or mutual Inoscu∣lation betwixt the small branches of the Vena Portae, and those of the Vena Cava, in the substance of the Liver; as was gene∣rally believed from the infancy of Physick, till of late years, when this Gentleman was so hap∣py as to evince the contrary, by ocular demon∣stration: (4.) That there are certain thin, slen∣der and transparent Vessells, for the most part accompaning the veins, & especially in the liver, (named Vasa Lymphatica, by Thomas Bartholinus, who seems first to have discovered them, and Lymphe-ducts, by others since) containing a clear liquor, like water, which they exonerate into the common Receptacle of the Chyle, newly mentioned; to the end, that being again infused together with so much of the Chyle as enters the veins, into the blood, it may both prevent the Coagulation of it, and also (in respect of its predisposition to Volatility) associating it self to the Vital spirits in the Heart and Arteries, promote the Mication, or boyling motion of the blood: And (5.) That the solid parts of the bo∣dy are not, in the general, nourished by the blood (which He conceives to be only the fewel of the
Vital Flame, or Heat; and in regard of its great Volatility, and harsh and grating nature, more likely to prey upon and consume, than feed and repair the substance of the solid parts) but by the sweeter and more unctuous part of the Chylus, drawn up by the mediation of the Nerves (espe∣cially those of the sixth Conjugation, called the Recurrent Nerves) into the brain, and there ela∣borated, and afterward transmitted by the Nerves, to all parts of the body: This worthy Person, I say, aiming to promote the certainty of these recent Opinions, hath collected, illustrated and disposed them into one Systeme; Hoping thereby to declare their mutual Consistence, as well each with other, as with the demonstrative doctrine of the Circulation of the blood; And at the same time put an end to all disputes, con∣cerning the Milky veins, the use of the Spleen, of the Capsulae Atrabilariae, or Renes succenturiati, Deputy Kidnies (as Casserius Placentinus called them) and sundry other Difficulties in Anato∣my. But, whether or no he hath attained to the full pitch of his hopes, in that design; you will be best able to judge, when you have read and examined the weight of his experiments and discourses, delivered in his excellent Book, de Anatomia Hepatis: In the mean time, give me leave to advertise you, that his modesty is so great, as that he expresly professes his own want of full satisfaction concerning the truth of sundry particulars therein contained; And therefore presents them to the World, as positi∣ons, not of apodictical evidence, but great pro∣bability,
and worthy to be embraced, only till time shall have brought more credible ones to light.
Furthermore, among these Merchants for light, we have some so excellently well skilled in all sorts of Medical Simples, that they know, not only the names, but the faces also and virtues of most of the Plants in Europe; And can, besides that, give you a better account of the American druggs, than Piso Margravius, and others, not∣withstanding the large volumes they have com∣piled concerning that subject. They likewise so well understand all Fossilia, and the several kinds of Minerals, pretious Stones, Salts, concreted juices, and other subterranean productions; That even Lapidaries and Miners come to learn of them. We have others, who enquire into the mysteries of Refiners, Belfounders, and all others that deal in Metals. Others, who search out the frauds and sophistications of Wine-Coopers and Vintners, in the brewing, feeding, stum∣ming, and adulterating of Wines. Others, who can inform you exactly of the severall hurtfull Arts of Brewers, Bakers, Butchers, Poulterers, and Cooks: All which are of very great detri∣ment to the health of men, though the danger be commonly undiscerned; And, were the civil Ma∣gistrate but half so careful to reform, as these Doctors have been in detecting those publick a∣buses, the Citty of London would soon find, by happy experience, that Physicians are both as willing and able to preserve health, as to restore it. In a word, there is nothing escapes their
examination, which may any way concern the safety of mans life; or the knowlege whereof can conduce to make themselves every way accom∣plisht in their Profession.
And as for Chymistry (which I had almost for∣gotten) in the whole world there are none who know better how to distinguish betwixt the impostures and truths of it, than these Men doe: or how to make use of all the secrets thereof, to∣wards the preparation of noble and generous Medicaments. Witnesse that plenty of choise Chymicall remedies, daily confected in the Ela∣boratory belonging to the Colledge, by the di∣rections and prescripts of the Fellowes; and the care they constantly take, to diffuse those safe and excellent preparations among all their Apo∣thecaries, that so the lives of their Patients be not endangered by the false and poysonous wares of Pseudo-chymists. A course, certainly, that occasions great readinesse and security in their Practice; and satisfies the World both of their singular Judgement, and constant Integrity in discharge of their trust. And thus, most ho∣nourd Sir, I have hastily, and slightly run over a few of those particulars, wherein Natural Philosophy, and the Art of Medicine have, of late, received such notable advancement, by the Inventions and Disquisitions of this Venerable Society; which for the Knowledge of Nature, well deserves to be esteemed the Great Luminary of the World, from whence there constantly stream rayes of light, for the dispelling the thick and long congested clouds of ignorance. But, before
I passe to the remainder of your demand, permit me to observe to you; that though the Fellows of this Colledge apply themselves severally to this or that particular Province, each one according to the inclination & delight of his own private Genius; Yet, when they meet together in Con∣sultations, they are so candid and liberal in the communication of their single observations and discoveries, that no one of them can long be ig∣norant of the notions of all the rest: And the no∣ble Emulation that hath equally enflamed their ingenious breasts, makes them unanimous in co∣operating toward the Common design, the e∣recting an intire and durable Fabrick of solid Science; such as posterity may not only admire, but set up their rest in.
And now Sir, if you please to goe along with me to Oxford, you shall there also find as great Benefactors to Learning, as those were, who foun∣ded and endowed their Colledges; and some, who for the excellency of their Inventions, will have their Memories fresh and verdant, when Time hath made those stately buildings confesse their brittleness, and reduced them into Quarries again. I could bring you to One there, who hath excogitated a Method, whereby the Astronomy of the primary Planets may be Geometrically explain'd: & that as wel according to the Ellip∣tical, as to the Circularway. A thing of stupendi∣ous difficulty, requiring universal knowledge in the Mathematiques; & of inestimable benefit to∣ward the Certification of Coelestiall Science: and which, being judiciously perpended, seemes to
be of equall weight with the merits of even the Great Hipparchus, who (you know) made the first Catalogue of the Fixt Stars, observed their severall Magnitudes, and marked out their particular Stations, both according to longitude and latitude; with∣out which there could be no certaine observa∣tion of the motions of the Erratick ones. So that if Hipparchus may be deservedly named Atlas the Second, for relieving the wearied shoulders of that Great Grandfather of Astronomy; and if the glorious Tycho Brahe may be called Hercules the Second, for relieving Hipparchus, long lan∣guishing and ready to sink under so prodigious a burden, as the whole mysterie of the Heavens: I see no reason, why the Author of this admirable Invention, which seemes to assure the truth of all the rest, may not be called Tycho the Second. For my part really, were I worthy to have this Gentlemans Picture in my study, I should desire to have it drawne in this manner. I would have Hipparchus, Ptolemy, and Tycho, standing in a triangle, and supporting the whole Coelestial Machine on their heads; on one side, Copernicus turning all the Orbs about with his right hand; and this Heros on the other side, with a Table in his left hand containing the Figures in Euclids Elements, and with the Fore∣finger of his right, pointing to the Planetary Spheres, as demonstrating the theory of their Motions, by the maxims of Geometry. And sure I am, He deserves to have his name assigned to some honorable place, among the worthy
Advancers of Astronomy, in the Selenographi∣call map of Ricciolus. I could bring you to Ano∣ther, who hath likewise discovered a Method, whereby the Parabola, Circle, Ellipsis, and Hyper∣bola really are (and most, if not all other regular Curve-lined Figures, may be) squared: A Problem that hath long perplex't the thoughts of the greatest Geometricians, and of late very neere turned the brains of even the great Leviathan himself, who arrogating the solution of it to himself, thought thereby not a little to justifie his pretences to the Monarchy of Knowledge, and Reformation of not only the Arts and Scien∣ces, but also of the Universities that teach them.
Here are some, who perceiving the great ad∣vantage arising to Students from the use of Sym∣bols (whereby the understanding is exempted from the encombrance of words, and brought, as it were, with one glance to behold the long con∣tinued series of complex and intricate ratiocina∣tion, which would otherwise oppresse the me∣mory, and confound the strongest imagination to sustain it) invented by Vieta, and brought to perfection by Mr. Oughtred and Des Cartes, for the more compendious tradition of the Mathema∣ticks; and considering that the same way was capable of being accommodated to the Facilita∣tion of discourses in Philosophy, Physick, and o∣ther parts of Learning; have made a very con∣siderable progress toward the invention of Sym∣bols, or Signes, for every thing and notion: inso∣much that one of these Wits hath found the va∣riety of many millions of Signes, in a square of
a quarter of an inch, as himself professeth, in a most ingenious discourse of his, entituled Vindi∣ciae Academiarum. Which perhaps you have read; and if you have, I need not tell you how little he wants of finishing that so long talked-of and desi∣red design of an Universal Character and Language.
And as for the Optiques, shew me the men in the whole World, who have more illustrated the nature, affections, and motions of that most subtle and glorious Creature, Light; Or given clearer demonstrations of their Knowledge of all sorts of Radiations, and the manner and reasons of Vision, than some Mathematical Wits, now flourishing in this University, have done. It is their usual recreation, to practise all Delusions of the sight, in the Figures, Magnitudes, Moti∣ons, Colours, Distances, and Multiplications of Objects: And, were you there, you might be en∣tertained with such admirable Curiosities, both Dioptrical and Catoptrical, as former ages would have been startled at, and believed to have been Magical. They will represent to you, the Images of Things and Persons intire, and to the life, from Tables whereon the naked eye can∣not discern so much as one part of them, unlesse in fractures and seemingly confused divisions; and this by collected reflections from mirrours Conical, Cylindrical, Concave, Convex, Mult∣angular, &c. They will imitate Nature to the height of perfect resemblance, in counterfeiting Rainbows, Halo's, and Circles of various Co∣lours about Lights, by artificial Refractions of their beams. They have all the severall waies of
Multiplying and Corroborating Light, and transmitting it in concourse to very great di∣stance; And this, as well by conveying the dis∣persed rayes through Diaphanous bodies, of con∣venient figures, and reuniting them in a cone or point, after their various refractions, for the en∣crease of their force; Or by repercussion from Concave (Elliptical, Parabolical, Circular) su∣perficies of polite Indiaphanous ones. Inso∣much, that if Niceron, Kircher, and other great Masters in the Art of Light and Shadowes, would see the errors of their Optical Theory a∣mended; and all the secrets of Catoptrical Ma∣gick, familiarly reduced into practice: hither and only hither they must come. And, were Friar Bacon alive again, he would with amazement confesse, that he was canonized a Conjurer, for effecting far lesse, than these men frequently ex∣hibit to their friends, in sport. They have, more∣over, Optick Tubes, or Telescopes, in such perfecti∣on, that they magnifie more, and take in more of the rayes proceeding from illuminate Objects, than any other of the same length, that ever were made before: And have brought them also to as great a length, as can well be managed. These they use for observations of Eclipses of Sun and Moon, of the several Phases or Appa∣rences of the Moon, of Saturn, and other Planets, both primary and secundary, of the Galaxy, the magnitudes and figures of the fixt stars, and o∣ther Coelestial Speculations. They have likewise Microscopes, that magnify the dimensions of mi∣nute and otherwise undiscernable bodies, even
to an incredible rate, and bring the sight to a fa∣miliar acquaintance with the shapes of not only whole small Flies and other Insects, but also of the smallest part of them. Insomuch as there is hope, if this Invention go on toward perfection as fast as it hath begun, within this last four or five years; that the eye ere long may be enabled to distinguish even the Seminal Figures of things, which seem to regulate them in their producti∣ons and growth; and to behold the originary Schematisms of Nature, drawn on the smallest Moleculae, or first collections of Atoms concur∣ring to determinate the Figures of Con∣cretions.
And thus, Noblest Isodicastes, have I essayd to yeeld you some satisfaction, concerning the state of Learning, now in England; And the chief Particulars, wherein it hath received Advance∣ment, by the prosperous endeavours of our Country-men, since your retirement here in France. I need not intimate to you, how imper∣fect and rambling an account I have given you of these Novell Inventions; and am sufficiently conscious, that I rather ought to excuse my self, by the frailty of my Memory, and want of judg∣ment, how to represent such excellent and use∣full Discoveries, in descriptions correspondent to their Natures: And ask your pardon for thus abusing your patience, and lessning the merits of those worthy Authors, who have thus enriched the Common-wealth of Philosophy.
Good Athanasius, how well you have deser∣ved both of those Authors and my self, in this your learned Harangue; I must forbear to speak, till you are absent. In the mean time, give me leave, a little to wonder, how it comes about, that Apollo, who seldom plants his Laurel in a Land yet wet and reaking with blood, and de∣lights to reside only where Peace and Plenty have long had their habitations; should thus take up his mansion in a Nation so lately opprest by the Tyranny of Mars, and scarce yet free from the distractions of a horrid Civil War. Pallas and Bellona I know to be one and the same God∣desse: Yet I do not remember, I ever saw her pictured (like Caesar) with a Spear in one hand, and a Book in the other. When I veiw the train of sad and heavy Calamities, that commonly attend the Sword; I should rather have expected the incroachment of Ignorance and Barbarism upon our Iland, than the encrease of Letters and growth of Knowledge there.
You have reason for your wonder, Sir, I must confesse; Yet when you have considered, that e∣very Age hath its peculiar Genius, which in∣clines mens Minds to some one study or other, and gives it a dominion over their affections pro∣portionate to its secret influence; and that the vi∣cissitudes of things ordained by Providence, re∣quire a general predisposition in mens hearts,
to co-operate with Fate, toward the Changes ap∣pointed to succeed in the fulnesse of their time: You will think it lesse strange, that Britain, which was but yesterday the Theatre of War and de∣solation, should to day be the School of Arts, and Court of all the Muses. Omnia secula suum habent Genium, qui mortalium animos in certa studia solet inflectere. Quaedam aetates praecipuè armis exer∣citae; mox omnia in quietem composita; tum Regno∣rum, tum Rerum publicarum in populis amor; nunc ve∣luti in barbariem homines nasci, deinde facilioribus animis mansuescere; & post secula aliquot ad stipa∣tum prima caligine ingenium redire: was the ob∣servation of a Modern Writer, and hath been frequently verified. Besides, our late Warrs and Schisms, having almost wholly discouraged men from the study of Theologie; and brought the Civil Law into contempt: The major part of young Schollers in our Universities addict them∣selves to Physick; and how much that conduceth to real and solid Knowledge, and what singu∣lar advantages it hath above other studies, in making men true Philosophers; I need not inti∣mate to you, who have so long tasted of that be∣nefit.
I guesse the Author of that observation you alleage; and that put's me in mind of another remark of his, perhaps not altogether unseason∣able. In his Character of the English Genius, he hath this saying: In Philosophia autem & Mathêsi, terrarumque & astrorum scientiis, nulla iam prodi∣giosa
est Sententia, quae non ex hac regione Authores invenerit, vel turbam amatorum, vividam quidem, sed modum subtilitati per innumeras disputatio∣nes effusae non invenientem. Now, if this be true, why may we not refer these Innovations in Phi∣losophy, Physick, and the Mathematicks, you have here recounted, rather to the English Hu∣mour of affecting new Opinions, than to any re∣all defects or errors in the Doctrine of the An∣cients?
How now, Lucretius; you an Epicurean, and yet against liberty of judgement among Philoso∣phers? It seems you have forgotten your Masters Rule; Quoties aliqua sunt in natura, quae pessunt mul∣tis peragi modis (uti eclipses syderum, uti eorundem ortus, occasus, sublimiaque caetera) tunc unum ali∣quem modum it a probare, ut improbentur caeteri, ri∣diculum profecto est. Pray, do but proceed to the words immediately subsequent to that passage in Barclay, concerning the pronesse of the English Genius to Novelties; and you will soon find, that he reflected chiefly on the Copernican Systeme, which in his daies began to grow into high repute, and obtained many Sectators among the learned of our Nation. So that confirming that Reproach, he endeavoured to fix upon our inge∣nious Spirits, by no better an instance, than that of our admission and promotion of the Pythago∣rean Hypothesis, of the Motion of the Earth, re∣vived and adorned by Copernicus (which all A∣stronomers now allow to be the most intelligible
and most convenient, that ever was invented) it easily appears, with how much more justice himself may be accused of grosse ignorance in matters Astronomical, which yet he would pre∣tend to judge of; than we can be of Levity and affected Innovation, for embracing and cultiva∣ting an opinion, of whose singular probability and excellency we are fully convinced. And as we have not submitted to that change in Astro∣nomy, but upon grounds of as much certainty and clearnesse, as the sublime and remote na∣ture of the subject seems capable of: So neither have we introduced any Alterations in Natural Philosophy, Physick, and other parts of Human Learning, but what carry their utility with them, and are justifiable by right reason, by aut∣optical or sensible demonstration, and by multi∣plied experience. So that every intelligent man may easily perceive, that it hath been the Re∣formation, that drew on the Change; not the desire of Change, which pretendeth the Refor∣mation. Did you, Lucretius, but know the Gra∣vity, Solidity, and Circumspection of these wor∣thy Reformers of the state of Learning now in England; you would not suspect them of incogi∣tancy, or too much indulgence toward the Mi∣nerva's of their own brain: but confesse that they have precisely followed that counsel of the Scripture, which injoynes us, to make a stand upon the Ancient way, and then look about us, and disco∣ver, what is the straight and right way, and so to walk in it.
For my part, truly, I conceive it fitting, that all Schollars should have a reverend esteem of Antiquity, as a good guide of our younger Rea∣son into the waies of Nature; Yet I think it scarce safe for any man to follow it implicitly, and without examination, as if it were impossi∣ble for him to erre the whiles, or as if the light of his own understanding were given him to no other use, but to be set in the drak-lanthorn of Authority. The Ancients indeed, (thanks be to their bounteous industry) have left us large and noble Foundations; but few compleat Buildings: and who so intends to have his understanding seated commodiously, and in a pleasant Mansion of Science, must advance superstructures of his own; otherwise he wil lie open to the weather of Doubts, and Whirlewinds of various Difficul∣ties, nor will he be ever able to entertain his friends with decency and satisfaction. It was gravely and wittily said of the Lord Bacon, that those who too much reverence Old times, often become a scorn to the New. But, Gentlemen, I perceive the evening hastens upon us, and I have already detained you longer, then suits with the civility of an accidentall encounter; Pray, there∣fore, let me beg the favour of your company to a light Collation of a Sallade and a bottle of good Wine, at my House: Or, if your occasions have otherwise preingaged you, let me resign you to the pursuit of them, with thanks for the con∣tent your learned conversation hath given me,
and hopes of enjoying the like again, as often as your vacancy from serious affairs will permit.
Noblest Sir, I most humbly thank you for the honour of your invitation; and would attend you home, with all joy and gratitude imaginable, would the urgency of a businesse I have appoint∣ed to dispatch, this evening, dispense with me.
I can assure you Sir, Athanasius is preingaged, and upon a matter of some moment; but for my self, I am at liberty to meet the happiness you are pleased to offer me.
I love not to hinder businesse; nor to impor∣tune a friend to his disadvantage. And so adieu, worthy Athanasius. Come Lucretius, I will bring you the shortest way; I have a key will let us forth at yonder Privy door, that opens into the fields, that lie within the prospect of my house.
Honour'd Isodicastes, farewell.
I See you are very precise in keeping your time prefix't, Athanasius; And I hope, I have not made you stay, many minutes, for me. If I have, you must impute it to the disagree∣ment of our Watches, not to any tardiness in my self; For, I assure you, I was here before you, in my desires.
I love alwaies to be punctuall in my appoint∣ments, and rather to prevent my Friends, than put them to expect me. But, have you acquaint∣ed this Noble person Isodicastes, with the occa∣sion of our present meeting?
Yes, Athanasius, he hath; and I acknowledge my self singularly obliged to him for importu∣ning you to a divertisement, than which none
could be more agreeable to me, as well in re∣spect of the Argument you have promised to discuss, as of your self, whose Writings and yesterdaie's Conference have created in me a desire of conversing with you, oftner than (I fear me) your studies and affairs will permit. And now we are convened, let us lose no time, but repose our selves upon this shady Seat, and omitting all Complements and Prologues; ad∣dresse immediately to the Subject intended. For my part, I promise you all attention of Mind possible, and as much Equity in judgement, as my slender stock of reason can attain to.
Among Us, who are so happy, as to be Sacra∣mentally engaged to fight under the Standard of the Crucified God, I observe, in the generall, two different perswasions concerning the nature of Faith. Some there are, who seem to have so active and long-winged a power of belief, as that they can mount up to an easie and quick ap∣prehension of all the Mysteries of the Christian Doctrine; and are ready to complain, that they want Difficulties enough to exercise the strength of their Belief. Others there are, who though their Faith be lively and strong enough to em∣brace even the most sublime Article of the Creed; and estimate the Verity of each Religi∣ous Principle only by its dependence on Autho∣rity Divine: are neverthelesse so sensible of the frailties of Human Nature, as that they think it necessary to have often recourse to that Patheti∣cal
Ejaculation of the man in the Gospel, Lord I believe, Lord help my unbelief. The First, wholly refuse the assistance of their Reason, even where it offers it self and the subject is capable of illu∣stration by the discourses it might raise thereup∣on; as judging any Fundamental of Religion much debased, and in a manner prophaned, if once it be brought to the Test of the Light of Nature, though meerly for Confirmation and more familiar admittance. The Others, humbly resign up their Assent to all Positions contained in Sacred Writ; and yet are glad, when they can bring up the Forces of their Reason to assist them in the conquest of their fleshly oppositions: And conceive they then make the best use of the talent of their Understanding, when they imploy it toward the ratification of Divine Traditi∣ons.
