OBSERVATIONS.
CAesar upon his first entrance into Gallia,* 1.1 was perplexed how to get to his army: and the matter stood in such terms, as brought ei∣ther the legions or his own person into hazard. For (as he saith) if he should send for the le∣gions to come unto him, they should doubt∣lesse be fought withall by the way, which he was loath to adventure, unlesse himself had been present: or otherwise if he himself had gone unto them, he doubted of the entertain∣ment of the revolting Galles, and might have o∣verthrown his army, by the losse of his own per∣son. In this extremity of choice, he resolved upon his own passage to the army, as lesse dangerous and more honourable, rather then to call the legions out of their wintering camps, where they stood as a check to bridle the inso∣lency of the mutinous Galles, and so to bring them to the hazard of battel in fetching their Generall into the field: whereby he might have lost the victory before he had begun the wars. And for his better safety in this passage, he u∣sed this cunning. Having assured the Roman Province by strong and frequent garrisons on the frontiers, and removed Lucterius from those parts; gathering together such supplies as he had brought with him out of Italy, with other forces which he found in the Province, he went speedily into the territories of the* 1.2 Arverni, making a way over the hill* 1.3 Gebenna, at such a time of the year as made it unpassable for any forces, had they not been led by Caesar; only for this purpose, to have it noised abroad, that whereas Vercingetorix and the Arverni had principally undertook the quarrell against the Romans, and made the beginning of a new war, Caesar would first deal with them, and lay the weight thereof upon their shoulders, by calling their fortunes first in question, to the end he might possesse the world with an opinion of his presence in that country, and draw Vercinge∣torix back again to defend his state, whilst he in the mean time did slip to his army without suspition or fear of perill: for staying there no longer then might serve to give a sufficient co∣lour to that pretence, and leaving those forces to execute the rest, and to make good the secret of the project, he conveyed himself to his army with such speed and celerity,* 1.4 as doth verify the saying of Suetonius; quod persaepe nuncios de se praevenit, that he often outwent the ordinary messengers.
These blinds and false intendments are of speciall use in matter of war, and serve as well to get advantages upon an enemy, as to clear a difficulty by cleanly evasion: neither is a Com∣mander the lesse valued for fine conveyance in military projects, but deserveth rather greater