The commentaries of C. Julius Cæsar of his warres in Gallia, and the civil warres betwixt him and Pompey / translated into English with many excellent and judicious observations thereupon ; as also The art of our modern training, or, Tactick practise, by Clement Edmonds Esquire, ... ; where unto is adjoyned the eighth commentary of the warres in Gallia, with some short observations upon it ; together with the life of Cæsar, and an account of his medalls ; revised, corrected, and enlarged.

CHAP. IX.

Caesar leaveth the siege, and goeth to take the enemy upon advantage; but returneth again without fighting.

WHen the towers began to approach near unto the walls,* 1.1 Caesar under∣stood by the captives, that Vercin∣getorix having consumed all his provision of forrage, had removed his camp nearer to Avaricum, and that he himself was gone with the cavalry, and such ready footmen as were accustomed to fight a∣mong the horsemen, to lye in ambush in that place where he thought our men would come a forraging the next day. Which being known, setting forward about midnight in silence, in the morning he came to the enemies camp. They having speedy advertisement by their scouts of Caesars coming, did hide their carri∣ages in the woods, and imbattelled all their for∣ces in an eminent and open place. Which being told Caesar, he commanded the baggage to be speedily laid together, and their arms to be made ready. There was a hill of a gentle ri∣sing from the bottome to the top, incompassed round about with a difficult and troublesome bog of fifty foot in breadth. Upon this hill, the bridge being broken, the Galles kept themselves, trusting to the strength of the place, and being distributed into companies according to their severall States, they kept all the fords and pas∣sages of the bog with watches, with this resolu∣tion, that if the Romans did passe over the bog, they might easily from the higher ground keep them under, as they stuck in the mire, who little reckoning of so small a distance, would deem the fight to be upon equall terms, whereas they themselves well knowing the inequality of the condition, did make but a vain and idle ostentation. The souldiers disdaining that the enemy could endure their presence so near at hand, and requiring the sign of battel, Cae∣sar acquainted them with what detriment and losse of many valiant men, the victory must at that time be bought, who being so resolute that they refused no danger to purchase him ho∣nour, he might well be condemned of great in∣gratitude and villany, if their lives were not dearer unto him then his own safety: and so comforting the souldiers, he brought them back again the same day into the camp, and gave order for such things as were requisite for the siege of the town.

OBSERVATIONS.

THis Chapter hath divers speciall particulars worthy observation. The first is, the oppor∣tunity

which Caesar took to visite the army of the Galles, when Vercingetorix was absent and gone to lie in ambush for the Roman forra∣gers: which was a caveat to Vercingetorix, not to be too busie with the Roman convoyes, lest his absence might draw on such an incon∣venience, as might make him repent for going a birding.

The second is, the inequality which the advan∣tage of the place giveth to a party: which I have already so often spoken of, as I am almost wea∣ry to repeat it; and the rather, for that I have produced this passage in the former book, to sig∣nifie the benefit of such an advantage. Yet for∣asmuch as it is so pregnant to that effect, as may well deserve a double consideration, and was also produced by Caesar himself upon occasion at Gergovia, give me leave to note how much it swayeth to counterpoise the want of the adverse party. Wherein as it cannot be denied, but that it may give such help as may make a small num∣ber equall a farre greater proportion of men; so in Caesars judgement it countervaileth the ab∣sence of the Generall,* 1.2 and maketh the body per∣fect without the head. Neither were they weak∣ned onely with the absence of their Generall; but their cavalry wherein they so much trusted was absent likewise; and yet more then that too, by how much the Roman legions excelled the Galles in valour and prowess of arms: which being all put together is no small advantage. For doubtless if the matter had stood upon equal tearms touching the place, neither the pre∣sence of Vercingetorix, nor the addition of their cavalry to assist them, had hindered the bat∣tell, or turned the Romans back to their camp.

The third thing is, the moderation which he shewed, forbearing to fight, the Galles inso∣lently vaunting, and the Roman souldiers fret∣ting and disdaining the enemies pride: whereby he settled such a confidence of his directions in the minds of his men, by shunning the perill of apparent danger which might fall upon them in particular, as afterwards they would make no question of his commands, but take them as the onely means of their safetie, being never better assured then in performing what he command∣ed. The practice of later times hath not so well deserved of that vertue, but hath often shewed it self more prodigall of bloud, as though men were made onely to fill up ditches, and to be the wofull executioners of other mens rashness.

The last thing is, the making ready of their weapons, arma expediri iussit. Concerning which point, we must understand that the Ro∣mans alwayes carried their targets in cases, and did hang their helmets at their backs, and fit∣ted their piles as might be most convenient with the rest of their carriages. And therefore when∣soever they were to give battel, they were first to put on their helmets, to uncase their targets, to fit their piles, and to make them ready for the charge: and this was called Arma ex∣pedire.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Caesar.
• * 1.2

  The advan∣tage of the place doth countervail the absence of the Ge∣nerall.