Now, albeit I admire, and could most wil∣lingly emulate the perfection of the Former sort; Yet, I confesse, I am not ashamed to rank my self among the Latter. For, although (thanks be to the Mercy of God) I do not find my self subject to diffidence in any point of the Christian belief, taught me by that Oracle of Sacred wisdom, the Word of God: Yet me thinks I perceive my faith somwhat Corroborated and Encouraged, when to the evidence therof I can superadd also the con∣current testimony of my Reason. Nor do I fear the frowns of Theology, if I adventure to affirm, that that Soul must have a clearer preception of the Excellency of Objects Supernatural, who can attain to speculate them both by the light
of Grace and that of Nature together. I am very far short of their Audacity, who are so con∣ceipted of the subtility of their Wit, as to permit it to fly at all that a Christian is bound to be∣lieve; insomuch as even the Arcana Deitatis, the Mysteries of the Trinity, of the Hypostatick Uni∣on, and other the like Divine Abstrusities (which poor Mortality is unqualified to contemplate; and, indeed, which Cherubins themselves cannot look into, without raptures of holy wonder) have hardly escaped their prophanation. No, far be it from me, to entertain a thought of so wild and dangerous a presumption. All I durst ever aspire unto, is only with pious humility to apply my Reason to such of the Articles in my Creed, as seem to be placed within the Sphere of its comprehension: Of which sort I conceive the First and Last Article to be, viz. the Being of God, as Father Almighty, and Maker of Heaven and Earth; and the Immortality of Mans Soul, or Life everlasting. Nor, indeed, need I seek further for my Confirmation in the belief of all the rest, when once I have advanced my Understanding to that due height, as clearly to behold the Ve∣rity of these two Positions, that are the Pillars and supporters of all the others. Nay, I have somtimes thought the Single position of the Im∣mortality of the Human Soul, to be the grand Base of Religion, and like the Key, or midle stone in an Arch, which bears the weight of all others in the building. For, if the Soul be mortal, & sub∣ject to utter dissolution with the body; to what purpose doth all Piety and Religion serve? What
issue can we expect of all our Prayers, of all our Adorations, of all our Self-denying acts of obe∣dience, of all our unjust Sufferings? Why should we worship God at all? Nay, more, why should we consider whether there be a God or no? For, the assurance of his Being could not much con∣duce to encrease our happinesse in this transito∣ry life; since that would then consist only in the full fruition of Sensual pleasures: And as for fu∣ture expectations after death, there could be none at all; For, absolute Dissolution imports absolute Insensibility; and what is not, cannot be capable of Reward or Punishment, of Felicity or Misery.
And from this Consideration was it, that I be∣gan first to apply my self to search for other Reasons, for the eviction of the Souls Eternal subsistence after death, besides those delivered in Holy Scripture; that conjoyning the evidence and certainty of those desumed from the Light of Nature, to that of my former belief arising from the Light of Grace: I might be the better able to withstand the Convulsions of my own frailties, and convince others, who are so re∣fractory, as to submit their assent to no induce∣ment of perswasion, but what is drawn meerly from Natural Reasons.
Now, for my encouragement and Iustification in this design, I need not go far; it being well
known, that many Doctors of the Church, and those of the best note both for Learning and Pi∣ety, have exercised their wits and pens in the same subject: and have unanimously concluded, that though in the Christian Creed there be sundry Articles, concerning the Condition of Mans Soul, after its separation from the body, which by infinite excesses transcend the capacity of his reason; Yet that general one of the perpe∣tual existence of it after death, may be satisfa∣ctorily evinced by the same reason. To mention all the excellent Discourses written by these Church-men and others, upon this Argument; would be both tedious and unnecessary: Especi∣ally to you, who I presume have perused the greatest part, if not all of them. It may suffice, that I have them for my Precedents, both for the warrantablenesse, and probability, of this my undertaking. However, if you require farther justification of me; I refer you to the undeniable Authority of the Lateran Council, held under Pope Leo the tenth. Which having decreed the Anathematization of all Atheists, who durst question the Being of God, or the Immortality of the Human Soul; in the close of the Canon not only exhorteth, but expressly commandeth all Chri∣stian Philosophers to endeavour the demonstra∣tion of those sacred Truths, by solid and Physi∣cal Arguments. And, certainly, so pious and prudent an Assembly would never have prescri∣bed that task, in case they had not conceived it both commendable and possible to be effected.
As for the Goodnesse and Piety of your Un∣dertaking, truly I think few understanding men will question it; and, on the other side, I fear me, you will meet with as few, that will acknowledge the Possibility of your accomplish∣ing it. For, if I am not much mistaken, the greatest number of those eminent Doctors of the Church, and chiefest of the School-men, whom you intimated to have been your examples, in this particular, do, after all their labours and subtle disputes, ingenuously confesse, that the best of their Arguments are not rigorously Con∣vincing, or such as constrain assent as inevitably as Mathematical Demonstrations. And, if so, though I expect to receive as high satisfaction from you, as from any, who ever gave me the same hopes: Yet I humbly begg your excuse, if I suspend my belief of your ability to prove the Immortality of mans Soul, by Reasons of evidence & force re∣quisite to the Conviction of a meer Natural man (such as I, for this time at least, suppose my self to be, and such as indeed all men would, when they come to examine the strength of Discourses of this nature) untill you shall have given me more pregnant testimonies thereof, than any Au∣thor; whose writings I have read, hath hitherto done, touching this subject. In a word, I believe the Soul to be Immortal, as firmly, as you, or any person living can; Yet I should account it no small felicity, to see a perfect Demonstration of
it; such as might for ever silense all Doubts and Contradictions, and make a Convert of my old Master Epicurus, in case he were now among the living: And any thing lesse than that, would hold no proportion to my expectation.
I will not deny, Lucretius, but some of those School-men, who have alleaged congruous and sinewy Reasons, in favour of the Souls Immor∣tality, did afterward themselves confesse, they were not compleatly Apodicticall: But, you may be pleased to remember also, that some others of them stiffly maintained the contrary; and all of them unanimously concur in this, that howbeit those Reasons do not ascertain equally with Geometrical Demonstrations; yet they are such as import either a Physicall or Moral evidence, sufficient to perswade a mind well affected to∣ward truth, and free from the obstruction of prejudice. Nor should I fear to obtain the Cause, however the Arguments I shall bring, to assert the Immortality of the Soul, arise not to the height of absolute Demonstrations: Provided they be found of greater certainty, clearnesse, and consequence, than those that have ever yet been urged by those of the contrary perswasion; and such as being superadded to the Authority of Holy Writ, become ineluctable. And more than this, (Lucretius) considering the singular ob∣scurity and abstruse condition of the subject, you have no reason to expect at my hands. Pray, do but reflect a little on the modesty of that great
man, Aristotle, declared in sundry places of his Writings, but more especially in the beginning of his Ethicks, where he saith, Hominis probe in∣stituti est, tantam in unoquoque genere subtilitatem desiderare, quantam rei ipsius natura recipit.
A man of Erudition, and a sound Judgement; ought to require only so much subtility and exactnesse in any kind of Argument, as the nature of the thing treated of, will admit, and no more.And, having observed the same un∣reasonable humour of curiosity in others of those times, that now possesseth you, and too ma∣ny of the sublime Wits of the present age, who look for nothing below Demonstrations, though in the Metaphysicks, and other Sciences that are really incapable of them; he addeth this posi∣tive rule, Mathematica certitudo non est in omnibus quaerenda; Mathematical Certitude is not to be required in all things. To convince you the more clearly of the Unreasonablenesse of what you would exact from me in this case; let me a while divert you to the consideration of the nature of a Demonstration. The Method of Demonstration, you know, is twofold; the one by Analysis, the other by Synthesis.
The Analytical teacheth the true way, by which the truth of a thing may be found out Methodically, and as à priori; so that if the Rea∣der or Hearer shall strictly follow the same, and attentively heed all the Antecedents and Con∣sequents therein propounded, he shall come at length to understand the thing demonstrated as perfectly, and make it as much his own, as if
himself had first found it out. But yet it contains nothing, whereby either the heedless, or dissent∣ing reader may be compelled to assent; For if a∣ny one of the least Propositions therein delive∣red, be not exactly and fully noted, the necessity of its Conclusions doth not sufficiently ap∣pear.
The Synthetical, by a way opposite to the for∣mer, and as it were sought à posteriori (though the Probation it self be oftentimes more à priori, than in the former) doth clearly demonstrate, what is concluded, and useth a long series of Definitions, Postula es, Axioms, Theorems, and Pro∣blems, that if any thing be denied of the Conse∣quents, it speedily sheweth the same to be com∣prehended in the Antecedents, and so extorts belief from the Reader, though formerly repug∣nant and pertinacious. Neverthelesse, this doth not satisfie, nor fil the mind of him who comes to learn, so amply as the other: Because it teach∣eth not the way or manner, how the thing pro∣ved was first found out. And this Latter is that, which the Ancient Geometricians generally made use of in their Writings; not that they were ignorant of the other: But (as I conceive) because they valued it so highly, as that they desired to reserve it to themselves, as a great Secret, and too noble to be prophaned by vulgar communication. Now, this is that strict and vi∣gorous Method, upon which I suppose you re∣flect, when you say; you would gladly meet with a perfect Demonstration of the Immortali∣ty of Mans Soul: And I must therefore advertise
you of the Incompetency thereof to Metaphysi∣cal subjects. And the reason doth consist in this Difference; that the First Notions, which are pre∣supposed, in order to the demonstration of things Geometrical, agreeing with the use of the Senses, are most easily and promptly admitted by all men; & so there is no difficulty, but only in dedu∣cing right Consequences from them, which may be done only by remembring the Antecedents: And the minute distinction of propositions is therefore made, that each of them may, upon occasion, be quickly recited, and so recalled to the memory of even the most heedlesse Reader: But on the contrary, in things Metaphysical, all the difficulty lies in clearly and distinctly per∣ceiving the First Notions; For, though of their own nature they be not lesse known, or, even more known, than those considered by Geome∣tricians: Yet, because many prejudgements of the Senses, to which from our infancy we have been accustomed, seem repugnant to them; therefore cannot they be perfectly known, but by such as are very attentive to them, and with∣all abstract their Minds from the Images of Cor∣poreal things, as much as is possible; and being proposed alone by themselves, they might easily be denied, by such as delight in contradiction. But, as for the Analytical method; I would not have you despair of seeing it in some measure accommodated to the subject, of which we now discourse. Provided you shall first tune your Mind to a fit key, to bear a part in the harmony of truth, when it resounds from the strings of
all the Antecedents and Consequents propound∣ed. Which you must do, both by abstracting your thoughts many times from the grosse re∣presentations of Corporeal things, that hold no commerce of proportion or similitude with the Incorporeal Nature of the thing enquired into: and by wholly devesting your self of all preju∣dice, and inclination to impugn truth, when it presents it self clad in sufficient evidence. For, whosoever comes to the examination of an in∣tricate truth, with the cloud of inveterate aver∣sion, and mask of affected contradiction, before his eyes; doth thereby make himself the lesse fit to perceive it: because he diverts his mind, from the due consideration of those reasons that might convince him, to the hunting after such as may dissuade him.
You do well, Athanasius, thus to prepare my belief before-hand, by telling me, how necessa∣ry it is, that I should abstract my Mind, as well from the Images of Material Objects, as from prejudice; when it remains on your part, first to shew me the way of that Abstraction, and then to devest me of prejudice. For, for my own part, I confesse ingenuously, I can speculate nothing, without the help of my Imagination; so that whatever I can think upon, comes to my mind in the dresse of Magnitude, Figure, Colour, and other the like conditions of Matter. Truth is, I have often heard, among your soaring and long∣winged Wits, of Abstracted and Unbodied Notions;
and have somtimes perplexed my mind, and almost crackt the membranes of my brain, in striving how to comprehend them: And yet I al∣waies found my Phansy so inseparably conjoin∣ed to my Intellect, as if they were both one and the same Faculty. Nor am I yet able to distin∣guish betwixt my Imagination and Intellection: And when once you shall have satisfied me of a reall Difference betwixt them; I shall soon con∣fesse, you have gone very near the Demonstrati∣on of the Souls Immortality. Because, if the o∣perations of the Intellect be clearly distinct from those of the Phansy, which is a Corporeal Fa∣culty, and therefore limited to the perception and representation of only Corporeal Natures: It will almost follow, that the Intellect, which is capable of knowing Incorporeals, is a sub∣stance clearly distinct from the body, and so Im∣material; since different effects must have different Causes. And, as for your other Postulate, viz. the exemption of my mind from contrary prejudice; This also is what I should expect from the effica∣cy of your intended Arguments. For, (as I told you before) I believe the Immortality of the Soul; but cannot perswade my self of the possibi∣lity of its Demonstration, by any other but Di∣vine reasons: And it must be your work, to con∣vince me of the error of that perswasion. Ne∣verthelesse, I will assure you of my best Atten∣tion, and that I come not with a resolution not to be satisfied.
Dear Sir, have patience a while, and you shall soon perceive both the Necessity and E∣quity of what I require: And in the mean time, do not take occasion to anticipate my Notions, but leave me to deliver them in their due places and order.
I shall punctually observe your commands; and therefore, if you think fit, immediately ad∣dresse your self to your Demonstration.
First, it will be convenient, in order to the prevention of all Equivocation and Logoma∣chy, that may arise from the various use of the word, Soul; that we insist a little on the exami∣nation of that vulgar Opinion, which admitteth a real distinction betwixt Animus and Anima, the Mind and the Soul: In regard it seems to be the very same, according to which many Doctors of the Church have conceived the Soul to have Two Parts, a Superior and Inferior; the one being the Mind, Intellect, or Reason; the other compre∣hending the Sense & Appetite Natural and Brutish.
There are (you know) many eminent men, as well Theologues, as Philosophers, who, as they hold Man to be composed of two parts, a Soul and a Body; so do they conceive, that his soul is likewise composed of a twofold sub∣stance, the one Incorporeal or Immate∣rial, immediately created by God, and infused
into the body, at the instant of its Empsychosis or first Animation, in the Mothers Womb: The other Corporeall or Material, originally con∣tained in the Parents Seed, and derived ex tra∣duce, from the Seminalities of Male and Female commixed in coition; which is as it were the Medium or Disposition, by the intermediate nature whereof the Diviner part is conjoined and united to the Elementary, or Body. And this Opinion they ground chieflly upon that speech of the Apostle, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: I per∣ceive a Law in my members warring against the Law of my Mind, &c. For (say they), since it is im∣possible, that one Simple Essence or thing should war against, or have contrariety to it self; from this Repugnancy betwixt the Sense, and the Mind or Reason, it seems necessarily consequent, that the Sensitive and Rational Soul are things essentially different each from other. Whereun∣to they superadd also, that unlesse this Distinction be admitted, we can never well understand, how Man, as a living Creature, can be said to be, in one part, little lower than the Angels: and in another, to be like the Horse or Mule, that have no understanding. How, in respect of one part, he is made after the Image of God: and in re∣spect of another, he is compared to the Beasts that perish. How, in one respect, he acknow∣ledgeth God to be his Author and Principle: and in another, he owns his production upon his Parents. How, in one relation, he is said to
be Immortall: and in another, subject to death equally with the smallest worme.
Notwithstanding, it is not either the Autho∣rity, or Arguments of these Men, that seem pre∣valent enough to bring me to be of their persua∣sion. For as to their Authority; I could thereunto oppose that of some Fathers, yea and Councils, who not onely reprehend, but condemne all such, as make a duality of Souls in man: were not the thing already well known to you. How∣ever, suffer me to put you in mind, that the pi∣ous and learned Conimbricenses (who certainly, have most profoundly and judiciously, of all o∣thers, handled this Question) though they pro∣ceed not so far, as to censure this conceipt to be Hereticall (as some others before them had don) yet they expressy declare their Dissent from it. And as for their Reasons alledged; I thinke them likewise insufficient. For all that Psychomachy, or intestine Conflicts which these men imagine to be betwixt the inferior part of the soul which is called the sensitive, and the superior called the Rational, or betwixt the Na∣tural Appetites and the Will; doe arise onely from the repugnancy or contrariety which is between those motions of the spirits, which are on one side caused by the senses affected by ex∣ternall objects; and those motions of the spirits which on the other side are caused by the will, after the soul hath deliberated upon their con∣veniency and utility. And, in truth, each indi∣viduall man hath one and onely one soul; in which is no variety of parts: that which is the
Sensitive is also the Rationall, and all her Appe∣tites are absolute Volitions. The cause of these mens error seems to be this, that they could not well distinguish the Functions proper to the soul, from the Functions proper to the body; to which alone we ought in right to ascribe what∣ever we observe in our selves to be repugnant to our Reason. So that in Man, there is no other Contract or Contrariety of Affections, but what consisteth in the contrary motions cau∣sed by the spirits and purer part of the blood, in that part of the body, in which as in its principall and more immediate organ, the soul is enthroned and exerciseth her faculties; whether that be the Plexus Choroides in the brain, as most Physi∣cians conceive; or the Heart, as the Scripture seems to intimate; or the Glandula pinealis, in the centre of the brain, as Des Cartes affirmeth; or any other part whatsoever: one of these motions arising from the determination of the spi∣rits by the will one way; and the other, from the determination of them by the corporeal Appetite, another way. And hence it comes often to pass, that these impulses being contrary each to other; the stronger doth im∣pede and countermand the effect of the weaker. Nor is it difficult to distinguish these two kinds of impulses or motions, made by the mediation of the spirits upon the principal sensory, or chief seat of the soul. Forasmuch as some of them represent to the soul, the Images of objects either at that time moving the senses, or the impressions formerly made and remaining in the brain; but offer no force or violence to it, so far as to engage
the will toward their prosecution: and others prove so effectual, as to dispose the will accor∣dingly; as may be observed in all those, which produce passions, or such motions in the body, as usually accompany passions. As for the for∣mer, though they often impede the actions of the soul, and are againe as often impeded and sup∣pressed by them; yet, because they are not direct∣ly opposite each to other, we can observe no conflict or wrestling betwixt them; as we may, betwixt the latter sort of Motions, and acts of the will or Volitions that oppose them, as (for ex∣ample) betwixt that impulse, by which the prin∣cipall organ of the soul is disposed to affect her with the cupidity or desire of any one particular object; and that, by which the will counterdis∣poseth her to an aversation from, or avoydance of, the same. And this Conflict chiefly demon∣strate thits selfe hereby, that the will being not able to excite passions directly, and immediately, is constrained to cast about and use a kind of art, in order thereunto; and to apply it selfe to the consideration of several things successively, or one after another; whereupon it comes to passe, that if any one of those things occurring, chance to be prevalent enough to change the course or cur∣rent of the spirits, at that instant; yet another that followes next after it, be not powerfull enough to second the former in that change, the spirits then immediately againe resume their first course or motion (the precedent dis∣position in the nerves, heart, and blood, being not yet altered) and thereupon the soul per∣ceives her selfe to be impelled to pursue and
avoid the same object, almost in one and the same moment. And this alone was that, which gave occasion to men, to imagine Two Distinct and mutually repugnant Powers or Faculties in the soul. Nevertheless, we may conceive a∣nother sort of Conflict consisting in this; that many times the same cause, which exciteth a passion in the soul, doth, even in the same mo∣ment, excite also in the body, certaine motions, to which the soul doth not at all conduce, and which she suppresseth or at least indeavours to suppress, so soon as she observes them to be begun. For instance, whatsoever causeth Feare, doth at the same instant cause also the spirits to flow into those muscles, which serve to move the thighs and legges to flight or avoidance of the terrible object; but if the Will suddainly rise up, and determine to exercise the vertue of Fortitude, and oppose the danger threatned, the soul then giveth check to that motion of the spirits, and converts them to the heart and armes the better to make resistance.
And here I ask leave to make a short Digressi∣on, while (with the excellent Des Cartes) I ob∣serve to you; that it is from the Event of these inward Conflicts, by which a man may come to understand the strength or weakness of his own soul. For such persons, who have their wills sufficiently strong to subdue passions, and countermand those suddain motions in the body which accompany the passions; are without doubt, endowed with Noble and Generous Souls: And those who have their wills subject
to the impetuosity of passions, and cannot check the motions of the spirits resulting from them, must be men of abject, effeminate and pusillanimous ones. Not that every man can make this Ex∣periment of himselfe, as to Weaknesse or Fortitude; because many and indeed most men come to these Duells, armed, not with the true and proper weapons of the mind, but with false ones borrowed from some contrary Affection: so that the conflict may seem to be rather be∣twixt two opposite Passions, than betwixt the Will and either of them; and the Will may be said to follow the fortune of the conquering passion, rather than to be it selfe the conque∣rour. By the true and proper weapons of the Mind, I meane certaine right and firme judgments concerning the knowledge of Good and evill; according to which it hath decreed to regulate it self in all the actions and occur∣rences of life. And, certainly, of all Souls, those are the most weak and feminine, which have not their wills thus determined to follow certaine settled Judgements, but suffer them to be drawn aside by present Affections; which being ma∣ny times contrary one to another, and equally prevalent, counter-incline the Will alternately, and so keep it on the rack of suspence. Thus, when Feare representeth Death, as the worst of evils, and which cannot be otherwise avoid∣ed, but by flight; if on the other side, Ambition step in, and represent the infamy of flight, as an Evill worse then Death: these two contrary Affections variously agitate and distract the
Will, and by putting it to a long conflict and irresolution, render the soul most servile and miserable.
Now from this consideration it is manifest, that there is no such necessity, as hath been i∣magined, of allowing a distinction of the soul into Animum and Animam, or making the Reaso∣nable soul and the Sensitive two distinct beings, in order to the explanation of that Psychoma∣chy, or Contest betwixt Reason and Sense, or the Superior and Inferior Faculties, of which the Apostle complained, and indeed which e∣very man feels within himselfe: all that repug∣nancy consisting in a Contrariety, not of the soul to it selfe (which in a Simple Essence is impossible) but onely of the Motions of the spi∣rits; caused by the Senses, on one side, and those caused by the Will, on the other, as hath been declared. And, as for the other Reasons that remaine; what I have now said, may be easi∣ly extended to the solution of them also: for, that Man is composed of a Reasonable Soul, and a Body; is sufficient to our understanding him to be, in one respect, little lower than the Angells, made after the Image of God, and Im∣mortall; and in another, like the Horse and Mule, that have no understanding, and subject to death equally with the beasts that perish.
By your favour, good Athanasius. You were saying even now, that there were some Fathers and Councils, who condemned all such as main∣tained
a Duality of Souls in Man: But, if I am not mistaken, that condemnation doth cheifly concern the Maniches, who held two distinct Souls in every man; the one derived from an e∣vill Principle, and so contaminated with the tincture of Vices; the other immaculate, pure, and having its origine immediately from God, yea being a certain Particle of the Divine Essence it self; And, perhaps, it may be extended also to the Platonist and Averrhoist, who affirm the Rati∣tional Soul not to be the Forma informans, and so make two forms in every individual person; both which opinions, are erroneous and hereticall. But, that it doth include also those, who distin∣guish the Soul into a Superior and Inferior part; the one comprehending the Mind Intellect or Reason only; the other the Sensitive Faculties and Appetites: I am yet to learn. Which I ad∣vertise you of, not that I am unsatisfied with the reason you have given of those Conflicts we daily have within us; For, in truth, it seems con∣veniently to explain the mystery of that Repug∣nancy betwixt our Rational and Corporeal Ap∣petites: but, to intimate to you, that I see no reason, why the Human Soul may not be admit∣ted: to consist of two parts, the one Immaterial and Intellectual, called the Mind, or Understand∣ing, and (by way of excellency) the Human Soul; the other Material, and only Sensitive, by the mediation whereof that Divine part is united to the body during life. And, with∣out admitting this Distinction, I do not under∣stand the meaning of that Sentence of Plato, Men∣tem
recipi in Anima; Animam, in corpore: nor of that of Trismegistus (or whoever was the Author of Poemander) Mentem in Animam, Animam in Spi∣ritu, Spiritum in corpore vehi: Both which not ob∣scurely intimate a certain Third Nature in Man, intermediate between that Divine essence, his reasonable Soul, & that Material or Elementary one, his body; which can be no other, but what we call the Sensitive part of the Soul.
