The commentaries of C. Julius Cæsar of his warres in Gallia, and the civil warres betwixt him and Pompey / translated into English with many excellent and judicious observations thereupon ; as also The art of our modern training, or, Tactick practise, by Clement Edmonds Esquire, ... ; where unto is adjoyned the eighth commentary of the warres in Gallia, with some short observations upon it ; together with the life of Cæsar, and an account of his medalls ; revised, corrected, and enlarged.

CHAP. XXII.

Asranius seeketh to take the Straights between certain Mountains; but is prevented by Caesar.

THe next day following, Petreius went out secretly with a few horse, to discover the Countrey; and for the samepurpose some went likewise out of Caesar's Camp: L. Decidius Saxa was sent with a small troup to view the site of the Place. And either party returned with the same report: that for* 1.1 five miles the way was open and champain, and afterwards very rough and mountainous; and whosoever first took those straight, might easily impeach the enemy from going further. The matter was disputed in the Councell of war, by Petreius and Afranius; the time of their setting forward was debated.* 1.2 Most of them thought it fit to take their journey in the night; for by that means they might come to those straights before it were perceived. Others were of opinion, that it was not possible to steal out in the night; as appeared by the cry of rising taken up the night before in Caesar's Camp, upon their removing: and Caesar's horsemen did so range abroad in the night, that all places and passages were kept and shut up. Neither were they to give occasion of night fights, but to avoid the same by all the means they could; forasmuch as in civile dissension, the ordinary souldier would rather suffer himself to be over master∣ed by fear, then continue firm in the allegiance which he had sworn unto: whereas, in the day time, every man hath shame and dishonour be∣fore his eyes, together with the presence of the Centurions and Tribunes; with which respects a souldier is restrained, and kept within the bounds of duty. And therefore the attempt was by all means to be undertaken in the day time: and although it ••ell out to some losse, yet neverthelesse the body of the Armie might pass in safety, and possesse that place which they sought for.

This opinion prevailing in their consultation, they determined by break of day the next morn∣ning to set forward. Caesar, having diligently viewed the Countrey, as soon as day began to ap∣pear, drew all his forces out of his Camp, and marched forward in a great circuit,* 1.3 keeping no direct way. For the waies which led to Iberus and Octogesa, were taken up with the Enemies Camp; insomuch as they were to passe over great and difficult vallies. And in many places, broken Rocks and stones did so hinder them, that they were necessarily forced to give their weapons from hand to hand, the souldiers lifting up one another; and so they passed most part of the way. Howsoever,* 1.4 no man thought much of the labour, for that they hoped to give an end to all their travell, if they could keep the enemy from passing over the River I••erus, and cut off his ••••••ualls.

At the first, Afranius souldiers ran joyfully out of their Camp to see the Army, casting out words of derision and reproch, that for want of victuall they fled and returned to Ilerda; for the way they held was quite contrary to that they in∣tended, whereby they seemed to go back again: and the Commanders themselves did much ap∣prove their own counsell, that they had kept their troups within the Camp. For that which con∣firmed them in their opinion was, that they per∣ceived they were come out without their car∣riages: whereby they hoped, necessity would not suffer them to continue long there. But when they saw the troups by little and little to wind to the right hand, and that they perceived, how those that were in front had fallen backward be∣yond their Camp, there was no man so dull, but thought it expedient presently to march out, and make head against them, Whereupon they cried

to Arme; and all their forces, excepting some few cohorts which were left to keep the Camp, went out, and marched directly towards Ibe∣rus.

The whole business consisted in speed and ce∣leritie, which of the two should first take the straights, and possesse the hills, Caesar's Army was hindered by the difficulty of the way: and Afranius partie was retarded by Caesar's Caval∣ry. The matter was come to that upshot, that if Afranius party did first get the hills, they might haply qu•••• themselves of danger; but the bag∣gage of the whole Army, and the cohorts left in the Camp could not be saved: for being inter∣cepted and s••••luded by Caesar's Armie, there was no means to relieve them.

It 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that Caesar first attained the place; and being come out from among those great Rocks into a plain champain, put his Army in order of battell against the enemy.