Whether that condemnatory Sentence men∣tioned, doth extend to such, as hold the Reason to be one part of the Soul, and the Sensitive power to be another, in this moderate sense you are pleased to state it; I will not much contend, it being the proper businesse of Divines to deter∣mine that doubt: But, thus much I am certain of, that it expresly toucheth all, who assert a Duality of Souls Coexistent in man; and that is e∣nough, I presume, to justifie my quotation of it, against them. As for those remarkable texts of Plato, and the great Hermes, which you alleage; I answer, that it is very probable, that those Philosophers, who held the Soul to be Compo∣sed of two different Natures, as these seem to have done; had for their principal argument that intestine Repugnancy, we have explained, and that nothing can be contrary to it selfe. Now, their ground or Supposition that this Repug∣nancy is in the Soul it self, or betwixt the Rea∣sonable part and the Sensitive, and not betwixt the Soul and Body only (as I have clearly pro∣ved
it to be) being manifestly erroneous: Assu∣redly, their Inference cannot be longer considera∣ble. Neverthelesse, if what I have already urged, be not sufficiently clear and valid; rather than shew my self so vain an Opiniator, as to put my judgement into the ballance against so solid a one as yours, I am content, you should continue the possession of your present perswasion, till you shall please to afford me some other opportuni∣ty of demonstrating the Unity and Simplicity of the Soul: My present undertaking being only to evince the Immortality of it; and this more out of compliance to Lucretius importunity, than any confidence of singular ability in my self, to man∣nage so noble and weighty an Argument. If therefore I have not already discouraged your patience; permit me now to apply my self wholly to that Province.
The Considerations which I have designed to alleage, at this time, in favour of the Souls Im∣mortality, are either Physical, or Moral; And the Physical, or such as arise from the Nature of the Soul it self, seem all to refer themselves to this one Capital Argument.
The Reasonable Soul of Man is Immaterial; and therefore Immortal.
Here, notwithstanding the main Difficulty be concerning the Antecedent, yet convenience of Method requires me first to manifest the Force or Necessity of the Consequence. The Reason there∣fore, why what is Immaterial, must also be Im∣mortal,
is deduceable from hence; that what wants Matter, wants likewise parts, into which it might be distracted and dissolved: and what is uncapable of being dissolved, must of perfect necessity alwayes continue to be what it is. For, whatever is of a nature free from the conditions of Matter or Body; doth neither carry the prin∣ciples of dissolution in it selfe, nor fear them from External Agents: and by pure conse∣quence, cannot but perpetually last, or (which is the very same) be Immortall. And this Rea∣son seems to me, both most evident and ineluc∣table.
I perceive no such unavoidable Necessity. For, though an Immateriall thing cannot perish by the Exsolution of parts, which is the only way, by which all Corporeall natures are destroyed: yet it is not impossible, but the same may be destroyed some other way proper to Incorporealls, and unknown to us. Forasmuch as what ever is Principiate, or once produced, must have some cause of its production; and then why may it not be againe destroyed by the selfe same Cause, or by an action of that Cause, con∣trary to that action by which it was at first pro∣duced?
There are but two wayes, comprehensible by the Understanding, how any thing, that hath existence in nature, can perish: the one is (as I
have already expressed) by the Exsolution and Dissipation of its parts, of which it was compo∣sed; the other by absolute Adnihilation of its Entity, as the Schoolmen phrase it. Now, though I confesse, that as the former way of de∣struction is peculiar to Corporeall natures; so I know nothing to the contrary, but the Latter may be competent to Incorporeals, which are produced ex nihilo; for, every dependent, or what hath not its Being from its selfe, but deri∣veth it from another, is liable at the pleasure of that, on which it doth depend, to be deposed from that essence or state of Being, in which it was, by the same, created: yet, that there is any such thing as Adnihilation though consistent with the Omnipotence of God, is hardly conceiveable, without derogation from his wisedome, which pronounced all to be good that he had made, and the formal reason of the Creatures goodnesse doth consist only in this, that it seem'd good to the Divine will so to make them; and to argue à posse ad esse, that God doth or will adnihilate any thing, because it is in his power to adnihilate, is much below so good a Logician, as Lucretius is. Nor are we to suppose any Innovation in the generall state of things; but that the course of the Universe or Nature, doth constantly and invariably proceed in the same manner or te∣nour of method, which was at first instituted by the wisedome of the Creator. There is, you know, a twofold Immortality, the one Absolute, the other only Derivative. That the First is competent onely to God, cannot be denyed; since it is im∣possible
that that essence, which is Non-prin∣cipiate, or never had beginning, nor any Cause of its production, should be determined, or ever cease to be, or meet with any cause of its destruc∣tion. And that the latter may be competent to the whole Genus of Immaterial Essences, not∣withstanding the power of God, which can re∣duce them to Nothing, as well as it hath edu∣ced them from nothing; is likewise undeniable: for, supposing (as we ought) that God doth no∣thing contrary to the establish't Lawes and de∣creed order of Nature, and that this Generall state of things doth continue still the same, which his Wisedom at first instituted; it doth evidently follow, that what He hath once made Incorporeal, shall persever to be the same to all eternity. I remember a passage in Scaliger (Exercit. 307. sect. 20.) that most fitly expres∣seth the summe of this consideration, and there∣fore shall recite it to you. Solus Deus est verè immortalis & incorruptibilis, quia solus exse suum esse habet, at{que} à nullo dependet; Dei verò respectu omnia creata mortalia & corruptibilia sunt, quae â Crea∣toris nutu deponi possunt ab essentia illa, in qua con∣stituta sunt. Non corumpuntur tamen quaedam, ut Angeli & Anima Rationalis, quia Creator non vult ea corrumpi, & nihil contrarii ipsis, à quo cor∣rumpantur, condidit, nec eas ita materiae immersit, ut extra eam nec subsistere, nec operari possint. And this I conceive sufficient to manifest the neces∣sity of Immortality from Incorporiety.
But I am not satisfied of any necessity, why you should have recourse to Immateriality, for the proof of Immortality; seeing that even a∣mong the Father▪ there are some who maintain Immortality to be consistent with Corporality: and amongst the best Philosophers, some assert the Coelestial Bodies to be Incorruptible, and deduce that their incorruptibility from the na∣ture of their Forme, which neverthelesse they account not incorporeal.
Those Fathers held some Corporeal natures to be Immortal, not ex ratione essentiae, but ex Divina Gratia, only from the decree of the Divine bene∣placet; otherwise than I affirme of Incorpore∣als, and particularly the Soul of man. And as for that opinion of some Philosophers, it is e∣nough that it doth not oppose our Consequence i. e. that granting some bodies to be Incorrup∣tible, it followes not, that therefore Incorpore∣als are the lesse, but rather the more inccorrup∣tible. Whatever becomes of that Opinion, I say, that because there is no Body, which is not in processe of time, exsoluble into such parts, of which it doth consist: in as much as whether their principles be Atomes, which by their na∣turall agility and contrary impulsions alwayes cause intestine commotions, and a constant civill warre in the very entrals. of Concretions, or whether they be Elementary Qualities, active
and reciprocally repugnant, which cannot be idle, but unnecessantly act one upon ano∣ther; they carry the possibility of Disso∣lution in their own Composition: I say, considering this, it is clearly necessary, that all bodies, according to the Fundamental Laws of Nature, be subject to Dissolution, their parts be∣ing at length exturbed from their primary site, or Position and Union, and a total resolution succeding thereupon. Besides, you well know, that that Tenent of Aristotle, of the Incorruptibi∣lity of Coelestial Bodies, hath been exploded long since: And that what his Interpreters have so magnificently talked, of the Nature of the Cae∣lestial Form, is a meer dream, a chimera of im∣moderate subtility, and worthy only to be laught at; especially after those many observations of changes in them, made by the Modern Astrono∣mers, evincing the contrary.
But, do not you incur an Absurdity, in sup∣posing that there is any substance Immaterial, or produced-Nature Incorporeal; when as the Fa∣thers many of them have judged, that what is not a Body, is Nothing; and that my Tutor, E∣picurus hath expressly taught, that in Nature, nothing is Incorporeal beside Space or Inanity?
I know no Father, but only Tertullian (whom St. Augustine doth smartly reprehend for assert∣ing it) of that unsound opinion; and to him we may oppose the Authority of all, at least of most the others, who solidly justified the contra∣ry. And to Epicurus, I oppose Plato, Aristotle, and sundry others, who would not admit any such thing as Emptinesse in the Universe; but expressly affirmed, that there were [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] Substances separate, incor∣poreal, and destitute of parts. What if there were a few, who could not elevate their minds so high, as to conceive any thing Incorporeal, be∣sides Inanity; doth it therefore follow, that those many, and great men, who did conceive the contrary were fools, and that I, who likewise affirm the existence of Incorporeal Natures, doe run my self upon an Absurdity? I hope, Lucreti∣us, you will be more favourable to your self, than to own the impertinence of any such Sequel.
To deal freely with you, I find the Notion of Immaterial Substance, to be somwhat too sublime for the comprehension of so humble and short∣sighted a reason as mine is. But, perhaps, you may assist it with the Telescope of yours, upon occasion of somwhat or other in the processe of your discourse: And, therefore, go on directly to the conviction of your Antecedent, viz. that
the Rational Soul is Immortal; for, upon that hang's all the weight of the businesse.
The Antecedent, viz. that the Reasonable Soul is Immaterial, is evident from the Nature and Man∣ner of its Operations. For, since it is a certain rule, that every Agent is known by its Effects, and that all Formes reveal themselves by their peculiar and distinct energies, and waies of O∣peration; and as certain, that the Actions of man, as a Cogitating and Intellectuall Essence, are of so noble and divine a strain, as that it is impossible they should be performed by a meer Material Agent, or Corporeal substance, how∣ever disposed, qualified, or modified: What truth can be more perspicuous, more strong, than this, that the Soul of man, by which alone he is impowered to think and understand, is an Immaterial Substance?
Now, all the Actions of the Human Soul, are referrible to two General Heads or Fountains; whereof the one is Perception, or the single Ope∣ration of the Intellect; the other, Volition, or the single Operation of the Will: For, to be sensible, to Imagine, and purely to understand, are only diverse manners of Perceiving; and to desire, to hate, to affirm, to deny, to embrace, to refuse, are only divers manners of Willing.
To examine these Actions, therefore, more particularly; let us in the first place, turn our eye, for a glance or two, upon the Will, which though but a branch of the Soul, and as it were a secundary Faculty, in respect of the Intellect,
doth clearly shew the Immateriality of the Soul, whose Faculty it is. For, insomuch as the Will doth by Natural and Congenial tendency, pro∣secute Bonum Honestum, which is for the most part repugnant to Bonum Delectabile, or such Good, as is only Sensual and Corporeal: It is a good Consequence, that the Will is an Incorporeal Faculty; it being impossible for a Corporeal Faculty to apprehend an Incorporeal Object, such as Good abstracted from all relati∣ons of the Sense.
Again, forasmuch as the Will is absolutely Free, to elect, or refuse what Objects she plea∣seth; and such a Freedom cannot consist with an Appetite immersed in Matter and obliged there∣unto inseparably (because all Dispositions of Matter are determinate and necessary, and the effects resulting from those certain dispositions, are likewise determinate and necessary:) there∣fore is the Will Superior to all Conditions and Obligations of Matter. And, that the Will hath this arbitrary Liberty of Election or Refusal, is demonstrable from hence; that it is in the power of every man living to suspend or withold his assent to any proposition whatever, until he is able to make a certain judgement of the Verity or Falsity, convenience or inconvenience thereof: Which reason is so manifest, out of our own ex∣perience, that Des Cartes (and He, you will con∣fesse, was a man of admirable circumspection and strictnesse in examining Fundamental and Proleptical Notions) doth securely account it among the First and most common Notions, that
are Congenial and Innate in the Mind of every man. But, because the Will is only the Branch, and the Understanding the Root, upon which it growes, and by which it is to be regulated; and that what I shall say of the Intellect, may be ea∣sily accommodated to the Will, with equal competency: I shall no longer insist upon the consideration of the Will, but fix my discourses wholly upon the Intellect, as the Principal and Primary Faculty, for proof of the Souls Imma∣teriality; drawing my Arguments first from the Actions of the Understanding, and then from its proper Objects.
The Operations of the Intellect, which give evidence of the Souls Immateriality, may be re∣duced to Three distinct Orders or Classes: The First consisting of such, by which it may be evinced, that Intellection and Imagination are Acts per∣fectly distinct each from other: The Second of such, as are called Reflex Acts, by which the In∣tellect doth understand it self, and its own pro∣per functions, and perceiveth that it doth under∣stand: The Third of those, by which we do not only form Universals, or Universal Notions of things; but also understand the very reason of Universality it self. And of each of these, I in∣tend to speak plainly and succinctly, according to this method.
I begin with Acts of the First Classis; not that they are of any singular dignity or excellency a∣bove the rest, but that I may seasonably remove that obstacle of common prejudice, which men generally have (and you, Lucretius, among the
rest, as your self professed even now) that the Intellect is not a Faculty distinct from the Phan∣sie or Imagination; as if, what we call Imaginati∣on in Beasts, were really the very same with that, which we call Understanding in Men, and only different from it, secundum magis & minus, according to the degrees of more and lesse, strength and acuteness.
In Man we cannot but observe a certain sort of Intellection, by which the soul exercising her Faculty of Ratiocination, doth advance her self to the assured and distinct knowledge or under∣standing of some things, which is impossible for the Imagination ever to have any apprehension of, in regard there can be no Images or represen∣tations of them in the Phansy, though we should with never so much intention or earnestnesse im∣ploy our mind to frame such resemblances. For example, when considering the Magnitude of the Sun, we follow the conduct of our Reason, and deduce inferences from sound premises (which is Discourse) we soon come to know most cer∣tainly, that the magnitude of the Sun is at least an hundred and sixty times greater than that of the Earth: Yet, do what we can, we can never bring our Imagination to apprehend any such vastnesse, but shall find it to consist only in such a small representation of the Solar Globe, as the Sense hath delivered into the brain. Nay, if we set our selves to meditate well and seriously up∣on the matter, we shall soon be satisfied, that we cannot imagine the Globe of the Earth (which is yet vastly short of that of the Sun) to
be neer so great, as Demonstrations Geometri∣cal convince it to be; forasmuch as the Imagina∣tion (which doth no more but copy out the pictures drawn on the tables of the Senses, and that as well in dimensions, as figure, colour, &c.) conceiveth the Vault or Arch of the Heavens to insist upon the limits of the visible Horizon, on every side, and that the Clouds, Sun, Moon, Starrs, and whatever else we behold within that Arch or Semicircle, are not more distant from us, than the Horizon is. So that you see plainly, how little the Imagination doth apprehend the Heavens, and the whole World to be; and how vastly short we come of imagining the Sun (a small part only of the Heavens, and of the Uni∣verse) to be so great, as really it is; while we cannot imagine the whole World to be as great, as the Earth really is: But, if we appeal to our Understanding; that doth instantly assure us, by irresistible demonstrations, that the World, Hea∣vens, Sun, and Earth are of certain magnitudes incomparably greater, than those to which the Phansy can possibly extend its power of compre∣hension. Which I think, Lucretius, doth not ob∣scurely import, that there is more than an ima∣ginary difference between the Understanding and the Phansy.
I do not think so, Athanasius. For, though perhaps I cannot so extend my Imagination, as to bring it to fathom or grasp so great a magni∣tude, as that of the Sun, all at once: Yet I can
imagine a greater and greater magnitude by de∣grees, till at last I come to equal the whole real magnitude thereof. Nor is it necessary, that I should have in my Phansy an Image of greatness equal thereunto, while that small one exhibited to me by my sight, is sufficient to make me con∣ceive, that the real magnitude is greater than the apparent: which I can do, only by comparing the several apparent magnitudes of one and the same Object, at several distances from the eye.
Hear you, Sir. That Addition you make of one degree of magnitude to another successively, till you attain to an apprehension of the real mag∣nitude of the Sun; is not an act of your Imagina∣tion, but purely of your Reason, which finding the Image of the Suns greatnesse in your Phansy to be incomparably too small, to answer to that immense distance that you understand to be be∣twixt the Sun and your eye, doth, by its own pro∣per Faculty, supply that disproportion, not by enlargement of the Image, but by inferring, from Geometrical Maxims, that a visible Ob∣ject at that supposed distance, though it seem to be no bigger than a Coach-wheel, must yet in reality be by vast excesses greater. For, if you had no other Conception of the Suns Magnitude, but what is deduced from the sight; how could it e∣ver enter into your mind, that the Sun is really so much larger than it appears to be? Manifest, therefore, it is, that that enlargement of your conception of the Suns Magnitude, beyond that of its apparence, is an act of your Intellect, whol∣ly
above the power of your Imagination. So likewise is your Comparing the several apparent magnitudes of one and the same Object, at seve∣ral degrees of distance. Where give me leave to observe to you, that the Imagination or common sense can have no Idea of Distance, beyond one or two hundred feet: as is evident from hence, that the Sun and Moon, which are amongst Ob∣jects of the greatest remotenesse from the eye, and whose Diameters are to their Circumfe∣rence, as one to an hundred, or thereabouts, seem to us to be at most two feet over; though Reason doth assure us, that they are very great and very far distant. And nothing is more cer∣tain, than that we estimate the magnitude of a thing, from the cognition, or opinion at least, which we have in our mind of the Distance of it comparatively to the magnitude of the image of it drawn in the bottom of the Eye, and not absolutely by the magnitude of that image; as I have amply and demonstratively declared in my discourse of the Manner of Vi∣sion, and as Des Cartes also hath demonstrated, in the sixt Chapter of his Dioptricks: Both which I am sure you have perused. However, because it conduceth somwhat to our present argument, permit me to give you this evident reason there∣of; that though the Image of an Object may be an hundred times greater, when the Object is very neer, than when the same is removed to a distance ten times greater: yet the Object it self doth not therefore appear to us an hundred times greater, but almost equal. So that the
Comparation of Magnitude and Distance, is an act of the Understanding, not of the Imaginati∣on, as you presume.
If all our Cognition doth proceed originally from our Senses, as all men concede, and Ari∣stotle affirms in that Maxim, Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuit in sensu; and that Intellection is made by Analogy, by Composition, Division, Ampliation, Extenuation, and the like waies of managing the Species or Images of things im∣mitted into the Common Sense, by the External Senses: Then certainly can we have no know∣ledge of any thing, whereof we have no Image; and consequently without Imagination there is no Intellection, so that in fine to Imagine and to Understand a thing will be all one.
Your Inference is not justifiable. For, the Common Notions, that are as it were engraven on our Minds, and that are not derived origi∣nally from the Observations of things by our selves, or the Tradition of them by others, do undeniably attest the contrary. Nor can any thing be more absurd, than to say, that all those Proleptical and Common Notions, which we have in our Mind, do arise only from impressi∣ons made upon the Organs of our Senses, by the incurse of External Objects; and that they cannot consist without them: Insomuch as all sensible Impressions are singular, but those Notions Uni∣versal, having no affinity with, no relation unto,
Corporeal motions or impressions. And, if you think the contrary, pray oblige me so far, as to teach me, what kind of Corporeal impression that may be, which formes this one Common Notion in our Mind, Quae sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem interse. Not that I am affraid, to que∣stion the truth of even your Supposition, not∣withstanding the generall allowance of that Maxim of the Philosopher. For, whoever dothwel observe, how far our Senses extend themselves, and what that is, which can arise from them, in order to our Faculty of Cogitating; will easily be brought to confesse, that they exhibite to us no such Idea's of things, as we form of them in our thoughts, and that in those Idea's we form, there is nothing, which is not Innate and Congenial to our Mind or Faculty of Cogita∣ting, except only those Circumstances, which relate to experience, or whereby we judge, that those Idea's, wehave now present to our Cogi∣tation, may be conveniently referred to those external Objects, which we speculate. Not that those Objects have immitted those very Idea's into our Mind, by the Organs of the Senses; but because they have immited somwhat, which hath given occasion to the Mind to form such Idea's, by its own Innate and proper Faculty, at this time rather than at any other. For, nothing comes to the Mind, from External Objects, by the mediation of the Senses, besides certain Cor∣poreal Impressions; and yet neither those Im∣pressions, nor the Figures resulting from them, are such as we conceive in the Mind; as Des
Cartes hath amply proved in his Dioptricks: Whence it follows, that the Idea's of Motions and Figures are innate to the Mind; that is, that the Mind hath an essential power to form them: for, when I say that such an Idea is in the Mind, I intend that it is not alwaies actually there, but Potentially, and the word Faculty will justifie that manner of speaking. I add moreover, that no Corporeal Image or Species, is ever received into the Mind; and that pure Intellection, as well of a Corporeal, as an Incorporeal thing, is made without any Material Species or Image at all; but, as for Imagination, to that, indeed, is required the presence of some Corporeal Im∣age, to which the Mind may apply it self; be∣cause there can be no Imagination but of Cor∣poreal things; and yet neverthelesse that Corpo∣real Image doth not enter into the Mind. For in∣stance, the Intellect or Mind hath no material Species of that Magnitude, which it understands the Sun to be of: but comprehends the same to be in the Sun, by its own proper Virtue or Fa∣culty, i. e. by Ratiocination. Whence we may se∣curely conclude, that the Intellect, understand∣ing a thing without a Material Image, must it self be immaterial: as on the contrary, the Imagi∣nation confesseth it self to be Material, because it is obliged to the use of Material Images. Truth is, the Intellect also makes use of Images concei∣ved by the Phansy (and therefore they are called Phantasms) yet only as certain Means, or De∣grees, that progressing through them, it may at length attain the knowledge of some things,
which it afterward perceives as sequestred, and in a manner sublimed from those Phantasms: But this is that, which doth sufficiently argue its being Immaterial, because it carrieth it self beyond all Images material, and comes to the Science of some things, of which it hath no Phantasms.
And thus you may perceive, that we do not owe all our Cognition to our Senses: And con∣sequently, that to Understand and to Imagine is not (as you would infer) all one thing.
I know not, what singular Faculty you may have, of abstracting your Understanding from all commerce with the Senses, in its negotiation for knowledge; but sure I am, that the most learned and most subtile among the Peripateticks have u∣nanimously held, that all our Cognition is made by the working of our Phansy; and that the Soul doth not understand, but by the Speculation of Phan∣tasms. Nay, Pomponatius and Sir K. Digby (both which flew up to an admirable sublimity in their Contemplations, concerning the nature and operations of the Soul) openly professe the Verity of that Axiome, from their own experi∣ence. So that unlesse you can give me some more pregnant testimony, of the Intellects knowing, without the immediate help of Images, pre-ad∣mitted by the Senses, than yet you have done: you must pardon me, if I believe, that in this point you affect to be paradoxical.
The Sum of what I have said, of this Argu∣ment, is this; that though the Intellect doth come to understand Corporeal Natures, by the mediation of Phantasms: Yet the Notions, which it frameth it to self of them, are Different from those Phantasms; and that it hath the Know∣ledge of some things, whereof the Phansy can have no Images. And for Confirmation here∣of, since you seem to desire it, I shall offer you this one Argument more.
All the particular Knowledges, that man hath, or can have, concerning finite and com∣pleat Entities (except only the Notion of Be∣ing) are only certain Comparisons or Respects be∣tween particular things: But of Respect, there can be no Image or representation at all, in the Phansy: and therefore our Knowledge is with∣out Images.
The truth of the Major proposition is evident from hence; that of all the particular Notions we have (except that of Being) there is no one, which doth belong to some one of the Ten Prae∣dicaments; all which are so manifestly Respective, that no man doubteth them to be so. In particu∣lar, Substance hath a respect to Being; Quantity doth consist in a respect unto Parts; Quality hath a respect unto that Subject, which is denomina∣ted from it; Action and Passion result from the Union of Quality and Substance; Relation denoteth the respect betwixt the Relatum and Correlatum; Ubi & Quando, or Where & When, arise from
substance considered with the circumstances of Place and Time; Situation is from the respect of Parts, to the Whole; Habit is a respect to the Sub∣stance wherein it is, as being the propriety, by which it is well or ill, conveniently or inconve∣niently affected, in regard of its own Nature. Forasmuch, therefore, as all the Ten Predica-; ments do consist only in diversity of Respects, and that each one of all the particular Notions which man is capable of, in this life, doth natu∣rally fall under the comprehension of some one of those Predicaments: What Consequence can be more genuine, more manifest, than this, that all our Cognition is drawn from Comparisons or Respects.
For the Minor; if you question the verity thereof, pray, exercise your mind in seriously reviewing all things that have been derived from the Senses, and see if you can find among them any such thing as what we call a Respect. It hath neither Figure, nor Colour, nor Sound, nor Odour, nor Tast: and so cannot possibly be represented to the Sense, nor Imagination. And, if you cannot either meet with any Image of Respect, or frame one in your Imagination; nor deny that all the Negotiation of the Intellect is in and by Respects: I hope, you will have little cause left for your suspicion, that I affect to be Paradoxical, in that I affirm, that the Notions of things in the understanding, are extreamly different from whatsoever is immitted into the Mind by the mediation of the Senses; and so, that the Intellect hath a knowledge of some
things, whereof the Imagination can have no Phantasms.
But, all this while, you give me no Criterion, or certain Rule, by which I may be able to dis∣cern betwixt meer Imagination, and pure In∣tellection, within my self; so as to know when I apprehend a thing by my Common Sense or Imaginative Faculty alone, and when by my In∣tellect alone, and without the immediate con∣currence of my Imagination. Pray, therefore, assist your alleaged argument, by prescribing me some such infallible Note of Distinction: And then perhaps, I shall submit to your opinion.
In simple Imagination, the Mind doth alwaies apply it self to the Image of the thing speculated; and in pure Intellection, it quitteth the Image, and converteth it self upon it Self: The former act being still accompanied with some labour, and contention of the Mind; the latter free, easie, and instantaneous. As in this Example. When I think upon a Triangle, I do not only instantly con∣ceive it to be a Figure comprehended in three lines, but I also behold those three lines, with the eye of my Mind, as if they were really present; and this is that I call Imagination. But, when I think of a Chiliogon, or Figure with a thousand Angles; albeit I as well understand, that the same is a Figure consisting a thousand sides, as I
do a Triangle to be one of only three sides: Yet I cannot as well imagine all those thousand sides, or behold them distinctly and at once, with the eye of my Mind, as if they were really present; for, though then, because of my custom of alwaies imagining somthing, I have some cer∣tain Figure confusedly represented to me; yet that that is not the representation of a Chilio∣gon, is manifest from hence, that it is no whit different from that, which I should represent to my self, in case I thought upon a Myriogon, or any other Figure with more sides: nor doth it help me at all to the knowing of those proprieties, by which a Chiliogon differs from other Polygon Figures. And, if the question be of only a Pen∣tagon, I can understand the nature of that Fi∣gure (as of a Chiliogon) without the help of my Imagination; and I can also imagine the same, by applying the acies of my Mind, to the five sides thereof, and to the Area contained in them: But, here, I plainly perceive, that to ima∣gine thus, there is required a certain peculiar strife, or Contention of my Mind, such as I use not in the meer understanding of that Figure, or any other Polygon; which new Contention and Labour of my Mind doth clearly shew the Difference betwixt Imagination and pure Intellection: And this is the best Note or Character of Distinction, I can in the present think upon to give you. But, it requireth strict and profound Meditation to observe it; and therefore let me desire you to consider what I have said of this Difference be∣twixt Imagining and Understanding, to morrow
morning, in your bed, when your Spirits are clear and active, your Faculties vigorous, and your Mind quiet and serene.
You say very wel, Sir▪ For, notwithstanding you have argued with singular subtility, in defence of this Distinction; yet, untill a man shall find his own Experience give light and Confirmati∣on to your Reasons, the thing will remain invol∣ved in much obscurity. And, therefore, since frequent and calm Meditation is so necessary, to the habituating our Mind to speculate ab∣stractedly, without material Phantasms, and to know when it doth so: Lucretius and I, will take some time, to meditate as seriously and pro∣foundly, as we can, upon this Nicety, before we decalre our final determination therupon; and in the mean time leave it tanquam Problema utrinque disputatum, as a Problem well disputed on both sides, but not fully decided by either. And so, if you please, you are at liberty to proceed to some new Argument of the Souls Immateriality.
The Second Branch of the Method I propo∣sed, ariseth (as you may remember) from that kind of Operation in the Soul, whereby the In∣tellect, Reflecting upon it self, doth become its own Object, and so understand it self, and its own Functions, and know it self to be an Intel∣lect, or thinking and discerning Nature. If there∣fore we well consider these Reflex Acts of the
Understanding; we can no longer doubt its be∣ing Immaterial. That the Intellect doth thus re∣flect upon its self, and discern its own know∣ledge, needs no other testimony but that of a mans own Experience; it being impossible for a∣ny person living not to know, that he knows what he knows, as is implied in that common Proverb, I very well know what I know. And, that this Operation is far above the power of what∣soever is Material, deriveth its evidence from hence; that every Material thing or Agent is so strictly obliged to some certain place, either permanently or successively, as that it cannot move toward it self, but if moved at all, is mo∣ved toward some thing divers from it self. Which truly is the Reason of that Canon Law in Nature, that Nothing can act upon it self. For, however one and the same thing may somtimes seem to act upon it self; yet really it is only one part of that thing act's upon another part of the same thing: As when one of a mans hands striketh against the other, or the end of one finger against the palm of the hand, but the end of the same finger cannot strike upon it self. And hence comes it, that the Sight cannot see it self, nor the Hearing hear it self, nor the Imagination perceive that it doth imagine, nor any Corpore∣al Faculty whatever perceive its own Functions. We know, indeed, when and what we see, or hear, or imagine, &c. but that Knowledge is the sole and proper effect of that Power or Facul∣ty within us, which being Superior to all Sense and Imagination, and so comprehending all
their activity in its own, doth perceive them, their Objects and Operations, judge of them, and reflect upon both those judgements, and it self that frames them. And the Reason, why the Imagination cannot perceive it self, or its own actions, is because the Act of the Phansy tendeth only to the Image of the thing imagined, not to the perception of that Image; for, of a Perception there can be no Image. It being then most cer∣tain, that the Intellect doth familiarly reflect upon it self, and understand its own Intelligence; and as certain, that such a power doth tran∣scend the capacity of any thing inseparably im∣mersed in Matter, and confined to the conditi∣ons of Matter: I cannot see how it is possible for you to avoid or decline the necessity of the Con∣sequence, viz, That the Intellect is a Faculty Imma∣terial. And here I dare you, Lucretius, or the subtilest Epicurean in the World, to try the strength of your Philosophy, upon this Argu∣ment; for to me, I professe, it seems not much in∣ferior to a Demonstration.
Why Sir, do you conceive, that what you affirm of the impossibility of internal Reflection, in any but an Immaterial Agent, is of Universal truth?
Seriously I do, and upon the Authority of that Reason, I now alleaged, I think it justifiable to persevere in that perswasion, untill your self,
or some other person shall offer me an Instance, wherein that General position doth admit of an Exception.
What think you, then, of sundry admirable actions of some Brute Animals, which seem to implie Dubitation, Resolution, Invention, and the like effects of a discoursive and self-knowing Principle within them? For example, when you observe a Dogg in hunting to cast about, trie the ground, stand still, run somtimes forward, som∣times turn aside, and then on a suddain change his course and return back; will you not allow this to arise from a kind of Examination of the actions of his Sense? And doth not that Exami∣nation import a Reflection of the discerning Fa∣culty both upon it self, and its action of discern∣ing?
Alas, Lucretius, this is so light an Objection, that I cannot but wonder, that it should retard your assent to a position of so much weight, as that, that no Material thing can act upon it self; es∣pecially since you have read the excellent dis∣courses of Monsieur Des Cartes, and Sir K. Digby; wherein they have so clearly solved all the most seemingly rational actions of Beasts, by sensible motions and corporeal principles. However, that you may no longer be deluded, in concei∣ving, that the suddain stopping, turning aside, returning, &c. of a Dogg, doth argue this emi∣nent
Reflection of a Faculty upon it self, which I attribute to a Man, as the propriety of his In∣tellect; be pleased to know, that the most it doth import, is only Reminiscence in the Dogg, by reason of some new Species in his Phansy, acci∣dentally intercurrent, and diverting him from the pursuit of that other, which immediately before possessing, and as it were beating upon his Phan∣sy, had engaged him to a different course: For, as often as the Species that move and affect his Sense, and so his Imagination, are changed, so often doth he change his course and vary his pursuit. And certainly nothing comes nearer to a manifest absurdity, than to suppose, that a Dogg can, as it were, say within himself, I imagine that I do imagine; or I perceive that I am a perceiving essence, and the like; which is an acti∣on of such singular eminence above all what we observe to proceed from Doggs, or any the most docible and cunning Beasts in nature, that it ought not to be imputed to any thing below an Immaterial and self-Cognoscent Being, such as the Reasonable Soul of Man is.
And it was upon this essential prerogative of the Human Soul, that Des Cartes seemeth to have reflected, when under the terme Cogitation, he un∣derstood all things that are done in us, cum Con∣scientia, with knowledge that we do them; so as that not only to understand, to wil, to ima∣gine; but also to have the sense of a thing, is the same as to Cogitate, or Think.
For (saith he) if I argue thus with my self, I see, or I walk; therefore I am; and understand this only of
that Vision, or walking, which is performed by the help of my body, then the Conclusion is not absolutely certain, because it often hap∣pens that in my sleep, I dream that I see, and walk, when in truth I do neither: But, if I un∣derstand it of my Perception, or Conscience of my seeing or walking, with reference only to my Mind, which alone doth perceive or think, that it doth see or walk; then the Conclusion is most certain, because it is of the nature of my Mind to be Conscious of its own actions.Which Description of Thinking, I the rather commemorate, because I have observed many to quarrel at it, as incompetent and somwhat ex∣travagant; not comprehending the Authors prin∣cipal Ground, the constant Reflection of the Mind upon its own Operations.
So that I perceive, you wholly exclude all Animals (except Man) from being conscious of their own actions: But with how much reason; I shall beseech Isodicastes here to judge, who can∣not but frequently have remarked the contrary, nothing being more common, then to see a set∣ting Dog to come creeping and trembling with fear and shame to his Master, when either through too much speed in hunting, or the a∣versenesse of the wind carrying away the scent from him, he hath chanced to spring the Par∣tridges, which he ought to have set: And on the other side, when he hath made a fair Set, and the game is taken, you shall have him leap and ex∣sult
for joy, and run confidently to his Master for his reward. And what can his fear and shame be referred unto, but his being conscious that he hath committed a fault, and so deserves to be beaten for it? or his exultation in his own cun∣ning, but to his being conscious that he hath done well, and so ought to be encouraged and recompensed with some share of the Prey?
I thought I had prevented your recourse to all Objections taken from the actions of Brute Ani∣mals, that carry a semblance of Reason in them; by remitting you to your remembrance of what you have read in the satisfactory Discour∣ses of Des Cartes, and Sir K. Digby concerning them: but seeing you will not acquiesce in that reference, let me tell you briefly, that what you now urge of a Dogs owning his faults, and ex∣ultation in his own skill and cunning, is not sufficient to entitle him to that transcendent ca∣pacity of acting with Knowledge, and Reflecti∣on, which I affirm to be the propriety of Mans informing Principle within him. For, the Dog having been used to be beaten, as often as he springs the game; no sooner see's the Birds upon their wings, but instantly the image of the smart he hath formerly suffered from his Master, upon the like occasion, recurrs to his Phansy, and af∣fecteth him with fear: As on the other side, the sight of the birds in the Net, brings afresh into his memory the Image of that pleasure, where∣with his Sense was affected, in eating the heads
of the Partridge, and strongly possessing his Im∣agination, causeth that passion of joy in him, which betrayeth it self by his leaping and skip∣ping. For, in the Phansy of Beasts there is al∣waies a conjunction of the Image of that parti∣cular good or harm they have formerly received from such or such things, with the Images of the things themselves: which is, indeed, the cause of all those so much admired effects, called Sympathies and Antipathies, amongst Animals of different kinds, as I have more particularly declared in my Physiology, where I treated of the Manifestation of Occult Qualities. And this reason may serve to solve what you object, concerning Beasts being Conscious when they have pleased, or displeased their Masters; without entrench∣ment upon the Prerogative of Man, whereby he is capable of acting with knowledge, and re∣flecting upon that knowledge, as part and the principall part of his Essence. But, since you have appealed to the judgement of Isodicastes, I hum∣bly expect his Verdict.
That many Brute Animals, especially such as are made tame and domestick, and frequently conversant with men, are conscious of their faults; daily experience doth testifie: But, that they are therefore animated with a Soul capable of knowing it self, and its actions, by reflecting upon it self: seems to me to be altogether incon∣sequent; because, as Athanasius hath explained the reason and manner of that particular action
in them, it doth import no more than what be∣longs to a meer Sensitive Soul. So that, Lucretius, unlesse you can impugne his Argument now alleadged, for proof of the Immateriality of the Human intellect by some more important Ob∣jection; I should be unjust not to allow it to be strongly perswasive.
Being free, then, from any impediment of fur∣ther Contradiction to this Argument of the In∣tellect's being an Immaterial Faculty, from its Reflex acts; I come now to the Third sort of its Operations, which testifie the same, viz. those whereby we do not only form to our selves Universals, or Universal Notions, but also understand the reason of Universality it self.
In Universal Notions we are to observe Two considerables; (1.) their Abstraction; (2.) their Universality: And either of these Conditions is a∣lone sufficient to inforce a perswasion of the Im∣materiality of that Faculty, the Intellect, which doth so apprehend them.
For, as to the First; it being evidently impossi∣ble, that any Corporeal thing should be exem∣pted from all Material conditions, and differen∣ces of singularity, as Magnitude, Figure, Colour, Time, Place, &c. and undeniably certain, that the Understanding hath a power to devest them of all and every one of those conditions, and circumstances, and to speculate them in that abstracted state, devoid of all particularities; it followeth of pure necessity, that the Understand∣ing,
which hath this power so to abstract them, must it self be exempt from all matter, and of a Condition more eminent, than to be confined to material Conditions.
And, as to the Other, viz. their Universality; this addeth to their abstraction one admirable particularity more, which is, that they abstract in such sort, as to expresse at the same time the very thing, they abstract from. Which is not a little wonderful; since it is not easie to conceive, that the same thing should be, and not be, in one and the same Notion. And yet if we seriously reflect upon what we mean, when we say thus, Every man hath two hands; we shall soon perceive, that we therein expresse nothing, whereby one individual man is distinguished from another: though that very word Every, doth import that every single person is distinct from another; so that here is (as Sir K. Digby most wittily saith) Particularity it self expressed in Common. Now, this being impossible to be done, in any Corporeal representation whatsoever, it is a necessary con∣sequence, that the Intellect, which hath this sin∣gular propriety of thus comprehending and ex∣pressing Universals, is it self Incorporeal.
Now, if you should require of me to declare, how the Understanding doth frame to it self Universals, when there are no such things in Nature; I shall explain the Manner of that tran∣scendent Operation to be thus. When we Cogi∣tate or think upon Individuals, that have resem∣blance each to other; we accommodate one and the same Idea to all particulars comprehended
under that one General notion: and so using to impose one and the same name upon all the things represented by that Common Idea, that name becomes Universal. Thus, when we see two stones, and apply our Mind to consider, not their Nature, but only that they are Two; we form to our selves an Idea of that Number, which we call a Binary, or Two: And after∣ward, when we see two Birds, or two Trees, and consider not their Nature, but only that they are two; we repeat the same Idea we had before, which comes thereby to be Universal, and we call this number by the same Universal name. After the same manner, when we behold a Fi∣gure comprehended in Three lines, we form in our Mind a certain Idea thereof, which we call the Idea of a Triangle; and we afterward al∣waies use the same Idea, as an Universal one, to represent to us all other Figures consisting of three lines. Again, when we perceive, that a∣mong Triangles there are some, which have one right angle, and others which have not; we form in our selves the Universal Idea of a rectangle Triangle, which in relation to the former Idea, as more General, we call a Species: And that rectitude of the Angle, is the Universal Diffe∣rence, by which all rectangle Triangles are di∣stinguished from others. Further, that in all such Triangles, the Basis is in power equal to the powers of the sides; this is a Propriety competent to all such, and only to such Triangles. And lastly, if we suppose that some of these Triangles are moved, and others not; this will be in them
an Universal Accident. And after this Manner doth the Understanding frame those Five Uni∣versals, Genus, Species, Difference, Propriety, and Accident: which really are but so many several Modes, or Manners of our Cogitating, or Thinking; and having no existence in Nature, but only in Mans Understanding, do bear pregnant testimony of its being Immaterial.
Here you say, it is undeniably certain, that the Understanding hath a power to abstract things from all conditions of Matter, and all Particularities; when for my part, I professe, I can find no such power in my self. For, after ma∣ny the most serious essayes I could make, I could never yet conceive an Universal, but there doth alwaies occur to my Mind somwhat of Particu∣larity, and that under some certain Magnitude, Figure, Colour, and the like adjuncts of Body. So that it seems, either I have not an Under∣standing as Active and Comprehensive, as other men have: or else those Unbodied and Uni∣versal Notions; of which you and other Phi∣losophers talke so solemnly, are meer Chimera's, invented by curious and wanton Wits, to amuse such vulgar heads, as mine is.
You cannot be ignorant of that power in your self, as you pretend, Lucretius. For, though your Mind is not capable of devesting Objects of their particular Magnitude, Figure, Colour, and the other concomitants of Matter, altogether, and
at once: yet it can easily doe it successively, or one after another; and that is sufficient to attest and manifest, that the Intellect hath this power of Abstracting, and forming Universals; as I have explained.
I have read a certain book, written by one Hieronymus Rorarius, a learned Prelate, contein∣ing a collection of all Arguments commonly urged to prove, that many Brute Animals have the use of Reason not only aswell as, but in a greater proportion than Man himself hath: and among the rest He affirmes, that they also frame Universals, as in particular the species of Man, according to which as often as they see a two-legged and erect Animal, they take it to be a Man, and not a Lion, or Horse, or the like: And if so, what becomes of this Prerogative of the Human Intellect, you so much depend upon, for testimony of its Incorporiety?
If this were true, yet doubtless Brutes can have no knowledg of the Universality of that Species, or universal Nature of Man, viz. Humanity, as abstracted from every degree of singularity. But, we have no reason to grant the Supposition; for, as Brutes doe not apprehend things abstracted, but concrete, as not Colour, but a body colour∣ed, not a sapour, but a body sapid, &c: so ought we to conceive, that there is nothing else in a Dog (for instance) but only the Memory of sin∣gulars,
or of those single men, whom he hath seen, and taken notice of; and when he meets a man, whom he hath not seen afore, his phansy instantly presents him the image of some one he hath seen afore, and so he takes him to be a man. Nor can you recurr to that vulgar subterfuge, that we are not so well acquainted with the na∣ture of Beasts, as to understand what is done in the secret cells of their brains, and after what manner they apprehend objects: seeing it is not difficult for us, to inferr as much, from their operations or external actings. For, in case they could aspire to so much perfection, as to frame Universal Notions of things, as we doe, and rea∣son upon them, as we doe; it were not to be doubt∣ed, but it would come into their minds, to en∣quire into the acts of their progenitors, what they knew before them; how they might signify to others at distance, what themselves have thought and done; and how they might devolve memorials to their posterity. They would like∣wise attempt to frame Arts usefull in their lives, and doe many noble actions; of which it is impossible they should have the least hint or no∣tice. For as much, therefore, as no age can give us an Example of any such action done by any Beast whatever; we may safely conclude, that they have no notion of Universals, as Rorarius and you from him seem to suppose. So that this prerogative of Mans Understanding in framing Universals, remains entire and untoucht: and while it doth so, I need not fear the stability of what I have founded thereupon, viz that the.
Human Intellect is Incorporeall. And therefore, if you have no more to object against this my reason; I doubt not but Isodicastes will give his vote on my side.
I should, be grossly partial, Athanasius, if I did not confess, that you have foiled your adversary at this weapon: yet I am sure Lucretius is so candid an Antagonist, as to ac∣count it no dishonour to be overcome by Truth; and I presume He doth contend, only to make your conquest the more absolute.