Afranius seeing the enemy in front, and his rereward hardly charged by Caesar's Ca••alry, got the advantage of a small hill, & there made his stand: and from thence sent four cohorts bearing round bucklers unto a Mountain, which in all mens sight was higher then the rest; com∣manding them to run as fast as they could, and possesse that hill, intending to follow after with all his forces, and altering his course, to get a∣long the ridges and tops of the Mountains to Octogesa.

As the cohorts were advanced forward by an oblique circuit, Caesar's Cavalry perceiving their intendment, set upon them with such vio∣lence, that they were not able any time to bear their charge, but were surrounded by them, and all cut in pieces in the fight of both Armies.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.* 1.5

PEtreius and Afranius, in their Councell of war, resolved by all means to shun night en∣counters, as a thing full of hazard and uncer∣tainty, and apt for looseness and disobedience: for the night, being neither a discoverer of er∣rours, nor yet a distinguisher either of actions or persons, but wrapping up both the vertuous and the faultie in her Mantle of obscuritie, doth not admit of directions, to follow an opportunity, or to help a mistaking; but rather giving way to impunitie and licentious confusion, leaveth no hope of what is wished:* 1.6 Whereas the light is a witness of every mans demeanour, and hath both honour and rebuke to make dutie respected.

For which causes,* 1.7 Curio (as it followeth in the next Commentarie) in his harangue before that untimely expedition against king Juba, thus rejected their advice that would have had him set forward in the night; At etiam ut media nocte proficiscamur addunt: quo majorem cre∣do licentiam habeant qui peccare conantur: nam∣que hujusmodi res aut pudore aut metu tenen∣tur, quibus rebus nox maxim: adversaria est. Further then this, they advise us to set out in the middle of the night: that so (I think) those men who have a mind to do mischief may take the greater liberty: for in the day-time they would be restrain'd either through shame or fear, to both which the darkness of the night is a great adver∣sary.

And that the danger may appear as well by ef∣fect as by discourse, let the Reader take notice of that battell by night, between Antonius Primus on the behalf of Vespasian, and the Vitellian le∣gions, near unto Cremona; whereof Tacitus hath this description;* 1.8 Praelium tota nocte varium, anceps, atrox; his, rursus illis, exitiabile. Nihil animus aut manus, n•• oculi quidem provisu ju∣vabant, &c. The fight was doubtfull and bloudy the whole night, now this party going to the worse, by and by that. A stout heart or a valiant hand availed little, neither could the eyes see be∣fore them either advantage or disadvantage. And thus are all night-works condemned, wherein ei∣ther order or honour are of any moment.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

I Have already noted, in the former Commenta∣ries, the use of exact and particular discoverie of the Countrey, where a partie is ingaged: then which nothing doth more advantage a Com∣mander to expedite the happy issue of a war. For by that means he is not onely able to judge of any motion which the enemy shall offer, and to give sure directions to frustrate and make void the same; but also to dispose himself according as shall seem expedient for his safety. Wherein, if a place of such consequence as is here mentioned shall by designe be aimed at, this historie sheweth how much it importeth either partie to obtain it: and therefore Caesar had reason to make his passage through Vallies and Rocks, rather then to lose victorie, for want of labouring in an un∣easie way.

This Lucius Decidius Saxa, or Didius Saxa, imployed in this discoverie, was afterward advanced by Caesar to be Tribune of the people; whereat Tullie was so much offended.* 1.9 How can I omit (saith he) this Decidius Saxa,* 1.10 a man brought from the furthest end of the world; whom we see Tribune of the people, before we ever saw him a Citizen?

Notes

• * 1.1

  At ol••unt campo g••∣minae 〈…〉〈…〉 rupes, Valle 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.2

  Lucan. lib. 4.
• * 1.3

  It•• sine ullo Ordine, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, rap••umque ••uga con∣v••••••ite. bellum, Et faciem pugnae, vultusquo in••••rte mi••aces.
• * 1.4

  Lucan. lib. ••
• * 1.5

  Nocturna prael••a esse vit••nda, quod per∣territus mi∣les in civili dissensione, timori ma∣gis quam religion•• consulere consu••••••••it; at ••u••em multum per se pudorem, omnium o∣culis 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.6

  Neque in victoria decue, nec in foga fla∣gitium.
• * 1.7

  Tacit. Hist. 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.8

  2. Histor▪
• * 1.9

  Otatio. 1••.
• * 1.10

  Philip.