To these few Reasons of the Immateriality of the Human Soul, desumed from the excellency of her operations, I might here add a multitude of others, of the same extraction and equivalent force, as in particular, that of the existence of Cor∣poreal natures in the Soul, by the power of apprehen∣sion; that of her drawing from multitude to unity, her apprehension of Negations and Privations; her con∣teining of Contraries without opposition; her capacity to move, without being moved herself; the incompossi∣bility of opposite propositions in the understanding; and sundry others: the least whereof is of evidence and vigour sufficient to carry the cause against all those Enemies to her Immortality, who would degrade her from the divine dignity of her nature, to an equality with the souls of Beasts, that are but certain dispositions of Mat∣ter, and so obnoxious to dissolution upon change of the same by contrary agents. But, considering that the certainty of truth ought to be estimated
rather by the weight than number of testimonies; and that the discourses I have already framed concerning some of the Soul's proper operations, are clear enough to give light to any judicious and well disposed person, how to inferr the like conclusion from those other of her operations, which I have not insisted upon: I shall now withdraw my owne and your thoughts from her operations, and convert them, for onely a few minutes upon her Objects, that so we may exa∣mine whether they be such, as that it is possible for them to fall under the apprehension of any, but a faculty superior to Materiality.
Concerning the Objects, therefore, of the Un∣derstanding, they are all things in the Universe, and so not only Corporeal and sensible natures, but Incorporeals also, and such as are many spheres above the utmost capacity of the Sense. That Corporeals belong to the Cognisance of the Intellect, I think no man will dispute: and that this knowledge doth prove it to be incorporeal, is manifest from hence, that it knowes the for∣mal reason of Body, or Corporiety it self, and that it doth consist in extensibility: which it could no more doe, unless it self were above Corporiety, than a man could see the amplitude of the sea if he were immersed into the bottom of it. Nay I might hence deduce it to be Inor∣ganical; insomuch as it knowes not only corpo∣real organs, but comprehends also the very rea∣son and forme of an Organ. For, since an Organ is alwayes somewhat intermediate betwixt the Faculty and the Object, or thing for the percep∣tion
of which it was made; and therefore can∣not act upon it self, or be that thing on which the Faculty worketh by an Organ: The Intellect could no more be exercised in knowing an Or∣gan, or the reason of it, if it self were an Organ, or Faculty Organical, than one Instrument, or tool of an Artist can imploy it self upon another Instrument, or serve to that end, for which it was framed, without the help of the Artist.
You say here, Athanasius, that no man doubt∣eth of the knowledge of Corporeal Natures, by the Understanding; when you cannot but re∣member that Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus have many Disciples in the World, who renounce all Knowledge whatesover, unlesse it be that of their own invincible ignorance: And for my own part, though I shall not go so high, as to say, we know nothing at all; yet sure, I am, we do not know the intimate Nature of so much as the smallest Plant that grows upon the ground. And if so, I cannot see how you will avoid the blame of begging the Question.
How dangerous a Doctrine that of the Scep∣ticks is, as to the regulation of our Minds, in all the Actions and Occurences of our lives, by cer∣tain setled Judgements in the Understanding, drawn from Philosophical Maxims, and con∣firmed by experience; I have professedly decla∣clared else where, and therefore shall not now
repeat. But, as to your Objection, that we do not know the intimate Natures of even Corporeal things; I answer, that though there be nothing in the World, to which the capacity of mans Under∣standing is not extensible, yet there are sundry things, which by reason of many impediments, it doth not actually know. But is this, think you, to be charged upon a defect in the Understand∣ing; or upon the obscurity of the things them∣selves? Do you but find a Cause, that may re∣veal these things, and as it were draw them out of that obscurity, wherein they are so deeply involved; and the Intellect, I will undertake, shall soon discern and know them to the full. The Eye doth not perceive what is at the Centre of the Earth; will you therefore conclude an ab∣solute incapacity therein, of perceiving what is there concealed, in case there were some Cause found out, which should unlock the bowels of the Earth, and lay open whatever is therein contain'd? I believe you wil be more advised; con∣sidering that the drawing of a Curtain betwixt a visible Object and the sight, doth not diminish the power of the sight, but only render the Ob∣ject inconspicuous. However, therefore, our Reason be not so perspicacious, as to transfix the Essences of things, and discern what is the inti∣mate Nature of Objects; yet by ratiocination we advance so far toward it, as to know, that besides all those qualities, and accidents, which are obvious to the Sense, and to the imagination, there is yet somwhat more remaining, which is not obvious to either the Sense, or Imaginati∣on.
And to understand thus much, is enough to exalt the Understanding many degrees above all Sense and Imagination; and consequently above all Corporeal Conditions. Whereunto I shall add, that there is no Corporeal Faculty, but is confined to the perception of only some one cer∣tain Genus of things; as in particular, the Sight to Visibles, the Hearing to Sounds, &c. and though the Imagination seems to be extended to very many kinds; yet all those are contained under the Classis of Sensibles; and thence it comes, that all Animals, which are endowed only with Phantasy, are addicted to only Sensi∣bles, no one affecting the Knowledge of any thing which falleth not under the Sense. But the Intellect alone is that, which hath for its Ob∣ject, omne verum, and (as the Schools speak) Ens ut Ens, every Being in the Universe; and there∣fore hath no mixture of matter, but is wholly free from it, and Incorporeal. A truth so clearly revealed by the Light of Nature, that Anaxago∣ras said, and Aristotle subscribed, Esse Intellectum necessariò 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Immistum, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quoniam intelligit universa.
And as for Incorporeals, that they likewise are within the Orb of the Intellects activity; and do not escape the apprehension of this unbound∣ed and Universal Capacity; needs no other proof, besides that of our own sublime specula∣tions concerning the Nature of God, of Intelli∣gences, of Angels, of the Human Soul, and what∣ever else belongs to the Science of Metaphy∣sicks▪
which teacheth us to abstract from all Matter and Quantity. Nor doth the Understand∣ing rest in the investigation of all substances im∣material, but flieth out of Trismegistus's Circle, and breaks through the battlements of the World into the Extra-mundan Spaces, and there finds the notion of a certain Being, which be∣longs not to the Categorie either of Substances, or Accidents, but is independent even upon God himself: and that is Space, and to this it gives Imaginary Dimensions. Nay, I presume it will not be accounted paradoxical in me to affirm, that Immaterial Objects are most genuine and natural to the Understanding; especially since Des Cartes hath irrefutably demonstrated, that the Knowledge we have of the existence of the Supreme Being, and of our own Souls, is not only Proleptical and Innate in the Mind of man, but also more certain, clear, and distinct, than the Knowledge of any Corporeal Nature whatever: according to that Canon of Thom. Aquinas and most of the School-men, Nullares, qualiscunque est, intelligi potest, nisi Deus intelligatur priùs. How∣ever, this is most indubitable, that the principal and most congenial Motives or incitements of the Soul, are abstracted Considerations; as hope of what is to come, of Eternity, Memory of what is past, Virtue, Honour, and the like, which arise not from material principles, and have no com∣merce with Elementary compositions. Now, if the Understanding were not it self purely Im∣material, it would be absolutely impossible for it ever so much as to suspect, much lesse to know
assuredly, that there were any such things as Incorporeals in the Universe: The Reason being obvious from that rule of Aristotle, juxtim appa∣rens prohibet alienum. For, as the eye when dis∣coloured with a yellow humour in the jaundice, can see no Object, but it appears tincted with the same colour: So could not the Intellect per∣ceive any other but Corporeal Natures, if it self were not only perfused with, but wholly and in∣tirely immersed into, Corporiety; so that of ne∣cessity it must be Incorporeal.
Me thinks now, you might with equal reason inferr the quite Contrary, viz. that the Intellect could not have any perception of Corporeal Na∣tures, if▪ it self were not likewise Corporeal; there being required some kind of proportion and compossibility betwixt the Faculty percipi∣ent, and the Object perceptible, as is exemplifi∣ed in each of the Senses: which is the sole reason of their opinion, who contend, that the Sensitive part of the Soul is Material.
I positively deny that, Lucretius. For, since the Order or Degree of Incorporeal is superior to that of Corporeal; thence it follows, that by virtue of that its superiority or excellency, it possesseth all the perfections of the inferior, and that in a more eminent manner. So that as the degree Animal, being nobler than the degree meerly Vegetable, doth in a more excellent pro∣portion
and manner, comprehend Vegetation, or Nutrition, Accretion, and Generation, which are the functions of the Vegetable: In like man∣ner, doth the degree Spiritual or Incorporeal, being more noble and perfect than the meer A∣nimal, and Corporeal, comprehend cognition Corporeal, or Sensation and Imagination, which are the functions proper to the degree Animal. And thus you see, that my inference of the In∣tellect's capacity to know Incorporeal essences, from its own being a Spiritual Faculty, is genu∣ine and orderly: but yours, of its being Corporeal from its capacity to know Corporeals, is false and preposterous.
But may not I lawfully object, that we do not conceive God, or Angells, or Intelligences, as Immaterial Substances; when we find in our selves, that the mind doth alwaies speculate the Divine Essence it self under some Species of a Body, and though not of a Human Body (which yet is most usual) yet of an aereal, or ethereal one, or somwhat more fine and subtile, if any such there be?
You may make this Objection, there is no doubt; but it will not be sufficient to prevail a∣gainst what I have urged, concerning the In∣tellect's extensibility even to God and other In∣tellectual essences. For the understanding, though it make use of those Phantasms, that
are proper to the Imagination, as the means or degrees, by which it mounteth it self up to a sub∣limity above all Corporeal species; doth yet, by ratiocination, at length attain to that height, as to be ascertained; that, beside all body of what∣soever thinness purity and subtility, there is moreover a certain supereminent substance, which hath nothing of Corporiety in it. The Intellect, I confess, doth not positively or intuiti∣vely (as they say) know this Substance: but, since this is its condition, while immersed in a body, which doth as it were infect it with cor∣poreal representations or Phantasms, and eclipse its power of Intuition; it is abundantly sufficient to our Conclusion, that even in this mortal body it doth retein and conserve its in∣corporeal nature, that it doth understand that substance Negatively or Abstractively. For, this investigation or search after God, and our con∣cluding him (out of the force of contradiction, or by way of Negation) to be Eternal, Infinite, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Immutable, with all other perfections imaginable essential to his na∣ture; doth clearly demonstrate, that though the Intellect be obliged to make use of Corporeal images, in order to its knowledge; yet it is not obliged to acquiesce in them, so as to enquire no further, but hath such a liberty and energy, as tht it doth ratiocinate beyond them, and con∣clude, that there is somewhat else in being, which cannot be represented by any Corporeal Image or species; and which though it cannot understand what it is in the fullness of its nature,
yet is it certain that such a nature there is; and more than that, is not required to justify my As∣sertion. You may remember, how Aristotle and o∣ther great Philosophers asserted the existence of Caelestial Intelligences, Abstracted Movers, and Immaterial Substances; not that they could see them, with the eye of the body, or frame any Idea's of them in their Imagination: but that by profound reasoning, from the magnitude, forme, situation, motion and duration of the Celestial bodies, they came to understand, that in nature there could not but be such Abstracted and Im∣material Movers, which governed and continu∣ally regulated those vast and glorious Orbs, in their Admirable and well ordered Motions.
If what you say, were true; it would follow, that in diseases of the brain, and such as cause a depravation of the Phansy; the Intellect, as be∣ing more at liberty to exercise its faculty of pure and abstracted intellection, would arise to the cognition of Immaterial things with more faci∣lity and promptness, than at any other time. But we daily see, that men of disturbed Phansies, and alienated minds (as the vulgar phrase is) are so far from understanding more clearly and distinctly, than before, that they cannot reason at all; and it was not without cause, that some Philosophers have held, that a man deprived of any one of his senses, can not rightly discourse of that sense, or the objects belonging to it.
You have no reason to urge this upon me; for I formerly rejected that error of the Aver∣rhoist, that the Soul is a Forme meerly Assistent, and in its functions altogether independent upon the body; and what I averr is this, that the soul of Man doth truely and intirely informe the bo∣dy, and to that purpose nature hath added sen∣ses and Imagination, as handmaids to attend it in its operations, and to give it opportunities of reasoning from what they bring in. So that it ought not to seem strange, that upon the loss of a sense, or perturbation of the Phansy, men cannot reason so exactly as before: and it sufficeth, that when the whole oeconomy of mans nature is in tune and order, his understanding is capable of reasoning so as to advance itself above the body, as far as is permitted to its nature, and at length to conclude, that there is somewhat Incorporeal. And now I have recited all the Arguments, which I thought most material towards the proof of the Soul's Immortality, drawn from considerations Physical, and in particular from the souls Operations and Objects: I referr my self to the Noble Isodicastes here, who is pleased to assume upon himself the trouble of acting the part of an Arbiter betwixt us in this dispute, whether you have been able to dissolve them.
How unfit I am, to have the casting and deci∣sive voice, in a matter of this high and abstruse
nature, I am sufficiently conscious. But, since you are both pleased to create me judge of this your Debate, I shall adventure to give you my sentiments briefly and clearly upon this last Ar∣gument of the Soul's being Immaterial, drawn from the unboundedness of the Intellect, as to its Object (for, of the rest, I delivered my opini∣on freely, as they were alleaged). Truly, I judge it to be as highly convincing, as any of which the subject is capable. And, for my owne part, I derive to my self from thence, a full confirmation of my beleif; that there is nothing in the world too vast for the comprehension of mans under∣standing, nothing too small for its discernment: and whether such a divine Capacity be compe∣tent to any but an Immaterial Essence, is not hard to determine. Now, the Intellect being thus found to be above all conditions of Matter, I doubt not but Lucretius will readily allow, what you have so learnedly concluded upon, viz, that the Human soul, whose Faculty it is, is above all possibility of Dissolution, at least from Natural Agents. And therefore, Athana∣sius, if you are not already weary with discour∣sing so long and strictly, be pleased to proceed to those Moral Considerations importing the souls Immortality, which I remember you promised, in the beginning.
The Moral Considerations usually brought in defence of the Souls Incorruptibility, are Princi∣pally Three: (1) The Universal Consent of Man
kind. (2) Mans Innate and Inseparable Appetite of Immortality. (3) The Iustice of God, in rewarding Good men, and punishing evil, after death.
Concerning the First; howbeit there ever have been, and still are among men, some diffe∣rences about the state of the Soul, after death; about the place of its posthume Mansion; and o∣ther circumstances: Yet there ever hath been and stil is an Universal concurrence among them in this Tenent, that it doth survive the body, and continue the same for ever. Now, as Cicero judiciously observeth, Omni in re Consensio omni∣um gentium, Lex Naturae putanda est, in every thing the general consent of all Nations is to be ac∣counted the Law of Nature: And consequently the Notion of the▪ Soul's Immortality must be im∣planted, by Nature's own hand, in the Mind of every man; and who so dares to deny it, doth impugne the very principles of Nature.
Your Assumption here, that all Nations con∣spire in the belief of the Souls Eternal subsistence after death; is contradicted by many good Au∣thors, who writing of certain salvage and bar∣barous Nations discovered in the New World, say of them, that their rudenesse and ignorance approacheth so nearly to that of Beasts, that they have not the least thought or conceipt of any such thing as the Souls being a distinct substance from the Body, or that it is indissoluble. And, as I remember, Pliny affirms the same of the Calaici, a wild and Atheistical people of Old Spain.
Granting these relations to be true, yet if we profoundly examine, wherupon their idolatrous devotion (and there never was any Nation without some kind of Religion and Veneration of a Deity) is grounded, and what dark belief lies blended under their ridiculous worship, we shall soon find, that those Indians have some im∣plicite belief of the Eternity of their Souls, as may appear from hence, that they assign the Soul some certain place of residence after its se∣paration from the body, and that either beyond the Sea, or beyond great Mountains, or the like. Again, being observed, to stand in awe of De∣vils, to be terrified with mightly Spectr's and ap∣paritions, and to be astonished at Magical impostures: it is evident, that if we dissect all their perswasion to the bottom, we shall detect it to contain an opinion of the Souls Immortali∣ty. But, though it may be true, that there are now, or formerly have been any such Salvage people, as were wholly destitute of any the least thought or hint of the Souls superviving the fu∣nerals of the body; yet we may return the same Answer, concerning them, that is due to those, who should object, that there alwaies have been, and now are some particular Persons of all Na∣tions, with whom the belief of the Souls Immor∣tality can find no entertainment or credit: which is, that therefore it doth not follow, that the perswasion of its Immortality ought not to be reputed General; and that the dissent of a few
persons doth not make a General Consent not to be Natural. For, as, though some men are born only with one foot, and some lay violent hands upon themselves; it is not lawful for us thence to argue, that it is not natural to men to have two feet, or that the desire of life is not natural to all men: So, though some are so unsound and monstrous in their judgement, as to perswade themselves, that their Souls are Mortal; yet is not the contrary perswasion of all other men, therefore to be esteemed Non∣natural.
You cannot be ignorant, that there have been not only rude and vulgar heads, but even Philo∣sophers, and those of sound judgement too, who have positively denied, and strongly impugned the Immortality of the Soul; and among therest, my Master, Epicurus, who hath the reputation of one of the most piercing and sublime Wits a∣mong all the Ancients: and therefore this posi∣tion of the Soul's Incorruptibility▪ seems not to be so Universal, as you presume.
But, pray, consider; these Philosophers were but Men, and so might erre, in their solitary con∣ceipts and opinions, as well as the most rude and illiterate among the vulgar; as is evident from hence, that the same persons held many other o∣pinions of things more obvious and familiar, which yet are highly absurd and manifestly ridi∣culous.
And what though Epicurus and some few other of the Grecian Scholiarchs asserted the Mortality of the Soul; are there not ten times as many others, as high in esteem for Solidity and Wit, who have with excellent arguments de∣fended the Immortality of it?
Let us leave your Assumption, and reflect up∣on the validity of your Inference. Though all men living should be perswaded of the truth of this opinion, That the Soul is Superiour to death and corruption; yet would it not follow, that therefore that perswasion is Natural and Conge∣nial to our very Essence, as you conclude. For, it is not impossible that an Universal perswasion may be erroneous, every man living being, by the imperfection of his Nature, obnoxious to Er∣ror; and Cicero (deriding the vanity of Auspices, which in his time were in great esteem among all Kings, People, and Nations) saith, quasi quic∣quam sit tam valde, quâm nihil sapere, vulgare; Is any thing so perfectly common among men, as to have foolish opinions?
Most evident it is, that there is no better Cri∣terion, or truer and safer rule, whereby to exa∣mine and confirm the truth of any thing belong∣ing to Men in the General, than the General Consent of Mankind concerning it. For, as when it is enquired, what belongs to jus Animale (vul∣garly called jus Naturale) we perpend the matter
by the observation of such things, as are com∣mon to all Animals: Even so, when we enquire, what is jus Humanum, or what by special right doth belong to Men, as Men, we must direct our judgement, by what is allowed of by all Men. And doubtlesse this is to be accounted Lex Natu∣rae, the Law of Nature, or vox Naturae, the voice of Nature; or else there is none at all. And, as to Cicero's smart saying; I confesse, nothing is more common with the multitude, than to be deluded with false opinions: But that is only in things Arbitrary, and such whereof Nature hath implanted no setled Sense and Notion in their Minds. And, in such things, erroneous conceipts many times spread themselves abroad, and diffuse by what subtle contagion I know not; e∣specially when they have been first taken up up∣on presumption of Authority, Antiquity, Utility and the like inducements to belief: but it is ob∣servable, that such fallacies, as they had no ground in Nature, so by degrees, in processe of ime, they decay insensibly, and at length come ttobe totally obliterated and forgotten. Of which sort, was that of the usefulnesse of Auspices, and other waies of Divination, against which the Orator pleaded; all which are long since laid a∣side, and laughed at by every one. But, as for such things, of which Nature her self hath im∣planted a certain Knowledge in our Minds; it is not vulgar for men to be mistaken in them: un∣lesse you will affirm that this natural Maxim, That every Father ought to take care of his Children; or this, That every man is bound to endeavour his own
preservation, and the like coessential Notions, are vulgar mistakes. And of this sort, certainly, is the opinion of the Soul's Immortality, as may be deduced from hence, that it seems to have been connate to the first man; and confirmed from the great antiquity of the opinion of Hell; and from hence, that it is so far from decaying, by length of time, that on the contrary it growes every day more strong and lively.
This Tenent of the Soul's Immortality which you averr to be as ancient as Humanity itself, and implanted by Naturein the Mind of every man, may have been, for ought we know, the poli∣tique invention of the First Law-makers: who, ob∣serving that the punishments denounced upon capital Delinquents in this life were not suffici∣ent to deterre them from committing enormities destructive to the common right and safety of Societies; prudently perswaded men that their Souls were not obnoxious to dissolution together with their bodies, but Immortal, and so capa∣ble of torment, after death, for their evil deeds; and of Felicity, by way of reward for their good. Than which, there could be no more powerfull consideration to coerce men, who were not sen∣sible of the present benefits of Virtue: it being in all times true, that such audacious Malefact∣ors, as are not moved by the whole arme of the Civil Magistrate, will yet tremble at the finger of Divinity. And this opinion could not but take so much the deeper root in mens breasts, by how
much the more agreeable it is to that desire and love of life, which is naturall to us all: so that being the most gratefull and correspondent to our nature, the promise of Eternal existence in our better part, found a general belief; and, by com∣mon tradition, came at length to be in a manner naturalized. But, how it is otherwise Natural, I profess, I doe not yet comprehend.
That this perswasion of the Soul's Eternity, was the invention of the primitive Legislators, the better to keep men in obedience to their Lawes; hath, I confess, been often said, but ne∣ver proved: and what the first supposers thereof have told us, of the manner of mens being con∣vened into common societies, after they had long lived abroad in the fields, and upon mutuall spoyles, rapine and slaughter, after the manner of wild Beasts; is altogether fabulous and unrea∣sonable. Whereas, on the contrary, we are able to prove, by those memorials that remain to us, of the First Law-makers we read of in History; that they found this Tenent of the Soul's Immor∣tality setled and radicated in the hearts of the people, from the very beginning of Mankind. I conceive it probable enough, that the wisdom of these Law-makers might teach them to make use of this perswasion, in order to their more fa∣cile governing and restraining the vulgar, other∣wise more prone to all kind of exorbitancy and violence; and it was a piece of eminent pru∣dence in them so to doe: but I have no reason, to
allow, that therefore it is a meer politique Fiction; unless you think it lawfull to conclude, that because an Husbandman doth turn the streams of a river upon his grounds, to make them the more fruitfull, therefore the river is only a Fiction. Again, though I concede, that the belief of Immortality is very conformable and gratefull to our Nature, which by instinct inclineth us to abhorr Dissolution: yet this con∣formity and gratefullness doth not arise to us from hence, that Immortality is offered to us as undue by Nature (as Poets report of Chiron the great Chirurgeon, who refused Immortality, when proffered him by the Gods: and of Pro∣metheus, who exclamed against Iupiter, for ex∣empting him from death) but, on the contrary, because it is Natural, and that we have the as∣surance of it engraven on our very essence; and therefore it can be no Fiction, as you would seem to imagine.
It is possible (and experience saith, frequent) that an Opinion may be General, and possesse the minds of all men, for many ages together with∣out dispute; which yet at length may be disco∣vered to be false and absurd, and the quite con∣trary succeed into the room thereof: as may be exemplified in that of the Antipodes, and the Cir∣cumvolution of the Earth; both which till of late years were held wholly unreasonable and Phan∣tasticall. And perhaps this of the Soul's Eternity may have the same fate.
If there be any Opinions, which all men at some time maintain; we are to judge of the Verity or Falsity of them, by this general rule. If they be confirmed by the judgement of all ages; and that the Mind find it self carried and incli∣ned to them, by secret assent and complacency, as to things generally concerning every man a∣like: Then, without doubt, those Opinions are sound, natural and congenial to man. But, if o∣therwise there be a tacite Reluctancy in the Mind against the admission of them; and that their importance or concernment is not equally diffusive to all men: they are false, arbitrary, and such as may be embraced, or rejected indiffe∣rently; for of themselves, they neither promove, nor impede Mans felicity (unlesse only by acci∣dent, or as their speculation may be pleasant, for the time) and it little relateth to mans happi∣nesse, whether there be Antipodes or not, for we in our Hemisphere can live without commerce with them; or whether the Earth, or Sun be moved since all the Apparences are the same, either way. But, as for the Opinion of the Soul's surviving the body; it is not indifferent, whe∣it be true or not: Nor is Man destitute of a Na∣tural propension to believe it, when it relateth to his Supreme and everlasting Felicity.
From the Antiquity, Universality, and Per∣petuity of any Opinion, I think we may safely
conclude upon the Verity of it. From the Antiquity of it; because, according to that Rule, Idem esse verum, quodcunque primum; id a∣dulterinum, quodcunque posterius, that which is the most antient, is likely to be the most true, in re∣spect of the purity and sincerity of mens Minds in the Primitive Age of the World, their Under∣standings being then more clear & perspicacious, and their judgements lesse perverted by irregu∣lar Affections and temporal Interest. From the Universality, because it seems inconsistent with the Goodnesse of God, to have made us of a Na∣ture so subject to error, as that All Mankind should be deluded. From the Perpetuity, because, as Cicero worthily noteth, Opinionum commenta delet dies, Naturae judicia confirmat, Time destroy∣eth all those fancies, which have no other ground, but only human opinion; but it strength∣neth all those judgements, which are founded upon Truth and pure natural Reason. And there∣fore, this Notion of the Souls Immortality, being so Ancient, as that it seems to have entered into the World together with the First Man, and what Plutarch (out of Sophocles) saith of the An∣tiquity of Religious principles,
may be most aptly accommodated thereunto: and so Universal, as that the apprehension of a Deity (without which no man ever lived, for, as Tully remarketh, Multi quidem de Diis prava
sentiunt, omnes tamen esse vim & Naturam Divinam arbitrantur) seems not to have been more Com∣mon: And lastly so Perpetual, as that Time doth rather confirm, that decay it; I must judge it, to be a sound and proleptical truth, especially when I reflect also upon that other Character Athanasius hath given of the verity and natural∣nesse of a General Tenent, viz. that the concern∣ment of it, is equally diffusive to all men. And did I not know, Lucretius, that your present businesse is Contradiction; I should a little wonder, how you could alleage that so in-considerable an Ob∣jection, of the opinion of the Soul's Immortality being a Fiction of the First Law-makers. For, you well understand from what incredible Authori∣ty that impious Whimsy was derived, even from Euripides the Poet; who suborning the Per∣son of Sisyphus, in his Tragedy, to speak such A∣theistical conceipts, as otherwise he durst not vent, introduceth him telling this formal tale.
That the life of men in old time, was sal∣vage and barbarous, like that of Wild Beasts; the stronger, by violence oppressing the weak∣er, untill at last, men were necessitated to de∣vise certain severe Laws, for the suppressing of mutual slaughter, and other acts of inju∣stice. But, when they found (after long expe∣rience) that all those Laws were ineffectual to the coercing men from enormities and out∣rages; because they could take hold of only o∣pen and publick offences, and reached not to close and secret ones: There arose up among them a certain subtle and politique Gover∣nour,
who invented a mean to provide against that mischief also, and to prevent clan∣destine and secret violations of common Right and Justice, as well as manifest and notorious. And that was, by insinuating into the peoples heads,
Quod sit perenni vita vigens aliquis Deus, Qui cernat ista, & audiat, at{que} intelligat, &c.
that there was an Immortal Power, or Deity above them, who took notice of all their most secret actions, and designes, and would most severely punish all injustice, in another life, which was to succeed this, and to continue e∣ternally.The like to which is very solemnly told by Cicero, in the person of Cotta, in his first Book de Natura Deorum; and also by Seneca, in his second Book of Natural Questions: But, how contrary to Reason, as well as to the authenti∣call Monuments (both Divine and Human) of Ancient times, and the first foundation of Re∣publicks, or Societies; is too well known, even to your self, Lucretius, to need my further insisting thereupon. However, this praise is due to you, that you have omitted nothing, that might im∣pugne Athanasius his Argument of the Soul's E∣ternity, desumed from the Universal belief of it by men of all Nations, and in all Ages.
Having received not only your Approbation▪ Noble Isodicastes, but your Assistance also, in this
my First Moral Argument; I need no other o∣ther encouragement to proceed to the Second; which ariseth from Mans inbred, or rather innate, and inseparable Appetite of Immortality.
For, there is no man who doth not desire to subsist Eternally; nay, not those very persons, who seem to impugne and disavow that desire, by a contrary opinion (as Epicurus and all his Sectators) could ever▪ suppress or extinguish it from glowing perpetually in their breast, not∣withstanding all their pretences of being free from any such expectation: as may be inferred from hence that they endeavoured to perpetuate their names and memories to all posterity, by their Books and opinions. And, therefore, it is not needfull for us to confirme this Assertion, by the Example of Cleombrotus, and the Disciples of Hegesias, who were so far transported with the force of Plato's and His discourses of the Souls e∣ternal state after death, that they could not for∣bear to lay violent hands upon themselves, that so they might set their impatient souls at liberty from the wearisom prison of Flesh, and emanci∣pate them into that their more proper and de∣lightfull mansion. All we shall urge, is only this, that There is no man, who thinks himself unconcerned in Futurity. Witness that general ambition all men have, to perpetuate their names in the re∣cords of immortal Fame; some, by the founding and institution of Common-wealths, Sects, Soci∣eties, and the prescription of Lawes for the con∣tinuation of them; others, by valiant acts in warre, even to the loss of health, limbs, and life
itself; others, by erecting pyramids, obeliks, Tombs, statues, and other monuments of their greatness and heroical atcheivements; others, by writing learned and usefull Books, and even such as import the contempt of posthume Glory and fame; others, by begetting of children, adop∣tion of heirs, publick legacies of piety, and the like: all which are strong and lively testimonies, that this Appetite of surviving their funerals, is implanted in their Minds, by Nature's owne hand, and so impossible ever to be totally eradi∣cated. Now, forasmuch as Nature doth institute nothing in vain; and that it is unreasonable to conceive, that she would infuse into us a conti∣nuall desire of, and providence for, such things in the future, whereof we shall then have no sense: it is more than probable, that our souls shall af∣ter death be invested in that state of Immortali∣ty, which we so uncessantly aspire unto, and to which we are carried by a secret and insuppress∣able tendency. To this purpose Cicero, in the first of his Tusculans, hath a remarkable saying, which I shall therefore rehearse, Nescio quomodo inhaereat in mentibus quasi seculorum quoddam augu∣rium, idque in maximis ingeniis altissimisque ani∣mis existit maximè, & apparet facillime: quo qui∣dem dempto, quis tam esset amens, qui semper in labo∣ribus & periculis viveret. &c.
This Affectation of Immortality, I confess, is very frequent, and almost General; yet doth it not appear to be so Essential or Natural, as that
it may not be vain, and so Nature no waies obli∣ged to provide for its satisfaction. For, we have other Appetites, that seem as Universal, and consequently as Natural as this; which yet im∣port no necessity of satisfaction, but rather an impossibility thereof. For example, who doth not desire and wish perpetuity of youth, strength, and health; and to be exempted from the stroke of that common enemy, Death? and yet 'tis well knowne to themselves, that these de∣sires are vain, and such as Nature hath ordained an absolute impossibility of their satisfaction. Wherefore, you cannot argue a necessity, nay not a probability of the Soul's being Immortal, from her affectation of Immortality.
But, pray, observe the Disparity; and let the institution of Nature itself be your rule, in dis∣cerning, what Appetite is vain, and what capa∣ble of satisfaction. Some Appetites there are, and those almost General too, which yet are not inserted into us originally by Nature, but arise from the presumption of some profit, or pleasure: such is the desire of being able to flie in the aire like Birds, which every man hath; for, who would not carry himselfe with all possible expe∣dition to the place whither he intends to goe? yet, because Nature hath not furnished man with wings to that purpose, it is manifest, she did not implant that desire in our Minds, and so is not bound to satisfy the same. Other Appe∣tites there are, which no prejudicate opinion, or
presumed cogitation, but Nature herself hath created together with us; and at the same time ordained means for our attaining to the fruition of them: such is our Appetite of constant Health and Indolency, which as Nature hath implanted, so doth she endeavour to satisfy, and would really satisfy, if it were not for our owne Intemperance and other Accidents, that frustrate those her en∣deavours. Now of the Former sort, are those Appetites of wealth, power, eternal youth, ex∣emption from death, and the like: of the Latter sort, is that of the immortal state of the Soul. For, there being a twofold Immortality, at which we aime, the one of the Species or Kind, the other of the Individual; and we being certain that Nature hath provided for the satisfaction of the First, by the Faculty of Generation: why should we not conclude, that she hath likewise provided for the satisfaction of the other, by gi∣ving our▪ Minds, by which we are what we are, an inexsoluble or incorporeal substance?
But, doe we not all abhorre Death?
Yes, generally we doe.
Is that Abhorrence Natural, or not?
Suppose it to be Natural; what would you inferr?
Why then, certainly, Nature hath instituted two Affections in us, the one point blank repug∣nant to the other; For how can it consist with our desire and hope of Immortality, that we should so much fear and abhor Death, which must put us in possession of it?
The fear of Death, Lucretius, and the desire of Immortality, seem to be rather one and the same natural Affection, than two contrary ones; for, to desire Eternal subsistence, is to covet Immor∣tality. But, our fear of Death ariseth only from our being more concerned in, or moved by things present, than by things to come. Which, indeed, is the main reason, why men generally offend not only in the inordinate love of this life, but in most other things appertaining to the same. Thus, meeting with occasions of intemperance, or incontinence; we weigh not the losse of our health, abbreviation of life, and other evills consequent thereupon, because our thoughts are wholly intent upon the present pleasure that offers it self to our sense: So that, as this our pursuit of sensual and hurtful pleasures, doth not hinder the desire of health and long life from being Natural to us; so doth not our desire of perpetuity in this life, hinder our desire of a better life after this, from being likewise natural.
The Induction you have here made, seems to prove no more than this, that men generally affect posthume Fame, or Glory; which may in∣deed be accounted a kind of life in death, ac∣cording to that of Ovid,
But, this is far from amounting to a real Im∣mortality.
It is enough, if my Induction declare, in the General, that in this life, we have a presension of some certain future state after death, in which we shall have some sense of what we have been in this life, and that accompanied with pleasure or pain. For, as Hunger is an Appetite, not of this or that particular dish of meat, but only of meat in the General; so though our opinion de∣termine that general appetite to some one parti∣cular dish before all others, which yet may be in it self lesse gratefull and wholsom; yet that is e∣vidence enough that we have an appetite to meat in the general, and that our affecting a de∣ceiptful dish, doth not exclude our capacity of affecting a wholsome and more nutritive dish. In like manner, it is apparent, we have an Appetite of Immortality in the General, or without de∣termination to this or that particular state or
condition therein. And though the mind per∣chance may pitch upon Immortal Fame, as the most grateful means to satisfie that appetite, which in it self is a meer vanity and deceiptful: yet that is sufficient to testifie, that we have ra∣dicated in our Mind an Appetite of Immortality in the General, and such a one as is true and ger∣mane. Whence, that you may not urge the ex∣amples of Epicurus and others, who believing the Souls of men to be Mortal, did yet long labour in composing Books, that might commend them to posterity after their death; I say, that these men did indirectly, and upon consequence give testimony of the true Immortality, in regard they were carried on, by the secret impulse of nature, to affect that vain and false one of Glo∣ry or Renown. For, Nature hath not implanted in us any desire of things vain; but it is our own folly and indiscretion, which permitting our mind to be too deeply infected with things of this life; averteth our studies and endeavours from the true and genuine scope of nature, to erroneous hopes, and delusive ex∣pectations. And now, I hope, you have not much left to say against this Argument of the Souls Immortality, from our Appetite thereof.
Whether Lucretius be convinced of the force of this Reason, or not; it appears by his silence, that he intends no longer to oppose it, but is willing you should think you have made him
your proselyte, and so proceed to your last Moral consideration that remains.
That may be desumed from the Necessity of Divine Iustice; for, as certain as God is, so cer∣tain is it, that He is just: and since it doth evi∣dently consist with the method of Gods justice, that it should be well with Good men, and ill with evil men; and we do not observe Good and Evil to be accordingly distributed in this life, but rather the contrary; Good men generally being even overwhelmed with afflictions, and wicked men as generally swimming in pleasures: It fol∣lows, that there must be another life, wherein Virtue is to receive its reward, and Vice its punishment. And, if it were otherwise, the gates of Piety would be shut up, and those of Impiety opened; all Religion be subverted, all honesty de∣stroyed, and all Human Society dissolved.
If this Reason be conclusive, as to Men, me∣thinks, it should be no lesse conclusive concern∣ing Beasts also. For, why should the harmlesse and patient sheep be worried by the noxious and bloody Wolf? Or the innocent Dove become a prey to the greedy Falcon? and no state remain after death, for the reward of the sufferings of the one, and punishment of the cruelty of the o∣ther? How can this consist, I pray, with the me∣thod of Divine Justice: All Animals being the Creatures of God, as well as Men; and (for
ought we know) as much the subjects of his Providence and Justice.
Forasmuch as of all Animals, Men only are capable of knowing, revering, worshiping and serving God; it is manifest, that They are as the principal care of his Providence, so the only Ob∣ject of his Justice. And though this be sufficient, yet I shall add two other Reasons of weight and evidence enough to exclude the pretence of Brutes to a concernment in justice divine. The one is, that among men in Societies, there is a mutual Communion, such as cannot be instituted among Beasts, in regard they want reason to understand the benefit of such Communion: And, that by this common compact, men are obliged to do good and not harm each to other, living in that communion; but Beasts are not reciprocally ob∣liged by any compact, and so are incapable of doing or suffering injury (rightly so called) one from another. And, therefore, the actions of Men one towards another, belong to the cogni∣zance of Gods special Providence; but not the actions of Beasts. The other is, that it is Natures own institution, that some Brute Animals should be Carnivorous, some feed upon Herbs, some upon fruits, &c. and so such as are Carnivorous must destroy other weaker Animals, or else they cannot subsist. To these, if you please, you may add also a third consideration, which is, that Man hath sentiments of a state after death, and desires to be happy in that state, and seems
convulst at the fear of the contrary: But, Beasts have no such thoughts, no such desires, no such fear; so that it is no wonder, that the provident Justice of God doth distribute Rewards and punishments to Men, and to no other of his Creatures.
As to this last Consideration; is it not possi∣ble, that Men, casting about for various devices and imaginations to palliate and sweeten the sowrenesse of their Miseries, in this life, may have both invented this comfortable opinion of a state of future Immortality; and introduced the supposition of this provident justice of God, relating only to mens actions, on purpose to sup∣port it: when other Animals, being destitute of the like use of reason, could have no such conceipt?
Impossible; because the opinion of Immorta∣lity was before any sense of Misery, and elder than all Memory; and as it came into mens minds, at first, upon more weighty considerati∣ons, than any temporal concernment: so must it have been, as soon as there were men to enter∣tain it. Wherefore, as it is true, that men who live in misery, do more frequently fix their thoughts upon Immortality, than those who live in happinesse: So is it equally true, that not only miserable, but many of the most prosperous and flourishing persons in the World, do neverthe∣lesse
contemn the delights and pleasures of this transitory and umbratil life, and account it the only satisfactory and comfortable entertainment of their thoughts, to be constantly meditating up∣on that state of Immortality, which shall receive them, when all the pageant pleasures of the pre∣sent life shall be▪ vanished away and come to not-hing.
But, is not Virtue, on one side, a sufficient re∣compence to it self? and Vice, on the other, a sufficient punishment to it self? and such, than which no Executioner can inflict a more grie∣vous and horrid? What need, therefore, of any such state to come, untill which the reward of Virtue, and punishment of Vice, is imagined to be deferred?
That virtue is not a sufficient recompence to itself, may be naturally collected from hence; that all virtuous persons have an eye of Affecti∣on constantly levelled at somewhat beyond it. For, though the Stoicks affected this high-straind expression of the exceeding amiableness of vir∣tue; yet could they never perswade themselves, or others, but that Glory and Honour, at least, were lookt upon, as the Consequents of Virtue: nor can it be affirmed, that Glory doth alwayes seek out and court virtue, of its owne accord; forasmuch as really those persons were ever the most covetuous of Glory, who have pretended
the most to decline and avoid it. Yea, the most Heroical among the Ancients seem to have pro∣posed Glory, and not barely Virtue itself, as the guerdon of their most difficult enterprises and atcheivements; which Cicero fully expresseth (pro Milone) in these elegant words: Ex omnibus praemiis virtutis, amplissimum est praemium Gloria, quae vitae brevitatem posteritatis memoriâ consolatur; & (pro Arch.) nullam virtus aliam mercedem labo∣rum, periculorumque desiderat, praeter hanc Laudis & Gloriae; quâ detractâ, quid est in hoc tam exiguo vitae curriculo, & tam brevi, quod tantis nos in labo∣ribus exerceamus? I add, that according to this drie and uncomfortable lesson of the Stoicks, a Prince would be unjust to expect honour from his subjects, for his prudent and happy government; a souldier unreasonable, in hoping for any re∣compence for his valour and wounds; an Artist worthy of blame in demanding a valuable price for an excellent piece of work; a Physician un∣conscionable, in receiving a fee for a Cure, and the like: For if virtue, or the doing of a good action be a competent reward to its self; it must be (as I say) manifest injustice to require or re∣ceive any other. The same likewise may be said of Vice. For, no man, that doth an ill action, fears only least that ill should torment him: but fears somthing beyond it, and consequent upon it, as infamy, imprisonment, torture and death. And these, truly, are more congruous punish∣ments for vice, than vice itself; otherwise all Lawes would be unjust, that inflict them. We may conclude, therefore, that since virtue doth
frequently want its due reward, in this life; and vice as frequently goe without its due punish∣ment: it followes, that after death, there is to succeed a certain immortal state, in which both shall receive their due.
Granting all this to be necessary, in respect of Justice Divine; yet I can see no necessity, why the Rewards of the Virtuous, and Punishment of the Vicious, should be Eternal. For, no Hu∣man action, though highly good and commen∣dable, can yet be so meritorious, as to deserve an Eternal recompence from God: as, on the other side, no action, though superlatively cri∣minal and detestable, can yet be so bad, as to re∣quire an everlasting punishment; because neither the one, nor the other is any thing but natural, transitory, and definite, and so can hold no pro∣portion to what is infinite.
Though a Good action, and so Virtue and Honesty, considered Physically, be but a slender thing; yet, because the worth or Merit of it is to be estimated according to the rule of Morality, it comes to be of such excellency, as that the Doer thereof, freely and upon election endea∣vouring to compose and regulate himself, by the best rules prescribed, and so ennobling his actions with divine perfection, as much as the frailty of his nature will permit; may in justice hope for a reward proportionable i. e. an Eminent, and
Divine one, such to which the Soul, by its inhe∣rent appetite and tendency, doth continually aspire. And this reward cannot be other but Everlasting; because, if it were only Temporal and Finite, it could not deserve the name of a re∣ward, insomuch as the Fear of being once depri∣ved of it again, though after many myriads of years, would destroy the pleasure of enjoying it. And the like may be said of the perpetuity of Punishments due to vicious persons so that there is no such disproportion as you surmise.
And here, if you please, let us set bounds to our Debate concerning the Immortality of that noble Essence, the Human Soul. For having run over the principal Physical Arguments, that arise from the Operations of the Soul, aswell in Volition, as Intellection, and also from the Nature and Uni∣versality of her Objects; and added thereunto other Moral Considerations, of high importance, in or∣der to the Conviction of this most comfortable and sacred Truth, whose Assertion, in obedience to your yesterdayes commands, I assumed upon myself: I find the clue of all my Notions and Col∣lections concerning this sublime subject, now wholly unravelled. Nor, after my solution of all your Scruples and Objections, doth any thing re∣main for me longer to exercise your patience withall, but only that I beg of you both your for∣giveness, in that I have thus long abused it alrea∣dy; and that I render my thanks to you Lucretius, for the advantage you were pleas'd to give me, by your most ingenious and learned Opposition, as you saw occasion, in the process of my Discour∣ses;
and to you, Isodicastes, for your most impar∣tial and judicious turning the scales on the side of truth, as often as Lucretius thought, or seemed to think them▪ equilibrated betwixt his reasons and mine.
If I have been so happy, Athanasius, as to judge according to truth; I assure you, it was the clear∣ness of your Reasonings alone, that gave me light so to do: and therefore, instead of that Forgiveness of your exercise of my patience, (as you call it) which your modesty makes you re∣quire of me; I must return you infinite thanks, for your so fully compensating my patience and attention with such satisfaction, as greater ought not to be expected, concerning an argument of so much abstrusity and difficulty, as this whereupon you have discoursed. And for Lucretius, I think it now time for him, to lay aside his disguise of a Contrary opinion which he put on only to ex∣periment the strength of your Allegations; for I must declare, that in my judgement (which yet I doe not take to be definitive) he hath been too weak for you, in all the passages of this con∣test; yet rather from the weakness of the Cause he undertook, than from any want of skill in himself to manage it to the utmost of its merit.
We have yet an hour good, before supper time; and you were both pleased to devote this whole Evening to this particular Divertise∣ment:
And therefore, if Athanasius be not tired with speaking, nor you, Isodicastes, with hearing; let me beseech you to continue your places a lit∣tle longer, while I propose some certain Ob∣jections, long since made by Epicurus and some of my Fellow-Disciples, against the Immorta∣lity of Mans Soul. For, until Athanasius hath per∣fectly refuted them also; if he thinks to Triumph, it will be before he hath compleated his Victory.
You are a politick Enemy, Lucretius, it seems: like experienced Generals, you place your chief∣est strength in a Reserve. But, come, draw up the remainder of your forces; I doubt not of as good successe in the second charge, as I have had in the first.
But, pray, Gentlemen, let me conjure you both, not to extend your Contract, beyond eight a clock; for, at that hour, I have appointed my Cook to furnish us with a short repast; and my Watch saith, it is almost seven already.
Lesse than an hour will conclude our quarrel, I promise you, Isodicastes: but lest we lose time in preparatory circumstances, I immediately ad∣dresse to the proposal of my intended Objections, which have alwaies hitherto been accounted of of moment.
The First is this, that the Soul is generated, grows up to maturity, then again declines, grows old, and at length wholly decaies, together with the body: So that, if that Axiome be true, quit∣quid natum est, possit interire, the Soul being pro∣duced, must be subject to dissolution.
This Argument hath two parts; the one sup∣posing, that the Soul is Generated: The other, that it grows old and languid, and decaies, as the body doth; and therefore I shall divide my Answer accordingly. To the First part I reply, that that Axiome, quicquid natum est, possit interire, is true indeed concerning all things Corporeal and Compound; but not concerning things In∣corporeal and Simple, such as I have already de∣monstrated the Soul to be: so that the Producti∣on of the Soul doth not necessitate her Dissolu∣bility. That Incorporeal Natures are incapable of destruction, I have formerly deduced from their want of parts into which they might be dissol∣ved: all exsolubility consisting wholly in Parti∣bility. And, that Simple Natures are likewise incorruptible, is manifest even from hence, that the General and First Matter, though Corpore∣al and produced from nothing by God at first, doth persevere the very same for ever. So that Dissolubility belonging neither to Incorporiety, nor Simplicity; it is purely consequent, that the Soul, which is an essence Incorporeal and Sim∣ple, cannot be obnoxious to Dissolution. And as to the Production of it, though it be not easie for
us (especially at the first thought) to conceive how an Incorporeal can be produced, with∣out perfect creation, from which we have good cause to believe that God long since desisted; yet that the Soul is produced, we have the perswa∣sion of sundry good reasons: As if it were impro∣duct, or eternal à parte ante, it would and must be so, either as Coherent by it self, and a sub∣stance sejoyned or severed from all other things; or as a part adhaerent to another, and deduced from that other, when it is induced into the bo∣dy. But, that it is not a substance cohaerent per se & ab aeterno, may be inferred from hence, that there is remaining in us no memory of any such eternal state; that the University of things would want beginning, and so could have neither Au∣thor, nor Governour, which is monstrous and absurd, as I have demonstrated in my Book a∣gainst Atheism; that if Men had been from all Eternity, they must have been Infinite, and so either there must have been an infinite multi∣tude of Souls, before all excogitable time, or the same numerical Souls must have, by trans∣migration, been inservient to, or informed suc∣cessively, not only many, but infinite persons; when yet it is repugnant, that there should be an infinite number (lest therein should be admit∣ted as many Binaries, Denaries, Millenaries, &c. as Unities: and so somthing be allowed more infinite than an infinite, which is absurd) And that our Souls were formerly in other men, who lived before us, we have no monument, no record, but those Fables of Pythagoras, Empedo∣cles,
and the like. And, that it is not a Particle desumed from another incorporeal, is demon∣strable from hence, that an Incorporeal is unca∣pable of division into parts: Which reason is so plain and obvious, that I cannot but wonder that Plato, having asserted God to be a Mind Divine and Incorporeal, should neverthelesse contradict himself in affirming, that Mans Soul was a Par∣ticle taken from the substance of God himself; or how he could imagine the Soul to be Inexsoluble, which he thought a part of an exsoluble nature. Wherefore, seeing the Soul cannot possibly be Improduct, either of these two waies (and cer∣tainly there can be no other) it must of necessity be Product, whatsoever the Manner of its Pro∣duction be. And here I might (as I suppose you expect I should) take occasion to engulph my self in that bottomlesse Sea of Difficulties, con∣cerning the Original and Extraduction of Mans Soul; but being digressive from my present Theme, and such whereof I am not yet able to give any other account, than what you have met with, in Sennertus, Harvey, and other modern Phy∣sicians, who have more expresly addicted them∣selves to enquire into the mysteries of Genera∣tion; I think it prudence to wave the opportu∣nity. Only thus much I may adventure to say, and it is pertinent to my businesse in hand, that the Production of the Soul cannot be from Mat∣ter, because she is her self Immaterial; nor from an Incorporeal, by way of desumption or partiti∣on, because Incorporiety and Divisibility are in∣compatible: So that they are not altogether de∣stitute
of reason, who conceive that it is produ∣ced ex Nihilo, and by such a Cause, whose pow∣er is immense, and superior to all the Energy of of Nature, which must be God, the Author of Nature. But, however it is plain, that though it hath its beginning and origine together with the body; yet being Incorporeal, it is not capable of perishing together with it, as you would con∣clude. And thus much for the First part of your Argument.
As for the Remainder of it; to that Aristotle hath long since provided an Answer to my hand, in the fourth Chapter of his first Book de Anima, which is a Text very apposite, and memorable (however it either import a Contradiction in the Author himself, or seem capable of their in∣terpretation, who alleage him as a defendant of the Mortality of the Soul) and therefore I shall recite it. Innasci autem Intellectus videtur, & substantia quaedam esse, nec corrumpi; nam si cor∣rumperetur quidem, id maximè fieret ab hebetatione illa, quae in senectute contingit: nunc autem res per∣inde fit, ac in ipsismet sensuum instrumentis. Si enim Senex oculum juvenilem reciperet, non secus ac ipse juvenis videret. Unde & senectus non ex eo est, quod quidquam passa Anima sit; sed quod simile aliquid, ac in ebrietate morbisque eveniat: ipsaque intelligendi & contemplandi functio propter aliquid aliud interius corruptum marcescit, cum ipsum in∣terim, cujus est, passionis expers maneat. Which words considered, we have good reason to afffirm, that all that change, which the Epicure∣an would have to be in the Rational Soul, or
Mind, during the growth of the body in youth, and decay of it in old age; doth not proceed from any mutation in the Soul it self, but in some o∣ther interior thing distinct from it, as the Imagi∣nation, or Organ of the Common Sense, the Brain, which being well or ill affected, the Soul it self suffereth no whit at all, but only the Fun∣ctions of it flourish or decay accordingly. For, since the Intellect is enshrined in the body, for only this end, that it might collect the Know∣ledge of things, by the intercession of the Phan∣sy, into which the images of things are convey∣ed through the Senses; and that in order to its reasoning concerning them, it might receive hints from those images, which residing in the Phansy, are therefore (as we have said) called Phantasms: hence is it, that the Soul, in the be∣ginning of its age, or during Childhood, doth reason but little, because it hath then but few images or phantasms in store, from which it might take occasion of composing discourses: but, in processe of time, it comes to ratiocinate more copiously and perfectly, as having then both more, and more clear and ordinate Phantasms; and lastly in decrepite old age, it again falls to reason but little and brokenly, because, by rea∣son of the drinesse of the brain, the Phantasms are then either wholly, or for the most part ob∣literated, and those few that remain, are repre∣sented both obscurely and perturbedly. So that (as Aristotle saith) if it were possible to give an old man a young Eye, and a young Imagination; his Soul would soon declare, by exquisite vision,
and quick reasoning, that it was not she, that had grown old, but her Organs; and that she is capable of no more change from the impairment of the body by old age, than is usually observed to arise (pro tempore) from a fit of drunkennesse, or some disease of the brain. For, as when the malignity of the Spirits of Wine is overcome by sleep, and dispelled by sweat; or the violence of a disease possessing the brain, or seat of reason, is abated; a man doth no longer suffer a delirium, but returns to the clear use of his reasoning Fa∣culty, as before his head was disordered: So, if the Brain and Phansy were youthfully affected in an old man, the Soul would no longer seem to doat, but reason as perfectly as ever before in the vigour and flourishing state of youth. From whence it is evident, that whatever of change men have thought to be in the Soul, by reason of that great decay generally attending old age; is not really in the Soul, but only in the Imagina∣tion, and the Organ thereof, which is not so well disposed, as in the vigour of life. And this might be conveniently explained by the simili∣tude of a Scribe, who cannot write so smooth and fine a hand, with an old and blunted pen, as with a new and sharp one: But the thing is of it self too clear, to need the illustration of Compa∣risons. And this may suffice to dissolve your mighty Argument objected.
My SECOND Argument is desumed from hence, that the Soul is not only distempered and
misaffected with diseases of her owne, but infect∣ed and touch't also by those of the body: and what is capable of disease or misaffection, either protopathically, or sympathically, is doubtless capable of dissolution. This you may remember, was long since urged by Panaetius of Epicurus sect; for, Cicero (primo Tuscul.) speaking of him, saith; alteram autem rationem affert, nihil esse quod dole at, quin id aegrum esse quoque possit: quod autem in mor∣bum cadat, id etiam interiturum; dolere autem Ani∣mos, ergo etiam interire.
As for such Diseases of the body, which you suppose extend to the discomposure of the Soul, by way of sympathy; as particulary the Phrensy, Madnesse, Hypochondriacall Melancholy, the Lethargy, Hydrophobia, and others which work upon the brain, and perturb the Animal Facul∣ties: the same Answer will serve to exempt the Soul from suffering any detriment from them, which I just now alleaged against her decay in old age. For, though in truth the Mind cannot exercise its proper functions duely and rightly, in fits of Delirium, the Phrensy, and the like; nor at all in Lethargies, and Apoplexies: yet this ought not to be ascribed to any depravation or change in the substance of the Mind itself, but only to an indisposition in the Phansy and Ani∣mal Organs.
And, as for Passions of Grief, Fear, Remorse &c. which are reputed the proper Diseases of the Mind; in the first place, we may derive our
Answer concerning them, from the place of Ari∣stotle newly cited. For, he there subjoyns, Amo∣res, odium, & alia, passiones esse non intellectûs, sed corporis ipsum habentis; esse enim fortè Intellectum aliquid divinum & passionis expers. By which, his meaning is, that the proper Function of the In∣tellect, is to understand and reason (though he was pleased to reckon Cogitation among the Passions) and that all Passions belong to the Appetite either Concupiscible or Irascible, which is a Corporeal Faculty. For, though Passion be posterior to Cognition, and dependent thereupon; so that it may seem to be received in the subject, to which Cognition doth belong, that is to the Mind: nevertheless, because the Mind, while resident in the body, doth make use of cor∣poreal Images pre-admitted into the Imagina∣tion; and in the mean while the Phansy, in ima∣gining what things are, doth co-operate together with the Mind, and the motion of the Corpore∣al or Sensitive Faculty followeth after the per∣ception of objects by the Phansy; thence it comes, that the whole Commotion, or Passion doth be∣long to the Appetite and Body, the Mind all that while remain free and unmoved, after the same manner, as a Master and servant travelling toge∣ther, the servant carries the burden, and the Master goes light and free, and unconcerned in the weight and trouble thereof. But, forasmuch as we must admit a certain Appetite properly competent to the Soul itself, viz. the Rational Appetite (from the name of its action, usually denominated the Will) by which we find our∣selves
secretly inclined and carried towards things Honest and Divine, and which ought to remain in the Soul even after death, since it must then be sensible either of pleasure in the state of felicity, or of pain in the state of misery: there∣fore, I confess, we cannot deny but there are some certain Motions in the Soul itself, which in re∣spect of the analogy they seem to hold to those of the sensual or Corporeal Appetite, and that we cannot otherwise express them, may well enough be called Passions, yet these are not to be conceived to arise from any dilatation, compres∣sion, solution of continuity, and the like violent motions, that might adferr any harme or detri∣ment to the substance of the Soul. Nor, indeed, ought this to seem strange or difficult, in a thing that is Incorporeal; since even among Corpore∣als, we observe some, that have a substance un∣alterable, and so inconsumable, by the most vio∣lent motions in Nature, as Gold, Amianthus, and the like; and that Aristotle makes the sub∣stance of Heavenly bodies, such as that it cannot be altered, heated, or dissolved by the heat of the Sun, as all sublunary bodies are.
What think you then, Athanasius, of Drun∣keness, wherein both the Rational Faculty is highly perturbed, and the Motive as much en∣feebled: neither of which could be, if the Soul did not suffer from the violence of the wine; and what is capable of suffering such damage from external causes, cannot be incapable of totall
dissolution from the same, in case their force and activity become more intense. Therefore the soul is Mortal.
Why, truly, I think this Argument as light and trivial as your former, and that the same solution will serve to both. For, it is not the Mind, which is overwhelmed with the deluge of Wine, but the brain and seat or instrument of the Phansy, whose images being beclouded and confused by the fumes or spirits of the wine, brought thither by the arteries; it is impossible the Mind should make use of them with that clearness and distin∣ction, as when they were pure and in order. And, as for that general weakness, which re∣maines for a while after the drunken fit is over, in all the members of the body; this is not to be referred to the Mind neither, but to the Motive-Faculty, whose instruments, and principally the Nerves, are then misaffected, and in a manner relaxed, so as they become indisposed to the re∣giment of the Mind.
The best Lutenist in the world, you know, can∣not play a tune upon a Lute, whose strings are relaxed by moisture, or otherwise altered from their requisite temper: and yet his skill in mu∣sick never a whit the less: why then should you conceive, that the soul should be able to conserve the harmony of voluntary motions in the sinewes, muscles, and members of the body, when the re∣quisite tenour of those her instruments is de∣praved, by the stupefactive and relaxing force of
the Wine, drank in excesse? The Members of the body are fit instruments▪ to execute the mo∣tions by the Soul impressed upon them; but when they are surrounded with the malignant and Narcotical vapours of Wine, and thereby relaxed or oppressed; they become uncapable of the Souls mandates and government, till those vapours being again discussed, they have recove∣red their natural temper, and due disposition: and yet the Soul it self all that while remain vigorous and strong, as in Sobriety; contrary to what this your Objection supposeth.
Since you so easily expede your self from the Objections drawn from Diseases, and Ebriety; I shall urge you with one, that seems more tough and knotty, and that is this. As the Body, so al∣so the Soul or Mind is capable of being cured or rectified by the Art of Medicine; and if so, there must be either an addition to, or a detraction of somwhat from the Soul; Physick being a De∣traction of what is superfluous, and an addition of what is deficient in mans Nature: And there∣fore the Soul, being capable of addition and de∣traction, is capable likewise of destruction.
Alas, Lucretius, this is still a branch of the same stock; and to it I may easily accommodate an Answer, out of what I even now replied to
your supposed sympathy of the Soul with the body, in some Diseases. For, albeit, it be most true, that by Hellebor and other Antimelancho∣lical remedies, we Physicians usually cure Mad∣nesse, called Insania, and Amentia, Unsoundness or Distraction of the Mind: Yet is it as true, that this Cure is wrought only upon the brain, or seat of the Imagination, which being purged of that adust and blackish humour, which oppressed it, and altered from the distemper therein cau∣sed by the noxious and intoxicating qualities of that humour; the Mind doth soon return to per∣form all its proper Functions as regularly and exactly, as at any time before the patient was invaded with that distemper of his brain, and depravation of his Phansy. So that, as when a man go's haulting, because one of his shooes is higher than the other, we may well enough say, that man doth hault, though all the cause of his haulting be only the inequality of his shooes; and to make him go right again, there needs no more, but to moke his shooes equally high: So, when a man haults, as it were, in his Reason, or fails in the evennesse and decorum of his Dis∣course; we may say, that man is Unsound or lame in his Mind, though that unsoundnesse con∣sist only in his Brain or Imagination, and to re∣store him to the right and becomming manage of his reason, there needs no more, but to rectify his Phansy or Brain, in whose preternatural di∣stemper alone his madnesse doth consist.
Again, forasmuch as there are (as it were
some certain diseases peculiar only to the Mind; at lest in that Metaphorical sense, I have already explained: And that these depravities, commonly called Diseases of the Mind, are capable of cure by, that which is truly the Physick of the Mind, viz. Moral Philosophy: Therefore ought we to conceive, that as the Mind is subject to those its Affections, without any the least detriment or alteration of its substance; so also may it be cu∣red of them again, without any alteration, ad∣dition, or detraction substantial. For, since the Diseases of the Mind are nothing else but cer∣tain Evill or vitious Habits, contracted by cu∣stom; and those Habits are nothing else but cer∣tain Modes or Manners of its standing affected to such or such objects: Thence comes it, that those Vicious Habits may be sensibly expelled by the induction of contrary Habits, that is of Virtu∣ous ones; like as a Crooked staffe may be made streight, only by bowing it the contrary way. And though no similitude be exactly congruous in this case, because the Affections of Corpore∣al Natures hold no correspondence with those of Incorporeals: Yet I choose to make use of this, of the rectification of a crooked staff, be∣cause the Crookednesse of the staff doth in some sort represent the Curvity of a Mind misaffect∣ed by vicious Habits; and the Rectitude of a staff, equally represent that Rightnesse of the Mind, which is acknowledged in the Soveraign∣ty and Habit of Virtue. And thus you see, that the Curability of the Mind by the prescripts of
Morality, doth not import its dissolubility, as you infer, but rather the Contrary; for no Mo∣ral precept can be applied to, or work upon a Corporeal or Dissoluble essence.
From Diseases and Remedies both of Body and Mind, let us have recourse to Death, and see if from the manner of its Tyranny we can raise an Objection or two against your opinion of the Souls being naturally exempted from the same. It is observed, that Men generally die Membratim, limb after limb, death advancing by sensible degrees from the extream parts to the Central and more noble: as if the Soul were not a substance intirely collected into it self, or resident in any one particular place of the body (as you seem to conceive) but diffused and scatter'd in several pieces, and so subject to dissi∣pation part after part.
The Solution of this is far from being difficult. For, conceiving the soul, as Incorporeal, to be diffused through the whole body, not by Exten∣sion of bulk, but by Replication, or (as the Schools speak) by position of the same Entity in each part of the body; it is easy to understand, that the soul, when the members grow cold and mortified, doth then, indeed, instantly cease to be in them:
yet is not cut off piece-meal, or diminished, and so sensibly or gradually dissipated, as you suppose; but the whole of it remains in so much of the body, as yet continues warme, and perfused by the vital Heat, untill ceasing longer to animate the principal seat or throne of its residence (whe∣ther the Brain, or Heart) it at length bid adieu to the whole, and withdraw itself intire and perfect. What I here say, of the Constitution of the whole Soul in the whole body, and the whole Soul in every part of the body, by way of Replication, or Po∣sition of the same Entity in divers places at the same time; is, I confess, som what obscure, and the imperfection of our knowledge in the affections of Immateriall natures, will hardly permit us to illustrate it: yet, lest you should think it meerly imaginary and sophisticall, I may assert the possibility and reasonableness of it, by a similitude of an intentional species, or visible Image; Which all men allow so to be diffused through the whole medium or space, as that it is at the same time whole in every part of that space: because in what part soever of the space the eye of the spectatour be posited, the whole Image is still visible therein. Now, if this man∣ner of total diffusion, without fraction or divi∣sion, be competent to the visible species, which is Corporeal, as I have amply proved in my Physiology, where I treated expresly of the na∣ture of Vision: certainly it must, with more reason, be competent to the Soul, which is In∣corporeal. And as for what you observe, of the
gradual encroachment of Death, and the sensi∣ble mortification of one limb after another, be∣ginning at the feet and other extremities of the body, and creeping along to the heart; the rea∣son thereof is only this, that the Vital Heat or Flame, being almost either suffocated by putre∣faction of the blood (the only fewel by which it is maintained) in Diseases, or exhausted by old age, goes out, like a Lamp, by degrees; cea∣sing first to enliven or irradiate the parts that are most remote from the Focus, or Heart, and then failing in its conserving influence more and more, untill at length suffering a total extincti∣on in the very Heart (as it were in the socket) it leave that also cold and livelesse. So that Death is an extinction only of the Vital Flame, not of the Soul, which as Solomon calls it, is the bright∣nesse of the Everlasting Light, the unspoited mirrour of the power of God, and the Image of his Goodnesse; and being but one, she can do all things, and remain∣ing in her self, she maketh all things new.
There is another Argument of the Soul's Mor∣tality drawn from hence; that the Soul is as well a part of the Body, as the Eye, Ear, or the other Sensitive Organs: But these are no sooner sepa∣rated from the whole, than they become incapa∣ble of all Sense; And therefore the Soul, when once separate from the Body, must likewise be∣come destitute of Sense.
The Mind or Soul cannot, without great im∣propriety, be said to be a part of the Body, as the Eyes and Ears, and other Organs of Sense are;
insomuch as these belong to the Integrality of the Body, and the Soul belongs to the Integrality of the Totum Compositum, and is the Essence or Form of Man: And the Soul, indeed, is in them all, and in all the rest of the Body, but none of them is in the Soul. So that for this reason alone, you ought not to conceive a parity betwixt the Soul and the Instruments of sense, as to their in∣capacity of Sensation, after their division from the body: being the Soul is the very Principle of Sense, and the Organs can have no Sensation without Her. But, not to insist upon this, I deny the Soul to be a part, as the instruments of sense are; because, otherwise than those all are, she is Incorporeal, and is to her self, and hath, both in her self, and from her self, the principle of all her actions and energy, which none of those can pre∣tend to. For, she doth not borrow or derive from any other principle her power of Understanding or Reasoning, as the eye doth its Faculty of seeing, & the Ear its faculty of Hearing: but hath it im∣mediately and solely from her self; and there∣fore it is no wonder, if the Eye or Ear, once dis∣joyned from the body, can see, nor hear no long∣er, &c. but the Soul, when separated from the body, can understand and Reason of and within her self.
But, pray Sir, reflect a little upon this; that the Soul and Body are mutually connected and as it were United by so neer a relation or Neces∣situde, as that look how the body, being once de∣stitute of the soul, can no longer performe any vital Action: so neither can the soul, when once
departed from the body, and mixt with the Aer, performe any action vital, or Animal; unless you please to give yourself the liberty of imagin∣ing, that she doth then animate that part of Aer, in which she doth take up her new lodging, and of that forme herself instruments fit for the exe∣cution of her faculties.
However the Conjunction of the Soul and body be very intimate; and the most part of vi∣tal and Animal actions belong to the Totum Com∣positum, or whole Composition: yet from thence it doth not follow, that though the body be in∣capable of any of those actions, without the Soul; therefore the in capacity is reciprocall, and the soul can doe no actions, without the body; be∣cause the soul is the Principle of life and activi∣ty to the body, but not the contrary. When we behold a souldier fighting with a sword or other weapon, we cannot justly say, that when he is deprived of those weapons, he can no lon∣ger strike a blow: because, though his weapons be gone, he hath still his armes and hands, wherewith he can strike, when and as often as he pleaseth. So, when the Soul is every way provided of Members and Organs, as it were with a Panoplie or complete armour, and there∣with performs several actions, vital, and Ani∣mal; we cannot say, that if once it devest it∣self of that armour, and become naked, it can no longer exercise its proper functions of Intel∣lection and Ratiocination; because, though the instruments, by the mediation whereof she doth commonly understand and reason in the
body, be taken away, yet still she retains her Faculties. Nor will it be therefore necessary, that when the soul is departed from the body, and breathed forth into the Aer (as you, with the vulgar, seem to conceive) that aer should be thereby Animated: because it is essential to it, then to act, i. e. to understand and reason, without the mediation of any organs at all; and neither in the aer, nor any other body whatever can the soul either meet with, or create those dispositions, that are requisite to vital informa∣tion. This Comparison, I have here made be∣twixt the Soul and a Souldier, is I confess incon∣gruous, as to the point of Information; yet it holds with conveniency enough, as to the point of Operation (and your question doth chiefly con∣cerne that): the weapons of the souldier are as much dead and useless instruments, without the hands, that are to manage them, as the members of the body are without the Soul; and as these are Animated by the soul, so are those in a manner, Animated by the hands of the Soul∣dier. And this may be extended also to the so∣lution of that so famous an Objection of Ari∣stotle (1. de Anim. 8.) where he saith; Esse quidem Animam separabilem, si aliquam functionem habeat, quam sine corpore exerceat, v. c. Intellectionem, quae est ipsius maxime propria, si modo ea quaepiam Ima∣ginatio non sit, aut sine Imaginatione fiat: necesse autem est, eum, qui speculatur, speculari simul ali∣quod phantasma; Ergo &c.
The soul is to be accounted separable, if it hath any function, which it can exercise without the body, namely Intellection, provided that be not a
certain kind of Imagination, or can be perfor∣med without Imagination: but experience testifieth, that no man can speculate, or under∣stand, without Phantasms; and therefore it is not likely, that the soul is a distinct substance and separable from the body.For, the ground hereof is false, viz that there is no Intellection, but what is either direct Imagination, or done by Imagi∣nation; as we have formerly proved; and that with no sparing hand, so that we need not here repeat it. Nor had I here remembred this Ar∣gument of Aristotle, but that this you now urge is very neer of kin thereunto, as to its force and importance, and so put me in mind of it afresh.
An Eighth Objection may be made from hence; that the Soul being once expired, the body soon corrupts, stinks, and resolves to dust: I say, expired, or like a vapour exhaled through the conduits and pores of the body; and therefore so divided into small portions or particles, as that in that very Egression or Expiration, it must be wholly comparated to Dispersion; and what is capable of such dispersion, is capable of totall dissolution.
You might well, Lucretius, have spared your∣self and me the trouble of this impertinent ob∣jection, had you thought my Answer to your Fifth, worthy your memory. For, since you could not then deny, that the soul, as Incorpore∣al, is diffused through the whole body; and therefore may issue out of it intire and unim∣paired, as possessing no place, and in that respect,
as capable of passing through the solid and com∣pacted parts, as through the conduits and pores: why should you now resume that gross concep∣tion, of the Souls expiring from the body, like a vapour, or exhalation? And, as for the Putre∣faction of the Body, after the Soul hath with∣drawn itself from it (though it nothing at all concern the buisiness in hand) I say, the Cause thereof is the defect of that vital Agitation of the Heart, Blood, and spirits, by which the Humours most prone to putrifaction, were partly kept from subsiding and fermenting, and partly so extenuated, as to be discussed and expelled.
A Ninth from hence; that in Lipothymies or swooning fits, the vigour of the Soul is so much abated and brought low, as that it would be to∣tally dissolved and extinguished, in case the Causes of those its Failings or Dejections, were yet more violent, as frequently they are, and then they cause sudden death.
Here you recur to the Symptomes of bodi∣ly Diseases again; but I wish I could as easily re∣move them from the body, as you from defend∣ing the Mortality of the Soul, by any considera∣tions drawn from them, and their most fatal ef∣fects. For, as to Lipothymies, which according to the Etymologie of the word, you call Failings of the Soul; they are in truth only Failings of the Heart, or vital influence; arising from the preclu∣sion or stopping of those passages, ordained for the continual transmission of vital Spirits; which as servants, the Soul makes use of to Life, Sense,
and Motion. And, therefore, reflecting upon what I have already said, it is obvious to con∣ceive, that the whole Soul being diffused through the whole body; all the failing in Swooning fits doth fall, not upon her Self, but upon the Vital Organs, which at that time are rendred unfit for the uses and actions, to which they were framed and accommodated. And, if the Causes of such Failings should chance to be so violent, as to in∣duce suddain death; then the Soul, indeed, would and must wholly depart: yet not by rea∣son of any dissolution of its substance, or exceed∣ing imbecility in it self; but only for want of those Dispositions in the Organs of life, by which she was enabled to enliven the body. And here I could mind you of a certain sort of Lypothy∣mies, that happen in Ecstasies of some Holy men, when the Soul being transported with the su∣perlative beauty and excellency of Divine Ob∣jects, in abstracted contemplations, doth so much neglect her inferior functions, as that the body all that while seems senselesse and livelesse: And yet this an argument rather of the strength of the Soul, than of any Failing or De∣fection in it self. I could also insist upon this, that in sleep there is a kind of Defection of the influ∣ence of the Soul upon her corporeal Organs, es∣pecially those inservient to Sense and Motion▪ and yet the Soul is then most her self, as Cyrus long since observed, in one of Xenophons Orations, in these most elegant words; Dormientium Animi maximè declarant Divinitatem suam; multa enim, eum remissi ac liberi sunt, futura prospiciunt: ex quo intelligitur, quales futuri sint, cum se planè corporis
vinculis relaxaverint. But the Objection, being otherwise refuted, doth require neither.
Experience teacheth, that no man, when dy∣ing, findeth his Soul to depart out of his body whole and at once; but rather to fail by degrees within his breast, just as he doth his Sense, in each proper Organ: Which he would not do, in case his Soul took her flight whole and intire, out of his breast, as a bird out of a Cage; and therefore it is probable that the Soul, being dissolved at the instant of death, is breathed out in dispersed A∣toms together with the Aer expired from the Lungs.
You must needs be streightned for Objections, Lucretius, when you fly to uncertain Experi∣ments, and incompetent conceptions of vulgar heads; and therefore I hope, you cannot much longer hold out against truth. I say, to uncertain experiments; because, since it is impossible that any man, in the extream moment of life, where∣in his Soul ceaseth to be either in his breast, or any other part of his body, should say to the standers by, Now I am sensible of the egresse or flight of my Soul, and I perceive how it departs; because while he is able to speak, or be sensible of any thing, the Soul is still in the body, and at the in∣stant of its departure, the Speech & all Sense fail for ever: The experience you alleage is uncertain and so no experience at all. To incompetent Con∣ceptions of vulgar heads; because the common peo∣ple, not being able to understand the nature of an Incorporeal; and how possessing no place, no bo∣dy
can hinder its passage or trajection; have a certain grosse apprehension, that the Soul must issue out of the breast, the same way that the breath doth out of the lungs. And as for its Dispersion into Atoms; you do ill to suppose it to be Corporeal, when you have been so often beaten from that starting hole. These Imperti∣nences are much below so great a wit, as yours, Lucretius; and I should very much wonder how you could fall upon them, but that I ascribe it to your present humour of Contradiction, which doth many times transport even wise men them∣selves to gross extravagancies.
If the Soul were Immortal, and conscious of its Immortality, as you have affirmed; certainly it would not grieve to leave the body, which is rather its prison, than delightful Mansion; but rather rejoyce to be set at liberty, and exult, as a snake doth to cast her slough, or a stagg his old horns.
To this I prepared a Solution, when I proved the Appetite of Immortality to be Natural to the Soul, however this present life cause in us a love of it self, above that we ought to have of our future state; just as the Appetite or love of Health doth not cease to be Natural, however the blandishments of Sense, and flattering baits of some present pleasure, that impugnes health, may create in us a stronger desire, for the time: and therefore you might have well omitted here to argue the Mortality of the Soul, from its re∣luctancy against death, and unwillingnesse to
leave its old companion, the body. However, without insisting upon this, that many men even in this life, long used to a mean and turbulent state or condition, become so depraved and ab∣ject in their judgement and affection, as to re∣fuse to change it for a better, if they might: To what I have said formerly of the Universal de∣sire of Immortality, I shall annex this one both pertinent and memorable consideration, out of Cicero (in Catone majore) Quid, quod sapientissimus quis{que} aequissimo animo moritur, stultissimus iniquissi∣mo? Nonne nobis videtur Animus is, qui plus cer∣nat, & longiùs, videre se ad meliora proficisci: ille autem, cujus obtusior sit acies, non videre? Equidem efferor studio patres vestros quos colui, & dilexi, vi∣dendi. Neque verò eos solùm convenire aveo, sed illos etiam, de quibus audivi & legi, & ipse conscripsi. Quò quidem me proficisceutem, haud scio quis facile retraxerit, & tanquam Peliam recoxerit. Quod si quis Deus mihi largiatur, ut ex hac aetate repueras∣cam, & in cunis vagiam, valde recusem; nec verò ve∣lim, quasi decurso spatio à calce ad carceres re∣vocari.
Doth not every wise man die with extream content and serenity of mind; and only Fools with disquiet, impatience, and reluctancy? Is not that mind to be accounted the most clear sighted, which seeth things afar off, and discerns that it is to be translated into a better state: and that dim and weak, which doth not look beyond things present, and discern nothing of its future condition? For my part, truly, I am even trans∣ported with vehement longing to behold again the faces of those brave men, your Fathers, whom, in their lives, I so much loved and hono∣red.
And not only them, but some other worthy persons also, whose fame I have heard and read of, and celebrated in my own writings. And, if I were so happy once, as to be on my journey toward those Heroes; I know none, that should easily draw me back again, or retard my speed, by restoring my youth, like Pelias. If any of the Gods should think to do me a favour, in making me young again, now after I have attained to this my declining age: I profess, I would refuse the proffer; nor would I, having run over the stage of life, be brought back again to the post, from which I first set forth.Hereunto I might add also that patheticall Exclamation of that Emperour of wisedom, Marcus Antoninus; Ec∣quando futura es, O Anima, bona simplex, una, nuda, corpore te ambiente dilucidior? Ecquando dispositi∣onem dilectioni et affectui genuino deditam degusta∣bis? Ecquando futura es plena, rei nullius indiga, ni∣hil desiderans ulterius, nihil expetens &c. As if He were angry, and passionately expostulating with his soul, that she staid so long in the indigent and vexatious condition of this life, and had omitted opportunities of translating herself into a better, in which she would be intirely Herself, and injoy those pleasures, that are more genuine and agree∣able to her immortal nature. But, so clear a truth, as this of the Souls desire of an Immortal state, after death, notwithstanding the unwillingness of some abject minds (loaden with earthy and base affections) to submit to the stroke of Death, which alone can transport them into that state: doth need no further testimonies, or illustration.
If the Soul survive the body, and be Cognos∣cent or Knowing, after death; doubtless it must be furnished with senses, that so she may see, hear, &c. in order to her knowledge: but, when once divorced from her Copartner, the body, she neither hath, nor can have Organs for any such uses at all; and therefore she can have no knowledge.
Here again you touch upon that so often re∣jected confusion of Knowledge and Sensation, as if they were one and the same thing; when from sundry passages in my precedent discourses, you might have easily collected, that the sense ascri∣bed to the Soul, is neither Hearing, nor seeing, nor &c. but the very power of Understanding, or Intellection itself: which is indeed called many times [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] Sense, in a general acceptation of the word; because Cognition is a Perception, and because it comprehends, in way of Eminency, all the subordinate senses, or Faculties of sensa∣tion, i. e. by itself it knowes Colours, as the Eye; sounds, as the Eare; and so of the rest. And this is the proper prerogative of superior Faculties, that besides their owne higher and nobler Fun∣ctions, they comprehend likewise all the Functi∣ons of Inferiors, and that in a transcendent and more excellent manner, as I have already ex∣plained. But, as for the particular manner of the Souls Knowledge, after death; I remit you to Sr. Kenelme Digbies sublime Speculations con∣cerning the condition of a separate Soul; in which, though perhaps you may not meet with such satisfaction, as you expect: yet you will
meet with more than I can now give you, with∣out repeating his notions.
Well, Athanasius, you would not have re∣ferred me to another, but that you are almost exhausted and wearied with speaking thus long yourself; and therefore it becomes me in civili∣ty to consider the weakness of your lungs, and slowness of your tongue (of both which I re∣member, you have many years since often com∣plained) and to ease you of this penance my cu∣riosity put upon you, as soon as I have proposed one Objection more, which wiser men than my∣self have thought not a little difficult to be sol∣ved; and that, in short, is this. Considering the vast disparity and (in truth) absolute incom∣possibility betwixt the affections of a Corporeal and Incorporeal Nature; it seems unreasonable to conceive, that they can be conjoyned in one Composition, such as Man is, if (as you affirme) his soul be an Immortal substance, and his Body a Mortal. Pray, therefore, make good the possi∣bility of such a Conjunction: and, if you can, explain what is the common caement or Glew, that unites and holds them together; and then I have done opposing you.
You very well understand Epicurus doctrine of an Eternal and Incorporeal Inanity, or space diffused through the world, and commixed with all Bodies or Concretions, which are yet dissolu∣ble: and doe you pretend after this, that you cannot conceive it reasonable, that an Incorpo∣real should be conjoyned to a Corporeal? But,
suppose you really cannot conceive it reasonable; must it therefore be unreasonable, when so many and so eminent Philosophers have understood, and allowed the reasonableness of this Con∣junction? What think you, in the first place, of Plato, Aristotle, and all their sectators, who una∣nimously held the Anima Mundi, or Universal Soul, and that being diffused through all parts of the Universe, it associateth and mixeth itself with all things, and totam intus agitat molem? And then what think you of those words of the great Hermes, quoted by Lactantius; when dis∣coursing of the Nature of Man, and how he was Created by God, he saith: Ac idem ex utraque na∣tura, immortali putà, ac mortali, unam hominis natu∣ram texebat, ipsum quadamtenus immortalem, qua∣damtenus mortalem faciens; ac eundem accipiens, in medio quasi interstitio, heinc divinae, immortalisque; illeinc mortalis obnoxiaeque mutationi naturae consti∣tuit, ut in omnia intuens, omnia miraretur. And thus Trismegistus; from whence it came, that Man was esteemed as it were the Horizon of the Uni∣verse, in whom Supreme natures are joyned to the most Low, and the Heavenly to the Earthy: and this with admirable correspondency, and as beseems the perfection of the Universe; because, since there are some Natures purely Incorpore∣al and Immortal, and others purely Corporeal and Mortal; that these Extremes might not be without a Mean, nothing seems more congruous, than that there should be a certain sort of third Natures, so mixed and compound of both the o∣thers, as to be Incorporeal and Immortal, on one part, and Corporeal and Mortal, on the other.
Again, whereas you imagine it absurd, that na∣tures so extremely different should concur to constitute one Composition; I beseech you, Lu∣cretius, are not Heat, and Cold, white and black, as different each from other, as Immortal and Mortal? and yet you see, they are often conjoyn∣ed together, so as that a Middle or Third nature doth result from their union, as in particular, warme, from Heat and Cold, and Grey or browne, from white and black. Nay, there seems so much the less repugnancy betwixt Im∣mortal and Mortal, Incorporeal and Corporeal natures; by how much they are the less Diffe∣rent and Incompossible because they are only as it were Disparate among themselves, and capa∣ble of conserving a whole nature: but Heat and Cold, Whiteness and Blackness, are absolute Contraries, and cannot consist together, without reciprocal destruction, or maintain a durable Union. And thus much for the First part of your Demand, viz, the Possibility of a Conjunction be∣twixt an Incorporeal and a Corporeal Nature.
As for the remainder, viz, what is the Common Medium, Cement or Glew, by which two such different natures are married and united into one Compositum; I Answer, that I conceive it to be the Blood, especially the spiritual and most elaborate or refined part thereof: according to that anci∣ent opinion of Critias, Sentire, maximè proprium esse Animae; atqe hoc inesse propter sanguinis naturam; commemorated by Aristotle (though with dis∣sent) in the 2 Ch. of his 1. Book de Anima; and with the testimony of sundry admirable Experiments, both revived and asserted by our perspicacious
Contryman, Dr. Harvey, in his Exercitations con∣cerning the Generation of Animals. For, since the visible observations of the Manner and process of Nature, in the production of the Chicken in and from the Egg, doe assure that the Blood is the part of the body, which is first generated, nourished, and moved; and that the Soul is Exci∣ted and as it were Enkindled first from the blood: doubtless, the blood is that, in which the opera∣tions vegetative and sensitive do first manifest themselves; that, in which the vital Heat, (the primary and immediate instrument of the Soul, especially as to Animation) is innate and con∣genial; that, which is the Common Vinculum, or Caement of the Soul and body; and that, by the mediation whereof, as a vehicle, the Soul doth transmit her conserving and invigorating influ∣ence into all parts of the body. Nay, considering that the Blood, by perpetual Circulation, doth flow (like a river of Living water) round the body, penetrating into and irrigating the sub∣stance of all the parts, and at the same time com∣municating to them both Heat and Life; and that the Heart is framed for no other end, but that by perpetual pulsation (together with the concurrence of the veins and arteries) it may receive this blood, and againe propell it into all the body: I say, these things duely considered, it can be but a Paradox at most, to affirme, that the Soul having its first, and perhaps principal residence in the Blood, may very well be concei∣ved to be, in respect thereof, Tota in toto, and tota in qualibet parte. And, lastly, concerning the Manner of this Conjunction of the Soul and bo∣dy,
by the Mediation of this vital Nectat, the Blood; it is not necessary, with the Vulgar, to imagine, that they should mutually touch, and by hooks take reciprocall hold each of other, in order to Cohaesion and constant Union; for, that is competent only to Corporeals; but that Incorporeals should be conjoyned either one: to another, or to Corporeals, no more is requi∣red but an Intimate Praesence, which is yet a kind of Contact, and so may serve in stead of mutual Apprehension and Continency. So that this speci∣al Manner of Praesence is that and only that, by which an Incorporeal Entity may be united to a Corporeal. And now I have explained those difficulties concerning the Conjunction of the Soul and Body, the one an Incorporeal and Im∣mortal Being, the other Corporeal and Mortal▪ which you seemed to think in-explicable. I ex∣pect you should be as good as your promise, no longer to oppose me, but hereafter concurr with me in opinion, that The Soul is an Immortal sub∣stance: and that its Immortality is not only credible by Faith, or upon Authority Divine; but also Demon∣strable by Reason, or the Light of Nature.
You may remember, Sr: I told you in the be∣ginning, that though I am an Epicurean, in ma∣ny things concerning Bodies; yet, as a Christian, I detest and utterly renounce the doctrine of that Sect, concerning Mens Souls: and that I askt your permission to interrupt you sometimes in your discourses, by intermixing such Doubts, and Objections, as seemed to render the Demon∣stration of the Souls Immortality, by meet▪ Rea∣son,
exceeding difficult, if not altogether impos∣sible; to this end only, that I might the more fully experiment the strength of your Arguments to the Contrary. So that notwithstanding all my Contradiction, you ought to believe me still as strongly perswaded of the truth of what you have asserted, as if I had acted your part, and undertaken the assertion of the same myself: my diffidence being not of the Souls Incorruptibility, but of the possibility of its Demonstration, by you or any man else. And now, though you have brought, I confess, most excellent Argu∣ments to prove it, and both satisfied all my Doubts, and solved all my Objections: yet whe∣ther you have so Demonstrated it, as to exclude all Dubiosity, and compell assent (which is the propriety of perfect Demonstration) in a pure Natural Philosopher, who refuseth to admit any other conviction, but from the Light of Na∣ture; I must leave to the judgement of our Ar∣biter, the noble Isodicastes, who will not, I am well assured, deliver any but an equitable Cen∣sure in the Cause.
And you may remember too, Lucretius, how in the beginning I advertised you of the Unrea∣sonableness of such over-curious Wits, as ex∣pect Mathematicall Demonstrations in Meta∣physicall Subjects, which are really incapable of them; and gave you an undeniable Reason thereof. So that considering my timely preven∣tion of your expectation in that kind; and your owne confession that I have satisfied all your Scruples, and solved all your Objections: I can∣not
but wonder at your obstinacy in your old opinion, that it is not possible to convince a meer Natural man, of the Souls Immortality, by the testimony of pure Reason. Nevertheless, I freely joyn with you, in your Appeal to the verdict of Isodicastes, than whom certainly no man can be more judicious, no man more just.
The matter now at last in dispute betwixt you, seems to be this; whether in a Thesis, or Proposition, which is not capable of being evinced by a Geometrical Demonstration (as this of the Souls Immortality seems not to be) there can yet be expected such sub∣stantiall and satisfactory Reasons, Physical or Moral, or both, as may suffice to the full establishment of it's Truth, in the mind of a reasonable man? And there∣fore (that I may give you my opinion, in a word) I say; that though in things belonging to the eog∣nizance of a pure Philosopher, every one ought to seek for the best assurance, of which the na∣ture of that thing, into which he enquireth, will possibly admit; and that the way of Demon∣stration, More Geometrico, is of all others the most convincing and scientificall: yet, since many things not only in Metaphysicks, but even in Physicks, are of so retired and abstruse a nature, as not to be brought under the strict laws and rules of Geometry, of which notwithstanding we may acquire a competent certitude, by well examining their Effects and constant Operations; as on one side, we ought not to require absolute Demonstrations, where the Condition of the subject doth exclude them; so on the other, we ought not to deny the force of all other testimo∣nies,
that right Reason offereth in evidence of its verity asserted, especially when all that can be said against it, shall be found vain and light, in comparison of what is alleaged in defence of it. This considered, though Athanasius hath not precisely (according to the rigorous acceptation of the word) Demonstrated the Immortality of Mans Soul; yet forasmuch as He hath proved it by good and important Reasons, aswell Physical as Moral, such as are not much inferiour to ab∣solute Demonstrations, and such as by vast ex∣cesses transcend the weight of all your opposite Allegations, Lucretius: truely, I think you ought to rest satisfied, that He hath discharged him∣self of his Undertaking to the Full; especially since it would be a very hard task for you to maintain, that all the beams of the Light of Na∣ture do concentre only in Mathematical Demon∣strations, and that we can know nothing, which is not Demonstrable. And now Gentlemen, if you please, let us be going towards my house, where I am sure we were expected at least an hour agoe, and where I shall have leasure to thank you more solemnely for the infinite con∣tent I have received from your Conversation.
We are ready to attend you, Noblest Isodi∣castes; and shall ever be as ready to acknowledg the singular Honour you have done us, in losing this Evening upon persons so unable to merit your attention, as we have now shewne our∣selves.